TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP VS.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS

AND MORTGAGE BANK
GR 137980 JUNE 20, 2000
FACTS:
Respondent has a legal problem with regard to its real estate holdings.
The law requires that respondents real estate holdings should only be
50% of its net worth. This constituted a bar to the planned expansion
of respondent. To solve the predicament of the respondent, it created
a separate entity, which is petitioner, wherein the existing branch sites
would be unloaded and the said petitioner would also acquire new
branch sites for respondent and lease it to the latter. Pursuant to the
agreement between the two parties, the petitioner acquired properties
from respondent and then leased them to the latter. It was a part of
the agreement that petitioner only holds properties for the respondent
and that the said properties would be returned to respondent at its
pleasure.
There came a time when there was a disagreement between the two
parties on which of the 2 lease contracts of lease presented by each
party governs them. Petitioner contends that it is the 11-year contract
while the other presents a 20-year contract. Both contracts have been
allegedly notarized and executed on the same date.
Using the 11-year contract as basis, the petitioner filed a petition for
ejectment against respondent. However, the petitioner lost in all its
cases and appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The CA
mentioned in its decision that the lower courts erred in refusing to
exercise jurisdiction, when the issue of possession and issue of validity
of contract is intertwined. Nonetheless, it dismissed the petition to
maintain judicial consistency and stability as other ejectment cases
like the one at bar have already been decided on. Petitioner filed MR
and was granted by ordering respondent to pay the unpaid rentals.
Subsequently, the respondent filed an MR and the CA reversed its
decision, which made petitioner file an appeal to the SC saying that
the CA erred in considering the ruling of the court in another case as
the law of the case between petitioner and respondent. Respondent then
said that only decisions of the SC establish jurisprudence or
doctrines.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to
the case at bar even if the parties and properties involved are
different?
HELD:
The stare decisis principle should be upheld.

There had been previously a decision by the SC involving the

same parties but different property, wherein it was upheld and decided
that the 20-year lease contract should prevail. It even mentioned in
its decision that the 11-year contract was forged and simulated as it
was never really notarized nor submitted to the Central Bank, as
required by law.
In the light of the aforementioned decision, the Court doesnt
have any option but to uphold the 20-year lease contract, following the
principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled).
It is the policy of the Court to maintain judicial stability in
accordance to stare decisis. As in this case, the same questions
relating to the same even have been put forward by parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent
court, the rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the
same issue. The ruling is final even as to parties who are strangers to
the original proceedings and not bound by the judgment under the res
judicata doctrine. Stare decisis should apply if the facts are
substantially the same even if the parties may be different.

JM TUASON AND CO. INC. VS. MARIANO

GR 3314O OCTOBER 23, 1978
FACTS:
Respondents filed a complaint praying that they be declared
owners of a certain parcel of land located in Rizal. They alleged that
their father acquired this land with a Spanish title. They alleged that
petitioner fraudulently or included the land in an original certificate of
title. They also alleged that transfer certificates of title were issued to
petitioners irregularly. Given such, they are praying that the titles
derived therefrom be declared void due to irregular proceedings.
The lower court issued an order requiring the parties to produce
documents to support their allegations. With this, the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, inter alia, that the lower court be
ordered to dismiss the complaint and enjoined from proceeding the
case.
Before this present complaint, the respondents had already filed
a complaint questioning the validity of the titles of petitioner, wherein
the lower court and the SC upheld its validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the titles can still be questioned by respondents?

HELD:
They cannot anymore question. Considering the principle of
stare decisis, the respondents cannot anymore continue with their
action without eroding the long settled holding of the courts of the
validity of the titles and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the
merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the courts time and
energies at the expense of other litigants.

EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS VS. MARQUIDA

GR 953, SEPTEMBER 18, 1947
FACTS:
The case at bar is an appeal of respondent of the decision
rendered by the lower court, finding him guilty of the crime of treason.
Respondent was charged with the crime of treason for allegedly
helping out Japanese occupants in arresting and abducting of Filipinos
who were thought to be guerrillas. He was found guilty by the lower
court, using the testimony of many witnesses.
It is alleged that respondent cannot be found of guilty of treason
due to the indetermination of his citizenship or nationality. Following
the doctrine of stare decisis, wherein in a prior case, 2 were not found
to be citizens since during the time of birth, a limitation on the
application of jus soli for citizenship was established.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the principle of stare decisis should be applied to
the case at bar?
HELD:
No. Stare decisis doesnt work up to the extent of perpetuating
an error. If it is found that in the past there was a mistake, stare
decisis shouldnt bar the Court from correcting itself.

JOSE TAN CHONG VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR

GR 47616 OCTOBER 15, 1941
This is an appeal taken by the Solicitor-General from the decision of the
Court of Jose Tan Chong for a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release
from the custody of the Secretary of Labor.
FACTS:

It appears that the petitioner was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in the month of
July, 1915, of a Chinese father named Tan Chong Hong and a Filipino mother
named Antonia Mangahis; that his parents were legally married; that
sometime in 1925 when the petitioner was about ten years old he was taken
by his parents to China; that on January 25, 1940, he arrived at the port of
Manila and sought entry as a native born citizen. The board of Special
Inquiry assigned to hear his case, denied him admission on the alleged
ground that he is a Chinese citizen, and on appeal, the Secretary of labor
affirmed the decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of the
petitioner to the port from whence he came. The petitioner sued for a writ
of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was granted.
Hence, the present appeal by the Solicitor-General.
The petitioner, having been born in the Philippines before the approval of our
Constitution, of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino citizen.
This conclusion is in harmony with the policy embodied in the Constitution
(par. 4 sec. 1, Art. IV; Torres vs. Tan Chim, G. R. No. 46593, promulgated
Feb. 3, 1940; Gallofin vs.Ordoez, G.R. No. 46782, promulgated June 27,
1940). His sojourn in China did not adversely affect his Philippine citizenship,
it appearing that ever since he was twelve years old he wanted to return to
the Philippines but his father would not allow him to come, and he did not
have means to pay for his transportation back to the Philippines until the
date of his return. Animus revertendi existed here. (Lim Teco vs. Collector of
Customs, 23 Phil., 84; Muoz vs. Collector of Customs, 20 Phil., 494;
Lorenzo vs. McCoy, 15 Phil., 559.)
The judgment of the lower court is accordingly affirmed, without
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.

LAM SWEE SANG VS. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILS.

GR 47623 SEPTEMBER 16, 1947
FACTS:
Petitioners in the two cases are both of born of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother. The first petitioner was granted writ of habeas
corpus since he was declared to be a Filipino citizen due to the doctrine
of jus soli, which says that when one is born in a country, he acquires
the citizenship of that country. Such has been said to be the same
with the second petitioner. Second petitioners petition for
naturalization was dismissed since he no longer needed to be

naturalized. The Solicitor General opposed such decision, saying that

the two are not citizens of the Philippines pursuant to the laws existing
during their time of birth.
Before this, the Court, with regard to cases like this, used the
principle of jus soli, adopted from the US Constitution, which says that
all those born and naturalized in the US and placed under its
jurisdiction is a citizen of the US.
The Solicitor General mentioned that the principle of jus soli
wasnt extended to the Philippines. In a previous case wherein jus soli
was used was based in a prior case, which mentioned the principle of
jus soli but wasnt actually the issue at hand. Furthermore, if ever the
principle of jus soli was extended, it had its limitations. The law that
prevailed then mentioned that if one was born after a certain date and
in accordance with other conditions, which would only be the time
when one is considered a citizen. Otherwise, they are not to be
considered citizens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not precedents regarding citizenship should be
upheld, following the principle of stare decisis?
HELD:
No, the principle of stare decisis doesnt mean being blind
adherence to precedents. Even if the doctrines laid down have been
followed for years, if it has been found to be contrary to law, it should
be abandoned or reconsidered. Principle of stare decisis shouldnt be
applied if there is conflict between law and precedent.
Given that the law enforced during the time of birth of two
petitioners doesnt allow them to be citizens of the Philippines, even if
precedence tells that they be allowed to be citizens of the Philippines,
cannot be declared Filipino citizens.

FRANCISCO VS. HRET

GR 160261 NOVEMBER 11, 2003
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition questioning the constitutionality of
the impeachment proceedings being held by the House of
Representatives against Chief Justice Davide.
The first impeachment proceeding brought against the Chief
Justice, together with other associate justices, is by Joseph Estrada,
for the alleged culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust, and other high crimes. It proceeded due to good form but was
later on dismissed due to lack of substance.
Another impeachment proceeding was being brought against the

Chief Justice, in a period less than the one-year bar provided by the
Constitution and the rules of the House of Representatives. This was
initiated by 2 representatives and was endorsed by many other
representatives.
This resulted to many petitions by many individuals as well as
associations questioning the constitutionality of such move by
Congress. The petitions were consolidated having raised similar
issues. The petitions contend that the second impeachment
proceeding was in culpable violation of the Constitution wherein there
is a one-year bar before one can initiate impeachment proceedings
against the same individual. The first proceeding was less than a year
away from the filing of the second proceeding.
Congress mainly contended that the Supreme Court had no
power to inquire about the impeachment proceedings as it is the
former which has the power to facilitate or administer impeachment
proceedings, as provided by the Constitution. If the Supreme Court
interrupts and inquires about the proceedings, it will disturb the
doctrine of separation of powers as well as the doctrine of checks and
balances. The impeachment proceeding is in itself under the power of
the Congress and is a political question.
ISSUE:
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Whether or not the second impeachment proceeding against
Davide is constitutional?
Whether or not the impeachment proceeding was a political
question wherein the SC cannot disturb it?
HELD:
On the first issue, it is prevalent that the second impeachment
proceeding against the Chief Justice is unconstitutional. Under Article
XI of our present Constitution, it is provided that with regard to the
impeachment of public officials such as the Chief Justice, there is a
one-year bar provided. No impeachment proceeding shall be initiated
against the same official within a period of one year. The term initiate
refers to the filing of the case against the official. It starts when a
complaint is filed with the Committee of Justice of the House of
Representatives. It is not initiated during the time when it is verified
by the other members of the House or when it is given to Senate for
hearing.
On the second issue, it is said that the SC cannot question or
inquire about the impeachment proceedings since it will disturb the
separation of power, check and balance between the branches of
government, and that the SC has vested interest in the issue.
The Constitution was equivocal in granting the judiciary,

moreover the SC, the duty to settle controversies that are legally
demandable and enforceable. It has been vested the duty to check if
there is any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
office of government. In this petition wherein the constitutionality of
the impeachment proceeding is questioned, no one has the power to
interpret the fundamental law of the land and answer the issue of
constitutionality other than the SC. Given such, even if the legislative
that commences and administers impeachment proceedings, it is not a
bar for the SC to inquire about their actions especially if
constitutionality is involved.

URBANA VELASCO AROC VS. PHHC

GR L-39674 JANUARY 31, 1978
FACTS:
The case at bar in appeal of the decision to the CA the order of
the Court of First Instance dismissing on the ground of res judicata the
complaint to declare null and void the sale of a certain parcel of land.
Appellants are occupants of one-half of a parcel of land. They
constructed a house and made some improvements on the land. They
later on filed with appellee corporation application for the award and
sale of such portion of land. They did this for several times without
any action from appellee corporation. They later found out that the
parcel of land had been unlawfully and in bad faith awarded and sold
to appellee spouses, who according to appellants, are disqualified from
purchasing said land since they have prior purchased a land already
from appellee corporation together with other properties. Appellants
filed a case against the appellee corporation and spouses.
In defense of the spouses, they contend that the case should be
dismissed due to the ground of res judicata. A case was already
decided in their favor, wherein the issue was regarding quieting of
title. They contend that appellants are barred by prior judgment.
The Court of First Instance dismissed the complaint of the
appellants, using the ground raised by the appellees of res judicata. It
contended that the prior case had already been final and executory
and that there is nothing else for them to do but to dismiss the
complaint of the appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not res judicata is applicable in the case at bar?
HELD:
No, it is not. For the principle of res judicata to apply, four
requisites must be present: the former judgment must be final, it must
have been rendered by a court with proper jurisdiction over the case,

it must be a judgment on the merits, and there must be, between the
two cases, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. In
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this case, it is only with regard to cause of action that the parties
disagree.
Cause of action is defined to be an act or omission of second
party in violation of the legal rights of the other, and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right.
In the prior judged case, the cause of action was for the quieting
of title or removing the cloud on the title of the land. While in the case
at bar, the cause of action was not only to ask for the nullification of
the award and sale of the parcel of land but also, it questions the
validity of appellee corporations award and sale of the parcel of land
to the spouses. Given such, the two causes of action are different
from one another.
In the application of the doctrine of res judicata wherein it is
sometimes doubtful whether there are same causes of action, the test
normally employed is to consider the identity of the facts or whether
the same evidence would sustain both. If the same facts and evidence
would sustain both, then the former would be a bar to any subsequent
action. Otherwise, there wouldnt be. And with applying such test, it
is found that more evidence is needed to prove the second cause of
action.
Given aforementioned circumstances, the second cause of action
is remanded to the Court of First Instance for further proceedings.

CAYANA VS. CA
GR 125607 MARCH 18, 2004
FACTS:
It appears that the petitioners and respondents father, with the
marital consent of his wife, sold two parcels of land to their son, one of
the respondents in this case. At the death of the father, the mother
filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claims pertaining to the two parcels of
land, alleging that the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of their son were
forgeries. However, later on, she issued an affidavit withdrawing such
adverse claims.
Later on, together with petitioners of this case and respondent
Marceliano, they filed a case against respondent Pastor, for the
cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale and reconveyance of the two

parcels of land. Meanwhile, respondent Pastor entered into an

agreement of counter guaranty with respondent corporation using
second parcel of land; mortgaged first parcel to respondent bank and
sold first parcel of land to a certain Rosafina Reginaldo, who then
mortgaged the land to respondent bank.
As the civil case against respondents was ongoing, respondents
filed an answer but were found to be in default, the court allowed
petitioners to file evidence ex parte.
The court decided the civil case in favor of petitioners, declaring
the deed of absolute sale null and void but denied the prayer for
reconveyance saying that the mother was still the owner of the land.
No appeal was entered by respondents and the decision was deemed
final.
The mortgage on the first parcel of land was foreclosed and the
bank being the highest bidder, bought the property who then sold it to
respondent spouses Marceliano Cayabyab. The respondent spouses M.
Cayabyab then sold the land to respondent spouses Ramos.
The petitioners filed a verified complaint for the nullification and
cancellation of the deeds of absolute sale of the respondents. They
asked also for the possession of the 2 parcels of land due to the
alleged donation inter vivos of their mother.
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The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners, part of the
decision included the application of res judicata. Respondents
appealed this to the CA contending the misuse of res judicata. CA
decided in favor of the respondents. It held that res judicata was
inapplicable and also, declared the deeds of absolute sale and TCTs
valid. CA mentioned that it was evident that there was an affidavit
withdrawing adverse claims over land, that the sale of parcels of land
were not simulated and not done in bad faith, and that there was no
evidence for the donation inter vivos being alleged by the petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision on the first civil case constitutes a
bar to the defenses and claims of respondents in the second case?
HELD:
Both the trial court and CA misread the provisions on the effect
of judgments or final orders as given by Rules of Civil Procedure:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing, or in
respect to the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a
deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal

condition or status of a particular person or his relationship to another,

the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing,
the will or administration, or the condition, status or relationship of the
person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the
testator or intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
to the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so

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Page 13 of 147
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessarily thereto.

Res judicata and the bar of prior judgment is not applicable to

this case since the requisites for these two to apply are not present.
There is bar by prior judgment when, between the first case where
the judgment was rendered and the second case which is sought to be
barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
The judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the
subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand in controversy,
including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to
every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the
claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose and of all matters that could have
been adjudged in that case. But where between the first and second
cases, there is identity of parties but no identity of cause of action, the
first judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those
matters actually and directly controverted and determined and not as
to matters merely involved therein. For res judicata to apply, there
must be (1) a former final judgment rendered on the merits; (2) the
court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; and, (3) identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action
between the first and second actions. According to the appellate court,
the third requisite for the application of res judicata is not present in
this case.
The doctrine that should have been followed in this case is
conclusiveness of judgment--a fact or question which was in issue in a
former suit and there was judicially passed upon and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment

therein as far as the parties to that action and persons in privity with
them are concerned and cannot be again litigated in any future action
between such parties or their privies, in the same court or any other
court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause of
action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper authority.
The decision of the trial court, which was final, declaring the
deeds of absolute sale null and void, precluded the CA from further
adjudicating the validity of the deeds and titles.

AGILENT TECHNOLOGIES VS. INTEGRATED SILICON

TECHNOLOGY
GR154618 APRIL 14, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner is a foreign corporation which doesnt have license to
do business in the Philippines. Respondent is a private domestic
corporation which 100% foreign owned. They have a juridical
relationship, which can be traced to a 5-year Value-Added Assembly
Services Agreement (VAASA).
Respondent filed a case against petitioner for specific
performance and damages for breach of oral agreement to extend the
terms of VAASA. Petitioner on the other hand, filed a separate
complaint against respondent for specific performance, recovery of
possession, sum of money with replevin, preliminary mandatory
injunction, and damages. Petitioner is praying for a writ of replevin or
preliminary injunction for the return of equipment and other materials,
together with damages. On this complaint, respondent filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of capacity of petitioner to sue, litis
pendentia, forum shopping and lack of cause of action.
The trial court ordered a writ of replevin and with a motion for
reconsideration, respondent immediately appealed to the CA who then
set aside the said order and dismissed the case filed by petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was reversible error on the part of the CA
when it dismissed the case of petitioner due to litis pendentia?
HELD:
Yes there was. It was erroneous on the part of the CA to say
that the lower court had no jurisdiction over second case because of
litis pendentiaa pending action doesnt strip a court of its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, Litis pendentia as a ground for the dismissal of a
civil action refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the
second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious. For litis pendentia

to be invoked, the concurrence of the following requisites is necessary:

(a) identity of parties or at least such as represent the same
interest in both actions;
(b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs
being founded on the same facts; and
(c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in one would, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.
The identity of the parties in the two cases notwithstanding,
there is want of the other 2 requisites for litis pendentia to apply.
There are distinct rights being asserted, two different causes of action
and reliefs prayed for. Moreover, there wouldnt be any res judicata
since the two causes of action are different from another.

BUAYA V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.

GR 139020 OCTOBER 11, 2000
FACTS:
On July 31, 1985, Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. filed a
complaint against Paquito B. Buaya, a manager of their Cebu branch
for the collection of the principal amount of P678,076.83, which is
allegedly his unremitted premium collections owing to the Stronghold.
For failure of Buaya and his counsel to appear at the pre-trial, he was
defaulted and Stronghold was allowed to present his evidences,
without the other party. On the basis of Strongholds evidence, the
court decided on September 17, 1987, in favor of Stronghold.
Buaya appealed to the CA, and on March 30, 1990, decided in favor of
Buaya, annulling the decision and remanding the case to the lower
court for further proceedings. The lower court therefore set a hearing
on December 13, 1990 but Buaya filed a Motion of Postponement of
the hearing and was granted. He repeated his motion and gave
several reasons to postpone the hearings. On July 26, 1991,
Stronghold opposed the motion, but the court granted Buayas motion
provided that the next time he does it, it will be considered a waiver of
his right to present evidence. Stronghold filed a motion to reinstate its
previous decision dated, September 17, 1987. Buaya filed a motion
for reconsideration but was denied. He files a Petition for Certiorari
assailing the orders of the court but was dismissed for lack of merit.
On June 28, 1993, the courts decision has became final and executory
and thus denied all other appeals made before it.
ISSUES:
1. Can a decision of a Regional Trial Court which is annulled by the
Court of Appeals be reinstated by the trial court which rendered

the decision or any trial court for that matter and thereafter
order its execution?
2. When the decision of a trial court is annulled by the Court of
Appeals for having been rendered without notice to the Buaya of
the pre-trial and subsequent hearing and remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings, does the jurisdiction of the trial
court merely require the presentation of evidence for Buaya and
without anymore requiring the presentation of Strongholds
evidence for cross-examination by the Buaya?
RULING: This petition has no merit. DENIED.
RATIO:
1. Annulled Decision: The decision of the trial court was not
annulled by the CA, because his Appeal Brief stated that it had
merely been set aside. This shows that the trial court's Decision
was reversed and set aside, not annulled, by the appellate court.
Since it was merely set aside to enable petitioner to present his
evidence, then there was nothing wrong with the Order of the
trial court reinstating its original decision after he had failed to
take advantage of the ample opportunity given him to present
evidence. An authentic copy thereof should have been
submitted to support his claim that the Decision of the trial court
had indeed been annulled by that of the CA. Hence, a copy of
the latter is a "material portion of the record [that] would
support the petition." Failure to attach or submit it is sufficient
ground for this Petition's dismissal.
2. Final and Executory Judgment: Once a judgment becomes final
and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right, it is axiomatic that once a decision attains
finality, it becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim
that it is erroneous. Having been rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction acting within its authority, the judgment
may no longer be altered even at the risk of occasional legal
infirmities or errors it may contain. Litigations must end and
terminate sometime and somewhere. The effective and efficient
administration of justice requires that once a judgment has
become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the
fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed
by the same parties.