I
disagree. It is inconsistent with the plenary power of the people to give or withhold their assent to a
proposed Constitution to maintain that they can do so only wholly. I cannot imagine any sound
principle that can be invoked to support the theory that the proposing authority can limit the power of
ratification of the people. As long as there are reliable means by which only partial approval can be
manifested, no cogent reason exists why the sovereign people may not do so. True it is that no
proposed Constitution can be perfect and it may therefore be taken with the good and the bad in it, but
when there are feasible ways by which it can be determined which portions of it, the people
disapprove, it would be stretching technicality beyond its purported office to render the final authority
the people impotent to act according to what they deem best suitable to their interests.
In any event, I feel it would be of no consequence to debate at length regarding the legal feasibility of
qualified ratification. Proclamation 1103 categorically declares that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, fourteen million nine hundred seventy six thousand five hundred sixty-one (14,976.561)
members of all the Barangays voted for the adoption of the proposed Constitution, as against seven
hundred forty-three thousand eight hundred sixty-nine (743,869) who voted for its rejection; but a
majority of those who approved the new Constitution conditioned their votes on the demand that the
interim National Assembly provided in its Transitory Provisions should not be convened."cralaw
virtua1aw library
and in consequence, the President has acted accordingly by not convening the Assembly. The above
factual premises of Proclamation 1103 is not disputed by petitioners. Actually, it is binding on the
Court, the same being a political act of a coordinate department of the government not properly
assailed as arbitrary or whimsical. At this point, it must be emphasized in relation to the contention
that a referendum is only consultative, that Proclamation 1103, taken together with Proclamation 1102
which proclaimed the ratification of the Constitution, must be accorded the same legal significance as
the latter proclamation, as indeed it is part and parcel of the act of ratification of the Constitution,
hence not only persuasive but mandatory. In the face of the incontrovertible fact that the sovereign
people have voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly, and faced with the
problem of amending the Constitution in order precisely to implement the peoples rejection of that
Assembly, the problem of constitutional dimension that confronts Us, is how can any such amendment
be proposed for ratification by the people?
To start with, it may not be supposed that just because the office or body designed by the
constitutional convention to perform the constituent function of formulating proposed amendments
has been rendered inoperative by the people themselves, the people have thereby foreclosed the
possibility of amending the Constitution no matter how desirable or necessary this might be. In this
connection, I submit that by the very nature of the office of the Presidency in the prevailing scheme of
government we have it being the only political department of the government in existence it is
consistent with basic principles of constitutionalism to acknowledge the Presidents authority to
perform the constituent function, there being no other entity or body lodged with the prerogative to
exercise such function.
There is another consideration that leads to the same conclusion. It is conceded by petitioners that
with the non-convening of the interim Assembly, the legislative authority has perforce fallen into the
hands of the President, if only to avoid a complete paralysis of law-making and resulting anarchy and
chaos. It is likewise conceded that the provisions of Section 3 (2) of Article XVII invest the President
with legislative power for the duration of the transition period. From these premises, it is safe to
conclude that in effect the President has been substituted by the people themselves in place of the
interim Assembly. Such being the case, the President should be deemed as having been granted also
the cognate prerogative of proposing amendments to the Constitution. In other words, the force of
necessity and the cognate nature of the act justify that the department exercising the legislative
faculty be the one to likewise perform the constituent function that was attached to the body rendered
impotent by the peoples mandate. Incidentally, I reject most vehemently the proposition that the
President may propose amendments to the Constitution in the exercise of his martial law powers.
Under any standards, such a suggestion cannot be reconciled with the ideal that a Constitution is the