CORNELIA MATABUENA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, Defendant-Appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Saez, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr., for Defendant-Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION
AGAINST DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. While Art. 133
of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage", policy considerations of the most exigent character as well
as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision
Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50 O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in
the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants
because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen
despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno, [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne
mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same
prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly
increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist lest the
condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality
alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. The
lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right
to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on
March 28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the
surviving sister to the other half.
DECISION
FERNANDO, J.:
A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the spouses
during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes,
was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latters stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling
on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later
that year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law
spouses falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The
decision must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that in plaintiffs complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under
the aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956
and her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was
stipulation of facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That
the deceased Felix Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of
Defendant, Petronila Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That
the donation of the land to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common law relationship as husband and wife between
the defendant-done and the now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on March 28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix
Matabuena died intestate on September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land declared in her name and paid the
estate and inheritance taxes thereon" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the
Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on
February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only
when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old
Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to
prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a
prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law; porque no se engaen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the
Partidas (Part IV, Tit. XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter
virum et uxorem); then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit
of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other,
so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr.

1), it would not be just that such donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be better. So long as
marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attach
to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It would
be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished. Moreover,
if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be nullified if
such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be susceptible
to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part
of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission may be
apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of Justice
Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a los tribunales en la aplicacin de sus disposiciones. 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive
right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
plaintiff, as the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965 dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is declared
void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court
for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.

MRS. HENRY E. HARDING, and her husband, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Lawrence & Ross for appellant.
Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for appellees.
FISHER, J.:
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and interest, alleged to be due under the terms of a policy of insurance.
The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount demanded, with interest and costs, and from that decision the defendant appeals.
The court below stated the issues made by the pleadings in this case, and its finding of fact, as follows:
It is alleged by plaintiffs and admitted by defendant that plaintiffs are husband and wife and residents of the city of Manila; that the
defendant is a foreign corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Great Britain and duly registered in the
Philippine Islands, and Smith, Bell & Co. (limited), a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with its
principal domicile in the city of Manila, is the agent in the Philippine Islands of said defendant.
The plaintiffs alleged that on February 16, 1916, the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile, registered
number 2063, in the city of Manila; that on said date; in consideration of the payment to the defendant of the premium of P150, by said
plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, with the consent of her husband, the defendant by its duly authorized agent, Smith, Bell & Company
(limited), made its policy of insurance in writing upon said automobile was set forth in said policy to be P3,000 that the value of said
automobile was set forth in said policy (Exhibit A) to be P3,000; that on March 24, 1916, said automobile was totally destroyed by fire; that
the loss thereby to plaintiffs was the sum of P3,000; that thereafter, within the period mentioned in the said policy of insurance, the
plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, furnished the defendant the proofs of her said loss and interest, and otherwise performed all the conditions
of said policy on her part, and that the defendant has not paid said loss nor any part thereof, although due demand was made upon
defendant therefor.
The defendant, by its answer, admitted the allegations of the residence and status of the parties and denied all the other allegation of the
said complaint, and for a separate and affirmative defense alleged (1) that on February 17, 1916, at the city of Manila, P.I. the defendant
upon request of plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, issued to the said plaintiff the policy of insurance on an automobile alleged by the said
plaintiff to be her property; that the said request for the issuance of said policy of insurance was made by means of a proposal in writing
signed and delivered by said plaintiff to the defendant, guaranteeing the truth of the statements contained therein which said proposal is
referred to in the said policy of insurance made a part thereof; (2) that certain of the statements and representations contained in said
proposal and warranted by said plaintiff to be true, to wit: (a) the price paid by the proposer for the said automobile; (b) the value of said

automobile at the time of the execution and delivery of the said proposal and (c) the ownership of said automobile, were false and known to
be false by the said plaintiff at the time of signing and delivering the said proposal and were made for the purpose of misleading and
deceiving the defendant, and inducing the defendant, relying upon the warranties, statements, and representations contained in the said
proposal and believing the same to be true, issued the said policy of insurance.
The defendant prays that judgment be entered declaring the said policy of insurance to be null and void, and that plaintiffs take nothing by
this action; and for such further relief as to the court may seem just and equitable.
The evidence in this case shows that some time in the year 1913 Levy Hermanos, the Manila agents for the Studebaker automobile, sold the
automobile No. 2063 to John Canson for P3,200 (testimony of Mr. Diehl); that under date of October 14, 1914, John Canson sold the said
automobile to Henry Harding for the sum of P1,500 (Exhibit 2); that under date of November 19, 1914, the said Henry Harding sold the
said automobile No. 2063 to J. Brannigan, of Los Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., for the sum of P2,000 (Exhibit 3); that under date of
December 20, 1915, J. C. Graham of Los Baos, Province of Laguna, P.I., sold the said automobile No. 2063 to Henry Harding of the city
of Manila for the sum of P2,800 (Exhibit 4 and testimony of J. C. Graham); that on or about January 1, 1916, the said Henry Harding gave
the said automobile to his wife; Mrs. Henry E. Harding, one of the plaintiffs, as a present; that said automobile was repaired and repainted
at the Luneta Garage at a cost of some P900 (testimony of Mr. Server); that while the said automobile was at the Luneta Garage; the said
Luneta Garage, acting as agent for Smith, Bell & Company, (limited), solicited of the plaintiff Mrs. Harding the insurance of said
automobile by the defendant Company (testimony of Mrs. Henry Harding and Mr. Server); that a proposal was filled out by the said agent
and signed by the plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding, and in said proposal under the heading "Price paid by proposer," is the amount of
"3,500" and under another heading "Present value" is the amount of "3,000" (Exhibit 1).
The evidence tends to show that after the said proposal was made a representative of the Manila agent of defendant went to the Luneta
Garage and examined said automobile No. 2063 and Mr. Server, the General Manager of the Luneta Garage, an experienced automobile
mechanic, testified that at the time this automobile was insured it was worth about P3,000, and the defendant, by and through its said agent
Smith, Bell & Company (limited), thereafter issued a policy of insurance upon proposal in which policy the said automobile was described
as of the "present value" of P3,000 and the said defendant charged the said plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding as premium on said policy the
sum of P150, or 5 per cent of the then estimated value of P3,000. (Exhibit A.)
The "Schedule" in said policy of insurance describes the automobile here in question, and provides in part of follows:
"Now it is hereby agreed as follows:
"That during the period above set forth and during any period for which the company may agree to renew this policy the
company will subject to the exception and conditions contained herein or endorsed hereon indemnify the insured against loss of
or damage to any motor car described in the schedule hereto (including accessories) by whatever cause such loss or damage may
be occasioned and will further indemnify the insured up to the value of the car or P3,000 whichever is the greater against any
claim at common law made by any person (not being a person in the said motor car nor in the insured's service) for loss of life or
for accidental bodily injury or damage to property caused by the said motor car including law costs payable in connection with
such claim when incurred with the consent of the company."
The evidence further shows that on March 24, 1916, the said automobile was totally destroyed by fire, and that the iron and steel portions
of said automobile which did not burn were taken into the possession of the defendant by and through its agent Smith, Bell & Company
(limited), and sold by it for a small sum, which had never been tendered to the plaintiff prior to the trial of this case, but in open court
during the trial the sum of P10 as the proceeds of such sale was tendered to plaintiff and refused.
Upon the facts so found, which we hold are supported by the evidence, the trial judge decided that there was no proof of fraud on the part of plaintiff
in her statement of the value of the automobile, or with respect to its ownership; that she had an insurable interest therein; and that defendant, having
agreed to the estimated value, P3,000, and having insured the automobile for that amount, upon the basis of which the premium was paid, is bound by
it and must pay the loss in accordance with the stipulated insured value. The assignments of error made on behalf of appellant put in issue the
correctness of those conclusions of law, and some others of minor importance relating to the exclusion of evidence. Disposing of the minor objections
first, as we have reached the conclusion that the trial court was right in holding that the defendant is bound by the estimated value of the automobile
upon which policy was issued, and that the plaintiff was not guilty of fraud in regard thereto, the exclusion of the testimony of the witness Diehl is
without importance. It merely tended to show the alleged actual value of the automobile, and in the view we take of the case such evidence was
irrelevant.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile at the time of the issuance of the policy, and, therefore, had no insurable
interest in it. The court below found that the automobile was given to plaintiff by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in question.
Appellant does not dispute the correctness of this finding, but contends that the gift was void, citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which provides

that "All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of the
family are not included in this rule."
We are of the opinion that this contention is without merit. In the case of Cook vs. McMicking 27 Phil. Rep., 10), this court said:
It is claimed by the appellants that the so-called transfer from plaintiff's husband to her was completely void under article 1458 of the Civil
Code and that, therefore, the property still remains the property of Edward Cook and subject to levy under execution against him.
In our opinion the position taken by appellants is untenable. They are not in a position to challenge the validity of the transfer, if it may be
called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the parties to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate,
present, remote, or otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from husband to wife
or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be taken advantage of only by persons who bear such
a relation to the parties making the transfer or to the property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a
relationship appears the transfer cannot be attacked.
Even assuming that defendant might have invoked article 1334 as a defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question does not
fall within the exception therein established. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband to his wife is not a
moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties, as to which nothing is disclosed by the record.
Defendant contends that the statement regarding the cost of the automobile was a warranty, that the statement was false, and that, therefore, the policy
never attached to the risk. We are of the opinion that it has not been shown by the evidence that the statement was false on the contrary we believe
that it shows that the automobile had in fact cost more than the amount mentioned. The court below found, and the evidence shows, that the
automobile was bought by plaintiff's husband a few weeks before the issuance of the policy in question for the sum of P2,800, and that between that
time and the issuance of the policy some P900 was spent upon it in repairs and repainting. The witness Server, an expert automobile mechanic,
testified that the automobile was practically as good as new at the time the insurance was effected. The form of proposal upon which the policy was
issued does not call for a statement regarding the value of the automobile at the time of its acquisition by the applicant for the insurance, but merely a
statement of its cost. The amount stated was less than the actual outlay which the automobile represented to Mr. Harding, including repairs, when the
insurance policy was issued. It is true that the printed form calls for a statement of the "price paid by the proposer," but we are of the opinion that it
would be unfair to hold the policy void simply because the outlay represented by the automobile was made by the plaintiff's husband and not by his
wife, to whom he had given the automobile. It cannot be assumed that defendant should not have issued the policy unless it were strictly true that the
price representing the cost of the machine had been paid by the insured and by no other person that it would no event insure an automobile
acquired by gift, inheritance, exchange, or any other title not requiring the owner to make a specific cash outlay for its acquisition.
Furthermore, the court below found and the evidence shows, without dispute, that the proposal upon which the policy in question was issued was
made out by defendant's agent by whom the insurance was solicited, and that appellee simply signed the same. It also appears that an examiner
employed by the defendant made an inspection of the automobile before the acceptance of the risk, and that the sum after this examination. The trial
court found that Mrs. Harding, in fixing the value of the automobile at P3,000, acted upon information given her by her husband and by Mr. Server,
the manager of the Luneta Garage. The Luneta Garage, it will be remembered, was the agent of the defendant corporation in the solicitation of the
insurance. Mrs. Harding did not state of her own knowledge that the automobile originally cost P3,000, or that its value at the time of the insurance
was P3,000. She merely repeated the information which had been given her by her husband, and at the same time disclosed to defendant's agent the
source of her information. There is no evidence to sustain the contention that this communication was made in bad faith. It appears that the
statements in the proposal as to the price paid for the automobile and as to its value were written by Mr. Quimby who solicited the insurance on
behalf of defendant, in his capacity as an employee of the Luneta Garage, and wrote out the proposal for Mrs. Harding to sign. Under these
circumstances, we do not think that the facts stated in the proposal can be held as a warranty of the insured, even if it should have been shown that
they were incorrect in the absence of proof of willful misstatement. Under such circumstance, the proposal is to be regarded as the act of the insurer
and not of the insured. This question was considered in the case of the Union Insurance Company vs. Wilkinson (13 Wall., 222; 20 L. ed., 617), in
which the Supreme Court of the United States said:
This question has been decided differently by courts of the highest respectability in cases precisely analogous to the present. It is not to be
denied that the application logically considered, is the work of the assured, and if left to himself or to such assistance as he might select, the
person so selected would be his agent, and he alone would be responsible. On the other hand, it is well-known, so well that no court would
be justified in shutting its eyes to it, that insurance companies organized under the laws of one State, and having in that State their principal
business office, send these agents all over the land, with directions to solicit and procure applications for policies furnishing them with
printed arguments in favor of the value and necessity of life insurance, and of the special advantages of the corporation which the agent
represents. They pay these agents large commissions on the premiums thus obtained, and the policies are delivered at their hands to the
assured. The agents are stimulated by letters and instructions to activity in procuring contracts, and the party who is in this manner induced
to take out a policy, rarely sees or knows anything about the company or its officers by whom it is issued, but looks to and relies upon the
agent who has persuaded him to effect insurance as the full and complete representative of the company, in all that is said or done in
making the contract. Has he not a right to so regard him? It is quite true that the reports of judicial decisions are filled with the efforts of

these companies, by their counsel, to establish the doctrine for the acts of these agents to the simple receipt of the premium and delivery of
the policy, the argument being that, as to all other acts of the agent, he is the agent of the assured. This proposition is not without support in
some of the earlier decision on the subject; and, at a time when insurance companies waited for parties to come to them to seek assurance,
or to forward applications on their own motion, the doctrine had a reasonable foundation to rest upon. But to apply such a doctrine, in its
full force, to the system of selling policies through agents, which we have described, would be a snare and a delusion, leading, as it has
done in numerous instances, to the grossest frauds, of which the insurance corporations receive the benefits, and the parties supposing
themselves insured are the victims. The tendency of the modern decisions in this country is steadily in the opposite direction. The powers
of the agent are, prima facie, co-extensive with the business intrusted to his care, and will not be narrowed by limitations not
communicated to the person with whom he deals. (Bebee vs. Ins. Co., 25 Conn., 51; Lycoming Ins. Co. vs. Schoolenberger, 44 Pa., 259;
Beal vs. Ins. Co., 16 Wis., 241; Davenport vs. Ins. Co., 17 Iowa, 276.) An insurance company, establishing a local agency, must be held
responsible to the parties with whom they transact business, for the acts and declarations of the agent, within the scope of his employment,
as if they proceeded from the principal. (Sav. Bk. vs. Ins. Co., 31 Conn., 517; Hortwitz vs. Ins. Co., 40 Mo., 557; Ayres vs. Ins. Co., 17
Iowa, 176; Howard Ins. Co. vs. Bruner, 23 Pa., 50.)
In the fifth edition of American Leading Cases, 917, after a full consideration of the authorities, it is said:
"By the interested or officious zeal of the agents employed by the insurance companies in the wish to outbid each other and
procure customers, they not unfrequently mislead the insured, by a false or erroneous statement of what the application should
contain; or, taking the preparation of it into their own hands, procure his signature by an assurance that it is properly drawn, and
will meet the requirements of the policy. The better opinion seems to be that, when this course is pursued, the description of the
risk should, though nominally proceeding from the insured, be regarded as the act of the insurers." (Rowley vs. Empire Ins. Co.,
36 N.Y., 550.)
The modern decisions fully sustain this proposition, and they seem to us founded on reason and justice, and meet our entire approval. This
principle does not admit oral testimony to vary or contradict that which is in writing, but it goes upon the idea that the writing offered in
evidence was not the instrument of the party whose name is signed to it; that it was procured under such circumstances by the other side as
estops that side from using it or relying on its contents; not that it may be contradicted by oral testimony, but that it may be shown by such
testimony that it cannot be lawfully used against the party whose name is signed to it. (See also Am. Life Ins. Co. vs. Mahone, 21 Wallace,
152.)
The defendant, upon the information given by plaintiff, and after an inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was worth
P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent matters
of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such estimated
value. As was said by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of the First National Bank vs. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (5 Otto, 673; 24
L. ed., 563), at. p. 565 of the Lawyers Edition:
The ordinary test of the value of property is the price it will commend in the market if offered for sale. But that test cannot, in the very
nature of the case, be applied at the time application is made for insurance. Men may honestly differ about the value of property, or as to
what it will bring in the market; and such differences are often very marked among those whose special business it is to buy and sell
property of all kinds. The assured could do no more than estimate such value; and that, it seems, was all that he was required to do in this
case. His duty was to deal fairly with the Company in making such estimate. The special finding shows that he discharged that duty and
observed good faith. We shall not presume that the Company, after requiring the assured in his application to give the "estimated value,"
and then to covenant that he had stated all material facts in regard to such value, so far as known to him, and after carrying that covenant,
by express words, into the written contract, intended to abandon the theory upon which it sought the contract, and make the absolute
correctness of such estimated value a condition precedent to any insurance whatever. The application, with its covenant and stipulations,
having been made a part of the policy, that presumption cannot be indulged without imputing to the Company a purpose, by studied
intricacy or an ingenious framing of the policy, to entrap the assured into incurring obligations which, perhaps, he had no thought of
assuming.
Section 163 of the Insurance Law (Act No. 2427) provides that "the effect of a valuation in a policy of fire insurance is the same as in a policy of
marine insurance."
By the terms of section 149 of the Act cited, the valuation in a policy of marine insurance is conclusive if the insured had an insurable interest and
was not guilty of fraud.
We are, therefore, of the opinion and hold that plaintiff was the owner of the automobile in question and had an insurable interest therein; that there
was no fraud on her part in procuring the insurance; that the valuation of the automobile, for the purposes of the insurance, is binding upon the
defendant corporation, and that the judgment of the court below is, therefore, correct and must be affirmed, with interest, the costs of this appeal to be
paid by the appellant. So ordered.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.

38 Phil. 464 Mercantile Law Insurance Law Representation Warranty

In February 1916, Mrs. Harding applied for car insurance for a Studebaker she received as a gift from her husband. She was assisted by Smith, Bell,
and Co. which was the duly authorized representative (insurance agent) of Commercial Union Assurance Company in the Philippines. The cars value
was estimated with the help of an experienced mechanic (Mr. Server) of the Luneta Garage. The car was bought by Mr. Harding for P2,800.00. The
mechanic, considering some repairs done, estimated the value to be at P3,000.00. This estimated value was the value disclosed by Mrs. Harding to
Smith, Bell, and Co. She also disclosed that the value was an estimate made by Luneta Garage (which also acts as an agent for Smith, Bell, and Co).
In March 1916, a fire destroyed the Studebaker. Mrs. Harding filed an insurance claim but Commercial Union denied it as it insisted that the
representations and averments made as to the cost of the car were false; and that said statement was a warranty. Commercial Union also stated that
the car does not belong to Mrs. Harding because such a gift [from her husband] is void under the Civil Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mrs. Harding is entitled to the insurance claim.
HELD: Yes. Commercial Union is not the proper party to attack the validity of the gift made by Mr. Harding to his wife.
The statement made by Mrs. Harding as to the cost of the car is not a warranty. The evidence does not prove that the statement is false. In fact, the
evidence shows that the cost of the car is more than the price of the insurance. The car was bought for P2,800.00 and then thereafter, Luneta Garage
made some repairs and body paints which amounted to P900.00. Mr. Server attested that the car is as good as new at the time the insurance was
effected.
Commercial Union, upon the information given by Mrs. Harding, and after an inspection of the automobile by its examiner, having agreed that it was
worth P3,000, is bound by this valuation in the absence of fraud on the part of the insured. All statements of value are, of necessity, to a large extent
matters of opinion, and it would be outrageous to hold that the validity of all valued policies must depend upon the absolute correctness of such
estimated value.

Matabuena v. Cervantes
G.R. No. L-28771 (March 31, 1971)
FACTS:
Felix Matabuena cohabitated with Respondent. During this period, Felix Matabuena donated to Respondent a parcel of land.
Later the two were married. After the death of Felix Matabuena, his sister, Petitioner, sought the nullification of the donation citing
Art.133 of the Civil Code Every donation between the spouses during the marriage shall be void.
The trial court ruled that this case was not covered by the prohibition because the donation was made at the time the deceased and
Respondent were not yet married and were simply cohabitating.
ISSUE:
W/N the prohibition applies to donations between live-in partners.
HELD:
Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what is
written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue
influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also
to common-law relationships.The court, however, said that the lack of the donation made by the deceased to Respondent does
not necessarily mean that the Petitioner will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between Felix
and Respondent were legitimated by marriage.