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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 4, Number 2, April 1966,

pp. 133-144 (Article)
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DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.1070

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Schopenhauer and
Platonic Ideas
HILDE HEIN

SCttOPENttAUER, in the Preface to the first edition of T h e W o r l d as W i l l a n d

R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , acknowledges the debt his philosophy owes to the doctrines of
Kant and Plato and the Upanishads. Specifically of Plato he says: "But i f . . . the
reader has dwelt for a while in the school of the divine Plato, he will be prepared
to hear me, and the more susceptible to what I say." 1
Historians and commentators, in defining Schopenhauer's place in the history of
philosophy, accept his self-appraisal and take for granted both the accuracy of
Schopenhauer's interpretation of his sources and the truth of his contention that
they were his primary influences.2 Only Russell, with characteristic scepticism,
refers to the acknowledgement and then goes on to add, "but I do not think he
owes as much to Plato as he thinks he does." 3 Russell does not state the reasons
for his doubts, but I believe he is right in having them, and it is my intention here
to examine Sehopenhauer's treatment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas and the
extent to which he departs from Plato's original conception of it. I shall not
make a parallel investigation of Schopenhauer's use of the philosophy of Kant
and the Upanishads, although I believe that one would discover that they also
undergo considerable transformation when put to the purposes for which Schopenhauer employs them.
I do not mean to deny that Schopenhauer was deeply moved and profoundly
influenced by these philosophies. It would be folly to contest the truth of a claim
which he was in the best position to make. And there is no doubt that he is in
agreement with them in the belief whose antiquity and generality he points out,
that the ordinary world of common experience has only a relative existence, that
the world is known as representation (Bk. I, f~3).4 But beyond this initial similarity there are significant discrepancies between Schopenhauer's views and those
of his avowed philosophical ancestors, I shall confine my remarks in the present
discussion to some of his deviations from "the divine Plato."
Schopenhauer is careful to distinguish between the Kantian use (or misuse) of
the term "Idea" ("the abstract productions of scholastic dogmatizing reason";
Bk. II, f~25) and the meaning which Plato gives to it, as referring to the unThe World as Will and Representation, trans, by E.F.J. Payne (Indian Hills, Colorado: The
Falcon's Wing Press, 1958), p. xxiii. A. Schopenhauer, S~immtliche Werke, Band II, herausgegeben Julius Frauenstadt (Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1891) p. xiii. All subsequent quotations
from Schopenhauerwill be taken from the Payne translation.
2E.g., E.F.J. Payne, The World as Will and Representation, Translator's Preface, pp. xiv, cvi ;
B.A.G. Fuller, A History o] Modern Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), p. 470;
and William Caldwell,Schopenhauer' s System in its Philosophical Significance, pp. 44, 166.
8Bertrand Russell, A History o] Western Philosophy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960),
p. 753.
4Payne, I, 6-7; Werke, II, 7-8.

]-133]

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HISTORY

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PHILOSOPHY

attained patterns, related to individual things as their eternal forms or prototypes. Schopenhauer clearly allies himself with the Platonic usage: "Therefore
with me the word is always to be understood in its genuine and original meaning
given it by Plato" (Bk. II, $25).5
Schopenhauer goes on to characterize the Ideas in what appears to be a Platonic
fashion. More like the Kantian thing-in-itself than like the Kantian Idea, they
are unconditioned by time and space, remaining fixed and subject to no change,
forever being and never having become, and foreign to all plurality. As such, the
Platonic Ideas play a major role in Schopenhauer's philosophy, particularly in
his theory of art. But precisely here we have grounds for suspicion that in fact
Schopenhauer used the Ideas in a very un-Platonic sense.
The disagreement between Plato and Schopenhauer regarding art is widely
recognized. It is well known that Plato denied that the artist possesses privileged
insight into reality. On the contrary, he maintained that the artist is a falsifier
whose product is "three removes from reality," and who merits banishment from
the ideal state because his "poetical imitations are ruinous to the understanding
of his hearers." 6 Poetic inspiration, as described in the Ion (533), is a kind of
visionary madness. It is not productive of knowledge; nor is it a consequence of it.
Schopenhauer, on the other hand, declares that it is through art, the work of
genius, that one may achieve knowledge of "what continues to exist outside and
independently of all relations, but which alone is really essential to the world,
the true content of its p h e n o m e n a . . . " (Bk. III, f/36)Y In other words, the
comprehension of the Platonic Ideas is, for Schopenhauer, to be found exclusively
in those who possess "the gift of genius." s Where Plato stresses the industry and
patience which precede the dialectician's insight into the Ideas, Schopenhauer
emphasizes the spontaneity of the genius whose art is "purely the work of the
ecstasy of the moment, the inspiration, the free movement of genius, without
any admixture of intention and reflection." 9
M y aim here is not to review the much discussed philosophies of art of Plato
and Schopenhauer, but rather to suggest that their disagreement about artistic
vision is indicative of a far more fundamental difference between them concerning
the nature of the Ideas and their function in philosophy.
Schopenhauer, as noted above, claims to preserve the Platonic sense of "Idea."
Like Plato, he thinks of Ideas as "the original unchanging f o r m s . . , of all natural
bodies," present as a whole in innumerable individuals and "related to them as
the archetype is to its copies" (Bk. III, $30).1~ There are thus relatively few
Ideas, corresponding to species rather than to particulars and yet, paradoxically,
exhibited as a whole in each instance or exemplification.
I, 129-130; Werke, II, 154.
6Republic, Bk. X, 599a and passim. Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. E. Hamilton & H.
Cairns (Bollinger Series LXXI, 1963), p. 824; Laws, 817, p. 1387; Ion 533-534, pp. 219-220.
Payne, I, 184; Werl~e,II, 217.
" ~Payne,

8Some qualification of this statement is necessary since, as Schopenhauer admits, everyone

who has any capacity for aesthetic enjoyment must have some rudimentary awareness of the
Ideas, and with the help of works of genius this awareness may be expanded. This topic will be
more fully discussed later.
gA. Schopenhauer, "On the Inner Nature of Art" in The Will to Live, ed. Richard Taylor
(New York : Anchor Book, Doubleday, 1962), p. 249.
Payne, I, 169; Werke, II, 199.

S C H O P E N H A U E R AND PLATONIC IDEAS

135

But the Ideas are not to be found as such in ordinary experience. They are only
imperfectly imitated by it. Ideas are outside time and space. They are immutable,
eternal, forever one and the same; while phenomena are unstable, impermanent,
mutable, and incessantly passing into and out of existence. It follows that while
Ideas are eminently real, phenomena cannot be claimed to exist fully.
If, according to Schopenhauer, Platonic Ideas are remote from Kantian Ideas,
they are not far from the Kantian thing-in-itself. Indeed, Schopenhauer believes
that the inner meaning of the Platonic and Kantian doctrines is "wholly the
same." Both Plato and Kant affirm that the visible world has only borrowed
reality, and that only the (Idea or thing-in-itself) which is expressed in this
world is truly real. Using the illustration of an animal (Bk. III, $31),11 Schopenhauer declares that for Plato only the Idea which is depicted in the animal has
true being, and as such only it can be the object of real knowledge. The individual features, as well as the position in space and time of the animal, are of no
account. In representing our awareness of the animal in Kantian terms, Schopenhauer says that as a spatio-temporal creature, it is mere phenomenon, valid only
with reference to our knowledge. Awareness of it as it is apart from its determinations would require a form of knowledge other than that which is possible to us
through sense and understanding.
In making the comparison between the Kantian thing-in-itself and the Platonic
Idea, Schopenhauer here mentions but does not take note of an important difference between them. For Plato it follows from the endless flux of the realm of
becoming that things within it do not fully exist and cannot truly be known. The
true object of knowledge for Plato is the Idea, which is changeless and eternal.
But for Kant the reverse is the case. Things in themselves cannot be known,
because knowledge presupposes the categories of the understanding and the forms
of intuition, and the noumenal realm is unconditioned by these forms. Thus
knowledge is possible only of phenomena. Schopenhauer is aware of this difference. He speaks of the Kantian phenomenon as "valid only in reference to our
knowledge," but he does not take it seriously, because he believes that despite
Kant's protestations to the contrary, there is a direct cognitive route to things-inthemselves, apart from their spatio-temporal conditions. This is intuition, and
Schopenhauer's prejudice in favor of this form of insight renders him incapable
of appreciating the enormity of the gulf between the Platonic Idea and the
Kantian thing-in-itself. Having redefined Kant's thing-in-itself to include the
possibility, at least in exceptional cases, of being immediately apprehended, he
sees it as differing from Plato's Ideas only to the extent that the temperaments
of Kant and Plato dictated dissimilar terminology.
According to Schopenhauer, the Platonic Idea is the Kantian thing-in-itself
with the additional property of being knowable. Furthermore, like Kant and
unlike Plato, Schopenhauer conceives this Idea to be ontologically one with the
phenomena through which it is expressed. But this is a radical departure from
Plato's own metaphysical position. Whatever the metaphysical and logical difficulties attendant upon Platonic dualism, Plato himself is committed to the view
Payne, I, 172; Werke, II, 203.

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HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

that there are two distinct and dissimilar realms, Being and Becoming, and that
things in the latter realm are what they are in virtue of their "imitation of" or
"participation in" the denizens of the former. Plato's denial of reality to things
which are Becoming is not due to their presumed illusoriness or failure to be
what they are, but rather because they do not remain anything very long or very
consistently and thus cannot be adequately characterized. For this reason they
also lack the perfection of the stable. They are unreal in the sense in which a
faithless friend is not nonexistent, but false, inferior to the ideal of friendship.
The existence of the unreal is frequently deplored by Plato, but it is not denied.
There is no comparable dualism in the Kantian doctrine of things-in-themselves. The noumenal and phenomenal realms are distinguished only epistemologically. Phenomena are noumena conditioned by the categories of the understanding. Their substance or "material" cause is identical. Schopenhauer, in his
concept of the Platonic Idea, adheres to the Kantian monism. For him things in
the realm of Becoming are unreal in the sense of being illusory, or, at least,
distortions of "the one being of each kind that alone really exists" (Bk. III,
$31). TM The categories of space, time and causality are the device which the
intellect imposes upon reality, thereby causing i t to appear to us as a "plurality
of homogenous beings, always being originated anew and passing away in endless succession." la
Schopenhauer himself calls attention to one difference between the Kantian
thing-in-itself and the Platonic Idea. He does not regard them as absolutely
identical. The thing-in-itself is ultimate reality, and for Schopenhauer this is
Will, the endless, surging process which cannot itself be an object of knowledge.
Knowledge of the Will would entail precisely the dualism which Plato predicates
of reality and Schopenhauer denies of it. The Idea for Schopenhauer is Will
objectified, its "immediate and therefore adequate objectivity." I t is conditioned
not by the categories which determine phenomena, but by the one, most general
condition, "the first and most universal form" that of being an ob]ect to a subject
(a "representation in general"). It thus differs from pure reality, the Will, in the
sole respect that it is known. Epistemologically it may be taken to stand between
reality, the Will which cannot be known at all, and the phenomena, which are
known as conditioned by the Kantian categories, the latter reduced to the principle of sufficient reason. But metaphysically all three are (not without precedent)
one and the same.
Schopenhauer takes this departure from Plato to be trivial. It is a strictly
epistemological distinction. There are no e n t i t i e s called Ideas, which are metaphysically apart from other aspects of reality. There is only the Will as u n k n o w n
in its primary state and the Will as k n o w n through its various gradations, the
Ideas. The Will itself is one and continuous; the plurality of the Ideas stems
from the fact that each represents or objectifies a different level or gradation of
the Will.
But this difference is not as insignificant as Schopenhauer thinks it to be, for in
denying that Ideas are ultimate reality, he is taking an un-Platonic position.
Payne, I, 173; Werke, II, 204.

is Ibid.

SCHOPENHAUER AND PLATONIC IDEAS

137

Plato believed that there were separate realms of reality, and t h a t nothing was
more real or ultimate t h a n Ideas. T h e y , collectively, are one of the three uncreated entities of the Timaeus (28),14 the p a t t e r n in whose image the world was
made. For Schopenhauer, the K a n t i a n thing-in-itself, the Will, is more fundamental than the Ideas and they are a representation of it. B u t in so far as this
ultimate is knowable through the mediation of the Ideas, Schopenhauer's position is also un-Kantian.
To the extent t h a t Schopenhauer's concept of the Platonic Idea m a y be summarized, we m a y say t h a t it is very like the K a n t i a n thing-in-itself, differing
from it by being one remove from reality, t h a t move consisting in its being an
object of knowledge.
I t is evident then that Schopenhauer did not use the term "Platonic I d e a " in
precisely the sense in which Plato intended it. T h a t Schopenhauer himself is
aware of this is suggested by his charge t h a t Plato was inconsistent in his use of
the expression. What Schopenhauer offers is a "persuasive redefinition" of the
term, one which somewhat impoverishes its connotation. For Schopenhauer accuses Plato of using the term " I d e a " loosely, and he himself proposes to use it
in a sense which covers only a part of what he took Plato to mean by it.
Schopenhauer believes t h a t there is a fundamental distinction between the Idea
and the concept, the latter being a mere object of rational thought and science.
Plato, he says, failed to make such a differentiation and thus he sometimes
characterized as Ideas universal abstractions which are not Platonic Ideas at
all. Schopenhauer's own discrimination between the two is not as luminous as one
might hope.
The concept is abstract, discursive, undetermined within its own sphere, only determined by its
limits, attainable and comprehensible by him who has only reason, communicable by words
without any other assistance, entirely exhausted by its definition. The Idea on the contrary,
although defined as the adequate representative of the concept, is always the object of perception, and although representing an infinite number of particular things, is yet thoroughly determined .... It is therefore not absolutely, but only conditionally communicable... (Bk. III,
I t is true t h a t Plato's account of the Ideas is not entirely clear. H e does appear
sometimes to t r e a t Ideas as abstractions from experience. Socrates' concern in
the early dialogues with the search for essential definitions which will identify
the connotation common to all the entities denoted by a t e r m illustrates a purely
discursive exercise of reason. Both the S y m p o s i u m (210-211)18 and the Phaedrus
(249) 17 make the point t h a t experience of m a n y particulars is absolutely necessary before the Idea of which they are an instance can be grasped.
The length of the training period required of the guardians in the Republic
and the Laws also suggests t h a t a solid basis of experience is a necessary, if not
sufficient, condition for the final confrontation with the Ideas. However, since
this training is largely in mathematics and dialectic, one might argue t h a t it is
Hamilton and Cairns, pp. 1161-1163.
1~Payne, I, 234 ; Werke, II, 276.
16
Hamilton and Cairns, pp. 561-563.
~7Ibid. pp. 495-496.

14

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not experience per se, but the m a s t e r y of the s y s t e m which consumes the philosopher's time. Nonetheless, in so far as this s y s t e m is purely rational, the I d e a which
is its conclusion would be w h a t Schopenhauer calls a concept.
On the other hand, Plato also writes as a mystic. H e represents the final
beholding of the I d e a of Absolute B e a u t y as a kind of revelation which renders
the perceiver "the friend of G o d " and " i m m o r t a l . " T h e experience is described in
the Republic (519) TM as a beatific vision. I n this sense it is ineffable, the object
of direct apprehension; and it can be neither t a u g h t nor communicated. I t is
concrete, as opposed to general, being an individual entity, indescribable in t e r m s
of common characteristics. B u t it is abstract as being on a plane a p a r t f r o m the
particular, t h a t which is m e r e l y an instance of a general type. T h e I d e a is not a
class designation; it is the p r o t o t y p e or p a r a d i g m , and as such is absolutely
unique.
N o w it appears t h a t it is this latter sense which Sehopenhauer t o o k to be the
true meaning of the t e r m " I d e a . " This is w h a t he believed was the object of
the genius' contemplation, and he chose to read P l a t o as being inconstant in his
adherence to t h a t definition. B u t I believe t h a t Schopenhauer's interpretation of
Plato on this m a t t e r is not necessarily correct. I n a n y event, it is surely not
the only one open to us.
Plato clearly did believe t h a t knowledge of the Ideas, p a r t i c u l a r l y t h a t of the
Good or the Beautiful, TM is attained only after a p r o t r a c t e d period of discipline
and study. While it is not guaranteed to all who seek it in this fashion, it is
totally inaccessible to those who do not. However, when it does come, it appears
in incandescent glory. T h e final achievement of knowledge transcends the purely
rational. This coalition of the mystical and the rational m a k e s sense of such
passages of the Seventh Epistle as the following:
Acquaintance with it must come rather after a long period of attendance in the subject itself
and of close companionship, when suddenly, like a blaze kindled by a leaping spark, it is generated in the soul and at once becomes self-sustaining. ~
and again:
... after practicing detailed comparisons of names and definitions.., at last, in a flash, understanding of each blazes up, and the mind as it exerts all its powers to the limit of human capacity is flooded with lights. 21
Conceivably, this view of the epistemic status of the Platonic I d e a s is consistent with Schopenhauer's own declaration t h a t the ability of the genius to
perceive the Ideas is due to his possession of a "superfluity of knowledge." B u t it
is not a surplus of knowledge of the ordinary t y p e which is involved; for, as

18Ibid., p. 751.
19There is some debate as to whether this is an Idea at all, or whether it might not better
be regarded as standing outside the hierarchy of Ideas altogether, as their source and anchor.
In my estimation this is a neo-Platonic innovation. I am inclined to the view that the Idea of
the Good is an Idea, albeit the highest and most perfect of them, and that there is nothing
which lies beyond or is more ultimate (if ultimacy permits of degrees) than the Ideas. Even
as the cause of all the other Ideas I should say that the Good remains one of them.
Hamilton and Cairns, p. 1589.
Ibid. p. 1591.

SCHOPENHAUER AND PLATONIC IDEAS

139

Schopenhauer indicates with the help of extremely Platonic imagery, the faculty
of knowledge for the common man is a "lamp to lighten his path," while for the
genius "it is the sun which reveals the world" (Bk. III, ~36).2~
The difference between Plato and Schopenhauer seems to revert to the metaphysical disagreement noted above. The knowledge required of the Platonic
philosopher is of an object existing in a realm which is ontologically distinct
from that of ordinary experience. This necessitates an appropriate adjustment of
his cognitive apparatus or perhaps a whole new set of equipment. But Schopenhauer's genius need only shift his intellectual gears to apprehend what there is.
There is one and only one reality, but the mode of its true apprehension is distinct
from the cognitive means employed for ordinary use.
There is a further consequence of this difference, and it is closely correlated to
the Platonic insistence upon experience and rational indoctrination. For Plato the
Ideas are not immanent in things. It is only after having been repeatedly reminded of it by the contemplation of fair forms and fair institutions that the
philosopher recalls the Idea of Beauty and then systematically achieves full
recognition of it. This would be impossible without breadth as well as depth of
acquaintance. But for Schopenhauer the Ideas are present in the realm of ordinary
experience. What is more, each Idea or adequate objectification of the Will is
present as a whole in each particular member of the species in which it is manifested.2~ This leads Schopenhauer to deny the necessity of wide experience of particulars in order to gain knowledge of the Ideas. On the contrary, he contends
that there is more to be gained from intense concentration upon a single thing
than from "measuring out the boundless world" (Bk. II, ~25).24
But now we encounter another difficulty common to both Plato's and Schopenhauer's philosophy, one which, however, thanks to his dualism, is more easily
resolved by Plato. Plato and Sehopenhauer are in accord in the belief that
things in nature never do achieve the perfection of the Ideas. Plato accounts for
the fact that we know this to be the case by means of his doctrine of reminiscence. All learning, he says, is recollection. Dimly seen half-truths in experience
evoke memories of fully grasped realities in a prior existence. Thus, while we
may remain ignorant of the standard, we all recognize that our experiences are
deficient. Even at best they merely approximate the Ideas; for it is of the very
nature of things in the realm of becoming that, being imitations, they fall short
of the Ideal model.
Schopenhauer has no more "perfect" realm to spur our memories. For him
Ideas are immanent in nature. But they are never totally realized in natural
phenomena. He must thus deal with two distinct problems. First, he must explain
how this unfortunate state of affairs is possible (i.e., that perfect and immanent
Ideas can yet be imperfect in their natural manifestation), and second how
anyone could know that this is so.
He addresses himself to the first of these questions by offering an account of
Payne, I, 188; Werke, II, 221.
The logical difficultiesof this position were well known to Plato and are extensively treated
in his discussionof the one and the many in Parmenides (131).
uPayne, I, 129; Werke, II, 153.

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the rarity of occurrences of Ideal beauty among natural phenomena. The various
levels of objectification of the Will are, he says, by their very nature constantly
at strife against one another (Bk. II, ~27).25 And the more complex the entity
(the human form being the highest and therefore most complex objectification of
the Will), the greater is the number of parts, each with its vita propria, which
must be coordinated and subordinated to the whole (Bk. III, ~45).26 Conceivably, then, a very simple entity could be a perfect embodiment of the Idea, but
the difficulty of harmonization of parts explains the infrequency of natural
beauty among complex entities. Things in nature, we must gather, do not correspond to complex Ideas, 27 but rather are composites in which a variety of
disparate Ideas are brought together. It is thus in the process of combination that
imperfections appear.
This is the explanation which Schopenhauer provides for the fact of imperfection in nature, but it may be that something else is really at the heart of the
matter. It seems likely that the elaborate account just given is a rationalization
of a thesis which Schopenhauer was led to defend on entirely different grounds.
Conceivably, the stimulus was an ambiguity inherent in his own terminology.
Schopenhauer uses the expression "Ideal" to refer to and adjectivally to modify
that which is perceived by the genius and represented in the work of art. This is
sometimes intended in the primary Platonic and evaluatively neutral sense of
"intelligible form" or "archetype." But the term as commonly used also has a
positive evaluative sense. Colloquially we speak of "the Ideal" as that which
would produce the highest moral or aesthetic satisfaction. We succeed or fail to
"live up to our Ideals"; we devise "Ideal systems"; and we hunt for and sometimes find "the Ideal girl," "the Ideal house," "the Ideal lob." In this sense, "the
Ideal" is a natural object of striving, a goal or final cause. It is a source of
motivation and a stimulus to action.
Since Schopenhauer describes the Will as constantly and restlessly striving,
one is almost automatically inclined to attribute a goal to this striving or at
least to imagine it as object-oriented. Normally one strives ]or something, an
Ideal. In fact, Schopenhauer claims elsewhere (Bk. II, ~21) ~s that the Will as
thing-in-itself is a blind force, guided by no purpose or knowledge of an end.
Yet on several occasions he seems to be swept along by common usage and thus
to treat the Ideal objectifications of the Will not simply as grades of reality
marking all possible species of things, but rather as high points, objectives which
nature vainly seeks to realize.
That such Ideals remain unachieved is also built into Sehopenhauer's philosophy. It is of the essence of the Will to be frustrated. For if it were ever permanently satisfied, it would cease its relentless striving, and thereby cease to be
what it is, or rather, come to an end altogether. Thus, it is that we are doomed to
Payne, I, 143; Werke, II, 174-175.
Payne, I, 221 ; Werke, II, 261.
If they did, we should be forced to say that the Ideas, being the "adequate" (i.e., most
perfect) objectification of the various gradations of the Will, must be paradigm instances of
incompatibility.Their disharmoniesmust be "built in"; but surely such domestic discord in the
realm of Being must be beneath the dignity of the Platonic archetypes.
~Payne, I, llO; WCrke,II, I31.

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141

the life of Tantalus, our goals dangling before us as a constant source of painful
longing; yet no more to be forgotten than achieved. Nature, if it is to exist at all,
is necessarily imperfect.
Granting this to be the case, and also assuming that imperfection, if it is to be
worth discussing, must be known as such, Schopenhauer is still faced with the
task of explaining how anyone can know that nature is deficient. In order to be
aware that x is lacking something, one must, according to the old Rationalist
dictum, have some idea of what a perfect x would be. Since Schopenhauer does
not attribute a transcendent existence to the Ideas, he cannot, as Plato does,
claim that some or all of us have privileged access to that supra-sensible realm
in which the unalloyed Ideas abide. And yet someone must be in a position to
perceive and constantly remind us of the shortcomings of ordinary experience.
It is the genius who fulfills this function. He possesses a priori knowledge of
the Ideas. It is not by recollection, but by "anticipation" that he "understands
the half-uttered speech of nature." He sees and represents what nature herself
never has produced, and thus he "articulates clearly what she only stammered
forth" (Bk. III, ~r
His ability to do so is gratuitous.
Such knowledge is not essential to the ordinary man. It is not presupposed by
daily experience, and without it the common man can live contentedly. He is
sufficiently equipped with intellectual powers to serve the needs of his individual
wilt, and normally he has no cause to linger over impractical details, lie sees
things restrictedly in a means-end, cause-effect relation, and this is adequate to
the demands of daily living. It is only when he comes in contact with works of
art and is touched by the creations of genius that he is enabled to recognize a
posteriori the Ideas as represented in nature.
Thus far we have left unquestioned the assumption, apparently made by both
Plato and Schopenhauer, that the apprehension of the Ideas is somehow ennobling and desirable. There is some similarity in their portrayal of what happens to an individual who has the experience. Plato describes the apprehension
of the Ideas as entailing an attention to the object devoid of all its relations of
time, place and circumstance (Symposium, 211). 80 Such concentration, he says,
produces a transfiguration in the viewer, rendering him "a friend of God" and
"immortal." In so far as knowledge is a kind of possession, communion or
identification with the object, knowledge of the immortal necessarily imparts
immortality to the knower.
Schopenhauer describes a similar transformation in the knower. In contemplating the Ideas, "we no longer consider the where, the when, the why and the
whither in things, but simply and solely the what" (Bk. III, ~34). 81 "We lose
ourselves entirely in this o b j e c t . . , we forget our individuality, our will, and
continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object, so that it is
as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we
are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception but the two have
become o n e . . . " (ibid.). As such, the viewer takes on the characteristics of the
~ Payne, I, 222-223 ; We~ke, II, 262.
3oHamilton and Cairns, pp. 562-563.
Payne, I, 178; Werke, II, 210.

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object and becomes a pure infinite, timeless subject of knowledge, s2 Of Schopenhauer's concept of the Ideas, one might almost say t h a t they are identified by
their effect upon the perceiver. T h e y are all but defined as the sort of thing which
can be experienced only b y a pure willess subject who has laid aside all individual
features.
But now what are the consequences of such shedding of individuality? According to Plato, the contemplation of the Ideas is in itself a source of incomparable joy, so great t h a t the philosopher must be compelled to break off his
concentration on the Ideas and to return to the cave to fulfill his obligation to
enlighten the remaining inhabitants. While he m a y be mocked and mistreated
upon his return, he knows for himself t h a t his labors have been worth the trouble
and t h a t it is better to suffer injustice than, through ignorance, to do it.
Schopenhauer too speaks glowingly, but qualifiedly, of the satisfaction derived
from contemplating the Ideas. The heightened sensitivity which enables the
artist to have this experience also enlarges his capacity for suffering. And the
excess of intellect which makes possible his insight is counterbalanced by defects
of a practical nature. H e is thus subject to all manner of indignities with only
the small compensation of periodic t e m p o r a r y release. Schopenhauer goes so far
as to suggest t h a t no one would voluntarily be an artist; t h a t it is only the
spontaneous overflow of intellect which produces the works of genius. This
contention, however, is difficult to reconcile with his assertion t h a t the artist
possesses the unique capacity of retaining the obiective vision of the world, "and
this not merely for moments, but with the necessary continuity and conscious
thought to enable (him) to repeat by deliberate art what has been apprehended,
and to fix in lasting thoughts the wavering images t h a t float before the mind"
(Bk. III, ~36).3'~
Plato avoids this incongruity in his depiction of the artist, for whom intuition
(however fallacious and far removed from the Ideas) and expression occur in a
single, spontaneous and unpremeditated act. 34 Technical training is of little value
to the artist on Plato's view. For, while there are objective standards of aesthetic
judgment, there is no such thing as deliberate art. This, according to Plato, is
the artist's worst offense; for the poet creates in ignorance, while in a state of
ecstatic inspiration (Ion, 534).35
B y contrast, there is no doubt t h a t for the philosopher, acquaintance with the
Ideas is a positive value to be consciously and deliberately pursued.
Schopenhauer goes on to draw a conclusion which Plato warily avoided, that the knower,
becoming aware of himself as pure knowing subject, discovers that he is the condition and
hence the supporter of the world and all objective existence. All nature is thus revealed as
dependent upon his existence, a mere accident of his being (ibid.). Such solipsistic romanticism
is surely foreign to Plato's concept of the universe as rational and real. There is indeed a bit
of perverse logic in the claim that of two identical entities (subject and object) one is dependent upon the other. The determination of which one is which must be a matter of pure caprice.
~Payne, I, 186; Werke, II, 219. Schopenhauer makes an exception in the case of the composer, who "reveals the innermost nature of the world, and expresses the profoundest wisdom
in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand, just as a magnetic somnambulist
gives information about things of which she has no conception when she is awake" (Bk. III,
~52). Payne, I, 260 ; Werke, II, 307.
*~Plato thus appears to anticipate Croce's view, as expressed in his Aesthetic (1909) that "To
intuite is to express; and nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less), than to express."
Aesthetic, trans. D. Ainslie, (New York: The Noonday Press), p. 11.
Hamilton and Cairns, p. 220.

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143

On the whole, the practical consequences of the apprehension of the Ideas are
far more affirmative for Plato than they are for Schopenhauer. Acquaintance
with the Ideas is, on Plato's view, the most certain means of realizing the good
life. And the life of goodness is the life of happiness. Knowledge of the Ideas is
that which satisfies man's highest (erotic) tendencies and which, in its completion, achieves his self-fulfillment and well-being. Plato offers some hope that, with
adequate education and the help of the enlightened philosopher, a small segment
of the population, at least, will reach this peak.
Schopenhauer's representation of the Will as a dynamic force has some elements in common with Plato's discussion of Eros in the Symposium. But there is
the major difference that Schopenhauer offers no lasting reward, no gratification
of purpose. The genius may gain temporary respite through the contemplation of
the Ideas. For a moment he enjoys surcease from the will to live and thus a
liberation from reality. By rising above himself and becoming a "pure will-less
subject of knowledge" he achieves a kind of blissful annihilation of the individual, will-tormented self. But inevitably, reality closes in once more upon him,
driving him hopelessly onward, nowhere. Since the Will is reality, it is impossible
for the genius (or anyone) to turn away from it altogether and deny life. The
saint comes closest of all to this state. Through asceticism and suffering he
reaches a level of resignation whose total self-denial amounts to an extinction of
the Will. 0nly then does he recognize that "this our world, which is so real, with
all its suns and milky ways--is nothing" (Bk. IV, ~71). 36 For him not even
the Ideas are ultimately worthy of contemplation.
It is curious that Plato, whose theories have often been criticized for their
other-worldliness, represents knowledge of the Ideas as leading to an increase of
satisfaction in this life. No doubt the philosopher would prefer to remain with the
Ideas and escape the limitations of Becoming altogether. Thus the true philosopher is "always occupied in the practice of dying"; and yet so long as he does
occupy the body and must live, his acquaintance with the Ideas enhances his
life and that of his fellows. This is not the case for Schopenhauer. The release
which the genius gets through his apprehension of the Ideas is brief and is for
him alone. Whatever insights are transmitted to other men through the contemplation of works of art are essentially accidental. They gratify men's need
for an occasional holiday from life, but they do not refresh and revitalize the
beholder. They have nothing to say to him which will enable him to return to
life and find there new meaning and value. Just the reverse, they cause mundane
existence to appear all the more intolerable by contrast.
Perhaps the basis of Plato's optimism and Schopenhauer's pessimism will be
illuminated by an analogy. We may compare Schopenhauer's representation of
the Ideas as gradations of the Will objectified to a series of still photographs of a
horse race. The Will itself, like the race, is a continuous process, but one may
artificially designate static phases of it. In the case of the horse race, such
pictures may be of value to someone who wants to see which horse was leading
at a given moment, or who wants to prove a point about the gait of a horse (e.g.,

Payne, I, 412; Werke, II, 487.

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HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

whether all four legs are ever simultaneously off the ground). They may enable
the cognoscenti to determine something about the peculiar habits of a particular
horse or jockey. In other words, the static representation of the race may be
interesting in a special way to someone who has an external purpose to fulfill.
But for the race enthusiast, the race is in the dynamics of the running. The image
is a distortion of that reality. I t is not its object or goal, nor can it, as a derivative falsification of it, be inherently superior to reality. This would be true if
there were a final cause guiding the direction of the stream of reality; it is so a
]ortiori of Schopenhauer's system in which the Will is explicitly described as
being blindly striving toward no specific goal. If the race itself is pointless, what
merit beyond that of a temporary aesthetic enjoyment can there be in lingering
over isolated moments of it?
For Plato the situation is quite otherwise. The Ideas for him are not mere
stops along the way. They are not crystallized slices of reality nor "bigger than
life" representations of it. They are the shimmering goal toward which all things
strive. They are the object of all love and hope. And thus to apprehend them is
already to have won the race. In so far as a particular thing realizes its Idea, it
achieves its purpose and is an object of value. Whoever perceives the Ideas then
gains an awareness of the fullest and most perfect expression of reality.
Schopenhauer appears to have retained the positive associations and the affectire tone of the Platonic theory of Ideas, but he has stripped the Ideas of their
purposive content. One may conclude that the Ideas play by no means as fundamental a role in the philosophy of Schopenhauer as in that of Plato. They are not
the ultimate constituents of reality, They are not presupposed by all human
knowledge, nor are they its final object. Indeed, one may survive moderately well
without ever having knowledge of the existence of the Ideas. They play no
integral part in the ethical well-being of man, and finally, they contribute only
infinitesimally to his meager portion of happiness. Perhaps the expression
"Platonic Ideas," as employed by Schopenhauer, should, as a historical nicety, be
enclosed in quotation marks.

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