HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL

Volume 5, Winter 2007

Human Security and Political

Philosophy in the Light of Judith Shklars
Writing
Frdric Ramel
This paper discusses "Freedom from Fear" from a philosophical standpoint,
with specific reference to Judith Shklar's work, whose thinking provides new
frames of mind to explain fear and human security as universal notions. The
article therefore fits into the mainstream debate in international relations
between universalism (human security as a tool which should be shared by
everybody) and relativism (human security as a Western concept).

uman security serves as a toolbox to

change political practices of leaders, as

suggested for example by the Harvard
Program on Humanitarian Policy
Conflict Research. But human security is also an
object of international relations theory. According
to Stanley Hoffmann, two kinds of theories must be
distinguished: empirical (conceptual frameworks
that explain or understand reality through empirical
studies) and philosophical (based on human nature,
conceptions of history or human action that produce
normative judgements, and which imply more
involvement from researchers). This paper aims to
explore the second type of international relations
theory with the understanding that human security
is essentially a philosophical concept. More
precisely, this concept (as discussed in this paper)
will concentrate upon "freedom from fear", an
expression coined by the Canadian government to
re-orient its foreign policy towards human security

but also developed originally by Thomas Hobbes.

Hobbes political philosophy was above all
else a reaction to war, with particular references
to the English civil war. If the State wished to
end wars, he argued, it must provide security.
This paper will not attempt to delve into the
mathematical foundations he used to develop this
theory1 but instead will highlight two elements of
his philosophy that are of relevance even today.
The first is Hobbes description of a "state of
nature" (a fiction where all people live without
political authority).2 This phase, characterized by a
quarrelsome people, is an allegory for a state of war
which stands for "Hell on earth." This description
allows Hobbes to point out that human beings are
egoistic by nature, and all people are afraid of each
other. Hobbes sought to emphasize the properties of
fear, an individual and natural feeling on account of
human behavior (Chapter XII of Leviathan).3 How
was it possible to overcome fear? The answer, for

Frdric Ramel is Professor of Political Science at the University Paris-Sud XI. He achieved a post-doctorate in Canada and
had been a teaching assistant at the University Jean Moulin Lyon 3 for years. His research interests include normative and
cultural change in international relations as well as the links between philosophy, sociology and international relations.

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Hobbes, lies in creating a Leviathan. People decide
to end the state of war by alienating their natural
rights to a sovereign that guaranteed security. This
social contract entered into between the people
and the sovereign is a submissive one. And this
conception of fear and "freedom from fear" is a
fundamental step in the modern era.4 On the one
hand, it must be borne in mind that Hobbesian
thought has been responsible for formulating the
main function of a State. Yet simultaneously, this
function has increasingly come to be questioned.
Hobbes concept of security was fairly strict in
its import. Since his time, new kinds of threats
have evolved. Some of these are not a result of
deliberate human action, but have developed
unexpectedly.5 Natural disasters are another kind
of threat that humans have to face. The second
element of Hobbes philosophy of relevance is
the gap between his conception of the State and
contemporary reality. Hobbes trusted the State,
but ab initio, certain behavioral characteristics of
States could become a source of threat. This is the
phenomenon Judith Shklar considers relevant, and is
something human security studies may benefit from.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first
part presents Shklars reasoning and her "liberalism
of fear." The second part discusses the trend to
universalize the idea of fear and the ways to tackle
it. This builds on and continues the arguments put
forward by Robert O. Keohane in his paper written
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.
Keohane sets up links between the attacks on
the United States and Shklars most fundamental
argument: that a basic function of a liberal state
is to protect its citizens from the fear of cruelty.6

by Thatcher and Reagan, she became a pioneer

of a new kind of liberalism during the 1980s: the
liberalism of fear. Unfortunately, her death ended
her academic career just as she was to embark on
a study of individuals' position in international
relations. It is probably why her colleague, Stanley
Hoffmann, insists on qualifying her death as a
"tragedy for political thought."8

philosophy based on emotion and

memory

Shklars "liberalism of fear" can be summed up in

four assertions:
1. Liberalism is above all a core of limitations
(prohibiting interference with the freedom of
others). Thus, it does not prescribe what to do so
as to discover happiness. For Shklar, "liberalism
does not have any particular positive doctrines
about how people are to conduct their lives
or what personal choices they are to make." 9

Shklar's "freedom from fear": another

2. The origins of liberalism lie in the religious wars

in the sixteenth century: these events were full of
cruelties committed with religious motivation. The
two primary branches of Christianity (Protestantism
and Catholicism) provoked and confronted each
other in bloody conflicts. It was eventually left
to the school of liberalism to encourage tolerance
against such behavior in Europe. The "liberalism of
fear" is located in this context and seeks to highlight
cruelties that continued to occur, even up to the
twentieth century. Unlike Emersons belief-system,
this understanding of liberalism is not about hope
but about the memory of such cruelties.10 It focuses
on the excesses of both power and administration.

Judith Shklar taught Political Science in Harvard

from 1951 to 1992. She played a major role in
political philosophy that is arguably comparable
with the contributions of her colleague John Rawls.
She left Europe during the turbulent years of the
Second World War and tried to produce a political
philosophy founded on the experience of exile.
She "embodied" her philosophy of life against
terror.7 After a period of criticizing ultraliberalism,
libertarian movements and the policies achieved

3. Shklar accepts the distinction between

positive and negative liberalism (Isaiah Berlins
conception)11 but according to her, it is impossible
to separate negative freedom from the conditions,
i.e., the political organization, etc., that allow such
freedom. All of these conditions can be drilled
down to the sole condition of rejecting cruelty.
The obvious question that is asked is: what does
cruelty mean in this context? Shklar refers to
Montaigne and Montesquieu two theorists who
did not set up links between cruelty and theology.

aspect of security

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Volume 5, Winter 2007

They abandoned the idea of religious sin when Contribution to human security
defining cruelty. Not only did the French moralists
refuse religion (in response to the failure of Spanish There are some clear implications of this thought
policies on the New Continent) but also the moral on the discipline of human security, four of which
arguments made by Machiavelli. Cruelty was are discussed here:
instead a psychological feeling: "It is the deliberate
infliction of physical, and secondarily emotional, 1. The Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy
pain upon a weaker person or group stronger ones Conflict Research, quoted at the beginning of this
in order to achieve some end, tangible or intangible, essay, defines human security as a people-centric
of the latter."12 Public cruelty could
concept. Similarly, Shklar, in her
not be explained by sadistic trends
towards the centricity of
"Fear is a result of inclination
because "it is made possible by
the people rather than of power, tends
the cruelty created to underline the function of politics
differences in public power and it is
almost always built into the system of by power ."
as a process against the perversion of
coercion upon which all governments
power in specific contexts. In political
have to fulfil their essential functions."13 Fear thus science, there are two different perspectives: topis an emotion linked with the presence of power down that insists on leaders and legitimation of
in modernity (or, in other words, the monopoly of power (e.g., Weber)20 or bottom-up that deals with
legitimate physical violence).14 Fear is a result of the the obedience of the people (La Boeties discourse
cruelty created by power. Fear from cruelty is not on servitude volontaire).21 Shklar does not focus on
anxiety (a normal fear against an external danger "power centricism", but professes instead a "people
or about human condition) but "fear of fear itself"15 centric" approach.
which inhibits people; as a result of which they
can neither express themselves, nor be free.16 The 2. Several States put people in jeopardy, and
idea underpinning the argument is that "cruelty [is] one has to be aware of some States that can
the summum malum, the most evil of all evils."17 clearly be a threat. Several analysts try to explain
such accumulation of power by mobilising the
4. Liberalism relies on an emotion (fear) and liberalism of fear (e.g., Ignatieff;22 Gourevitch).23
not on reason. It is an instinctive liberalism There are some differences, though, which this
and not a rational one; it is "based on common paper believes are not of much relevance. For
and immediate experiences" 18 that all people example, Shklar tackles strong States whereas
could share. Such liberalism is strong, even Ignatieff and Gourevich handle failed States. For
if it is not deeply implanted in human nature the latter, issues of ethnic warfare and culture are
conventionally defined by rational components. sources of fear while Shklar believes that it is
Shklars liberalism stems from Montesquieu and politics that creates fear. Of more interest, though,
Tocqueville. The risks of terror justify rule of law, a is the new dimension that Shklar introduces in
fragmented power, tolerance, social pluralism and Hobbes reasoning, as a result of which the reader
"a strong defense of equal rights and their legal is compelled to view the State as a source of
protection."19 This makes clear what Shklar meant fear. Shklar upholds the rule of law and rejects
by "freedom from fear." Politics relies on a struggle absolute and monarchical power. In this context,
against terror created by the development of strong human security should be a "frame of mind"
States that generate "fear of fear." While Hobbes sets that has its closest equivalent in Claude Leforts
up the idea of peace produced by social contracts concept of "savage democracy,"24 which demands
of submission by society with the State, Shklar that people ought to participate in civil debate.
argues that the State could be a source of fear itself.
3. Shklars school of thought also articulates
the notion of injustice.25 She makes a distinction
between misfortune and injustice: misfortune is
linked with external forces of nature, akin perhaps

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to destiny; while injustice is linked with the action
of ill-disposed people. Citing the example of the
United States, she argues that people are unfair in
a passive way. They are witnesses to stealing, rape,
and other crimes and misdemeanors, but refuse
to support victims by providing evidence to the
police. Such unfair behavior on the part of people
conveniently ignores, or even forgets, that everyone
could be a victim. The feeling of injustice, therefore,
is weak, and it is a feeling that has to be studied
and dealt with. Rousseau underlined the impact
of compassion, when he said that compassion
was an instinctive feeling.26 Liberalism has to
integrate this feeling and defend the victim, and
can be considered universal only if it incorporates
the concepts of victimization and political
surveillance to prevent cruelty. Human security is
ultimately a response to the injustice in the world.
4. Fear is a universal emotion. It allows Shklar
to qualify her liberalism as a universal one even
though it could appear unconvincing (politics
has to prevent cruelty). This paper attempts
to develop this fourth consequence further.

"Freedom from terror" and the problem

of universality

Many political thinkers argue that Shklar

developed a reductionist conception of
"what ought to be politics." 27 But this paper
believes otherwise: the main contribution of
Shklars work to human security should be the
understanding of universality. She consistently
deals with the universal aspect of her liberalism:
"[O]f fear it can be said without qualification that
it is universal as it is physiological. It is a mental
as well as a physical reaction, and it is common
to animals as well as to human beings. To be
alive is to be afraid, and much to our advantage
in many cases, since alarm often preserves us
from danger. The fear we fear is of pain inflicted
by others to kill and maim us, not the natural and
healthy fear that merely warns us of avoidable
pain. And, when we think politically, we are afraid
not only for ourselves but for our fellow citizens
as well. We fear a society of fearful people"28
This underlines what is required of us in the
future: all people can be victims. Therefore, people

collectively have to prevent this summum malum.29

These properties converge in a "cosmopolitan
claim"30 This claim is quite different from the
arguments of Diogenes from Ancient Greece
(cosmopolitanism monopolised by the wise man
in exile) or from the pejorative discourses during
the sixteenth century. Instead, this claim, inspired
by Kant, is a critical position against relativism.

Shklar's critiques of relativism

Relativists argue that such liberalism of fear is
a new kind of colonialism or occidental-centric
conception of politics. Shklar disagrees with
this line of reasoning. Relativism is a dogmatic
frame of mind that emphasizes local human
aspirations and leads to a blindness of the truth:
we cannot help being involved against horrors of
our world. "Liberalism of fear" does not have a
specific origin.31 It does not result from a particular
culture or tradition. "Freedom from terror" is a
desirable end that is shared globally. All people
refuse fear of fear, and proactively seek to reject
the conditions of such a feeling, regardless of the
times they live in, or their geographical locations.
We can infer from Shklars criticism of
relativism a philosophical foundation for human
security. Several contemporary thinkers attempt
to establish links between cultures in order to
develop a common definition of security. For
instance, Amitav Acharya sees a common cultural
legacy that States become increasingly conscious
of in intergovernmental organizations. 32 He
also identifies a common trend: a "governing
framework of security cooperation in the post-cold
war era", even in Asia, a region where strategic
issues are extreme and large (terrorism, natural
disaster, nuclear tensions).33 In 2005, he adopted
a title inspired by Shklars work although he did
not quote her: "Human Security, Identity Politics
and Global Governance: From Freedom from Fear
to Fear of Freedoms."34 He acknowledges a new
difficulty for the paradigm of human security after
the September 11 attacks because of the aggressive
war against terror that has fundamentally altered
public rights. But such an atmosphere creates new
possibilities for human security that cannot be
"reversed in the near future", which is precisely
the universal point of view defended by Shklar.

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Volume 5, Winter 2007
It is interesting to find that the liberalism "Freedom from terror" as legitimating force
of fear as a philosophical wave infiltrates
human security studies in spite of the fact that Corey Robin identifies the perverse effects of the
nobody has quoted Shklar explicitly. However, liberalism of fear on societies, especially in the
this universal ambition must be questioned. United States.39 According to him, fear cannot
represent a genuine foundation for liberal societies
A "liberalism from nowhere"
when it creates "repressive fear." This point of view
is interesting when applied to the international
The "community" forgotten
level. According to international law, the threat
or the use of force outside of the context of selfShklars research focuses on the individual level, defense or an action sanctioned by the United
because of which she could be criticised for Nations under chapter VII of the UN Charter is
increasing the excessive emphasis on atomism not legal. However, ad hoc missions in the name
in the public sphere. She forgets, like all liberals, of preventive action benefit from a discourse of
that humans need to share common values and legitimacy.40 Fear plays an important role in such
that society requests an acknowledgement of a process. The Kosovo intervention during 1999
differences. A society is defined as a community benefited from the same reason especially in Llyod
of communities according to Amita Etzioni; a Axworthys discourse in the Group of Eight. As
community that protects particular cultures.35 Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, he explained
Michael Walzer underlines another dimension that the legitimacy of resorting to force, even though
Shklar seems to overshadow. The struggle against the Security Council did not ratify such action,
the fear of terror implies something else in the by arguing that there was a duty to protect the
bargain: "we are defending more than our lives, we Albanian community who lived in "fear of terror."41
are defending our way of life."36 A singular culture The war against terror (which also raises the issue
is called into question by terror. The individual of the concept of war in modernity)42 is defined in
level (which the communautarists consider to the same manner. It rests on an obsolete category
be abstract) becomes a distortion of reality. dating back to the Clinton-era-rogue states. (Such
Therefore, this
classification was in fact
critical discourse
criticized at the end of
"The
struggle
against
the
fear
of
against liberalism of fear
the 1990s by the US
supposes a conception terror implies something else in the administration). These
of universality that does bargain: "we are defending more actors are transformed
not rely on individuals
into enemies even
than
our
lives,
we
are
defending
but on communities.
though their strategic
A
r e s p o n s i v e our way of life." A singular culture characteristics might
communautarism such is called into question by terror."
make them appear
as the one embodied
more like puppets than
by Etzioni aims at integrating security issues anything else (inferior in capacities and in culture)
and human security, particularly in two ways. in the typologies of Marthan Cottam or Richard
Upstream, new threats increase and affect the Herrmann.43 For instance, the war in Iraq had
life of communities. Down stream, Etzioni is been justified by a similar argument: to protect
aware of new kinds of diplomatic methods that the population against Saddam Hussein (and
associate transnational actors, intergovernmental also the American population against a "terroristorganisations and States (that he calls the "Global sponsored State)." In such a context, "freedom from
Safety Authority" after 9/11)37 in order to manage terror" may be used as an argument to legitimise
these new threats. Such Authority calls in question the resort to force. It is a rhetorical element of
the imperialist order that is undesirable. It the States current "responsibility to protect".
tries to set up new political practices between
In the first Chapter of Ordinary Vices, Shklar
actors by sharing morals, power and costs. 38 deals with the perverse effects of victimisation.

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She acknowledges that victims of torture wait
to exchange places with their torturers, which
feeds into the idea of "cruelties without an end."
However, she tackles inter-individual relations.
She does not deal with an instrumental discourse
relying on victims or studying a foreign policy that
exceeds multilateral rules.

integrated into this research program. Therefore,

this paper proposes a new field for human security
studies: political philosophy and human security.
This approach could be improved by an enhanced
understanding of Hans Jonas and the hermeneutics
of fear (the effects of human action on environment
that gradually tend to a collective start),48 or by
Spinozas conception of peace (before Galtung,
A negative conception of politics
the philosopher produces a definition of positive
peace). This may nourish human security (its
Shklar is convinced that liberalism of fear is properties and purpose) and continue to inspire
an ambitious project because of its purpose to new modes of action.
prevent destruction of all people. Therefore, she
sticks to a culture of barriers and of constraints
against terror, which is the main lesson of the
twentieth century. But this "negative" conception
of politics (not to experiment destruction) seems
to represent a minimalist thought of universality.
Walzer and Etzioni underline this aspect.
Walzer admires Shklar but he is sceptical
about the substantive dimension of her liberalism.
On the one hand, "what is defended, however, is
always something, different in each case, even
if the threat is similar in kind."44 In parallel with
negative freedom (Isaiah Berlins contribution
to liberal thought),45 there is always something
that is protected. On the other hand, one has to
go beyond Shklars ambition because she does
not explain what ought to be the world order. A
global architecture that goes beyond the presently
international order is immediately required.
According to Etzioni, a new kind of community is
emerging. Liberalism of fear as a minimalist project
cannot be a structural reference for humanity. It is
too restricted. An imagined community at the
world level compared with national ones that
Benedict Anderson 46 studied must be defined
in positive terms and not only in negative ones.

Conclusion:

political philosophy as a
new field for human security studies

Security is a contested concept in empirical

theories, as explained by Buzan. Human security
is also a contested one, especially because of its
"lasticit." We have to deal with human security
not just as a toolbox but also as a philosophical
notion. Political philosophy highlights several
international issues.47 Human security should be

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Volume 5, Winter 2007

Notes

Leo Strauss, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: its Basis and its Genesis (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963).
On the state of nature as a fiction, see Pasquale Pasquino, Thomas Hobbes : la condition naturelle de lhumanit Revue Franaise de Science Politique 2 (April 1994): 294-307.
3
See this study of fear in Corey Robin, Fear: The History of a Political Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
4
The liberal interpretations of Hobbes underline this dimension because his philosophy aims at protecting above all else individuals and their rights even
against the State when it does not respect its function of security. Jean-Jacques Roche uses this interpretation in order to see in Hobbes the first philosopher of human security. Jean-Jacques Roche, Le ralisme face la scurit humaine, in Jean-Franois Rioux, ed., La Scurit humaine. Un nouveau
concept des relations internationales (Paris, Montral: LHarmattan, 2003), 57-71. Upholding an absolutist interpretation of Hobbes, Bertrand Badie
denies such fatherhood but he acknowledges the hobbesian influence on modern political practices in Europe and abroad. Bertrand Badie, Un monde sans
souverainet (Paris: Fayard, 1999).
5
Ulrich Beck has described this issue for several years.
6
Robert O. Keohane. The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the liberalism of fear in Understanding 11 September,
ed. Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer, (New York: Social Science Research Council, September 2002).
7
Stanley Hoffmann, Judith Shklar as a Political Thinker in Liberalism Without Illusions: Essays on Liberal Theory and the Political Vision of Judith
N. Shklar, ed. Bernard Yack (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 86.
8
Ibid, 82.
9
Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear in Liberalism and the Moral Life, ed. Nancy Rosenblum, (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1989), 21.
10
Ibid, 26-27.
11
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 118-172. According to him, the definition
of liberty is plural. Negative freedom is the mere fact of not beeing interfered with ones business whereas positive freedom is a wish for self-expression
to be somebody, not nobody (p. 131).
12
Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 29.
13
Ibid.
14
This potentiality of modern power comes closer to Anthony Giddens explanation of totalitarism. Totalitarian regimes or systems are developed in modernity by the possibility of surveillance (Michel Foucaults notion) created by States. See Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence, (Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1987).
15
Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 29. Julien Freund highlights the impact of imagination on this kind of fear. Julien Freund, La peur de la peur,
Actions et recherches sociales, 21, no. 4, (1985): 20.
16
Systematic fear is the condition that makes freedom impossible. Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 29.
17
Judith Shklar, Putting Cruelties First, Daedelus, (1982), 12.
18
Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 32.
19
Ibid., 37.
20
Max Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968).
21
Discours sur la servitude volontaire in Etienne de La Botie, uvres politiques (Paris: Ed. sociales, 1963)
22
Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the new Nationalism (London, Vintage, 1994)
23
Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (London: Picador, 1999).
24
Claude Lefort, Elements dune critique de la bureaucratie (Paris: Droz, 1971); Miguel Abensour, Dmocratie sauvage et principe danarchie, Revue
europenne des Sciences Sociales, 31, no. 97 (1993): 229-235.
25
Judith Shklar, The Faces of Injustice (New Haven: Tale University Press, 1990).
26
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 5 (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1995), Book I.
27
For instance, see the debate between Robert Meister and Catherine Lu in Ethics and International Affairs, 16, no. 2 (2002). See also paper by Giorgio
Baruchello, where he underlined a tradition of liberalism (especially in Beccaria) that conceived cruelty to be pertaining to the liberal organisation of
society: Baruchello, The Cruelty of Liberalism : An Essay on Judith Shklar, Richard Rorty, John Kekes and Cesare Beccaria, Philosophy and Social
Criticism, 30, no. 3 (2004): 303-313.
28
Judith Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, 29.
29
Ibid., 31.
30
Ibid., 29.
31
Ibid., 34.
32
Amitav Acharya, in Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions over Time and Space, ed. Holga Hafterndorn and Robert O. Keohane (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 55.
33
Amitav Acharya, Human Security East versus West, International Journal, LVI, no. 3, (Summer 2001): 442-460.
34
Amitav Acharya, Human Security, Identity Politics and Global Governance: From Freedom from Fear to Fear of Freedoms (paper presented at the
International Conference on Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance: Paradigms of Power and Persuasion, Canberra, Australia, September 1-2,
2005), http://law.anu.edu.au/nissl/acharya.pdf (accessed 4 December 2007).
35
Amita Etzioni, Communitarianism, in Encyclopedia of Community: From the Village to the Virtual World, ed. Karen Christensen and David Levinson,
vol. 1, A-D (London: Sage Publications, 2003), 225.
36
Michael Walzer, On Negative Politics in Yack, Liberalism Without Illusions, 18.
37
Amita Etzioni, From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 160.
38
Intervention in Afghanistan after 9/11 is an element of this new global architecture. Amita Etzioni, Implications of the American Anto-Terrorism
Coalition for Global Architectures, European Journal of Political Theory, 1, no. 1 (2002): 9-30.
39
Robin, Fear.
40
For the mechanism of legitimation in international relations, see Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005).
1
2

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Conclusions (The G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting, Grzenich/Kln, Germany, June 10, 1999), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of
Canada, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/g8fmm-g8rmae/concl-en.asp (accessed 4 December 2007).
42
Noemi Gal-Or, Klaus-Gerd Giesen, The Concept of War, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 19 (2007): 149-156.
43
Martha Cottam, Foreign Policy Decision Making. The Influence of Cognition (Boulder: Colorado, Westview Press, 1986); Richard Herrmann, Michael
P. Fischerkeller, Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model. Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War, International Organization, 49, no. 3
(Summer 1995): 415-450.
44
Michael Walzer, On Negative Politics, 18.
45
Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty.
46
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections in the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006).
47
Frdric Ramel, ed., Philosophie et relations internationales. Regards contemporains, Etudes internationales, XXXVIII, no. 1, (Mars 2007): 5-109.
48
For Jonas, fear is not a passion that resulted from current war but a feeling about future threats linked to technologic progress or natural disasters. Hans
Jonas, The Imperative Responsbility. In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age (Chicago: the Chicago University Press, 1984).
41

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Frdric Ramel