Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?
By
Laura
Stanworth
Abstract
This
paper
begins
by
assessing
the
basic
premise
for
and
the
origins
of
the
doctrine
of
the
responsibility
to
protect.
As
states
within
Africa
have
been
used
as
case
studies
to
highlight
the
importance
of
this
rising
doctrine,
the
paper
then
flows
in
to
a
brief
discussion
of
why
the
cases
have
been
limited
in
this
way;
concluding
that
in
a
continent
fraught
with
civil
war
and
unrest
they
provide
an
ample
discussion
basis.
The
case
studies
of
Somalia,
Rwanda
and
Sudan
are
then
investigated
in
turn,
each
highlighting
different
difficulties
that
the
international
community
has
faced
in
deciding,
not
only
whether
or
not
to
act,
but
how
and
when.
For
a
more
in
depth
and
empirical
debate,
the
paper
then
discusses
the
international
legal
principles
and
constraints
that
not
only
prevent
states
acting,
but
also
enforce
them
to
in
limited
circumstances.
This
is
followed
by
a
brief
look
at
the
theoretical
surroundings
of
the
doctrine
and
how
these,
alongside
the
practical
and
legal
implications
already
discussed,
will
shape
the
future
of
the
doctrine
of
the
responsibility
to
protect.
To
conclude,
it
is
established
that
even
though
states
do
have
a
responsibility
to
protect
through
a
developing
international
norm,
it
is
yet
to
be
seen
whether
this
will
evolve
in
practice,
or
whether
states
will
avoid
acting
for
reasons
of
self‐preservation.
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
Introduction
Responsibility
to
Protect
(R2P)
necessitates
striking
a
balance
between
placing
the
individual
as
the
referent
object
at
the
heart
of
international
relations
and
security,
and
then
adapting
this
in
a
way
in
which
state
sovereignty
can
also
be
respected.
Evidence
of
this
balance
can
be
identified
as
all
doctrine
surrounding
the
use
of
R2P
is
emphasising
that
states
will
only
intervene
when
the
host
state
is
unwilling
or
unable
to
protect
its
citizens.1
The
responsibility
to
protect
as
a
concept
emerged
as
a
semantic
shift
away
from
‘a
right
to
intervene.’
The
civilian
protection
agenda
was
already
an
established
norm
based
on
international
humanitarian
law
and
therefore
also
on
the
protection
of
human
rights.
The
key
difference
is
that
the
civilian
protection
agenda
is
based
around
protecting
one’s
dignity
and
R2P
around
protecting
one
against
force.This
came
after
The
Cold
War
when
there
was
room
for
fresh
debate
and
a
political
shift
within
the
international
community.
The
move
was
seen
as
necessary
after
the
international
community
failed
to prevent
or
stop
mass
killings
during
the
1990s,
Rwanda
and
Bosnia
being
the
main
examples.
State
sovereignty
became
a
major
discussion
point
as
international
law
has
long
been
based
around
the
principle
of
equal
and
sovereign
states.
The
International
Commission
on
Intervention
and
State
Sovereignty
(ICISS)
report
circumvented
this
by
suggesting
that
sovereignty
was
interlinked
with
responsibility;
in
order
to
remain
sovereign
a
State
had
to
accept
responsibility
for
the
fate
of
its
citizens.2
This
responsibility
is
two‐fold;
default
responsibility
is
that
of
the
host
state
and
coincides
with
notions
of
state
sovereignty
whereas
residual
responsibility
lies
with
the
wider
international
community.
In
order
to
provide
a
reasoned
answer
to
this
question,
this
paper
will
centre
on
Africa.
As
a
continent
fraught
with
civil
wars,
it
represents
a
vast
percentage
of
the
United
Nations
budget,
time
and
resources.
Basic Premise for R2P
Whilst
there
is
no
need
to
go
in
to
depth
at
this
juncture
about
the
reasons
for
R2P,
as
these
will
become
clear
throughout
the
paper,
it
is
worth
outlining
the
basic
arguments
for
the
establishment
of
such
a
doctrine.
R2P
is
a
doctrine
rather
than
a
principle
because
it
is
a
continuum
(prevent,
react,
1
‘Unwilling
or
unable’
within
the
context
of
host
states
failings,
can
be
found
a
staggering
eight
times
within
the
International
Commission
on
Intervention
and
State
Sovereignty
Report
alone.
Including
in
the
foreword
(pg.
VIII)
and
listed
within
the
basic
principles
(pg.
XI).
2
This
notion
has
also
been
strongly
endorsed
by
Secretary
General
–
Special
Representative
Francis
Deng
‘Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management In Africa’
Washington
D.C
(1996)
2
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
rebuild)3
and
is
not
isolated.
It
encompasses
more
than
a
mere
foundation
upon
which
a
decision
to
intervene
can
be
made.
R2P
was
endorsed
after
the
international
community
failed
to
prevent
and
protect
on
several
occasions
when
millions
of
people
could
have
been
saved.
In
this
sense
the
international
community
is
not
being
asked
to
look
out
for
and
protect
other
states,
but
rather
to
save
citizens
of
the
human
race
to
which
we
all
belong.
The
premise
for
this
argument
is
based
around
the
morality
of
preventing
mass
killings.
This
was
made
clear
by
Kofi
Annan
in
his
address
to
the
International
Peace
Academy
Seminar
when
he
wholeheartedly
endorsed
R2P.
“I hoped to spark a wide‐ranging and constructive debate on how better we can protect the dignity
and sanctity of every human life.”4
Africa as an Approach to Responsibility
There
are
four
main
reasons
that
Africa,
as
a
continent,
provides
an
ample
discussion
basis
on
the
topic
of
the
responsibility
to
protect.5
First,
the
sheer
scale
of
the
humanitarian
crisis
in
Africa.
There
have
been
more
than
30
wars
in
Africa
is
less
than
40
years,
which
have
resulted
in
more
than
half
of
the
worldwide
war
related
deaths.
In
1996
alone,
8
million
refugees
were
forced
to
flee
their
homes
due
to
the
impending
severity
of
intra‐state
wars
that
consume
this
continent.
Secondly,
recognition
must
be
given
to
the
legitimacy
of
intervention.
Due
to
the
non‐intervention
principle
of
Art.2
(7)
of
the
UN
Charter,6
respect
must
be
given
to
the
sovereign
equality
of
all
states.7
This
is
a
particularly
topical
debate
in
Africa
where
the
states
themselves
are
already
in
crisis
due
to
the
presence
of
warlords
and
the
presence
of
fragility
through
the
lack
of
stability.
Thirdly,
using
Africa
as
a
large
scale
case
study,
it
is
evident
that
the
self
interest
and
political
bias
of
Western
states
plays
a
large
part
in
not
only
whether
or
not
intervention
will
occur,
but
also
whether
or
not
it
will
prove
to
be
successful.
The
widening
gap
on
this
spectrum
became
more
distinct
at
the
end
of
the
Cold
War
when
the
West
had
no
self‐
interest
in
Africa
due
its
transparency
on
the
3
These
separate
notions
are
listed
within
the
synopsis
of
the
ICISS
report,
section
3:
Elements.
4
Kofi
Annan,
‘Secretary General Addresses International Peace Academy Seminar on ‘The Responsibility to
th
Protect’,
15
February
2002.
5
James
Mayall,
‘Humanitarian
Intervention
and
International
Society:
Lessons
from
Africa’
in
Jennifer
Welsh,
‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’
Oxford
University
Press
(2004)
pgs.
120‐141.
6
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
1945
Article
2
(7)
‘Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state...’
7
Art.
2
(1)
UN
Charter
3
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
international
‘radar.’
Africa
posed
no
threat
due
to
the
lack
of
nuclear
weapons,
and
was
not
of
economic
importance
on
an
international
scale.
Lastly,
this
lack
of
state
self‐interest
will
mean
that
most,
if
not
all,
of
the
humanitarian
crises
that
occur
in
Africa
will
obtain
aid
and
assistance
from
international
organisations
rather
than
states.
This
adds
fuel
to
the
debate
of
whose
responsibility
it
should
be
to
intervene
in
the
first
place.
Whose Responsibility? – Rwanda, Somalia & Sudan
The
notion
of
co‐operative
security
suggests
that
in
order
for
international
security
to
be
upheld
to
the
greatest
possible
degree,
co‐operation
from
a
majority
of
states
in
required.
Within
Africa
alone
there
have
been
significant
failings
of
states
to
stop
and
prevent
mass
killings
as
they
have
not
been
working
together
to
achieve
sustainable
security.
It
is
such
failings
that
have
led
to
questions
being
asked
about
whether
or
not
responsibility
exists
as
a
concept
within
the
international
community
and,
if
it
does,
who
holds
this responsibility?
The
depth
of
such
theoretical
questions
is
staggering.
Once
a
move
away
from
the
basic
presumptions
is
made,
one
can
begin
examining
ideas
such
as
the
proximity
of
a
state,
possibly
concluding
that
a
nearby
state
is
in
the
best
place
to
react8
quickly
and
should
therefore
bear
the
brunt
of
responsibility.
In
addition,
is
a
burden
placed
upon
the
most
militarily
capable
of
states?9
Should
a
greater
burden
be
placed
upon
the
five
permanent
members
of
the
Security
Council,10
not
only
because
it
is
a
hugely
powerful
organisation,
but
also
because
they
can
each
veto
a
decision
to
protect?11
Even
beyond
this,
do
states
have
to
be
at
peace
and
have
a
fully
functioning
democracy
to
have
a
responsibility?
For
example,
it
would
seem
incomprehensible
to
expect
the
Central
African
Republic
to
intervene
in
the
Darfur
region
of
Sudan,
because
of
the
problems
that
they
themselves
have
within
their
own
state,
even
though
they
are
neighbours.
In
this
sense
it
seems
sensible
to
apply
the
age
old
saying
of
‘charity
begins
at
home.’
Once
a
state
is
at
peace,
it
will
have
fewer
national
issues
and
would
therefore
be
in
a
more
appropriate
position
to
aid
effectively.
Although,
this
raises
further
issues;
would,
for
example,
the
current
wars
in
Iraq
and
more
significantly
now
Afghanistan
prevent
the
UK
and
the
USA
from
intervening
elsewhere
as
they
are
both
already
at
war?
8
It
is
worth
noting
here
that
the
ICISS
Report
is
based
upon
3
fundamental
principles.
The
first
and
most
important
one
being
the
responsibility
to
prevent;
with
the
responsibility
to
rebuild;
and
the
responsibility
to
react
taking
a
joint
second
place.
9 st
Stephen
Groves
‘The U.S Should Reject The U.N Responsibility to Protect Doctrine’
May
1
2001.
10
China,
France,
Russia,
United
Kingdom,
United
States.
11
For
example
Russia
and
China
have
both
vetoed
decisions
to
act
for
reasons
of
self
interest.
4
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
An
analysis
of
failings
within
Africa
will
help
to
answer
some
of
these
questions
by
suggesting
who
was
in
the
best
and
most
suitable
position
at
the
time
to
act
most
effectively.
The
most
infamous
example
of
a
failure
was
the
Rwandan
genocide
when
the
international
community
failed
not
only
to
prevent
the
deaths
of
nearly
1,000,000
Rwandans,
but
Belgian
peacekeepers
actually
left
a
school
where
around
2000
Tutsis
were
later
killed.
After
the
killing
of
10
Belgian
peacekeepers,
the
then
UN
Secretary‐General
Boutros‐Ghali
sought
to
increase
UNAMIR12,
scale
it
down
or
completely
withdraw
it.
The
Security
Council
voted
to
scale
it
down
and
left
only
270
troops
on
the
ground.
This
fatal
decision
left
the
RPF13
to
take
control
and
commence
the
mass
killings.
A
reverse
decision
came
too
late
and
few
troops
were
replaced
before
the
end
of
the
killings
in
late
July
of
1994.
The
Carlsson
Committee14
heavily
criticised
the
lack
of
forceful
involvement
by
the
UN,
whose
primary
concern
should
have
been
the
lives
of
those
who
cannot
protect
themselves.
This
is,
after
all,
the
essence
of
R2P.
In
this
case
as
the
Belgians
already
had
troops
on
the
ground
in
Rwanda
they
were
without
a
doubt
in
the
best
position
to
have
prevented
this
particular
massacre
within
the
genocide.
It
is
noteworthy
that
the
Clinton
Administration
deliberately
avoided
referring
to
the
situation
as
‘genocide’
to
avoid
military
engagement.
“On the day the report was released, Mr. Annan ‐‐ who headed UN peacekeeping at the time of the
genocide ‐‐ said: "All of us must bitterly regret that we did not do more to prevent it. . . . On behalf of
the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse.”15
The
UN
kept
strictly
to
the
mandate
allowing
the
peacekeeping
operations
but
avoiding
confrontation,
and
the
final
price
for
this
was
paid
via
civilian
deaths.
Here
the
only
way
that
mass
genocide
could
have
been
prevented
would
have
been
with
the
placement
of
more
troops
at
an
earlier
stage
of
intervention
with
more
power
to
eradicate
the
rebel
forces
before
they
managed
to
take
total
control
of
the
state.
This
method
of
intervention
would
have
required
war
fighting
and
inevitably
deaths
would
have
occurred
on
both
sides;
but
with
the
aid
of
the
international
community
lending
troops
to
the
UN,
it
seems
that
significantly
fewer
deaths
would
have
occurred.
12
United
Nations
Assistance
Mission
for
Rwanda
–
They
were
sent
to
patrol
an
established
ceasefire
and
to
support
the
demilitarisation
and
demobilisation
processes
that
had
been
initiated
in
1993.
The
genocide
then
th
began
on
April
7
2004.
Timeline
‐
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html
13
Rwandan
Patriotic
Front
–
a
Ugandan
based
rebel
force
formed
in
1987
by
Tutsi
refugees.
14
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/12/991216‐rwanda1.htm
15
Africa Recovery, United Nations, New Releases, April 2004
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/newrels/rwanda.htm
5
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
A
further
example
is
that
of
Sudan
in
general
and
more
particularly,
the
Darfur
region
within
Sudan.
Unfortunately
the
experience
in
Darfur
highlights
the
limitations
of
the
R2P.
Mass
killings
were
obvious
by
spring
2004,
and
yet
the
international
community
was
very
slow
to
act.
It
was
noted
at
the
time
that,
“people in Darfur (were) losing faith in the international community’s will or ability to
help.”16 Here
Colin
Powell
delayed
his
recognition
of
the
killings
as
genocide17
in
order
to
evade
the
United
States
responsibility
to
prevent
genocide.18
In
discussion
of
the
Darfur
crisis,
Badescu
and
Bergholm
conclude
“that the international failure to
offer meaningful protection in Darfur highlights the need for continued caution and critical analysis
of the ways in which R2P is conceptualized and implemented.”19
It
is
apparent
that
R2P
is
necessary
if
atrocities
such
as
Darfur
are
to
be
prevented
in
the
future.
The
world
needs
a
responsibility
to
be
placed
upon
states;
otherwise
they
will
merely
find
ways
around
having
to
act.20
“Engagement must be patient, informed, flexible and determined.”21
Whilst
it
is
clear
that
the
‘determined’
element
is
a
key
proponent
to
success,
as
indicated
by
failures
surrounding
the
lack
of
political
will,
the
use
of
the
word
‘patient’
here
is
more
problematic.
Intervention
must
certainly
not
be
rushed
and
care
must
be
taken
to
ensure
that
the
correct
approach
is
adopted,
although
being
‘patient’
can
include
waiting
for
consensus
from
the
international
community,
whilst
collecting
data
and
awaiting
Security
Council
approval.
Although
these
things
are
pivotal
to
the
existence
of
stability
within
the
international
community,
they
are
perhaps
not
as
appropriate
to
a
civil
war
and
internal
conflict
situation,
as
indicated
by
not
only
the
Rwandan
genocide
and
Darfur
situation,
but
also
Kenya.
Towards
the
end
of
2007
Kenya
“showed just how quickly and comparatively unexpectedly
some situations can explode.”22
The
first
element
to
note
concerning
the
intervention
in
Somalia
is
the
landmark
decision
that
was
made
in
1992
by
the
UNSC
to
intervene
using
Chapter
VII
provisions
without
the
consent
of
the
host
16
C.
Badescu,
and
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐Down’,
Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009),
p.301.
17 th
‘Powell
declares
genocide
in
Sudan’
9
September
2004
18
Genocide
Convention
1948
‐
Article
1
“The
Contracting
Parties
confirm
that
genocide,
whether
committed
in
time
of
peace
or
in
time
of
war,
is
a
crime
under
international
law
which
they
undertake
to
prevent
and
to
punish.”
19
C.
Badescu,
and
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐Down’,
Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009),
p.287
20
As
discussed
in
the
cases
where
the
use
of
the
word
‘genocide’
was
avoided
so
states
did
not
have
to
fulfil
their
commitments
under
The
Genocide
Act
1948.
21
Oliver
Ramsbotham
and
Tom
Woodhouse,
‘Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict’,
Polity
Press
(1996),
pg.219.
22
Gareth
Evans,
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All’
Washington,
D.C:
Brookings
Institution
Press,
(2008),
pg.72.
6
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
state.23
This
progression
in
policy
suggests
that
the
international
community
does
have
an
R2P.
However
critics
have
argued
that
R2P
comes
as
a
secondary
principle
here
as
Chapter
VII
authorisations
are
ordinarily
endorsed
under
the
principle
of
maintaining
international
peace
and
security.
However,
prior
to
this,
it
was
famine
that
swept
the
country
and
led
to
a
savage
civil
war.
It
was
the
knowledge
of
Mohammed
Sahnoun
and
his
insight
in
to
the
Somali
culture
that
finally
led
to
intervention
taking
place
as
previously
“all the humanitarian organs of the UN failed to act quickly
and effectively to stop the deaths of hundreds of thousands from malnutrition and starvation.”24
There
are
many
political
and
economic
reasons
for
the
failings
of
the
UN
to
act
accordingly,
and
when
action
was
taken,
it
was
not
as
successful
as
it
might
have
been.
“If there is one lesson that we have to remember from what went tragically wrong in some
operations of the 90s, it is precisely when you try to mix two different types of operation, a
peacekeeping operation and a peace‐enforcement, or a war,” that
things
tend
to
go
wrong.
“Remember what happened in Somalia, where there were basically conflicting goals which led to a
very disastrous situation. We feel that the key to success is clarity.”25
This
is
a
basic
assertion
as
any
operation
of
such
scale
will
demand
an
aim
and
a
plan
of
action
to
be
clearly
ascertained
before
any
steps
should
be
taken
to
the
commission
of
it.
The
peacekeeping
mission
in
Somalia
was
indubitably
compromised
due
to
the
internal
anarchy
already
rife
within
the
state.
The
UN
had
obviously
taken
on
the
responsibility
to
protect
in
this
case.
Unfortunately
it
proved
to
be
another
example
of
high
expectations
that
could
not
be
met
alongside
poor
planning.
In
terms
of
sovereignty
as
responsibility26,
these
failings
indicate
that
the
international
community
in
theory
has
a
responsibility
to
protect,
but
it
is
still
unclear
as
to
whether
or
not
this
applies
in
practice.
To
help
establish
this,
it
is
essential
to
delve
deeper
into
the
international
law
that
surrounds
the
area.
Legal Implications and Analysis
The
legal
implications
of
the
responsibility
to
protect
are
crucial
within
a
discussion
of
whether
or
not
the
international
community
should
protect.
23
N.
Wheeler,
‘Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Security’
Oxford
University
Press
(2002)
pg.172
24
Ibid.
Pg.
172.
25
Secretary‐General
Jean‐Marie
Guehenno
'You are in situations where you show force so as not to use it ‐
peacekeeping is not about waging war.'
‘Irish Times’
April
22,
2002
‐
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2002/guehenno.htm
26
As
mentioned
in
the
introductory
comment.
7
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
Natural
law
theory
is
based
around
the
assertion
that
all
laws
are
derived
from
a
higher
order
and
power,
so
law
is
equal
to
morality.
As
this
is
an
over‐
arching
power,
law
effectively
goes
beyond
the
control
of
humanity.
It
is
this
morality
that
is
crucial
for
the
implementation
of
R2P.
If
one
takes
domestic
law
as
an
example
it
can
be
seen
that
murder
is
a
crime
across
the
globe;
that
is
transferable
to
international
law.
If
law
is
morality,
and
it
is
immoral
to
take
another’s
life,
due
to
the
sanctity
of
life,
then
states
do
have
a
R2P
member’s
of
the
human
race
from
their
counterparts.
Unfortunately,
international
law
is
not
quite
this
clear
cut.
One
of
the
fundamental
and
basic
principles
which
underpin
the
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
is,
as
mentioned,
the
principle
of
state
sovereignty
and
non‐intervention.27
As
all
states
are
sovereign
and
equal,28
it
should
not
be
the
responsibility
of
one
state
to
intervene
within
the
internal
affairs
of
another
state.29
This
is
where
the
complex
relationship
and
moral
argument
creates
difficulties.
It
has
been
suggested
by
Francis
Deng30
that
state
sovereignty
should
be
state
responsibility
and
this
is
transferable
from
within
a
state
to
other
states
if
that
state
will
not
or
cannot
protect
its
citizens.
States
lose
their
legitimacy
if
they
lapse
on
basic
standards
of
humanity.31
This
loss
of
legitimacy
removes
sovereignty.
For
this
reason
the
ICISS
seek
to
view
sovereignty
as
a
contingent
of
responsibility:
the
two
are
intertwined.
Sovereignty
is
therefore
a
privilege
to
be
earned
rather
than
a
right
to
be
claimed.
“State sovereignties are not being viewed as part of a predetermined structure but as something
which is subject to change.”32
These
principles
are
particularly
important
to
developing
states
who
feel
disadvantaged
by
the
rapid
development
of
the
Western
world.
It
is
noteworthy
that,
at
this
juncture,
globalisation
has
actually
proved
to
have
a
positive
impact
on
intervention.
The
increased
use
of
communications
and
technology
has
led
directly
to
citizens
putting
pressure
on
their
governments
to
act.33
This
is
because
27
Art.
2(7)
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
28
Art.
2(1)
Charter
of
the
United
Nations
29
For
further
see
Robert
Jackson,
‘The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States’
Oxford
University
Press
(2003),
pg.230;
who
describes
this
moral
dilemma
as
“knotted”.
30
Francis
Deng
‘Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management In Africa’
Washington
D.C
(1996)
31
“The surest means by which a state may avoid outside intervention is to recognise and itself to ensure
respect for fundamental rights and liberties in the territories under its jurisdiction.”
–
Rene
Cassin,
Nobel
th
Lecture,
11
December
1968.
In
Louise
Arbour,
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
as
a
Duty
of
Care
in
International
Law
and
Practice’,
Review of International Studies 34:3
(2008)
pp.445‐58
32
T.
Weiss,
‘The
Politics
of
Humanitarian
Ideas’
Security Dialogue, 31(1),
(2000),
pg.12
33
For
example,
Steven
Spielberg
pulled
out
of
a
role
at
the
Beijing
Olympics
in
protest
to
China’s
policies
on
intervention
in
Sudan.
They
refused
to
allow
the
UNSC
to
authorise
intervention
based
wholly
on
self‐interest
reasons.
8
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
of
the
increased
awareness
that
the
international
community
has
of
atrocities,
and
the
emotive
nature
that
has
impacted
upon
citizens.
“We do not deny that the UN has the right and duty to help suffering humanity, but we remain
extremely sensitive to any undermining of our sovereignty, not only because sovereignty is our last
defense against the rules of an unequal world, but because we are not taking part in the decision‐
making process of the Security Council.” –
President
Abdelaziz
Bouteflike
of
Algeria.34
This
raises
additional
legal
concerns.
The
interpretation
of
the
phrase
‘international
peace
and
security,’35
in
itself
requires
consideration.
In
African
states,
as
the
civil
wars
that
create
the
need
for
humanitarian
intervention
do
not
regularly
pose
a
threat
to
international
peace
and
security,
this
has
posed
a
problem
as
the
permanent
members
of
the
Security
Council
have
used
their
veto
power
in
order
to
prevent
intervention
on
these
grounds.
It
is
only
when
civil
wars
spill
across
their
borders
and
into
neighbouring
states
that
the
conflict
can
truly
be
classified
as
‘international’
in
nature.36
This
draws
upon
the
ICISS
report
itself
and
its
notion
of
prevention.
It
is
the
prevention
of
the
spilling
of
a
conflict
across
a
border
which
should
be
prevented,
rather
than
simply
stopped,
once
war
has
broken
out.
Furthermore,
controversy
arises
by
virtue
of
Art.
2
(4)
of
the
UN
Charter.
It
lays
down
a
blanket
prohibition
on
the
use
of
force
within
international
law.
The
exceptions
to
this
come
in
the
form
of
self‐defence
(Art.
51)
and
Security
Council
authorised
operations
under
Chapter
VII.
Humanitarian
intervention
has
long
been,
and
remains,
a
controversial
stepping
stone
around
this
prohibition.
It
has
been
dubbed
as
a
‘Chapter
VI
and
a
half’
provision.
To
allow
the
use
of
force
for
humanitarian
purposes,
and
therefore
within
the
international
community’s
R2P,
would
undermine
all
efforts
to
ban
the
use
of
force.
One
could
refute
the
argument,
that
had
the
drafters
of
the
Charter
envisaged
allowing
the
use
of
force
for
humanitarian
purposes,
the
statute
would
have
clearly
stated
this.
The
Charter
was
drafted
at
the
end
of
the
Second
World
War
when
the
world
was
understandably
preoccupied
with
state
on
state
war.
The
prospect
of
internal
affairs,
and
how
damaging
a
regime
could
be
to
its
own
people
was
not
of
concern.37
It
can
therefore
be
upheld
that
simply
because
this
idea
was
not
considered
and
therefore
codified
into
the
law
at
the
time,
then
this
does
not
mean
that
it
was
intended
to
be
or
should
be
illegal.
34
Thomas
Weiss,
‘The
Sunset
of
Humanitarian
Intervention?’
Security Dialogue
35(2),
(2004),
pg.141.
35
As
used
in
the
Charter
of
the
United
Nations.
36
For
example,
the
conflict
in
Zimbabwe
should
have
been
stopped
before
spilling
over
its
borders
and
into
Botswana.
37 st
Gareth
Evans
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’
31
March
2006
9
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
Further,
humanitarian
intervention
‐
and
indeed
the
use
of
force
to
aid
‐
is
not
a
new
phenomenon,
as
it
can
be
seen
within
many
treaties
and
statutes.38
The
“concept of responsibility towards the
other is not an add‐on to already existing identities and subjectivities”:
it
is
already
there
in
its
own
right.39
Historically,
the
US
Bill
of
Rights
and
the
English
Magna
Carta
were
extremely
focused
upon
the
political
and
legal
rights
of
the
individual.40
It
is
respect
for
such
rights
that
is
re‐emerging
and
developing
into
an
international
norm.
More
recently,
the
creation
of
the
ICTR
was
the
first
step
to
intrusion
upon
state
sovereignty.
The
principle
of
complementarity
is
also
enshrined
within
international
law.
It
essentially
stipulates
that
international
law
can
only
function
effectively
if
it
complements
domestic
law
and
does
not
attempt
to
become
an
over
arching
power.
It
could
be
suggested
that
in
this
sense
the
responsibility
to
protect
becomes
problematic.
However,
one
could
argue
that
due
to
the
emphasis
that
is
put
on
intervention
only
occurring
if
the
host
state
is
unwilling
or
unable
to
act
or
if
the
UN
has
been
invited
by
the
government,
then
this
problem
is
removed.
Here
the
R2P
doctrine
is
respecting
the
principle
of
complementarity
as
it
has
clear
boundaries
of
when
it
can,
cannot,
will
or
will
not
be
invoked.
To
conclude
on
this
legal
dimension,
there
are
many
legal
obstacles
to
overcome
in
order
that
R2P
can
function
at
all,
let
alone
effectively.
As
witnessed
in
the
case
studies
of
Rwanda,
Sudan
and
Somalia,
it
was
the
‘red
tape’
constraints
that
led
to
the
peacekeeping
operations
being,
for
the
most
part,
unsuccessful.
So,
if
concluding
that
the
international
community
has
a
R2P,
then
surely
it
also
has
a
responsibility
to
allow
states
more
freedom
in
order
that
they
can
act
effectively
and
that
procedure
can
be
adapted
to
meet
the
needs
of
each
individual
scenario.
The Practical Problems of R2P Identifiable in its Life So Far
Further
to
the
issues
already
identified
surrounding
whether
or
not
there
is
or
should
be
an
R2P,
are
the
practical
difficulties
that
arise
when
it
is
invoked.
The
first
point
to
consider
is
the
misuse
of
the
doctrine.
States
intervene
for
their
own
personal
motives
but
justify
the
intervention
under
R2P.
This
approach
may,
however,
be
questioned.
Does
the
intention
of
the
intervening
state
matter?
Of
course
humanitarianism
should
be
at
the
forefront
of
policy
making,
but
of
course
we
do
not
live
in
a
perfect
world.
States
need
self‐motivation
and
political
will
in
order
to
intervene
effectively.
So
considered
pragmatically,
as
long
as
civilians
are
38
For
example
‐
The
Convention
Against
Genocide
1948.
39
S.
Smith
‘Conceptualizing
Security
in
the
Last
20
Years’
in
Terry
Terriff
et
al
‘Security Studies Today’ Polity
Press
(1999)
40
P.
R.
Viotti,
&
M.
V.
Kaupp,
‘International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond’
rd
Longman
Publishers
(1999)
3
ed.
pg.
402.
10
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
being
helped
in
the
long
run,
this
should
be
what
is
important,
and
not
the
underlying
rationale
for
the
initial
intervention.
It
seems
that,
as
a
doctrine,
R2P
is
“too easily capable of misapplication by
neo‐conservatives and others to justify unjustifiable military adventures such as Iraq.”41
This
consideration
links
to
a
further
practical
implication.
The
lack
of
political
will
from
states
to
want
to
intervene
creates
problems.
There
is
debate
as
to
whether
or
not
it
is
morally
right
to
force
states
to
intervene
if
they
have
reasons
for
not
doing
so.
The
lack
of
political
will
was
only
too
obvious
in
Rwanda
and
it
is
these
types
of
catastrophes
that
need
averting.42
Further,
with
the
lack
of
a
World
Government
and
overarching
power,
there
is
no
authority
with
which
to
force
states
to
intervene.
This
is
related
to
international
criminal
law
and
the
International
Criminal
Court,
which
has
recently
proved
successful
in
trying
and
prosecuting
criminals.
The
international
community,
however,
lacks
a
substantive
authority,
which
can
enforce
rules
upon
pariah
states
without
military
intervention.
This
is
ironic,
as
it
would
be
states
avoiding
military
intervention
that
would
face
it
coming
back
to
haunt
them
if
such
a
system
were
in
place.
Moreover,
the
lack
of
a
capacity
to
deploy
troops
is
in
itself
a
problem.
As
there
is
no
overarching
world
power,
the
UN
is
left
with
the
responsibility
of
intervention.
States
are
often
reluctant
to
give
troops
to
the
UN
for
fear
that
they
will
be
needed
at
home.
So
even
though
the
UN
has
power,
it
is
rendered
toothless
without
the
co‐operation
of
individual
states.
This
links
to
a
further
practical
problem
of
the
R2P.
What
form
of
intervention
should
it
take
if
states
are
to
protect
rather
than
merely
partake
in
war
fighting?
Evans
and
Sahnoun
outlined
six
principles43
to
be
satisfied
before
military
intervention
should
be
carried
out.44
The
six
criteria
reiterate
themes
from
just
war
theory
as
the
first
is
just
cause,
followed
by
four
precautionary
principles
and
lastly,
a
requirement
of
right
authority.45
In
theory
if
consideration
is
given
to
all
of
these
criteria,
then
military
intervention
should
only
occur
when
all
other
methods
of
intervention
have
been
tested
and
it
is
a
last
resort.
As
the
Rwanda
experience
indicated,
this
is
not
always
appropriate.
The
evidence
from
this
case
study
seems
to
suggest
that
a
strong
military
presence
is
required
for
effective
peacemaking
and
peacekeeping.
In
this
sense
the
41 st
Gareth
Evans
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’
31
March
2006
42
For
further
discussion,
see
the
comments
made
by
Alex
De
Waal
on
how
R2P
has
failed,
particularly
in
Darfur.
‘Darfur
and
the
Failure
of
the
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
International Affairs
83:6
(2007),
pp.1039‐1054
43
Just
cause,
right
intention,
last
resort,
proportional
means,
reasonable
prospects
and
whose
authority?
Evans,
G.
&
Sahnoun,
M.
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
Foreign Affairs
Vol.
81
(Nov/Dec
2002),
Issue
6
44
For
further
discussion
on
the
moral
obligation
on
the
use
of
force
in
peacekeeping
operations
see:
Iain
Atack,
‘Ethical
Objections
to
Humanitarian
Intervention’,
Security Dialogue 33(3),
(2002),
pp.279‐92.
45
Ibid.
11
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
international
community
needs
a
report
such
as
the
ICISS,
so
that
they
can
justify
military
intervention,
if
needed,
to
succeed,
whilst
they
are
carrying
out
their
moral
obligation
to
protect.
Theoretical Opinion / Analysis
There
inevitably
exists
a
dichotomy
of
academic
opinion
on
the
politically
charged
debate(s)
surrounding
whether
or
not
the
international
community
has
a
responsibility
to
protect.
This
paper
will
consider
briefly
what
realists
have
to
say
on
the
issue,
but
will
initially
look
at
the
position
historically.
There
was
a
general
consensus
between
classical
theorists,
such
as
Rousseau,
Hobbes
and
Locke,
that
the
human
being
is
the
ultimate
power
source
within
society.46
It
seems
logical
therefore,
that
they
would
have
endorsed
R2P
because,
as
previously
discussed,
the
entire
notion
of
the
doctrine
is
based
around
the
respect
for
human
life
and
dignity.
This
analysis
can
be
further
drawn
upon
as
the
sovereign
within
a
democratic
state
draws
their
power
from
the
voting
public;
they
therefore
must
respect
the
public
in
order
to
stay
in
power.
This
particular
distinction
is,
however,
problematic.
It
shares
similarities
with
the
democratic
peace
theory,
in
suggesting
that
to
spread
democracy
would
inevitably
spread
peace.47
As
Viotti
and
Kauppi
point
out,
despite
the
fact
that
respect
for
human
rights
and
dignity
seems
to
be
a
recent
Western
phenomenon,
it
can
in
fact
be
witnessed
in
ancient
Greek
and
Roman
times.
Although,
“the liberal spirit of the Enlightenment (was) developed further in the nineteenth‐century
work of the utilitarians and Kantians.”48
As
realists
view
the
state
as
the
referent
object,
intervention
becomes
highly
problematic
due
to
the
upstanding
preference
for
state
sovereignty.
In
addition,
the
presumption
that
war
is
an
inevitable
component
of
international
politics
is
also
problematic.
R2P
is
about
avoiding
war
fighting
and
rather
partaking
in
peacekeeping
efforts
to
sustain
and
preserve
human
rights.
This
contradicts
the
presumption
that
war
is
inevitable.
This
premise
almost
suggests
that
R2P
is
destined
to
fail.
A
further
presumption
is
that
states
are
rational
actors,
promoting
their
own self‐
interest.
This
in
fact
can
be
seen
through
various
peacekeeping
operations
where
R2P
has
been
invoked.49
As
discussed
earlier,
the
motivation
under
which
the
action
is
taking
place
is
somewhat
irrelevant.
As
long
as
46
Viotti,
P.R.
&
Kaupp,
M.V.
‘International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond’
rd
Longman
Publishers
(1999),
3
ed.
pg.
401.
47
To
discuss
this
further
would
evade
from
the
true
discussion
point
of
this
paper.
For
further
see
Williams,
M.
‘The
discipline
of
the
democratic
peace’,
European Journal of International
Relations,
7:4
(2001),
525‐53.
48
Ibid.
pg.
401.
49
For
example
it
has
been
argued
that
the
US
and
UK
would
not
have
intervened
into
Afghanistan,
when
R2P
was
mentioned
as
a
reason
for
intervention,
had
the
not
had
self‐interest
in
intervening.
This
self‐interest
came
in
the
form
of
combating
terrorism,
under
the
notion
of
therefore
seeking
a
more
secure
future.
12
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
humanitarian
needs
are
being
met
in
the
state
in
which
action
is
occurring,
the
issue
of
why
the
states
are
intervening
loses
significance.
This
can
have
both
a
positive
and
a
negative
effect.
The
lack
of
intervention
for
self‐preservation
reasons
is
problematic,
but
intervening
for
self‐interest
and
in
turn
protecting
can
have
many
positive
effects.
In
this
sense
the
international
community
does
have
a
R2P.
Chandler
suggests
that
the
liberal
peace
thesis
tends
to
reflect
the
current
balance
of
power
within
the
international
sphere,
as
opposed
to
being
a
moral
dilemma
surrounding
state
sovereignty
and
the
complications
of
intervention.50
He
is
therefore
opposing
the
realist
view,
by
suggesting
that
the
notion
of
state
sovereignty
has
been
superseded
by
a
progressive
norm
for
the
protection
of
individual
rights.51
This
is
further
support
that
not
only
does
the
international
have
an
R2P,
but
it
is
endorsing
it.
The
Future
of
the
doctrine
of
Responsibility
to
Protect
in
Africa
Recognition
of
two
of
the
fundamental
principles
identified
in
the
ICISS
Report
by
the
Outcome
Document
of
the
World
Summit
200552
indicates
a
shift
towards
a
developing
international
norm.
This
large
scale
recognition
is
a
major
step
forward
for
R2P
as
it
has
been
endorsed
on
an
international
scale.
This
creates
a
positive
outlook
for
the
future
of
the
developing
doctrine,
and
in
particular
as
to
the
effect
that
this
will
have
on
unstable
African
nations.
Having
said
this,
the
doctrine
may
be
in
place
but
it
will
be
the
practical
application
that
will
create
difficulties.
For
example,
even
though
the
Outcome
Document
endorsed
R2P,
it
did
not
offer
any
sort
of
indication
of
what
the
international
community
should
do
if
the
UN
Security
Council
fails
to
come
to
a
decision
on
whether
or
not
to
act.53
Activities
of
the
UN
and
ICISS
are
norm
creating
behaviour.
The
creation
of
Special
Advisor
on
R2P,
by
the
UN
Secretary
General54
is
a
clear
recognition
of
this
norm
creating
behaviour.
A
further
development
came
with
the
establishment
of
a
Global
Centre
for
R2P
at
the
City
University
of
New
50
David
Chandler
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect?
Imposing
the
Liberal
Peace’
International Peacekeeping 11:1,
(2004),
pg.59.
51
Ibid.
52
United
Nations
General
Assembly
2005
World
Summit
Outcome
–
resolution
60/1
paragraphs
138‐140;
Responsibility
to
protect
populations
from
genocide,
war
crimes,
ethnic
cleansing
and
crimes
against
humanity.
53
C.
Badescu,
And
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐Down’,
Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009),
p.291
54 th
This
post
was
established
as
of
the
12
December
2007
and
is
currently
undertaken
by
Edward
Luck
who
was
appointed
by
UN
Secretary
General
Ban‐Ki
Moon.
st
‘Secretary‐General appoints special adviser to focus on responsibility to protect’
21
February
2008.
13
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
York
in
February
2008.
Such
a
development
highlights
the
[academic]
complexity
surrounding
the
use
of
the
doctrine.
These
developments
are
further
evidence
of
the
progressive
and
accepted
norm.
“The debate about intervention for human purposes has not gone away and it will not go away so
long as human nature remains fallible.”55
Despite
this
negativity,
as
discussed,
the
provision
of
a
solid
doctrine
to
be
followed
and
the
adaptability
of
provisions
should
provide
for
a
more
positive
outlook.
Lastly,
“if R2P is to flourish, the US must be on board.”56
As
a
hegemonic
state,
the
US
has
spent
many
years
acquiring
and
strengthening
its
independence,
and
more
importantly
its
large
military
capability.
As
the
World’s
dominant
military
power
it
seems
that
the
US
would
bear
the
brunt
of
the
responsibility,
not
only
by
means
of
troops
but
also
economically.
Despite
this,
the
Obama
administration
has
“supported moves to implement a U.N. doctrine calling for collective military
action to halt genocide.”57 This
is
an
encouraging
step
forward
for
the
doctrine
and
provides
hope
to
African
nations,
that
should
this
positive
reinforcement
continue,
any
future
‘Rwandas’,
‘Somalias’
or
‘Sudans’
would
be
avoided.
Conclusion
The
international
community
must
be
prepared
to
act
to
prevent
the
next
mass
killing
or
ethnic
cleansing.
But
we
must
ask
ourselves
whether
making
a
law
effectively
insisting
that
states
react
positively
to
such
situations
is
the
correct
strategy.
If
the
rationale
behind
the
thinking
is
to
protect
those
who
cannot
protect
themselves
and
is
therefore
a
moral
obligation,
then
we
must
also
ask
ourselves
why
states
are
not
protecting
in
the
first
place.
Surely
if
states
are
not
immediately
acting
to
protect,
despite
its
morality,
then
there
must
be
a
good
reason,
or
explanation
as
least,
for
this.
In
which
case,
the
argument
is
that
it
would
not
be
right
to
legislate
in
this
area;
it
should
instead
be
left
to
a
case
by
case
analysis,
providing
greater
adaptability
and
flexibility,
and
highly
arguably
on
this
basis,
therefore,
a
more
effective
approach.
In
the
current
world
climate,
within
which
the
media
is
consumed
by
threats
of
terrorism,
a
state’s
decision
to
intervene
will
be
affected.
States
will
be
less
likely
to
intervene
in
certain
pariah
states
for
fear
of
fuelling
terrorist
cells
within
them.
So
even
though
the
international
community
does
have
an
R2P
through
a
developing
international
norm,
states
may
attempt
to
avoid
such
responsibility
for
reasons
of
self‐preservation.
Moreover
55
Gareth
Evans
and
Mohammed
Sahnoun,
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
Foreign Affairs
Vol.
81
Issue
6
(Nov/Dec
2002),
pg.99
56
Thomas
Weiss,
‘The
Sunset
of
Humanitarian
Intervention?’
Security Dialogue
35(2),
(2004),
pg.149.
57 th
Joe
Lauria,
‘U.S Backs Implementing U.N Doctrine to Halt Genocide’
The Wall Street Journal 30
July
2009
pg.A11
14
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
“the criterion for success cannot be limited to the immediate military act; it is dependent on the
longer‐term developmental challenge of reconstructing states, where the breakdown of societal
order…is normally the principal cause for intervention58. The
challenge
ultimately
is
how
to
overcome
this.
Bibliography
Annan,
Kofi,
‘Secretary General Addresses International Peace Academy Seminar on ‘The
Responsibility to Protect’
15th
February
2002
–
available
at
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8125.doc.htm
accessed
on
19/12/2009
at
16.17
Arbour,
L.
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
as
a
Duty
of
Care
in
International
Law
and
Practice’,
Review
of International Studies 34:3
(2008)
pp.445‐58
58
Roland
Dannreuther,
‘International Security – The Contemporary Dilemmas and Challenges of Intervention’
Polity
Cambridge
(2007),pg.161.
15
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
Atack,
I.
‘Ethical
Objections
to
Humanitarian
Intervention’,
Security Dialogue
33(3),
(2002)
pp.279‐
92.
Badescu,
C.
And
L.
Bergholm
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect
and
the
Conflict
in
Darfur:
The
Big
Let‐
Down’,
Security Dialogue 40(3),
(2009)
pp.287‐309.
Chandler,
D.
‘The
Responsibility
to
Protect?
Imposing
the
Liberal
Peace’
International Peacekeeping 11:1,
(2004),
pp
59‐81.
Dannreuther,
R.
‘International Security – The Contemporary Dilemmas and Challenges of
Intervention’
Polity
Cambridge
(2007)
Deng, F. ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa’ Washington D.C (1996)
Evans,
G.
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’
31st
March
2006
‐
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4060&l=1
‐
accessed
on
17/12/09
at
13.01
Evans,
G.
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All’
Washington,
D.C:
Brookings
Institution
Press
(2008)
Evans, G. & Sahnoun, M. ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, Foreign Affairs Vol. 81 Issue 6 Nov/Dec 2002
Groves,
S.
‘The U.S Should Reject The U.N Responsibility to Protect Doctrine’
May
1st
2001
available
at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Internationalorganizations/bg2130.cfm
accessed
on
17/12/09
at
14.22
Guehenno,
Secretary‐General
Jean‐Marie
‐
Irish Times
April
22,
2002
‐
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/reform/2002/guehenno.htm
accessed
on
12/01/10
at
11.50.
International
Commission
on
Intervention
and
State
Sovereignty
(2001)
The Responsibility to Protect
(Ottawa)
available
at
http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission‐Report.pdf
accessed
on
10/01/2010
at
19.56
International
Crisis
Group,
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4521&l=1#primer
accessed
on
10/01/2010
at
20.08
Jackson,
R.
‘The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States’
Oxford
University
Press
(2003)
Lauria.
J.
‘U.S
Backs
Implementing
U.N
Doctrine
to
Halt
Genocide’
The Wall Street Journal 30th
July
2009
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124890587995691589.html
accessed
on
09/01/2010
at
20.21.
Ramsbotham,
O.
&
Woodhouse,
T.
‘Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict’
Polity
Press
(1996)
Terriff. T, et al ‘Security Studies Today’ Polity Press (1999)
16
Published
by
Project
GOA:
25
March
2010
Stanworth,
“Does
The
International
Community
Have
a
Responsibility
To
Protect?”
United
Nations
General
Assembly
2005
World
Summit
Outcome
–
resolution
60/1
available
at
http://daccess‐dds‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement
accessed
on
17/12/09
at
14.11
Viotti,
P.R.
&
Kaupp,
M.V.
‘International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond’
Longman
Publishers
(1999),
3rd
ed.
Waal,
Alex
de,
‘Darfur
and
the
Failure
of
the
Responsibility
to
Protect’,
International Affairs
83:6
(2007),
pp.1039‐1054
Weiss, T. ‘The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas’, Security Dialogue, 31(1), (2000) pp.11‐23
Weiss, T. ‘The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention?’ Security Dialogue, 35(2), (2004), pp.135‐54
Welsh, J. ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations’ Oxford University Press (2004)
Wheeler,
N.
‘Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Security’
Oxford
University
Press
(2002)
Williams,
M.
‘The
discipline
of
the
democratic
peace’,
European Journal of International
Relations,
7:4
(2001),
525‐53
Africa Recovery, United Nations, New Releases, April 2004
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/newrels/rwanda.htm
accessed
on
19/12/2009
at
10.05.
‘Powell
declares
genocide
in
Sudan’
9th
September
2004
–
Available
at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/3641820.stm
accessed
on
18/12/2009
at
12.21.
‘Secretary‐General
appoints
special
adviser
to
focus
on
responsibility
to
protect’
21st
February
2008
Available
at
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=25702&Cr=ki‐moon&Cr1
accessed
on
17/12/2009
at
14.35
Timeline
‐
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html
accessed
on
18/12/2009
at
15.32.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/1999/12/991216‐rwanda1.htm
accessed
on
16/12/2009
at
17.25.
17
Published by Project GOA: 25 March 2010