subsequent referenda, those of July, 1973 and February, 1975, why may not a duly held plebiscite

suffice for the purpose of creating a substitute for that Assembly? It should be borne in mind that after
all, as indicated in the whereas of the impugned Presidential Decree, actually, the proposed
amendments were initiated by the barangays and sanggunian members. In other words, in submitting
the amendments for ratification, the President is merely acting as the conduit thru whom a substantial
portion of the people, represented in the Katipunan ng Mga Sanggunian, Barangay at Kabataang
Barangay, seek the approval of the people as a whole of the amendments in question. If all these
mean that the sovereign people have arrogated unto themselves the functions relative to the
amendment to the Constitution, I would regard myself as totally devoid of legal standing to question it,
having in mind that the most fundamental tenet on which our whole political structure rests is that
"sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the light of the foregoing considerations, I hold that Presidential Decree No. 1033 does not infringe
the Constitution, if only because the specific provision it is supposed to infringe does not exist in legal
contemplation since it was coevally made inoperative when the people ratified the Constitution on
January 17, 1973. I am fully convinced that there is nothing in the procedure of amendment contained
in said decree that is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of constitutionalism. On the
contrary, I find that the Decree, in issue conforms admirably with the underlying tenet of our
government the sovereignty and plenary power of the people.
On the issue of whether or not October 16, 1976 is too proximate to enable the people to sufficiently
comprehend the issues and intelligently vote in the referendum and plebiscite set by Presidential
Decree 1033, all I can say is that while perhaps my other colleagues are right in holding that the period
given to the people is adequate, I would leave it to the President to consider whether or not it would be
wiser to extend the same. Just to avoid adverse comments later I wish the President orders a
postponement. But whether such postponement is ordered or not, date of the referendum-plebiscite
anywhere from October 16, 1976 to any other later date, would be of no vital import.
In conclusion, I vote to dismiss all the three petitions before Us.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Since the validity or effectivity of the proposed amendments is to be decided ultimately by the people
in their sovereign capacity, the question is political as the term is defined in Taada, Et. Al. v. Cuenco,
Et. Al. (103 Phil. 1051), which is a bar to any judicial inquiry, for the reasons stated in Our opinion in
Javellana, Et. Al. v. Executive Secretary, Et. Al. (L-36142); Tan, Et. Al. v. Executive Secretary, Et. Al. (L36164); Roxas, Et. Al. v. Executive Secretary, Et. Al. (L-36165); Monteclaro, etc., Et. Al. v. Executive
Secretary, Et. Al. (L-36236); and Dilag, Et. Al. v. Executive Secretary, Et. Al. (L-36283, March 31, 1973,
50 SCRA 30, 204-283). The procedure for amendment is not important. Ratification by the people is all
that is indispensable to validate an amendment. Once ratified, the method of making the proposal and
the period for submission become irrelevant.
The contrary view negates the very essence of a republican democracy that the people are
sovereign and renders meaningless the emphatic declaration in the very first provision of Article II of
the 1973 Constitution that the Philippines is a republican state, sovereignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them. It is axiomatic that sovereignty is illimitable. The
representatives cannot dictate to the sovereign people. They may guide them; but they cannot
supplant their judgment. Such an opposite view likewise distrusts the wisdom of the people as much as
it despises their intelligence. It evinces a presumptuous pretension to intellectual superiority. There are
thousands upon thousands among the citizenry, who are not in the public service, who are more
learned and better skilled than many of their elected representatives.
Moreover, WE already ruled in Aquino, Et. Al. v. Comelec, Et. Al. (L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275,
298-302) that the President as enforcer or administrator of martial rule during the period of martial law
can legislate; and that he has the discretion as to when the convene the interim National Assembly
depending on prevailing conditions of peace and order. In view of the fact that the interim National
Assembly has not been convoked in obedience to the desire of the people clearly expressed in the
1973 referenda, the President therefore remains the lone law-making authority while martial law
subsists. Consequently, he can also exercise the power of the interim National Assembly to propose
amendments to the New Constitution (Sec. 15, Art. XVII). If, as conceded by petitioner Vicente Guzman
(L-44684), former delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention which drafted the 1973 Constitution,

the President, during the period of martial law, can call a constitutional convention for the purpose,
admittedly a constituent power, it stands to reason that the President can likewise legally propose
amendments to the fundamental law.chanrobles law library : red
ANTONIO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I.
At the threshold, it is necessary to clarify what is a "political question." It must be noted that this
device has been utilized by the judiciary "to avoid determining questions it is ill equipped to determine
or that could be settled in any event only with the effective support of the political branches." 1
According to Weston, judges, whether "personal representatives of a truly sovereign king, or taking
their seats as the creatures of a largely popular sovereignty speaking through a written constitution,
derive their power by a delegation, which clearly or obscurely as the case may be, delineates and
delimits their delegated jurisdiction. . . . Judicial questions . . . are those which the sovereign has set to
be decided in the courts. Political question, similarly, are those which the sovereign has entrusted to
the so-called political departments of government or has reserved to be settled by its own extragovernmental action." 2 Reflecting a similar concept, this Court has defined a "political question" as a
"matter which is to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity or that has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, with
discretionary power to act." 3 In other words, it refers to those questions which, under the Constitution,
are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government. 4
In determining whether an issue falls within the political question category, the absence of a
satisfactory criterion for a judicial determination or the appropriateness of attributing finality to the
action of the political departments of government is a dominant consideration. This was explained by
Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 5 thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding