Una concepcin sobre la influencia que conlleva la asimetra en
el reparto de informacin en las partes contratantes.
v[5] Ross, S.A. (1973): The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem; en: American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings. 63: pp. 134-139.Jensen, M. / Meckling, W. (1976):
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Capital Structure. En: Journal of
Financial Economics, nr. 1/2: pp. 305-360.
Grossman, S.J. /Hart, O.D. (1983): An analysis of the principal-agent problem. En: Econ, 51: pp.
7-45.
Fama, E.F./Jensen, M.C. (1983a): Separation of ownership and control; en: Journal of Law and
Economic, 26: pp. 301-325.
Fama, E.F./Jensen, M.C. (1983b): Agency problems and residual claims; en: Journal of Law and
Economic, 26: pp. 327-349.
Pratt, J. /Zeckhauser, R. (eds)(1985): Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston:
Harvard Business School Press.
Wenger, E. / Terberger, E. (1988): Die Beziehung zwischen Agent und Principal als Baustein
einer konomischen Theorie der Organisation (La relacin entre agente y principal como
elemento bsico de una teora econmica de la organizacin). En:
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium, 10: pp. 506-514.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989): Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review; en: Academy of
Management Review, 1, pp. 57-74.
Dobson, J. (1994): Theory of the Firm - Beyond the Sirens. En: Economics and Philosophy, 10,
pp. 73-89.
vii[7] Donaldson, L./Davis, J.H. (1989): CEO governance and shareholder returngs: Agency
theory or stewardship theory. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of
Management. Washington.Donaldson, L./Davis, J.H. (1991): Stewardship theory or agency
theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16: pp.
49-64.
Donaldson, L./Davis, J.H. (1994): Boards and company performance - Research challenges the
conventional wisdom. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2: pp. 151-160.
xii[12] Dobson, J. (1994): Theory of the Firm - Beyond the Sirens. En:
Economics and Philosophy, 10, pp. 73-89.
xiv[14] Axelrod, Robert (1984): The Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Basic
Books.
xx[20] Demsetz, Harold (1995): The Economic of the Business Firm. Seven
Critical Commentaries. Cambridge University Press (trad. Esp. 1997: La
economa de la empresa. Madrid: Alianza): pp. 37 s.
xxiii[23] Arrow, K.J. (1985): The ecomics of agency; en: Pratt, J. /Zeckhauser, R.
(eds)(1985): Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business. Boston: Harvard
Business School Press. pp. 37-51.
xxiv[24] Holmstrm, B.R. (1979): Moral hazard and observability. En: Bell Journal of Economics,
10: pp. 74-91.Holmstrm, B.R./Tirole, J. (1989): The theory of the firm. En: Handbook of
Industrial Organization. Vol. I. Amsterdam: pp. 61-133.