beyond the control of Congress and the Courts" and ruled that the constitutional article on the

amending process "is nothing more than a part of the Constitution thus ordained by the people. Hence,
in construing said section, We must read it as if the people had said, The Constitution may be
amended, but it is our will that the amendment must be proposed and submitted to Us for ratification
only in the manner herein provided." 27
This Court therein stressed that "This must be so, because it is plain to Us that the framers of the
Constitution took care that the process of amending the same should not be undertaken with the same
ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation. Constitution making is the most valued power,
second to none, of the people in a constitutional democracy such as the one our founding fathers have
chosen for this nation, and which we of the succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the
Constitution affects the lives, fortunes, future and every other conceivable aspect of the lives of all the
people within the country and those subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in
preparing and drafting it. A constitution worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be
prepared in haste without adequate deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any
amendment of the Constitution is of no less importance than the whole Constitution itself, and perforce
must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation;" and that "written constitutions
are supposed to be designed so as to last for some time, if not for ages, or for, at least, as long as they
can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must be insulated against
precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies. Thus, as a
rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less stringent, made
so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment." 28
9. The convening of the interim National Assembly to exercise the constituent power to proposed
amendments is the only way to fulfill the express mandate of the Constitution.
As Mr. Justice Fernando emphasized for this Court in Mutuc v. Comelec 29 in the setting aside of a
Comelec resolution banning the use of political taped jingles by candidates for Constitutional
Convention delegates in the special 1970 elections, "the concept of the Constitution as the
fundamental law. setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from
the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government. That is to
manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the
legal hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the functions with which it is
entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be
observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in the execution of the laws
cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in
deciding cases, the judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental
law."cralaw virtua1aw library
This is but to give meaning to the plain and clear mandate of section 15 of the Transitory Provisions
(which allows of no other interpretation) that during the stage of transition the interim National
Assembly alone exercises the constituent power to propose amendments, upon special call therefor.
This is reinforced by the fact that the cited section does not grant to the interim National Assembly the
same power granted to the regular National Assembly of calling a constitutional convention, thus
expressing the will of the Convention (and presumably of the people upon ratification) that if ever the
need to propose amendments arose during the limited period of transition, the interim National
Assembly alone would discharge the task and no constitutional convention could be called for the
purpose.
As to the alleged costs involved in convening the interim National Assembly to propose amendments,
among them its own abolition, (P24 million annually in salaries alone for its 400 members at
P60,000.00 per annum per member, assuming that its deliberations could last for one year), suffice it
to recall this Courts pronouncement in Tolentino (in rejecting a similar argument on the costs of
holding a plebiscite separately from the general elections for elective officials) that "it is a matter of
public knowledge that bigger amounts have been spent or thrown to waste for many lesser
objectives. . . . Surely, the amount of seventeen million pesos or even more is not too much a price to

pay for fealty and loyalty to the Constitution . . ." 30 and that "while the financial costs of a separate
plebiscite may be high, it can never be as much as the dangers involved in disregarding clear mandate
of the Constitution, no matter how laudable the objective" and "no consideration of financial costs shall
deter Us from adherence to the requirements of the Constitution." 31
10. The imposition of martial law (and "the problems of rebellion, subversion, secession, recession,
inflation and economic crisis -a crisis greater than war") 32 cited by the majority opinion as justifying
the concentration of powers in the President, and the recognition now of his exercising the constituent
power to propose amendments to the Fundamental Law "as agent for and in behalf of the people" 33
has no constitutional basis.
In the post-war Emergency Powers 33* , former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras reaffirmed for the Court the
principle that emergency in itself cannot and should not create power. "In our democracy the hope and
survival of the nation lie in the wisdom and unselfish patriotism of all officials and in their faithful
adherence to the Constitution."
The martial law clause of the 1973 Constitution found in Article IX, section 12, as stressed by the writer
in his separate opinion in the Referendum Cases, 34 "is a verbatim reproduction of Article VII, section
10 (2) of the 1935 Constitution and provides for the imposition of martial law only in case of invasion,
insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it and hence the
use of the legislative power or more accurately military power under martial rule is limited to such
necessary measures as will safeguard the Republic and suppress the rebellion (or invasion)." 35
11. Article XVII, section 3 (2) of the 1973 Constitution which has been held by the majority in the
Referendum Cases to be the recognition or warrant for the exercise of legislative power by the
President during the period of martial law is but a transitory provision. Together with the martial law
clause, they constitute hut two provisions which are not to be considered in isolation from the
Constitution but as mere integral parts thereof which must he harmonized consistently with the entire
Constitution.
As Cooley restated the rule: "effect is to be given, if possible, to the whole instrument, and to every
section and clause. If different portions seem to conflict, the courts must harmonize them, if
practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather
than one which may make some words idle and nugatory.
"This rule is applicable with special force to written constitutions, in which the people will be presumed
to have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the