OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs CA

The use of the word may is ordinarily

construed as permissive or directory,
indicating that a matter of discretion is
involved.
FACTS: Dr. Minda Virtudes (Dr. Virtudes) charged
Dr. Mercedita J. Macabulos (Dr. Macabulos) who
was then holding the position of Medical Officer
V at the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports - National Capital Region (DECS-NCR) or
the Chief of the School Health and Nutrition Unit
with dishonesty, grave misconduct, oppression,
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of
the service and acts unbecoming a public official
in violation of the Civil Service Laws and the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees. Dr. Virtudes alleged
that Dr. Macabulos incurred a cash advance of
P45,000 and she was required by the latter to
produce dental and medical receipts for the
liquidation of the cash advance. Taking into
account that Dr. Virtudes was not yet assigned at
School Health and Nutrition Unit, DECS-NCR, she
did not submit the receipts and invoices.
Upon failure to submit the receipts, Dr.
Macabulos allegedly subjected her to several
forms of harassment. Dr. Macabulos denied the
accusations and claimed that it was Dr. Antonia
Lopez-Dee (Dr. Dee), the Supervising Dentist,
who used the money to purchase medical and
dental supplies. In support of her claim, she
attached an unnotarized affidavit of Dr. Dee
admitting said purchase using the cash advance
of Dr. Macabulos. Dr. Virtudes asserted that it
was Dr. Macabulos who used the cash advance
by improperly spending it and that she tried to
liquidate the same by submitting a tampered
invoice in conformity with the amount of the
cash advance.
Graft Investigation Officer I Ulysis S. Calumpad
rendered a decision absolving Dr. Macabulos
from the administrative charge. However,
Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P.
Gervacio, Jr. disapproved the decision. He found
out that Dr. Dee signed an unnotarized affidavit
but the contents of the first page were entirely
different from the affidavit submitted by Dr.
Macabulos in her counteraffidavit. A new
memorandum by the Ombudsman was released
finding Dr. Macabulos guilty imposing upon her
the penalty of dismissal from the government
service. Thereafter, Dr. Macabulos filed a motion
for consideration before the Court of Appeals
(CA). The CA reversed the decision of the
Ombudsman ratiocinating that the Ombudsman
can no longer investigate the complaint since
the acts complained of were committed one year
from the filing of the complaint and that the
penalty imposed by the Ombudsman is not
immediately executory.
1

ISSUES:
Whether or not CAs interpretation of Section
20(5) of Republic Act No. 6670 (The Ombudsman
Act of 1989) as a prescriptive period on the

Ombudsman administrative disciplinary cases is

correct
Whether or not the penalty of dismissal from the
service meted on the private respondent is
immediately executory in accordance with the
valid rule of execution pending appeal uniformly
observed in administrative disciplinary cases
HELD: The Court of Appeals should have
granted the motion for intervention filed by the
Ombudsman. In its decision, the appellate court
not only reversed the order of the Ombudsman
but also delved into the investigatory power of
the Ombudsman. Since the Ombudsman was not
impleaded as a party when the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals in accordance
with Section 6, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, the
Ombudsman had no other recourse but to move
for intervention and reconsideration of the
decision in order to prevent the undue restriction
of its constitutionally mandated investigatory
power.
The Court of Appeals held that under Section
20(5) of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman is already
barred by prescription from investigating the
complaint since it was filed more than one year
from the occurrence of the complained act. The
Court found this interpretation by the appellate
court unduly restrictive of the duty of the
Ombudsman as provided under the Constitution
to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official
or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper,
or inefficient.
The use of the word may is ordinarily
construed as permissive or directory, indicating
that a matter of discretion is involved. Thus, the
word may, when used in a statute, does not
generally suggest compulsion. The use of the
word may in Section 20(5) of R.A. 6770
indicates that it is within the discretion of the
Ombudsman
whether
to
conduct
an
investigation when a complaint is filed after one
year from the occurrence of the complained act
or omission.
The Court of Appeals held that the order of the
Ombudsman imposing the penalty of dismissal is
not immediately executory. The Court of Appeals
applied the ruling in Lapid v. Court of Appeals,
that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which
impose penalties that are not enumerated in
Section 27 of RA 6770 are neither final nor
immediately executory.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of
the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The above rules may be amended or modified by
the Office of the Ombudsman as the interest of
justice may require.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being

executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal,
he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the
salary and such other emoluments that he did
not receive by reason of the suspension or
removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases shall be executed as a
matter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman
shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly
enforced and properly implemented. The refusal
or failure by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
or censure shall be ground for disciplinary action
against said officer.
Hence, in the case of In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPWH, the Court noted that Section
7 of A.O. 17 provides for execution of the
decisions pending appeal, which provision is
similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.
More recently, in the 2007 case of Buencamino
v. Court of Appeals, the primary issue was
whether the decision of the Ombudsman
suspending petitioner therein from office for six
months without pay was immediately executory
even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.
The Court held that the pertinent ruling in Lapid
v. Court of Appeals has already been superseded
by the case of In the Matter to Declare in
Contempt of Court Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
Secretary of DPWH, which clearly held that
decisions of the Ombudsman are immediately
executory even pending appeal.

capital stock of the petitioner is held and owned

by persons who are not citizens of the Philippine
Islands or of the United States. It is conceded by
the parties that the land involved is private
agricultural land, that is, land which is held and
owned by the respondent, for which she holds a
Torrens title.
ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 2874 is applicable
to agricultural lands, in the PhilippineIslands
which are privately owned.
HELD: In construing the act, the California Sate
Constitution provides, Every Act shall embrace
but one subject, which shall be expressed in its
title; but, if any subject shall be embraced in an
act which shall not be expressed in its title, such
act shall be void only as to so much thereof as
shall not be expressed in its title." The court,
after citing this constitutional provision, said
that the purpose of the act was the creation of
a primary election law and "other purposes.
Under the cloak of "other purposes," all and
every conceivable kind of legislation could hide
and thrive in the body of the act, and thus the
constitutional provision be set at naught ..when
these words "for other purposes" are found in
the title of an act of the state legislature they
accomplish nothing, and in reading the title our
eyes are closed to them. These matters of
legislation, not being embraced within the
purview of the title, are void and fall to the
ground.
Having demonstrated that said Act No 2874 does
not apply to lands of the respondent, and there
being no objection to the form of the remedy
prayed for, the same is hereby granted, without
any finding as to costs

US vs. WILLIAM C. HART, C. J. MILLER, and

SERVILIANO NATIVIDAD
Central Capiz v. Ramirez G.R. No. 16197.
FACTS:
This is an original action brought in the Supreme
Court. Its purpose is to obtain an interpretation
and application of the intent, purpose and scope
of Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature,
known as the "Public Land Act," so far as it
affects agricultural lands, privately owned. The
petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on
or about July 1, 1919, Ramirez contracted with
the Central Capiz to supply to it for a term of
thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation, which said contract, by agreement,
was to be converted later into a right in rem and
recorded in the Registry of Property as an
encumbrance upon the land, and to be binding
upon all future owners of the same. However,
Act No 2874 became effective in the execution
of saidcontract and its conversion into a right in
rem upon the respondent's property. The
respondent, while admitting said contract and
her obligation thereunder to execute a deed
pursuant thereto, bases her refusal so to do
upon the fact that more than 61 per cent of the

Facts: The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad,

were found guilty on a charge of vagrancy under
the provisions of Act No. 519. All three appealed
and presented evidence showing that each of
the defendants was earning a living at a lawful
trade or business sufficient enough to support
themselves. However, the Attorney-General
defended his clients by arguing that in Section 1
of Act No. 519, the phrase no visible means of
support only applies to the clause tramping or
straying through the country and not the first
clause which states that every person found
loitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, thus making the 3 appellants
guilty of vagrancy. He further argued that it been
intended for without visible means of support
to qualify the first part of the clause, either the
comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after country would
have been inserted.
Issue: WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty
of vagrancy under the Attorney-Generals

argument
criticism.

based

on

mere

grammatical

Held: An argument based upon punctuation

alone is not conclusive and the effect intended
by the Legislature should be the relevant
determinant of the interpretation of the law.
When the meaning of a legislative enactment is
in question, it is the duty of the courts to
ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that construction of the
statute which will give it effect. Moreover,
ascertaining the consequences flowing from
such a construction of the law is also helpful in
determining the soundness of the reasoning.
Considering that the argument of the AttorneyGeneral would suggest a lack of logical
classification on the part of the legislature of the
various classes of vagrants and since it was
proven that all three of the defendants were
earning a living by legitimate means at a level of
comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and
Natividad were acquitted, with the costs de
oficio.
People of the Philippines v. Buenviaje
FACTS: Defendant appeals the ruling of the trial
court finding her guilty for the violation of illegal
practice of medicine and illegally advertising
oneself as a doctor.
Defendant practices chiropractic although she
has not secured a certificate to practice
medicine. She treated and manipulated the head
and body of Regino Noble. She also contends
that practice of chiropractic has nothing to do
with medicine and that unauthorized use of title
of doctor should be understood to refer to doctor
of medicine and not to doctors of chiropractic,
and lastly, that Act3111 is unconstitutional as it
does not express its subject.
ISSUE: W/N chiropractic is included in the term
practice of medicine under Medical laws
provided in the Revised Administrative Code.
HELD: Act 3111 is constitutional as the title An
Act to Amend (enumeration of sections to be
amended) is sufficient and it need not include
the subject matter of each section. Chiropractic
is included in the practice of medicine. Statutory
definition prevails over ordinary usage of the
term. The constitutional requirement as to the
title of the bill must be liberally construed. It
should not be technically or narrowly construed
as to impede the power of legislation. When
there is doubt as to its validity, it must be
resolved against the doubt and in favor of its
validity. A bill shall embrace only one subject,
expressed in its title, to prohibit duplicity in
legislation by apprising legislators and the public
about the nature, scope, and consequences of
the law.
Unabia v. City Mayor

Severino Unabia was a foreman, Group Disposal,

Office of the City Health Officer, Cebu City; the
City Mayor removed him from the service and his
place was taken by Perfecto Abellana, and latter
by Pedro E. Gonzales; Petitioner sought to be
reinstated but the respondents refused. Unabia
is a person in the Philippine Civil Service,
specifically the unclassified service and his
removal from his position is a violation of section
694 of the Revised Administrative Code and
section 4 of Art XII of the Constitution.
Respondents claims that the
use of capital in the words "Civil Service" in the
Constitution and the use small letters for the
"civil service" in the Revised Administrative code
indicates only those pertaining to the classified
service.
UNCLASSIFIED SERVICE are those positions
wherein the nature of the work and qualifications
are not subject to classification. Capital "C" and
"S" in the words "Civil Service" were used in the
Constitution to indicate the group. No capitals
are used in the similar provisions of the Code to
indicate the system. Hence,
there is no difference between the use of
capitals in the constitution and small letters in
the Revised Administrative Code. Both are
expressly declared to belong to the Civil Service;
hence the same rights and privileges should be
accorded to both
Petitioner was dismissed and since he did not
petition for mandamus for his reinstatement
within a year, he is deemed to have abandoned
his right to his former position and is not entitled
to reinstatement therein by mandamus.
Oliva vs. Lamadrid,
Facts: Plaintiff Laureano Oliva owns a parcel of
land in Camarines Norte. He mortgaged the
property to the Rural Bank of Daet as security for
the payment of a loan. Having defaulted in the
payment of his obligation, the mortgage was
extrajudicially foreclosed and the property sold
at public auction, to the Bank, as the sole bidder,
on February 4, 1961. The certificate of sale,
issued by the sheriff stated that the property
could be redeemed within two (2) years from
and after the date of the sale, or until February
4, 1963. No redemption having been made
within said period, the corresponding deed of
sale was executed in favor of the Bank, on
February 27, 1963.Prior to May 31, 1963, plaintiff
offered to repurchase the property but the offer
was turned down. He claimed that, as holder of a
free patent and a torrens title, he is entitled to
redeem the property within five (5) years from
the date of the auction sale, pursuant to Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Upon the
other hand, defendants alleged in their answer
that the right of redemption expired on February
4, 1963, under the provisions of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 720, as amended by Republic
Act No. 2670, which, they maintain, is
controlling.

Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141

Owners of lands covered by a homestead or free
patent are entitled to redeem their property
within five(5) years from the date of sale.
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended
by Republic Act No. 2670
The period of two (2) years granted for the
redemption of property foreclosed refers to lands
not covered by a Torrens Title, a homestead or
free patent, or to owners of lands without
torrens titles, who can show five years or more
of peaceful, continuous and uninterrupted
possession thereof in the concept of an owner,
or of homesteads or free patent lands pending
the issuance of titles but already approved, or
of lands pending homestead or free patent
titles.
ISSUE: Whether the period of redemption is
governed by Section 119 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as asserted by the plaintiff, or by
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 720, as amended,
as contended by the defendants
Held: The plaintiff herein has the right to
repurchase the property in question within five
(5) years from the date of the conveyance or
foreclosure sale or up to February 4, 1966, and

that having exercised such right and tendered

payment long before the date last mentioned,
defendants herein are bound to reconvey said
property to him.
Ratio:The legislative history of the bills which
later became said Republic Act No. 2670,
amending Republic Act No. 720, shows that the
original proposal was to give homesteaders or
free patent holders a period of ten (10) years
within which to redeem their property foreclosed
by rural banks; that this proposal was eventually
found to be unwise, because its effect would
have been to dissuade rural banks from granting
loans to homesteaders or free patent holders
which were sought to be liberalized said
period of redemption being too long, from the
viewpoint of said banks; and that, consequently,
the proposal was given up, with the specific
intent and understanding that
homesteaders
or holders of free patent would retain the right to
redeem within five (5) years from the
conveyance of their properties, as provided in
the general law, that is to say the Public Land
Act, or Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Where the general law is the Commonwealth Act
and the specific law is the Republic Act, they
should be unified, and should abide by the
conditions of the times.