World Development, Vol. 24, No. I, pp.

1209-1221, 1996
Copyright 0 1996 Eisevier Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
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SO305-750X(96)00030-7

Ethical Development
MOZAFFAR QIZILBASH
University of Southampton,

U.K.

Summary. -The subject of this paper is the project of rethinking and redefining development since disenchantment has set in with the view that development is an expansion in material prosperity. This project
is termed Ethical development. It is argued that we are looking for a concept that involves improvements
in the quality of human lives subject to the demands of social justice and freedom. Sens capability
approach, the basic needs approach and the UNDPs conception of human development fall short of providing an adequate foundation for a new paradigm of development. Nussbaums version of the capability

approach is stronger than Sens but fails to provide the basis for a consensual view of development. The
most nromisina approach is one that takes its lead from J. Griffins recent account of well-being. Copyright
0 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd

1. INTRODUCTION
Terms such as development ethics, the ethics of
development,* just,) and human development are
now in wide use in the development literature. So I
must make clear, at the outset, what I mean by the term
ethical development. Ethical development is the
project of rethinking and redefining development,
since some development economists have become disenchanted with the view that economic growth is the
chief objective, and that per capita income is the measure of development. These economists have moved
away from the associated view that development is an
expansion is material prosperity.
The use of the term ethical development is particularly appropriate for this project. The attempts of
economists to rethink the concept of development
have followed three important lines of thinking. These
are that development must be (a) consistent with the
demands of social justice, (b) consistent with the
demands of human freedom, and (c) concerned with
human beings as ends rather than means and with
humanwell-being. Since the nature of human wellbeing, and the claims of freedom and social justice
have been at the heart of ethical enquiry for centuries,
ethics has had an important bearing on the project of
redefining development. Indeed, one attempt to redefine development, Sens capability approach, reflects
this relation of ethics to development theory, in that it
has been developed as a critique of two ethical theories
(namely, utilitarianism and Rawlss theory of justice)
and as a critique of the view that development is an
expansion in material prosperity.
In this paper, I examine the contributions of Sen, the
basic needs school, and the UNDP to rethinking the
concept of development. For each, I highlight limita-

tions of the approach as a possible foundation for a

comprehensive account of development. It is argued
that Nussbaums version of the capability approach
generates a strong variant of Sens capability approach
which is compatible with the basic needs approach, in
a particular sense. Nussbaums Aristotelian approach
to human flourishing may be rejected by many, however, and so fails to provide the basis for a consensual
view of development.
It is argued that the most
promising line to pursue is one which starts from
James Griffins recent writing on human well-being.
A sketch of an account of development grounded on
such a view of well-being is given at the end of the
paper. This approach can also take on the concerns of
the basic needs school within a broader picture of
human values.
I explain the project of ethical development in section 2. Section 3 discusses Sens account, and its limi-

* I owe a debt of gratitude to James Griffin, for inspiration,

for giving me access to unpublished material and helpful
comments. I am also grateful to John Aldrich, Subrata
Ghatak, Reginald Green, Alan Hamlin, Barbara HarrissWhite, Tim Jenkins, John Knight, James Malcolmson, Barry
McCormick, Andrew Oswald, Amartya Sen, Peter Smith,
Frances Stewart, Alistair Ulph, Howard White, an anonymous referee, and discussants at seminars at Southampton,
Oxford and at the Economic and Social Research Councils
Development Economics Study Group Conference at Leicester for comments on previous versions of this paper. I
acknowledge with thanks the financial support of the ESRC
and the ODA in making the Leicester conference possible.
The revised version of this paper was prepared while I was
visiting the Lahore University of Management Sciences; my
thanks to all there who made my work easy. Final revision
accepted: February 8, 1996.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

1210

tations. Section 4 does the same for the basic needs

approach. Section 5 reviews Nussbaums version of
the capability approach and argues that it is more
defensible than Sens. Section 6 describes the UNDPs
concept of human development and various themes
this brings to the debate. Section 7 presents a preliminary and incomplete sketch of a view of development
that is based on James Griffins account of well-being.
Section 8 concludes.

2. ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT
Dissatisfaction
with the traditional view that
development is an expansion in material prosperity,
and with exclusive focus on economic growth, set in
fairly early in the history of development economics.
Economic growth, here, was growth in per capita
income (i.e. per capita GNP). The chief reason for dissatisfaction was that a rise in per capita incomes was
often accompanied
by the persistence of, or an
increase in, absolute poverty. Growth was also often
accompanied by rising inequality. These problems led
to a concern with distribution and social justice. The
growth with redistribution
and basic needs
approaches to development responded to this concern.
The first of these - associated with Chenery (1974) developed measures of growth which would give
some weight to inequality and poverty; the second associated with Streeten (198 1) - argued for giving
priority to meeting the basic needs of the most
deprived. Close to Streeten was Morriss (1979)
approach which argued for looking at the physical
quality of life of the most deprived.
Streeten and Morris, as well as later commentators
(particularly Sen), objected to the concentration on per
capita incomes in development theory, because of the
instrumental role of incomes in increasing well-being.
The primary concern in development, it was argued, is
with improving the quality of human lives. Thus, any
decent approach to development must take seriously
the nature and diversity of human beings, and place
them at the centre of development as the ends rather
than the means of development.4 Any approach that
does so is an account of human development.
Finally, it was noted that economic growth was consistent with excessive restrictions on freedom and violations of human rights by coercive and oppressive
political regimes. Considerations of human freedom
have led Sen as well as Dasgupta (1986, 1989 and
1993) to insist on the intrinsic importance of human
freedom in development. They have led others, such
as Goulet (1989), to be particularly concerned with the
participation of non-elite groups in the formation and
implementation of development strategies.
There are three strands in these attempts to define a
new concept or paradigm of development. These are
that development must (a) give primary import to

human beings and treat humans as the ends rather than

the means of development (b) not be consistent with
the persistence of, or an increase in, poverty or relative
deprivation and (c) give intrinsic importance to freedom. The paradigm is one that envisages people living
better lives consistent with the demands of distributive
justice and freedom. The paradigm is the following:
The paradigm of development (ED): Development
occurs if and only if there is some overall expansion
in humanflourishing
or the quality of human lives
or human well-being consistent with the demands of
social justice and freedom.
The chief reasons for rejecting the traditional view
was that it conflated improvements in human wellbeing with increases in material prosperity or opulence, and entirely ignored the claims of justice and
freedom. In the following sections, I consider the two
leading approaches to rethinking development: the
capability and basic needs approaches. The chief limitations of these approaches to development lie in their
failure to deal adequately with parts of (ED).
The essential link between philosophy and development theory is apparent in (ED). It stems from the fact
that such questions as: what constitutes human wellbeing or flourishing? and what constitutes a just or
free society? are ethical and political questions to
which philosophers, especially in ethical and political
theory, have devoted a great deal of time. The form of
(ED) shows that there are good reasons why philosophers must be involved in the attempts made by economists to redefine development.

3. CAPABILITIES 1: DEVELOPMENT
EMANCIPATION

AS

Sens capability approach is perhaps the most intluential account of human development. It is founded on his
capability approach to the quality of life? This is based
on two grounding concepts:j%nctioning and capability.
The approach has been reformulated in light of much
criticism, so I shah quote recent versions of it, when
necessary. Sen writes that: [fhmctionings represent
parts of the state of a person - in particular the various
things he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.
Lives are thought to be made up of doings and beings.
The quality of life however, is not judged chiefly in
terms of a persons achievements (though these are not
regarded as unimportant). It is assessed in terms of the
capability to achieve valuable ftmctionings. He writes:
The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from
which he or she can choose one collection. The approach
is based on a view of living as a combination of various
beings and doings, with the quality of life to be assessed in
terms of the capability to achieve valuable functionings.

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

The reason for Sens insistence on judging the quality of life in terms of capability is that he wants to give
intrinsic importance to positive freedom,* which he
understands in terms of what the agent can do or be. Of
course, since the capability approach is concerned
with valuable functionings the agent can achieve,
[tlhe freedom to lead different types of life is
reflected in the persons capability set, where the
capability set is the set of beings and doings (or functioning vectors) which she can achieve.
Sens capability approach to development as
capability expansion follows directly from this
account of the quality of life and freedom. His clearest exposition of it comes in his essay Goods and
People, though he has given other more recent
accounts9 He writes that: [tlhe process of economic
development is best seen as an expansion of peoples
capabilities, and development is seen as a process of
emancipation from the enforced necessity to live less
and be less.o
Sens view is that many - especially the most
deprived - in the Third World lead constrained
lives: there are important limitations to what they
can do or be. Development is about liberation from
such constraints. It is here that Sen links his conception of emancipation to Marxs notion of replacing
the domination of circumstances and chance by the
domination of individuals over chance and circumstances*: the conception of emancipation has Marxian overtones.
It is clear, then, how Sen understands freedom and
the quality of life. Justice is also understood in terms
of capabilities: egalitarians must, Sen thinks, express
their ideal in terms of equality of capability.13 This is
an extension of Sens view expressed in his famous
Tanner lecture, Equality of What?,14 that egalitarians must be concerned with equality of basic capabilities, where these were intended to separate out the
ability to satisfy certain crucially important functionings up to certain minimally adequate levels.j5 While
Sen thinks that basic capabilities are linked to certain
needs, and that they consequently have a particular
moral and political urgency and importance,6 he now
thinks of them, primarily, as important in terms of
poverty analysis. Poverty is thought of as a failure to
be able to achieve various crucially important functionings up to minimally adequate levels.17 There is
running throughout this account ofjustice and poverty
the notion that positive freedom matters first and foremost and not the means to freedom. Thus, Sen is
opposed to the view that justice or poverty should be
thought of in terms of commodities or incomes.
This account of justice and poverty helps us to
understand Sens account of development. Clearly, for
Sen, those who live the most constrained lives are
those who suffer from a failure of basic capabilities.
Thus, poverty alleviation must be given considerable
importance in the conception of development.

1211

Furthermore, liberating the poor from extreme constraints clearly implies a more equal distribution of
capability in the process of development.
These considerations allow a formulation of Sens
contribution to the project of ethical development. A
summary of his conception of development, expanded to
take account of his views on equality, is the following:
Sen s conception of development (S): development

occurs if and only if there is an expansion in the

capability set of people, consistent with the
demands of social justice.
It is because of considerations of distributive justice
that Sens account is not simply one of capability
expansion but one of emancipation from the
enforced necessity to live less and be less.* A first
problem with this account is that it is not clear what
sort of priority must be given to the expansion of basic
capabilities (i.e. poverty alleviation) as compared to
other sorts of capabilities. There is the related problem
of how interpersonal comparisons of capability are to
be done. The capability approach is incomplete here,
as Beitz (1986) has pointed out, and Sen has conceded.19Second, while positive freedom is taken into
account nothing is said about negative freedom. Negative freedom is defined by Berlin as, roughly, freedom from external hindrance, coercion or control. It
is invariably discussed by Sen and he insists that it
must have intrinsic importance.2 There is little room
for it however, in his account of development. This
can cause difficulties. Take the following case.
X is severely deprived. To live a valuable life in the
service of humanity he steals from a rich and decrepit
woman. X is successful and thereby considerably
more capable of leading a valuable life. He also helps
others become more capable of leading such lives.
There is a limited reduction in the ability of the old
woman to function.
In this example X has increased his freedom, and
may, to some degree, be liberated from the necessity
to live less and be less. He has also liberated others.
There may be more equality of capability in society as
a whole. I doubt very much that one would want to
say, however, that development has taken place. If it
had, development can simply be achieved by certain
acts of theft, of this sort. There is a related point that is
highlighted by this example: the means by which
freedom is achieved matters a great deal. Indeed, in
this case, the reason why, I suggest, we object to
counting these expansions in freedom as development, is that we object to the means by which they
are achieved. Sens approach is too exclusively concerned with freedom as an end, as compared to the
means of freedom.
The example also shows up the incompleteness of
Sens approach when it comes to interpersonal comparisons. It is not obvious that we can compare the
gains in capability to X, and to those he helps, with the

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

1212

limited loss in capability (say, the ability to live without fear) to the old woman. It seems implausible that
we can make such comparisons without a fuller
account of value. In the absence of such an account,
we may not be able to say whether, overall, development has occurred.
Finally, there is also the difficulty that abilities,
such as the ability to steal, pose for Sens account of
the quality of life. It could, for example, be argued that
it is only because X is severely deprived that he is
capable of theftI Indeed, it can be argued that the ability to steal here reveals the extent of Xs desperation.
Furthermore, it is in cases such as stealing that negative freedom is important; societies typically limit
peoples negative freedom to steal, both through legal
and moral constraints. Indeed, it may be just in the
case of extreme deprivation that an individual ceases
to care about such constraints and so becomes capable
of functionings such as stealing or murder. It is
because Sen fails to give a complete account of the
valuable functionings that are constitutive of good or
flourishing lives that he has difficulty here. Nussbaum
(1988) and Williams (1987) have criticized Sen on
these grounds, and Nussbaums variant of the capability approach, which I discuss below, is largely free of
these problems.
So there are difficulties with Sens account. These
arise primarily because he fails to give a list of capabilities, or functionings, associated with human flourishing, a complete account of interpersonal comparisons, or sufficient importance to the means of freedom and negative freedom. The upshot of the above
criticisms is that not all expansions of capabilities constitute development, even when these expansions meet
the claims of distributive justice, as conceived of by
Sen. Furthermore, when economic transformations
involve expansions in some capabilities and contractions in others (e.g., those associated with traditional
ways of life) the capability approach may not be able
to decide whether development
has occurred,
because of difficulties in making comparisons of capability.

4. BASIC NEEDS
The basic needs approach (henceforth, BNA) is
associated with the name of Paul Streeten, and has
several advocates. I am also concerned with a version
of the approach due to Frances Stewart (1989 and
1994). All versions of the approach articulate the priority of meeting the basic needs of the worlds poor,
over other aims of development. Furthermore, in all
cases there is some notion of full or minimally
decent lives. In one version, Streetens, the basic
needs concept is a reminder that the object of development effort is to provide all human beings with the
opportunity for a full life. Streeten adds that, how-

ever one defines the full life, the opportunity for

achieving it presupposes meeting basic needs. In
Stewarts version, there is some minimally decent or
full life below which people are not supposed to fall;
basic goods are the goods necessary to lead such a
life.Z4In each case, however the BNA is about the priority of meeting basic needs in the process of development, rather than redefining development, altogether.
Stewart writes, for example, that a common perception of development is that it involves a pattern of
sustained economic growth, the benefits of which
extend to the whole of society, including the most
deprived, so that basic needs are met and poverty eliminated.2s Here Stewart does not challenge the importance of income growth; she stresses the importance of
meeting basic needs in the process of growth. Indeed,
this highlights an important point made by Streeten:
that the BNA can be left open so as to embrace previous approaches to development. While there may be
tensions between the income approach and the BNA,
the two are not incompatible. Indeed, the BNA need
not be thought of as an all-embracing strategy of
development, at alLz6
The BNA is an approach to human development,
since maintaining people above the minimum Eevel of
living (where basic needs are met) is the main purpose
of the BNA. The goods that are necessary to achieve
this objective are (at least) such basic goods as food,
health care, shelter, education, water and clothing.
Such goods are only valued instrumentally, however.
They are related to the full life (on Stewarts view)
via a metaproduction function. The BNA is concerned with the full life (or the opportunity to live
such a life) as an end, basic goods as means, and the
relation between these.
Sen has criticized the BNA for its emphasis on
access to basic goods, and thus with the means rather
than ends of development.* Such emphasis however,
has been mostly due to the pragmatics of the BNA.
The approach has also been criticized on the grounds
that it is not entirely clear who will define the list of
basic needs. In practice, however, there is considerable agreement about a core of such needs (nutrition,
health, shelter, literacy and sanitation). Nonmaterial
needs such as participation or self-reliance, which
were stressed by Streeten, are more controversial.
Furthermore, the core list of needs corresponds closely
to the functionings that Sen associates with basic capability, and there seems little to differentiate the two
approaches at the level of policy implications as
regards poverty alleviation.
A philosophical grounding for the BNA can be
found in two different sorts of ethical theory. The first
is that of Rawls (1972), whose theory of justice
included the following principle ofjustice (the difference principle): social and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are . . to the greatest
benefit of the least advantaged.2y This gives one way

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

to justify the priority of the least well-off in the BNA.

The second way is to insist that people have a right to
the fulfilment of certain basic needs, which are
thought of as representing vitalM interests. Wiggins
(1987) supplies a theory that would provide such a
foundation. This rights-based
account derives its
strength from the moral priority of needs over mere
desires in moral debate and it involves some route
from basic needs to human rights, via the justification
of such rights through interests of certain sorts. Either
way, the philosophic grounding of the BNA is through
the special claims of the least well-off in considerations of social justice.3L
In fact, in 1976, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Bights recognized the
right to development which encompassed the right
to basic goods and went beyond these to include the
right to work and to participate in social, cultural and
political development.3* Furthermore, some advocates
of the BNA, such as Frances Stewart, take the view
that human beings do have a right to the fulfilment of
basic needs, though she has discussed this view mostly
from a strategic point of view.
The BNA has done a great deal to put the cause of
the most deprived to the forefront of the development
debate. While the BNA can be grounded in various
highly regarded philosophic theories, however, it is
unlikely to provide the foundation of a general theory
of human development, as Gasper (1995) has recently
suggested it might. There are several reasons for this.
First, it is not clear what sort of priority meeting basic
needs has over other aims of developmentg3 It is
implausible that the priority of such needs is lexical;
there seems to be scope for trade-offs. It is unlikely
that any sacrifice is justified in the fulfilment of basic
needs. Furthermore, as Streeten (1984) has pointed
out, while some might accept that people have a right
to a minimum standard of living, it is clear that this
right may conflict with other rights and difficult decisions have to be made about which of the rights has
priority or whether rights can be weighed against each
other.
Indeed, concerns about rights and negative freedom
must be accommodated in the BNA, if it is to provide
a general theory of development. This is particularly
the case because some countries, such as China, have
done well in the achievement of basic needs, at various
times, but have done so through extraordinary constraints on freedom. In cases such as this, a basic needs
strategy has been successful but the paradigm of
development has clearly not been realized. Finally,
even if there are reasons to concentrate on the fulfilment of the needs of the most deprived, some account
must be taken of the rest of the population. This is
important because, as Sen has argued, the meeting of
basic needs may be accompanied by large increases in
the well-being of other members of the population.
The overall effect may be an increase in relative depri-

1213

vation. Indeed, the BNA has tended to devalue the

objective of equality, as compared to that of meeting
basic needs.36 The BNA may not, then, be consistent
with the demands of social justice as articulated by
many egalitarians.

5. CAPABILITIES 2: DEVELOPMENT
EMPOWERMENT

AS

Nussbaums account of capabilities avoids many of

the difficulties associated with Sens approach; it also
links the capability and needs approaches in an interesting manner which echoes Marxs The Economic
and Political Manuscripts. The reason that Nussbaum
has relatively few of Sens problems is that she gives a
list of capabilities, which are based on an Aristotelian
account of flourishing, virtuous lives and social justice. Furthermore, she gives importance to negative
freedom.
I define someone as negatively free to Y (where to
Y is to do or to be, so that Ying is functioning), if and
only if she is not in any way hindered from Ying.j8 In
the stealing example, above, while X was positively
free to Y, in the sense that he was capable of Ying,
Ying was the sort of thing that was almost certainly
morally or socially prohibited. So X was not negatively free to Y.
Nussbaum
takes such problems
into account
through her distinction between I and E-capabilities.
I-capabilities
are, roughly, capabilities
that are
internal to the person; E-capabilities involve external factors that facilitate the exercise of I-capabilities. Furthermore, the relevant capabilities are, in a
sense, ethical or moral;39 they are capabilities for
leading a virtuous life,4o which is conceived of as
right functioning in various realms of experience.
Much of this needs qualification because, as Nussbaum notes, Aristotle does not have our modem conception of morals, nor are all Aristotelian virtues
moral, in modem terms4 In this account of capabilities for functioning well, however, there is little
room for functionings such as stealing from decrepit
old women.
Nussbaums formal definition of I-capability runs:
[a] person is I-capable of function A at time t if and
only if the person is so organized at t that, should the
appropriate circumstances
present themselves, the
person can choose an A action.42 Nussbaum is aware,
however, that outside forces may be important in hindering one from leading a virtuous life: in the earlier
terminology, the agent must be both positively and
negatively free to lead a good life. Thus, her definition
of E-capability: [a] person is E-capable of function A
at time t, if and only if at t the person is I-capable of A
and there are no circumstances present that impede or
prevent the exercise of A.43
If someone is E-capable of Ying, she is, in the ear-

1214

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

lier terminology, both positively and negatively free to

Y: she has the relevant abilities and dispositions
required to Y and there is nothing external hindering her
from Ying. Thus, if someone is E-capable there is no
conflict between positive and negative freedoms: this
was the crux of the difficulty in the stealing example.
Nussbaum thus takes account of and rules out
vicious capabilities; she insists on certain capabilities,
specifically those that are needed to function well and
live virtuously (i.e. to choose to function in the right
way, in the appropriate circumstances, in the relevant
area of experience). Here good functioning must be
seen in the context of her objective Aristotelian
account of human flourishing.
As regards social justice, Nussbaum argues that distribution must be according to basic capabilities or
B-capabilities. These are unfulfilled capabilities and
distinct from Sens basic capabilities described
above. To avoid confusion, I refer to Nussbaums
basic capabilities simply as B-capabilities.
She
defines them as follows: [a], person is B-capable of
function A if and only if the person has an individual
constitution organized so as to A, given the provision
of the suitable training, time, and other instrumental
necessary conditions.45
She argues that, for Aristotle, just distribution is
based on peoples possession of B-capabilities and
that education is required to develop these into I-capabilities. Other instrumental necessary conditions are
then required to turn these into E-capabilities. She
argues, further, that for Aristotle the best political
arrangement is that arrangement . . according to
which anyone whosoever. . . might do best. . . and live
a flourishing life.* Thus, the idea is that functions
must be distributed according to B-capabilities, which
must be developed and refined and, further, people
must be given the sort of environment in which they
can flourish. Finally, the possibility of such flourishing lives must be open to anyone at all.
This approach has many of the ingredients of a good
account of development. A paradigm of development
that takes its inspiration from it is:
Nussbaums conception of development (N): (i)
Development occurs if and only tf there is some
overall expansion in peoples I and E-capabilities
to lead flourishing
lives consistent with the
demands of social justice. (ii) Social justice
demands that functions be distributed on the basis
of B-capabilities, and that the possibility ofjlourishing lives be open to all.
(N)(i) needs some explanation. For Nussbaum, this
would mean something like: development occurs if
there is an expansion in capabilities to function well;
expansions would include any move from B-capabilities to I-capabilities or more E-capabilities for existing
I-capabilities. One would have to be concerned both

with education of B-capabilities and with making possible the exercise of I-capabilities. The notion of
development that is implicit is of development as
empowerment. It is a conception that is close to Sens,
but not identical with it.
The chief differences between this paradigm and
Sens are in the role of freedom, and in the very precise
account of flourishing. Whereas Sen conceives of
development in Marxian terms as an emancipation
from enforced necessity, Nussbaum primarily looks
to Marx and Aristotle for an account of our shared
humanity which helps ground a culturally non-relative
account of human flourishing and development. Nevertheless, as in Sens account, the demands of freedom
are captured in capabilities? Indeed, as I have argued,
if a person is E-capable of Ying, in Nussbaums sense,
that person must be both positively and negatively free
to Y.
There remains the question of whether, in spite of
the above considerations, this conception of development may be consistent with considerable restrictions
on freedom. This difficulty is associated with Aristotles own account of politics, which is notoriously
anti-democratic. In Nussbaums case, the problem is
bound up with the fact that Nussbaums account of
human flourishing is objective, and may conflict with
various peoples personal views of the good life. The
question that arises is whether coercion or constraints
on liberty are justified to make reluctant people act and
live well. Nussbaum is relatively free from criticism
on these grounds. First, Nussbaum rejects the idea that
people be forced to live particular lives. For her the
virtuous life is only virtuous if it is chosen, as such.
Indeed, her description of the attempts of a Rural
Advancement Committee in Bangladesh to improve
female literacy shows that she thinks that her paradigm of development work is a sort of interactive
approach, whereby workers immerse themselves in
the local way of life and help the community grasp the
usefulness of various capabilities (such as literacy)
that they do not possess. As regards personal liberty,
again Nussbaum puts great emphasis on choice, and,
in general, her work is free of the anti-democratic
views with which Aristotle is associated: her intention
is to define a form of Aristotelian Social Democracy. WI expect that she will accept that negative freedom has to be restricted to the degree that this helps
people to flourish, and this seems to be the point of her
notion of E-capability. One might construe this ungenerously, but her writings do not call for such an interpretation.5
Finally, while there is no talk of emancipation in
Nussbaum, her account is influenced by Marxs
account of human need in the The Economic and
Political Manuscripts. In particular, she associates
her conception of B-capability with need, since Bcapabilities are thought of as unfulfilled and thus as
generating special claims on those who are concerned

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

with distribution with a view to flourishing lives. Here

she echoes Marxs notions of the rich human being
and the rich human need.52 So clearly there is scope
for subsuming the BNA within Nussbaums account
of capabilities.
The chief difficulty with Nussbaums approach to
development is that it is based on Aristotles account of
the virtuous life, which involves a singular and objective account of the good life. As she ~tates,5~very few
philosophers today hold to this view and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to have a consensus about the
paradigm of development on the basis of this account of
flourishing. It may be easier to found a consensus
around her list of capabilities. That alone however is not
enough. Furthermore, like Sen, Nussbaum fails to deal
with interpersonal comparisons of capability, though it
is not clear how this might affect her approach. In much
of her work she argues that values are, in some sense,
incommensurable. If they are, interpersonal comparisons may not be possible. So it may not be possible to
compare one persons capability loss with anothers
gain. Finally, while it is clear why Nussbaum thinks that
distribution should be on the basis of B-capability or
need, it is not at all clear that this is an easy thing to carry
out. The most important reason for this is that there is
typically asymmetric information about peoples abilities; the state is likely to be less well informed than the
agents whose B-capabilities are involved. In the circumstances, there may be incentive problems involving
moral hazard and adverse selection, and Nussbaum says
nothing of such problems.

6. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: PARTICIPATION

AND SUSTAINABILITY
The concept of human development used by the
UNDP in the 1990 Human Development Report owes
a great deal to the approaches that have been discussed
above. The emphasis
is on enlarging peoples
choices. These include access to income, a long
healthy life, education, a decent standard of living,
political freedom, guaranteed human rights and personal self-respect.55 Furthermore, the concern is not
just with capabilities but with their use. The environment in which capabilities are exercised matters. The
report states that the basic objective of development is
to create an enabling environment for people to live
long, healthy and creative lives.5b Finally, human
beings must have a decisive voice in shaping their
political frameworks: the UNDP gives explicit importance to participation.
The approach is close to Sen, since it is concerned
with increasing choice. It echoes the BNA since it is
concerned with access to basic goods and with participation. It also puts explicit importance on political freedom and rights (and thus, negative freedom). In this
respect, it goes beyond some of the other approaches.

1215

By incorporating participation, the UNDP also takes

account of another tradition in development, associated with Goulet (1989), who writes that participation, or some role-playing by intended beneficiaries, is
an indispensable part of development.57
Participation is, of course, included in Streetens list
of nonmaterial basic needs. Its status however, as a
basic need (even if one accepts that it is a need) is not
uncontroversial. Irrespective of its status as a need,
one might nonetheless think of participation as something that matters in defining development. There is
certainly room for it within the capability approach.
Participation can be viewed as falling within that
approach, since the concern there is with positive freedom and autonomy, which might encompass the ability to participate in ones own development.
The concern with participation stems, in part, from a
concern with the imposition of development by elite
groups on non-elite groups, in the form of Western and
modem techniques or goods which are inappropriate to
local conditions. Indeed, a perception that the traditional view of development encompassed the notions
of modernization and Westernization is reflected
in the literature on participation and authentic development:* and in the UNDPs concept of human development. Much of this would tit well with Nussbaums
capability approach, since (as stated above) Nussbaum
has insisted that development
workers must be
involved with the intended beneficiaries of their work
and show the latter how and why various capabilities
are relevant to their lives. Indeed, Nussbaum and Sen
(1989) have jointly argued for an Aristotelian view that
any good account of development involves an account
of value that will be rooted in the experience of the people and genuinely practi~al.~~ Nussbaum and Sen both
argue that any critique of traditional practices must be
internal to society and made from a position of immersion in a culture: it cannot be made from the outside
from a detached point of view. Thus, the concern with
participatory development can be taken on board by
either capability approach.
In the 1994 Human Development Repoti, the UNDP
conception of human development is still closer to the
capability approach of Nussbaum. The new paradigm
of development is one which enables all individuals
to enlarge their human capabilities to the full and to
put those capabilities to their best use in all fields economic, social, cultural and political.M It also protects the options of unborn generations, however, and
thus insists on sustainable development which is environmentally friendly. Thus, there is explicit emphasis
on intergenerational justice, which has received scant
attention from some commentators mentioned above.
Finally, inasmuch as equity is valued, it is as equality
of opportunities.6 This is again close to Sen and Nussbaum, though it is also very close to related proposals
in the philosophical literature.62
In short, the UNDPs conception seems to take a

1216

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

little from all the various views of human development

presented here, and draws our attention to participation, sustainability and human rights. It gives the
impression at present, however, of being more a set of
slogans than a coherent approach to development. The
importance of the UNDP conception is more in bringing the notion of human development to a wide audience, and in making it strategically important in international policy making, than in making a coherent
contribution to the project of ethical development.

7. HUMAN WELL-BEING, PRUDENTIAL

VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT
I want now to sketch a new conception of development, which takes its inspiration from the recent writing of Griffin (1991, 1992, 1993a and 1993b and
1994). The sketch is a preliminary one, which starts
from Griffins account of well-being and prudential
value. Prudential values cover, roughly, everything
that makes a persons life go better. They are distinct from moral values (such as justice) and aesthetic
values (such as beauty). Griffin has argued that certain
prudential values are shared amongst human beings
and that recognition of these values is crucial to our
seeing each other as human beings. Griffin is here
directly echoing the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein
and Donald Davidson. He writes that we tend to overlook how central certain prudential values are to our
concept of a human person or of his agency.63 Furthermore, he writes: I cannot see you as a fellow
human being without seeing you as having certain
aims, likes, aversions-in
short without seeing you as
sharing certain prudential values with me.@
While Griffin insists that recognition of certain
core prudential values (such as the avoidance of
pain) is necessary for our mutual intelligibility as
humans, he does not insist that all prudential values
are shared, in this sense. A value such as accomplishment - which he singles out as the sort of
achievement that gives life point and weight - is the
sort of thing that makes a life go better but it is not necessary for our mutual intelligibility or recognition as
humans. This sort of non-core value may play a part
in some peoples lives but not in the lives of others.
Some may find the pursuit of accomplishment
too
stressful. Nevertheless,
Griffin thinks that accomplishment is the sort of thing that will be generally recognized as prudentially valuable, even if it is the sort
of thing that some person, in particular, does not give
weight to. Non-core values are shared in this sense. He
gives the following conception of prudential value:
[tlo see anything as prudentially valuable we have
got to see it as enhancing life in a generally intelligible
way, in a way that pertains to human life.65 Griffin
argues that prudential deliberation leads us to a list of
prudential values. He puts forward this one: (1)

accomplishment (2) the components of a charactetistitally human existence (autonomy, liberty, and minimum material provision) (3) understanding (4) enjoyment and (5) deep personal relations.@
Griffin accepts that one might disagree with this
list. His important point is that prudential deliberation leads us to a list of this sort, which contains the
whole range of prudential values. Some values may
matter more than others so that one will typically
assign relative weights to them.68 Some might play no
part at all in a particular life. Furthermore, there is considerable scope for individual variations: you may
enjoy playing rugby; I may enjoy chess. Both are
instances of the value enjoyment. This is a promising account of well-being for an approach to human
development. The reason for this is that if the list of
prudential values contains elements that will be recognized as valuable for anyone, it can provide a basis for
a consensual view of (human) development among
people with diverging personal views of the good life.
This is precisely where Nussbaum falls short. Like
Nussbaum, however, Griffins account concentrates
on values that make a distinctively human life go well.
Thus, his view is also culturally non relative inasmuch
as he is concerned with values which are recognizably
human, and not culture bound. Some such view is
indeed needed to ground an account of human development, which is relevant to any human culture, but
open to different specifications in different contexts
and cultures.
In the context of the development debate, I suggest a
different list of prudential values: (1) certain, at least
minimal, levels of health, nutrition, sanitation, shelter
and security (2) certain, at least minimal, capacities,
including (a) literacy and (b) certain basic intellectual
and physical capacities (3) self-respect and aspiration
(4) positive freedom or autonomy (5) negative freedom
or liberty (6) enjoyment (7) understanding or knowledge (8) significant relations with others and some par
ticipation in social life and (9) accomplishment.
This list is a variation on Griffins. Looking at the
list, it is clear that the BNA and Sens approach have
highlighted certain elements of it. The BNA has been
mainly concerned with categories (1) and (2a) listed
above. Some of the items listed (autonomy and participation) are close to Streetens nonmaterial needs,
so that the broad definition of basic needs would
include elements of (4) and (8). Sen, on the other hand,
has done a great deal to put the emphasis on category
(4), and has tried to subsume categories (l), (2) and (3)
under (4), by arguing that people without these values
are unfree. There is a strong case to be made however,
for the other elements on the list. Indeed, when Sen
argues that many people in developing countries are
falling far short of their utmost,@ it is to the lack of a
value like accomplishment that he seems to be referring. Putting the emphasis on the lack of a value like
accomplishment in many peoples lives, points the

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

way to thinking of many lives in the underdeveloped

world as frittered away, wasted and lacking in any
point or meaning. This seems to be a common and
accurate perception. Sens account of it as an absence
of positive freedom or capability is inadequate.
Each member of the above list is a candidate for
prudential value, for any human being, in any culture,
with any personal view of the good. The list is mostly
made up of intrinsic rather than instrumental values:
things that are valuable in themselves (such as personal relations and enjoyment) rather than means to
the good. Some items on the list, such as sanitation and
shelter might be thought of as means, not valuable in
themselves. I would suggest that they are instrumental
necessary conditions for human beings to be able to
pursue their conceptions of the good. I doubt the distinction however, between ends and means is of great
importance in defining the list.
The list also draws our attention to certain values
that some feel are more present in certain underdeveloped countries than in developed ones. The lack
of a sense of community and various forms of traditional social activity, the perception of a fragmented
and atomistic existence in the more developed countries, lead some to view the underdeveloped world
as, in certain respects, more developed and civilized
than the West. This view would be very hard to make
sense of in the BNA or indeed on Sens capability
approach. Yet the view seems perfectly comprehensible in Griffins prudential value theory. The reason is
that Griffin allows for important values that the other
approaches do not emphasize.
To move from a list of prudential values to a view
of development, we need to accommodate the claims
of freedom and justice. In Griffins account of wellbeing, freedom is taken on board as a prudential
value. It is not clear what account of egalitarian justice one would want to develop, in the context of this
view of well-being. I suggest that the best egalitarian
position would be one that insisted on people having
equal prospects or opportunities for leading prudentially valuable lives. I shall not develop this formulation here.l It is clear, furthermore, that anyone
who is lacking in the prudential values under (1) and
(2a) above, must count as seriously impoverished.
These values I refer to as basic prudential values. A
person may be said to be living in poverty if her life is
sufficiently lacking in the basic values of minimal
health, nutrition, shelter, sanitation, security, and literacy. There is a strong case for giving these values priority in the conception of development. Finally, it is
important to take as a backdrop, for the following
account of development, some set of moral values,
social norms and legal constraints that are necessary
for society to function in the best interests of its members. In this regard, certain sorts of human disposition
altruism, kindness, courage etc. must be
regarded as valuable from a moral (rather than pru-

1217

dential) point of view. While moral values and virtuous dispositions are taken into account, however, only
the profile of prudential values matters in judging the
quality of life. Morals do, however, have an important
role in deciding the extent of freedom, particularly, of
negative freedom. They do so by defining obligations
for individuals and other agencies (governments etc.)
and rights which protect certain freedoms. Development cannot be consistent with the violation of certain
rights. The account of development, then, requires an
account of certain basic human rights; again I cannot
give one here.
The account of development I suggest is:
An alternative conception of development (D):
(i) Development occurs if and only if people live
more prudentially valuable lives consistent with the
demands of social justice and morality. (ii) Social
justice demands (a) that particular importance be
put on peoples lives containing the elements of
basic prudential value and (b) that people have
equal prospects for living prudentially valuable
lives; morality demands that rights protect certain
freedoms.
This is not a complete account on its own. It is
important to note however, that concerns in the development debate about participation, gender and intergenerational justice can be accommodated within it.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to give some notion of the
priority or weight to be placed on the interests of the
least well-off and of the way in which interpersonal
comparisons must be done. More needs to be said
about the formulation of the egalitarian ideal and about
what freedoms people have, when they must be protected and what to do in the case of a conflict of rights.
Griffin has discussed some of these issues; I shall not
develop his views here.*
So the picture I have sketched is a starting point. It
has many of the elements of what one would want in
an account of human development. By incorporating
the claims of morality, it rules out the difficulty Sen
has in the example in section 3, and sets bounds on
negative freedom. Perhaps something also has to be
said about the way in which morality changes, and the
way we question and refine our social norms and
moral beliefs. That discussion however, is perhaps
best left to one side as concerning the moral development of society.
The approach is, as I have argued, consistent with
pluralism and ought to provide a basis for a consensual
view of human development. In this respect, it is
preferable to Nussbaums account. It is important that
Griffins account is culturally non relative in terms of
prudence: it does not demand non relativity in terms
of morality. It seems undeniable that different societies have evolved different moral norms. I suspect
that some moral norms and values such as justice and

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

1218

the protection of certain freedoms such as freedom of

speech, association and worship are fairly universal. It
would be a mistake, however, to use any more than
a very thin account of morality in defining development. It is here that the most important disagreements
among human beings and cultures take place and must
do so.
The conception of basic value offers a tool for
poverty analysis which is a little different from
Sens conception of basic capability. A life that
contains the elements of the basic prudential values
is much the same as the minimally decent life of
the BNA. Thus, an important aspect of the BNA is
incorporated in the approach. The ideas of the BNA
however, are embedded in a full account of prudential value.
A final argument in favour of this approach is that
the account of prudential value is as relevant for
rich as for poor countries. Both Sens capability
approach and the BNA are very much concerned with
thinking about development in terms of liberation
from or removal of the most extreme forms of deprivation. Nussbaums approach does not have this limiting characteristic. The view of development that
takes its lead from Griffins account of well-being
certainly does not. This is not least because Griffin
means to single out in his profile of prudential values
a chart to the various high points human life can rise
to.74 So the account of well-being and development
is as appropriate for countries where there is widespread extreme poverty and deprivation, as for others
where there is not.

8. CONCLUSIONS
We have come far in trying to rethink and redefine
development since dissatisfaction with the conception of
development as an expansion in material prosperity (and
the related focus on per capita GNP) set it. In this paper, I
have argued that what we are looking for is a conception
of development as an expansion in human flourishing,
well-being, or the quality of peoples lives, subject to the
claims of freedom and social justice. I have argued that
Sens view of development as capability expansion and
the UNDP s concept of human development fall short of
the conception of development we are looking for. The
BNA was not developed as a general theory of develop
ment, but is unlikely to provide a foundation for such a
theory. Nussbaums capability approach is perhaps the
strongest version of the capability approach. A version of
it which takes on the UNDPs concerns with participation and intergenerational justice seems to be the best
direction for the capability approach to go in.
There are, however, difficulties with Nussbaums
approach since it is based on an Aristotelian account of
flourishing and the virtuous life, which may not be
accepted by many. Thus, despite her manifest concern
with pluralism and consensus, her capability approach is
unlikely to provide a basis for a consensual view of
development. The most promising view of development
comes, I have argued, from James Grifftns account of
human well-being. Such a view has been sketched here:
the main reason to recommend this is that it is based on
the idea that prudential deliberation leads us to a list of
prudential values that must be accepted by any human
being, whatever her individual view of the good life. It is
thus consistent with pluralism.

NOTES
1.

Cracker (1991).

10. Sen (1984b), pp. 509-510.

2.

Ingham (1993).

11. See Sen (1984a). p. 509.

3.

Naqvi (1992).

12. Sen (199Ob). p. 44.

4.

Sen (1990b) pp. 4243

5.

See Sen (1993, 1992, 1990a and 199Ob, 1988, 1987,

1985a and 1985b. 1984a and 1984b and 1980).

makes this point very clearly.

13. See Sen (199Ob), and Sen (1992), chapter 5.

14. Sen (1980).
15. Sen(1993),p.41.

6.
Particularly Beitz (1986), Sugden (1986 and 1993), Basu
(1987), Williams (1987), Nussbaum (1988), Ameson (1989),
Cohen ( 1989 and 1993), Cracker (1992) and Gaertner (1993).

16. Sen (1993, p. 40.

17. Sen (1993), p. 42.

7.

Sen (1993) p. 31.

18. Sen (1984b), p. 510.

8.
Sens version of this concept is similar but different to
Berlins (1969), pp. 131-134.
9.

See Sen (1988 and 1990b).

19. Sen (1993). pp. 48-49 thinks of the incompleteness as a

virtue, since he wishes to leave his approach open to different
views of value and weighting.

ETHICAL DEVELOPMENT

1219

20. Berlin (1%9), p. 122.

49. See Nussbaum (1993). p. 258.

21. See Sen (1985b) and (1984a). for example.

50. Nussbaum (1989).

22. It may be argued that the failure of capabilities in this

example is a failure to be able to refrain from stealing. X is, as
it were, compelled to steal and in that degree unfree. While
Sen may indeed want to say this, his failure to distinguish
between doing and refraining from doing limits his ability to make such a defence.

51. Charles (1988), pp. 202-204 expresses worries along

these lines in his critique of Nussbaum. His concern is with
Nussbaums account as a piece of Aristotelian exegesis; my
concern is with Nussbaums own account as a contender for
serious consideration. I do think that Nussbaums is a charitable and attractive account of Aristotle, but that is not the issue
here.

23. Streeten etal. (1981), p. 21.

52. Nussbaum (1988), p. 145.
24. See Stewart (1989). pp. 352-353.
53. Nussbaum (1993). p. 243.
25. Stewart (1989), p. 360.
54. See Nussbaum (1986), p. 294.
26. Streeteneral.(1981),pp.32-41.
55. UNDP (1990), p. 1.
27. Sen(1984b),p.513.
56. see UNDP (1990). p. 9.
28. Streeten et al. (1981), p. 34.
57. Goulet (1989). p. 175.
29. Bawls (1972). p. 83.
58. Cracker (1991).
30. For a critique of this view, see Gtiffin (1986), chapter 3.
59. Nussbaum and Sen (1989), p. 308.
31. Sec.Wiggins (1987), pp. 44-57.
60. UNDP (1994), p. 4.
32. See Stewart (1989), p. 348.
61. UNDP (1994), p. 14.
33. See Streeten eral. (1981). p. 55.
62. See Cohen (1989) and Richard Ameson (1989).
34. Streeten (1984). p. 974.
63. Griftin (1991), p. 51.
35. Sen (1984b), pp. 514-515.
64. Griffin (1991).
36. Streeten et&. (1981), p. 17.
65. Griffin (1991), p. 652.
31. For the basic capabilities see Nussbaum (1990). p. 225
and Nussbaum (1992). p. 222.
38. See Berlin (1%9), p. 122.
39. Nussbaum (1988), p. 170.
40. Nussbaum (1993) gives a fuller account.
41. Nussbaum (1988), p. 170.
42. Nussbaum (1988), p. 160.
43. Nussbaum(l988), p. 164.
44. See Nussbaum (1993). pp. 263-265 and Nussbaum
(1995).

66. This list in Griffin (1991, 1992, 1993a and 1993b and
1995).
67. Griffin (1991), p. 62.
68. The prudential values are at least, in this sense, taken to
be commensurable.
69. Sen (1984b), p. 509.
70. It is important that Griffin (1991). p. 60, does not intend
to mean by accomplishment simply achievement since. he
thinks that one can achieve a great deal without accomplishing much.
71. See Qizilbash (1995).
72. See Griffin (1986 and 1991).

45. Nussbaum (1988). p. 166.

47. Nussbaum discusses rights in Nussbaum (1990).

73. In this sense the approach manages to do something similar to Griffins sueuestions in WeN-Beinn(Griffin, 1986) D.
53, that [a]11ba&-needs will have the; place, and imGtance marked in the hierarchy of prudential value.

48. Nussbaum (1988). p. 153.

74. Grifftn (1986), p. 64.

46. Nussbaum (1988). p. 146.

1220

WORLD DEVELOPMENT

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