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Goal Setting Approach for Blast Resistant

Design
ARTICLE JANUARY 2012

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1 AUTHOR:
Sirous Yasseri
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Goal Setting Approach for Blast Resistant Design

Sirous Yasseri, Safe-Sight Technology

ABSTRACT
This article describes a goal setting approach (or performance based design method) to help safety
professionals specify blast resistant design requirements for processing facilities. A two-level approach is
defined; a lower tier design requirement to minimize business interruption from low and moderate blast
events, and a higher or second tier design requirement to minimise fatalities and injuries from more intense,
and much less frequent, larger blasts. This papers defines blast resistant deign goals (or performance
requirements) for each tier and suggest suitable acceptance criteria. Acceptance criteria are metrics to help
in deciding whether goals are achieved.
The intention of this article is to provide a model document for a Blast Safety Philosophy for oil & gas
and petrochemical facilities.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The owner of an installation must consider the effects of low to moderate blast loads as well as severe
blasts; low to moderate blast loads should not cause excessive business interruption while design against
larger blasts should aim to minimise fatalities and injury. In its simple form it is easy to comprehend that
the likelihood of a large blast is low compared to that of a low/moderate blast. In the socio-economic
context it makes sense that for a large blast, the main design structure should remain intact to help preserve
life, whereas for low/moderate blasts the design should aim to minimise damage and business interruption.
Similar dual goals have been widely adopted by the engineering community for the seismic loading and
more recently for blast (for example see Walker 13 and 14). This philosophy involves making a
fundamental trade-off between providing very costly high structural resistance for large blast loads events,
and the risk of damage to systems with lower resistance, while still avoiding collapse. Such decisions
require in-depth assessments of the performance of various components and the important economic
implications of providing or not providing higher resistance. It is not only life safety that concerns the
owner of a hydrocarbon facility, but also the economical implication of prolonged periods of downtime.
Such concerns lead to a two level blast resistant design, known as SLB (Strength Level Blast) and DLB
(Ductility Level Blast)-See References 13 and 14 for the background. This paper considers this in the
context of performance based or goal setting approach. The designation of SLB (first tier) and DLB
(second tier) are also referred to as the functionality level blast and the collapse prevention or life safety,
respectively. This paper uses goal setting approach and performance based design interchangeably.
Furthermore each performance level may be looked as a limit state of damage, which for a given load
intensity shall not be exceeded.
Performance-Based Earthquake Engineering (PBEE) answers the question of what must be saved at what
cost and for what load frequency; hence it requires analytical techniques to provide a design with
predictable behaviour. It seeks to improve decision-making through assessment and design methods that
are more transparent, scientific, and informative to stakeholders. A key feature of PBEE is the definition of
performance metrics that are relevant to decision making for blast risk mitigation. Generally speaking,
these metrics reflect direct losses (repair and restoration), loss of functionality (or downtime), and risk of
casualties.

2.

The need for Multilevel Blast Criteria

Design for one level inevitably means designing for the life safety only; namely, the DLB event. Most
processing equipment and piping as well as some of the structural components are not required for the life

safety objectives and may also not be able to withstand low intensity blast events. The design for the life
safety objectives does not necessarily imply that the facility will be operational after low blast event. This
problem can be resolved using a two level design approach. Experience has shown that the functionality
level blast, would generally govern the design; thus one should be realistic in choice of the probability of its
occurrence and associated blast overpressure (Figure 3 gives the author suggestion).
PBBD is a desirable concept whose implementation has a long way to go. However, a two level blast
resistant design, as advanced by HSE reports (13 and 14), is undoubtedly gaining acceptance by both safety
professionals and owners. The Regulators concern is taken care of by the higher tier (in HSE terminology
DLB) blast resistant objective, and the Owners commercial concern is addressed by the lower tier (SLB)
blast overpressure. This approach accepts the concept of economically improving the design safety but
requires a target to aim at. The objective of PBBD is to build safer and more economical facilities by
concentrating design attention where it is needed most.

The society requires the owner of an installation to prevent injury, fatality and damage to
the environment. This requirement which is enforced by the regulator applies to people
working on the facility as well as the communities around it. In addition, the owner has
its own expectation of return on his investment which requires minimal interruption of
the operation. This tied with the economic benefit of the installation to the local economy.
The selection of performance objectives (goals) sets the acceptance criteria for the design. The performance
objectives represent performance levels, or damage levels which must not be exceeded as a result of the
design blast load. The performance levels are keyed to limiting values of measurable structural response
parameters, such as plastic strain, deformation and ductility demand. When the performance objectives are
selected, the associated limiting values become the acceptance criteria to be checked in later stages of the
design. Limiting values of the response parameters that correlate with the defined performance levels must
be established by consensus of all stakeholders. As an example, Figure 1 gives Vision 2000 performance
levels and damage states for the seismic event (adopted from Ref 12).

Moderate

Negligible

Limited
Damage

Damage is moderate; selected components

are protected from damage to prevent
escalation. Structure is damaged but remains
stable

Collapse
Prevention

Partial collapse, but the global collapse is

not imminent. TR and means of escape are
available. Life safety is generally protected

Light

Mostly
Functional

Operation can resume after inspection.

Structure is safe for occupancy. Essential
systems are protected. Light damage
requiring repair

Severe

No damage, continuous operation.

Fully
Operational Negligible damage may require repair

Figure 1: Vision 2000 performance levels and damage states.

Performance levels are defined in terms of damage to the structure and in terms of consequences to the
occupants and functions of the facility. Four performance levels are identified and are described in detail in
the Vision 2000 Report (Reference 12).
PBBD by itself will not accomplish improved or more predictable structural performance. Design provides
only a set of drawings and instruction to fabricators. The quality of an engineered facility depends on the
clarity of the concept, documentation and communication of ideas and willingness of the fabricator to
implement instructions.
The conceptual framework for Performance Based Blast Design (PBBD) encompasses the full range of
explosion engineering issues addressing the design of structures for predictable and controlled blast
performance within established levels of risks. The first step is the selection of design objectives. The
design objectives are selected and expressed in terms of expected level of damage resulting from expected
level of blast overpressure. The design objectives are a coupling of desired performance levels with the
levels of blast overpressure. A performance level represents a distinct band in the spectrum of damage to
the structural and non-structural components and equipment/piping, and also considers the consequence of
damage to workers and function of the facility. In this article four distinct levels are indentified, and two of
them are recommended to be used for the goal setting approach.

3.

Overview of PBBD Assessment Process

Definition of performance levels of Figure 1, is shown pictorially in Figure 2. The aim of the design is not
to exceed predefined damage level for load associated each for that performance level is the design goal.

Figure 2: Division of whole spectrum of damage into four performance level

Performance levels are defined in terms of damage to the structure and in terms of consequences to the
occupants and functions of the facility. Four performance levels are identified and are described in detail
here. These performance levels are as follows:

Fully Operational Facility continues in operation with negligible damage.

Functional Facility continues in operation with minor damage and minor disruption in
non-essential services.

Damage Limitation Life Safety is substantially protected, damage is moderate to

extensive.

Near Collapse Life safety is at risk, damage is severe, structural collapse is prevented.

One way to characterize Performance Based Design (PBD) is through the idealized load deformation curve
as shown in Fig. 3. Figure 3 pictorially shows the blast intensity (vertical axis) against deformation or
damage (horizontal axis). Here the damage is used as a performance metric, quantities such as cost of
repair/replacement or downtime would serve equally this purpose, however, these are situation dependant
and difficult to quantify. This curve relates blast intensity to the resulting performance metrics. The goal of
PBD is to expand this interpretation to more direct performance metrics. The performance-oriented
descriptions of structural response indices such as totally operational (TO), Mostly Functional (MF),
Damage Control (DC) and Collapse Prevention for life safety (CP) are also noted on Figure 2.

Collapse

DC

MF
25%
0.0001
2

50%

100%

0.01

0.01

26

52

0.1

CP

Designation
Replacement Cost
Causality Rate
Downtime Weeks

Figure 3: Idealised load intensity against damage; also showing other metrics for loss (example).

Figure 4 shows the proposed probability of occurrence for each performance level. These performance
levels ranges for totally operational (i.e. immediate resumption of operation) to collapse prevention, in
which case the structure wont collapse but there would only be little margin against collapse (the safety
factor is no less than 1.15).
Achieving a design which remains totally operational for high blast levels is very costly and given the
extremely low frequency of these events it is not necessary. Hence, accepting some damage but, keeping
the system functional is a more realistic goal - this is the first tier of performance requirement which is
suggested in this article (this is in line with HSEs definition of SLB-See References 13 and 14). The
second tier performance requirement is suggested to be the collapse prevention (in line with HSEs DLB).
It would appear that the gap between Mostly Functional and Collapse Prevention performance levels
might be too large, and hence Damage Control performance level is introduced. Though this article
advocates a two tier system, the choice of using more performance levels is purely economical as it adds to
the cost of design, but provides a better definition of the structural behaviour under various blasts load
intensity.

Blast
Intensity
Measure

Joes
Beer!
Food!

Beer!
Food!

Very rare events

(Frequency <10-4)
Rare events
(Frequency <10-3)
Occasional events
(Frequency<10-2)
Functional

Structurally
Stable (Life
Repairable Safety)

Extremely
rare events
(Frequency
<10-5)

Frequent events
(Frequency <10-1)

Damage Measure (Deformations)

Figure4: Performance levels and their associated loads. (After R. Hamburger & J. Moehle)
Design Performance Objectives typically include multiple goals for the performance of the engineered
facility. For example, the system is fully operational in the 10 year event; the system enables business
continuity in the 1,000 year event, life safety for the 10000-year and the system will not collapse in 100,000
year event. Figure 4 shows the authors suggested frequencies for blasts associated to each performance
level. The performance levels are keyed to values of measurable structural response parameters, known as
acceptance criteria, such as deformation and plastic strain. When the performance levels are selected, the
associated limiting values, such as the maximum expected damage, become the acceptability criteria.

4.

Setting the Goals

The author suggests that petrochemical facilities should be constructed, based on their sizes, locations and
intended uses, to meet the performance objectives indicated in Figure 5. In this figure, each combination of
a blast frequency and performance level, shown by a red dot, represents a specific design performance
objective. The intent is that the installation will impose a lower risk to life as a result of the performance
requirements set for any blast that is likely to affect it, that the owner is not burdened with extensive repairs
or loss of revenue for the more frequent lower energy blasts, that facilities required for emergency response
and essential function have a higher survival probability, and that facilities housing systems and materials
that could pose an escalation risk to personnel, on-site or off-site, have a low risk of damage resulting in
their release.
The current practice defines only one level of blast loading, which is for the life safety only. This is
appealing to those responsible for developing, adopting and enforcing the life safety, as it aligns well with
the basic role of regulator in charge of public safety. In fact design for normal loads follows a two
performance level approach: a serviceability limit state targeting the functionality of the system, and a
failure or collapse limit state which targets life safety.
It is not necessary to adopt four independent levels of performance as shown in Figure 4 to attain the
enhanced performance desired for blast design. Using two levels (similar to LRFD serviceability and
collapse levels) is sufficient for this purpose. For the more important structures, the design margin against
the collapse limit state for maximum expected loads should be greater than for less important structures.
Similarly, for the more important structures, the load level at which serviceability performance must be
assured should also be increased, such that the probability that the serviceability level is exceeded is
reduced.

Topside performance levels

Functional
Totally
( resumption of
Operational operation after

Frequent
10-2

Near
Collapse/ Life
safety

Not Acceptable

Broadly Tolerable
10-5

Remote

Blast Loading Level

inspection)

Damage
Control

Figure 5: Performance levels, relating level of damage to the probability of blast occurrence.

Tables 1 through 4 further define these performance levels in terms of damage to the various components
of the installation.

Table 1 General Damage Description by Performance Levels and Systems

Description
of
What to expect

Repair

Effect
Operation

on

Performance Level
Fully Operational

Functional

Damage Control

Collapse
Prevention

Not required

At
owners
convenience

Downtime
repair

Probably
practical

Not much

Continuous
operation
possible

Short
term
to
indefinite loss of
use

Potential
permanent loss of
use

is

for

not

Permissible
permanent
deformation(for
primary girders)

<L/100

<L/75

<L/50

>L/25

Permissible
permanent
deformation(for
primary columns)

<L/200

<L/150

<L/100

>L/50

Permissible
plastic strain (for
primary
members)

<0.2%

<1%

<7.5%

<12.5%

Means
Evacuation

Not impaired

Remain available

Remain available

Remain available

Escape Routs

Not impaired

No
major
distortion
or
obstruction

Moderate damage
but can be used.

Major distortion
but can be used by
able bodied people

TR

Not impaired

Not impaired

Not impaired

Functional

Safety
Critical
Elements

Not impaired

Not impaired

Functional

Functional

Primary
Structure

Not impaired

Slight
damage,
but no need for
repair

Functional

Near partial or
global collapse

of

Table 1continued: General Damage Description by Performance Levels and Systems (part II)
Description
of
What to expect

Performance Level
Fully Operational

Functional

Damage Control

Collapse
Prevention

(Reference 12)
Secondary system
supporting heavy
equipment

Not impaired

Secondary
Systems

Not impaired

Slight damage, but

no need for repair

Moderate
deformation
exceeding
equipment
tolerance

Moderate
damage

Near collapse

Total loss

(<12.5%
strain)

Plastic
>12.5%

local

(200mm
permanent
deformation)
Not impaired

Tertiary steel

Moderate
damage

local

(200mm
permanent
deformation
Some light damage
of non-hazardous
content only

Hazardous
materials
contained

Not impaired

Equipment
containing more
than
35t
hydrocarbon

Negligible damage

Equipment
containing
between 5 to 35 t
inventory

Some light damage

of non-hazardous
content only

Hazardous
materials
contained

Equipment
containing
less
than
5t
hydrocarbon

Not impaired

Non-structural
elements

Not impaired

Content

Mechanical
Electrical
equipment

&

Near collapse
not

plastic

Plastic
<12.5%

Near collapse

Total loss

(12.5%
strain)

Plastic
>12.5%

plastic

strain

strain

strain

Hazardous
material cannot be
totally contained

Partial or total loss

of
smaller
inventories

Moderate damage
to holding down
system

Displaced
distorted

Overturned
reusable

Minor damage

Hazardous
material
contained

are

or

not

are

Hazardous
material cannot be
totally contained

Hazardous
material cannot be
totally contained

Partial or total loss

of
smaller
inventories

Moderate damage
to supports.

Displaced
distorted

or

Overturned
not
reusable causing
some hazard

Minor damage

Severely distorted
and probably not
reusable

Write off but not a

hazard

are

Table 2 Performance Levels and Permissible Damage Structural elements

Systems

Performance Level
Fully Operational

Functional

Damage Control

Collapse
Prevention

Primary System

Negligible

Minor
local
yielding at a few
places
,
no
observable
fracture;
minor
buckling
of
observable
permanent
local
distortion

Hinges form; local

buckling of some
elements, isolated
connection failure;
a few elements
may rupture.

Extensive
distortion of beams
and column; many
fractured
connections

Secondary
system
supporting
heavy equipment

Negligible

Minor
local
yielding at a few
places
,
no
observable
fracture;
minor
buckling
of
observable
permanent
local
distortion

Hinges form; local

buckling of some
element s, isolated
connection failure;
a few elements
may rupture.

Extensive
distortion of beams
and column; many
fractured
connections

Secondary
Systems

Negligible

some
local
yielding, a few
elements
may
rapture observable
fracture;
observable
permanent
local
distortion

Extensive damage
in the locality of
incident.

Total
loss
of
beams
in
the
explosion area

Tertiary steel

Negligible damage

Minor damage

Major distortion
but hanging in
place

Extensive
distortion but no
hazard

10

Table 3 Performance Levels and Permissible Damage non-structural components.

refers to the immediate accident area)
Elements of the
Systems

(This table

Performance Level
Fully Operational

Functional

Damage Control

Collapse
Prevention

Cladding

Light damage

Connections
yields;
cladding
bending

Severe distortion
and rupturing

Severe
damage;
some falling

Glazing

Isolated cracking

Some
falling
avoided

(suitable
blast)

for

broken;
hazard

Extensive broken
glass; some missile
hazard

Generally
shattered
glass;
missile hazard

Partitions

Negligible damage

Crushing
cracking
connections

and
at

Sever distributed
damage

Part
ions
are
dislodged and drop
but no flying

Suspended
Ceiling

Generally
negligible damage

Minor
damage;
suspended ceilings
are disrupted

Extensive damage;
dropped panels

Most
suspended
ceilings dropped

Light fixture

Negligible damage

Minor
damage;
some
pendant
lights broken

Many broken light

fixtures

Extensive damage;
falling hazard

Doors

Negligible damage

Minor damage

Racked
and
jammed doors

Extensive racked
and jammed door;
some
dislodged
doors

Un-secured items

Shaken
distributed

fallen

Possible falling or
flying hazard

Falling or flying
hazard

(e.g.
fire
extinguishers)

11

and

Table 4 Performance Levels and Permissible Damage Equipment, vessels, piping and electrical
systems. (This table refers to the immediate accident area)
Elements
of
the Systems

Performance Levels
Fully Operational

Functional

Damage Control

Collapse
Prevention

Many units nonoperational

and
requiring
replacement

Most (those low

inventory)
damaged

Mechanical
equipment &
vessels

Negligible damage;
all remains in service

Piping

Negligible damage

Minor
damage;
minor leaking may
occur

Piping
contains
non-hazardous
material ruptures;
hazardous material
piping
damaged
but no loss of
containment

Many pipes leaks;

support fail; nonhazardous
pipes
collapse

Fire
Alarms
Systems (in the
immediate
area)

Functional

Functional

Not functional

Not functional

Fire Fighting
equipment
(deluge
systems)

Functional

Functional

Minor Damaged
but functional

Moderate damage,
but functional

Emergency
lighting
systems

Functional

Functional

Not functional in
the immediate area

Not functional in
the immediate area

Electrical
systems (in the
immediate
area)

Negligible damage

Minor
damage;
isolated loss of
secondary systems

Moderate damage;
some
loss
of
function
and
service in primary
system

Extensive damage
and loss of service

Ducts

Negligible damage

Minor damage, but

system remain in
service

Minor
damage;
some units not
essential
to
function
out-ofservice

The explosion hazard for a given installation is represented as a set of overpressures with
specified probabilities of occurrence. Four levels of probabilistic events are proposed as follows:

12

Table 5 Event probability and their exceedance during a service life of 50 year.
Event
Frequent
Occasional
Rare
Very Rare

Recurrence Interval
10
100
1000
10000
100000

Extremely Rare
5.

Probability of Exceedence
99.5% in 50 Years
39.5% In 50 years
5% in 50 years
0.5% in 50 years
0.05% in 50 years

Setting the Goals for Blast Safety

It is suggested to use the second and the fourth tier (Figure 4) for blast resistant design.
Two tier of choice are named occasional and very rare events in Figure 6 and Table 5.
The topside must be divided into areas and the explosion exceedance curve should be
determined for each area. The explosion overpressure for each area associated with
probabilities noted in Table 5 is then determined, and what must be achieved is given in
Tables 1 to 4 as well as acceptance criteria to assess whether the goals also given in these
tables are achieved.

Joes

Joes
Beer!
Food!

Beer!
Food!

Beer!
Food!

Collapse
Maximum Considered Blast
e
r
u
s
s
e
r
p
r
e
v
O
t
s
a
l
B

Life

Exteremly
Rare Events

Damage Control
Very Rare
Events

Design SLB Level

Frequent
Events

Occasional
Events

Rare Events

Collapse
Life safety Prevention

Installation Performance Level

Figure 6 Performance Levels (After Moehle)

13

Safety

Prevention

6.

Conclusions

A model process for the performance based blast design is presented in this paper. The intention was to
provide a model for producing a Blast Safety Philosophy for the design of installations which require
consideration of blast. For this purpose, the entire system is divided into a number of groups depending on
how their design can be handled. Acceptance criteria for each group and for all four performance levels are
noted, and it is up to the owner and the safety professional involved in the project to choose two or more
performance levels. The authors suggestion is that two levels are adequate for producing a safe and
economical design.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to acknowledge Mr Guillaume Vannier and Mr. Chris Millyard for their many helpful
comments. The views of the author do not purport to reflect the position of his employer or the reviewers.

References
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14

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15