Anti-Satellite Capability - A Chinese Eye View

http://www.c3sindia.org/military/34/anti-satellite-capability-a-chinese-eye-view-china-
monitor-paper-no-11/
B.Raman, dated January 23, 2007
As appeared in www.saag.org
Chinese military thinking and scenario building are based on the assumption that future
wars would be of very limited duration. Any country resorting to military means for
achieving its objectives should be in a position to achieve them within the limited time
span available before the international community intervenes and puts a stop to it. Over-
ambitious objectives would be counter-productive.
2. Chinese strategists envisage that China may have to initiate a military conflict only in
respect of Taiwan if it tries to proclaim its independence. They do not envisage a scenario
where China may have to initiate a military conflict with the US or Japan, but their
military thinking takes into account the possibility that either the US or Japan or both
together might initiate a military conflict with China. They do not apprehend a situation
where India might initiate a military conflict with China. But do they envisage a scenario
where China might have to initiate another military conflict with India—as it did in 1962
—if there is serious instability in Tibet after the death of the Dalai Lama or if the current
border talks between the two countries do not give them satisfaction on their claims to
Arunachal Pradesh? They are not very forthcoming on this question, but India has to
presume that such a scenario cannot be ruled out so that it is not taken by surprise once
again as it was in 1962. They look upon their claims at least to Tawang in Arunachal
Pradesh—if not the whole of it— as irreducible.
3. In the Chinese view, military planning has two essential components. First, strategic
capability building such as the modernisation of their armed forces, building up a
capability for offensive and defensive information warfare etc. Second, strategic asset
building like roads, railways, port development etc. While no part of their present
capacity building can be characterised as specifically related to India, their strategic
assets building provide for the contingency of a military conflict with India too.
Examples: firstly, their strategic road and rail communications building in Tibet and in
the Northern Areas of Pakistan (Gilgit and Baltistan); secondly, their acquiring strategic
use of assets such as ports etc in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka; and thirdly, their
military supply relationship with these countries, including their nuclear and missile
supply relationship with Pakistan.
4. The totality of their military planning is almost completely directed towards the US,
Japan and Taiwan. While they do not rule out a military confrontation with Taiwan in the
short or medium term, they expect any conflict with the USA or Japan to be in the long
term, but feel they have to prepare themselves for it from now onwards. Conventional
wisdom would dictate that if they build up their military capabilities with regard to the
US and Japan, these would automatically be available for use against Taiwan and hence,
there would be no need for separate building with regard to Taiwan. However, they do not
look at it this way. Since they envisage a military confrontation with Taiwan in the short
or medium term and with the US and Japan only in the long term, military planning with
regard to Taiwan cannot wait till they strengthen their capability with regard to the US
and Japan. So, both capability buildings have to be undertaken simultaneously, instead of
one following the other.
5. They do not envisage a situation where the US and Japan might intervene militarily on
the land, in the sea and in air in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. However, they
do apprehend their intervention—particularly of the US—in space. Such intervention
could come in two ways—neutralisation of China’s assets such as communications and
spy-in-the-sky satellites and placing the space assets of the US and Japan at the disposal
of Taiwan by sharing with it real time intelligence and early warnings.
6. Chinese planning in space has to provide for two contingencies— strengthening their
space assets and preserving them in time of war and damaging, if not neutralising, the
assets of the US and Japan, without providing the US with a casus belli for a more active
intervention in support of Taiwan on the land, in the sea and in air.
7. In respect of the first contingency, the US enjoys a tremendous advantage over China,
which Beijing will not be able to match in the short and medium terms. Firstly, the US
space infrastructure in the form of launching sites, tracking stations etc has a wide
geographic spread. China’s infrastructure is largely confined to its territory. Secondly, it
has been estimated that the US scientists would be able to launch a communications or
spy-in-the-sky satellite, place it in orbit and make it operational within 24 hours of a
requirement in this regard being projected to them by their armed forces. Thus, the US
scientists would be able to replace their damaged or destroyed satellites very fast. The
replacement capability of the Chinese scientists is no comparison to that of their
American counterparts. So, if the US renders China’s space assets non-operational at the
beginning of a military conflict with Taiwan, the Chinese Armed Forces might find
themselves handicapped with regard to real time intelligence, early warnings and
battlefield communications.
8. This would provide a big strategic advantage to Taiwan. How to reduce it, even if
China is not able to eliminate it totally? That is the question preoccupying Chinese
scientists and military planners as they try to develop their anti-satellite capability. The
Chinese have undertaken this task ever since the 1980s. This has been receiving even
greater attention since the Gulf war of 1991. The US has also been closely monitoring the
Chinese efforts in this regard. A report on China’s military power submitted by the
Pentagon to the US Congress in 2000 said, inter alia, as follows: “China is said to be
acquiring a variety of foreign technologies, which could be used to develop an anti-
satellite (ASAT) capability. Beijing already may have acquired technical assistance which
could be applied to the development of laser radars used to track and image satellites and
may be seeking an advanced radar system with the capability to track satellites in low
earth orbit. It also may be developing jammers, which could be used against Global
Positioning System (GPS) receivers. In addition, China already may possess the
capability to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very
vulnerable to damage by lasers. Beijing also may have acquired high-energy laser
equipment and technical assistance, which probably could be used in the development of
ground-based ASAT weapons. Given China’s current level of interest in laser technology,
Beijing probably could develop a weapon that could destroy satellites in the future.
Although specific Chinese programs for laser ASAT have not been identified, press
articles indicate an interest in developing this capability and Beijing may be working on
appropriate technologies.”
9. In a web posting dated April 26, 2001, in the Worldnetdaily.com, Jon Dougherty, an
analyst of space-related developments, said:
“China is continuing to develop anti-satellite weapons aimed at reducing a huge military
advantage held over the People’s Liberation Army by the United States. According to
Jane’s Defense Weekly, China’s ongoing anti-satellite effort is focusing on “co-orbital
space weapons” and “a terrestrial laser, to be used for blinding satellite optics. “Chinese
laser weapons development dates back to the 1960s, as reported in 1999 by
WorldNetDaily. Beijing’s laser technology is thought to equal or surpass U.S.
capabilities, analysts said then. Also, quoting Asia arms experts and published Chinese
reports, WND reported on China’s anti-satellite development in January. The Jane’s
report said China’s anti-satellite weapons programs are said “to have benefited both from
PRC (People’s Republic of China) research and development” from the 1980s and
beyond, “and the transfer of Cold War-era space weapon technology from Russia.” WND
said one of the new Chinese weapons is designed to “stick” to the body of enemy
satellites so as to go unnoticed, then rendering it ineffective through jamming when
activated.
Anti-satellite programs, known by the acronym ASAT, are of increasing concern to U.S.
military planners because of the Pentagon’s reliance on space-based command, control
and guidance satellites. Civilian leaders are worried because of the damage ASATs could
do to domestic communications and infrastructure-support satellites. Jane’s said the
Chinese are already ground testing their programs and will begin flight testing them in
2002. One aspect of the ASAT program is said to be based on Soviet-developed co-orbital
techniques that were perfected in the 1980s. “The kill mechanism of the PRC ASAT
remains uncertain from published reports,” Jane’s said, but the Soviet-developed system
envisioned “a large orbital vehicle using a fragmentation warhead as its kill mechanism
— probably the most likely approach” for a Chinese ASAT weapon. The magazine
Foreign Affairs said in this month’s issue that the U.S. also experimented with similar
“rudimentary” ASAT vehicles in the 1980s. The magazine said both Washington and
Moscow had developed crude ASAT capabilities, but little further development — at least
by the Pentagon — had been conducted since then. Echoing the details of the January
WND report, Jane’s said “there are unconfirmed reports that the kill mechanism [of the
Chinese ASAT] is a micro- or nano-satellite capable of flying close to the target satellite
or even attaching itself as a parasite. …” That vehicle, Jane’s confirmed, “is also reported
to have the option for the non-lethal jamming of a satellite as well as destroying it. “But,
the weekly defense publication said, terrestrial optical sensors “are likely to be able to
detect” even such small satellite “parasites” in low earth orbit. China is known to be
working on such systems, but current micro-satellites which have an on-board propulsion
system are intended only for space-based station keeping. “None have had the amount of
fuel [onboard] to match the orbit of another satellite, let alone dock with a target,” Jane’s
said. Despite the uncertainty of the details of China’s nano-satellite development, ASAT
programs remain vibrant within the Chinese military nonetheless. The laser weapon
concept has also been investigated by the U.S. — tested even, against an old Air Force
satellite last year — and is part of China’s “asymmetric warfare” program, designed to
develop cost-effective, technologically simple concepts of warfare to combat complex
U.S. systems.”
10. An article dated January 21, 2002, written by one Wei Long found on a Chinese web
site said as follows: “A group of Chinese space scientists urged the government to
accelerate acceptance of the proposal to develop an infrastructure in space and regard
developing the “space territory” as a national strategy, the Hong Kong Bureau of the
China News Agency reported last Tuesday (Jan. 15). The group also suggested to claim
access to space as China’s “fourth territory”. In the recently submitted consultation report
“Building of China’s Space-based Infrastructure”, space technology specialist Wang Xiji
of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and three other Academy colleagues
contended that conventional ground-based space facilities would no longer meet future
requirements, so they proposed the construction of a space-based infrastructure.
“The report said that “opening up of outer space would require infrastructure in space;
much like development of land, sea and air which require ground facilities such as
railroads, sea ports, power stations and airports. “Wang elaborated on the concept: “The
so-called space-based infrastructure refers to the engineering system that will be built in
space, and used in developing and exploiting space resources and expanding the
habitation space of humankind. “The system will consist of space vehicles and their
ground supporting facilities which would provide long-term stable functions and services.
In fact, it is an integration of space- and ground-based national development of strategic
infrastructure.”
“The group of CAS space specialists also argued that by virtue of having “vehicles that
take up positions in space and the ability to possess part of the space resources”, a
country would effectively extend its three territorial claims — land, sea and air — into
space; thus the claim of the “fourth territory”. Chinese space scientists recognize that
there is a fierce competition of space resources, but most nations do not currently have
the capability to be a participant. Therefore China should not miss out the opportunity to
be part of the “space civilization”.
“According to the authors of the consultation report, China has “in effect a substantial
capacity to enter, develop and exploit space. One of the reasons that China has not
utilized its full capacity is restricted by a lag in the consciousness of the people and the
nation. “For a long time China has not given a serious regard to its capability to develop,
exploit as well as reap huge political, military and economic benefits from the ‘fourth
territory’. Speaking from this sense, the concept and perspective of ’space territory’ needs
vigorous promotion in China. Developing ’space territory’ should be treated as a
fundamental national strategy along with birth control planning and environment
protection.”
“The report recommends eight areas of space-based infrastructure:
- Discuss issues in building a high-speed information highway;
- Increase steadily the level of performance in meteorology infrastructure;
- Plan resource [Ziyuan series] satellites as part of the national earth-resource
infrastructure;
- Establish a 3-D navigation and positioning infrastructure based on the existing twin
[Beidou series] navigation and positioning satellites foundation;
- Establish a national geographic information infrastructure based on the survey satellite
foundation;
- Planned development of the ocean [Haiyang series] satellites into an ocean observation,
monitoring and research infrastructure;
- Develop as quickly as possible a disaster and environment monitoring infrastructure;
- Develop a comprehensive civilian information network suitable for use during wartime.
“To implement the proposed space-based infrastructure, the report suggests to take a
three-stage approach:
Use effectively satellites that are on-orbit and under development, and place them in the
top tier of planning as a starting foundation. This stage would mark a change in the
direction of Chinese space technology development: from primarily technology of
entering space to technology of utilizing space functions.
Build and effectively use an elementary comprehensive information network, which
would provide effective support of the national development of the space-based
infrastructure. This stage would mark the completion of an elementary space-based
infrastructure. Chinese space technology development enters the phase of fulfilling urgent
requirements and gradually adapting to national development.
Develop sequentially the space-based infrastructure according to the blueprint. This stage
would mark the initial achievement of the strategic development of China’s “fourth
territory”. The space-based infrastructure would have formed a definite scale and
continue to develop to perfection.”
11. A despatch dated October 6, 2006, of the All Headline News of the US said: “The
Pentagon has confirmed that China has tested its anti-satellite laser and jammed a U.S.
satellite but wouldn’t say which satellite was involved. The U.S. has 30 Global
Positioning Satellites that it relies on for a number of tasks. That ranges from military
uses such as targeting bombs and finding enemy locations to consumer uses such as
automobile navigation systems and bank automatic teller machines. The Pentagon’s
National Reconnaissance Office Director Donald Kerr acknowledged the incident to
Defense News last week, but said it did not materially damage the U.S. satellite’s ability
to collect information. “It makes us think,” Kerr said. The incident has sparked
worldwide concerns over the vulnerabilities of communications satellites and has made
watchdog groups to re-consider if satellite problems are caused by malfunctions, weather
anomalies like solar flares, or targeted attacks. Air Force Space Commander General
Kevin Chilton said, “We’re at a point where the technology’s out there and the capability
for people to do things to our satellites is there. I’m focused on it beyond any single
event. “The reports of Beijing’s testing of the anti-satellite laser is likely to reignite the
debate over the U.S.’ own anti-satellite program, Starfire, for which the House of
Representatives attempted to block funding. The funds were reinstated after Air Force
told lawmakers that the program would only be used for tracking.”
12. If the reports that China had its old weather satellite destroyed on January 11,2007,
through a missile fired from the ground are correct, it has thus proven capabilities for
damaging or destroying the space assets of its adversaries through laser directed from the
ground as well as missiles fired from the ground. Does it also have the capability for
using killer satellites and parasites? Parasite satellites are launched in peacetime and
activated when war breaks out.
(The writer, Mr.B.Raman, is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of
India, New Delhi, and presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai. e-mail:
itschen36@gmail.com).