GM 08 030 02

HAZOP Process
A printed or saved copy is an UNCONTROLLED copy.

Check that it is the latest available version before use.
Title:
HAZOP PROCESS
Number:
GM-08-030-02
Version Number:
17.0
Date Revised:
13 January 2015
Owner:
Bob Gregorovich
Authoriser:
Leigh Meyers
Reasons for Creating or

Amending Document:
New Owner
New Authoriser
Full Review of Document
Actual Change Details:
Changes to Owner and Authoriser. Inclusion of necessity to

consider risk reduction to SFARP now included
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Document last modified: 13 January 2015.
WesCEF disclaims any liability or responsibility for the use of this document
other than as authorised by WesCEF.
Page 1 of 62
HAZOP Process
TABLE OF CONTENTS
FIGURE 1 - HAZOP PROCESS FLOW CHART............................................................................................. 3
1.
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 4
2.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
HAZOP PREPARATION ........................................................................................................ 5

SCOPE................................................................................................................................... 5
HAZOP LEADER ................................................................................................................. 5
SELECTION OF HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS ...................................................... 6
OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES .............................................................................................. 8
INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY ......................................................... 8
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
HAZOP TERMINOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 9

SYSTEM ............................................................................................................................... 9
DESIGN INTENT ................................................................................................................. 9
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS ..................................................................................................... 9
HAZOP STUDY RECORD .................................................................................................. 9
3.
4.
HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE ...................................................................................... 13
5.
5.1
5.2
HAZOP RECORD MANAGEMENT ................................................................................... 14

HAZOP STUDY GUIDE .................................................................................................... 14
HAZOP FOLLOW UP ACTIONS ...................................................................................... 14
6.1
HAZOP CLOSURE ................................................................................................................ 15

CLOSE-OUT ....................................................................................................................... 15
6.
7.
DOCUMENTATION .............................................................................................................. 15
8.
RECORD KEEPING TABLE................................................................................................ 16
APPENDIX 1 - RISK ASSESSMENT TABLES ............................................................................. 17

APPENDIX 2 - HAZARD STUDY CARDS ..................................................................................... 18
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 2 of 62
HAZOP Process
Figure 1 - HAZOP Process Flow Chart
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 3 of 62
HAZOP Process
1.
INTRODUCTION
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a

planned or existing process or operation in order to identify and evaluate problems that may
represent a risk to personnel or equipment, or prevent efficient operation. A HAZOP is a
qualitative technique based on "guide words" and is carried out by a multi-disciplinary team (the
HAZOP Team) during one or more meetings.
This Guide Manual defines the principles for conducting a HAZOP study, the tools that will be
used and the documentation that will be produced. It provides guidance on the information that
is required to prepare for and run a HAZOP study.
This Guide Manual does not define when a HAZOP study should be carried out. In the case of
modifications, this is defined in Engineering Modification (GM-05-050-01). A HAZOP study is
a mandatory requirement for any new plant and for modifications to "critical" plant items as
defined in the Modification Procedure.
A HAZOP is a design verification process. It should not be used as a design development
process. The HAZOP should be performed at the stage in the design process when all
preliminary engineering is complete and the basic design has been fixed. This includes complete
process design, process flow diagrams, P&IDs, plant and equipment layout, operating
philosophy, control and instrumentation philosophy, utilities requirements, specification and
selection of major equipment items, protection systems, start up and shutdown systems.
A HAZOP may be conducted on an existing facility to identify modifications that should be
implemented to reduce risk and operability problems.
The HAZOP process is most suited to analysis of piping systems and can extend to solid
materials handling systems. For solid material handling projects that do not involve any piping
systems, a design review as detailed in Engineering Project Design Review (EP-08-030-19)
should be carried out instead of a HAZOP.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 4 of 62
HAZOP Process
2.
HAZOP PREPARATION
2.1
SCOPE
HAZOPs maybe undertaken for a variety of reasons including, but not limited to:
In response to a proposed plant modification as defined in Engineering Modification
(GM-05-050-01).
As part of the development of a risk assessment to be used to support a Safety Report as
discussed in Hazard Identification Major Hazards (WCEF-PD-CMP-000-12).
A clear understanding of why the HAZOP is being undertaken important as it can influence the
way the HAZOP is to be managed. For example, for the Major Hazard Facilities, HAZOPs can
form part of an integrated strategy of identification of hazards and risks. Other studies such as
Quantitative Risk Assessments and Layer of Protection Analysis may also be used to support
the MHF process. The HAZOP study can significantly improve the ability to integrate these
types of studies into a more cohesive risk assessment process.
2.2
HAZOP LEADER
The Responsible Officer will first appoint an independent HAZOP Leader to act as the
Chairperson for the HAZOP meetings. The HAZOP Leader must be trained in HAZOP
methodology and have successfully completed a suitably recognised HAZOP Leader Course, or
equivalent experience, as approved by the Manager - Project Engineering. The HAZOP Leader
should be independent, i.e. with no responsibility for the process or operations in the area where
the process being reviewed is located.
Current approved CSBP HAZOP Leaders are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
Ambrose Hargan
Barry Wagg
Colin McKenzie
Daniel Massie
Eli Knudsen
Kim Eng
Peter Hein
Phillip Brown
Yvonne Darlow
Deepak Gupta
Justin Manganaro
Vinod Verma
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 5 of 62
HAZOP Process
Note:
2.3
If there is no CSBP HAZOP Leader available from within CSBP, an external

Chairperson who is a qualified HAZOP Leader with experience in chemical
industries may be engaged.
SELECTION OF HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS
HAZOP studies will be conducted using a team approach, with a minimum of four members.
The Responsible Officer together with the HAZOP Leader will select the HAZOP team
members to achieve the spread of knowledge and skills required for the particular project, and
may include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Representative of the customer

A person with Process knowledge
A person with Safety knowledge
A person with Environmental knowledge
A person with operating and/or maintenance experience in comparable
environment
A person with Engineering/Design knowledge
Secretary
How this knowledge and experience is represented in the team depends on the size and nature of
the change being reviewed by the HAZOP. As a guide in team member selection for projects of
different sizes, refer to the table below. However, the final selection will be at the discretion of
the HAZOP Leader and/or the responsible officer having regard for potential risk.
It is expected (but not essential) that the people selected as members of the HAZOP team will
already have completed a suitably recognised HAZOP Team Member training course, or
equivalent experience, and have a good understanding of the HAZOP process.
Note: The HAZOP shall be led by a person considered to be independent to the day to day
responsibilities of the process plant, who nonetheless has sound process knowledge of the plant
being HAZOPed. For example:
(i) A process engineer responsible for a different but similar plant on site; or
(ii) A process engineer/ technical officer/ superintendent/ manager who previously had
process engineering/ process chemistry/ technical operational responsibilities for the
plant concerned but works elsewhere in the business, are considered suitable
independent persons to lead a HAZOP.
At least one process knowledge representative in the HAZOP team must be of sufficient
experience having sound knowledge and understanding of the process fundamentals as well as
possess high abstract reasoning capabilities. This HAZOP team member is usually the most
experienced resident process engineer responsible for the plant.
When requested by the HAZOP leader, the HAZOP leader can be supported by the process
knowledge representative in the team.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 6 of 62
HAZOP Process
TEAM MEMBERSHIP
SMALL PROJECT
for example
Minor Alteration
Independent Chairperson
MEDIUM PROJECT
for example
Replacing Sections of Plant
Independent Chairperson
LARGE PROJECT
for example
New Plant or Replacing
more than 50% of a Plant
External Chairperson
Process Designers
Design Engineer
Project Engineer/Plant
Engineer (i.e., Responsible
Officer)
Project Engineer/Plant
Engineer (i.e. Responsible
Officer)
Responsible Officer/Senior
Project Engineer
Plant Process Engineer or

Manufacture Team Leader
Plant Process Engineer or

Manufacture Team Leader
Plant Process Engineer
Manufacture Team
representative
Manufacture Team
representative/Maintenance
Team representative
Manufacture Team
representative/Maintenance
Team representative
Process Safety, OHS &

Environmental1

Environmental

Environmental
Others as required:
Others as required:
Others as required:
Electrical/Instrument
representative
representative
representative
OSH Advisor and

Environmental Advisor
Improvement Facilitator
Maintenance Team
representative
Equipment vendor
representative
Other specialist knowledge.
Other specialist knowledge
It is noted that even small project may significantly impact on existing Safety Reports, DG &
Environmental licences. It is therefore important that the respective advisors for the BU are made aware
of the projects being implemented
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 7 of 62
HAZOP Process
2.4
OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES
The Responsible Officer is responsible for the following HAZOP study arrangements:
a.
Organising meeting dates, venue and notices to the attendees
b.
Layout of venue and supply of stationery and other resources for the meeting
c.
Provision of information required for the HAZOP study (refer to Section 2.5)
d.
Close out meeting date, venue and notice to the attendees.
2.5
INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY
The following information should be assembled by the Responsible Officer and the HAZOP
Leader before the HAZOP study team commences work.
a.
ESSENTIAL ITEMS
1.
2.
3.
4.
b.
Functionally complete P & ID for the process

System design philosophy and process description
Licences to operate that maybe impacted
Any existing risk assessments for the area under review
DESIRABLE ITEMS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Plot plans or layouts

Process flow diagrams
Piping class specifications
Equipment data sheets and purchase specifications
Vessel inventories
Relief valve specifications
Start up and emergency shut-down procedures
Emergency depressurising system functions
Electrical area classification
Standards used
Procedures - operating and maintenance as applicable
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 8 of 62
HAZOP Process
3.
HAZOP TERMINOLOGY
3.1
SYSTEM
A System is a specific location or logical part of the process or operation in which possible
deviations from the design intent are to be evaluated. Examples might be a heat exchanger,
vessel, pump, compressor and interconnecting pipeline or group of lines. Systems should be
progressively identified on the P&ID as the HAZOP study proceeds.
3.2
DESIGN INTENT
The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the system being
studied. This is qualitatively described as an activity e.g. feed, reaction, transfer, heating, and
quantitatively in process parameters such as pressure, temperature, and flow rate.
3.3
HAZOP GUIDE WORDS
All HAZOP studies will be conducted using the HAZOP Study Cards included in Appendix 2.
These HAZOP Study Cards provide guide words and prompts for a range of deviations from
acceptable conditions, and each of these must be individually considered by the HAZOP team
for each System. This review is done "line by line" by selecting a line or System off the P&ID
and reviewing each of the guide words on the HAZOP Study Cards for that System. When all
guide words have been reviewed for a particular line or System, the process is repeated for the
next line or System selected off the P&ID.
Note: The list of HAZOP guide words as listed in Appendix 2 are not mandatory in
that HAZOP Guide words can be additional HAZOP Gide words can be chosen at the
discrtion of the Responsible Officer. The need to use alternative guide words maybe
necessary depending on the nature of the process.
3.4
HAZOP STUDY RECORD
A Hazard Study Record form (CSBP HAZOP Study Record - 2010 Template) is used to create a
historic record of the HAZOP Study. Details of discussions, decisions taken, risk assessments
made and further actions recommended during evaluation of each of the HAZOP Study Cards
will be progressively recorded by the HAZOP Secretary on the HAZOP Study Record form.
Discussions on each of the following items should be recorded for each guide word.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 9 of 62
HAZOP Process
3.4.1
Deviation
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart from the design intent as
suggested by each guide word, e.g. high pressure.
3.4.2
Cause
As each guide word is considered, if it is determined that a deviation, e.g. high pressure, could
occur, then the possible cause or circumstances that would allow the deviation to occur should
be identified. There may be several causes identified for one deviation.
When reviewing the various causes of a deviation, it is best to start with the causes that may
result in the worst possible consequences.
3.4.3
Consequence
Having identified a possible cause for the deviation, the HAZOP Team should then assess the
possible consequences if the deviation occurred. Consequences may comprise both process
hazards and operability problems. Several consequences may follow from one cause. One
consequence can have several causes.
Each cause and consequence scenario identified should be recorded in the HAZOP Study
Record form and must be comprehensive, realistic and sequential. E.g. "Closed valve in pump
discharge causes high pressure which leads to pipe rupture which results in a loss of 20 kg of
ammonia to atmosphere before a shut off valve closes".
3.4.4
Safeguards
Safeguards are facilities, processes or procedures that help to reduce the likelihood or frequency
of the deviation, or to mitigate its consequences. Examples of safeguards include the following.
a.
procedures to define what actions to take in the event of a deviation
b.
increased frequency of inspection, servicing or calibration of critical items
c.
facilities that draw attention to the deviation (e.g. indicators and alarms to inform
operators so that they can make the process safe)
d.
facilities that automatically compensate for the deviation (e.g. an automatic control
system, usually an integrated part of the process control)
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 10 of 62
HAZOP Process
e.
facilities that prevent the deviation from occurring (e.g. excess flow valve)
f.
facilities that prevent further escalation of the deviation (e.g. by total trip of the activity
or process by a safety interlock, control system, or emergency shutdown (ESD) system)
g.
facilities that relieve the process from a hazardous deviation (e.g. pressure safety valve
(PSV) and vent systems)
As each cause and consequence scenario is identified, planned safeguards should be reviewed to
determine if they are adequate to either prevent the deviation or to protect the System if the
deviation occurs. Any decision on the adequacy of the safeguards should take into consideration
the magnitude of the potential consequences and the likelihood of the event occurring with all
the planned safeguards in place. This is reflected in the risk assessment as below.
Each scenario will usually have more than a single layer of protection. For high risk deviations,
it is useful to review each of the layers of protection before determining the adequacy of the
safeguards.
3.4.5
Control Measure Practicability
During the HAZOP process, it is necessary to ensure that risk has been reduced So Far as
Reasonably Practicable. This required that where possible, additional potential means of
reducing risk are identified and assessed to determine if it is reasonably practicable to
implement these control measures. This is a requirement of the Dangerous Goods Safety Act.
Refer to the following WesCEF documents for additional guidance:
WesCEF Demonstration of Adequacy & SFARP Procedure (WCEF-PD-CMP-000-23)
Control Measure Practicability Assessment Guideline (WCEF-PD-CMP-000-08)
3.4.6
Recommendations
If the HAZOP Team recommends that additional safeguards or changes to the design should be
made to ensure the safety of the system, these recommendations must be captured in the
HAZOP Study Record for inclusion into the Cintellate Action system. Risk Assessment
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 11 of 62
HAZOP Process
3.4.7
Risk Assessments
Risk assessments shall be carried out to quantify the risks associated with deviations and their
potential consequences, and to assist in determining the adequacy of planned safeguards and the
possible need for further action.
An initial informal risk assessment should be carried out on each cause - consequence scenario
based on the inherent risk in the unprotected state. The Risk Matrix included in Appendix 1
should be used as a guide. The risk shall then be re-assessed taking into consideration the
planned safeguards and risk reduction measures.
The risk assessment must look at the risk to People, Property and the Environment. This is
especially the case where there are possible impacts on the Safety Report as Major Incidents
involve impacts onto each of these receptors.
For less important risks, the need for further action can be based on the experience and
judgement of the HAZOP Study Team.
For high risk scenarios, several layers of protection will usually be necessary to reduce the risk
to an acceptable level. If the HAZOP team agrees that, so long as the planned safeguards are in
place, the risk of an unwanted event occurring is reduced to an acceptable level, then no further
action is required.
For those events that meet the Major Incident definition (refer to WesCEF Process Safety Risk
Management WCEF-PD-CMP-000-19), the adequacy of safeguards and the need for further
action should be quantitatively assessed using higher level risk assessment techniques such as
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA). This will be determined in consultation with the Process
Safety Advisor for the BU.
The risk assessment process and outcome shall be recorded on the HAZOP Study Record form
against each item.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 12 of 62
HAZOP Process
4.
HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE
At the HAZOP meeting, the HAZOP Leader will act as Chairperson to lead the team through
each of the following steps.
a.
Introduce the project

1.
Ensure all team members are familiar with the HAZOP process
2.
Define the project for the team
3.
Review the proposed process or modification using the Process and

Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) and describe its operation
4.
On the P&ID, divide the process to be studied into logical Systems (or
nodes).
Note: Modifications that are prone to the potential of expected two phase flow or
condensation effects (eg. modifications to steam or chemical vapour systems) will be
highlighted during the introduction.
b.
Carry out HAZOP Study

1.
Select a particular System for detailed review and describe the design intent
for that System.
2.
Work through the guide words on the HAZOP Study Cards, following the
HAZOP Process Flow Chart as per Figure 1
3.
For each guide word, establish if the deviation from normal conditions
suggested by the guide word could occur.
4.
If the deviation could occur, identify the possible causes of the deviation
5.
Determine the possible consequences or problems if the deviation occurred.
6.
Carry out an initial assessment of the risk associated with the identified
consequneces
7.
Review any proposed safeguards to prevent or mitigate the consequences
8.
Evaluate if the proposed safeguards adequately reduce the risk to an

acceptable level and if not, suggest further actions having regard to the
consequences and the safeguards already proposed
9.
Repeat procedure from step (a) above for the next System.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 13 of 62
HAZOP Process
10.
Progressively complete HAZOP Study Record including recording of further

actions.
Note: Modifications must be asessed for impact during a variety of plant conditions
(ie. start up, running, plant upset, and plant shutdown). This aspect will be formally
documented where appropriate throughout the HAZOP, and must also feature as a
specific element considered within the agreement and sign-off of the final records of the
HAZOP.
Note: A high level of detail and clarity MUST be required to be captured to fully
explain what the process deviation is causing, and how it gives rise to the consequence
outcomes. Consider who will understand the HAZOP in 5 years time when it is being
reviewed by someone who was not present at the time of the study.
5.
HAZOP RECORD MANAGEMENT
5.1
HAZOP STUDY GUIDE
The Responsible Officer shall ensure that the HAZOP Study record is loaded into Cintellate as
an Inspection. This will allow for Actions to be allocated directly against the HAZOP Study
itself ensuring traceability of the HAZOP Study and associated actions.
5.2
HAZOP FOLLOW UP ACTIONS
The Responsible Officer shall verify that all actions arising from the HAZOP are properly
managed and are completed prior to commencing the modification or commissioning the
modified plant as determined during the HAZOP.
The items recorded on the HAZOP Study Record as requiring action shall be identified with the
Cintellate Action Number (automatically generated by the Cintellate system).
Actions identified during the HAZOP process are to be captured in the Cintellate Actions
Management System. Refer to the Cintellate Users Guide for details on how to undertake this.
The use of alternative means of tracking HAZOP actions such as spreadsheets is not permitted.
There are significant issues with traceability of actions when alternative action tracking systems
are implemented.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 14 of 62
HAZOP Process
6.
HAZOP CLOSURE
6.1
CLOSE-OUT
The Responsible Officer shall run periodic reports on the status of the identified HAZOP
detailing the status of the identified action. Once all actions are closed, the Responsible Officer
will close off the HAZOP Study within Cintellate.
Note: The impact of the modification(s) during all plant conditions (ie. start up, running, plant
upset, and plant shutdown) must have its related HAZOP conditions revisited during the Closeout process.
7.
DOCUMENTATION
The following HAZOP study information and documents are required for the files:
a.
HAZOP Study Record which includes:

1.
Project title
2.
Project number (that is, work order number for the parent project)
3.
Project scope
4.
Study date
5.
Participant names, job titles, organisation, brief profile
Note:
Any generic issues or matters requiring further study but not considered to be
part of the HAZOP should still be recorded on the HAZOP Study Record and a
person nominated to follow up
b.
Signed off HAZOP Study Record of Discussions (SF1909)
c.
The original copy of all P&IDs used in the study (with lines clearly identified)
d.
Variations in guide words used.
e.
Signed off Action Summary sheet (if generated in accordance with 5.5.1)
f.
Signed off HAZOP Action sheets (if generated in accordance with 5.5.1)
The study Responsible Officer is responsible for the preparation and collation of the output
documentation from the HAZOP study, and for forwarding it to all attendees, including the
Chairperson who should sign off the HAZOP Study Record before filing by the Responsible
Officer.
The Responsible Officer ensures an electronic copy the documentation listed above is filed in
the Domino.Doc System in accordance with Management of Risk Assessment Records (GM-04GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 15 of 62
HAZOP Process
041-14). A hard copy of all this documentation will also be filed in the Project File by the
Project Officer.
8.
RECORD KEEPING TABLE

RECORD
IDENTIFICATION
Form
No.
N/A
Storage
Media
Storage
Location
Indexing
Method
Retention
Period
Paper
Project File
Indefinite
Electronic
Domino Doc
Project
Number
Paper
Project File
Indefinite
Electronic
Domino Doc
Project
Number
Paper
Project File
Indefinite
Electronic
Domino Doc
Project
Number
Cintellate
Cintellate
Paper
Project File
Indefinite
Electronic
Domino Doc
Project
Number
Paper
Project File
Indefinite
Electronic
Domino Doc
Project
Number
Authorised
Disposer
Disposal
Method
Document Title
HAZOP Study
Record (CSBP
HAZOP Study
Record - 2010
Template)
SF1909 HAZOP Study

Record of
Discussions
Record of
Actions arising
from the HAZOP
Action Summary
sheet (if created)
HAZOP Action
sheets (if created)
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 16 of 62
HAZOP Process
APPENDIX 1 - RISK ASSESSMENT TABLES
DESCRIPTION
CONSEQUENCE
Injury / Illness
Property Damage /
Process Loss
Environment
Insignificant
Minor Injury / Illness
Little or no environmental
impact
Low financial loss

(<$5,000)
Minor
Medical Treatment Injury /

Illness
Small and/or localised

impact
Medium financial loss

($5,000 - $20,000
Moderate
Restricted Duties Injury /

Illness
Substantial environmental
impact
High financial loss
Major
Lost Time Injury / Illness
Serious environmental
impact
Major financial loss

($50,000 - $500,000)
Catastrophic
Fatality or Permanent
Disability Injury / Illness
Widespread environmental
impact
Huge financial loss

(>$500,000)
LIKELIHOOD
DESCRIPTION
($20,000 - $50,000)
RISK RANK
IMPACT
Rare
Only by exception
Low risk
Unlikely
Could occur at some stage
Medium risk
Possible
Might occur at some time
High risk
Likely
Will probably occur
Extreme risk
Almost certain
Is expected to occur
Table 1 HAZOP Risk Assessment: Consequence, Likelihood and Risk

Ranking Definitions
Once the reasonable consequence and likelihood of each potential unwanted event is
determined, the risk can be ranked using the Risk Assessment Matrix below and recorded on
the HAZOP Study Record sheet.
CONSEQUENCE
LIKELIHOOD
Insignificant
Minor
Moderate
Major
Catastrophic
Rare
Unlikely
Possible
Likely
Almost certain
Table 2 HAZOP Risk Assessment Matrix: Likelihood versus Consequence
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Page 17 of 62
HAZOP Process
APPENDIX 2 - HAZARD STUDY CARDS
NEW DRAWING
1.
DESCRIPTION OF PURPOSE OF PLANT SHOWN
2.
BROAD OUTLINE OF OPERATION
NEW LINE OR SYSTEM

1.
PURPOSE OF LINE AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT
2.
NORMAL OPERATING CONDITION
3.
NORMAL METHOD OF OPERATION
4.
DESCRIPTION OF EQUIPMENT, VALVES, INSTRUMENTS
5.
GENERAL BROAD DISCUSSION
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 18 of 62
WesCEF disclaims any liability or responsibility for the use of this document other than as authorised by WesCEF.
HAZOP Process
HIGH FLOW
HIGH LEVEL
PUMP RACING, DELIVERY VESSEL PRESSURE LOST, SUCTION PRESSURISED, SCALE DISLODGED,
LEAK IN HEAT EXCHANGER, LOSS OF AUTO CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR, FAILURE OF PIPE, TRAP,
ETC.
FOR SOLIDS HANDLING PROCESSES:
BLOCKED OR ARCHED CHUTES, LUMPS FALLING ONTO BELT, CLEAN OUT SAFETY, BELT RUN-ON,
SEQUENCING, OBSTRUCTION, CONVEYOR BELT BROKEN, DRIVE BELT BROKEN, BELT RUN- BACK,
BUCKET RUN- BACK.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 19 of 62
HAZOP Process
LOW FLOW
LOW LEVEL
PUMP FAILURE, SCALING OF DELIVERY, FOREIGN BODY OR SEDIMENT, POOR SUCTION
CONDITION, CAVITATION, LEAK IN HEAT EXCHANGER, DRAIN LEAKING, VALVE JAMMED, LOSS OF
AUTO CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR, FAILURE OR JOINT, PIPE, TRAP ETC.
BLOCKED OR ARCHED CHUTES, LUMPS FALLING ONTO BELT, CLEAN OUT SAFETY, BELT RUN- ON,
BUCKET RUN-BACK.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 20 of 62
HAZOP Process
ZERO FLOW
EMPTY
PUMP FAILURE, DELIVERY VESSEL/MAIN PRESSURISED, GAS LOCKING, BLOCKAGE PRESENCE OF
FOREIGN BODY, SCALE ETC. SUCTION VESSEL EMPTY, LOSS OF AUTO CONTROL, OPERATOR
ERROR, FAILURE OF JOINT, PIPE ETC.
BLOCKED OR ARCHED CHUTES, LUMPS FALLING ONTO BELT, CLEAN OUT SAFETY, BELT RUN- ON,
BUCKET RUN-BACK.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 21 of 62
HAZOP Process
REVERSE FLOW
PUMP FAILURE, PUMP REVERSED, DELIVERY VESSEL/MAIN OVER PRESSURE, POOR ISOLATION,
GAS LOCKING, SURGING, BACK SIPHONING, LOSS OF AUTOMATIC CONTROL, OPERATOR ERROR,
PIPE FAILURE, ETC.
STOP BEFORE START, WARNING FOR TAIL DISCHARGE ELEVATOR ROLL-BACK.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 22 of 62
HAZOP Process
HIGH PRESSURE
- VENTING
- RELIEF RATE
BOILING, CAVITATION, FREEZING, CHEMICAL BREAKDOWN, FLASHING, CONDENSATION,

SEDIMENTATION, SCALING, FOAMING, GAS RELEASE, PRIMING, EXPLODING, IMPLODING, CHANGES IN
VISCOSITY, DENSITY, EXTERNAL FIRE, WEATHER CONDITIONS.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 23 of 62
HAZOP Process
LOW PRESSURE
- VENTING
- RELIEF RATE

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 24 of 62
HAZOP Process
HIGH TEMPERATURE
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 25 of 62
HAZOP Process
LOW TEMPERATURE
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 26 of 62
HAZOP Process
IMPURITIES
- GASEOUS
- LIQUID
- SOLID
INGRESS OF AIR, WATER, STEAM, FUEL, LUBRICANTS, CORROSION PRODUCTS, OTHER PROCESS
MATERIALS FROM HIGH PRESSURE SYSTEM, LEAKAGE FROM HEAT EXCHANGER SYSTEM.
CONTAMINANTS, MATERIAL CHARACTERISTICS DEVIATION, TRAMP METAL.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 27 of 62
HAZOP Process
CHANGE IN COMPOSITION
CHANGE IN CONCENTRATION
2 PHASE FLOW
REACTION
ACIDIC FUMES, BUILD- UP, OVER GRANULATION, SCREEN BLINDING,
SETS TOO FAST, STICKS TO BELT/IDLERS, HARD TO CLEAN.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 28 of 62
HAZOP Process
TESTING
- EQUIPMENT (INCL. TRIPS & ALARMS)
- PRODUCT
HOW DO WE KNOW THEY ARE OK?

VACUUM & PRESSURE TESTING WITH HARMLESS MATERIAL.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 29 of 62
HAZOP Process
PLANT ITEMS
- OPERABLE
- MAINTAINABLE
ACCESS, ISOLATION, SPARES, PURGING, DRYING, COOLING, WARMING

LACK OF ACCESS (IDLERS, SCRAPERS), BUILD- UP CAUSING DIFFICULTY MOVING, LONG CLEANING
REACH, CONFINED SPACE.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 30 of 62
HAZOP Process
ELECTRICAL
- AREA CLASSIFICATION
- ISOLATION
- EARTHING
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 31 of 62
HAZOP Process
INSTRUMENTS
- SUFFICIENT FOR CONTROL
- TOO MANY
- CORRECT LOCATION
- INFORMATION FOR OPERATORS
THIS LINE IS NOW COMPLETE. NOW DO NEXT LINE.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 32 of 62
HAZOP Process
OVERVIEW
- TO BE DONE WHEN ALL LINES ARE COMPLETE.
- CONSIDER CUMULATIVE AND POTENTIAL OFFSITE IMPACT
OF THE REVIEWED PROCESS (SUCH AS IMPACT ON
UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM OF THE PROCESS DUE TO
MODIFICATIONS/CHANGES).
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 33 of 62
HAZOP Process
SERVICES REQUIRED
- AIR
- NITROGEN
- WATER
- ETC.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 34 of 62
HAZOP Process
MATERIALS OF CONSTRUCTION
- VESSELS
- PIPELINES
- PUMPS
- OTHERS
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 35 of 62
HAZOP Process
COMMISSION
- BROADLY HOW WILL IT BE DONE
- WHAT DIFFICULTIES & HAZARDS CAN BE FORESEEN
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 36 of 62
HAZOP Process
STARTUP
- FIRST STARTUP METHODS, DIFFICULTIES,
- HAZARDS ROUTINE STARTUP METHODS, DIFFICULTIES,
- HAZARDS TOO MANY INTERLOCKS?
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 37 of 62
HAZOP Process
SHUTDOWN
- ISOLATION
- PURGING
DIFFICULTIES, HAZARDS
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 38 of 62
HAZOP Process
BREAKDOWN
- POWER FAILURE
- AIR
- STEAM
- WATER
- VACUUM
- FUEL
- VENTS
- COMPUTER
- OTHER
MAJOR CAUSES OF BREAKDOWN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES & COMMUNICATIONS
WHICH WAY SHOULD VALVES MOVE
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 39 of 62
HAZOP Process
EFFLUENT
- GASEOUS
- LIQUID
- SOLID
CONTAINMENT
REACTIONS IN DRAINS
TREATMENT METHODS
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 40 of 62
HAZOP Process
NOISE
SOURCES
PROBLEMS?
CONTROL MEASURES
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 41 of 62
HAZOP Process
FIRE
EXPLOSION
BROAD OVERVIEW - PROTECTION, PREVENTION, CONTROL
LOCATION OF SAFETY SHOWERS, DELUGES, SHUT-OFF VALVES & CONTROLS.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 42 of 62
HAZOP Process
SAFETY EQUIPMENT
- PERSONAL
- FIRE DETECTION
- FIRE FIGHTING
- MEANS OF ESCAPE
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 43 of 62
HAZOP Process
QUALITY & CONSISTENCY

WHAT WILL MOST CAUSE QUALITY TO FAIL OR VARY - HOW PREVENT
OUTPUT- RELIABILITY & BOTTLE NECKS

LEAST RELIABLE COMPONENTS, MOST LIMITING COMPONENTS
EFFICIENCY - LOSSES
WHERE WILL WE LOSE MATERIAL, CONVERSION ETC
SIMPLICITY
CAN WE OMIT PLANT OR SIMPLIFY CONTROL
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 44 of 62
HAZOP Process
PERSONAL HAZARD
SOLIDS HANDLING:
FUMES,
LUMPS OFF CONVEYORS,
EXPOSURE TO MAGNETIC FIELD,
DUST,
LOCATION OF NORMAL ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT,
POTENTIAL FOR LOOSE OBJECTS TO FALL (EG ACCESS DOORS & WEDGES.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 45 of 62
HAZOP Process
GUIDE WORDS AND DEVIATION FOR COMPUTERISED AND

DISTRIBUTION CONTROL SYSTEMS.
ITEMS LISTED ON THE FOLLOWING CARDS CAN BE
ADDRESSED BY ASKING THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 46 of 62
HAZOP Process
DOES IT MATTER?
RISK ASSESSMENT
LIKELIHOOD
CONSEQUENCE
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 47 of 62
HAZOP Process
WILL THE OPERATOR KNOW?
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 48 of 62
HAZOP Process
ANY ACTIONS REQUIRED BY THE OPERATOR OR OTHER SYSTEMS?
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 49 of 62
HAZOP Process
ANY CHANGES NEEDED?
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 50 of 62
HAZOP Process
PURPOSE
METHOD OF OPERATION, CONTROL PHILOSOPHY, SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 51 of 62
HAZOP Process
MORE OF
SIGNAL ACTION, BLOCK OF DATA, TRANSFER FREQUENCY.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 52 of 62
HAZOP Process
LESS OF
SIGNAL ACTION, INCOMPLETE TRANSFER, SYSTEM CRASHES DURING TRANSFER.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 53 of 62
HAZOP Process
NONE OF
SIGNAL ACTION, NO TRANSFER, ACTUATOR STUCK.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 54 of 62
HAZOP Process
OTHER THAN
MISMATCH DUE TO SOFTWARE CHANGE OR REFORMAT, INCORRECT ACTION OR SIGNAL.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 55 of 62
HAZOP Process
SOONER / LATER THAN

PROCESSING OF MEASUREMENTS, TIME OUT, OUT OF SEQUENCE, AVERAGING ASSUMPTIONS.
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 56 of 62
HAZOP Process
CORRUPTION
NOISE, MAGNETIC FIELDS, RADIO INTERFERENCE, WELDING, LIGHTNING, HIGH VOLTAGE
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 57 of 62
HAZOP Process
REVERSE
LOOK AT ABOVE POINTS WITH DATA TRANSFER IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 58 of 62
HAZOP Process
INTERACTION
WITH OTHER SYSTEMS, START-UP, SHUT-DOWN, NORMAL OPERATION, EXPECTED OR REQUIRED
OPERATOR ACTIONS, SYNCHRONISATION AND TIMING ISSUES AND ALARMS, PLANT UPSETS
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 59 of 62
HAZOP Process
TUNING PARAMETERS
ARE THEY CORRECT, ANY CHANGES REQUIRED
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 60 of 62
HAZOP Process
SECURITY
SECURITY ACCESS LEVEL, PROTECTION AGAINST UNAUTHORISED MODIFICATION
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 61 of 62
HAZOP Process
OTHER
TRAINING
TESTING
GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0
Page 62 of 62

GM 08 030 02

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Judul Asli

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

GM 08 030 02

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

HAZOP Process

A printed or saved copy is an UNCONTROLLED copy.

Reasons for Creating or

Actual Change Details:

Changes to Owner and Authoriser. Inclusion of necessity to

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

HAZOP PREPARATION ........................................................................................................ 5

HAZOP TERMINOLOGY ...................................................................................................... 9

HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE ...................................................................................... 13

HAZOP RECORD MANAGEMENT ................................................................................... 14

HAZOP CLOSURE ................................................................................................................ 15

RECORD KEEPING TABLE................................................................................................ 16

APPENDIX 1 - RISK ASSESSMENT TABLES ............................................................................. 17

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Figure 1 - HAZOP Process Flow Chart

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is a structured and systematic examination of a

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

If there is no CSBP HAZOP Leader available from within CSBP, an external

SELECTION OF HAZOP STUDY TEAM MEMBERS

Representative of the customer

Plant Process Engineer or

Plant Process Engineer or

Plant Process Engineer

Process Safety, OHS &

Process Safety, OHS &

Process Safety, OHS &

OSH Advisor and

Other specialist knowledge

Organising meeting dates, venue and notices to the attendees

Close out meeting date, venue and notice to the attendees.

INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR HAZOP STUDY

Functionally complete P & ID for the process

Plot plans or layouts

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

HAZOP GUIDE WORDS

HAZOP STUDY RECORD

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

procedures to define what actions to take in the event of a deviation

increased frequency of inspection, servicing or calibration of critical items

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Control Measure Practicability

WesCEF Demonstration of Adequacy & SFARP Procedure (WCEF-PD-CMP-000-23)

Control Measure Practicability Assessment Guideline (WCEF-PD-CMP-000-08)

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

HAZOP MEETING PROCEDURE

Introduce the project

Define the project for the team

Review the proposed process or modification using the Process and

Carry out HAZOP Study

Determine the possible consequences or problems if the deviation occurred.

Review any proposed safeguards to prevent or mitigate the consequences

Evaluate if the proposed safeguards adequately reduce the risk to an

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

Progressively complete HAZOP Study Record including recording of further

HAZOP RECORD MANAGEMENT

HAZOP STUDY GUIDE

HAZOP FOLLOW UP ACTIONS

GM-08-030-02 Version No. 17.0

HAZOP Study Record which includes: