Civpro Session 2

Civil Procedure | session 2| 1
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 92625 : December 26, 1990.]
192 SCRA 768
Inasmuch as [petitioners] have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by

producing the body of the child, Joyce Orda Galang, and submitted their
comments to the petition, the trial on the merits could now proceed to
determine who of the parties are entitled to the custody of the child.
JOSE ORDA and IMELDA LOZADA, Petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS and GIL GALANG Respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to REMAND

this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on
the merits as to which of the parties are legally entitled to the custody of the
child, Joyce Orda Galang.
DECISION
SO ORDERED. 2
GANCAYCO, J.:
The question presented in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals may refer
a petition for habeas corpus originally filed with it to the Regional Trial Court for a fullblown trial due to conflicting facts presented by the parties.
Originally, private respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Regional Trial
Court of San Pablo City to regain custody of his minor daughter, Joyce, who
continued staying with her maternal grandparents, petitioners herein, her mother
being already deceased at the initiation of the action. The case was eventually
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because petitioners, as defendants therein, had
moved to Bataan and any writ of habeas corpus to be issued by the trial court may
not be enforced against them.
In conformity with the foregoing decision the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City,
the Hon. Napoleon R. Flojo presiding, before which private respondent filed his first
action, ordered the reinstatement of Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87) and
scheduled the case for trial on the merits. 3 Upon examination of the records of said
case, petitioners noted that only the order of dismissal of the same was in the
expediente of the case. They brought this matter to the attention of the trial court
which then issued an order dated 27 January 1989 directing the Chief, Archives
Section of the Court of Appeals "to transmit to this Court the original record of case
AC-G.R. No. SP-13912 (sic) immediately upon receipt of this Order." 4
Subsequently, private respondent, on the basis of his being the sole surviving parent
of his daughter, filed a petition for habeas corpus with the respondent Court of
Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 13912-SP, an original action to compel petitioners
to produce the body of minor Joyce Orda Galang and explain the basis of their
custody. Petitioners herein filed their Opposition/Answer 1 alleging that private
respondent abandoned his wife and child, had no source of livelihood and therefore
could not support his daughter, they prayed that care and custody of the child be
awarded them.: rd
In reply, the respondent Court of Appeals advised the trial court that no records can
be remanded because no expediente from the lower court was ever elevated. For this
reason, petitioners filed with respondent court on 21 April 1989 a Motion for
Clarification of its earlier decision alleging that CA-G.R. No. SP-13912 was an original
action, not an appeal emanating from, or a special civil action to assail, a case filed
with the trial court, hence no record of the case can be remanded because no
expediente from the lower court was ever elevated to the Court of Appeals; that
Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87) was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and the
order of dismissal has long become final and, moreover, herein petitioners were never
brought to the jurisdiction of the trial court in said special proceedings, so much so
that they have not even presented an answer or opposition in said special
proceedings; and that a reinstatement of Special Proceedings No. SP-719 (87), over
which the trial court had lost jurisdiction, may not be justified by virtue of the order of
the Court of Appeals to remand CA-G.R. No. 13912 for trial on the merits. 5
On 13 April 1988, respondent court issued its assailed decision, as follows:
The Court of Appeals 6 resolved this motion on 6 June 1989 as follows:
The conflicting thesis (sic), however, of petitioner [private respondent herein]

and respondents [petitioners herein] require a full-blown trial of the facts
alleged by the parties. This could be shown by the initial discussions
aforestated.
The records show that [private respondent] had already filed a similar
petition before the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 31,
San Pablo City, on November 23, 1987, in Special Proceedings No. SP-719
(87). However, the writ was returned unserved as [petitioners] ostensibly
transferred their domicile at the Philippine Refugee Processing Center at
Barrio Sabang, Morong, Bataan.
At the outset, it is necessary to point out that this Court entertained this petition for
Habeas Corpus in the exercise of its original jurisdiction over such case. Said petition
is in no way connected with the one dismissed by the lower court in SP-719 (87).
In their Motion for Clarification, [petitioners] appear to be confused by this Court's
directive remanding the case to the lower court.
It should be noted that when this Court ordered the same, it did not mean the
remanding of the records, but (the) referring (of) the case to the court a quo for
appropriate action, it enjoying original and concurrent jurisdiction with this Court over
habeas corpus cases (B.P. 129).:-cralaw

Judge Napoleon Flojo also appears to be mixed up as he issued an Order dated
January 27, 1989, which inter alia require the Chief, Archives Section of this Court "to
transmit" to the Regional Trial Court "the original record of case AC-G.R. No. 13912
immediately upon receipt of this order." (p. 106, Rollo) (sic) But no records can be
transmitted back to the lower court simply because no records were elevated in that,
as aforesaid, the case was filed here as an original action.
The [petitioners] have manifested in their motion that they were not given an
opportunity to answer or at least comment on the petition. Now the same is in the
lower court as directed in the decision sought to be clarified. Indeed, issues cannot be
joined if the lower court will deprive the [petitioners] (of) their right to respond to the
petition.
WHEREFORE, for the sake of clarity the dispositive portion of the decision
dated April 13, 1988 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to
REFER this case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo
City, for trial on the merits as to which of the parties are legally
entitled to the custody of the child, Joyce Orda Galang. FOR
ISSUES TO BE JOINED, THE LOWER COURT IS HEREBY
ORDERED TO REQUIRE THE [petitioners] TO ANSWER THE
PETITION."
SO ORDERED." 7
Both parties filed separate motions for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution.
Petitioners contended that respondent Court of Appeals had no authority to refer the
case to the lower court for trial on the merits because said court, in the original
habeas corpus case filed by private respondent, had never acquired jurisdiction over
their persons. Further, that respondent court had no power to order a case docketed
with the lower court without private respondent having paid the docketing fee and
filing an appropriate pleading therein. Private respondent, on the other hand, also set
forth similar contentions and prayed that trial on the merits be resumed by respondent
Court.
The Court of Appeals 8 resolved both motions for reconsideration on 13 March 1990
as follows:
We entertain no doubt that [petitioners] had never been brought to the
jurisdiction of the lower court in SP: PROC. No. SP-719 (87)and agree with
the claim that the Order of dismissal issued in said case had already
become final and executory. But then, it must be pointed out again that with
the filing of another petition for habeas corpus before this Court (docketed as
AC [sic] G.R. SP No. 13912), an entirely new proceeding was commenced.
Unlike the lower court in the previous habeas corpus case, this Court
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of [petitioners] upon their filing of an
Opposition/Answer on April 4, 1988 (p. 14, Rollo).
Section 9[1] in relation to Section 21 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 confers upon the
Court of Appeals authority to try and decide habeas corpus cases concurrent with the
Regional Trial Courts. Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction has been defined as that
which is possessed by a court together with another or others over the same subject
matter. Clearly, therefore, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides the basis for Us to refer
AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912 to the lower court for trial on the merits. With the referral
of AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912, the jurisdiction which this Court acquired over the
persons of [petitioners] was transferred to and conferred upon the Regional Trial
Court, which necessarily must treat said case as a separate and distinct proceeding
from the one it earlier dismissed. This means that the Regional Trial Court must
assign the referred case a new number, but need not require the [private respondent]
to remit the prescribed docketing fee inasmuch as the same had already been paid
with this Court. What the parties need to do though is to reproduce the pleadings they
filed in AC (sic) G.R. SP No. 13912 before the Regional Trial Court in order for issues
to be joined therein.- nad
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the Decision dated April 13, 1988 is hereby
further clarified to read thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to REFER
this case to the regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on
the merits as to which of the parties are legally entitled to the custody of the
child, Joyce Orda Galang. FOR THIS PURPOSE, THE PARTIES ARE
DIRECTED TO REPRODUCE ALL THE PLEADINGS THEY FILED IN AC
(sic) G.R. SP NO. 13912 BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, UPON
THE RECEIPT OF WHICH, SHALL ASSIGN THE CASE A NEW NUMBER
WITHOUT REQUIRING [private respondent] TO PAY THE DOCKETING
FEE."
SO ORDERED. 9
In this special civil action for Certiorari petitioners assign the following as errors
committed by the Court of Appeals:
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, as it is without authority [to do so], in
referring the original action for habeas corpus filed before it to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, for trial on the merits to
determine the issue as to which of the parties are legally entitled to the
custody of the child, its reliance on Section 9[1] in relation to Section 21
of B.P. Blg. 21 being specious.
2. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in ordering the parties to the original
action for habeas corpus filed before it to reproduce before the Regional
Trial Court all the pleadings they filed in AC-G.R. SP No. 13912 (sic).
3. Respondent Court of Appeals erred, as it is without authority [to do so], in
directing the Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, San Pablo City, to assign
the case a new case number without requiring herein private
respondent (as petitioner therein) to pay the docket fee therefor. 10
There is merit in the contentions of petitioners.
Essentially, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals has no power to issue the
decision remanding the proceedings to the trial court and the two subsequent
resolutions clarifying the same.

The assailed decision and the two resolutions of the Court of Appeals are not
supported by law and the Rules of Court. The provisions of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act (B.P. Blg. 129) cited by the respondent Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated 13 March 1990 are not in point. Sections 9(1) and 21 thereof merely
provide that the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Courts, respectively, exercise
original jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus, among others. While recognizing
the concurrent original jurisdiction of both courts over habeas corpus cases as special
proceedings, these provisions are not authority for remanding or referring to the latter
original actions filed with the former.
On the contrary, the Court of Appeals is specifically given the power to receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in
cases falling within its original jurisdiction. 11 Furthermore, under the Supreme Court
Resolution dated 11 February 1983 implementing B.P. Blg. 129 pending the
corresponding thorough revision of the Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals is
authorized to conduct a trial or hearing to receive evidence and for the purpose shall
observe the procedure prescribed for the trial courts. 12 Clearly, the Court of Appeals
should not have remanded or referred the petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the
trial court.: nad
Finally, the questioned decision and resolutions go against the Revised Internal Rules
of the Court of Appeals. 13 Under Rule 6, Section 2(c) (5) thereof, the proper
procedure is as follows:
RULE 6
PROCEDURE IN SPECIAL CASES
xxx
SEC. 2. Special Civil Action. Original verified petitions for Certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo warranto and other writs may
be filed in the Court of Appeals . . .
xxx
c. Judicial Action. The Court may either deny due course or dismiss the
petition outright, or require the private respondent or respondents to
comment on the petition, or give due course thereto.
xxx
(5) If it appears that there is need for reception of evidence, the Division to
which the Justice to whom the case is assigned for study and report belongs
shall conduct the hearing. The Division shall have the power to perform any
acts to resolve the factual issues raised in the case (Emphasis supplied.)
Attention is also directed to the fact that the foregoing provision is silent as to whether
or not the hearing may be delegated, unlike that of the provision on annulment of
judgments, Section 1(c)(3) of the same Rule, where, on motion of the parties, referral
of any of the issues to a Commissioner is allowed in accordance with Rule 33 of the
Rules of Court.
Under the foregoing disquisition, the Court of Appeals was in error in ordering the
remand and later on the referral of the original petition for habeas corpus filed with it
to the Regional Trial Court. What respondent court should have done was to conduct
the reception of evidence and pass upon the merits of the conflicting allegations of
the parties insofar as the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is concerned.
While We agree with the conclusion reached by respondent court that the case
requires a full-blown trial of the facts, the same should be done in the context of the
special proceedings for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, and
not a remand or referral of the original action for a writ of habeas corpus filed with the
respondent court. Parenthetically, the proper venue in this action is the place where
the petitioner therein resides. 14 Petitioners' third assigned error is disposed of
accordingly.
WHEREFORE, the petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision
and resolutions of the respondent Court of Appeals are SET ASIDE and a new one is
rendered DISMISSING the petition for habeas corpus WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the
filing by private respondent of the appropriate special proceedings to gain custody of
his minor child. Let copies of this decision be furnished all Members of the respondent
Court of Appeals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 101428 August 5, 1992
DR. ISABELITA VITAL-GOZON, in her official capacity as MEDICAL CENTER
CHIEF
OF
THE
NATIONAL
CHILDREN'S
HOSPITAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and DR. ALEJANDRO S. DE LA
FUENTE, respondents.
Gregorio San Agustin for private respondent.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, in a special civil action
of mandamus against a public officer, to take cognizance of the matter of damages
sought to be recovered from the defendant officer, is the chief issue raised in
the certiorari action at bar. Also put the issue is whether or not the Solicitor General
may represent the defendant public officer in the mandamus suit, in so far as the
claim for damages is concerned, in light of the Court's rulings in Urbano , et al. v.
Chavez, et al., and Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig, et al. 1
There is no dispute about the facts from which these issues arise.
In the early months of 1987 and pursuant to Executive Order No. 119 issued on
January 30, 1987 by President Corazon Aquino reorganization of the various
offices of the Ministry of Health commenced; existing offices were abolished, transfers
of personnel effected.
At the time of the reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of the
Clinics of the National Children's Hospital, having been appointed to that position on
December 20, 1978. Prior thereto, he occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a
position to which he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I of the
same hospital for six (6) years (since 1971).
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice from the Department of Health
that he would be re-appointed "Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a
demotion by no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de la Fuente
filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board. When his protest was ignored, he
brought his case to the Civil Service Commission where it was docketed as CSC
Case No. 4. In the meantime "the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the position
of Chief of Clinics were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr. Jose
D.
Merencilla,
Jr." 2
Dr. de la Fuente's case was decided by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution
dated August 9, 1988. In that Resolution, the Commission made the following
conclusion and disposition, to wit:
. . (The Commission) declares the demotion/transfer of appellant de
la Fuente, Jr. from Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null
and void: hence, illegal. Considering further that since the National
Children's Hospital was not abolished and the position therein
remained intact although the title or the position of Chief of Clinics
was changed to "Chief of Medical Professional Staff" with
substantially the same functions and responsibilities, the
Commission hereby orders that:
1. Appellant de la Fuente, Jr. be retained or considering as never
having relinquished his position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of
Medical Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights; and
2. He be paid back salaries, transportation, representation and
housing allowances and such other benefits withheld from him from
the date of his illegal demotion/transfer.
No motion for reconsideration of this Resolution was ever submitted nor appeal
therefrom essayed to the Supreme Court, within the thirty-day period prescribed
therefor by the Constitution. 3 Consequently, the resolution became final, on
September 21, 1988.
De la Fuente thereupon sent two (2) letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center
Chief of National Children's Hospital, 4 demanding the implementation of the
Commission's decision. Dr. Vital-Gozon referred "de la Fuente's claims to the
Department of Health Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs for appropriate advice
and/or action . . (She did this allegedly because, according to the Solicitor General,
she was) unaware when and how a CSC Resolution becomes final and executory,
whether such Resolution had in fact become final and executory and whether the
DOH Legal Department would officially assail the mentioned Resolution." 5 But she
did not answer Dr. de la Fuente's letters, not even to inform him of the referral thereof
to the Assistant Secretary. She chose simply to await "legal guidance from the DOH
Legal Department." On the other hand, no one in the DOH Legal Department
bothered to reply to Dr. de la Fuente, or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise

compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission.
In fact, de la Fuente claims that Vital-Gozon had "actually threatened to stop
paying . . . (his) salary and allowances on the pretext that he has as yet no 'approved'
appointment even as 'Medical Specialist II' . . . 6
Three months having elapsed without any word from Vital-Gozon or anyone in her
behalf, or any indication whatever that the CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988 would
be obeyed, and apprehensive that the funds to cover the salaries and allowances
otherwise due him would revert to the General Fund, Dr. de al Fuente repaired to the
Civil Service Commission and asked it to enforce its judgment. He was however
"told to
file in
court
a
petition
for mandamus because of the belief that the Commission had no coercive powers
unlike a court to enforceits final decisions/resolutions. 7
So he instituted in the Court of Appeals on December 28, 1988 an action of
"mandamus and damages with preliminary injunction" to compel Vital-Gozon, and the
Administrative Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with the final
and executory resolution of the Civil Service Commission. He prayed for the following
specific reliefs:
(1) (That) . . a temporary restraining order be issued immediately,
ordering the principal and other respondents to revert the funds the
of the NCH corresponding to the amounts necessary to implement
the final resolution of the CSC in CSC Case No. 4 in favor of herein
petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., and to pay such sums
which have accrued and due and payable as of the date of said
order;
(2) After hearing on the prayer for preliminary injunction, that the
restraining order be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction;
and that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued
ordering principal respondent and the other respondents to
implement in full the said final resolution; and
(3) That, after hearing on the merits of the petition, that judgment
be rendered seeking (sic) permanent writs issued and that principal
respondent be ordered and commanded to comply with and
implement the said final resolution without further delay; and,
furthermore, that the principal respondent be ordered to pay to the
sums of P100,000.00 and P20,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, and P10,000.00 for litigation expenses and attorney's
fees.
xxx xxx xxx

The Court of Appeals required the respondents to answer. It also issued a temporary
restraining order as prayed for, and required the respondent to show cause why it
should not be converted to a writ of preliminary injunction. The record shows that the
respondents prayed for and were granted an extension of fifteen (15) days to file their
answer "through counsel, who," as the Court of Appeals was later to point out, 8 "did
not bother to indicate his address, thus notice was sent to him through the individual
respondents. . . . (However, no) answer was filed; neither was there any show cause
(sic) against a writ of preliminary injunction." It was a certain Atty. Jose Fabia who
appeared in Vital-Gozon's behalf. 9
About a month afterwards, de la Fuente filed with the same Court a
"Supplemental/Amended Petition" dated February 2, 1989. The second petition
described as one for "quo warranto" aside from "mandamus", added three
respondents including Dr. Jose Merencilla, Jr.; and alleged inter alia that he (de la
Fuente) had "clear title" to the position in question in virtue of the final and executory
judgment of the Civil Service Commission; that even after the Commission's judgment
had become final and executory and been communicated to Vital-Gozon, the latter
allowed "Dr. Merencilla, Jr. as 'OIC Professional Service' to further usurp, intrude into
and unlawfully hold and exercise the public office/position of petitioner, (under a duly
approved permanent appointment as 'Chief of Clinics' since 1978). De la Fuente thus
prayed, additionally, for judgment:
(a) Declaring that principal respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is
not legally entitled to the office of "Chief of Clinics" (now
retitled/known as "Chief of Medical Professional Staff," NCH),
ousting him therefrom and ordering said respondent to immediately
cease and desist from further performing as "OIC Professional
Service" any and all duties and responsibilities of the said office;
(and)
(b) Declaring that the petitioner, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente, Jr., is
the lawful or de jure Chief of Clinics (now known as "Chief of the
Medical Professional Staff") and placing him in the possession of
said office/position, without the need of reappointment
or new appointment as held by the Civil Service Commission in its
resolution of August 9, 1988, in CSC Case No. 4.
xxx xxx xxx

Copy of the "Supplemental/Amended Petition" was sent to Atty. Jose A. Fabia,
Counsel for Respondents c/o Dr. Ma. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, etc., National Children's
Hospital, E. Rodriguez Ave., Quezon City (Atty. Fabia's address not being indicated or
mentioned
in
his
motion
for
Extension
of
Time). 10
Again the Court of Appeals required answer of the respondents. Again, none was
filed. The petitions were consequently "resolved on the basis of their allegations and
the annexes." The Appellate Court promulgated its judgment on June 9, 1989. 11 It
held that
The question of whether petitioner may be divested of his position
as Chief of Clinics by the expedient of having him appointed to
another, lower position is no longer an issue. It ceased to be such
when the resolution in CSC Case No. 4 became final. The said
resolution is explicit in its mandate; petitioner was declared the
lawful and de jure Chief of Clinics (Chief of the Medical
Professional Staff) of the National Children's Hospital, and by this
token, respondent Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr. is not legally entitled
to the office. Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon,
had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to be
complied with. It was ill-advised of principal respondent, and
violative of the rule of law, that the resolution has not been obeyed
or implemented.
and accordingly ordered
. . . respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon, . . . to
forthwith comply with, obey and implement the resolution CSC
Case No. 4 (and) . . . Dr. Jose D. Merencilla, Jr., who is not entitled
to the office, . . . to immediately cease and desist from further
performing and acting as OIC Professional Service.
But de la Fuente's prayer for damages founded essentially on the refusal of
Gozon, et al. to obey the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service
Commission, which thus compelled him to litigate anew in a different forum was
denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the "petitions (for mandamus) are
not the vehicle nor is the Court the forum for . . . (said) claim of damages."
Gozon acknowledged in writing that she received a copy of the Appellate Tribunal's
Decision of June 9, 1989 on June 15, 1989. 12 Respondent de la Fuente
acknowledged receipt of his own copy on June 15, 1989. 13 Neither Vital-Gozon nor
her co-party, Dr. Merencilla, Jr., moved for reconsideration of, or attempted to appeal
the decision.
It was de la Fuente who sought reconsideration of the judgment, by motion filed
through new counsel, Atty. Ceferino Gaddi. 14 He insisted that the Appellate Court had
competence to award damages in a mandamus action. He argued that while such a
claim for damages might not have been proper in a mandamus proceeding in the
Appellate Court "before the enactment of B.P. Blg. 129 because the Court of Appeals
had authority to issue such writs only 'in aid of its appellate jurisdiction,'" the situation
was changed by said BP 129 in virtue of which three levels of courts the Supreme
Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals were conferred
concurrent original jurisdiction to issue said writs, and the Court of Appeals was given
power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual issues. To require
him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead to that
multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law.
While his motion for reconsideration was pending, de la Fuente sought to enforce the
judgment of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989 directing his reinstatement
pursuant to the Civil Service Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988, supra. He
filed on July 4, 1989 a "Motion for Execution," alleging that the judgment of June 9,
1989 had become final and executory for failure of Gozon, et al. served with notice
thereof on June 16, 1989 to move for its reconsideration or elevate the same to the
Supreme Court. 15 His motion was granted by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated July 7, 1989, 16 reading as follows:
The decision of June 9, 1989 having become final and executory,
as prayed for, let the writ of execution issue forthwith.
The corresponding writ of execution issued on July 13, 1989, 17 on the invoked
authority of Section 9, Rule 39. 18 The writ quoted the dispositive portion of the
judgment of June 9, 1989, including, as the Solicitor General's Office points out, the
second paragraph to the effect that the petitions "are not the vehicle nor is the Court
the forum for the claim of damages; (hence,) the prayer therefor is denied."
The writ of execution notwithstanding, compliance with the June 9, 1989 judgment
was not effected. Consequently, de la Fuente filed, on July 20, 1989, an "Urgent Ex
Parte Manifestation with Prayer to Cite Respondents for Contempt," complaining that
although Gozon and her co-parties had been served with the writ of execution on July
14, they had not complied therewith. By Resolution dated July 26, 1989, the Court
required Gozon and Merencilla to appear before it on August 3, 1989 to answer the
charge and show cause "why they should not be adjudged in contempt for disobeying
and/or resisting the judgment." 19

At the hearing Gozon and Merencilla duly presented themselves, accompanied by
their individual private lawyers one for Gozon (Felipe Hidalgo, Jr.), two for
Merencilla (Bernardo S. Nera and Moises S. Rimando). One other lawyer appeared in
their behalf, from the Health Department, Artemio Manalo, who stated that he was
there "in behalf of Jose A. Fabia." 20 They explained that they had no intention to defy
the Court, they had simply referred the matter to their superiors in good faith; and
they were perfectly willing to comply with the judgment, undertaking to do so "even in
the afternoon" of that same day. The Court consequently ordered them "to comply
with their undertaking . . . without any further delay," and report the action taken
towards this end, within five (5) days.
On August 9, 1989, Gozon as "Medical Center Chief," sent a letter to Associate
Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, advising that under Hospital Special Order No. 31 dated
August 3, 1989, de la Fuente had been directed to assume the position of Chief of the
Medical Professional Staff, and that a voucher for the payment of his allowances had
been prepared and was being processed. 21
More than a month later, or more precisely on September 27, 1989, the Court of
Appeals promulgated another Resolution, this time resolving de la Fuente's motion for
reconsideration of June 29, 1989. 22 It modified the Decision of June 9, 1989 by (a)
deleting its last paragraph (disallowing the claim of damages, supra), (b)
consequently describing and treating it as a "PARTIAL DECISION," and (c)
scheduling "further proceedings for the purpose of receiving evidence (of damages),"
since said question "cannot be resolved by mere reference to the pleadings." 23 This
was done in reliance on Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, invoked by de la
Fuente, which reads as follows: 24
Sec. 3. Mandamus. When any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or
at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages
sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
At about this time, yet another lawyer, Atty. Pedro F. Martinez entered his appearance
for Isabelita Gozon. 25 At his instance, the Court gave him an "opportunity to . . . file a
motion for reconsideration" of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. 26 That motion
he filed by registered mail on November 10, 1989. 27 His basic contentions were (a)
that the decision of June 9, 1989 could no longer be altered, having become final and
executory and having in fact been executed, and (b) that under BP 129, the Appellate
Court had no jurisdiction over the question of damages in a mandamus action.
The Office of the Solicitor General also put in an appearance in Gozon's behalf at this
juncture, saying that the case had been referred to it only on November 14, 1989. It,
too, sought reconsideration of the Resolution of September 27, 1989. It filed on
November 16, 1989 an "Omnibus Motion; I. For Reconsideration of Resolution dated
September 27, 1989; and II. To defer hearing on petitioner's claims for damages." 28
Both motions were denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated January 11,
1991. In that Resolution, the Court
1) declared that the amended decision had already become final
and could no longer be re-opened because, although "a copy of the
amendatory resolution was received by counsel who was
representing Gozon on October 3, 1989," the first motion for
reconsideration was not mailed until November 10, 1989 and the
Solicitor General's "Omnibus Motion" was not filed until November
16, 1989; and
2) prohibited the Solicitor General from representing Gozon "in
connection with . . . (de la Fuente's) claim for damages," on the
authority of this Court's ruling promulgated on March 19, 1990 in
G.R. No. 87977 (Urbano, et al. v. Chavez, et al.) and G.R. No.
88578 (Co v. Regional Trial Court of Pasig).29
Notice of this Resolution of January 11, 1991 was served on the Solicitor General's
Office on January 18, 1991.30 Again the Solicitor General sought reconsideration, by
motion dated January 25, 1991 and filed on January 30, 1991. 31Again it was
rebuffed. In a Resolution rendered on August 7, 1991, 32 served on the Solicitor
General's Office on August 20, 1991, 33 the Court of Appeals denied the motion. It
ruled that the "question of the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for respondent Gozon . . . (had already) been extensively discussed," and that its
"jurisdiction . . . to hear and determine issues on damages proceeds from Sec. 9,
Batas Pambansa 129 as amended."

In an attempt to nullify the adverse dispositions of the Court of
Appeals and obtain "the ultimate and corollary relief of dismissing respondent de la
Fuente's claim for damages" the Solicitor General's Office had instituted the
special civil action of certiorari at bar. It contends that the Court of Appeals is not
legally competent to take cognizance of and decide the question of damages in
amandamus suit. It argues that
1) B.P. Blg. 129 does not confer jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to hear, as a
trial court, claims for moral and exemplary damages;
2) assuming that the Court of Appeals does have jurisdiction over the claims for
damages, it lost the power to take cognizance thereof after the Decision of June 9,
1989 had, by its own pronouncement, become final and executory; and
3) the Urbano and Co doctrines cited by the Appellate Tribunal do not disqualify the
Solicitor General's Office from representing government officials sued in their official
capacities and in damage claims not arising from a felony.
It is in light of these facts, just narrated, that this Court will now proceed to deal with
the legal issues raised in this action. But first, a few brief observations respecting the
proceedings in the Civil Service Commission.
I
The record demonstrates that Vital-Gozon was fully aware of the following acts and
events: 34
1) the proceedings commenced by de la Fuente in the Civil Service Commission in
protest against his demotion;
2) the Commission's Resolution of August 9, 1988 as well, particularly, as the
direction therein that de la Fuente be reinstated and paid all his back salaries and
other monetary benefits otherwise due him, this being couched in fairly simple
language obviously understandable to persons of ordinary or normal intelligence;
3) no less than two (2) written demands of de la Fuente for implementation of the
CSC's aforesaid Resolution of August 9, 1988;
4) the petition filed by de la Fuente in the Court of Appeals for enforcement of the
CSC Resolution of August 9, 1988;
5) the extension granted by said Court of Appeals within which to file answer, notice
thereof having been sent directly to her and her co-respondents since the attorney
who sought the extension in their behalf (Atty. Fabia) did not set out his address in his
motion for extension;
6) the "supplemental/amended petition" subsequently presented by de la Fuente,
copy of which was sent to Atty. Fabia, c/o Dr. Vital-Gozon; and
7) the Decision and Amendatory Decision sent to her counsel on October 3, 1989.
To all these, her reaction, and that of the officials of the Department of Health
concerned, was a regrettably cavalier one, to say the least. Neither she nor the
Health officials concerned accorded said acts and events any importance. She never
bothered to find out what was being done to contest or negate de la Fuente's petitions
and actions, notwithstanding that as time went by, de la Fuente's efforts were being
met with success.
Nothing in the record even remotely suggests that Vital-Gozon merits relief from the
final and executory Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. This Court will not
disturb that Resolution. It is satisfied that no procedural or substantive errors taint that
Resolution, or its becoming final and executory.
II
Now, final and executory judgments are enforced by writ of execution and not by
another, separate action, whether of mandamus or otherwise. Hence, execution of the
Civil Service Commission's decision of August 9, 1988 should have been ordered and
effected by the Commission itself, when de la Fuente filed a motion therefor. It
declined to do so, however, on the alleged ground, as de la Fuente claims he was
told, that it "had no coercive powers unlike a court to enforce its final
decisions/resolutions." 35 That proposition, communicated to de la Fuente, of the
Commission's supposed lack of coercive power to enforce its final judgments, is
incorrect. It is inconsistent with previous acts of the Commission of actually directing
execution of its decisions and resolutions, which this Court has sanctioned in several
cases; 36 and it is not in truth a correct assessment of its powers under the
Constitution and the relevant laws.
In an En Banc Decision promulgated on October 15, 1991 in G.R. No. 96938 entitled
"Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) versus Civil Service Commission, et
al.," 37 this Court declared that in light of the pertinent provisions of the Constitution
and relevant statutes

. . . it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service Commission
the power or authority to enforce or order execution of its decisions,
resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it has been
exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the
authority to decide cases in inutile unless accompanied by the
authority to see that what has been decided is carried out. Hence,
the grant to a tribunal or agency of adjudicatory power, or the
authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically
be deemed to include the grant of authority to enforce or execute
the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.
In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution
has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases.
Be this as it may, the fact is that by reason of the Commission's mistaken refusal to
execute its final and executory Resolution of August 9, 1988, extended proceedings
have taken place in the Court of Appeals and certain issues have been expressly
raised in relation thereto, supra. Those issues appear to the Court to be important
enough to deserve serious treatment and resolution, instead of simply being given
short shrift by a terse ruling that the proceedings in the Court Service Commission
actually had the power to execute its final and executory Resolution.
III
The first such issue is whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the matter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus. The
Solicitor General's Office argues that since jurisdiction is conferred only by law, not by
agreement of the parties, or acquiescence of the court, and since the law conferring
jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals, Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, makes no reference to
"actions for moral and exemplary damages, as those claimed by . . . (de la Fuente)," it
follows that the Court of Appeals has no competence to act on said claim of damages.
And Section 3 of Rule 65, which authorizes the petitioner in amandamus suit to pray
for judgment commanding the defendant inter alia "to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant," is "nothing more than
a procedural rule allowing joinder of causes of action, i.e., mandamus and damages,"
and such an award of damages is allowable only in actions commenced in Regional
Trial Courts but not in the Court of Appeals or this Court.
The argument is specious. It cannot be sustained.
The Solicitor General's Office correctly identifies Section 9, B.P. 129 as the legal
provision specifying the original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The
section pertinently declares that the "Intermediate Appellate Court (now the Court of
Appeals) shall exercise . .," among others:
. . . Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction . . . 38
The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched said Section 9 for an explicit and
specific statement regarding "actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding
none, concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted competence to
assume cognizance of claims for such damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section
19, governing the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in civil cases,
contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral and exemplary damages," and
indeed does not use the word "damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts
have power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other classes of
damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of cases falling within their
specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor General's theory that the rule in question is a mere
procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for damages,
is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission or
failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the
latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action
for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
Now, at the time of the enactment of B.P. 129, the issuance of the extraordinary writs
above mentioned was controlled by the Rules of Court of 1964, as they continue to
date to be so controlled. More particularly, the principal writs of mandamus,
prohibition and certiorari were (and continue to be) governed by Rule 65; the writ
ofhabeas corpus, by Rule 102; and the writ of quo warranto, by Rule 66. The socalled auxiliary writs were (and continue to be) also governed by the same code
e.g., preliminary attachment, by Rule 57; preliminary injunction, by Rule 58,
receivership, by Rule 59; writ of seizure or delivery in a replevin suit, by Rule 60.
At that time, Section 3 of Rule 65 authorized (as it continues to authorize to date)
rendition of judgment in amandamus action "commanding the defendant, immediately
or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights
of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the defendant." 39 The provision makes plain that the damages are an
incident, or the result of, the defendant's wrongful act in failing and refusing to do the
act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of 1940 had an identical
counterpart provision. 40

Moreover, Section 4 of the same Rule 65 authorized, as it continues to authorize to
date, the filing of the petition "in the Supreme Court, or, if it relates to the acts or
omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) having jurisdiction thereof," as well as
"inthe Court of Appeals (whether or not) 41 in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."
The next issue is whether or not the Solicitor General may properly represent a public
official like Dr. Vital-Gozon, who is sued for damages for allegedly refusing to comply
with a lawful and executory judgment of competent authority. The doctrine laid down
in the Urbano and Co cases already adverted to, 45 is quite clear:
. . . (T)he Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to
represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case. . . .
Worthy of note, too, is that Rule 66 of the Rules of Court similarly authorizes the
recovery of damages in a quo warranto action against a corporate officer an action
within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals as follows: 42
Sec. 14. Liability of officer neglecting to deliver property of
corporation to receiver. An officer of such corporation who
refuses or neglects, upon demand, to deliver over to the receiver all
money, property, books, deeds, notes, bills, obligations, and papers
of every description within his power or control, belonging to the
corporation, or in any wise necessary for the settlement of its
affairs, or the discharge of its debts and liabilities, may be punished
for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court, and
shall be liable to the receiver for the value of all money or other
things so refused or neglected to be surrendered, together with all
damages that may have been sustained by the stockholders and
creditors of the corporation, or any of them, in consequence of
such neglect or refusal.
An award of damages was and is also allowed in connection with the auxiliary writ of
preliminary attachment, preliminary injunction or receivership which the Court of
Appeals has the power to issue in common with the Supreme Court and the Regional
Trial Courts, 43 payable by the sureties of the bond given in support of the writ, upon
seasonable application and summary hearing. 44
Since it cannot but be assumed that in formulating, and incorporating in BP 129, the
provision governing the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court, now Court of
Appeals, the Batasang Pambansa was fully cognizant of the relevant provisions of the
Rules of Court just cited, as well as the rule against multiplicity of actions, it follows
that in conferring on the Court of Appeals original jurisdiction over the special civil
action ofmandamus, among others, as well as over the issuance of auxiliary writs or
processes, the Batasang Pambansaclearly intended that said Court should exercise
all the powers then possessed by it under the Rules of Court in relation to said action
of mandamus and auxiliary writs, including the adjudication of damages to the
petitioner in the action in appropriate cases.
IV
This observation should apply as well to a public official who is

haled to court on a civil suit for damages arising from a felony
allegedly committed by him (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Any
pecuniary liability he may be held to account for on the occasion of
such civil suit is for his own account. The State is not liable for the
same. A fortiori, the Office of the Solicitor General likewise has no
authority to represent him in such a civil suit for damages.
It being quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a crime, or civilly
prosecuted for damages arising from a crime, there is no legal obstacle to her being
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
V
The last issue is whether or not the decision of the Court of Appeals of June 9, 1989
could still be modified after it was pronounced final and executory and was in fact
executed with respect to de la Fuente's reinstatement to his position and the payment
of the salaries and allowances due him.
There would seem to be no question about the timeliness of de la Fuente's motion for
reconsideration of the June 9, 1989 decision. As already narrated, notice of said
decision was served on him on the 15th of June, and his motion for reconsideration
was presented on June 29, 1989, or fourteen (14) days after receiving a copy of the
judgment, i.e., within the fifteen-day period prescribed by Section 1, Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court for filing a motion for new trial reconsideration.
This being so, it would certainly have been entirely within the authority of the Court of
Appeals, under normal circumstances, to rule on that motion for reconsideration and,
in its discretion, act favorably on it, as it did through its Resolution of September 27,
1991 by amending the decision of June 9, 1989, declaring it a partial judgment,
and setting a date for reception of evidence on the la Fuente's claim for damages.

It would also appear that the motions for reconsideration of said Resolution of
September 27, 1991 separately submitted in Gozon's behalf, by her own private
attorney and by the Solicitor General's Office, were filed way out of time. As also
already pointed out, notice of that Resolution of September 27, 1991 was served on
Gozon's counsel on October 3, 1989 and on Gozon herself on October 4, 1989; but
the motion for reconsideration of Atty. Martinez (Gozon's private lawyer) was not filed
until November 10, 1989, thirty-eight (38) days afterwards, and that of the Solicitor
General, until November 16, 1989, or forty-four (44) days later. What is worse is that,
its motion for reconsideration of November 16, 1989 having been denied by a
Resolution dated January 11, 1991, notice of which it received on January 18, 1991,
the Solicitor General's Office filed still another motion for reconsideration on January
30, 1991, ostensibly directed against that Resolution of January 11, 1991 but actually
seeking the setting aside of the Resolution of September 17, 1989. In effect it filed a
second motion for reconsideration which, of course, is prohibited by law. 46
However, disposition of the question simply and solely on the foregoing premises is
precluded by the fact that prior to the promulgation by the Appellate Court of its
Resolution of September 27, 1989. granting de la Fuente's motion for
reconsideration of June 29, 1989 de la Fuente had asked for and been granted by
the Court of Appeals, authority to execute the decision of June 9, 1989 and had in
fact succeeded in bringing about satisfaction thereof, in so far as concerned his
reinstatement to the position from which he had been illegally ousted and the
payment to him his salaries and allowances.
It has therefore become essential to determine the effect of the execution of said
decision of June 9, 1989 at de la Fuente's instance, on the power of the Court of
Appeals to modify that judgment as earlier prayed for by de la Fuente in such a way
as to concede the latter's capacity to claim damages in his mandamus action, and
consequently authorize him to present evidence on the matter.
The general rule is that when a judgment has been satisfied, it passes beyond review,
satisfaction being the last act and end of the proceedings, and payment of satisfaction
of the obligation thereby established produces permanent and irrevocable
discharge; 47 hence, a judgment debtor who acquiesces in and voluntarily complies
with the judgment, is estopped from taking an appeal therefrom. 48
On the other hand the question of whether or not a judgment creditor is estopped
from appealing or seeking modification of a judgment which has been executed at his
instance, is one dependent upon the nature of the judgment as being indivisible or
not. This is the doctrine laid down by this Court in a case decided as early as
1925, Verches v. Rios. 49 In that case this Court held that although "there are cases
holding the contrary view," where the judgment is indivisible, "the weight of authority
is to the effect that an acceptance of full satisfaction of the judgment annihilates the
right to further prosecute the appeal; . . . that a party who has recovered judgment
on a claim which cannot be split up and made the basis of several causes of action,
and afterwards coerced full satisfaction by writ of execution or authority of the court,
cannot maintain an appeal from the judgment against the objections of the judgment
debtor;" and that even partial execution by compulsory legal process at the instance
of a party in whose favor a judgment appealed from was rendered, places said party
in estoppel to ask that the judgment be amended, either "by appeal or answer to his
adversary's appeal, or otherwise." 50
A converso, where the judgment is divisible, estoppel should not operate against the
judgment creditor who causes implementation of a part of the decision by writ of
execution. This is the clear import of Verches and the precedents therein invoked. It is
an aspect of the principle above mentioned that is fully consistent not only with the
dissenting opinion that "(a)cceptance of payment of . . . only the uncontroverted part
of the claim . . . should not preclude the plaintiff from prosecuting his appeal, to
determine whether he should not have been allowed more," 51 but also with logic and
common sense.
In this case, the amended judgment of the Court of Appeals is clearly divisible,
satisfaction of which may be "split up." One part has reference to the enforcement of
the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, that de la Fuente
should be reinstated to the position of Chief of Clinics (now Chief of Medical
Professional Staff) without loss of seniority rights and that he be paid his back
salaries and all monetary benefits due him from the date of his illegal demotion. This
part is no longer issuable, and has not in truth been controverted by Gozon herself.
The other part has reference to the damages which de la Fuente contends he
suffered as a result of the unjustified refusal of Gozon and her co-parties to comply
with the final and executory judgment of the Civil Service Commission, and which the
Appellate Tribunal has allowed him to prove. Obviously, the second part cannot
possibly affect the first. Whether de la Fuente succeeds or fails in his bid to recover
damages against Gozon, et al. because of their refusal to obey the judgment of the
Civil Service Commission, is a contingency that cannot affect the unalterable
enforceability of that judgment. Similarly, the enforcement of the Commission's
judgment (already accomplished by writ of execution of the Court of Appeals issued at
de la Fuente's instance) cannot influence in any manner the question whether or not
there was culpable refusal on the part of Gozon, et al. to comply with said judgment
when first required so to do, and whether de la Fuente did in fact suffer compensable
injury thereby.
It bears stressing that the juridical situation in which de la Fuente finds himself is not
of his making. It is a consequence of circumstances not attributable to any fault on his

part, i.e., the unwarranted refusal or neglect of his superiors to obey the executory
judgment of the Civil Service Commission; the erroneous refusal of the Commission
to execute its own decision which made necessary, in de la Fuente's view, the filing of
a mandamusaction in the Court of Appeals; the initial refusal of the latter Court to
acknowledge his right to damages in connection with the mandamus suit; and
ultimately, the change of view by the Court of Appeals, on de la Fuente's motion, as
regards its competence to take cognizance of the matter of damages in relation to
the mandamusproceeding.
Under these circumstances, there was no reason whatsoever to defer concession to
de la Fuente of the relief of reinstatement to which he
was indisputably already entitled in the meantime that issues arising after finality of
the Civil Service Commission's judgment were being ventilated and resolved these
issues being, to repeat, whether or not the refusal by Gozon, et al. obey said
judgment of the Commission could be justified, and whether or not, by reason of that
refusal to obey, de la Fuente did in fact suffer compensable injury.
It was therefore correct for the Court of Appeals, albeit by implication, to treat its
judgment as divisible, or capable of being enforced by parts, and to consider de la
Fuente as not having been placed in estoppel to pursue his claim for damages by
seeking and obtaining authority for a partial execution of the judgment. De la Fuente
not being in estoppel, it follows that his motion for reconsideration, timely filed, was
not deemed abandoned or waived by the partial execution of the judgment, and
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals to amend the judgment was retained and not lost.
It follows, too, that since no motion for reconsideration was filed against, or appeal
attempted to be taken from, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals amending its
original judgment, within the time prescribed therefor by law, said amendatory
resolution has long since become final and immutable, particularly in so far as it holds
itself competent to take cognizance of the matter of damages and authorizes the
reception of evidence on de la Fuente's claim therefor.
G.R. No. 130866 September 16, 1998
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged Resolutions of September
27, 1989, January 11, 1991 and August 7, 1991 are AFFIRMED, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ST.
MARTIN
FUNERAL
vs.
NATIONAL
LABOR
RELATIONS
COMMISSION
ARICAYOS, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
HOME, petitioner,
and
BIENVENIDO

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed
by herein private respondent before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San Fernando, Pampanga. Private
respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no contract of
employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included in the
semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment
for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by
petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). 1
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its employee but
only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martin's Funeral Home.
Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was formerly working as an overseas
contract worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then,
as an indication of gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of
Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter then took over the
management of the business. She then discovered that there were arrears in the
payment of taxes and other government fees, although the records purported to show
that the same were already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the business
operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to participate in
the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that
petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. 2
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore, his office had no jurisdiction
over the case. 3
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a "volunteer" and not as an
employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or
a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and petitioner. 4
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the questioned
decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings. 5 Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the NLRC in its resolution dated August 18, 1997 for lack of merit, 6 hence the present
petition alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion. 7
Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels that it is
now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and systemic
practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and still follows with
respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of labor disputes that find
their way to this Court and the legislative changes introduced over the years into the
provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines
and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)
now stridently call for and warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.
We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established in the
Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its decisions were
expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the
President of the Philippines.
On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the same to
take effect six months after its promulgation. 8 Created and regulated therein is the
present NLRC which was attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for
program and policy coordination only. 9 Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof
also granted an aggrieved party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC
to the Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision
and abolished such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for appeals
from the decision of the NLRC. 10 The present Section 223, as last amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the Commission shall
decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and
that such decision shall be final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary of
Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review thereof, the Court
nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction
even though no right of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial review
is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial
rights of the parties; and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts
the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 11
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this Court, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, 12 and then seasonably avail of the

special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, 13 for which said Rule has now fixed the
reglementary period of sixty days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the
10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as
contemplated in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may
still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65. 14
Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A. No.
7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals shall exercise:
Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129 originally
provided as follows:
(1)
Original
jurisdiction to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
jurisdiction;
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall

exercise:
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(1)
Original
jurisdiction to
issue
writs
of mandamus,
jurisdiction;
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,

decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the Social Security Commission, the Employees Compensation
Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

judgments of Regional Trial Courts; and
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,
decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section
17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases
and conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all
acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to
grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory
orders issued under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals. 15
The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct
hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original
and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct
new trials or further proceedings. Trials or hearings in the Court of
Appeals must be continuous and must be completed within, three
(3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.
It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the lower
appellate court, 16 the following amendments of the original provisions of Section 9 of
B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:
1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and replaced
by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to conduct trials and
hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.

2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to
paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause therein now
provides "except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph
of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948." (Emphasis supplied).
3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-judicial
agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction
are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission.
This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of purpose and
terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review over decisions of the
NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course, a special original action limited to the
resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost
all cases that have been brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction.
It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now grants
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final adjudications of
the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies generally or specifically
referred to therein except, among others, "those falling within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court in accordance with . . . the Labor Code of the Philippines under
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, . . . ." This would necessarily contradict
what has been ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the
NLRC. 17 Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the
NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by necessary
implication.
The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that the Court
of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions
of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
These cases can, of course, be properly excluded from the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned
amendment by transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This
is illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that procedural
gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court or of any
other court for that matter.
A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902 persuades us
that there may have been an oversight in the course of the deliberations on the said
Act or an imprecision in the terminology used therein. In fine, Congress did intend to
provide for judicial review of the adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the
Supreme Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode
of review. This conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been
drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more particularly on
Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on S. No. 1495/H. No.
10452. 18
In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his sponsorship
speech 19 from which we reproduce the following excerpts:
The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time
expanded its jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate
jurisdiction was expanded to cover not only final judgment of
Regional Trial Courts, but also all final judgment(s), decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial agencies,
instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of
subparagraph 1 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 4 of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the
Supreme Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of
factual issues to the Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits
that can be derived from the expansion of the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals was cut short by the last paragraph of
Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which excludes from its
coverage the "decisions and interlocutory orders issued under the
Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.
Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the
Supreme Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495
seeks to eliminate the exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and,
additionally, extends the coverage of appellate review of the Court

of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the Employees
Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases
elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)
xxx xxx xxx
Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from
Laguna provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the
workload of the Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the
privilege of review by an appellate tribunal.
In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief
Justice Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme
Court:
. . . Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to
relieve the Supreme Court of the burden of
reviewing these cases which present no
important issues involved beyond the particular
fact and the parties involved, so that the
Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to
cases of public interest in the discharge of its
mandated task as the guardian of the
Constitution and the guarantor of the people's
basic rights and additional task expressly vested
on it now "to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr.
President. It has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years
ago. I understand we are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we
distribute the work of the appellate courts, we shall continue to
mount and add to the number of cases pending.
In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the
reasons we have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human
Rights requests the support and collegial approval of our Chamber.
xxx xxx xxx
Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment

was introduced by the said sponsor and the following proceedings transpired: 20
Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line "Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution," add the phrase "THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED."
So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that issues arising from the
Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme Court.
The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be
deleted. This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House
of Representatives and as we understand it, as approved in the
House, this was also deleted, Mr. President.
amendment is approved.
Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr.
President.
Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of
Committee amendments.
amendment is approved. (Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495 was
passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous approval on third
reading followed. 21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495 and
House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February 20,
1995, 22 inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme Court earlier
discussed.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the

special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC. The use of the word "appeal" in relation thereto and in the
instances we have noted could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals
by certiorari and the original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review
addressed to the appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however,
and with which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action
ofcertiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of
Appeals; 23 whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by certiorari to the
Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the intention of
Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the
relief desired.
Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al. 25 should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a
propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same
may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses before
us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by
seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact that the same
is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their original or
concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by law to be sought
therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of the
imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of
the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of the case which often has to be remanded or referred
to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure,
or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a
trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this
Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional
and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.
Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of the
opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial step in the
process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong the proceedings. On
the contrary, as he commendably and realistically emphasized, that procedure would
be advantageous to the aggrieved party on this reasoning:
On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be
appealed to the Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage
to have all the evidence on record be reexamined and reweighed
after which the findings of facts and conclusions of said bodies are
correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.
Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly
the axiom that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and
may not be reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of
the records will reveal appeals which are factual in nature and may,
therefore, be dismissed outright by minute resolutions. 24
While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter of the
wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that there is a growing
number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which, not being a trier of fact, has
at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or
ambiguous factual findings; that the Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that
purpose, aside from the increased number of its component divisions; and that there
is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major
aspect of constitutional protection to labor.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to supposed
appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all such
petitions should hence forth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be FORWARDED,
to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition consistent with the
views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue is whether Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over appeals from
decisions, resolutions or orders of the National Water Resources Board (petitioner).
A.L. Ang Network (respondent) filed on January 23, 2003 an application for a
Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) with petitioner to operate and maintain a
water service system in Alijis, Bacolod City.
Bacolod City Water District (BACIWA) opposed respondents application on the
ground that it is the only government agency authorized to operate a water service
system within the city.1
By Decision of August 20, 2003, petitioner granted respondents CPC application.
BACIWA moved to have the decision reconsidered, contending that its right to due
process was violated when it was not allowed to present evidence in support of its
opposition.2
Petitioner reconsidered its Decision and allowed BACIWA to present
evidence,3 drawing respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City against petitioner and BACIWA. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the petition, arguing that the proper recourse of respondent was to the Court
of Appeals, citing Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC, by Order of April 15, 2005, 4 dismissed respondents petition for lack of
jurisdiction, holding that it is the Court of Appeals which has "exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of . . .
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commission[s] . . . except those
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court . . . ." Thus the RTC explained:
G.R. No. 186450
April 14, 2010
NATIONAL
WATER
RESOURCES
vs.
A. L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
Art. 89 of P.D. 1067 having been long repealed by BP 129, as amended, which has
effectively and explicitly removed the Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over
the decisions, resolutions, order[s] or awards of quasi-judicial agencies such as
[petitioner] NWRB, and vested with the Court of Appeals, very clearly now, this Court
has no jurisdiction over this instant petition.
BOARD
(NWRB), Petitioner,
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari at the Court of Appeals, which, by Decision of January 25, 2008,5 annulled
and set aside the RTC April 15, 2005, holding that it is the RTC which has jurisdiction
over appeals from petitioners decisions. Thus the appellate court discoursed.

In the analogous case of BF Northwest Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court[,] the Supreme Court . . . categorically pronounced
the RTCs jurisdiction over appeals from the decisions of the NWRB consistent with
Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and ratiocinated in this wise:
x x x x.
The logical conclusion, therefore, is that jurisdiction over actions for annulment of
NWRC decisions lies with the Regional Trial Courts, particularly, when we take note
of the fact that the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over NWRC
decisions covers such broad and all embracing grounds as grave abuse of discretion,
questions of law, and questions of fact and law (Art. 89, P.D. No. 1067). This
conclusion is also in keeping with the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, which
vests Regional Trial Courts with original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, etc. (Sec. 21 [1], B.P. Blg. 129) relating to acts or omissions
of an inferior court (Sec. 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
x x x x.
Similarly, in Tanjay Water District vs. Pedro Gabaton, the Supreme Court conformably
ruled, viz:
"Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the appropriation, utilization and control of
water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in the first instance,
pertains to the Water Resources Council as provided in PD No. 1067 which is the
special law on the subject. The Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) has
only appellate jurisdiction over the case."
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, there is no doubt that [petitioner] NWRB is
mistaken in its assertion. As no repeal is expressly made, Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067
is certainly meant to be an exception to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over
appeals or petitions for certiorari of the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies. This finds
harmony with Paragraph 2, Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
stated that, "If it involves the acts of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the
Court of Appeals." Evidently, not all petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 involving the
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies must be filed with the Court of Appeals. The rule
admits of some exceptions as plainly provided by the phrase "unless otherwise
provided by law or these rules" and Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 is verily an example of
these exceptions. (italics and emphasis partly in the original; underscoring supplied)
Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by
Resolution of February 9, 2009,6 petitioner filed the present petition for review,
contending that:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE
[PETITIONER] SINCE SECTION 89, PD NO. 1067, REGARDING APPEALS, HAS
BEEN SUPERSEDED AND REPEALED BY [BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG] 129 AND
THE RULES OF COURT. FURTHERMORE, PD 1067 ITSELF DOES NOT
CONTEMPLATE THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
CERTIORARI JURISDICTION OVER THE [PETITIONER].7 (underscoring supplied)
Petitioner maintains that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to annul or modify its acts or omissions as a quasi-judicial
agency. Citing Section 4 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner contends that
there is no law or rule which requires the filing of a petition for certiorari over its acts
or omissions in any other court or tribunal other than the Court of Appeals.8
Petitioner goes on to fault the appellate court in holding that Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 (BP 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act did not expressly repeal Article 89 of
Presidential Decree No. 1067 (PD 1067) otherwise known as the Water Code of the
Philippines.9
Respondent, on the other hand, maintains the correctness of the assailed decision of
the appellate court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Section 9 (1) of BP 129 granted the Court of Appeals (then known as the Intermediate
Appellate Court) original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.10
Since the appellate court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over quasi-judicial
agencies under Rule 4311 of the Rules of Court, petitions for writs of certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus against the acts and omissions of quasi-judicial agencies,
like petitioner, should be filed with it. This is what Rule 65 of the Rules imposes for
procedural uniformity. The only exception to this instruction is when the law or the
Rules itself directs otherwise, as cited in Section 4, Rule 65. 12 The appellate courts
construction that Article 89 of PD 1067, which reads:

ART. 89. The decisions of the [NWRB] on water rights controversies may be appealed
to the [RTC] of the province where the subject matter of the controversy is situated
within fifteen (15) days from the date the party appealing receives a copy of the
decision, on any of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion; (2) question
of law; and (3) questions of fact and law (emphasis and underscoring supplied), is
such an exception, is erroneous.
Article 89 of PD 1067 had long been rendered inoperative by the passage of BP 129.
Aside from delineating the jurisdictions of the Court of Appeals and the RTCs, Section
47 of BP 129 repealed or modified:
x x x. [t]he provisions of Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary Act
of 1948, as amended, of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended, of the Rules of Court,
and of all other statutes, letters of instructions and general orders or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act x x x. (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The general repealing clause under Section 47 "predicates the intended repeal under
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts."13
In enacting BP 129, the Batasang Pambansa was presumed to have knowledge of
the provision of Article 89 of P.D. No. 1067 and to have intended to change it. 14 The
legislative intent to repeal Article 89 is clear and manifest given the scope and
purpose of BP 129, one of which is to provide a homogeneous procedure for the
review of adjudications of quasi-judicial entities to the Court of Appeals.
More importantly, what Article 89 of PD 1067 conferred to the RTC was the power of
review on appeal the decisions of petitioner. It appears that the appellate court gave
significant consideration to the ground of "grave abuse of discretion" to thus hold that
the RTC has certiorari jurisdiction over petitioners decisions. A reading of said Article
89 shows, however, that it only made "grave abuse of discretion" as another ground
to invoke in an ordinary appeal to the RTC. Indeed, the provision was unique to the
Water Code at the time of its application in 1976.
The issuance of BP 129, specifically Section 9 (Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
then known as Intermediate Appellate Court), and the subsequent formulation of the
Rules, clarified and delineated the appellate and certiorari jurisdictions of the Court of
Appeals over adjudications of quasi-judicial bodies. Grave abuse of discretion may be
invoked before the appellate court as a ground for an error of jurisdiction.
It bears noting that, in the present case, respondent assailed petitioners order via
certiorari before the RTC, invoking grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof. In other words, it invoked such ground

not for an error of judgment.
While Section 9 (3) of BP 12915 and Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court 16 does
not list petitioner as"among" the quasi-judicial agencies whose final judgments,
orders, resolutions or awards are appealable to the appellate court, it is non sequitur
to hold that the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over petitioners
judgments, orders, resolutions or awards. It is settled that the list of quasi-judicial
agencies specifically mentioned in Rule 43 is not meant to be exclusive. 17 The
employment of the word "among" clearly instructs so.1avvphi1
BF Northwest Homeowners Association v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a 1987
case cited by the appellate court to support its ruling that RTCs have jurisdiction over
judgments, orders, resolutions or awards of petitioner, is no longer controlling in light
of the definitive instruction of Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Tanjay Water District v. Gabaton19 is not in point either as the issue raised therein was
which between the RTC and the then National Water Resources Council had
jurisdiction over disputes in the appropriation, utilization and control of water.
In fine, certiorari and appellate jurisdiction over adjudications of petitioner properly
belongs to the Court of Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The April 15, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Bacolod City dismissing petitioners petition for lack of jurisdiction is UPHELD.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999

EULALIA RUSSELL, PUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T.
REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO
TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM
TAUTHO,
AND
MARILYN
PERALES, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTlL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO
TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND
ARTEMIO CABATINGAN, respondent.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order dated January 12, 1995
issued by respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaue City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on ground of
lack of jurisdiction, as well as his Order dated February 13, 1995 denying petitioners'
Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal.
The facts of the case are as follows:

On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents,
denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND PARTITION," with the Regional
Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-2275. The
complaint, in substance, alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land,
Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters,
more or less. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and
Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property was inherited by their
legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had
remained undivided until petitioners discovered a public document denominated
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS
ORAL AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this
deed, private respondents divided the property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero
Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners claimed that the document was false and
perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition
of the property whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed
that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to partition the
land among all the heirs. 1
Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-2275.
We find merit in the petition.
Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is
for the annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND
DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one
incapable of pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.
Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition
and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the complaint is P5,000.00,
then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
Compostela, Cebu.
For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are
reproduced hereunder:
On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss 2 the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the case as the total assessed
value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3) 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 4 falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Curt of Liloan, Compostela. 5
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 6 saying that the Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one which is incapable of
pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as
amended. 7
4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a

certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as
follows:
On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to
Dismiss. 8 A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed by petitioners on
January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not
one for recovery of title to or possession of the land but an action to annul a
document or declare it null and void, 9 hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation
falling within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did not
oppose the motion for reconsideration.
On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the
motion for reconsideration. 10
3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of
spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long
time ago;
A parcel of land containing 56,97740 square

meters, more or less, located at Cotcot, Liloan,
Cebu.
designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification
issued by the Office of the Land Management copy of which are
hereto attached as Annexes "A" and "A-1" and are made part
hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;
5. That the passed to the children of the spouses (who are all
deceased except for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely: Zacarias,
Epifania, Vicenta, Felecisimo, Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and

which in turn passed to the plaintiffs and defendants upon their
death they being their descendants and legal heirs;
6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by
and among the legal heirs of said previous owners;
7. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public document,
which is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a
previous oral agreement of partition, affecting the land executed by
and among the defendants whereby defendants divided the
property among themselves to the exclusion of plaintiffs who are
entitled thereto; attached hereto as Annex "B" and is made part
hereof is xerox copy of said document;
8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a
complete nullity because the defendants are not the only heirs of
Casimero Tautho; plaintiffs are also heirs and descendants of said
deceased; moreover, there has been no oral partition of the
property;
9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had
procured tax declarations of the land for their supposed "shares" to
the great damage and prejudice of plaintiffs;
10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven
(7) equal parts since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had
seven children;
11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at
the barangay level; attached hereto as Annex "C" is Certification to
file Action;
12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act of
defendants, plaintiffs were forced to bring instant action and
contract the services of the undersigned counsel with whom they
bind themselves to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Court to declare null and void the document (Annex "B") of
declaration of heirs and confirmation and to order the partition of
the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall respectively go
to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho and considering six

(6) of them died already the same shall go to their children or
descendants, and to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs
attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and
equitable under the premises. 11
We agree with petitioners.
The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one
incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the
jurisdiction of said court.
In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill, 12 we had the occasion to rule that:
[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted
the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and
whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in instance would
depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money,
where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now
Regional Trial Courts). 13
Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific
performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of judgment; 14 also
actions questioning the validity of a mortgage, 15 annulling a deed of sale or
conveyance and to recover the price paid 16 and for rescession, which is a counterpart
of specific performance. 17
While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the MTC,
METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed
P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. If the value exceeds
P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which
have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2). 18 However, the subject matter of the complaint in

this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS
AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."
The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the
document in which private respondents declared themselves as the only heirs of the
late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among
themselves to the exclusion of petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled
to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is
just incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document
above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or
some of the claims asserted therein. 19
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order
dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order denying the motion for
reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, Mandaue City is ORDERED to proceed with
dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. MAN-2275. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 163021
April 27, 2007
PATRICIO
A.
vs.
PATRICIO S. PAYOYO, Respondent.
VILLENA, Petitioner,
On October 26, 1998, Payoyo filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money and
damages against Villena. Villena moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. He argued that there was no ground to cancel the contract; thus,
there was no basis for refund. The trial court denied his motion. Villena thereafter filed
an answer with compulsory counterclaim citing as an affirmative defense Payoyos
failure to state a cause of action.
On June 1, 1999, immediately after the trial court issued a pre-trial order, Villena filed
a second motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but it was denied. Thereafter, trial ensued.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
1
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated November 21, 2003 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70513 and its Resolution 2 dated March 18,
2004, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. The appellate court had
affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated April 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 78.
The facts are undisputed.
The trial court decided in favor of Payoyo, reasoning that the power to rescind is
implied in reciprocal obligations. Considering that Villena repeatedly failed to comply
with his obligation, Payoyo had the right to rescind the contract and demand a refund.
The trial court ordered petitioner to pay respondent P184,821.50 as actual damages
plus 12% interest per annum from the date of filing of the complaint and P20,000 as
moral damages plus legal interest from judicial demand until fully paid.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision with the following modifications:
1) [Petitioner Villena is] hereby ordered to pay [respondent Payoyo] actual
damages in the amount of P155,183.00 with 12% interest per annum from
the date of the filing of the complaint;
On October 28, 1997, respondent Patricio Payoyo and Novaline, Inc., through its
president, petitioner Patricio Villena, entered into a contract for the delivery and
installation of kitchen cabinets in Payoyos residence. The cabinets were to be
delivered within ninety days from downpayment of 50% of the purchase price. On
October 29, 1997, Payoyo paid Villena P155,183 as downpayment.
2) [Petitioner is] likewise ordered to deliver the Indesit Multifunction Oven

and Indesit Hob in favor of [respondent] within thirty (30) days from the
finality of this decision; and
On December 9, 1997, Payoyo entered into another contract with Villena for the
delivery of home appliances. On the same day, Payoyo paid 50% of the purchase
price equal to P29,638.50 as downpayment.
However, Villena failed to install the kitchen cabinets and deliver the appliances.
Payoyo made several demands upon Villena but the latter failed to comply.
In a letter dated March 12, 1998, Payoyo demanded the cancellation of the contracts
and the refund in full of the downpayments amounting to P184,821.50. Villena
promised to install the kitchen cabinets on or before May 10, 1998 and to deliver the
appliances. Despite repeated demands, Villena again failed to do so.
Payoyo sent Villena two demand letters on June 24, 1998 and on July 28, 1998
asking the latter to either deliver all items or return the downpayments.
3) [Respondent] is hereby ordered to pay the purchase price of the Indesit

Multifunction Oven and Indesit Hob in favor of [petitioner] on the day the
delivery is made.4
The appellate court reasoned that while there was delay in the delivery and
installation of the kitchen cabinets, there was none in the delivery of the appliances.
The contract for said appliances did not specify the date of delivery but that delivery
should be made upon payment of the 50% balance of the purchase price.
Considering that Payoyo failed to pay the balance, Villena did not incur delay.
Hence, the instant petition, where petitioner raises the following issues:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (PETITIONER AND

NOVALINE, INC.), ARE ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES.5
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary

estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be
ascertained. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends
on the amount of the claim. But, where the primary issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, such are actions whose subjects are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.10
Simply, the issue in this case is whether the trial court had jurisdiction over the
complaint.
Verily, what determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought.11
Petitioner maintains that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. He posits that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint since it is
mainly for recovery of a sum of money in the amount ofP184,821.50 which is below
the jurisdictional amount set for RTCs.6 Moreover, petitioner contends that the issue
of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, even on appeal, since jurisdiction is
conferred only by law and cannot be acquired through or waived by any act or
omission of the parties.7
In our considered view, the complaint, albeit entitled as one for collection of a sum of
money with damages, is one incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, one within the
RTCs jurisdiction. The allegations therein show that it is actually for breach of
contract, thus,
II.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the RTC has jurisdiction over the
complaint as the allegations therein show that it is actually a case for rescission of the
contracts. The recovery of a sum of money is merely a necessary consequence of the
cancellation of the contracts.8
The pertinent portion of Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7691,9provides:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary
estimation;
xxxx
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items
exceeds Two Hundred Thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
xxxx
7. Under their Contracts, prestation and/or delivery of the items will be performed and
delivered within NINETY (90) DAYS from the receipt of downpayment. Plaintiff
complied with its prestation but defendants defaulted with their obligation;
xxxx
10. On 12 March 1998, plaintiff sent letter to defendants requesting the latter for the
cancellation of the purchase contracts and refund in full the (50%) downpayment paid
in the total amount of (P 184, 821.50) within five (5) days upon receipt of the letter
xxxx
12. On 24 March 1998, plaintiff and defendant Patricio A. Villena, personally talked
[to] each other regarding the full refund of the (50%) downpayment in the amount of P
184, 821.50. Defendant informed the plaintiff that it was their fault because the order
from their Australian supplier was made only on 15 December 1997. Defendant
promised plaintiff [delivery of] the three (3) Kitchen Cabinets on or before 10 [M]ay
1998, and the three (3) home appliances were considered fully paid applying the
(50%) downpayment of (P 29,638.50) for home appliances only. But defendant did
not fulfill his promise;

13. Despite all these, repeated demands for the installation of the (3) three kitchen
[c]abinets and complete delivery of home appliances were made, but defendants did
nothing;
x x x x12 (Emphasis added.)
A case for breach of contract is a cause of action either for specific performance or
rescission of contracts.13 An action for rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an
action for specific performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore
falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. 14 In the present case, the averments in the
complaint show that Payoyo sought the cancellation of the contracts and refund of the
downpayments since Villena failed to comply with the obligation to deliver the
appliances and install the kitchen cabinets subject of the contracts. The court then
must examine the facts and the applicable law to determine whether there is in fact
substantial breach that would warrant rescission or cancellation of the contracts and
entitle the respondent for a refund. While the respondent prayed for the refund, this is
just incidental to the main action, which is the rescission or cancellation of the
contracts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
November 21, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70513 and the
Resolution dated March 18, 2004 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS OF CEBU CITY (FORMER TWENTIETH
DIVISION),
DAVID
LU,
ROSA
GO,
SILVANO
LUDO
&
CL
CORPORATION, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
By Decision of August 26, 2008, the Court 1 unanimously disposed of the three
present petitions as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 153690 and 157381
are DENIED for being moot and academic; while the petition in G.R. No. 170889 is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Status Quo Order dated January 23,
2006 is hereby LIFTED.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to proceed with CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 and to
resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED[,]2
G.R. No. 153690
February 15, 2011
DAVID
LU, Petitioner,
vs.
PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM,
KELLY
LU
YM,
and
LUDO
&
LUYM
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 157381
which Decision was, on motion for reconsideration, the Court voting 4-1,3 reversed by
Resolution of August 4, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by John
Lu Ym and Ludo & LuYm Development Corporation is GRANTED. The Decision of
this Court dated August 26, 2008 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
Complaint in SRC Case No. 021-CEB, now on appeal with the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 81163, is DISMISSED.
All interlocutory matters challenged in these consolidated petitions are DENIED for
being moot and academic.
PATERNO LU YM, SR., PATERNO LU YM, JR., VICTOR LU YM, JOHN LU YM,
KELLY LU YM, and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
DAVID LU, Respondent.
SO ORDERED.4
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
Following his receipt on October 19, 2009 of the minute Resolution, David Lu
personally filed on October 30, 2009 a Second Motion for Reconsideration and
Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc. On even date, he filed through
registered mail an "Amended Second Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer
Resolution to the Court En Banc." And on November 3, 2009, he filed a "Motion for
Leave to File [a] Motion for Clarification[, and the] Second Motion for Reconsideration
and Motion to Refer Resolution to the Court En Banc." He later also filed a
G.R. No. 170889

JOHN LU YM and LUDO & LUYM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
David Lus Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Refer Resolution to the
Court En Banc was denied by minute Resolution of September 23, 2009.

"Supplement to Second Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss" dated
January 6, 2010.
availed of an improper mode (via an Urgent Motion filed with this Court) to assail the
admission of the Amended Complaint.
John Lu Ym and Ludo & Luym Development Corporation (LLDC), meanwhile, filed
with leave a Motion5 for the Issuance of an Entry of Judgment of February 2, 2010,
which merited an Opposition from David Lu.
In G.R. No. 157381 wherein Lu Ym father and sons challenged the appellate courts
resolution restraining the trial court from proceeding with their motion to lift the
receivership order which was filed during the pendency of G.R. No. 153690, the
Court, by Decision of August 26, 2008 resolved that the issue was mooted by the
amendment of the complaint and by the trial courts decision on the merits. The
motion having been filed ancillary to the main action, which main action was already
decided on the merits by the trial court, the Court held that there was nothing more to
enjoin.
In compliance with the Courts Resolution of January 11, 2010, Kelly Lu Ym, Victor Lu
Ym and Paterno Lu Ym, Jr. filed a Comment/Opposition of March 20, 2010, while
John Lu Ym and LLDC filed a Consolidated Comment of March 25, 2010, a
Supplement thereto of April 20, 2010, and a Manifestation of May 24, 2010.
The present cases were later referred to the Court en banc by Resolution of October
20, 2010.
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
The three consolidated cases stemmed from the complaint for "Declaration of Nullity
of Share Issue, Receivership and Dissolution" filed on August 14, 2000 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City by David Lu, et al.against Paterno Lu Ym, Sr.
and sons (Lu Ym father and sons) and LLDC.
By Decision of March 1, 2004, Branch 12 of the RTC ruled in favor of David et al. by
annulling the issuance of the shares of stock subscribed and paid by Lu Ym father
and sons at less than par value, and ordering the dissolution and asset liquidation of
LLDC. The appeal of the trial courts Decision remains pending with the appellate
court inCA-G.R. CV No. 81163.
Several incidents arising from the complaint reached the Court through the present
three petitions.
In G.R. No. 153690 wherein David, et al. assailed the appellate courts resolutions
dismissing their complaint for its incomplete signatory in the certificate of non-forum
shopping and consequently annulling the placing of the subject corporation under
receivership pendente lite, the Court, by Decision of August 26, 2008, found the issue
to have been mooted by the admission by the trial court of David et al.s Amended
Complaint, filed by them pursuant to the trial courts order to conform to the
requirements of the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies.
G.R. No. 170889 involved the denial by the appellate court of Lu Ym father and sons
application in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163 for a writ of preliminary injunction. By August
26, 2008 Decision, the Court dismissed the petition after finding no merit on their
argument which they raised for the first time in their motion for reconsideration
before the appellate court of lack of jurisdiction for non-payment of the correct RTC
docket fees.
As reflected early on, the Court, in a turnaround, by Resolution of August 4, 2009,
reconsidered its position on the matter of docket fees. It ruled that the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the case for David Lu, et al.s failure to pay the correct
docket fees, hence, all interlocutory matters and incidents subject of the present
petitions must consequently be denied.
Taking Cognizance of the Present Incidents
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) states that the Court en banc shall
act on the following matters and cases:
(a) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international
or executive agreement, law, executive order, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question;
(b) criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty
or reclusion perpetua;
(c) cases raising novel questions of law;
(d) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls;
Since an amended pleading supersedes the pleading that it amends, the original
complaint of David, et al. was deemed withdrawn from the records.
The Court noted in G.R. No. 153690 that both parties admitted the mootness of the
issue and that the trial court had already rendered a decision on the merits of the
case. It added that the Amended Complaint stands since Lu Ym father and sons
(e) cases involving decisions, resolutions, and orders of the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit;

(f) cases where the penalty recommended or imposed is the dismissal of a
judge, the disbarment of a lawyer, the suspension of any of them for a period
of more than one year, or a fine exceeding forty thousand pesos;
(g) cases covered by the preceding paragraph and involving the
reinstatement in the judiciary of a dismissed judge, the reinstatement of a
lawyer in the roll of attorneys, or the lifting of a judges suspension or a
lawyers suspension from the practice of law;
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;
(i) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or by
a Division my be modified or reversed;
(j) cases involving conflicting decisions of two or more divisions;
(k) cases where three votes in a Division cannot be obtained;
(l) Division cases where the subject matter has a huge financial impact on
businesses or affects the welfare of a community;
(m) Subject to Section 11 (b) of this rule, other division cases that, in the
opinion of at least three Members of the Division who are voting and
present, are appropriate for transfer to the Court en banc;
(n) cases that the Court en banc deems of sufficient importance to merit its
attention; and
(o) all matters involving policy decisions in the administrative supervision of
all courts and their personnel.6(underscoring supplied)
The enumeration is an amalgamation of SC Circular No. 2-89 (February 7, 1989), as
amended by En Banc Resolution of November 18, 1993, and the amplifications
introduced by Resolution of January 18, 2000 in A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC with respect
to administrative cases and matters.
The present cases fall under at least three types of cases for consideration by the
Court En Banc. At least three members of the Courts Second Division (to which the
present cases were transferred,7 they being assigned to a Member thereof) found, by
Resolution of October 20, 2010, that the cases were appropriate for referral-transfer
to the Court En Banc which subsequently accepted8 the referral in view of the
sufficiently important reason to resolve all doubts on the validity of the challenged
resolutions as they appear to modify or reverse doctrines or principles of law.
In Firestone Ceramics v. Court of Appeals, 9 the Court treated the consolidated cases
as En Banc cases and set the therein petitioners motion for oral argument, after
finding that the cases were of sufficient importance to merit the Court En Bancs
attention. It ruled that the Courts action is a legitimate and valid exercise of its
residual power.10
In Limketkai Sons Milling, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court conceded that it is not
infallible. Should any error of judgment be perceived, it does not blindly adhere to
such error, and the parties adversely affected thereby are not precluded from seeking
relief therefrom, by way of a motion for reconsideration. In this jurisdiction,
rectification of an error, more than anything else, is of paramount importance.
xxxx
It bears stressing that where, as in the present case, the Court En Banc entertains a
case for its resolution and disposition, it does so without implying that the Division of
origin is incapable of rendering objective and fair justice. The action of the Court
simply means that the nature of the cases calls for en banc attention and
consideration. Neither can it be concluded that the Court has taken undue advantage
of sheer voting strength. It was merely guided by the well-studied finding and
sustainable opinion of the majority of its actual membership that, indeed, subject
cases are of sufficient importance meriting the action and decision of the whole Court.
It is, of course, beyond cavil that all the members of this highest Court of the land are
always embued with the noblest of intentions in interpreting and applying the
germane provisions of law, jurisprudence, rules and Resolutions of the Court to the
end that public interest be duly safeguarded and rule of law be observed.11
It is argued that the assailed Resolutions in the present cases have already become
final,12 since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited except for
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only upon express leave first obtained; 13 and
that once a judgment attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable,
however unjust the result of error may appear.
The contention, however, misses an important point. The doctrine of immutability of
decisions applies only to final and executory decisions. Since the present cases may
involve a modification or reversal of a Court-ordained doctrine or principle, the
judgment rendered by the Special Third Division may be considered unconstitutional,
hence, it can never become final. It finds mooring in the deliberations of the framers
of the Constitution:
On proposed Section 3(4), Commissioner Natividad asked what the effect would be of
a decision that violates the proviso that "no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the court en banc." The answer given was that such a decision would be
invalid. Following up, Father Bernas asked whether the decision, if not challenged,
could become final and binding at least on the parties. Romulo answered that, since

such a decision would be in excess of jurisdiction, the decision on the case
could be reopened anytime.14 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A decision rendered by a Division of this Court in violation of this constitutional
provision would be in excess of jurisdiction and, therefore, invalid. 15 Any entry of
judgment may thus be said to be "inefficacious" 16 since the decision is void for being
unconstitutional.
While it is true that the Court en banc exercises no appellate jurisdiction over its
Divisions, Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes opined in Firestone and concededly
recognized that "[t]he only constraint is that any doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the Court, either rendered en banc or in division, may be overturned or reversed
only by the Court sitting en banc."17
That a judgment must become final at some definite point at the risk of occasional
error cannot be appreciated in a case that embroils not only a general allegation of
"occasional error" but also a serious accusation of a violation of the Constitution, viz.,
that doctrines or principles of law were modified or reversed by the Courts Special
Third Division August 4, 2009 Resolution.
The law allows a determination at first impression that a doctrine or principle laid
down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed in a case which
would warrant a referral to the Court En Banc. The use of the word "may" instead of
"shall" connotes probability, not certainty, of modification or reversal of a doctrine, as
may be deemed by the Court. Ultimately, it is the entire Court which shall decide on
the acceptance of the referral and, if so, "to reconcile any seeming conflict, to reverse
or modify an earlier decision, and to declare the Courts doctrine."18
The Court has the power and prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a
case from their operation if and when justice requires it, 19 as in the present
circumstance where movant filed a motion for leave after the prompt submission of a
second motion for reconsideration but, nonetheless, still within 15 days from receipt of
the last assailed resolution.
Well-entrenched doctrines or principles of law that went astray need to be steered
back to their proper course. Specifically, as David Lu correctly points out, it is
necessary to reconcile and declare the legal doctrines regarding actions that are
incapable of pecuniary estimation, application of estoppel by laches in raising an
objection of lack of jurisdiction, and whether bad faith can be deduced from the
erroneous annotation of lis pendens.
Upon a considered, thorough reexamination, the Court grants David Lus
Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Resolutions of August 4, 2009 and
September 23, 2009, which turn turtle settled doctrines, must be
overturned. The Court thus reinstates the August 26, 2008 Decision wherein a threetiered approach was utilized to analyze the issue on docket fees:
In the instant case, however, we cannot grant the dismissal prayed for because of the
following reasons: First, the case instituted before the RTC is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Hence, the correct docket fees were paid. Second, John and
LLDC are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court because of
their active participation in the proceedings below, and because the issue of payment
of insufficient docket fees had been belatedly raised before the Court of Appeals, i.e.,
only in their motion for reconsideration. Lastly, assuming that the docket fees paid
were truly inadequate, the mistake was committed by the Clerk of Court who
assessed the same and not imputable to David; and as to the deficiency, if any,
the same may instead be considered a lien on the judgment that may thereafter
be rendered.20 (italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Value of the Subject Matter Cannot be Estimated
On the claim that the complaint had for its objective the nullification of the issuance of
600,000 shares of stock of LLDC, the real value of which based on underlying real
estate values, as alleged in the complaint, stands atP1,087,055,105, the Courts
assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution found:
Upon deeper reflection, we find that the movants [Lu Ym father & sons] claim has
merit. The 600,000 shares of stock were, indeed, properties in litigation. They were
the subject matter of the complaint, and the relief prayed for entailed the nullification
of the transfer thereof and their return to LLDC. David, et al., are minority
shareholders of the corporation who claim to have been prejudiced by the sale of the
shares of stock to the Lu Ym father and sons. Thus, to the extent of the damage or
injury they allegedly have suffered from this sale of the shares of stock, the action
they filed can be characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation. The shares of
stock have a definite value, which was declared by plaintiffs [David Lu, et al.]
themselves in their complaint. Accordingly, the docket fees should have been
computed based on this amount. This is clear from the following version of Rule 141,
Section 7, which was in effect at the time the complaint was filed[.] 21 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The said Resolution added that the value of the 600,000 shares of stock, which are
the properties in litigation, should be the basis for the computation of the filing fees. It
bears noting, however, that David, et al. are not claiming to own these shares. They
do not claim to be the owners thereof entitled to be the transferees of the shares of
stock. The mention of the real value of the shares of stock, over which David, et
al. do not, it bears emphasis, interpose a claim of right to recovery, is merely
narrative or descriptive in order to emphasize the inequitable price at which the
transfer was effected.
The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution also stated that "to the extent of the damage
or injury [David, et al.] allegedly have suffered from this sale," the action "can be
characterized as one capable of pecuniary estimation." The Resolution does not,
however, explore the value of the extent of the damage or injury. Could it be the pro

rata decrease (e.g., from 20% to 15%) of the percentage shareholding of David, et
al. vis--vis to the whole?
Inc. and Bautista v. Lim. In Lapitan this Court, in an opinion by Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
held:
Whatever property, real or personal, that would be distributed to the stockholders

would be a mere consequence of the main action. In the end, in the event LLDC is
dissolved, David, et al. would not be getting the value of the 600,000 shares, but only
the value of their minority number of shares, which are theirs to begin with.
A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an

action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action
or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of,
the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is
plainly that the second class cases, besides the determination of damages,
demand an inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more
within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the lowest courts of
record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were enacted allocating
jurisdiction (Act 136 of the Philippine Commission of June 11, 1901).
The complaint filed by David, et al. is one for declaration of nullity of share
issuance. The main relief prayed for both in the original complaint and the amended
complaint is the same, that is, to declare null and void the issuance of 600,000
unsubscribed and unissued shares to Lu Ym father and sons, et al. for a price of 1/18
of their real value, for being inequitable, having been done in breach of directors
fiduciarys duty to stockholders, in violation of the minority stockholders rights, and
with unjust enrichment.
As judiciously discussed in the Courts August 26, 2008 Decision, the test in
determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary
estimation is by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. It
explained:
x x x To be sure, the annulment of the shares, the dissolution of the corporation and
the appointment of receivers/management committee are actions which do not
consist in the recovery of a sum of money. If, in the end, a sum of money or real
property would be recovered, it would simply be the consequence of such principal
action. Therefore, the case before the RTC was incapable of pecuniary
estimation.22 (italics in the original, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Actions which the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation
include legality of conveyances. In a case involving annulment of contract, the Court
found it to be one which cannot be estimated:
Petitioners argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of
real property is a real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid
by private respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the property,
subject matter of the action, or its estimated value as alleged in the complaint,
pursuant to the last paragraph of 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the Resolution of
the Court dated September 12, 1990. Since private respondents alleged that the land,
in which they claimed an interest as heirs, had been sold for P4,378,000.00 to
petitioners, this amount should be considered the estimated value of the land for the
purpose of determining the docket fees.
On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and, so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, 7(b)(1).
In support of their argument, they cite the cases of Lapitan v. Scandia,
Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be

exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L26816, February 28, 1967; Manufacturer's Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L21285, April 29, 1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced
by the parties, why an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently
treated, a "rescission" being a counterpart, so to speak, of "specific
performance". In both cases, the court would certainly have to undertake an
investigation into facts that would justify one act or the other. No award for
damages may be had in an action for rescission without first conducting an
inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in the
same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and law
in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court,
arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31,
1967 (the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination
of the validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18,
1950 (validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959
(validity of a mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations
of the parties, the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for
support), De Rivera, et al. v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or
nullity of documents upon which claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature
may be raised by a party against whom an action for rescission has been brought, or
by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore, difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an
action for rescission should be taken as the basis for concluding such action as one
capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer which must be included in the main
action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he may have suffered as a result of
the breach committed by defendant, and not later on precluded from recovering

damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and discouraging multiplicity of
suits.23 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
IN FINE, the Court holds that David Lu, et al.s complaint is one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, hence, the correct docket fees were paid. The Court thus
proceeds to tackle the arguments on estoppel and lien, mindful that the succeeding
discussions rest merely on a contrary assumption, viz., that there was deficient
payment.
Lu Ym father and sons further inquiry from the OCA cannot redeem them. A mere
inquiry from an improper officeat that, could not, by any stretch, be considered as an
act of having raised the jurisdictional question prior to the rendition of the trial courts
decision. In one case, it was held:
Assuming arguendo that the docket fees were insufficiently paid, the doctrine of
estoppel already applies.
Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount of docket fees as
assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch 17, where they filed the complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment
was incorrect, they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead,
petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket fees through this
petition, attempting to support their position with the opinion and certification of
the Clerk of Court of another judicial region. Needless to state, such
certification has no bearing on the instant case.27 (italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
The assailed August 4, 2009 Resolution cited Vargas v. Caminas24 on the nonapplicability of the Tijam doctrinewhere the issue of jurisdiction was, in fact, raised
before the trial court rendered its decision. Thus the Resolution explained:
The inequity resulting from the abrogation of the whole proceedings at this late stage
when the decision subsequently rendered was adverse to the father and sons is
precisely the evil being avoided by the equitable principle of estoppel.
Next, the Lu Ym father and sons filed a motion for the lifting of the receivership order,
which the trial court had issued in the interim. David, et al., brought the matter up to
the CA even before the trial court could resolve the motion. Thereafter, David, at al.,
filed their Motion to Admit Complaint to Conform to the Interim Rules Governing IntraCorporate Controversies. It was at this point that the Lu Ym father and sons raised
the question of the amount of filing fees paid. They also raised this point again in the
CA when they appealed the trial courts decision in the case below.
No Intent to Defraud the Government
Estoppel Has Set In
We find that, in the circumstances, the Lu Ym father and sons are not estopped from
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. They raised the insufficiency of the
docket fees before the trial court rendered judgment and continuously maintained
their position even on appeal to the CA. Although the manner of challenge
waserroneous they should have addressed this issue directly to the trial court
instead of the OCA they should not be deemed to have waived their right to assail
the jurisdiction of the trial court.25 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Lu Ym father and sons did not raise the issue before the trial court. The narration of
facts in the Courts original decision shows that Lu Ym father and sons merely
inquired from the Clerk of Court on the amount of paid docket fees on January 23,
2004. They thereafter still "speculat[ed] on the fortune of litigation." 26 Thirty-seven
days later or on March 1, 2004 the trial court rendered its decision adverse to them.
Meanwhile, Lu Ym father and sons attempted to verify the matter of docket fees from
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In their Application for the issuance a writ
of preliminary injunction filed with the Court of Appeals, they still failed to question the
amount of docket fees paid by David Lu, et al. It was only in their Motion for
Reconsideration of the denial by the appellate court of their application for injunctive
writ that they raised such issue.
Assuming arguendo that the docket fees paid were insufficient, there is no proof of
bad faith to warrant a dismissal of the complaint, hence, the following doctrine
applies:
x x x In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion, this Court ruled that the filing
of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the
action. If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient considering the amount of the
claim, the clerk of court of the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has
the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment. The party filing the case will be
required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not automatically lost.28 (underscoring
supplied)
The assailed Resolution of August 4, 2009 held, however, that the above-quoted
doctrine does not apply since there was intent to defraud the government, citing one
attendant circumstance the annotation of notices of lis pendens on real properties
owned by LLDC. It deduced:
From the foregoing, it is clear that a notice of lis pendens is availed of mainly in real
actions. Hence, when David,et al., sought the annotation of notices of lis pendens on
the titles of LLDC, they acknowledged that the complaint they had filed affected a title
to or a right to possession of real properties. At the very least, they must have been
fully aware that the docket fees would be based on the value of the realties involved.
Their silence or inaction to point this out to the Clerk of Court who computed their
docket fees, therefore, becomes highly suspect, and thus, sufficient for this Court to
conclude that they have crossed beyond the threshold of good faith and into the area

of fraud. Clearly, there was an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the
correct docket fees. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case.29
2.
All findings of fraud should begin the exposition with the presumption of good faith.
The inquiry is not whether there was good faith on the part of David, et al., but
whether there was bad faith on their part.
3.
The erroneous annotation of a notice of lis pendens does not negate good faith. The
overzealousness of a party in protecting pendente lite his perceived interest, inchoate
or otherwise, in the corporations properties from depletion or dissipation, should not
be lightly equated to bad faith.
That notices of lis pendens were erroneously annotated on the titles does not have
the effect of changing the nature of the action. The aggrieved party is not left without
a remedy, for they can move to cancel the annotations. The assailed August 4, 2009
Resolution, however, deemed such act as an acknowledgement that the case they
filed was a real action, concerning as it indirectly does the corporate realties, the titles
of which were allegedly annotated. This conclusion does not help much in
ascertaining the filing fees because the value of these real properties and the value of
the 600,000 shares of stock are different.
Further, good faith can be gathered from the series of amendments on the provisions
on filing fees, that the Court was even prompted to make a clarification.1avvphi1
When David Lu, et al. filed the Complaint on August 14, 2000 or five days after the
effectivity of the Securities Regulation Code or Republic Act No. 8799,30 the then
Section 7 of Rule 141 was the applicable provision, without any restricted reference
to paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 or paragraph (a) alone. Said section then provided:
SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts.
(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against
an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court a third-party,
fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical
services in the same, if the total sum claimed, exclusive of
interest, or thestated value of the property in litigation, is:
Special civil actions except judicial foreclosure of

mortgage which shall be governed by paragraph (a) .....
above
xxx
All other actions not involving property
.
xxx
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated
value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the
fees.
x x x x31 (emphasis supplied)
The Court, by Resolution of September 4, 2001 in A. M. No. 00-8-10-SC, 32 clarified
the matter of legal fees to be collected in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities
and Exchange Commission following their transfer to the RTC.
Clarification has been sought on the legal fees to be collected and the period of
appeal applicable in cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It appears that the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies
do not provide the basis for the assessment of filing fees and the period of appeal in
cases transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission to particular
Regional Trial Courts.
The nature of the above mentioned cases should first be ascertained. Section 3(a),
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action as one by which a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong. It further states that a civil action may either be ordinary or
special, both being governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions subject to the
special rules prescribed for special civil actions. Section 3(c) of the same Rule,
defines a special proceeding as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact.
Applying these definitions, the cases covered by the Interim Rules for IntraCorporate Controversies should be considered as ordinary civil actions. These
cases either seek the recovery of damages/property or specific performance of
an act against a party for the violation or protection of a right. These cases are:
xxxx
(b) For filing:
1.
Actions where the value of the subject matter ... x

cannot be estimated
xx
(1) Devices or schemes employed by, or any act of, the board of directors,
business associates, officers or partners, amounting to fraud or
misrepresentation which may be detrimental to the interest of the public
and/or of the stockholders, partners, or members of any corporation,
partnership, or association;

(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates; and
between, any or all of them and the corporation, partnership, or association
of which they are stockholders, members or associates, respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers, or managers of corporations, partnerships, or associations;
(4) Derivative suits; and
(5) Inspection of corporate books.
On the other hand, a petition for rehabilitation, the procedure for which is provided in
the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Recovery, should be considered as a
special proceeding. It is one that seeks to establish the status of a party or a
particular fact. As provided in section 1, Rule 4 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Recovery, the status or fact sought to be established is the inability of the corporate
debtor to pay its debts when they fall due so that a rehabilitation plan, containing the
formula for the successful recovery of the corporation, may be approved in the end. It
does not seek a relief from an injury caused by another party.
Section 7 of Rule 141 (Legal Fees) of the Revised Rules of Court lays the amount of
filing fees to be assessed for actions or proceedings filed with the Regional Trial
Court. Section 7(a) and (b) apply to ordinary civil actionswhile 7(d) and (g) apply
to special proceedings.
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the express
phraseology of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.
In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000
during which time Section 7, without qualification, was the applicable provision. Even
the Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the applicable
rule expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) l & 3 shall be the basis for computing the
filing fees in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an intra-corporate
controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated, such as an
action for inspection of corporate books. The immediate illustration shows that no
mistake can even be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the assessment of the
docket fees.
Finally, assuming there was deficiency in paying the docket fees and assuming
further that there was a mistake in computation, the deficiency may be considered a
lien on the judgment that may be rendered, there being no established intent to
defraud the government.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of August 4, 2009 and September 23, 2009
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Courts Decision of August 26, 2008
is REINSTATED.
The Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to resume the proceedings and resolve the
remaining issues with utmost dispatch in CA-G.R. CV No. 81163.
SO ORDERED.
In fine, the basis for computing the filing fees in intra-corporate cases shall
be section 7(a) and (b) l & 3of Rule 141. For petitions for rehabilitation, section 7(d)
shall be applied. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The new Section 21(k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
04-2-04-SC33 (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency
or other cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed
under Section 7(a) shall apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section
7 thereof was omitted from the reference. Said paragraph 34 refers to docket fees for
filing "[a]ctions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" and "all
other actions not involving property."
By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes
that an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation, the value
of which is always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest
amendments seem to imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere
inspection of corporate books.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated May 26, 2004
and the Resolution2 dated September 17, 2004 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 60764.
On August 26, 1999, respondents Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor (Rosario),
Nepthalie Castor Itucas, Ferolyn Castor Facurib (Ferolyn), Rachel De Castor, Lea
Castor Dollolosa and Rosalie Castor Benedicto, filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of General Santos City a Complaint3 for ownership, possession and damages,
and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent nullities,
and/or for recovery of Rosario's conjugal share with damages or redemption of the
subject land against petitioner Ceferina de Ungria, defendants Avelino Gumban,
Dolores Cagaitan, Zacasio Poutan, PO1 Jonas Montales, Ignacio Olarte and alias
Dory. Respondent Rosario is the surviving wife of the late Fernando Castor, while the
rest of the respondents are their legitimate children. The documents they sought to
annul are (1) the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements
thereon dated October 3, 1960 allegedly executed by Fernando in favor of Eugenio
de Ungria, petitioner's father; and (2) the Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November
23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner.
G.R. No. 165777
July 25, 2011
CEFERINA DE UNGRIA [DECEASED], substituted by her HEIRS, represented by

LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-JAVIER, and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA as their
Attorney-in-fact, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY, BRANCH 35, ROSARIO DIDELES VDA. DE
CASTOR, NEPTHALIE CASTOR ITUCAS, FEROLYN CASTOR FACURIB,
RACHEL DE CASTOR, LEA CASTOR DOLLOLOSA, and ROSALIE CASTOR
BENEDICTO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion to Dismiss 4 (Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam) on the

following grounds: (1) the claim or demand has been extinguished by virtue of the
valid sale of Lot No. 1615 to Eugenio; (2) the action is barred by extraordinary
acquisitive prescription; (3) the action is barred by laches; and (4) plaintiff failed to
state a cause of action, or filed the case prematurely for failure to resort to prior
barangay conciliation proceedings.
Petitioner also filed an Addendum to the Motion to Dismiss 5 raising the following
additional grounds: (1) plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue; and (2) the court has
no jurisdiction over the case for failure of plaintiffs to pay the filing fee in full.
Respondents filed their Opposition thereto.
On November 19, 1999, the RTC issued an Order 6 denying the motion to dismiss, to
wit:
After the motion to dismiss and its addendum have been received, it is now ripe for
resolution. One of the grounds alleged in the complaint is for the recovery of conjugal
share on Lot No. 1615, of Pls-209 D with damages.
It is alleged that the late Fernando Castor and Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor were
married on September 15, 1952, and the application to the land was dated January
17, 1952 and the patent was issued by the President on November 19, 1954.

The said land was sold to the defendant on October 3, 1960 (Annex C) and an
Affidavit of Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 which was made a part thereof
as Annex "D." Considering the marriage of September 15, 1992, the said land
became conjugal as of the date of the marriage and, therefore, thereof belongs to
the wife, Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor.
The defendant shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
order.13
From this Order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification on
whether plaintiffs should be allowed to continue prosecuting the case as indigent
litigants.
Thus, considering the above, the motion to dismiss is DENIED.7

On March 30, 2000, the RTC issued a Clarificatory Order14 reading as follows:
8
Petitioner Ceferina filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an
Order9 dated February 4, 2000.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion 10 asking the RTC to resolve the issues of (1)
whether or not the complaint should be dismissed or expunged from the records
pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 7; (2) reconsidering the findings
contained in the Order dated February 4, 2000; and (3) holding in abeyance the
submission of the answer to the complaint.
Pending resolution of the motion, respondents filed a Motion to Allow11 them to
continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants.
On March 8, 2000, the RTC resolved the Omnibus Motion in an Order 12 that read in
this wise:
On the omnibus motion regarding filing fees, the plaintiffs asserted in its motion that
they are charging defendant actual and compensatory damages such as are proved
during the hearing of this case. So also are attorneys fees and moral damages, all to
be proved during the hearing of this case.
As has been said, the plaintiff asserted in its motion that they are charging defendants
actual and compensatory damages as has been proved during the hearing of this
case. So also are attorney's fees and moral damages all to be proved during the
hearing of this case.
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic) to determine how
much is to be charged.
At any rate, after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still
insufficient, the same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be
entered.
As to the motion seeking from the Honorable Court allowance to allow plaintiff to
continue prosecuting this case as indigent litigants, suffice it to say that the same is
already provided for in this order.
WHEREFORE, the defendants shall file their answer within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of this Order.15
Since there was no hearing yet, they are not in a possession (sic) to determine how
much is to be charged.
In an Order dated May 31, 2000, the RTC again denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
At any rate, if after hearing the Clerk of Court determine that the filing fees is still
insufficient, considering the total amount of the claim, the Clerk of Court should
determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must require the private
respondent to pay the same x x x.
Petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioner sought the nullification of the Order dated November 19, 1999 and the
subsequent orders issued by the RTC thereto for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their
Comment thereto.
As to the second issue, the same has already been decided in its order dated
February 4, 2000.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the omnibus motion is DENIED.
In a Decision dated May 26, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition. The CA found that
SC Circular No. 7 would not apply where the amount of damages or value of the
property was immaterial; that the Circular could be applied only in cases where the

amount claimed or the value of the personal property was determinative of the court's
jurisdiction citing the case of Tacay v. RTC of Tagum, Davao del Norte. 16 The CA
found that respondents had paid the corresponding docket fees upon the filing of the
complaint, thus, the RTC had acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the failure to
state the amount of damages claimed in the body of the complaint or in the prayer
thereof. The CA found that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. It noted
that the RTC's Clarificatory Order dated March 30, 2000, which stated that "if after
hearing the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still insufficient, the same
shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered" was in accordance
with the rule laid down in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion.17 The CA proceeded
to state that a judicious examination of the complaint pointed to a determination of the
respective rights and interests of the parties over the property based on the issues
presented therein which could only be determined in a full-blown trial on the merits of
the case.
Preliminarily, although not raised as an issue in this petition, we find it necessary to

discuss the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Respondents'
complaint was filed in 1999, at the time Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 129, the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, was already amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691, An
Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, amending for the purpose BP Blg. 129. 19 Section
1 of RA 7691, amending BP Blg. 129, provides that the RTC shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction on the following actions:
Section 1. Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980," is hereby amended to read as follows:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in a Resolution

dated September 17, 2004. The CA ruled, among others, that the defenses of
acquisitive prescription and laches were likewise unavailing. It found that the subject
property is covered by a Torrens title (OCT No. V-19556); thus, it is axiomatic that
adverse, notorious and continuous possession under a claim of ownership for the
period fixed by law is ineffective against a Torrens title; that unless there are
intervening rights of third persons which may be affected or prejudiced by a decision
directing the return of the lot to petitioner, the equitable defense of laches will not
apply as against the registered owner.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following
assignment of errors:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS
DESPITE RESPONDENTS' NON-PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET
FEES.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACTION
OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IS BARRED BY LACHES AND
EXTRAORDINARY ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION.18
We find the petition without merit.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts; x x x
Section 3 of RA No. 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level
courts, thus:
Section 3. Section 33 of the same law (BP Blg. 129) is hereby amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or

interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots.
It would appear that the first cause of action involves the issue of recovery of
possession and interest of the parties over the subject land which is a real action.
Respondents alleged that the assessed value of the subject land was P12,780.00
based on Tax Declaration No. 15272. Thus, since it is a real action with an assessed
value of less than P20,000.00, the case would fall under the jurisdiction of the MTC
as provided under the above-quoted Section 33 (3) of BP 129, as amended.
Respondents filed their Complaint with the RTC; hence, we would first determine
whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case based on the
above-quoted provisions.
Notably, however, respondents in the same Complaint filed alternative causes of

action assailing the validity of the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest executed by
Fernando in favor of petitioner's father. Respondents also sought for the
reconveyance to respondent Rosario of the undivided one-half portion of the subject
land as conjugal owner thereof in case the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest will
be upheld as valid; and/or for redemption of the subject land. Clearly, this is a case of
joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of possession of,
or any interest in the real property under contention, but includes an action to annul
contracts and reconveyance which are incapable of pecuniary estimation and, thus,
properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.20
The Complaint filed by respondents in the RTC was for ownership, possession and
damages, and alternative causes of action either to declare two documents as patent
nullities and/or for recovery of conjugal share on the subject land with damages or
redemption of the subject land. In their Complaint, respondents claimed that Rosario
and Fernando are the registered owners of the subject land with an assessed value
of P12,780.00; that the couple left the cultivation and enjoyment of the usufruct of the
subject land to Fernando's mother and her second family to augment their means of
livelihood; that respondent Rosario and Fernando thought that when the latter's
mother died in 1980, the subject land was in the enjoyment of the second family of his
mother, but later learned that the subject land was leased by petitioner Ceferina; that
sometime in August 1999, respondents learned of the existence of the Deed of
Transfer of Rights and Interest including Improvements thereon dated October 3,
1960, where Fernando had allegedly transferred his rights and interests on the
subject land in favor of Eugenio, petitioner Ceferina's father, as well as an Affidavit of
Relinquishment dated November 23, 1960 executed by Eugenio in favor of petitioner
Ceferina; that Fernando's signature in the Deed of Transfer was not his but a forgery;
and the Affidavit of Relinquishment was also void as it was a direct result of a
simulated Deed of Transfer.
Respondents prayed that they be declared as absolute and lawful owners of the
subject land and to order petitioner and the other defendants to vacate the premises
and restore respondents to its possession and enjoyment therefore. On their second
cause of action, they prayed that the Deed of Transfer of Rights and Interest Including
Improvements Thereon be declared as a forgery, purely simulated and without any
consideration; hence, inexistent, void ab initio and/or a patent nullity, as well as the
Affidavit of Relinquishment which was the direct result of the Deed of Transfer.
Respondents also prayed in the alternative that if the Deed be finally upheld as valid,
to order petitioner to reconvey to respondent Rosario the undivided one-half portion of
the subject land as conjugal owner thereof and to account and reimburse her of its
usufruct; and/or to allow them to redeem the subject land.
In Singson v. Isabela Sawmill,21 we held that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the
nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a
consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as
cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and
are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).22
Thus, respondents correctly filed their Complaint with the RTC.
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that when an action is filed in court, the complaint
must be accompanied by the payment of the requisite docket and filing fees.23 It is not
simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action.24
Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 7. Clerks of Regional Trial Courts. - (a) For filing an action or a permissive
counter-claim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing
with leave of court a third-party, fourth-party, etc. complaint, or a complaint-inintervention, and for all clerical services in the same, if the total-sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the stated value of the property in litigation, is:
xxxx
are jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs of the produce thereby in the following
proportions, viz: (a) for defendant Ceferina de Ungria for a period of time claimed by
her as such; (b) for defendants Dolores Cagautan, a certain alias "Dory," and PO1
Jonas Montales, of an undetermined area, the latter having entered the area
sometime in 1998 and defendant alias "Dory," only just few months ago; that
defendant Ignacio Olarte and Zacasio Puutan of occupying about one-half hectare
each.27
(b) For filing:
and in their prayer asked:
1. Actions where the value of the subject matter

cannot be estimated ........ P400.00
x x x Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, in proportion to the length and
area of their respective occupancy, to pay reasonable rentals to the plaintiffs in the
proportion and amount assessed in paragraph 13 of the First Cause of Action.
2. x x x
xxxx
In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the
estimated value thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the
basis in computing the fees.25
Since we find that the case involved the annulment of contract which is not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation, thus, falling within the jurisdiction of the RTC, the
docket fees should not be based on the assessed value of the subject land as
claimed by petitioner in their memorandum, but should be based on Section 7(b)(1) of
Rule 141. A perusal of the entries in the Legal Fees Form attached to the records
would reflect that the amount of P400.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court, together with
the other fees, as assessed by the Clerk of Court. Thus, upon respondents' proof of
payment of the assessed fees, the RTC has properly acquired jurisdiction over the
complaint. Jurisdiction once acquired is never lost, it continues until the case is
terminated. 26
Notably, petitioners claim that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction in this case is
premised on her contention that respondents violated SC Circular No. 7 issued on
March 24, 1998 requiring that all complaints must specify the amount of damages
sought not only in the body of the pleadings but also in the prayer to be accepted and
admitted for filing. Petitioner argues that respondents alleged in paragraph 13 of their
Complaint that:
(T)he reasonable rental for the use of the [subject] land is P2,000.00 per hectare,
every crop time, once every four months, or P6,000.00 a year per hectare; that
defendants in proportion and length of time of their respective occupancy is and/or
(a) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs actual and
compensatory damages such as are proved during the hearing of this case;
(b) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs attorneys'
fees and moral damages, all to be proved during the hearing of this case.28
Thus, the RTC should have dismissed the case, since respondents did not specify the
amount of damages in their prayer.
We are not persuaded.
SC Circular No. 7 was brought about by our ruling in Manchester Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,29where we held that a pleading which does not
specify in the prayer the amount of damages being asked for shall not be accepted or
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record; and that the Court acquires
jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.
However, in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,30 we laid down the following
guidelines in the payment of docket fees, to wit:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of
the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the

court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
after hearing, the Clerk of Court determines that the filing fee is still insufficient, the
same shall be considered as lien on the judgment that may be entered."
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and

similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of
said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.
Petitioner claims that the action is barred by extraordinary acquisitive prescription and
laches. Petitioner contends that she took possession of the land in the concept of an
owner, open, exclusive, notorious and continuous since 1952 through her
predecessor-in-interest, Eugenio, and by herself up to the present; that the late
Fernando and private respondents had never taken possession of the land at any
single moment; and that, granting without admitting that the transfer of rights between
Fernando and Eugenio was null and void for any reason whatsoever, petitioner's
possession of the land had already ripened into ownership after the lapse of 30 years
from August 1952 by virtue of the extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or
if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be
the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly-authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Subsequently, in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,31 we said:
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents prayed for payment of damages "in
amounts justified by the evidence" does not call for the dismissal of the complaint for
violation of SC Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which required that all
complaints must specify the amount of damages sought not only in the body of the
pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be accepted and admitted for filing. Sun
Insurance effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by providing that filing fees for
damages and awards that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the awards finally
granted by the trial court.
x x x judgment awards which were left for determination by the court or as may be
proven during trial would still be subject to additional filing fees which shall constitute
a lien on the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court of the
trial court or his duly-authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fees.32
A reading of the allegations in the complaint would show that the amount of the rental
due can only be determined after a final judgment, since there is a need to show
supporting evidence when the petitioner and the other defendants started to possess
the subject land. Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA when it ruled
that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in issuing its Order
dated March 30, 2000, where the RTC stated that "since there was no hearing yet,
respondents are not in a position to determine how much is to be charged and that
We are not persuaded.

It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that no title to registered land in
derogation of the rights of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.33 Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner
but also against his hereditary successors.34 In this case, the parcel of land subject of
this case is a titled property, i.e., titled in the name of the late Fernando Castor,
married to Rosario Dideles.
Petitioner claims that respondent had impliedly admitted the fact of sale by Fernando
to Eugenio in August 1952, but only according to respondents, the sale was null and
void because it violated the provisions of the Public Land Act. Petitioner argues that
the application of Fernando, dated January 17, 1952, was not the homestead
application referred to in Sections 118 and 124 of the Public Land Act; and that
Fernando's application was only as settler, or for the allocation of the subject land to
him vice the original settler Cadiente.
Such argument does not persuade.
The trial in this case has not yet started as in fact no answer has yet been filed. We
find that these issues are factual which must be resolved at the trial of this case on
the merits wherein both parties will be given ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims and defenses.
Anent petitioner's defense of laches, the same is evidentiary in nature and cannot be
established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Without solid evidentiary basis,
laches cannot be a valid ground to dismiss respondents' complaint. 35 Notably, the
allegations of respondents in their petition filed before the RTC which alleged among
others:

7. That sometime between the years 1965 to 1970, defendant Ceferina de
Ungria, accompanied by Miss Angela Jagna-an, appeared in the residence
of plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor in Bo.1, Banga, South Cotabato,
and requested her to sign a folded document with her name only appearing
thereon, telling her that it has something to do with the land abovedescribed, of which she refused telling her that she better return it to the
person who requested her to do so (referring to her mother-in-law), more so
that her husband was out at that time;
8. That when the matter was brought home to Fernando Castor, the latter
just commented that [his] mother desires the land above-described to be
sold to defendant Ceferina de Ungria which however he was opposed to do
so even as they occasionally come into heated arguments everytime this
insistence on the same subject propped up;
9. That even after the death of the mother of the late Fernando Castor in Bo.
Bula, City of General Santos, sometime in 1980, the latter and his surviving
wife thought all the while that the land above-described was in the
enjoyment of his late mother's family with his 2nd husband; that it was only
after sometime when plaintiff Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor heard that the
land above-described had even been leased by defendant Ceferina de
Ungria with the Stanfilco and Checkered farm;
10. That sometime in 1997, defendant Ceferina de Ungria sent overtures to
plaintiffs through Ester Orejana, who is the half sister-in-law of plaintiff
Rosario Dideles Vda. de Castor that she desires to settle with them relating
to the land above-described; that the overtures developed into defendant
Ceferina de Ungria meeting for the purpose plaintiff Ferolyn Castor Facurib
where the negotiation continued with Lolita Javier as attorney-in-fact after
defendant Ceferina de Ungria left to reside in Manila and which resulted later
to the attorney-in-fact offering the plaintiffs P100,000.00 to quitclaim on their
rights over the said land, which offer, however, was refused by plaintiffs as
so [insignificant] as compared to the actual value of the same land; that in
that negotiation, defendant Ceferina de Ungria was challenged to show any
pertinent document to support her claim on the land in question and where
she meekly answered by saying at the time that she does not have any of
such document;
x x x x36
would not conclusively establish laches.1avvphil Thus, it is necessary for petitioners

to proceed to trial and present controverting evidence to prove the elements of
laches.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005
CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR,
LINA
and
PRESCILLA,
all
surnamed
HILARIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ALLAN T. SALVADOR, Respondents.
HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and
VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM,respondents-intervenors.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 as well as its
Resolution2 denying the motion for the reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents
On September 3, 1996, petitioners Cesar, Ibarra, Nestor, Lina and Prescilla, all
surnamed Hilario, filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Romblon,
Romblon, Branch 71, against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged
therein, inter alia, as follows:
2. That, the plaintiffs are co-owners by inheritance from Concepcion Mazo Salvador of
a parcel of land designated as Cad. Lot No. 3113-part, located at Sawang, Romblon,
Romblon, which property was [adjudged] as the hereditary share of their father,
Brigido M. Hilario, Jr. when their father was still single, and which adjudication was
known by the plaintiffs[] fathers co-heirs;

3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials
on the property of the plaintiffs father without the knowledge of the herein plaintiffs or
their predecessors-in-interest;
(B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended by Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. 5 He
averred that
(1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute;
4. That, demands have been made of the defendant to vacate the premises but the
latter manifested that he have (sic) asked the prior consent of their grandmother,
Concepcion Mazo Salvador;
5. That, to reach a possible amicable settlement, the plaintiffs brought the matter to
the Lupon of Barangay Sawang, to no avail, evidenced by the CERTIFICATE TO
FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B;
6. That, the unjustified refusal of the defendant to vacate the property has caused the
plaintiffs to suffer shame, humiliation, wounded feelings, anxiety and sleepless nights;
7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the
services of a lawyer.3
The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their
favor, thus:
(2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land
referred to as the subject-matter of this action;
both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court
where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in
question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the
relief prayed for which can be picked-up for determining the Courts jurisdiction as
provided by law.
In the face of this predicament, it can nevertheless be surmised by reading between
the lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00
and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and
should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. 6
a. actual damages, as follows:
The petitioners opposed the motion.7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction
over the action since the court can take judicial notice of the market value of the
property in question, which was P200.00 per square meter and considering that the
property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof
isP3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was
premature and "the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced
evidence that the land is of such value."
a.1. transportation expenses in connection with the projected settlement of the case
amounting to P1,500.00 and for the subsequent attendance to the hearing of this
case at P1,500.00 each schedule;
On November 7, 1996, the RTC issued an Order 8 denying the motion to dismiss,
holding that the action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore,
cognizable by the RTC as provided in Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended.
a.2. attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court
appearance;
After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with
counterclaim.9 Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that
the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was
the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and
Concepcion Mazo-Salvador.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an
order be issued for the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs
the occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs:
b. moral and exemplary damages in such amount incumbent upon the Honorable
Court to determine; and
c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.4
The private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction over the nature of the action, citing Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-inIntervention10 making common cause with the private respondent. On her own
motion, however, Virginia Salvador was dropped as intervenor.11

During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing
that in 1991 the property had an assessed value of P5,950.00.12
On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered:
Ordering the defendant to vacate and peacefully turn over to the plaintiffs the
occupied property; and
Dismissing defendants counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.13
Aggrieved, the private respondent and respondent-intervenor Regidor Salvador
appealed the decision to the CA, which rendered judgment on May 23, 2003
reversing the ruling of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction.
The fallo of the decision is as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is REVERSED, and the case
DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.14
The CA declared that the action of the petitioners was one for the recovery of
ownership and possession of real property. Absent any allegation in the complaint of
the assessed value of the property, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) had exclusive
jurisdiction over the action, conformably to Section 3315 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the said decision, which the
appellate court denied.16 Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE, ACCION REINVINDICATORIA,
FALLS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON, AND NOT WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
ROMBLON.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN ORDERING THE REFILING OF THE CASE IN THE [PROPER] COURT,
INSTEAD OF DECIDING THE CASE ON THE MERITS BASED ON THE COMPLETE
RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT
AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT.17
The Ruling of the Court
The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action
of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was
the defendant therein.
The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion
reinvindicatoria, an action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the
assessed value of the subject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said
court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their opposition to respondents motion
to dismiss, they made mention of the increase in the assessed value of the land in
question in the amount of P3.5 million. Moreover, the petitioners maintain that their
action is also one for damages exceedingP20,000.00, over which the RTC has
exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691.
The petition has no merit.
It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.18 The caption of the complaint is not determinative of the
nature of the action. Nor does the jurisdiction of the court depend upon the answer of
the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the
parties.
We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that
the action of the petitioners in the RTC was an accion reinvindicatoria. We find and so
rule that the action of the petitioners was an accion publiciana, or one for the recovery
of possession of the real property subject matter thereof. An accion reinvindicatoria is
a suit which has for its object the recovery of possession over the real property as
owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said
ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of
possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after

the expiration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty.19
upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts.
The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of
ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as
such, entitled to its possession, and that the private respondent, who was the
defendant, constructed his house thereon in 1989 without their knowledge and
refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that
the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them.
The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is
now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value
thereof. The assessed value of real property is the fair market value of the real
property multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. 20 The
fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not
compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy.
When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was
already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides:
Even a cursory reading of the complaint will show that it does not contain an
allegation stating the assessed value of the property subject of the complaint. 21 The
court cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of lands. 22 Absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it cannot thus be
determined whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over
the petitioners action.
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
interest therein does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for
taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed
value of the adjacent lots.
Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive
(2) In all civil actions, which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value
exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred
We note that during the trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No.
8590-A, showing that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was P5,950.00. The
petitioners, however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration
containing the assessed value of the property when they filed their complaint in 1996.
Even assuming that the assessed value of the property in 1991 was the same in 1995
or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners
since the case involved title to or possession of real property with an assessed value
of less than P20,000.00.23
We quote with approval, in this connection, the CAs disquisition:
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reinvindicatoria is, as RA 7691
discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For properties in the
provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and the
MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below. An assessed value can have reference only to
the tax rolls in the municipality where the property is located, and is contained in the
tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declaration secured and
presented by the plaintiffs-appellees is Exhibit B. The loose remark made by them
that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mention that there is absolutely
no evidence for this, is irrelevant in the light of the fact that there is an assessed
value. It is the amount in the tax declaration that should be consulted and no other
kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which
has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a
quo.24

It is elementary that the tax declaration indicating the assessed value of the property
enjoys the presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government
agency.25
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, all the
proceedings therein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The
complaint should perforce be dismissed.27
Unavailing also is the petitioners argumentation that since the complaint, likewise,
seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original
jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted
earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the
demand for "interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses,
and costs." This Court issued Administrative Circular No. 09-94 setting the guidelines
in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioners.
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the

jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to
or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
Neither may the petitioners find comfort and solace in Section 19(8) of B.P. Blg. 129,
as amended, which states:
SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in
controversy exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other
cases in Metro Manila, where the demand, exclusive of the above-mentioned items
exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
The said provision is applicable only to "all other cases" other than an action involving
title to, or possession of real property in which the assessed value is the controlling
factor in determining the courts jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental
to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real
property.26
SO ORDERED.

HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87; HON. MANUEL TARO, in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 42; and the HEIRS OF SPOUSES APOLONIO V. DIONISIO and
VALERIANA DIONISIO (namely, ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO and ELEANOR R.
DIONISIO, herein represented by ALLAN GEORGE R. DIONISIO), Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This resolves the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying
that the Resolutions1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 15, 2003 and
June 1, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
Sometime in July 2001, private respondents, heirs of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana
Dionisio, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City, Branch 42, a
Complaint2 against herein petitioners and Wood Crest Residents Association, Inc.,
for Accion Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damages, with Prayer for Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction. Private respondents alleged that subject property located in
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, with an assessed value of P32,100.00, was titled in the
name of spouses Apolonio and Valeriana Dionisio; but petitioners, with malice and
evident bad faith, claimed that they were the owners of a parcel of land that
encompasses and covers subject property. Private respondents had allegedly been
prevented from entering, possessing and using subject property. It was further alleged
in the Complaint that petitioners' Transfer Certificate of Title over their alleged
property was spurious. Private respondents then prayed that they be declared the
sole and absolute owners of the subject property; that petitioners be ordered to
surrender possession of subject property to them; that petitioners and Wood Crest
and/or its members be ordered to pay actual and moral damages, and attorney's
fees.
Petitioners, for their part, filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 said complaint on the ground that
the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, as the subject of
litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation.
G.R. No. 164560
ANA
vs.
DE
GUIA
July 22, 2009

SAN
PEDRO
and
ALEJO
DOPEO, Petitioners,
The MeTC then issued an Order 4 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion to dismiss,
ruling that, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129, as amended, the MeTC had
exclusive original jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real
property of small value.

Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of said Order dated July 4, 2002 was denied.
Petitioners assailed the aforementioned Order by filing a petition for certiorari with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 87. However, in its
Decision5 dated March 10, 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Presiding Judge. The RTC sustained the
MeTC ruling, stating that, in accordance with Section 33(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7691, amending B.P. Blg. 129, the MeTC had jurisdiction over the complaint
for Accion Reivindicatoria, as it involves recovery of ownership and possession of real
property located in Quezon City, with an assessed value not exceeding P50,000.00. A
Motion for Reconsideration6 of the Decision was filed by petitioners, but was denied in
an Order7 dated July 3, 2003.
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, insisting
that both the MeTC and RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction by not ordering the dismissal of the complaint for Accion
Reivindicatoria, for lack of jurisdiction over the same. In the assailed CA Resolution
dated September 15, 2003, the CA dismissed the petition outright, holding
that certiorari was not available to petitioners as they should have availed themselves
of the remedy of appeal. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
dismissal was denied per Resolution8 dated June 1, 2004.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and, in support thereof, they allege that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND FOR FAILURE TO RESOLVE
THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE CERTIORARI REGARDING THE JURISDICTION OF
THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF A CASE
OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT FATIMA GONZALES-ASDALA, AS
PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC BRANCH 87, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF (SIC)
JURISDICTION IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND IN
RESOLVING THAT A CASE OF ACCION REINVINDICATORIA IS WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT.
THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT MANUEL TARO AS PRESIDING
JUDGE MeTC, BRANCH 42, QUEZON CITY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN (SIC) EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
SO
TAKING
COGNIZANCE
OF
THE
COMPLAINT
FORACCION
REINVINDICATORIA IN CIVIL CASE NO. 27434 ENTITLED, "HEIRS OF SPS.

APOLONIO V. DIONISIO AND VALERIANA DIONISIO, ETC. VS. ANA DE GUIA SAN
PEDRO, ET. AL."9
The present Petition for Certiorari is doomed and should not have been entertained
from the very beginning.
The settled rule is that appeals from judgments or final orders or resolutions of the CA
should be by a verified petition for review on certiorari, as provided for under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, inPasiona, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,10 the Court expounded as follows:
The aggrieved party is proscribed from assailing a decision or final order of the CA via
Rule 65, because such recourse is proper only if the party has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the course of law. In this case, petitioner had an adequate
remedy, namely, a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. A petition for review on certiorari, not a special civil action for certiorari was,
therefore, the correct remedy.
xxxx
Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special
civil action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot
be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's
choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse. One of the requisites of certiorari is
that there be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where
an appeal was available, as in this case, certiorari will not prosper, even if the
ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner's resort to this Court by
Petition for Certiorari was a fatal procedural error, and the instant petition must,
therefore, fail.11
For the very same reason given above, the CA, therefore, acted properly when it
dismissed the petition for certiorari outright, on the ground that petitioners should
have resorted to the remedy of appeal instead ofcertiorari. Verily, the present Petition
for Certiorari should not have been given due course at all.
Moreover, since the period for petitioners to file a petition for review on certiorari had
lapsed by the time the instant petition was filed, the assailed CA Resolutions have
attained finality.1avvphi1

Nevertheless, just to put the matter to rest, the Court reiterates the ruling in Heirs of
Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Spouses Lumocso,12 to wit:
In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of or for
cancellation of title to or to quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the
classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein."
xxxx
x x x Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a
case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under
Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The
distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced
by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real
property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided
between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real
property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog
the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration
of justice."13
Clearly, the RTC and the CA ruled correctly that the MeTC had jurisdiction over
private respondents' complaint forAccion Reivindicatoria.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78978, dated September
15, 2003 and June 1, 2004, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174908
June 17, 2013
DARMA
MASLAG, Petitioner,
vs.
ELIZABETH MONZON, WILLIAM GESTON, and REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF
BENGUET, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"It is incumbent upon x x x appellants to utilize the correct mode of appeal of the
decisions of trial courts to the appellate courts. In the mistaken choice of their remedy,
they can blame no one but themselves."1
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 of the May 31, 2006 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365, which dismissed petitioner Darma
Maslag's (petitioner) ordinary appeal to it for being an improper remedy. The
Resolution disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and the Appeal is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.4

The Petition also assails the CAs September 22, 2006 Resolution5 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.6
remedies afforded by law to a builder in good faith for the improvements she
constructed thereon.
Factual Antecedents
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint7 for reconveyance of real property with

declaration of nullity of original certificate of title (OCT) against respondents Elizabeth
Monzon (Monzon), William Geston and the Registry of Deeds of La Trinidad,
Benguet. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La
Trinidad, Benguet.
SO ORDERED.14
After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over
petitioners property.8 It ordered her to reconvey the said property to petitioner, and to
pay damages and costs of suit.9
Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet.
After going over the MTC records and the parties respective memoranda, the RTC of
La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, through Acting Presiding Judge Fernando P. Cabato
(Judge Cabato), issued its October 22, 2003 Order,10 declaring the MTC without
jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. It further held that it will take cognizance
of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. x
xx
If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has
original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with the
preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice. Both parties acknowledged receipt of the
October 22, 2003 Order,11 but neither presented additional evidence before the new
judge, Edgardo B. Diaz De Rivera, Jr. (Judge Diaz De Rivera).12
On May 4, 2004, Judge Diaz De Rivera issued a Resolution 13 reversing the MTC
Decision. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment appealed from the Municipal Trial Court of La Trinidad,
Benguet is set aside. [Petitioner] is ordered to turn over the possession of the 4,415
square meter land she presently occupies to [Monzon]. This case is remanded to the
court a quo for further proceedings to determine whether [Maslag] is entitled to the
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal15 from the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution.
Petitioner assailed the RTCs May 4, 2004 Resolution for reversing the MTCs factual
findings16 and prayed that the MTC Decision be adopted. Her prayer before the CA
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed that the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of La Trinidad, Benguet, appealed from be
reversed in toto and that the Honorable Court adopt the decision of the Municipal Trial
Court. Further reliefs just and equitable under the premises are prayed for.17
Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners ordinary appeal for being the improper
remedy. They asserted that the proper mode of appeal is a Petition for Review under
Rule 42 because the RTC rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its appellate
jurisdiction.18
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA dismissed petitioners appeal. It observed that the RTCs May 4, 2004
Resolution (the subject matter of the appeal before the CA) set aside an MTC
Judgment; hence, the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not
an ordinary appeal.19
Petitioner sought reconsideration.20 She argued, for the first time, that the RTC
rendered its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction. She cited the earlier
October 22, 2003 Order of the RTC declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over the
case.
The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its September 22, 2006
Resolution:21
A perusal of the May 4, 2004 Resolution of the RTC, which is the subject matter of the
appeal, clearly reveals that it took cognizance of the MTC case in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Consequently, as We have previously enunciated, the proper

remedy, is a petition for review under Rule 42 and not an ordinary appeal under Rule
41.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration is
DENIED. The May 31, 2006 Resolution of this Court is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Hence this Petition wherein petitioner prays that the CA be ordered to take
cognizance of her appeal.23
Issues
Petitioner set forth the following issues in her Petition:
WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10 OF LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET HELD THAT THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AS FILED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF LA
TRINIDAD, BENGUET WAS DECIDED BY THE LATTER WITHOUT ANY
JURISDICTION AND, IN ORDERING THAT THE CASE SHALL BE DECIDED
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISION OF SECTION 8 OF RULE 40 OF THE RULES OF
COURT, IT DECIDED THE CASE NOT ON ITS APPELLATE JURISDICTION BUT
ON ITS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECT OF THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 10 OF LA TRINIDAD,
BENGUET, WHEN IT DECIDED A CASE APPEALED BEFORE IT UNDER THE
PROVISION OF SECTION 8, RULE 40 OF THE RULES OF COURT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AS TO THE COURSE OF REMEDY THAT MAY BE AVAILED OF BY
THE PETITIONER A PETITION FOR REVIEWUNDER RULE 42 OR AN
ORDINARY APPEAL UNDER RULE 41.24
Our Ruling
In its October 22, 2003 Order, the RTC declared that the MTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the case based on the supposition that the same is incapable of
pecuniary estimation. Thus, following Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, it took
cognizance of the case and directed the parties to adduce further evidence if they so
desire. The parties bowed to this ruling of the RTC and, eventually, submitted the
case for its decision after they had submitted their respective memoranda.
We cannot, however, gloss over this jurisdictional faux pas of the RTC. Since it
involves a question of jurisdiction, we may motu proprio review and pass upon the
same even at this late stage of the proceedings.25
In her Complaint26 for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of OCT,
petitioner claimed that she and her father had been in open, continuous, notorious
and exclusive possession of the disputed property since the 1940s. She averred:
7. Sometime in the year 1987, Elizabeth Monzon, the owner of the adjacent
parcel of land being occupied by plaintiff [Maslag], informed the plaintiff that
the respective parcels of land being claimed by them can now be titled. A
suggestion was, thereafter made, that those who were interested to have
their lands titled, will contribute to a common fund for the surveying and
subsequent titling of the land;
8. Since plaintiff had, for so long, yearned for a title to the land she occupies,
she contributed to the amount being requested by Elizabeth Monzon;
9. A subdivision survey was made and in the survey, the respective areas of
the plaintiff and the defendants were defined and delimited all for purposes
of titling. x x x
10. But alas, despite the assurance of subdivided titles, when the title was
finally issued by the Registry of Deeds, the same was only in the name of
Elizabeth Monzon and WILLIAM GESTON. The name of Darma Maslag was
fraudulently, deliberately and in bad faith omitted. Thus, the title to the
property, to the extent of 18,295 square meters, was titled solely in the name
of ELIZABETH MONZON.
As a relief, petitioner prayed that Monzon be ordered to reconvey the portion of the
property which she claimed was fraudulently included in Monzons title. Her primary
relief was to recover ownership of real property. Indubitably, petitioners complaint
involves title to real property. An action "involving title to real property," on the other
hand, was defined as an action where "the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a
claim that she owns such property or that she has the legal rights to have exclusive
control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same."27
Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and
exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the
assessed value of the subject property.28 Pertinent provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129,29 as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7691,30 provides:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides for the dismissal of an improper
appeal:
(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of
pecuniary estimation;
SECTION 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. An appeal under

Rule 41 taken from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only
questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of appeal instead of by petition for review from
the appellate judgment of a Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property
involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in
Metro Manila, where x x x the assessed value of the property exceeds Fifty
thousand pesos ([P]50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is
conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil
actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.
In the case at bench, annexed to the Complaint is a Declaration of Real
Property31 dated November 12, 1991, which was later marked as petitioners Exhibit
"A",32 showing that the disputed property has an assessed value ofP12,40033 only.
Such assessed value of the property is well within the jurisdiction of the MTC. In fine,
the RTC, thru Judge Cabato, erred in applying Section 19(1) of BP 129 in determining
which court has jurisdiction over the case and in pronouncing that the MTC is
divested of original and exclusive jurisdiction.
This brings to fore the next issue of whether the CA was correct in dismissing
petitioners appeal.
An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the
appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.1wphi1 (Emphasis supplied)
There are two modes of appealing an RTC decision or resolution on issues of fact
and law.34 The first mode is an ordinary appeal under Rule 41 in cases where the
RTC exercised its original jurisdiction. It is done by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. The second mode is a petition for review under Rule 42 in cases where the
RTC exercised its appellate jurisdiction over MTC decisions. It is done by filing a
Petition for Review with the CA. Simply put, the distinction between these two modes
of appeal lies in the type of jurisdiction exercised by the RTC in the Order or Decision
being appealed.
As discussed above, the MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case; hence, there is no other way the RTC could have taken
cognizance of the case and review the court a quos Judgment except in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction. Besides, the new RTC Judge who penned the May 4,
2004 Resolution, Judge Diaz de Rivera, actually treated the case as an appeal
despite the October 22, 2003 Order. He started his Resolution by stating, "This is an
appeal from the Judgment rendered by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of La Trinidad
Benguet"35 and then proceeded to discuss the merits of the "appeal." In the
dispositive portion of said Resolution, he reversed the MTCs findings and
conclusions and remanded residual issues for trial with the MTC. Thus, in fact and in
law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated from
the MTC. It was a judgment issued by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction. With regard to the RTCs earlier October 22, 2003 Order, the same should
be disregarded for it produces no effect (other than to confuse the parties whether the
RTC was invested with original or appellate jurisdiction). It cannot be overemphasized
that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by law and it is "not within
the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set
aside."37 Neither would the active participation of the parties nor estoppel operate to
confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields
appellate jurisdiction over the case.38 Thus, the CA is correct in holding that the

proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.
Seeing the futility of arguing against what the RTC actually did, petitioner resorts to
arguing for what the RTC should have done. She maintains that the RTC should have
issued its May 4, 2004 Resolution in its original jurisdiction because it had earlier
ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the cause of action.
Petitioners argument lacks merit. To reiterate, only statutes can confer jurisdiction.
Court issuances cannot seize or appropriate jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held
that "any judgment, order or resolution issued without jurisdiction is void and cannot
be given any effect."39 By parity of reasoning, an order issued by a court declaring
that it has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case when
under the law it has none cannot likewise be given effect. It amounts to usurpation of
jurisdiction which cannot be countenanced. Since BP 129 already apportioned the
jurisdiction of the MTC and the RTC in cases involving title to property, neither the
courts nor the petitioner could alter or disregard the same. Besides, in determining
the proper mode of appeal from an RTC Decision or Resolution, the determinative
factor is the type of jurisdiction actually exercised by the RTC in rendering its Decision
or Resolution. Was it rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, or
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction? In short, we look at what type of
jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC. We do not look into what type of
jurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. This is but logical. Inquiring into what the
RTC should have done in disposing of the case is a question which already involves
the merits of the appeal, but we obviously cannot go into that where the mode of
appeal was improper to begin with.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed May 31, 2006 and September 22, 2006 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83365 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

That an ORDER be issued directing the Sheriff or other officer of
this Court to forthwith take custody and possession of the subject
equipment and to dispose it in accordance with the Rules of Court.
AFTER TRIAL
That judgment be rendered for the plaintiff ordering the defendants,
jointly and severally, to pay the following amounts:
(1) P11,000.00 per month as
actual damages by way of
reasonable compensation for
the use, enjoyment and/or
rental of the subject equipment
from April 9, 1995 until it is
repossessed by the plaintiff;
G.R. No. 131755 October 25, 1999

MOVERS-BASECO
INTEGRATED
PORT
SERVICES,
vs.
CYBORG LEASING CORPORATION, respondent.
INC., petitioner,
(2)
P1,000.000.00
exemplary damages and
VITUG, J.:
The instant matter has been brought to this Court via a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court to seek a reversal of the decision of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Manila, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 9785267.1wphi1.nt
Cyborg Leasing Corporation ("Cyborg"), herein private respondent, filed on 22 August
1996 before the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila a case, captioned
"Damages with Prayer for a Writ of Replevin" (Civil Case No. 152839), against
Conpac Warehousing, Inc. ("Conpac"), and herein petitioner Movers-Baseco
Integrated Port Services ("Movers"). The complaint alleged that pursuant to a lease
agreement, Cyborg had delivered one (1) NISSAN forklift to CONPAC. The lease
agreement stipulated a monthly rental of P11,000.00 for the use of the equipment
from its date of delivery. Conpac supposedly failed and refused to pay the stipulated
rentals starting April 1995 notwithstanding demands therefor. Sometime in May 1995,
petitioner took control of the operations of Conpac and seized all cargoes and
equipment including the subject forklift. Petitioner ignored Cyborg's demand for the
return to it of the equipment and the formal disclaimer of ownership made by
CONPAC. In its Complaint, Cyborg prayed:
UPON RECEIPT AND BEFORE ANSWER
as
(3) P50,000.00 as attorney's

fees and costs.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE
In the event that the subject equipment could not be seized, that
defendants be jointly and severally ordered to pay the plaintiff its
actual market value of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00), Philippine Currency, exclusive of the damages
under paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) stated supra.
Plaintiff further prays for other equitable reliefs and remedies. 1
Upon application of Cyborg, a writ of replevin was issued following the filing of a
P300,000.00 replevin bond. The directive was contained in the court's order of 27
August 1996, viz:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Sections 1 to 3, Rule 60 of the Revised
Rules of Court, a Writ of Replevin is hereby ordered issued
requiring the Sheriff of this Court to fortwith take possession of the
property specified on the face of this Order after serving a copy of

this Order to defendants, together with a copy of the application,
affidavit, and bond. Accordingly, the Sheriff of this Court is hereby
required to comply with Sections 4 to 8 of Rule 60.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 2
On 06 February 1997, petitioner was served with a copy of the summons and the writ
of replevin. On 14 February 1997, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the MTC since the complaint had asked
for, among other things, the following:
(a) . . . actual market value of the
equipment (par. 8 of the complaint)
P150,000.00
(b) . . . actual damages for use of the
equipment at the rate of P11,000.00
monthly from 09 April 1995 up to the
time possession was taken by the
It is a fundamental axiom in adjective law that jurisdiction is

conferred by law, and where there is none, no agreement of the
parties can vest competencia (Leonor vs. Court of Appeals, 256
SCRA 69; (1996); Department of Health vs. National Labor
Commission, 251 SCRA 700; 707 (1995); 1Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, 1988 5th rev. ed., p. 9).
Albeit the subject equipment has a market value of P150,000.00
(paragraph 8, Complaint) and while it is true that interest, damages
of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs are
excluded in ascertaining jurisdiction per Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 7691 and are considered only to determine the filing fees, it is
equally true that if the principal request in the complaint is for
damages, or one of the causes of action, the amount of such claim
shall be determinative ofcompetencia under Supreme Court
Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14, 1994.
The amount sought to be recovered is the "amount of the demand"
(Oteng vs. Tan Kiem, Ta, 61 Phil. 87) and included in the
computation of the jurisdictional amount are attorney's fees
recoverable as damages (Article 2208, New Civil Code),
consequential damages, exemplary damages if the amount thereof
is specified in the complaint (Enerio vs. Alampay, 64 SCRA 142,
and moral damages, if quantified in the complaint (Quiason,
Philippines Courts and their Jurisdictions, 1986 ed., pp. 166-168).
plaintiff under the order of the Honorable

Court (par, 9(a) of the complaint)
242,000.00
(c) exemplary damages 1,000,000.00
(d) attorney's fees 50,000.00
Total P1,442,000.00
On 18 March 1997, the MTC issued an order dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, and ratiocinating, thus
Hence, on the basis of the clarification of the Supreme Court, the

total claims of the plaintiff are beyond the purview of this Court's
jurisdiction.
Accordingly, Civil Case No. 152839 is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of jurisdiction as prayed for. 3
The MTC, in its order of 10 June 1997, denied Cyborg's motion for reconsideration,
elaborating that it
. . . is not unaware of Justice Regalado's discourse in his treatise
that "replevin is available only where the principal relief sought in
the action is the recovery of personal property, the other reliefs, like
damages, being merely incidental thereto" (1 Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, 1988 5th rev. ed., p. 437) which was utilized by
plaintiffs counsel to secure re-evaluation of the challenged Order

(page 2, Additional Arguments Relative to the Motion for
Reconsideration). Yet, this Court cannot also ignore the language of
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated June 14,
1994 that if the principal supplication is for damages, or is one of
the causes of action, like in this case, the amount of such claim will
spell the difference in jurisdiction between the Metropolitan Trial
Court and the Regional Trial Court.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and
plaintiffs additional arguments relative to the motion for
reconsideration are hereby DENIED. Accordingly, as prayed for by
defendant's counsel on May 27, 1997, Sheriff Abulencia is hereby
directed to RETURN the Nissan Forklift described as Equipment
No. C-201, 2 Tonner, Engine No. G1-214511 FG 25 TCM to
defendant Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. 4
Cyborg did not succeed in its motion for clarificatory judgment which the court took as
just a second motion for reconsideration. Then, on 26 September 1997, Cyborg filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction and/or prayer for
temporary restraining order, against the MTC Judge, Conpac Warehousing and
Movers, before the RTC of Manila (Civil Case No. 97-85267). This petition was
opposed by Movers as being tardily filed. Still, later, an answer to this petition was
filed by Movers.
On 20 October 1997, the RTC issued an order granting Cyborg's application for
preliminary injunction; the court said:
The MTC dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner Cyborg for
replevin of a leased Nissan forklift by defendant Compac and later
taken into custody by defendant Movers-Baseco. Upon the MTC's
denial of Cyborg's motion for reconsideration, Cyborg caused the
filing of the instant petition.
In its motion to dismiss before the MTC Manila, Movers-Baseco
argued that the MTC had no jurisdiction over this case because
while the alleged amount of the forklift is P150,000, together with
the other amounts/damages claimed, the total is beyond the MTC's
jurisdiction.
Cyborg argued that since the principal action is for replevin, the
other amounts being merely incidental, as the amount of P150,000
is within the MTC jurisdiction, the latter is competent to take

cognizance of the case.
Such arguments, however, are better reserved for the adjudication
on the merits of this petition. The issue now is whether there is
sufficient legal ground to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin enforcement of the MTC's order dated June 10, 1997 which
directed the delivery of the replevied forklift back to MoversBaseco.
The MTC complaint alleged that the rentals of P11,000 per month
are not being paid in the interim which lease contract is dated
January 5, 1995 (Record, page 35).
It appears that Cyborg is the lessor-owner of the forklift. In the
meantime, the rentals are not being paid it. As owner of the same,
Cyborg has a clear right to the possession of the same during the
pendency of this proceedings, the MTC having already issued a
writ of replevin to gain possession of the forklift which is now in the
possession of Cyborg. This status quo existing at the time this
petition was filed should be maintained pending the resolution of
the case, otherwise, great damage will be caused to Cyborg, the
owner.
The 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure allow the ex parte issuance of a
20-day TRO, the Rules silent as to whether a bond should cover
the 20-day TRO, as it is the writ of preliminary injunction that
requires the filing of an injunction bond. Hence, this Court issued a
TRO until October 22, 1997 (Rule 58, Section 5), otherwise, with
the rentals in the interim being unpaid, Cyborg is destined to suffer
GREAT damage (not necessarily irreparable), the Rule expressly
mentioning great OR irreparable injury.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, let a writ of preliminary
injunction issue against the respondents. The public and private
respondents, the sheriff concerned, and any person acting for and
in their behalf are restrained from implementing the order of the
MTC Manila dated June 10, 1997 directing the delivery of the forklift
back to the private respondent Movers-Baseco until the Court
resolves the petition with finality.

Serve a copy of this order, together with a copy of the affidavit,
upon the public and private respondents. No additional injunction
bond is being required because Cyborg already filed an injunction
bond before the MTC Manila. 5
Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed before the RTC on 24 October 1997 this
manifestation:
judgment upon the respondent Sheriff, counsel for petitioner,

counsel for CONPAC, and counsel for MOVERS-BASECO. 7
Petitioner timely resorted to this Court, via the instant petition for review, assailing the
decision of the RTC and submitting to the Court the following legal issues: Whether or
not
(1) the MTC had jurisdiction over respondent's complaint;
For accuracy, respondent Movers-Baseco would like to state that:

(2) the MTC's order of dismissal had become final and executory;
(a) respondent Movers-Baseco never took custody of the forklift
after the respondent Sheriff took possession of the same pursuant
to the writ of replevin issued by the MTC; and
(b) moreover, there is no bond posted by the petitioner for the
issuance of the injunction. The bond referred to by this Court is the
replevin bond posted in the Metropolitan Trial Court. 6
Ultimately, on 04 December 1997, the RTC promulgated its judgment in Civil Case
No. 97-85267; resolving the merits of the petition, it concluded:
WHEREFORE,
PREMISES
CONSIDERED,
for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Consequently,
the
petition
(3) Cyborg's special civil action of certiorari and prohibition before the RTC can be a
substitute for a lost appeal; and
(4) a temporary restraining order or preliminary writ of injunction can be issued
without an injunction bond apart from the replevin bond.
The threshold issue concerns MTC's jurisdiction over the action filed by Cyborg in
Civil Case No. 152839 for "Damages with prayer for a writ of replevin." Hardly
disputable is that the jurisdiction of the court and the nature of the action must be
determined by the averments in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought 8 vis-a-visthe corresponding provisions of the law involved. 9
Sec. 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
1. Having been rendered with grave abuse of

discretion, the orders of respondent judge dated
March 18, (Annex A), June 10, 1997 (Annex B),
and August 22, 1997 (Annex C) are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
2. Respondent judge is ordered to refrain from
implementing his order dated June 10, 1997 for
the delivery of the forklift to respondent
MOVERS-BASECO, making the writ of injunction
permanent.
3. Remanding the case to the MTC Manila for
trial on the merits.
Let a certified copy of this judgment be served upon the public
respondent MTC Manila judge. Serve likewise a copy of this
Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts; Municipal Trial

Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate
proceedings testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional
remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed, or amount of the
demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property,
estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00), exclusive of interest, damages of
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the
amount of which must be specifically alleged: Provided, That
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation

expenses, and costs shall be included in the determination of the
filing fees: Provided,further, That where there are several claims or
causes of actions between the same or different parties, embodied
in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different
transactions;
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 09-94, in turn, provides:
SUBJECT: Guidelines in the Implementation of the Republic Act
No. 7691, Entitled "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Amending For the Purpose Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, otherwise Known As the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980."
xxx xxx xxx
2. the exclusion of the term "damages" of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and
Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,
applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a
consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court.
The complaint filed by Cyborg with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila prayed for
the return of the Nissan Forklift to it, as owner and as lessor pursuant to a lease
agreement executed by it in favor of Conpac, or, in the alternative for the payment of
P150,000.00 (the actual market value of the forklift), plus damages, plus the amount
of unpaid lease, starting 09 April 1995 at P11,000.00 per month, which as of the time
of the filing of the complaint on 22 August 1996 had amounted to P180,000.00 which,
together with the value of the forklift, reach the sum of P230,000.00 excluding the
amount of damages and attorney's fees likewise claimed. It would be incorrect to
argue that the actual damages in the form of unpaid rentals were just incident of the
action for the return of the forklift, considering that private respondent specifically
sought in the complaint not only the seizure of the forklift from petitioner-Movers,
which took control of the operations of Conpac, but likewise the payment of unpaid
and outstanding rentals. Verily, the Metropolitan Trial Court's orders of 18 March 1997
and 10 June 1997 dismissing the complaint and denying the motion of private
respondent, respectively, were properly decreed.
Another set back for Cyborg's cause was the fact that its petition for certiorari, with
preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order, filed before the RTC
should not have been allowed not only for being late but also for not being a valid
substitute for a lost appeal. A petition for certiorari under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure should be filed within 60 days from receipt of the assailed decision, order
or resolution. Cyborg's petition with the RTC was filed fourteen (14) days late 10 on 26
September 1997, or on the 74th day from its receipt of the order denying the motion
for reconsideration on 14 July 1997. The RTC acted on the mistaken notion that the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure took effect only in October 1997; in fact, the new rules
became operative since 01 July 1997.
Having thus concluded, the Court need not take up the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED, and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 97-85267 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
orders dated 18 March 1997, 10 June 1997 and 22 August 1997 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 152839 for "Damages With Prayer for a Writ of
Replevin" are reinstated. Civil Case No. 152839 for damages is ordered DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143951 October 25, 2005

Norma
Mangaliag
and
Narciso
Solano, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 1st Judicial
Region, San Carlos City, (Pangasinan), Branch 56 and Apolinario Serquina,
Jr., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, to set aside the Order dated April 17, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 56, San Carlos City in Civil Case No. SCC-2240, which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss; and the Order dated June 13, 2000, which denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On May 10, 1999, private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a
complaint for damages against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The
complaint alleges that: on January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to 10:00 a.m., private
respondent, together with Marco de Leon, Abner Mandapat and Manuel de Guzman,
was on board a tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte; while in Pagal, San Carlos City, a
dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and driven by her employee, petitioner
Solano, coming from the opposite direction, tried to overtake and bypass a tricycle in

front of it and thereby encroached the left lane and sideswiped the tricycle ridden by
private respondent; due to the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of
petitioner Solano in driving the truck, private respondent and his co-passengers
sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities; petitioner Mangaliag failed to
exercise due diligence required by law in the selection and supervision of her
employee; private respondent was hospitalized and spent P71,392.00 as medical
expenses; private respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity due to a
fractured nose and suffers from severe depression as a result thereof, for which he
should be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of moral damages; as
a further result of his hospitalization, private respondent lost income of P25,000.00;
private respondent engaged the services of counsel on a contingent basis equal to
25% of the total award.1
On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying that private
respondent has a cause of action against them. They attributed fault or negligence in
the vehicular accident on the tricycle driver, Jayson Laforte, who was allegedly driving
without license.2
Following pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. When private respondent
rested his case, petitioner Solano testified in his defense.
Subsequently, on March 8, 2000, petitioners, assisted by a new counsel, filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the case
since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount of P71,392.00, falls within its
jurisdiction.3 Private respondent opposed petitioners motion to dismiss.4 On March
24, 2000, petitioners filed a supplement in support of their motion to dismiss.5
On April 17, 2000, the respondent RTC Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, issued the
first assailed Order denying petitioners motion to dismiss, 6 relying upon the mandate
of Administrative Circular No. 09-94, paragraph 2 of which reads:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.
The respondent RTC Judge also cited the 1999 case of Ong vs. Court of
Appeals,7 where an action for damages due to a vehicular accident, with prayer for
actual damages of P10,000.00 and moral damages of P1,000,000.00, was tried in a

RTC.
On May 19, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 8 but it was denied by
the respondent RTC Judge in her second assailed Order, dated June 13, 2000.9
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order.10
On August 9, 2000, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining order
prayed for by petitioners. Consequently, the respondent RTC Judge desisted from
hearing further Civil Case No. SCC-2240.11
Petitioners propound this issue for consideration: In an action for recovery of
damages, does the amount of actual damages prayed for in the complaint provide the
sole test for determining the courts jurisdiction, or is the total amount of all the
damages claimed, regardless of kind and nature, such as moral, exemplary, nominal
damages, and attorneys fees, etc., to be computed collectively with the actual
damages to determine what court whether the MTC or the RTC has jurisdiction
over the action?
Petitioners maintain that the courts jurisdiction should be based exclusively on the
amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the amounts claimed as moral,
exemplary, nominal damages and attorneys fee, etc. They submit that the
specification in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that "in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action. . . the amount of such claim shall be
considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court"signifies that the courts
jurisdiction must be tested solely by the amount of that damage which is principally
and primarily demanded, and not the totality of all the damages sought to be
recovered.
Petitioners insist that private respondents claim for actual damages in the amount
of P71,392.00 is the principal and primary demand, the same being the direct result of
the alleged negligence of petitioners, while the moral damages for P500,000.00 and
attorneys fee, being the consequent effects thereof, may prosper only upon a prior
finding by the court of the existence of petitioners negligence that caused the actual
damages. Considering that the amount of actual damages claimed by private
respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-2240 does not exceedP200,000.00, which was
then the jurisdictional amount of the MTC, the jurisdiction over the case clearly
pertains to the MTC, and not to the RTC. Therefore, the RTC should have dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners cite as relevant the case of MoversBaseco Integrated Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation 12 wherein the

Court, in disposing of the jurisdictional issue, limited its consideration only to the
actual or compensatory damages.
because his claim for actual damages does not exceed P200,000.00 which amount
falls under the jurisdiction of the MTC.
Furthermore, while admitting that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was only raised
during the trial, petitioners nevertheless contend that jurisdiction may be raised
anytime, even after judgment, but before it is barred by laches or estoppel. They
submit that they seasonably presented the objection to the RTCs lack of
jurisdiction, i.e., during the trial stage where no decision had as yet been rendered,
must less one unfavorable to them.
Lastly, he asserts that it is too late in the day for petitioners to question the jurisdiction
of the RTC since they are estopped from invoking this ground. He contends that after
actively taking part in the trial proceedings and presenting a witness to seek
exoneration, it would be unfair and legally improper for petitioners to seek the
dismissal of the case.
At any rate, they argue that when the jurisdictional flaw is evident from the record of
the case, the court may, even without the urgings of the parties, take judicial notice of
such fact, and thereupon dismiss the case motu proprio.Thus, even if lack of
jurisdiction was not initially raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, no waiver
may be imputed to them.
Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that in an action for recovery of
damages arising from a tortious act, the claim of moral damages is not merely an
incidental or consequential claim but must be considered in the amount of demand
which will determine the courts jurisdiction. He argues that the position taken by
petitioners is a misreading of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94. The
clear and explicit language of said circular leaves no room for doubt; hence, needs no
interpretation.
He further submits that petitioners reliance on Movers-Baseco Integrated Port
Services, Inc. is misplaced since that case is for recovery of the value of vehicle and
unpaid rentals on the lease of the same. He contends that Section 18, paragraph 8
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, upon which
petitioners anchor their stand, refers to all the demands involving collection of sums of
money based on obligations arising from contract, express or implied, where the
claim for damages is just incidental thereto and it does not apply to actions for
damages based on obligations arising from quasi-delict where the claim for damages
of whatever kind is the main action.
Private respondent also contends that, being incapable of pecuniary computation, the
amount of moral damages that he may be awarded depends on the sound discretion
of the trial court, not restrained by the limitation of the jurisdictional amount. Should
the Court follow petitioners line of reasoning, private respondent argues that it will
result in an absurd situation where he can only be awarded moral damages of not
more than P200,000.00 although he deserves more than this amount, taking into
consideration his physical suffering, as well as social and financial standing, simply
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that generally a direct recourse to this Court is
highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict observance of the judicial
hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and the Court of Appeals (CA)
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the
petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. This Court is a court of last
resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it
by the Constitution and immemorial tradition.13
Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress
desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify
the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction.14 Such exceptional and compelling circumstances were
present in the following cases: (a) Chavez vs. Romulo15 on the citizens right to bear
arms; (b) Government of the United States of America vs. Purganan 16 on bail in
extradition proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla17 on a
government contract on the modernization and computerization of the voters
registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora[18] on the status and
existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich vs. Corona19 on the so-called "Win-Win
Resolution" of the Office of the President which modified the approval of the
conversion to agro-industrial area of a 144-hectare land.
Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It generally
applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are
required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity
of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases
which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before
appellate courts as they are not triers of facts.20 Therefore, a strict application of the
rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the
appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions.

In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving the
interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling enough reasons
to allow petitioners invocation of this Courts jurisdiction in the first instance.
Before resolving this issue, the Court shall deal first on the question of estoppel
posed by private respondent. Private respondent argues that the defense of lack of
jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active participation in the trial. Such,
however, is not the general rule but an exception, best characterized by the peculiar
circumstances in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.21 In Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of
jurisdiction did so only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had
already been elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoyis an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due
diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it.22
As enunciated in Calimlim vs. Ramirez,23 this Court held:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so
numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of the action
is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties.
The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even
on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which
stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be
regretted, however, that the holding in said case had been applied to situations which
were obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved
inSibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of nonwaivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine
had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as
the exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing altogether the time
honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
...
It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or proceeding which
was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks jurisdiction over the same irrespective
of the attendant circumstances. The equitable defense of estoppel requires
knowledge or consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is
true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is shown, among
others, that the representation must have been made with knowledge of the facts and
that the party to whom it was made is ignorant of the truth of the matter (De Castro
vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623). The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not
possess jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be deliberate and
intended to secure a ruling which could later be annulled if not favorable to the party
who filed such suit or proceeding. Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It
can just as well be prejudicial to the one who file the action or suit in the event that he
obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for having been
rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the correct jurisdiction of a court is
not a simple matter. It can raise highly debatable issues of such importance that the
highest tribunal of the land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the
same. The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same, such act
may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of estoppel. It could have been the result
of an honest mistake or of divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any
fault is to be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame should
be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby lulling the parties into
believing that they pursued their remedies in the correct forum. Under the rules, it is
the duty of the court to dismiss an action "whenever it appears that court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter." (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the
Court render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be impeached or
annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid), within ten (10) years from the
finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3, Civil Code).24
In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. 25 As a matter of
fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional defect, they did
not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss. Hence, finding the pivotal
element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy doctrine does not control the
present controversy. Instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings must apply. Therefore,
petitioners are not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.
In any event, the petition for certiorari is bereft of merit.
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994,
provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases
exceeds P100,000.00,26 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof is lodged with in
the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in the
complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the
same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

The jurisdictional amount was increased to P200,000.00,27 effective March 20, 1999,
pursuant to Section 528 of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, the Court specified the
guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691. Paragraph 2 of the Circular
provides:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind in determining the
jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases where the damages are merely
incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the
jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis supplied)
The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the complaint and the
law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of the
claims or reliefs sought therein.29 In the present case, the allegations in the complaint
plainly show that private respondent seeks to recover not only his medical expenses,
lost income but also damages for physical suffering and mental anguish due to
permanent facial deformity from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed
as an action for quasi-delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of
Article 2219 (2),30 which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of
quasi-delict causing physical injuries.
Private respondents claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be considered
as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual damages. It is a
separate and distinct cause of action or an independent actionable tort. It springs
from the right of a person to the physical integrity of his or her body, and if that
integrity is violated, damages are due and assessable. 31 Hence, the demand for moral
damages must be considered as a separate cause of action, independent of the claim
for actual damages and must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount, in
clear consonance with paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e., the courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing
physical injuries would only be based on the claim for actual damages and the
complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral damages in an amount within its
jurisdictional limitations, a situation not intended by the framers of the law.
It must be remembered that moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded

feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a
person.32 Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means,
diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has
undergone, by reason of the defendants culpable action. Its award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus, it must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be governed by its own
peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining the proper
amount.33
The petitioners reliance in the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated Port Services, Inc.
vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation34 is misplaced. The claim for damages therein was
based on a breach of a contract of lease, not a quasi-delict causing physical injuries,
as in this case. Besides, there was no claim therein for moral damages. Furthermore,
moral damages are generally not recoverable in damage actions predicated on a
breach of contract in view of the provisions of Article 222035 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the respondent RTC Judge
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated April 17,
2000 and June 13, 2000.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 9, 2000 is LIFTED.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City is DIRECTED to continue with
the trial proceedings in Civil Case No. SCC-2240 and resolve the case with dispatch.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

On September 19, 2002, petitioner, through its corporate secretary, Dr. Jose Giovanni
E. Dimayuga, demanded from respondent payment for alleged unpaid association
dues and assessments amounting to P145,567.42. Respondent disputed this demand
claiming that he had been religiously paying his dues shown by the fact that he was
previously elected president and director of petitioner.4 Petitioner, on the other hand,
claimed that respondents obligation was a carry-over of that of MLHI. 5 Consequently,
respondent was prevented from exercising his right to vote and be voted for during
the 2002 election of petitioners Board of Directors.6Respondent thus clarified from
MLHI the veracity of petitioners claim, but MLHI allegedly claimed that the same had
already been settled.7 This prompted respondent to demand from petitioner an
explanation why he was considered a delinquent payer despite the settlement of the
obligation. Petitioner failed to make such explanation. Hence, the Complaint for
Damages8 filed by respondent against petitioner and MLHI, the pertinent portions of
which read:
G.R. No. 181416
xxxx
November 11, 2013
MEDICAL
PLAZA
MAKATI
CONDOMINIUM
vs.
ROBERT H. CULLEN, Respondent.
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution 2 dated
January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86614. The assailed decision reversed and set
aside the September 9, 2005 Order3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
Branch 58 in Civil Case No. 03-1018; while the assailed resolution denied the
separate motions for reconsideration filed by petitioner Medical Plaza Makati
Condominium Corporation (MPMCC) and Meridien Land Holding, Inc. (MLHI).
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Respondent Robert H. Cullen purchased from MLHI condominium Unit No. 1201 of
the Medical Plaza Makati covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 45808 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati. Said title was later cancelled and Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 64218 was issued in the name of respondent.
6. Thereafter, plaintiff occupied the said condominium unit no. 1201 and
religiously paid all the corresponding monthly contributions/association dues
and other assessments imposed on the same. For the years 2000 and 2001,
plaintiff served as President and Director of the Medical Plaza Makati
Condominium Corporation;
7. Nonetheless, on September 19, 2002, plaintiff was shocked/surprised to
receive a letter from the incumbent Corporate Secretary of the defendant
Medical Plaza Makati, demanding payment of alleged unpaid association
dues and assessments arising from plaintiffs condominium unit no. 1201.
The said letter further stressed that plaintiff is considered a delinquent
member of the defendant Medical Plaza Makati.
x x x;
8. As a consequence, plaintiff was not allowed to file his certificate of
candidacy as director. Being considered a delinquent, plaintiff was also
barred from exercising his right to vote in the election of new members of the
Board of Directors x x x;
9. x x x Again, prior to the said election date, x x x counsel for the defendant
[MPMCC] sent a demand letter to plaintiff, anent the said delinquency,
explaining that the said unpaid amount is a carry-over from the obligation of
defendant Meridien. x x x;

10. Verification with the defendant [MPMCC] resulted to the issuance of a
certification stating that Condominium Unit 1201 has an outstanding unpaid
obligation in the total amount of P145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002,
which again, was attributed by defendant [MPMCC] to defendant Meridien. x
x x;
11. Due to the seriousness of the matter, and the feeling that defendant
Meridien made false representations considering that it fully warranted to
plaintiff that condominium unit 1201 is free and clear from all liens and
encumbrances, the matter was referred to counsel, who accordingly sent a
letter to defendant Meridien, to demand for the payment of said unpaid
association dues and other assessments imposed on the condominium unit
and being claimed by defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
12. x x x defendant Meridien claimed however, that the obligation does not
exist considering that the matter was already settled and paid by defendant
Meridien to defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
13. Plaintiff thus caused to be sent a letter to defendant [MPMCC] x x x. The
said letter x x x sought an explanation on the fact that, as per the letter of
defendant Meridien, the delinquency of unit 1201 was already fully paid and
settled, contrary to the claim of defendant [MPMCC]. x x x;
14. Despite receipt of said letter on April 24, 2003, and to date however, no
explanation was given by defendant [MPMCC], to the damage and prejudice
of plaintiff who is again obviously being barred from voting/participating in
the election of members of the board of directors for the year 2003;
amount of P500,000.00 and for which defendant [MPMCC] should be held

liable;
18. By way of example or correction for the public good, and as a stern
warning to all similarly situated, defendant [MPMCC] should be ordered to
pay plaintiff exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00;
19. As a consequence, and so as to protect his rights and interests, plaintiff
was constrained to hire the services of counsel, for an acceptance fee
of P100,000.00 plus P2,500.00 per every court hearing attended by counsel;
20. In the event that the claim of defendant [MPMCC] turned out to be true,
however, the herein defendant Meridien should be held liable instead, by
ordering the same to pay the said delinquency of condominium unit 1201 in
the amount of P145,567.42 as of November 30, 2002 as well as the above
damages, considering that the non-payment thereof would be the proximate
cause of the damages suffered by plaintiff;9
Petitioner and MLHI filed their separate motions to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.10MLHI claims that it is the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) which is vested with the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. Petitioner, on the other hand, raises the following specific grounds
for the dismissal of the complaint: (1) estoppel as respondent himself approved the
assessment when he was the president; (2) lack of jurisdiction as the case involves
an intra-corporate controversy; (3) prematurity for failure of respondent to exhaust all
intra-corporate remedies; and (4) the case is already moot and academic, the
obligation having been settled between petitioner and MLHI.11
15. Clearly, defendant [MPMCC] acted maliciously by insisting that plaintiff is

a delinquent member when in fact, defendant Meridien had already paid the
said delinquency, if any. The branding of plaintiff as delinquent member was
willfully and deceitfully employed so as to prevent plaintiff from exercising his
right to vote or be voted as director of the condominium corporation; 16.
Defendant [MPMCC]s ominous silence when confronted with claim of
payment made by defendant Meridien is tantamount to admission that
indeed, plaintiff is not really a delinquent member;
On September 9, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision granting petitioners and MLHIs
motions to dismiss and, consequently, dismissing respondents complaint.
17. Accordingly, as a direct and proximate result of the said acts of

defendant [MPMCC], plaintiff experienced/suffered from mental anguish,
moral shock, and serious anxiety. Plaintiff, being a doctor of medicine and
respected in the community further suffered from social humiliation and
besmirched reputation thereby warranting the grant of moral damages in the
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the trial courts decision and remanded the
case to the RTC for further proceedings. Contrary to the RTC conclusion, the CA held
that the controversy is an ordinary civil action for damages which falls within the
jurisdiction of regular courts.14 It explained that the case hinged on petitioners refusal
to confirm MLHIs claim that the subject obligation had already been settled as early
The trial court agreed with MLHI that the action for specific performance filed by
respondent clearly falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.12 As to
petitioner, the court held that the complaint states no cause of action, considering that
respondents obligation had already been settled by MLHI. It, likewise, ruled that the
issues raised are intra-corporate between the corporation and member.13

as 1998 causing damage to respondent.15 Petitioners and MLHIs motions for
reconsideration had also been denied.16
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court based on the following grounds:
I.
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE, NOT
THERETOFORE DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT, OR HAS DECIDED IT
IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT DECLARED THE INSTANT CASE AN
ORDINARY ACTION FOR DAMAGES INSTEAD OF AN INTRA-CORPORATE
CONTROVERSY COGNIZABLE BY A SPECIAL COMMERCIAL COURT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO HAS DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT WHEN IT TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL WHILE RAISING ONLY
PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW.17
The petition is meritorious.
It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. It is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant. 18 Also
illuminating is the Courts pronouncement in Go v. Distinction Properties Development
and Construction, Inc.:19
Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein. The averments in the complaint and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the
complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff
is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. x x x20
Based on the allegations made by respondent in his complaint, does the controversy
involve intra-corporate issues as would fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as
a special commercial court or an ordinary action for damages within the jurisdiction of
regular courts?
In determining whether a dispute constitutes an intra-corporate controversy, the Court
uses two tests, namely, the relationship test and the nature of the controversy test. 21
An intra-corporate controversy is one which pertains to any of the following
relationships: (1) between the corporation, partnership or association and the public;
(2) between the corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as its
franchise, permit or license to operate is concerned; (3) between the corporation,
partnership or association and its stockholders, partners, members or officers; and (4)
among the stockholders, partners or associates themselves. 22 Thus, under the
relationship test, the existence of any of the above intra-corporate relations makes the
case intra-corporate.23
Under the nature of the controversy test, "the controversy must not only be rooted in
the existence of an intra-corporate relationship, but must as well pertain to the
enforcement of the parties correlative rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code and the internal and intra-corporate regulatory rules of the corporation." 24 In
other words, jurisdiction should be determined by considering both the relationship of
the parties as well as the nature of the question involved.25
Applying the two tests, we find and so hold that the case involves intra-corporate
controversy. It obviously arose from the intra-corporate relations between the parties,
and the questions involved pertain to their rights and obligations under the
Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of the corporation.26
Admittedly, petitioner is a condominium corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, charged with the management of the Medical Plaza Makati.
Respondent, on the other hand, is the registered owner of Unit No. 1201 and is thus a
stockholder/member of the condominium corporation. Clearly, there is an intracorporate relationship between the corporation and a stockholder/member.
The nature of the action is determined by the body rather than the title of the
complaint.1wphi1 Though denominated as an action for damages, an examination of
the allegations made by respondent in his complaint shows that the case principally
dwells on the propriety of the assessment made by petitioner against respondent as
well as the validity of petitioners act in preventing respondent from participating in the
election of the corporations Board of Directors. Respondent contested the alleged
unpaid dues and assessments demanded by petitioner.

The issue is not novel. The nature of an action involving any dispute as to the validity
of the assessment of association dues has been settled by the Court in Chateau de
Baie Condominium Corporation v. Moreno.27 In that case, respondents therein filed a
complaint for intra-corporate dispute against the petitioner therein to question how it
calculated the dues assessed against them, and to ask an accounting of association
dues. Petitioner, however, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction alleging that since the complaint was against the owner/developer of a
condominium whose condominium project was registered with and licensed by the
HLURB, the latter has the exclusive jurisdiction. In sustaining the denial of the motion
to dismiss, the Court held that the dispute as to the validity of the assessments is
purely an intra-corporate matter between petitioner and respondent and is thus within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. More so in
this case as respondent repeatedly questioned his characterization as a delinquent
member and, consequently, petitioners decision to bar him from exercising his rights
to vote and be voted for. These issues are clearly corporate and the demand for
damages is just incidental. Being corporate in nature, the issues should be threshed
out before the RTC sitting as a special commercial court. The issues on damages can
still be resolved in the same special commercial court just like a regular RTC which is
still competent to tackle civil law issues incidental to intra-corporate disputes filed
before it.28
Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 902-A enumerates the cases over which the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) exercises exclusive jurisdiction:
xxxx
b) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate or partnership relations,
between and among stockholders, members or associates; between any or
all of them and the corporation, partnership or association of which they are
stockholders, members, or associates, respectively; and between such
corporation, partnership or association and the State insofar as it concerns
their individual franchise or right to exist as such entity; and
c) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees,
officers, or managers of such corporations, partnerships, or associations.29
To be sure, this action partakes of the nature of an intra-corporate controversy, the
jurisdiction over which pertains to the SEC. Pursuant to Section 5.2 of Republic Act
No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the jurisdiction of the
SEC over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 902-A
has been transferred to RTCs designated by this Court as Special Commercial
Courts.30 While the CA may be correct that the RTC has jurisdiction, the case should
have been filed not with the regular court but with the branch of the RTC designated
as a special commercial court. Considering that the RTC of Makati City, Branch 58
was not designated as a special commercial court, it was not vested with jurisdiction
over cases previously cognizable by the SEC. 31 The CA, therefore, gravely erred in
remanding the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Indeed, Republic Act (RA) No. 9904, or the Magna Carta for Homeowners and
Homeowners Associations, approved on January 7, 2010 and became effective on
July 10, 2010, empowers the HLURB to hear and decide inter-association and/or
intra-association controversies or conflicts concerning homeowners associations.
However, we cannot apply the same in the present case as it involves a controversy
between a condominium unit owner and a condominium corporation. While the term
association as defined in the law covers homeowners associations of other
residential real property which is broad enough to cover a condominium corporation, it
does not seem to be the legislative intent. A thorough review of the deliberations of
the bicameral conference committee would show that the lawmakers did not intend to
extend the coverage of the law to such kind of association. We quote hereunder the
pertinent portion of the Bicameral Conference Committees deliberation, to wit:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Lets go back, Mr. Chair, very quickly on
homeowners.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Ang sa akin lang, I think our views are
similar, Your Honor, Senator Zubiri, the entry of the condominium units might just
complicate the whole matters. So wed like to put it on record that were very much
concerned about the plight of the Condominium Unit Homeowners Association. But
this could very well be addressed on a separate bill that Im willing to co-sponsor with
the distinguished Senator Zubiri, to address in the Condominium Act of the
Philippines, rather than address it here because it might just create a red herring into
the entire thing and it will just complicate matters, hindi ba?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). I also agree with you although I sympathize with
them---although we sympathize with them and we feel that many times their rights
have been also violated by abusive condominium corporations. However, there are
certain things that we have to reconcile. There are certain issues that we have to
reconcile with this version.
In the Condominium Code, for example, they just raised a very peculiar situation
under the Condominium Code --- Condominium Corporation Act. Its five years the
proxy, whereas here, its three years. So there would already be violation or there will
be already a problem with their version and our version. Sino ang matutupad doon?
Will it be our version or their version?

So I agree that has to be studied further. And because they have a law pertaining to
the condominium housing units, I personally feel that it would complicate matters if we
include them. Although I agree that they should be looked after and their problems be
looked into.
Probably we can ask our staff, Your Honor, to come up already with the bill although
we have no more time. Hopefully we can tackle this again on the 15th Congress. But I
agree with the sentiments and the inputs of the Honorable Chair of the House panel.
May we ask our resource persons to also probably give comments?
MR. JALANDONI. It will become complicated. There will be a lot of conflict of laws
between the two laws.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Kaya nga eh. At saka, I dont know. I
think the --- mayroon naman silang protection sa ano eh, di ba? Buyers decree doon
sa Condominium Act. Im sure there are provisions there eh. Huwag na lang, huwag
na lang.
MR. JALANDONI. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be best if your previous comments
that youd be supporting an amendment.1wphi1 I think that would be --- Well, that
would be the best course of action with all due respect.
Atty. Dayrit.
MR. DAYRIT.
Yes I agree with you. There are many, I think, practices in their provisions in the
Condominium Law that may be conflicting with this version of ours.
For instance, in the case of, lets say, the condominium, the so-called common areas
and/or maybe so called open spaces that they may have, especially common areas,
they are usually owned by the condominium corporation. Unlike a subdivision where
the open spaces and/or the common areas are not necessarily owned by the
association. Because sometimes --- generally these are donated to the municipality or
to the city. And it is only when the city or municipality gives the approval or the
conformity that this is donated to the homeowners association. But generally, under
PD [Presidential Decree] 957, its donated. In the Condominium Corporation, hindi.
Lahat ng mga open spaces and common areas like corridors, the function rooms and
everything, are owned by the corporation. So thats one main issue that can be
conflicting.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). Ill just ask for a one-minute suspension so we can
talk.
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Unless you want to put a catchall phrase
like what we did in the Senior Citizens Act. Something like, to the extent --- paano ba
iyon? To the extent that it is practicable and applicable, the rights and benefits of the
homeowners, are hereby extended to the --- mayroon kaming ginamit na phrase
eh...to the extent that it be practicable and applicable to the unit homeoweners, is
hereby extended, something like that. Its a catchall phrase. But then again, it might
create a...
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA). Yeah. Okay. Thank you. So iyon na lang
final proposal naming yung catchall phrase, "With respect to the..."32
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI). xxx And so, what is their final decision on the
definition of homeowners?
THE ACTING CHAIRMAN (REP. ZIALCITA).
We stick to the original, Mr. Chairman. Well just open up a whole can of worms and a
whole new ball game will come into play. Besides, I am not authorized, neither are
you, by our counterparts to include the condominium owners.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ZUBIRI).
Basically that is correct. We are not authorized by the Senate nor because we have
discussed this lengthily on the floor, actually, several months on the floor. And we
dont have the authority as well for other Bicam members to add a provision to include
a separate entity that has already their legal or their established Republic Act tackling
on that particular issue. But we just like to put on record, we sympathize with the
plight of our friends in the condominium associations and we will just guarantee them
that we will work on an amendment to the Condominium Corporation Code. So with
that we skipped, that is correct, we have to go back to homeowners association
definition, Your Honor, because we had skipped it altogether. So just quickly going
back to Page 7 because there are amendments to the definition of homeowners. If it
is alright with the House Panel, adopt the opening phrase of Subsection 7 of the
Senate version as opening phrase of Subsection 10 of the reconciled version.

x x x x33
To be sure, RA 4726 or the Condominium Act was enacted to specifically govern a
condominium. Said law sanctions the creation of the condominium corporation which
is especially formed for the purpose of holding title to the common area, in which the
holders of separate interests shall automatically be members or shareholders, to the
exclusion of others, in proportion to the appurtenant interest of their respective
units.34 The rights and obligations of the condominium unit owners and the
condominium corporation are set forth in the above Act.
Clearly, condominium corporations are not covered by the amendment. Thus, the
intra-corporate dispute between petitioner and respondent is still within the jurisdiction
of the RTC sitting as a special commercial court and not the HLURB. The doctrine
laid down by the Court in Chateau de Baie Condominium Corporation v.
Moreno35 which in turn cited Wack Wack Condominium Corporation, et al v. CA 36 is
still a good law.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition and REVERSE the Court of Appeals
Decision dated July 10, 2007 and Resolution dated January 25, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86614. The Complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58,
which is not a special commercial court, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-1018 is
ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Let the case be REMANDED to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for re-raffle purposes
among the designated special commercial courts.
G.R. Nos. 160054-55
July 21, 2004
MANOLO
P.
SAMSON, petitioner,
vs.
HON. REYNALDO B. DAWAY, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
CATERPILLAR, INC., respondents.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari is the March 26, 2003 Order1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, which denied petitioners (1) motion to quash
the information; and (2) motion for reconsideration of the August 9, 2002 Order
denying his motion to suspend the arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal
Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. Petitioner also questioned its August 5, 2003
Order2 which denied his motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts show that on March 7, 2002, two informations for unfair
competition under Section 168.3 (a), in relation to Section 170, of the Intellectual
Property Code (Republic Act No. 8293), similarly worded save for the dates and
places of commission, were filed against petitioner Manolo P. Samson, the registered
owner of ITTI Shoes. The accusatory portion of said informations read:
That on or about the first week of November 1999 and sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, above-named accused, owner/proprietor of ITTI
Shoes/Mano Shoes Manufactuirng Corporation located at Robinsons
Galleria, EDSA corner Ortigas Avenue, Quezon City, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously distribute, sell and/or offer for sale
CATERPILLAR products such as footwear, garments, clothing, bags,
accessories and paraphernalia which are closely identical to and/or
colorable imitations of the authentic Caterpillar products and likewise using
trademarks, symbols and/or designs as would cause confusion, mistake or
deception on the part of the buying public to the damage and prejudice of
CATERPILLAR, INC., the prior adopter, user and owner of the following
internationally: "CATERPILLAR", "CAT", "CATERPILLAR & DESIGN", "CAT
AND DESIGN", "WALKING MACHINES" and "TRACK-TYPE TRACTOR &
DESIGN."
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On April 19, 2002, petitioner filed a motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in view of the existence of an alleged prejudicial question involved in
Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 for unfair competition pending with the same branch; and
also in view of the pendency of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the Chief State Prosecutors resolution finding probable cause to charge
petitioner with unfair competition. In an Order dated August 9, 2002, the trial court
denied the motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings.
On August 20, 2002, petitioner filed a twin motion to quash the informations and
motion for reconsideration of the order denying motion to suspend, this time
challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense charged. He contended
that since under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, the penalty4 of imprisonment for unfair
competition does not exceed six years, the offense is cognizable by the Municipal
Trial Courts and not by the Regional Trial Court, per R.A. No. 7691.
In its assailed March 26, 2003 Order, the trial court denied petitioners twin
motions.6 A motion for reconsideration thereof was likewise denied on August 5,
2003.
Hence, the instant petition alleging that respondent Judge gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the assailed orders.
The issues posed for resolution are (1) Which court has jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases for violation of intellectual property rights? (2) Did the respondent
Judge gravely abuse his discretion in refusing to suspend the arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44 on the ground of (a) the
existence of a prejudicial question; and (b) the pendency of a petition for review with
the Secretary of Justice on the finding of probable cause for unfair competition?
Under Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293, which took effect on January 1, 1998, the
criminal penalty for infringement of registered marks, unfair competition, false
designation of origin and false description or representation, is imprisonment from 2
to 5 years and a fine ranging from Fifty Thousand Pesos to Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos, to wit:
SEC. 170. Penalties. Independent of the civil and administrative sanctions
imposed by law, a criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years to five
(5) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00), shall be imposed on any person
who is found guilty of committing any of the acts mentioned in Section 155
[Infringement], Section 168 [Unfair Competition] and Section 169.1 [False
Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation].
Corollarily, Section 163 of the same Code states that actions (including criminal and
civil) under Sections 150, 155, 164, 166, 167, 168 and 169 shall be brought before
the proper courts with appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws, thus
SEC. 163. Jurisdiction of Court. All actions under Sections 150, 155, 164
and 166 to 169 shall be brought before the proper courts with appropriate
jurisdiction under existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
The existing law referred to in the foregoing provision is Section 27 of R.A. No. 166
(The Trademark Law) which provides that jurisdiction over cases for infringement of
registered marks, unfair competition, false designation of origin and false description
or representation, is lodged with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
SEC. 27. Jurisdiction of Court of First Instance. All actions under this
Chapter [V Infringement] and Chapters VI [Unfair Competition] and VII
[False Designation of Origin and False Description or Representation],
hereof shall be brought before the Court of First Instance.
We find no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 166 was expressly repealed
by R.A. No. 8293. The repealing clause of R.A. No. 8293, reads
SEC. 239. Repeals. 239.1. All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent
herewith, more particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended; Republic
Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal

Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended, are hereby repealed. (Emphasis added)
Notably, the aforequoted clause did not expressly repeal R.A. No. 166 in its entirety,
otherwise, it would not have used the phrases "parts of Acts" and "inconsistent
herewith;" and it would have simply stated "Republic Act No. 165, as amended;
Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal
Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including Presidential Decree No. 285, as
amended are hereby repealed." It would have removed all doubts that said specific
laws had been rendered without force and effect. The use of the phrases "parts of
Acts" and "inconsistent herewith" only means that the repeal pertains only to
provisions which are repugnant or not susceptible of harmonization with R.A. No.
8293.6 Section 27 of R.A. No. 166, however, is consistent and in harmony with
Section 163 of R.A. No. 8293. Had R.A. No. 8293 intended to vest jurisdiction over
violations of intellectual property rights with the Metropolitan Trial Courts, it would
have expressly stated so under Section 163 thereof.
Moreover, the settled rule in statutory construction is that in case of conflict between a
general law and a special law, the latter must prevail. Jurisdiction conferred by a
special law to Regional Trial Courts must prevail over that granted by a general law to
Municipal Trial Courts.7
In the case at bar, R.A. No. 8293 and R.A. No. 166 are special laws8 conferring
jurisdiction over violations of intellectual property rights to the Regional Trial Court.
They should therefore prevail over R.A. No. 7691, which is a general law.9 Hence,
jurisdiction over the instant criminal case for unfair competition is properly lodged with
the Regional Trial Court even if the penalty therefor is imprisonment of less than 6
years, or from 2 to 5 years and a fine ranging from P50,000.00 to P200,000.00.
In fact, to implement and ensure the speedy disposition of cases involving violations
of intellectual property rights under R.A. No. 8293, the Court issued A.M. No. 02-1-11SC dated February 19, 2002 designating certain Regional Trial Courts as Intellectual
Property Courts. On June 17, 2003, the Court further issued a Resolution
consolidating jurisdiction to hear and decide Intellectual Property Code and Securities
and Exchange Commission cases in specific Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Commercial Courts.
The case of Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals,10 invoked by petitioner finds no application in
the present case. Nowhere in Mirpuri did we state that Section 27 of R.A. No. 166
was repealed by R.A. No. 8293. Neither did we make a categorical ruling therein that
jurisdiction over cases for violation of intellectual property rights is lodged with the
Municipal Trial Courts. The passing remark in Mirpuri on the repeal of R.A. No. 166 by
R.A. No. 8293 was merely a backgrounder to the enactment of the present
Intellectual Property Code and cannot thus be construed as a jurisdictional
pronouncement in cases for violation of intellectual property rights.
Anent the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a
prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003
order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other
proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-108043-44. For unknown reasons, however,
he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment.
Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote
the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other.11 Under Rule 111, Section 3
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition
under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud.12 Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil
Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q-00-41446, which as admitted13 by private respondent
also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the
Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal cases at bar.
Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the proper party, the
arraignment shall be suspended in the following cases
xxxxxxxxx
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided,
that the period of suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from
the filing of the petition with the reviewing office.
While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the
arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It
follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to
arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment.
In the instant case, petitioner failed to establish that respondent Judge abused his
discretion in denying his motion to suspend. His pleadings and annexes submitted
before the Court do not show the date of filing of the petition for review with the
Secretary of Justice.14 Moreover, the Order dated August 9, 2002 denying his motion

to suspend was not appended to the petition. He thus failed to discharge the burden
of proving that he was entitled to a suspension of his arraignment and that the
questioned orders are contrary to Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the age-old but familiar rule is that he who alleges must
prove his allegations.
In sum, the dismissal of the petition is proper considering that petitioner has not
established that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion. So also, his
failure to attach documents relevant to his allegations warrants the dismissal of the
petition, pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with
requirements. The petition shall contain the full names and actual
addresses of all the petitioners and respondents, a concise statement of the
matters involved, the factual background of the case, and the grounds relied
upon for the relief prayed for.
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of
service thereof on the respondent with the original copy intended for the
court indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a
clearly legible duplicate original or certified true copy of the judgment,
order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, such material portions of
the record as are referred to therein, and other documents relevant or
pertinent thereto.
xxxxxxxxx
The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition. (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 154598
August 16, 2004
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of the minor child SEQUEIRA
JENNIFER
DELLE
FRANCISCO
THORNTON, petitioner,
vs.
ADELFA FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition to review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the July 5, 2002
resolution1 of the Court of Appeals, Sixteenth Division, in CA G.R. SP No. 70501

dismissing the petition for habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and
lack of substance. The dispositive portion2 read:
Court. This jurisdiction finds its procedural expression in Sec. 1, Rule 102 of
the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for habeas corpus on the
grounds that: a) this Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition; and b) the petition is not sufficient in substance.
In 1997, RA 8369 otherwise known as Family Courts Act was enacted. It

provides:
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998
in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue, Manila. A year later,
respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle
Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife.
She wanted to return to her old job as a "guest relations officer" in a nightclub, with
the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the
country, respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her daughter in the
care of the househelp.
Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her
carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family home with her
daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was
bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan Province.
Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati
City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation that the child was
in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent
and their daughter. However, he did not find them there and the barangay office of
Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification 3 that respondent was no longer
residing there.
Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills
showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Metro Manila and
other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in
the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ of habeas corpus enforceable in the
entire country.
However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not
have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369 (The Family Courts Act of
1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas
corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980):
Under Sec. 9 (1), BP 129 (1981) the Intermediate Appellate Court (now
Court of Appeals) has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus whether or
not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This conferment of jurisdiction was restated in Sec. 1, RA 7902 (1995), an act expanding the jurisdiction of this
Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of Family Court. The Family Courts shall have

exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following
cases:
xxx
xxx
xxx
b. Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas

corpus in relation to the latter.
The vital question is, did RA 8369 impliedly repeal BP 129 and RA 7902
insofar as the jurisdiction of this Court to issue writ of habeas corpus in
custody of minor cases is concerned? The simple answer is, yes, it did,
because there is no other meaning of the word "exclusive" than to constitute
the Family Court as the sole court which can issue said writ. If a court other
than the Family Court also possesses the same competence, then the
jurisdiction of the former is not exclusive but concurrent and such an
interpretation is contrary to the simple and clear wording of RA 8369.
Petitioner argues that unless this Court assumes jurisdiction over a petition
for habeas corpus involving custody of minors, a respondent can easily
evade the service of a writ of habeas corpus on him or her by just moving
out of the region over which the Regional Trial Court issuing the writ has
territorial jurisdiction. That may be so but then jurisdiction is conferred by
law. In the absence of a law conferring such jurisdiction in this Court, it
cannot exercise it even if it is demanded by expediency or necessity.
Whether RA 8369 is a good or unwise law is not within the authority of this
Court or any court for that matter to determine. The enactment of a law
on jurisdiction is within the exclusive domain of the legislature. When there is
a perceived defect in the law, the remedy is not to be sought form the courts
but only from the legislature.
The only issue before us therefore is whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the
provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such
petitions.
In his comment, the Solicitor General points out that Section 20 of the Rule on
Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors (A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC, effective May 15, 2003) has rendered the issue moot. Section 20 of

the rule provides that a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme
Court,4 Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall
be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.5
The petition is granted.
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody
of minors.
The Court of Appeals opines that RA 8369 impliedly repealed RA 7902 and BP 129
since, by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases, the
lawmakers intended it to be the sole court which can issue writs of habeas corpus. To
the court a quo, the word "exclusive" apparently cannot be construed any other way.
court of jurisdiction will result in the evil sought to be avoided by the

legislature: the childs welfare and well being will be prejudiced.
This is not the first time that this Court construed the word "exclusive"
as not foreclosing resort to another jurisdiction. As correctly cited by the Solicitor
General, in Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation,6 the heirs of miners killed in a
work-related accident were allowed to file suit in the regular courts even if, under the
Workmens Compensation Act, the Workmens Compensation Commissioner had
exclusive jurisdiction over such cases.
We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that:
We disagree with the CAs reasoning because it will result in an iniquitous situation,
leaving individuals like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their
children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for
would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are
enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner
in a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could
not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts
Act of 1997. As observed by the Solicitor General:
While Floresca involved a cause of action different from the case at bar. it
supports petitioners submission that the word "exclusive" in the Family
Courts Act of 1997 may not connote automatic foreclosure of the jurisdiction
of other courts over habeas corpus cases involving minors. In the same
manner that the remedies in the Floresca case were selective, the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Family Court in the case at bar is
concurrent. The Family Court can issue writs of habeas corpus enforceable
only within its territorial jurisdiction. On the other hand, in cases where the
territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of the writ cannot be determined
with certainty, the Court of Appeals can issue the same writ enforceable
throughout the Philippines, as provided in Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Revised
Rules of Court, thus:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the avowed policy of the State is to
"protect the rights and promote the welfare of children." The creation of the
Family Court is geared towards addressing three major issues regarding
childrens welfare cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent behind giving Family Courts
exclusive and original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid further
clogging of regular court dockets, ensure greater sensitivity and
specialization in view of the nature of the case and the parties, as well as to
guarantee that the privacy of the children party to the case remains
protected.
The Writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court,

or any member thereof, on any day and at any time, or by the Court
of Appeals or any member thereof in the instances authorized by
law, and if so granted it shall be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines, and may be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First Instance, or any judge
thereof for hearing and decision on the merits. It may also be
granted by a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on any day
and at any time, and returnable before himself, enforceable only
within his judicial district. (Emphasis supplied)
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best interests of the child. We rule
therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of
their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. Again, to
quote the Solicitor General:
In ruling that the Commissioners "exclusive" jurisdiction did not foreclose resort to the
regular courts for damages, this Court, in the same Floresca case, said that it was
merely applying and giving effect to the constitutional guarantees of social justice in
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and implemented by the Civil Code. It also applied
the well-established rule that what is controlling is the spirit and intent, not the letter,
of the law:
To allow the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction over the petition for
habeas corpus involving a minor child whose whereabouts are uncertain and
transient will not result in one of the situations that the legislature seeks to
avoid. First, the welfare of the child is paramount. Second, the ex parte
nature of habeas corpus proceedings will not result in disruption of the
childs privacy and emotional well-being; whereas to deprive the appellate
"Idolatrous reverence" for the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of
the law insures mans survival and ennobles him. In the words of
Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit giveth life."

xxx
xxx
xxx
It is therefore patent that giving effect to the social justice guarantees of the
Constitution, as implemented by the provisions of the New Civil Code, is not
an exercise of the power of law-making, but is rendering obedience to the
mandates of the fundamental law and the implementing legislation
aforementioned.
Language is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being used in more
than one sense. Sometimes, what the legislature actually had in mind is not
accurately reflected in the language of a statute, and its literal interpretation may
render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice or contradiction. 7 In the case at bar,
a literal interpretation of the word "exclusive" will result in grave injustice and negate
the policy "to protect the rights and promote the welfare of children" 8 under the
Constitution and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. This
mandate must prevail over legal technicalities and serve as the guiding principle in
construing the provisions of RA 8369.
Moreover, settled is the rule in statutory construction that implied repeals are not
favored:
The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof
must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule
is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus est optimus
interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into
accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The
fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the
existing laws on the subject and not have enacted conflicting statutes.
Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject."9
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption of
A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ
of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family
Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable
anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family
Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or
where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the merits.
(Emphasis Ours)
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases where the
custody of minors is involved.
One final note. Requiring the serving officer to search for the child all over the country
is not an unreasonable availment of a remedy which the Court of Appeals cited as a
ground for dismissing the petition. As explained by the Solicitor General:10
That the serving officer will have to "search for the child all over the country"
does not represent an insurmountable or unreasonable obstacle, since such
a task is no more different from or difficult than the duty of the peace officer
in effecting a warrant of arrest, since the latter is likewise enforceable
anywhere within the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The petition for habeas corpus in
CA-G.R.-SP-No. 70501 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals, Sixteenth Division.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 159374
July 12, 2007
FELIPE
N.
vs.
FRANCISCA R. MADRIAN, Respondent.
MADRIAN, Petitioner,
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When a family breaks up, the children are always the victims. The ensuing battle for
custody of the minor children is not only a thorny issue but also a highly sensitive and
heart-rending affair. Such is the case here. Even the usually technical subject of
jurisdiction became emotionally charged.

Petitioner Felipe N. Madrian and respondent Francisca R. Madrian were married
on July 7, 1993 in Paraaque City. They resided in San Agustin Village, Brgy.
Moonwalk, Paraaque City.
impaired his mental faculties, causing him to commit acts of violence against her and
their children. The situation was aggravated by the fact that their home was adjacent
to that of her in-laws who frequently meddled in their personal problems.4
Their union was blessed with three sons and a daughter: Ronnick, born on January
30, 1994; Phillip, born on November 19, 1996; Francis Angelo, born on May 12, 1998
and Krizia Ann, born on December 12, 2000.
On October 21, 2002, the Court of Appeals 5 rendered a decision6 asserting its
authority to take cognizance of the petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the
Family Code, respondent was entitled to the custody of Phillip and Francis Angelo
who were at that time aged six and four, respectively, subject to the visitation rights of
petitioner. With respect to Ronnick who was then eight years old, the court ruled that
his custody should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding
on custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
After a bitter quarrel on May 18, 2002, petitioner allegedly left their conjugal abode
and took their three sons with him to Ligao City, Albay and subsequently to Sta. Rosa,
Laguna. Respondent sought the help of her parents and parents-in-law to patch
things up between her and petitioner to no avail. She then brought the matter to
theLupong Tagapamayapa in their barangay but this too proved futile.
Thus respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus of Ronnick, Phillip and Francis
Angelo in the Court of Appeals, alleging that petitioners act of leaving the conjugal
dwelling and going to Albay and then to Laguna disrupted the education of their
children and deprived them of their mothers care. She prayed that petitioner be
ordered to appear and produce their sons before the court and to explain why they
should not be returned to her custody.
Petitioner and respondent appeared at the hearing on September 17, 2002. They
initially agreed that petitioner would return the custody of their three sons to
respondent. Petitioner, however, had a change of heart 1 and decided to file a
memorandum.
On September 3, 2002, petitioner filed his memorandum2 alleging that respondent
was unfit to take custody of their three sons because she was habitually drunk,
frequently went home late at night or in the wee hours of the morning, spent much of
her time at a beer house and neglected her duties as a mother. He claimed that, after
their squabble on May 18, 2002, it was respondent who left, taking their daughter with
her. It was only then that he went to Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he worked as a tricycle
driver. He submitted a certification from the principal of the Dila Elementary School in
Sta. Rosa, Laguna that Ronnick and Phillip were enrolled there. He also questioned
the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369
(otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent.3
For her part, respondent averred that she did not leave their home on May 18, 2002
but was driven out by petitioner. She alleged that it was petitioner who was an
alcoholic, gambler and drug addict. Petitioners alcoholism and drug addiction
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition
for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family
courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA 8369:
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. The Family Courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx
xxx
xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to the

latter;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Petitioner is wrong.
In Thornton v. Thornton,7 this Court resolved the issue of the Court of Appeals
jurisdiction to issue writs ofhabeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the
light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing
in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
xxx
xxx
xxx

We rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the
custody of minors.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus relating to the
custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092
[An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980] are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not
prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas
corpus in cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369
must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpuswhere the custody of minors is at issue.8 (emphases
supplied)
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas corpus was further
affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors
and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the adoption
of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall
be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.
xxx
xxx
We note that after petitioner moved out of their Paraaque residence on May 18,
2002, he twice transferred his sons to provinces covered by different judicial regions.
This situation is what the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369s provision on jurisdiction
precisely addressed:
xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or
with any of its membersand, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere
in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court or to any
regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and Supreme
Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.9(emphases supplied)1avvphi1
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can issue
writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals like
[respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals
who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless
since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in
their respective territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from
one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in
a habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse
could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
8369].10
Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that family courts are
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody cases, not in habeas
corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which may be issued exclusively by family
courts under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be
availed of in conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely ancillary to the
custody case pending before the family court. The writ must be issued by the same
court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction, conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal
court and judicial instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,
all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be
employed by such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all other courts, including related
incidents and ancillary matters.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 149578
April 10, 2003
Yokohama, Japan. The vessel departed for Long Beach California, passing
by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the time of embarkation, CAPT.
TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.
EVELYN
TOLOSA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (through its
resident-agent, FUMIO NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC.,
PEDRO GARATE and MARIO ASIS, respondents.
"During 'channeling activities' upon the vessel's departure from Yokohama

sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with
rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever and in
the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated resulting in
his death on November 18, 1992.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
"According to Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the Vessel, in his statement

submitted to the U.S. Coast Guard on November 23, 1992 upon arrival in
Long Beach, California CAPT. TOLOSA experienced high fever between
November 11-15, 1992 and suffered from loose bowel movement (LBM)
beginning November 9, 1992. By November 11, 1992, his temperature was
39.5 although his LBM had 'slightly' stopped. The next day, his temperature
rose to 39.8 and had lost his appetite. In the evening of that day, November
13, 1992, he slipped in the toilet and suffered scratches at the back of his
waist. First aid was applied and CAPT. TOLOSA was henceforth confined to
his quarters with an able seaman to watch him 24 hours a day until
November 15, 1992, when his conditioned worsened.
As a rule, labor arbiters and the National Labor Relations Commission have no power
or authority to grant reliefs from claims that do not arise from employer-employee
relations. They have no jurisdiction over torts that have no reasonable causal
connection to any of the claims provided for in the Labor Code, other labor statutes,
or collective bargaining agreements.
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the April 18, 2001 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 57660, as well as the April 17, 2001 CA
Resolution2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of
the challenged Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DENIED and accordingly DISMISSED, without prejudice to the right
of herein petitioner to file a suit before the proper court, if she so desires. No
pronouncement as to costs."3
The Facts
The appellate court narrated the facts of the case in this manner:
"Evelyn Tolosa (hereafter EVELYN), was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa
(hereafter CAPT. TOLOSA) who was hired by Qwana-Kaiun, through its
manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils. Inc., (ASIA BULK for brevity), to
be the master of the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. CAPT. TOLOSA had a
monthly compensation of US$1700, plus US$400.00 monthly overtime
allowance. His contract officially began on November 1, 1992, as supported
by his contract of employment when he assumed command of the vessel in
"On the same day, November 15, 1992, the Chief Engineer initiated the
move and contacted ASIA BULK which left CAPT. TOLOSA's fate in the
hands of Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, Second Mate of the same vessel
who was in-charge of the primary medical care of its officers and crew.
Contact with the U.S. Coast Guard in Honolulu, Hawaii (USCGHH) was
likewise initiated to seek medical advice.
"On November 17, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was 'losing resistance' and his
'condition was getting serious.' At 2215 GMT, a telex was sent to ASIA BULK
requesting for the immediate evacuation of CAPT. TOLOSA and thereafter
an airlift was set on November 19, 1992. However, on November 18, 1992,
at 0753 GMT, CAPT. TOLOSA was officially recorded as having breathed his
last.
"Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner,
filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA (POEA Case No. 93-061080) against Qwana-Kaiun, thru its resident-agent, Mr. Fumio Nakagawa,
ASIA BULK, Pedro Garate and Mario Asis, as respondents.

"After initial hearings and submissions of pleadings, the case was however
transferred to the Department of Labor and Employment, National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), when the amendatory legislation expanding
its jurisdiction, and removing overseas employment related claims from the
ambit of POEA jurisdiction. The case was then raffled to Labor Arbiter,
Vladimir Sampang.
xxx
xxx
(c) In this case, gross negligence is imputed to respondents Garate

and Asis, who have no employer-employee relationship with the
late Capt. Virgilio Tolosa;
(d) The labor arbiter has no jurisdiction over the controversy;
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Despite other peripheral issues raised by the parties in their respective

pleadings, the NLRC on September 10, 1998, vacated the appealed
decision dated July 8, 1997 of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed petitioner's
case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action pursuant to
the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended."4 (Citations omitted)
"After considering the pleadings and evidences, on July 8, 1997, the Labor
Arbiter Vladimir P. L. Sampang, in conformity with petitioner's plea to hold
respondents solidarily liable, granted all the damages, (plus legal interest),
as prayed for by the petitioner. The dispositive portion of his Decision reads:
'WHEREFORE, premises considered, the respondents are hereby
ordered to jointly and solidarily pay complainants the following:
xxx
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
2. interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum or

P1,238,328.00 (from November 1992 to May 1997 or 4 years);
Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor commission had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her cause did not arise from an
employer-employee relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no
reasonable causal connection between her suit for damages and her claim under
Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an award of damages incident to
an employer-employee relation.
3. moral damages of P200,000.00;
Hence, this Petition.5
4. exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and
Issues
5. 10% of the total award, or P612,472.80, as attorney's fees.'
Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. US$176,400.00 (US$2,100.00 x 12 months x 7 years) or

P4,586,400.00 (at P26.00 per US$1.00) by way of lost income;
xxx
xxx
xxx
"On appeal, private respondents raised before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) the following grounds:
"I
"Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
"II
(a) the action before the Arbiter, as he himself concedes, is a

complaint based on torts due to negligence. It is the regular courts
of law which have jurisdiction over the action;
"Whether or not Evelyn is entitled to the monetary awards granted by the

labor arbiter."6
(b) Labor Arbiters have jurisdiction over claims for damages arising
from employer-employee relationship (Art. 217, Section (a) (3));
After reviewing petitioner's Memorandum, we find that we are specifically being asked
to determine 1) whether the labor arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over

petitioner's action, and 2) whether the monetary award granted by the labor arbiter
has already reached finality.
examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are convinced that the

allegations therein are in the nature of an action based on a quasi delict or tort. It is
evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario Asis for gross negligence.
The Court's Ruling

Petitioner's complaint/position paper refers to and extensively discusses the negligent
acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with
Captain Tolosa. Specifically, the paper alleges the following tortious acts:
The Petition has no merit.

First
Jurisdiction over the Action
Issue:
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi delict or tort,
but on the failure of private respondents -- as employers of her husband (Captain
Tolosa) -- to provide him with timely, adequate and competent medical services under
Article 161 of the Labor Code:
"ART 161. Assistance of employer. -- It shall be the duty of any employer to
provide all the necessary assistance to ensure the adequate and immediate
medical and dental attendance and treatment to an injured or sick employee
in case of emergency."
Likewise, she contends that Article 217 (a) (4) 7 of the Labor Code vests labor arbiters
and the NLRC with jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in cases arising from
employer-employee relations.
Petitioner also alleges that the "reasonable causal connection" rule should be applied
in her favor. Citing San Miguel Corporation v. Etcuban,8 she insists that a reasonable
causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relation
confers jurisdiction upon labor tribunals. She adds that she has satisfied the required
conditions: 1) the dispute arose from an employer-employee relation, considering that
the claim was for damages based on the failure of private respondents to comply with
their obligation under Article 161 of the Labor Code; and 2) the dispute can be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, because the material issue is whether
private respondents complied with their legal obligation to provide timely, adequate
and competent medical services to guarantee Captain Tolosa's occupational safety.9
We disagree. We affirm the CA's ruling that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no
jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a
quasi delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.10
Time and time again, we have held that the allegations in the complaint determine the
nature of the action and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts. 11 After carefully
"x x x [R]espondent Asis was the medical officer of the Vessel, who failed to
regularly monitor Capt. Tolosa's condition, and who needed the USCG to
prod him to take the latter's vital signs. In fact, he failed to keep a medical
record, like a patient's card or folder, of Capt. Tolosa's illness."12
"Respondents, however, failed Capt. Tolosa because Garate never initiated
actions to save him. x x x In fact, Garate rarely checked personally on Capt.
Tolosa's condition, to wit:"13
"x x x Noticeably, the History (Annex "D") fails to mention any instance when
Garate consulted the other officers, much less Capt. Tolosa, regarding the
possibility of deviation. To save Capt. Tolosa's life was surely a just cause for
the change in course, which the other officers would have concurred in had
they been consulted by respondent Garate which he grossly neglected to
do.
"Garate's poor judgement, since he was the officer effectively in command of
the vessel, prevented him from undertaking these emergency measures, the
neglect of which resulted in Capt. Tolosa's untimely demise."14
The labor arbiter himself classified petitioner's case as "a complaint for damages,
blacklisting and watchlisting (pending inquiry) for gross negligence resulting in the
death of complainant's husband, Capt. Virgilio Tolosa."15
We stress that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but the
recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The jurisdiction of labor tribunals is
limited to disputes arising from employer-employee relations, as we ruled in Georg
Grotjahn GMBH & Co. v. Isnani:16
"Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters
that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and
the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes arising

from an employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by
reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective
bargaining agreement."17
The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the relief sought
by petitioner. From her paper, it is evident that the primary reliefs she seeks are as
follows: (a) loss of earning capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or "lost
income" and (b) blacklisting. The loss she claims does not refer to the actual earnings
of the deceased, but to his earning capacity based on a life expectancy of 65 years.
This amount is recoverable if the action is based on a quasi delict as provided for in
Article 2206 of the Civil Code,18 but not in the Labor Code.
While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award not only
reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code, 19 these
reliefs must still he based on an action that has a reasonable causal connection with
the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.20
The central issue is determined essentially from the relief sought in the complaint.
In San Miguel Corporation v. NLRC,21 this Court held:
"It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this
connection. Where suchprincipal relief is to be granted under labor
legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within
the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for
damages might be asserted as an incident to such claim."22
The labor arbiter found private respondents to be grossly negligent. He ruled that
Captain Tolosa, who died at age 58, could expect to live up to 65 years and to have
an earning capacity of US$176,400.
It must be noted that a worker's loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be
equated with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor
benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning capacity is
a relief or claim resulting from a quasi delict or a similar cause within the realm of civil
law.
"Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in the article in order to be cognizable
by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the
claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee relations." 23In
the present case, petitioner's claim for damages is not related to any other claim
under Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.
Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor Code,
which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is only a safety and
health standard under Book IV of the same Code. The enforcement of this labor
standard rests with the labor secretary.24 Thus, claims for an employer's violation
thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner
cannot enforce the labor standard provided for in Article 161 by suing for damages
before the labor arbiter.
It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions for
damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and in which
the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation such as a
tort.25 Since petitioner's claim for damages is predicated on a quasi delict or tort that
has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article
217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the
action lies with the regular courts26 -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.
Second
Finality of the Monetary Award
Issue:
Petitioner contends that the labor arbiter's monetary award has already reached
finality, since private respondents were not able to file a timely appeal before the
NLRC.
This argument cannot be passed upon in this appeal, because it was not raised in the
tribunals a quo. Well-settled is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. Thus, points of law, theories, and arguments not brought
to the attention of the Court of Appeals need not -- and ordinarily will not -- be
considered by this Court.27 Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this Court on
its face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents' right to due
process.28
Furthermore, whether respondents were able to appeal on time is a question of fact
that cannot be entertained in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In general, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the court a
quo.29
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

of Branch 136, Regional Trial Court of Makati, and STANDARD CHARTERED
BANK, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60141 denying the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner praying the nullification of the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136.2
Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank and
petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under which the
petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as Compensation and Benefits
Manager, VP (M21). However, the petitioner abruptly resigned from the respondent
bank barely a month after his employment and rejoined his former employer.
On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank filed a complaint against the petitioner with
the RTC of Makati City. The respondent bank alleged inter alia in its complaint that:
1. It is a foreign banking institution authorized to do business in the
Philippines, with principal offices at the 5th Floor, Bankmer Bldg., 6756 Ayala
Avenue, Makati City.
2. Defendant Eduardo Eviota ("Eviota") is a former employee of the Bank,
and may be served with summons and other court processes at 8 Maple
Street, Cottonwoods, Antipolo, Metro Manila.
3. On December 22, 1997, Eviota began negotiating with the Bank on his
possible employment with the latter. Taken up during these negotiations
were not only his compensation and benefit package, but also the nature
and demands of his prospective position. The Bank made sure that Eviota
was fully aware of all the terms and conditions of his possible job with the
Bank.
G.R. No. 152121
July 29, 2003
EDUARDO
G.
EVIOTA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. JOSE BAUTISTA, Presiding Judge
4. On January 26, 1998, Eviota indicated his conformity with the Banks Offer
of Employment by signing a written copy of such offer dated January 22,
1998 (the "Employment Contract"). A copy of the Employment Contract
between Eviota and the Bank is hereto attached as Annex "A."

5. Acting on the Employment Contract and on Eviotas uninhibited display of
interest in assuming his position, the Bank promptly proceeded to carry out
the terms of the Employment Contract as well as to facilitate his integration
into the workforce. Among others, the Bank: (a) renovated and refurbished
the room which was to serve as Eviotas office; (b) purchased a 1998 Honda
CR-V (Motor No. PEWED7P101101; Chassis No. PADRD 1830WV00108)
for Eviotas use; (c) purchased a desktop IBM computer for Eviotas use; (d)
arranged the takeout of Eviotas loans with Eviotas former employer; (e)
released Eviotas signing bonus in the net amount of P300,000.00; (f)
booked Eviotas participation in a Singapore conference on Y2K project
scheduled on March 10 and 11, 1998; and (g) introduced Eviota to the local
and regional staff and officers of the Bank via personal introductions and
electronic mail.
6. The various expenses incurred by the Bank in carrying out the above acts
are itemized below, as follows:
a. Signing Bonus P 300,000.00
b. 1 Honda CR-V 800,000.00
c. IBM Desktop Computer 89,995.00
d. Office Reconfiguration 29,815.00
e.
2-Drawer
Cabinet 13,200.00
f. 1 Officers Chair 31,539.00
g. 1 Guest Chair 2,200.00
h. 1 Hanging Shelf 2,012.00
i. Staff Loan Processing
Title Verification 375.00
Cost of Appraisal
Housing Loan 3,500.00
Lateral
File
TOTAL P1,272,636.00
An itemized schedule of the above expenses incurred by the Bank is hereto
attached as Annex "B."
7. On February 25, 1998, Eviota assumed his position as Compensation and
Benefits Manager with the Bank and began to discharge his duties. At one
Human Resources ("HR") Committee meeting held on March 3, 1998, Eviota
energetically presented to senior management his projects for the year, thus
raising the latters expectations. The same day, Eviota instructed the Banks
HR Administrator to book him a flight for Singapore, where he was
scheduled to participate in a Y2K project on March 10 and 11, 1998.
Confident of Eviotas professed commitment to the Bank, the latter made the
aforementioned airline booking for him. In addition, the Bank allowed Eviota
access to certain sensitive and confidential information and documents
concerning the Banks operations.
8. After leading the Bank to believe that he had come to stay, Eviota
suddenly resigned his employment with immediate effect to re-join his
previous employer. His resignation, which did not comply with the 30-day
prior notice rule under the law and under the Employment Contract, was so
unexpected that it disrupted plans already in the pipeline (e.g., the
development of a salary/matrix grid and salary structure, and the processing
of merit promotion recommendations), aborted meetings previously
scheduled among Bank officers, and forced the Bank to hire the services of
a third party to perform the job he was hired to do. For the services of this
third party, the Bank had to pay a total of P208,807.50. A copy of a receipt
for the above expenses is hereto attached as Annex "C" (See also, Annex
"B").
9. Aside from causing no small degree of chaos within the Bank by reason of
his sudden resignation, Eviota made off with a computer diskette and other
papers and documents containing confidential information on employee
compensation and other Bank matters, such as the salary schedule of all
Corporate and Institutional Banking officers and photocopies of schedules of
benefits provided expatriates being employed by the Bank.
10. With the benefit of hindsight, the Bank realizes that it was simply used by
Eviota as a mere leverage for his selfish efforts at negotiating better terms of
employment with his previous employer. Worse, there is evidence to show
that in his attempts to justify his hasty departure from the Bank and conceal
the real reason for his move, Eviota has resorted to falsehoods derogatory to

the reputation of the Bank. In particular, he has been maliciously purveying
the canard that he had hurriedly left the Bank because it had failed to
provide him support. His untruthful remarks have falsely depicted the Bank
as a contract violator and an undesirable employer, thus damaging the
Banks reputation and business standing in the highly competitive banking
community, and undermining its ability to recruit and retain the best
personnel in the labor market.
11. On March 16, 1998, the Bank made a written demand on Eviota to return
the aforementioned computer diskette and other confidential documents and
papers, reimburse the Bank for the various expenses incurred on his
account as a result of his resignation (with legal interest), and pay damages
in the amount of at least P500,000.00 for the inconvenience and
work/program disruptions suffered by the Bank.
14. Eviotas actions constitute a clear violation of Articles 19, 20 and 21 of

Republic Act No. 386, as amended (the "Civil Code"). Assuming arguendo
that Eviota had the right to terminate his employment with the Bank for no
reason, the manner in and circumstances under which he exercised the
same are clearly abusive and contrary to the rules governing human
relations.
14.1. By his actions and representations, Eviota had induced the
Bank to believe that he was committed to fulfilling his obligations
under the Employment Contract. As a result, the Bank incurred
expenses in carrying out its part of the contract (see Annexes "B"
and "C"). Less reimbursements received from Eviota, the Bank is
entitled to actual damages of P360,562.12. (See, Annex "C").
Second Cause of Action
A copy of the Banks demand letter dated March 16, 1998 is hereto attached as
Annex "D."
12. In partial compliance with said demand, Eviota made arrangements with
his previous employer to reimburse the Bank for the expenses incurred in
connection with the Banks purchase of the Honda CR-V for his use. The
Bank informed Eviota that in addition to the Honda CR-Vs purchase price of
P848,000.00 (of which Eviota initially shouldered P48,000.00), incidental
costs in the form of Processing Fees (P1,000.00), FPD/MCAR/98-155684
(P1,232.53) and Fund Transfer Price (P18,646.84) were incurred, bringing
the total cost of the Honda CR-V to P868,881.38. On April 29, 1998, the
Bank received two managers checks in the aggregate amount of
P868,881.38, representing costs incurred in connection with the purchase of
the Honda CR-V, inclusive of processing fees and other incidental costs.
Previously, Eviota had returned his P300,000.00 signing bonus, less the
P48,000.00 he had advanced for the Honda CR-Vs purchase price.
13. Eviota never complied with the Banks demand that he reimburse the
latter for the other expenses incurred on his account, amounting to
P360,562.12 (see, Annex "B").3
The respondent bank alleged, by way of its causes of action against the petitioner, the
following:
First Cause of Action
15. Under Article 285 (a) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (the
Labor Code), an employee may terminate without just cause the employeremployee relationship by serving written notice on the employer at least one
(1) month in advance. In addition, Section 13 of the Employment Contract
specifically provides that: "Your [i.e., Eviotas] employment may be
terminated by either party giving notice of at least one month." (Annex "A," p.
5.)
15.1. Eviotas failure to comply with the above requirement threw a
monkey wrench into the Banks operations Eviotas sudden
resignation aborted meetings previously scheduled among Bank
officers and disrupted plans for a salary/merit review program and
development of a salary structure and merit grid already in the
pipeline.
Hence, Eviota is liable to the Bank for damages in the amount of at least
P100,000.00.
Third Cause of Action
16. Eviotas false and derogatory statements that the Bank had failed to
deliver what it had purportedly promised have besmirched the Banks
reputation and depicted it as a contract violator and one which does not treat
its employees properly. These derogatory statements have injured the
Banks business standing in the banking community, and have undermined

the Banks ability to recruit and retain the best personnel. Hence, plaintiff is
entitled to moral damages of at least P2,000,000.00.
17. By way of example or correction for the public good, and to deter other
parties from committing similar acts in the future, defendant should be held
liable for exemplary damages of at least P1,000,000.00
18. Eviotas actions have compelled plaintiff to obtain the services of
undersigned counsel for a fee, in order to protect its interests. Hence,
plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees of at least P200,000.00.4
The respondent bank prayed, that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in its
favor as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant to pay the plaintiff:
1. As actual damages, the amount of P360,562.12, representing expenses
referred to in items c to i of par. 6 and the cost of the third-party services
mentioned in par. 8;
2. For violating the 30-day notice requirement under the Labor Code and
order (sic) the Employment Contract, damages in the amount of at least
P100,000.00;
3. As moral damages, the amount of P2,000,000.00;
4. As exemplary damages, the amount of P1,000,000.00;
5. As attorneys fees, the amount of P200,000.00; and
6. Costs of the suit.
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.5
The respondent bank appended to its complaint a copy of the petitioners
employment contract.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the action for
damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter under paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The petitioner averred that the respondent banks claim for damages arose
out of or were in connection with his employer-employee relationship with the
respondent bank or some aspect or incident of such relationship. The respondent
bank opposed the motion, claiming that its action for damages was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the trial court. Although its claims for damages incidentally
involved an employer-employee relationship, the said claims are actually predicated
on the petitioners acts and omissions which are separately, specifically and distinctly
governed by the New Civil Code.
On November 29, 1999, the trial court issued an order denying the petitioners motion
to dismiss, ratiocinating that the primary relief prayed for by the respondent bank was
grounded on the tortious manner by which the petitioner terminated his employment
with the latter, and as such is governed by the New Civil Code:
The Court holds that here, since the primary relief prayed for by the plaintiff is for
damages, grounded on the tortious manner by which the defendant terminated his
employment with the company, the same are recoverable under the applicable
provision of the Civil Code, the present controversy is removed from the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter and brings in within the purview of the regular courts.6
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said order, but the court issued
an order denying the same. The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals for the nullification of the orders of the trial court, alleging that the court a
quo committed grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the said orders. The petitioner further asserted that contrary to
the ruling of the court, the respondent bank claimed damages in its complaint against
the petitioner based on his employment contract, and not on tortious acts.
On November 15, 2001, the CA promulgated a decision dismissing the petition,
holding that the trial court and not the Labor Arbiter had exclusive jurisdiction over the
action of the respondent bank. It held that the latters claims for damages were
grounded on the petitioners sudden and unceremonious severance of his
employment with the respondent bank barely a month after assuming office.
With his motion for reconsideration of the decision having been denied by the CA, the
petitioner filed his petition with this Court contending that:
Suffice to state immediately that on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, it is
the Labor Arbiter, not the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. 98-1397, the principal cause of action being
the alleged omission of petitioner in giving notice to the respondent Bank employer of

termination of their relationship; whereas the claims for other actual/moral/exemplary
damages are well within the competence of the Labor Arbiter.7
The petition is barren of merit.
Article 217 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6715
which took effect on March 21, 1989 reads:
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.(a) Except as
otherwise provided under this Code the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether
agricultural or non-agricultural:
1. Unfair labor practice cases;
2. Termination disputes;
3. If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers
may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and
conditions of employment;
4. Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising
from the employer-employee relations.
Case law has it that the nature of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as
which court has jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations
of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for in relation to the law involved.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or viceversa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money claim by a
worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter only if there is a "reasonable causal connection" between the claim
asserted and employee-employer relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be
cognizable by the regular courts of justice.8
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee relationship
is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different source of
obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. 9 In Georg Grotjahn
GMBH & Co. v. Isnani,10 we held that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article
217 of the Labor Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an employeremployee relationship which can only be resolved by reference to the Labor Code of
the Philippines, other labor laws or their collective bargaining agreements. In
Singapore Airlines Limited v. Pao, 11 the complaint of the employer against the
employee for damages for wanton justice and refusal without just cause to report for
duty, and for having maliciously and with bad faith violated the terms and conditions
of their agreement for a course of conversion training at the expense of the employer,
we ruled that jurisdiction over the action belongs to the civil court:
On appeal to this court, we held that jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the
civil courts. We stated that the action was for breach of a contractual obligation, which
is intrinsically a civil dispute. We further stated that while seemingly the cause of
action arose from employer-employee relations, the employers claim for damages is
grounded on "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause to report to duty coupled
with the averment that the employee "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the
terms and conditions of the contract to the damage of the employer. Such averments
removed the controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code of the Philippines and
brought it within the purview of the Civil Law.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under paragraph 4 of
Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must have a reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in that article. Only if there is such a
connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be considered as arising
from employer-employee relations.12
The claims were the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation,
intrinsically civil in nature.
In Medina v. Castro-Bartolome,13 we held that a complaint of an employee for
damages against the employer for slanderous remarks made against him was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts of justice because the cause of action
of the plaintiff was for damages for tortious acts allegedly committed by the employer.
The fact that there was between the parties an employer-employee relationship does
not negate the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Pao,14 we held that:
Stated differently, petitioner seeks protection under the civil laws and claims no
benefits under the Labor Code.1wphi1The primary relief sought is for liquidated
damages for breach of a contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not
labor benefits demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes,
such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation pay. The items

claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach of an obligation,
intrinsically a civil dispute.
In Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corporation v. Villarama, Jr., 15 the petitioner
sued its employee Adonis Limjuco for breach of contract which reads:
That for a period of two (2) years after termination of service from EMPLOYER,
EMPLOYEE shall not in any manner be connected, and/or employed, be a consultant
and/or be an informative body directly or indirectly, with any business firm, entity or
undertaking engaged in a business similar to or in competition with that of the
EMPLOYER."16
The petitioner alleged in its complaint with the trial court that:
Petitioner claimed that private respondent became an employee of Angel Sound
Philippines Corporation, a corporation engaged in the same line of business as that of
petitioner, within two years from January 30, 1992, the date of private respondents
resignation from petitioners employ. Petitioner further alleged that private respondent
is holding the position of Head of the Material Management Control Department, the
same position he held while in the employ of petitioner.17
second cause of action, the petitioner simply walked away from his employment with
the private respondent sans any written notice, to the prejudice of the private
respondent, its banking operations and the conduct of its business. Anent its third
cause of action, the petitioner made false and derogatory statements that the private
respondent reneged on its obligations under their contract of employment; thus,
depicting the private respondent as unworthy of trust.
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the petitioner
do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines and other labor
laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of action are intrinsically civil.
There is no causal relationship between the causes of action of the private
respondents causes of action against the petitioner and their employer-employee
relationship. The fact that the private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the
petitioner under an existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his
employment is merely incidental. In fact, the petitioner had already been replaced by
the private respondent before the action was filed against the petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dismissing the petition of the petitioner is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
because the cause of action for damages arose out of the parties employeremployee relationship. We reversed the order of the trial court and held, thus:
Petitioner does not ask for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. It seeks
to recover damages agreed upon in the contract as redress for private respondents
breach of his contractual obligation to its "damage and prejudice" (Rollo, p. 57). Such
cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law, and jurisdiction over the controversy
belongs to the regular courts. More so when we consider that the stipulation refers to
the post-employment relations of the parties.18
In this case, the private respondents first cause of action for damages is anchored on
the petitioners employment of deceit and of making the private respondent believe
that he would fulfill his obligation under the employment contract with assiduousness
and earnestness. The petitioner volte face when, without the requisite thirty-day
notice under the contract and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, he
abandoned his office and rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the private
respondent to hire a replacement. The private respondent was left in a lurch, and its
corporate plans and program in jeopardy and disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took
off with the private respondents computer diskette, papers and documents containing
confidential information on employee compensation and other bank matters. On its
G.R. No. 154830
June 8, 2007

PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES, INC., PIONEER PHILIPPINES HOLDINGS,
and
PHILIP
J.
KLEPZIG,petitioners,
vs.
ANTONIO D. TODARO, respondent.
Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of action, that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, as the same is within the
jurisdiction of the NLRC, and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.5
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No.
54155 and its Resolution2 of August 21, 2002 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On January 16, 1998, herein respondent Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, a complaint for Sum of Money and
Damages with Preliminary Attachment against Pioneer International Limited (PIL),
Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI),
John G. McDonald (McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).3
In his complaint, Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and
concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by PIL to own and
hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines; PCPI is the company
established by PIL to undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete
aggregates and quarrying operations in the Philippines; McDonald is the Chief
Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL; and, Klepzig is the President and Managing
Director of PPHI and PCPI; Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval
Readyconcrete, Inc. (Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and
concrete aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in May
1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in
connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other
related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL of his availability and
interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein
the former consented to engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to
three months, after which, he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix
concrete operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines;
subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it refused to
comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent basis.4
In its Order dated January 4, 1999, the RTC of Makati, Branch 147, denied herein
petitioners' respective motions to dismiss.6 Herein petitioners, as defendants, filed an
Urgent Omnibus Motion7 for the reconsideration of the trial court's Order of January 4,
1999 but the trial court denied it via its Order8 dated June 3, 1999.
On August 3, 1999, herein petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.9 On
October 31, 2000, the CA rendered its presently assailed Decision denying herein
petitioners' Petition for Certiorari. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the CA denied it in its Resolution dated August 21, 2002.
Hence, herein Petition for Review on Certiorari based on the following assignment of
errors:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS' CONCLUSION THAT THE COMPLAINT
STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONERS IS WITHOUT ANY
LEGAL BASIS. THE ANNEXES TO THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY BELIE
THE ALLEGATION OF EXISTENCE OF AN EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
BETWEEN PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND PETITIONERS.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE JURISDICTION OF
THE TRIAL COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE COMPLAINT
INDUBITABLY SHOWS THAT IT IS AN ACTION FOR AN ALLEGED
BREACH OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT, AND HENCE, FALLS WITHIN
THE EXLCUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION.
C

THE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE PRINCIPLE OF "FORUM NON CONVENIENS" AS A VALID GROUND
FOR DISMISSING A COMPLAINT.10
In their first assigned error, petitioners contend that there was no perfected
employment contract between PIL and herein respondent. Petitioners assert that the
annexes to respondent's complaint show that PIL's offer was for respondent to be
employed as the manager only of its pre-mixed concrete operations and not as the
company's managing director or CEO. Petitioners argue that when respondent
reiterated his intention to become the manager of PIL's overall business venture in
the Philippines, he, in effect did not accept PIL's offer of employment and instead
made a counter-offer, which, however, was not accepted by PIL. Petitioners also
contend that under Article 1318 of the Civil Code, one of the requisites for a contract
to be perfected is the consent of the contracting parties; that under Article 1319 of the
same Code, consent is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract; that the offer must
be certain and the acceptance absolute; that a qualified acceptance constitutes a
counter-offer. Petitioners assert that since PIL did not accept respondent's counteroffer, there never was any employment contract that was perfected between them.
Petitioners further argue that respondent's claim for damages based on the provisions
of Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code is baseless because it was shown that there
was no perfected employment contract.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that PIL may be held liable for breach of
employment contract, petitioners contend that PCPI and PPHI, may not also be held
liable because they are juridical entities with personalities which are separate and
distinct from PIL, even if they are subsidiary corporations of the latter. Petitioners also
aver that the annexes to respondent's complaint show that the negotiations on the
alleged employment contract took place between respondent and PIL through its
office in Hongkong. In other words, PCPI and PPHI were not privy to the negotiations
between PIL and respondent for the possible employment of the latter; and under
Article 1311 of the Civil Code, a contract is not binding upon and cannot be enforced
against one who was not a party to it even if he be aware of such contract and has
acted with knowledge thereof.
Petitioners further assert that petitioner Klepzig may not be held liable because he is
simply acting in his capacity as president of PCPI and PPHI and settled is the rule
that an officer of a corporation is not personally liable for acts done in the
performance of his duties and within the bounds of the authority conferred on him.
Furthermore, petitioners argue that even if PCPI and PPHI are held liable, respondent
still has no cause of action against Klepzig because PCPI and PPHI have
personalities which are separate and distinct from those acting in their behalf, such as
Klepzig.
As to their second assigned error, petitioners contend that since herein respondent's
claims for actual, moral and exemplary damages are solely premised on the alleged
breach of employment contract, the present case should be considered as falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC.
With respect to the third assigned error, petitioners assert that the principle of forum
non conveniens dictates that even where exercise of jurisidiction is authorized by law,
courts may refuse to entertain a case involving a foreign element where the matter
can be better tried and decided elsewhere, either because the main aspects of the
case transpired in a foreign jurisdiction or the material witnesses have their residence
there and the plaintiff sought the forum merely to secure procedural advantage or to
annoy or harass the defendant. Petitioners also argue that one of the factors in
determining the most convenient forum for conflicts problem is the power of the court
to enforce its decision. Petitioners contend that since the majority of the defendants in
the present case are not residents of the Philippines, they are not subject to
compulsory processes of the Philippine court handling the case for purposes of
requiring their attendance during trial. Even assuming that they can be summoned,
their appearance would entail excessive costs. Petitioners further assert that there is
no allegation in the complaint from which one can conclude that the evidence to be
presented during the trial can be better obtained in the Philippines. Moreover, the
events which led to the present controversy occurred outside the Philippines.
Petitioners conclude that based on the foregoing factual circumstances, the case
should be dismissed under the principle of forum non conveniens.
In his Comment, respondent extensively quoted the assailed CA Decision maintaining
that the factual allegations in the complaint determine whether or not the complaint
states a cause of action.
As to the question of jurisdiction, respondent contends that the complaint he filed was
not based on a contract of employment. Rather, it was based on petitioners'
unwarranted breach of their contractual obligation to employ respondent. This breach,
respondent argues, gave rise to an action for damages which is cognizable by the
regular courts.
Even assuming that there was an employment contract, respondent asserts that for
the NLRC to acquire jurisdiction, the claim for damages must have a reasonable
causal connection with the employer-employee relationship of petitioners and
respondent.

Respondent further argues that there is a perfected contract between him and
petitioners as they both agreed that the latter shall employ him to manage and
operate their ready-mix concrete operations in the Philippines. Even assuming that
there was no perfected contract, respondent contends that his complaint alleges an
alternative cause of action which is based on the provisions of Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code.
Hence, in resolving whether or not the Complaint in the present case states a cause
of action, the trial court correctly limited itself to examining the sufficiency of the
allegations in the Complaint as well as the annexes thereto. It is proscribed from
inquiring into the truth of the allegations in the Complaint or the authenticity of any of
the documents referred or attached to the Complaint, since these are deemed
hypothetically admitted by the respondent.
As to the applicability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, respondent avers that
the question of whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the
principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular
case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best
position to determine whether special circumstances require that the court desist from
assuming jurisdiction over the suit.
This Court has reviewed respondents allegations in its Complaint. In a nutshell,

respondent alleged that herein petitioners reneged on their contractual obligation to
employ him on a permanent basis. This allegation is sufficient to constitute a cause of
action for damages.
The petition lacks merit.

Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the
act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of
the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and, (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the
latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.11
In Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan,12 this Court held:
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded.
Stated otherwise, may the court render a valid judgment upon the facts
alleged therein? The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity of the
material allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis
on which it can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the
defense that may be presented by the defendants.13
Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the
existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the
merits of the case.14 To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim
has been defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.15
The issue as to whether or not there was a perfected contract between petitioners
and respondent is a matter which is not ripe for determination in the present case;
rather, this issue must be taken up during trial, considering that its resolution would
necessarily entail an examination of the veracity of the allegations not only of herein
respondent as plaintiff but also of petitioners as defendants.
The Court does not agree with petitioners' contention that they were not privy to the
negotiations for respondent's possible employment. It is evident from paragraphs 24
to 28 of the Complaint 16 that, on various occasions, Klepzig conducted negotiations
with respondent regarding the latter's possible employment. In fact, Annex "H" 17of the
complaint shows that it was Klepzig who informed respondent that his company was
no longer interested in employing respondent. Hence, based on the allegations in the
Complaint and the annexes attached thereto, respondent has a cause of action
against herein petitioners.
As to the question of jurisdiction, this Court has consistently held that where no
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue is involved
which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or any
collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction. 18 In
the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and
respondent. In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief
under the Labor Code, but seeks payment of damages on account of petitioners'
alleged breach of their obligation under their agreement to employ him. It is settled
that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically a civil dispute.19 In the
alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19 and
21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of
civil law, and jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.20

With respect to the applicability of the principle of forum non conveniens in the
present case, this Court's ruling inBank of America NT & SA v. Court of Appeals 21 is
instructive, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning the forum is

inconvenient, emerged in private international law to deter the practice of
global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident litigants from choosing
the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as
to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to
avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. Under this
doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its
jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said
doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case
ofCommunication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this Court
held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it
chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the
Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to
the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to
have power to enforce its decision."
Moreover, this Court enunciated in Philsec. Investment Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not
be used as a ground for a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. This
Court further ruled that while it is within the discretion of the trial court
to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so
only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special
circumstances require the courts desistance; and that the propriety of
dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly
considered a matter of defense.22 (emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the factual circumstances cited by petitioners which would
allegedly justify the application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens are matters of
defense, the merits of which should properly be threshed out during trial.
SO ORDERED.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Through a petition for review on certiorari,1 petitioner Arsenio Z. Locsin (Locsin) seeks
the reversal of the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated August 28, 2008, 3 in
"Arsenio Z. Locsin v. Nissan Car Lease Phils., Inc. and Luis Banson," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 103720 and the Resolution dated December 9, 2008,4denying
Locsins Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed ruling of the CA reversed and set
aside the Decision5of the Hon. Labor Arbiter Thelma Concepcion (Labor Arbiter
Concepcion) which denied Nissan Lease Phils. Inc.s (NCLPI) and Luis T. Bansons
(Banson) Motion to Dismiss.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and Treasurer
(EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and responsibilities included:
(1) the management of the finances of the company; (2) carrying out the directions of
the President and/or the Board of Directors regarding financial management; and (3)
the preparation of financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial
condition of NCLPI.6 Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been re-elected
every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was nominated and elected
Chairman of NCLPIs Board of Directors.7
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as Chairman of the
Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the Manila Polo Club. One of the
items of the agenda was the election of a new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin
was neither re-elected Chairman nor reinstated to his previous position as
EVP/Treasurer.8
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and attorneys fees before the
Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who was then President of NCLPI.9
The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
G.R. No. 185567
October 20, 2010
ARSENIO
Z.
LOCSIN, Petitioner,
vs.
NISSAN LEASE PHILS. INC. and LUIS BANSON, Respondents.
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson filed a
Motion to Dismiss,10 on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have jurisdiction over
the case since the issue of Locsins removal as EVP/Treasurer involves an intracorporate dispute.

On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to dismiss,
maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI.
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss, holding that her office acquired "jurisdiction to arbitrate and/or decide the
instant complaint finding extant in the case an employer-employee relationship."11
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.12 NCLPI raised the issue on whether the Labor
Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion by denying the Motion to Dismiss and
holding that her office had jurisdiction over the dispute.
The CA Decision - Locsin was a corporate officer; the issue of his removal as
EVP/Treasurer is an intra-corporate dispute under the RTCs jurisdiction.
On August 28, 2008,13 the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiters Order
denying the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a corporate officer.
Citing PD 902-A, the CA defined "corporate officers as those officers of a corporation
who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the corporations
by-laws." In this regard, the CA held:
Scrutinizing the records, We hold that petitioners successfully discharged their onus
of establishing that private respondent was a corporate officer who held the position
of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer as provided in the by-laws of petitioner
corporation and that he held such position by virtue of election by the Board of
Directors.
That private respondent is a corporate officer cannot be disputed. The position of
Executive Vice-President/Treasurer is specifically included in the roster of officers
provided for by the (Amended) By-Laws of petitioner corporation, his duties and
responsibilities, as well as compensation as such officer are likewise set forth
therein.14
Article 280 of the Labor Code, the receipt of salaries by Locsin, SSS deductions on
that salary, and the element of control in the performance of work duties indicia
used by the Labor Arbiter to conclude that Locsin was a regular employee were
held inapplicable by the CA.15 The CA noted the Labor Arbiters failure to address the
fact that the position of EVP/Treasurer is specifically enumerated as an "office" in the
corporations by-laws.16
Further, the CA pointed out Locsins failure to "state any circumstance by which
NCLPI engaged his services as a corporate officer that would make him an
employee." The CA found, in this regard, that Locsins assumption and retention as
EVP/Treasurer was based on his election and subsequent re-elections from 1992
until 2005. Further, he performed only those functions that were "specifically set forth
in the By-Laws or required of him by the Board of Directors.17"
With respect to the suit Locsin filed with the Labor Arbiter, the CA held that:
Private respondent, in belatedly filing this suit before the Labor Arbiter, questioned the
legality of his "dismissal" but in essence, he raises the issue of whether or not the
Board of Directors had the authority to remove him from the corporate office to which
he was elected pursuant to the By-Laws of the petitioner corporation. Indeed, had
private respondent been an ordinary employee, an election conducted by the Board
of Directors would not have been necessary to remove him as Executive VicePresident/Treasurer. However, in an obvious attempt to preclude the application of
settled jurisprudence that corporate officers whose position is provided in the by-laws,
their election, removal or dismissal is subject to Section 5 of P.D. No. 902-A (now R.A.
No. 8799), private respondent would even claim in his Position Paper, that since his
responsibilities were akin to that of the companys Executive VicePresident/Treasurer, he was "hired under the pretext that he was being elected into
said post.18 [Emphasis supplied.]
As a consequence, the CA concluded that Locsin does not have any recourse with
the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a corporate officer, whether
elected or appointed, is an intra-corporate controversy over which the NLRC has no
jurisdiction.19 Instead, according to the CA, Locsins complaint for "illegal dismissal"
should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to Rule 6 of the
Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies.20
Finally, the CA addressed Locsins invocation of Article 4 of the Labor Code.
Dismissing the application of the provision, the CA cited Dean Cesar Villanueva of the
Ateneo School of Law, as follows:
x x x the non-coverage of corporate officers from the security of tenure clause under
the Constitution is now well-established principle by numerous decisions upholding
such doctrine under the aegis of the 1987 Constitution in the face of contemporary
decisions of the same Supreme Court likewise confirming that security of tenure
covers all employees or workers including managerial employees.21
THE PETITIONERS ARGUMENTS

Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CAs decision, Locsin filed the present
petition on January 28, 2009, raising the following procedural and substantive issues:
(1) Whether the CA has original jurisdiction to review decision of the Labor
Arbiter under Rule 65?
Chairman of the Board on January 1, 2005. Instead, he theorizes that he never lost
his position as EVP/Treasurer having continuously performed the functions
appurtenant thereto.25 Thus, he questions his "unceremonious removal" as
EVP/Treasurer during the August 5, 2005 special Board meeting.
THE RESPONDENTS ARGUMENTS
(2) Whether he is a regular employee of NCLPI under the definition of Article

280 of the Labor Code? and
(3) Whether Locsins position as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer makes
him a corporate officer thereby excluding him from the coverage of the Labor
Code?
Procedurally, Locsin essentially submits that NCLPI wrongfully filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA, as the latters remedy is to proceed with the arbitration, and
to appeal to the NLRC after the Labor Arbiter shall have ruled on the merits of the
case. Locsin cites, in this regard, Rule V, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC Rules), which provides that a denial of
a motion to dismiss by the Labor Arbiter is not subject to an appeal. Locsin also
argues that even if the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the NCLPI motion, a special civil action for certiorari, filed with the CA was not the
appropriate remedy, since this was a breach of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Substantively, Locsin submits that he is a regular employee of NCLPI since - as he
argued before the Labor Arbiter and the CA - his relationship with the company meets
the "four-fold test."
First, Locsin contends that NCLPI had the power to engage his services as
EVP/Treasurer. Second, he received regular wages from NCLPI, from which his SSS
and Philhealth contributions, as well as his withholding taxes were deducted. Third,
NCLPI had the power to terminate his employment. 22 Lastly, Nissan had control over
the manner of the performance of his functions as EVP/Treasurer, as shown by the 13
years of faithful execution of his job, which he carried out in accordance with the
standards and expectations set by NCLPI. 23 Further, Locsin maintains that even after
his election as Chairman, he essentially performed the functions of EVP/Treasurer
handling the financial and administrative operations of the Corporation thus making
him a regular employee.24
Under these claimed facts, Locsin concludes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
not the RTC (as NCLPI posits) has jurisdiction to decide the controversy.
Parenthetically, Locsin clarifies that he does not dispute the validity of his election as
It its April 17, 2009 Comment, 26 Nissan prays for the denial of the petition for lack of
merit. Nissan submits that the CA correctly ruled that the Labor Arbiter does not have
jurisdiction over Locsins complaint for illegal dismissal. In support, Nissan maintains
that Locsin is a corporate officer and not an employee. In addressing the procedural
defect Locsin raised, Nissan brushes the issue aside, stating that (1) this issue was
belatedly raised in the Motion for Reconsideration, and that (2) in any case, Rule VI,
Section 2(1) of the NLRC does not apply since only appealable decisions, resolutions
and orders are covered under the rule.
THE COURTS RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
At the outset, we stress that there are two (2) important considerations in the final
determination of this case. On the one hand, Locsin raises a procedural issue that, if
proven correct, will require the Court to dismiss the instant petition for using an
improper remedy. On the other hand, there is the substantive issue that will be
disregarded if a strict implementation of the rules of procedure is upheld.
Prefatorily, we agree with Locsins submission that the NCLPI incorrectly elevated the
Labor Arbiters denial of the Motion to Dismiss to the CA. Locsin is correct in positing
that the denial of a motion to dismiss is unappealable. As a general rule, an aggrieved
partys proper recourse to the denial is to file his position paper, interpose the grounds
relied upon in the motion to dismiss before the labor arbiter, and actively participate in
the proceedings. Thereafter, the labor arbiters decision can be appealed to the
NLRC, not to the CA.
As a rule, we strictly adhere to the rules of procedure and do everything we can, to
the point of penalizing violators, to encourage respect for these rules. We take
exception to this general rule, however, when a strict implementation of these rules
would cause substantial injustice to the parties.
We see it appropriate to apply the exception to this case for the reasons discussed
below; hence, we are compelled to go beyond procedure and rule on the merits of the

case. In the context of this case, we see sufficient justification to rule on the
employer-employee relationship issue raised by NCLPI, even though the Labor
Arbiters interlocutory order was incorrectly brought to the CA under Rule 65.
The NLRC Rules are clear: the denial by the labor arbiter of the motion to dismiss is
not appealable because the denial is merely an interlocutory order.
In Metro Drug v. Metro Drug Employees, 27 we definitively stated that the denial of a
motion to dismiss by a labor arbiter is not immediately appealable.28
We similarly ruled in Texon Manufacturing v. Millena,29 in Sime Darby Employees
Association v. National Labor Relations Commission 30 and in Westmont
Pharmaceuticals v. Samaniego.31 In Texon, we specifically said:
The Order of the Labor Arbiter denying petitioners motion to dismiss is interlocutory. It
is well-settled that a denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint is an interlocutory order
and hence, cannot be appealed, until a final judgment on the merits of the case is
rendered. [Emphasis supplied.]32
and indicated the appropriate recourse in Metro Drug, as follows:33
x x x The NLRC rule proscribing appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss is similar
to the general rule observed in civil procedure that an order denying a motion to
dismiss is interlocutory and, hence, not appealable until final judgment or order is
rendered [1 Feria and Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 453 (2001 ed.)]. The remedy
of the aggrieved party in case of denial of the motion to dismiss is to file an answer
and interpose, as a defense or defenses, the ground or grounds relied upon in the
motion to dismiss, proceed to trial and, in case of adverse judgment, to elevate the
entire case by appeal in due course [Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81909,
September 5, 1991, 201 SCRA 343]. In order to avail of the extraordinary writ
of certiorari, it is incumbent upon petitioner to establish that the denial of the motion to
dismiss was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. [Macawiwili Gold Mining and
Development Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998, 297
SCRA 602]
In so citing Feria and Noche, the Court was referring to Sec. 1 (b), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, which specifically enumerates interlocutory orders as one of the court
actions that cannot be appealed. In the same rule, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12SC, the aggrieved party is allowed to file an appropriate special civil action under
Rule 65. The latter rule, however, also contains limitations for its application, clearly
outlined in its Section 1 which provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.

When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of
such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
In the labor law setting, a plain, speedy and adequate remedy is still open to the
aggrieved party when a labor arbiter denies a motion to dismiss. This is Article 223 of
Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended (Labor Code),34 which states:
ART. 223. APPEAL
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on
any of the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor
Arbiter; x x x [Emphasis supplied.]
Pursuant to this Article, we held in Metro Drug (citing Air Services Cooperative, et al.
v. Court of Appeals35) that the NLRC is clothed with sufficient authority to correct any
claimed "erroneous assumption of jurisdiction" by labor arbiters:
In Air Services Cooperative, et al. v. The Court of Appeals, et al., a case where the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter was put in issue and was assailed through a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and annulment of judgment before a regional trial court, this
Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature of appeal as embodied in Article
223 of the Labor Code, thus:
x x x Also, while the title of the Article 223 seems to provide only for the remedy of
appeal as that term is understood in procedural law and as distinguished from the
office of certiorari, nonetheless, a closer reading thereof reveals that it is not as
limited as understood by the petitioners x x x.

Abuse of discretion is admittedly within the ambit of certiorari and its grant of review
thereof to the NLRC indicates the lawmakers intention to broaden the meaning of
appeal as that term is used in the Code. For this reason, petitioners cannot argue
now that the NLRC is devoid of any corrective power to rectify a supposed erroneous
assumption of jurisdiction by the Labor Arbiter x x x. [Air Services Cooperative, et al.
v. The Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 118693, 23 July 1998, 293 SCRA 101]
Since the legislature had clothed the NLRC with the appellate authority to correct a
claimed "erroneous assumption of jurisdiction" on the part of the labor arbiter a case
of grave abuse of discretion - the remedy availed of by petitioner in this case is
patently erroneous as recourse in this case is lodged, under the law, with the NLRC.
In Metro Drug, as in the present case, the defect imputed through the NLCPI Motion
to Dismiss is the labor arbiters lack of jurisdiction since Locsin is alleged to be a
corporate officer, not an employee. Parallelisms between the two cases is undeniable,
as they are similar on the following points: (1) in Metro Drug, as in this case, the
Labor Arbiter issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss by one of the parties; (2)
the basis of the Motion to Dismiss is also the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Labor
Arbiter to settle the dispute; and (3) dissatisfied with the Order of the Labor Arbiter,
the aggrieved party likewise elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65.
The similarities end there, however. Unlike in the present case, the CA denied the
petition for certiorari and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration in Metro Drug;
the CA correctly found that the proper appellate mechanism was an appeal to the
NLRC and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. In the present case, the CA took
a different position despite our clear ruling in Metro Drug, and allowed, not only the
use of Rule 65, but also ruled on the merits.
From this perspective, the CA clearly erred in the application of the procedural rules
by disregarding the relevant provisions of the NLRC Rules, as well as the
requirements for a petition for certiorari under the Rules of Court. To reiterate, the
proper action of an aggrieved party faced with the labor arbiters denial of his motion
to dismiss is to submit his position paper and raise therein the supposed lack of
jurisdiction. The aggrieved party cannot immediately appeal the denial since it is an
interlocutory order; the appropriate remedial recourse is the procedure outlined in
Article 223 of the Labor Code, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A strict implementation of the NLRC Rules and the Rules of Court would cause
injustice to the parties because the Labor Arbiter clearly has no jurisdiction over the
present intra-corporate dispute.
Our ruling in Mejillano v. Lucillo36 stands for the proposition that we should strictly
apply the rules of procedure. We said:
Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience
of the litigants. Rules of Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in
the guise of liberal construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules
were established primarily to provide order to and enhance the efficiency of our
judicial system. [Emphasis supplied.]
An exception to this rule is our ruling in Lazaro v. Court of Appeals 37 where we held
that the strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally
meritorious cases:
x x x Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
The Court reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, "have oft been held as absolutely
indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of business. x x x The reason for rules of this nature is because the
dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays would
result, without rules governing practice x x x. Such rules are a necessary incident to
the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicial functions." Indeed, in no
uncertain terms, the Court held that the said rules may be relaxed only in
exceptionally meritorious cases. [Emphasis supplied.]
Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious circumstance can be tested
under the guidelines we established in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,38 as follows:
Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and
review by the appellate court of the lower courts findings of fact, the other elements
that should be considered are the following: (a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (d) a lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other
party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under these standards, we hold that exceptional circumstances exist in the present
case to merit the relaxation of the applicable rules of procedure.

Due to existing exceptional circumstances, the ruling on the merits that Locsin is an
officer and not an employee of Nissan must take precedence over procedural
considerations.
We arrived at the conclusion that we should go beyond the procedural rules and
immediately take a look at the intrinsic merits of the case based on several
considerations.
First, the parties have sufficiently ventilated their positions on the disputed employeremployee relationship and have, in fact, submitted the matter for the CAs
consideration.
Second, the CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists
between Locsin and Nissan.
Locsin was undeniably Chairman and President, and was elected to these positions
by the Nissan board pursuant to its By-laws. 39 As such, he was a corporate officer, not
an employee. The CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted facts and
on Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers as "those officers of a
corporation who are given that character either by the Corporation Code or by the
corporations by-laws." Likewise, Section 25 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 69, or the
Corporation Code of the Philippines (Corporation Code) provides that corporate
officers are the president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be
provided for in the by-laws.
Third. Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin already acted as a
corporate officer because the position of Executive Vice-President/Treasurer is
provided for in Nissans By-Laws. Article IV, Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically
provides for this position, as follows:
ARTICLE
Officers
IV
Section 1. Election and Appointment The Board of Directors at their first meeting,
annually thereafter, shall elect as officers of the Corporation a Chairman of the Board,
a President, an Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, a Vice-President/General
Manager and a Corporate Secretary. The other Senior Operating Officers of the
Corporation shall be appointed by the Board upon the recommendation of the
President.
xxxx
Section 4. Executive Vice-President/Treasurer The Executive VicePresident/Treasurer shall have such powers and perform such duties as are
prescribed by these By-Laws, and as may be required of him by the Board of
Directors. As the concurrent Treasurer of the Corporation, he shall have the charge of
the funds, securities, receipts, and disbursements of the Corporation. He shall
deposit, or cause to be deposited, the credit of the Corporation in such banks or trust
companies, or with such banks of other depositories, as the Board of Directors may
from time to time designate. He shall tender to the President or to the Board of
Directors whenever required an account of the financial condition of the corporation
and of all his transactions as Treasurer. As soon as practicable after the close of each
fiscal year, he shall make and submit to the Board of Directors a like report of such
fiscal year. He shall keep correct books of account of all the business and
transactions of the Corporation.
In Okol v. Slimmers World International,40 citing Tabang v. National Labor Relations
Commission,41 we held that
x x x an "office" is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is
elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an "employee"
usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the directors or
stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation who also determines the
compensation to be paid to such employee. [Emphasis supplied.]
In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with the
Amended By-Laws of the corporation. The following factual determination by the CA
is elucidating:
More important, private respondent failed to state any such "circumstance" by which
the petitioner corporation "engaged his services" as corporate officer that would make
him an employee. In the first place, the Vice-President/Treasurer was elected on an
annual basis as provided in the By-Laws, and no duties and responsibilities were
stated by private respondent which he discharged while occupying said position other
than those specifically set forth in the By-Laws or required of him by the Board of
Directors. The unrebutted fact remains that private respondent held the position of
Executive Vice-President/Treasurer of petitioner corporation, a position provided for in
the latters by-laws, by virtue of election by the Board of Directors, and has functioned
as such Executive Vice-President/Treasurer pursuant to the provisions of the said ByLaws. Private respondent knew very well that he was simply not re-elected to the said
position during the August 5, 2005 board meeting, but he had objected to the election
of a new set of officers held at the time upon the advice of his lawyer that he cannot
be "terminated" or replaced as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer as he had attained
tenurial security.42

We fully agree with this factual determination which we find to be sufficiently
supported by evidence. We likewise rule, based on law and established
jurisprudence, that Locsin, at the time of his severance from NCLPI, was the latters
corporate officer.
a. The Question of Jurisdiction
Given Locsins status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor Arbiter or the
NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination of his relationship with
Nissan. As we also held in Okol, a corporate officers dismissal from service is an
intra-corporate dispute:
In a number of cases [Estrada v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
106722, 4 October 1996, 262 SCRA 709; Lozon v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 310 Phil. 1 (1995); Espino v. National Labor Relations Commission, 310
Phil. 61 (1995); Fortune Cement Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 79762, 24 January 1991, 193 SCRA 258], we have held that a
corporate officers dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-corporate
controversy which arises between a stockholder and a corporation. 43 [Emphasis
supplied.]
so that the RTC should exercise jurisdiction based on the following legal reasoning:
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of Presidential Decree No. 902-A (PD 902-A)
provided that intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC):
Sec. 5. In addition to the regulatory and adjudicative functions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission over corporations, partnerships and other forms of
associations registered with it as expressly granted under existing laws and decrees,
it shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving:
xxxx
c) Controversies in the election or appointments of directors, trustees, officers or
managers of such corporations, partnerships or associations.
Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8799, which took effect on 8 August
2000, transferred to regional trial courts the SECs jurisdiction over all cases listed in
Section 5 of PD 902-A:
5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general
jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court. [Emphasis supplied.]
b. Precedence
of
Primacy of Element of Jurisdiction
Substantive
Merits;
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to remand the

case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to dismiss the petition
outright due to the wrongful use of Rule 65.44 We cannot close our eyes, however, to
the factual and legal reality, established by evidence already on record, that Locsin is
a corporate officer whose termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiters
jurisdiction to rule upon.
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of the case,
and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and rule
on a case and is the threshold element that must exist before any quasi-judicial officer
can act. In the context of the present case, the Labor Arbiter does not have
jurisdiction over the termination dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to
continue to act on the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious,
based on the records and the law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only
cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary expenses, to the
point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of course, does not go into the merits
of termination of relationship and is without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate
dispute on this point before the appropriate RTC.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, and
AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 103720,
promulgated on August 28, 2008, as well as its Resolution of December 9, 2008,
which reversed and set aside the March 10, 2008 Order of Labor Arbiter Concepcion
in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-06165-07. This Decision is without prejudice to
petitioner Locsins available recourse for relief through the appropriate remedy in the
proper forum.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

they are raising an issue of ownership. They alleged that their father, the late
Victoriano Gayoso, sold the lot (a conjugal property) to Almeda without the consent of
their mother. The sale, being void, Almeda could not have transferred ownership of
the lot to respondent corporation.
On July 21, 1997, the MeTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
G.R. No. 147874
July 17, 2006
DOLORES GAYOSO, DANNY GAYOSO, ELIZABETH G. DONDRIANO,

VICTORIANO GAYOSO, CHRISTOPHER GAYOSO, REMEDIOS GAYOSO and
THE
HEIRS
OF
VICTORIANO
GAYOSO, petitioners,
vs.
TWENTY-TWO REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48001.
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment:

A. Ordering the defendants
1. and all other persons claiming rights under them to vacate the
premises located at Mariveles corner Calbayog Streets,
Mandaluyong City, and to surrender the possession of the same to
the plaintiff;
2. to pay the plaintiff the amount of P4,000.00 representing their
unpaid rentals beginning February 1981 to December 1996 and the
amount of P20.00 per month every month thereafter until the
premises shall have been vacated;
3. to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as and by way of
attorney's fees; and
This case stemmed from a Complaint for Ejectment filed by Twenty-Two Realty
Development Corporation (TTRDC), respondent, on December 12, 1996 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 60, Mandaluyong City against the abovenamed petitioners. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 15340, alleges that on
October 11, 1954, Victoriano Gayoso (now deceased) sold to Prospero Almeda a lot
located on Mariveles corner Calbayog Streets, Mandaluyong City. After the sale,
Almeda allowed Gayoso and his children, herein petitioners, to stay on the property
as lessees, paying P20.00 a month. Later, Almeda's heirs sold the lot to respondent
TTRDC. Thus, on February 19, 1996, the title to the property was transferred in the
name of respondent corporation.
The MeTC ruled that since petitioners failed to pay rentals for more than three
months, then respondent has the right to evict them from the premises.
However, petitioners have stopped paying rentals. Respondent then sent letters dated
September 12 and October 17, 1996 to petitioners demanding that they vacate the
premises, but they refused to do so. This prompted respondent to file with the MeTC
a complaint for illegal detainer against them.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, Mandaluyong City, affirmed
the MeTC Decision, holding that the refusal of petitioners to vacate the property and
pay the rents make out a clear case of unlawful detainer over which the MeTC has
jurisdiction.
In their answer, petitioners denied specifically TTRDC's allegations in its complaint.

They claimed that the MeTC has no jurisdiction over the case since in their answer
Petitioners then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
4. to pay the costs of suit.

B. dismissing the counterclaim.
SO ORDERED.

In its Decision dated April 20, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Mandaluyong City, Branch 60, is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners contend that since the issue of ownership of the property in dispute is
inextricably linked with the issue of possession, the MeTC has no jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 15340.
For its part, respondent maintains that the real issue is who between the parties is
entitled to possession. Hence, the MeTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case.
We find for the respondent.
It is basic that a court's jurisdiction is provided by law. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended, provides in part:
SEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts,
and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. - Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxx
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession
cannot be resolved without deciding the question of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession; (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, Section 18, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
states that:
SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession, not conclusive in actions

involving title or ownership. The judgment rendered in an action for
forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the
possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership
of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional
Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of
the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs
as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court.
In Barba vs. Court of Appeals,2 this Court held:
The Court has repeatedly emphasized that municipal trial courts,
metropolitan trial courts, and municipal circuit trial courts now retain
jurisdiction over ejectment cases if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership. In forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be
resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, inferior courts,
nonetheless, have the undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the
issue of ownership for the sole purpose of determining the issue of
possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building, neither shall it bar an action between the
same parties respecting title to the land or building nor be held conclusive of
the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different
cause of action involving possession.
Likewise, in Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank,3 this Court ruled:
All ejectment cases are covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and
are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts regardless of whether they
involve questions of ownership. The courts in ejectment cases may
determine questions of ownership whenever necessary to decide the
question of possession.
Verily, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the MeTC of
Mandaluyong City has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 15340,
notwithstanding the issue of ownership raised by petitioners in their answer.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
April 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48001 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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Inasmuch as [petitioners] have submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court by

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby decides to REMAND

On 13 April 1988, respondent court issued its assailed decision, as follows:

The Court of Appeals 6 resolved this motion on 6 June 1989 as follows:

The conflicting thesis (sic), however, of petitioner [private respondent herein]

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xxx xxx xxx

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This observation should apply as well to a public official who is

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Sec. 9. Jurisdiction. The Intermediate Appellate Court shall

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments,

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of

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Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee Amendment

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G.R. No. 186450

April 14, 2010

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excess of jurisdiction as ground-basis thereof. In other words, it invoked such ground

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G.R. No. 119347 March 17, 1999

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xxx xxx xxx

4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a

A parcel of land containing 56,97740 square

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to the seven (7) children of Casimero Tautho and considering six

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G.R. No. 163021

April 27, 2007

2) [Petitioner is] likewise ordered to deliver the Indesit Multifunction Oven

3) [Respondent] is hereby ordered to pay the purchase price of the Indesit

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WHETHER OR NOT [THE] DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS (PETITIONER AND

In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary

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February 15, 2011

G.R. No. 170889

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Whatever property, real or personal, that would be distributed to the stockholders

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be

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