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Japan's Intelligence Reform Inches Forward

Analysis MARCH2,2015|10:08GMT Print TextSize

JapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbe(L)inspectstroopsattheGroundSelfDefenseForceAsakatrainingground
onOct.27,2013.(TORUYAMANAKA/AFP/GettyImages)

Summary
WhentheAlliesdefeatedJapanattheendofWorldWarII,theydismantledtheJapanesesecurityapparatus
anddeliberatelyleftthecountrydependentonoutsidepowers.Thisentailednotonlytakingapartthemilitary
butalsotheextensiveimperialintelligenceapparatusthathadfacilitatedJapaneseexpansioninAsia.Asit
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reconstituteditself,postwarJapanoptedforadecentralizedintelligencesystemasanalternativetoitsprewar
model.Theresultwasmoreafragmentofanintelligenceapparatusthanafullsystem,withTokyo
outsourcingthemissingcomponentstoitsallies.ThissystemworkedthroughtheColdWar,whenJapanwas
moreessentialtoU.S.antiSovietstrategy.Sincethen,however,Japanhasfounditselfunabletocountonits
alliestoprovidevitalintelligenceinatimelymanner.TheIslamicStatehostagecrisisinJanuary,duringwhich
JapandependedonJordanianandTurkishintelligence,reinforcedthislesson.
Inresponsetotherecentincident,Japan'srulingLiberalDemocraticPartyhasstarteddraftingaproposalto
createanewagencyspecializinginforeignintelligence.ToaddressJapanesedependenceonoutsiders,the
newsystemwillshiftawayfromadecentralizedmodelwithlimitedcollectioncapacitytoacentralizedsystem
withinhousecapabilities.TheplanwouldsupportJapan'sslownormalizationofitsoverallmilitarycapabilities
inordertofacenewthreats.

Analysis
DuringtheColdWar,TokyocoulddependonWashingtontoprovideforJapan'sexternalsecurity,while
relyingonitsowneconomicmuscletogainaccesstoresources.ButJapanisnolongerthevitalColdWar
bulwarkinthePacific,givingtheUnitedStateslessincentivetocooperate.Meanwhile,bothChinaandNorth
KoreahaveemergedasthreatstoJapanesesecurity.Fartherafield,Japanesenationalshavebecomemore
deeplyinvolvedinregionssuchasAfricaandtheMiddleEast.Today,Japanneedsfast,accurateandreliable
intelligence.NearlyaquartercenturysincetheendoftheColdWar,however,Japanisstillusingavintage
systemmaladaptedtothechangingworld.
Japan'scurrentintelligenceapparatusisfragmentedamongfiveorganizations.TheCabinetInformationand
ResearchOfficefocusesonopensourceandgeospatialintelligence.Japan'sMinistryofForeignAffairs
collectsdiplomaticintelligence.TheDefenseIntelligenceHeadquartersgatherssignalsintelligence,including
electronicandtelecommunicationssystems.UndertheMinistryofJustice,thePublicSecurityIntelligence
Agencymainlyconductsinternalinvestigationsandmonitorssubversivedomesticgroups.Themostpowerful
oftheseistheNationalPoliceAgency,whichisresponsiblefordomesticlawenforcement,counterterrorism
andcombatingtransnationalcrime.Italsohaspersonnelpositionedinthefourotherinstitutionsashighlevel
intelligencedirectors.

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Thissystemlackstwokeycomponents:Itsgreatestweaknessistheabsenceofaclandestineintelligence
arm,deprivingJapanofreliableaccesstohumanintelligence.Thecountryalsodoesnothaveaninstitution
thatpoolstheintelligencegatheredbythedifferentbranches.Suchaninstitutionwouldprovide
comprehensiveanalysistotoppolicymakersandensureeffectiveinformationsharingamongagencies.
Instead,Japan'sintelligenceagencieseachreportdirectlytotheprimeminister'soffice.Theabsenceofthese
twokeynodeshasleftJapanesepolicymakerswithhugegapsinawareness,forcingthemtoreacttocrises
insteadofpreemptingthem.Timeandagain,thishasledtotragicconsequencesforJapanesecitizens.

Imperial and Cold War Roots

TounderstandthecurrentlimitationsoftheJapaneseintelligencesystem,onemustlookatthecountry's
militaristpastanditsColdWareragrandstrategy.Before1945,theJapanesemilitarydominatedthe
governmentstructure.ThearmedforcessawtheconquestofAsiaastheislandnation'sbestmeansof
securingaccesstotheresourcesitneeded.TodestabilizeitsfoesandprimeAsiaforconquest,themilitary
developedastrongforeignintelligenceapparatusmodeledalongGermanlines:thearmyandnavyrantheir
ownintelligenceservices,whilethemilitarypolicecorps,orKempeitai,conductedcounterintelligenceand
secretpolicefunctions.
Theempire'sintelligencesystemwashighlyeffective.Themilitaryranclandestineoperationsthroughspy
networkscalledTokumuKikan,orspecialservicesagencies.Inadditiontocollectingintelligence,theTokumu
KikanconductedarangeofactivitiestokeepJapan'sadversariesoffbalance,carryingoutassassinationsand
falseflagoperations,aswellastrainingfifthcolumnslikeSubhasChandraBose'sIndianNationalArmy.
Officially,militaryintelligencecommandersreportedtotheintelligencebranchesofvariousregionalarmies
andnaviesbuttheirconnectionsinTokyogavethemwidelatitude.LiketherestofImperialJapan'smilitary,
theTokumuKikanhadlittleoversightandsubvertedcivilianauthoritywithimpunity,attimesrunningpolitically
motivatedoperationsaimedatjustifyingmilitaryexpansion.Duringthe1931MukdenIncident,forexample,
JapanesemilitaryintelligenceagentsactingontheirowninitiativebombedtheSouthManchuriaRailroadand
blamedlocalChineseforces.TheoperationprovidedthepretextforJapantoseizetheresourcerichand
industrializedregionofManchuriainmoderndaynortheastChina.

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Japanese experts inspect the scene of the alleged sabotage of the South Manchuria Railway on Sept. 18, 1931,
leading to the Mukden Incident and Japan's occupation of Manchuria. (Rekishi Syashin)
AfterWorldWarII,thevictoriousUnitedStatesdismantledImperialJapan'smilitary,alongwiththemilitary
intelligenceapparatus.DisarmedandoccupiedbytheUnitedStates,Japanwasforcedtofallbackonits
economicstrengthtoacquireresources.FromthisemergedtheYoshidaDoctrine,namedforthenPrime
MinisterShigeruYoshida,inwhichJapanoutsourcedexternalsecuritytotheUnitedStateswhile
concentratingoneconomicreconstruction.
FortunatelyforJapan,itslocationmadeitindispensableforU.S.containmentoftheSovietUnion.TheUnited
StatesguaranteedJapan'sexternalsecurityina1952mutualdefensetreaty.Theintelligencesystemfollowed
thismodel.JapancametodependontheCIAtocollectintelligenceandinformtheJapanesegovernment,
whichretainedreliableaccesstotimelyintelligencethroughouttheColdWar.
However,Japancontinuedtofacedomesticthreats.TheseincludedSovietsupportfortheJapanese
CommunistPartyandterroristgroupssuchastheJapaneseRedArmy.Japan'spoliceforcemovedtofillthe
gapbycollectingdomesticintelligence.Fromthisfoundation,Japandevelopedadecentralizedintelligence
networkfocusedprimarilyondomesticthreats.TheNationalPoliceAgencydominatedthisintelligence
structure,apositionitcontinuestoholdtoday.
AlthoughtheColdWareraintelligencesystemwaslimitedanddependentontheUnitedStates,itmetJapan's
needsthroughoutthisperiod.Attemptstostrengthentheintelligencesystemranintostrongoppositionfrom
bothlawmakersandfromthepublic,whichrememberedtheexcessesoftheimperialeramilitaryintelligence
services.

Post-Cold War Challenges

AftertheendoftheColdWar,Japanfounditselfinanewcontext.Itseconomicinvolvementdeepenedin
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LatinAmerica,AfricaandtheMiddleEast.Meanwhile,China'sexplosivegrowthsince1978hadtransformedit
fromaweakeconomicbackwatertoanaggressivepeercompetitorinbothsecurityandeconomics,justas
Japan'sowngrowthbegantodeclineprecipitously.ThecollapseoftheSovietUnionjeopardizedNorth
KoreansecurityandledPyongyangtoredoubleeffortstoacquireandtestnuclearandballisticmissile
capability.ItalsodiminishedU.S.interestinunderwritingJapan'ssecurity,particularlyonceWashington
beganchannelingmoreofitsresourcesandattentiontowardstabilizingtheMiddleEast.Astheinterestsof
theUnitedStatesandJapandiverged,fewerandfewerintelligenceresourcesweredirectedtowardobjectives
thatJapanfoundimportant.

Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori (C) with special forces troops inside the Japanese ambassador's
residence in Lima in April 1997 after releasing the 77 hostages captured by the Revolutionary Movement Tupac
Amaru guerrilla group. (MARIE HIPPENMEYER/AFP/Getty Images)
DecliningU.S.supportexposedtheinherentweaknessesinJapan'sunderdevelopedintelligencesystem.In
1996,forexample,Peru'sTupacAmaruMarxistRevolutionaryMovementoccupiedtheJapanese
ambassador'sofficialresidenceinLima,taking24Japanesehostages,includingtheambassadorandseveral
highlevelofficials.TheJapaneseforeignministerflewtoLima,whereheneededtobebriefedbythe
Canadianambassadorandspendtimecollectingfirsthandinformation.Japanwasthencaughtoffguardin
1998bythelaunchofaNorthKoreanTaepodongrocketanditsinabilitytotrackthemissile'sflight.This
incidentledJapantoinvestinreconnaissancesatellitesanddevelopitsowngeospatialintelligenceprogram
housedintheCabinetInformationandResearchOffice.Thissmallstepwasinsufficient,however,andJapan
founditselfonceagaincaughtunawaresbytherecentIslamicStatehostagesituationspurringtheruling
partytoproposemorewholesaleintelligencereform.
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Reform Attempts and Challenges

InthepostColdWarperiod,theLiberalDemocraticPartyhaschampionedintelligencereform.In2006,a
partyparliamentarycommitteeproducedtheSecondMachimuraReport,whichproposedanewagencyto
collectforeignintelligenceoperatingoutofJapan'sembassies.Theproposalalsocalledforanagencyto
performcentralizedintelligenceanalysisinamannerakintotheU.S.OfficeoftheDirectorofNational
Intelligence.
TheSecondMachimuraReportdidnotchangetheJapaneseintelligencesystem,butthelatestLiberal
DemocraticPartyproposalnineyearslateraddressesthesamedeeprootedproblems.However,
Japaneseintelligencereformcontinuestofaceseveralchallenges.Thefirstarethepersistentantimilitarist
sentimentsoftheJapanesepublic.TheJapaneseConstitutionfamouslycontainsanarticle,Article9,that
forbidstheuseofwartosolveinternationalconflicts.ThoughthereisnointelligenceequivalenttoArticle9
forbiddingaclandestineintelligenceservice,intheeyeofthepublic,intelligenceandmilitarismaredeeply
intertwined.MemoriesofWorldWarIIstillrundeep.
Bureaucratichurdlesalsostandinthewaytoreform.TheCabinetInformationandResearchOffice's
geospatialwingestablishedaftertheincidentwithNorthKoreain1998wasintendedtoplayarolefusingthe
separateintelligencestreams.However,theotherintelligenceagenciesoptedtobypassitentirely.Anynew
centralanalysisorganizationwouldfacesimilarresistance,especiallyfromtheinfluentialNationalPolice
Agency,whichhashistoricallybeenreluctanttoshareinformation.Thesameholdsforanewforeign
intelligenceagency,whichwouldmostlikelydivertpersonnelandfiscalresourcesfromexistingagencies.The
UnitedStates,too,dealtwiththesameissuesinestablishingitsOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence
andHomelandSecurity's"fusioncenters"inthewakeof9/11.TheU.S.oversightagencyhasyettosucceed
fullyinitsobjectiveofcollatingintelligencefromthe16otheragenciesoftheU.S.intelligencecommunity.
Japan,however,ismovingslowlyandinexorablytowardintelligencereform,justasitismovingforwardwith
itsmilitarynormalization.SincetheendoftheColdWar,theJapanesehaveaddedcapabilitieswhen
absolutelynecessary.Inthewakeofthe1998NorthKoreanrocketlaunch,forexample,Tokyomanagedtofill
criticalgapsbyinvestinginreconnaissancesatellitesandbuildingupitsgeospatialintelligencecapabilities.
Today,geospatialintelligenceisastrengthoftheJapaneseintelligencesystem.In2013,theLiberal
DemocraticPartypushedthroughtheSpecialSecrecyLaw,whichestablishedaunifiedclassificationsystem
amongagenciesandlaidoutclearconsequencesforleakingsecrets.Previously,thedifferentagencies
protectedinformationindifferentways,meaningthattheycouldnottrustoneanothertokeepsecretssafe.
Thestandardizationofclassificationschemesencouragedcollaboration.Thelawishighlyunpopularwiththe
public,butitendedalongstruggletoimposesuchareform.
ThereisnoguaranteethattheLiberalDemocraticParty'scurrentproposalwillleadtoimmediateorsweeping
changes.However,thedemandsforfastandaccurateintelligencearerising,andJapancannotdependonits
alliestomeetitsneeds.Thereformprocesswillbeslow,butTokyowilleventuallyacquireandfullydevelopits
ownhumanintelligenceandcentralanalysiscapabilities.Thecountrywillinvestinitscyberintelligence
capabilitiesaswellasitstrivestodevelopanintelligencesystemtomanageallaspectsofintelligence
operations.Thematurationofthetechnicalaspectsofthissystemwilltaketime,butJapan'sinstitutionshave
historicallyprovedcapableofmasteringnewprocedureswithinarelativelyshorttimespan.
TheUnitedStatesislikelytoencourageJapanthroughoutthisprocessbysharingitsownexperiencesand
expertise.ThiswilleaseJapan'sgrowingpainsasitbuildsitsmissingcapabilitiesfromscratch.Foritspart,
theUnitedStateswantstoempowerJapantoshouldermoreallianceburdens.However,thelongtermeffect
willbetoaffordJapantheautonomyneededdowntheroadtoindependentlypursueandprotectitsown
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interestsabroad.

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