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THE MEDICAL ACT OF 1959

implementation of the foregoing functions.


ARTICLE I
Objectives and Implementation

Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of
the practice of medicine in the Philippines.
Section 2. Enforcement. For the purpose of implementing the provisions of this Act, there are created the
following agencies: the Board of Medical Education under the Department of Education, and the Board of
Medical Examiners under the Commissioner of Civil Service.
ARTICLE II
The Board of Medical Education Its Functions
Section 3. Composition of Board of Medical Education. The Board of Medical Education shall be composed of
the Secretary of Education or his duly authorized representative, as chairman, and the Secretary of Health or his
duly authorized representative, the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools or his duly authorized
representative, the chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners or his duly authorized representative, a
representative of private practitioners, upon recommendation of an acknowledged medical association and a
representative chosen by the Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities, as members.
The officials acting as chairman and members of the Board of Medical Education shall hold office during their
incumbency in their respective positions.

Section 6. Minimum required courses. Students seeking admission to the medical course must have a bachelor
of science or bachelor of arts degree or their equivalent and must have taken in four years the following subjects
with their corresponding number of units:
Unit
English

12

Latin

Mathematics, including Accounting and Statistics

Philosophy, including Psychology and Logic

12

Zoology and Botany

15

Physics

Chemistry

21

Library Science

Humanities and Social Sciences

12

Section 4. Compensation and traveling expenses. The chairman and members of the Board of Medical
Education shall not be entitled to any compensation except for traveling expenses in connection with their
official duties as herein provided.

Twelve units of Spanish shall be required pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Seven hundred nine; but
commencing with the academic year nineteen hundred sixty to nineteen hundred sixty-one, twenty-four units of
Spanish shall be required pursuant to Republic Act Numbered Eighteen hundred and eighty-one as cultural,
social and nationalistic studies.

For administrative purposes, the Board shall hold office in the office of its chairman, who may designate a
ranking official in the Department of Education to serve as secretary of the Board.

Provided, That the following students may be permitted to complete the aforesaid preparatory medical course in
shorter periods as follows:

Section 5. Functions. The functions of the Board of Medical Education shall be:
(a) To determine and prescribe minimum requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine,
to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instructions in accordance with modern
trends;

(a) Students whose general average is below eighty-five per cent but without any grade of failure or
condition may be allowed to pursue and finish the course in three academic years and the intervening
summer sessions; and
(b) Students whose general average is eighty-five per cent or over may be permitted to finish the
course in three academic years by allowing them to take each semester the overload permitted to
bright students under existing regulations of the Bureau of Private Schools.

(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and the minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including student-teacher ratio and curriculum;

Provided, That upon failure to maintain the general average of eighty-five per cent, students under (b) shall
automatically revert to the category of students under (a) and those under (a), upon having any grade of failure
or condition, shall automatically revert to the category of students required to pursue the preparatory course in
four years mentioned above.

(d) To determine and prescribe the number of students who should be allowed to take up the
preparatory course taking into account the capacity of the different recognized colleges of medicine.

The medical course shall be at least five years, including not less than eleven rotating internship in an approved
hospital, and shall consist of the following subjects:

(e) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which
comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof: and
(f) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce necessary rules and regulations for the proper

Anatomy
Physiology

Biochemistry and Nutrition


Pharmacology
Microbiology
Parasitology
Medicine and Therapeutics
Genycology
Opthalmology, Otology, Rhinology and Laryngology
Pediatrics

10. Number of students enrolled in each class.


ARTICLE III
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS; REGISTRATION OF PHYSICIANS
Section 8. Prerequisite to the practice of medicine. No person shall engage in the practice of medicine in the
Philippines unless he is at least twenty-one years of age, has satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board
Examination, and is a holder of a valid Certificate of Registration duly issued to him by the Board of Medical
Examiners.
Section 9. Candidates for board examination. Candidates for Board examinations shall have the following
qualifications:

Surgery

(1) He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has submitted
competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under
the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof;

Preventive Medicine and Public Health

(2) He shall be of good moral character, showing for this purpose certificate of civil status;

Legal Medicine, including Medical Jurisprudence and Ethics.

(3) He shall be of sound mind;

Obstetrics

Section 7. Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student to its first year class who has
not been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude, and who
presents (a) a certificate showing completion of a standard high school course, (b) a record showing completion
of a standard preparatory medical course as herein provided, (c) a certificate of registration as medical student,
(d) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former professors in the pre-medicine course, and (e)
birth certificate and marriage certificate, if any. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to inhibit any college of
medicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed
admissible.
For the purposes of this Act, the term "College of Medicine" shall mean to include faculty of medicine, institute
of medicine, school of medicine or other similar institution offering a complete medical course leading to the
degree of Doctor of Medicine or its equivalent.
Every college of medicine must keep a complete record of enrollment, grades and turnover, and must publish
each year a catalogue giving the following information:
1. Date of publication
2. Calendar for the academic year
3. Faculty roll indicating whether on full time part time basis
4. Requirements of admission
5. Grading system
6. Requirements for promotion
7. Requirements for graduation
8. Medical hours per academic year by departments
9. Schedule hours per academic year by departments

(4) He shall not have been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving
moral turpitude; and
(5) He shall be a holder of the degree of Doctor of Medicine or its equivalent, conferred by a college
of medicine duly recognized by the Department of Education.
Section 10. Acts constituting practice of medicine. A person shall be considered as engaged in the practice of
medicine (a) who shall, for compensation, fee, salary or reward in any form, paid to him directly or through
another, or even without the same, physical examine any person, and diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe any
remedy for any human disease, injury, deformity, physical, mental or physical condition or any ailment, real or
imaginary, regardless of the nature of the remedy or treatment administered, prescribed or recommended; or (b)
who shall, by means of signs, cards, advertisements, written or printed matter, or through the radio, television or
any other means of communication, either offer or undertake by any means or method to diagnose, treat,
operate or prescribe any remedy for any human disease, injury, deformity, physical, mental or physical
condition; or (c) who shall use the title M.D. after his name.
Section 11. Exemptions. The preceding section shall not be construed to affect (a) any medical student duly
enrolled in an approved medical college or school under training, serving without any professional fee in any
government or private hospital, provided that he renders such service under the direct supervision and control of
a registered physician; (b) any legally registered dentist engaged exclusively in the practice of dentistry; (c) any
duly registered masseur or physiotherapist, provided that he applies massage or other physical means upon
written order or prescription of a duly registered physician, or provided that such application of massage or
physical means shall be limited to physical or muscular development; (d) any duly registered optometrist who
mechanically fits or sells lenses, artificial eyes, limbs or other similar appliances or who is engaged in the
mechanical examination of eyes for the purpose of constructing or adjusting eye glasses, spectacles and lenses;
(e) any person who renders any service gratuitously in cases of emergency, or in places where the services of a
duly registered physician, nurse or midwife are not available; (f) any person who administers or recommends
any household remedy as per classification of existing Pharmacy Laws; and (g) any psychologist or mental
hygienist in the performance of his duties, provided such performance is done in conjunction with a duly
registered physician.

Section 12. Limited practice without any certificate of registration. Certificates of registration shall not be
required of the following persons:
(a) Physicians and surgeons from other countries called in consultation only and exclusively in
specific and definite cases, or those attached to international bodies or organization assigned to
perform certain definite work in the Philippines provided they shall limit their practice to the specific
work assigned to them and provided further they shall secure a previous authorization from the Board
of Medical Examiners.
(b) Commissioned medical officers of the United States armed forces stationed in the Philippines
while rendering service as such only for the members of the said armed forces and within the limit of
their own respective territorial jurisdiction.
(c) Foreign physicians employed as exchange professors in special branches of medicine or surgery
whose service may in the discretion of the Board of Medical Education, be necessary.
(d) Medical students who have completed the first four years of medical course, graduates of
medicine and registered nurses who may be given limited and special authorization by the Secretary
of Health to render medical services during epidemics or national emergencies whenever the services
of duly registered physicians are not available. Such authorization shall automatically cease when the
epidemic or national emergency is declared terminated by the Secretary of Health.
Section 13. The Board of Medical Examiners, its composition and duties. The Board of Medical Examiners
shall be composed of six members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines from a confidential list of
not more than twelve names approved and submitted by the executive council of the Philippine Medical
Association, after due consultation with other medical associations, during the months of April and October of
each year. The chairman of the Board shall be elected from among themselves by the member at a meeting
called for the purpose. The President of the Philippines shall fill any vacancy that may occur during any
examination from the list of names submitted by the Philippine Medical Association in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
No examiner shall handle the examinations in more than four subjects or groups of subjects as hereinafter
provided. The distribution of subject to each member shall be agreed upon at a meeting called by the chairman
for the purpose. The examination papers shall be under the custody of the Commissioner of Civil Service or his
duly authorized representative, and shall be distributed to each member of the Board who shall correct, grade,
and sign, and submit them to the said Commissioner within one hundred twenty days from the date of the
termination of the examinations.
A final meeting of the Board for the deliberation and approval of the grades shall be called by the
Commissioner of Civil Service immediately after receipt of the records from the members of the Board of
Medical Examiners. The secretary of the Board shall submit to the President of the Philippines for approval the
names of the successful candidates as having been duly qualified for licensure in alphabetical order, without
stating the ratings obtained by each.
Section 14. Qualifications of examiners. No person shall be appointed a member of the Board of Medical
Examiners unless he or she (1) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, (2) is a duly registered physician in
the Philippines, (3) has been in the practice of medicine for at least ten years, (4) is of good moral character and
of recognized standing in the medical profession, (5) is not a member of the faculty of any medical school and
has no pecuniary interest, directly or indirectly, in any college of medicine or in any institution where any
branch of medicine is taught, at the time of his appointment: Provided, That of the six members to be appointed,
not more than two shall be graduates of the same institution and not more than three shall be government

physicians.
Section 15. Tenure of office and compensation of members. The members of the Board of Medical Examiners
shall hold office for one year: Provided, That any member may be reappointed for not more than one year. Each
member shall receive as compensation ten pesos for each candidate examined for registration as physician, and
five pesos for each candidate examined in the preliminary or final physician examination.
The President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil Service , after due
investigation, may remove any member of the Board of Medical Examiners for neglect of duty, incompetency,
or unprofessional or dishonorable conduct.
Section 16. Executive Officer and Secretary of the Board. The Secretary of the Boards of Examiners appointed
in accordance with section ten of Act Numbered Four thousand seven, as amended, shall also be the secretary of
the Board of Medical Examiners, who shall keep all the records, including examination papers, and the minutes
of the deliberations of the Board. He shall also keep a register of all persons to whom certificates of registration
has been granted; set forth the name, sec, age, and place of birth of each, place of business, post office address,
the name of the medical college or university from which he graduated or in which he had studied, together
with time spent in the study of the profession elsewhere, the name of the country where the institution is located
which had granted to him the degree or certificate of attendance upon clinic and all lectures in medicine and
surgery, and all other degrees granted to him from institutions of learning. He shall keep an up-to-date
registration book of all duly registered physicians in the Philippines. He shall furnish copies of all examination
questions and ratings in each subject of the respective candidates in the physicians examination, one month
after the release of the list of successful examinees, to the deans of the different colleges of medicine
exclusively for the information and guidance of the faculties thereof. This report shall be considered as
restricted information. Any school which violates this rule shall be deprived of such privilege. The secretary of
the Board shall likewise keep a record of all registered medical students. He shall keep all the records and
proceedings, and issue and receive all papers in connection with any and all complaints presented to the Board.
Section 17. Rules and regulations. The Board of Medical Examiners, with the approval of the Commissioner of
Civil Service, shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the proper conduct of the
examinations, correction of examination papers, and registration of physicians. The Commissioner shall
supervise each Board examination and enforce the said rules and regulations. These rules and regulations shall
take effect fifteen days after the date of their publication in the Official Gazette and shall not be changed within
sixty days immediately before any examination. Such rules and regulations shall be printed and distributed for
the information and guidance of all concerned.
Section 18. Dates of examinations. The Board of Medical Examiners shall give examinations for the
registration of physicians, one in May and one in November every year, in the City of Manila or any of its
suburbs after giving not less than ten days' notice to each candidate who had filed his name and address with the
secretary of the Board.
Section 19. Fees. The secretary of the Board, under the supervision of the Commissioner of Civil Service, shall
collect from each candidate the following fees:
For registration as medical student

P 5.00

For complete physician examination

75.00

For preliminary or final examination

40.00

For registration as physician

20.00

All fees paid as provided herein shall accrue to the funds of the Board of Medical Examiners and be expended
for the payment of the compensation of the members thereof. No fees other than those provided herein shall be
paid to the Board.

observed during all administrative investigations. The Board may disapprove applications for examination or
registration, reprimand erring physicians, or suspend or revoke registration certificates, if the respondents are
found guilty after due investigations.

Section 20. Issuance of Certificate of Registration, grounds for refusal of same. The Commissioner of Civil
Service and the secretary of the Board of Medical Examiners shall sign jointly and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board. They shall not issue a
certificate of registration to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any
criminal offense involving moral turpitude, or has been found guilty of immoral or dishonorable conduct after
he due investigation by the Board of Medical Examiners, or has been declared to be of unsound mind.

Section 23. Procedure and rules. Within five days after the filling of written charges under oath, the respondent
physician shall be furnished a copy thereof, without requiring him or her to answer the same, and the Board
shall conduct the investigation within five days after the receipt of such copy by the respondent. The
investigation shall be completed as soon as practicable.

Section 21. Scope of examination. The examination for the registration of physicians shall consist of the
following subjects: (1) Anatomy and Histology, (2) Physiology, (3) Biochemistry, (4) Microbiology and
Parasitology, (5) Pharcology and Therapeutics, (6) Pathology, (7) Medicine, (8) Obstetrics and Gynecology, (9)
Pediatrics and Nutrition, (10) Surgery and Opthalmology, Otolaryngology and Rhinology, (11) Preventive
Medicine and Public Health, and (12) Legal Medicine, Ethics and Medical Jurisprudence: Provided, however,
That the examination questions in each subject or group of subject shall at least be ten in number: Provided,
further, That the examination questions in Medicine shall include at least three from the following branches:
Infectious diseases, Neurology, Dermatology, Allergy, Endocrinology and Cardio-Vascular
diseases: Provided, finally, That the examination questions in Surgery shall include at least four questions from
the following: Opthalmology, Otology, Rhinology, Laryngology, Orthopedic Surgery and Anesthesiology.
The questions shall be the same for all applicants. All answers must be written either in English or Spanish. No
name of the examinee shall appear in the examination paper but the examiners shall devise a system whereby
each applicant can be identified by number only.
In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examination successfully he must have obtained a
general average of seventy-five per cent without a grade lower than sixty-five per cent in Medicine, Pediatrics
and Nutrition, Obstetrics and Gynecology, and Preventive Medicine and Public Health, and no grade lower than
fifty per cent in the rest of the subjects.
The preliminary examinations shall comprise of the following subjects:
(1) Gross Anatomy and Histology
(2) Physiology
(3) Biochemistry
(4) Microbiology and Parasitology
Section 22. Administrative investigations. In addition to the functions provided for in the preceding sections,
the Board of Medical Examiners shall perform the following duties: (1) to administer oath to physicians who
qualified in the examination; (2) to study the conditions affecting the practice of medicine in all parts of the
Philippines; (3) to exercise the powers conferred upon it by this article with the view of maintaining the ethical
and professional standards of the medical profession; (4) to subpoena or subpoena duces tecum witnesses for all
purposes required in the discharge of its duties; and (5) to promulgate, with the approval of the Commissioner
of Civil Service, such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary for the performance of its duties in
harmony with the provisions of this Act and necessary for the proper practice of medicine in the Philippines.
Administrative investigations may be conducted by not less than four members of the Board of Medical
Examiners; otherwise the proceedings shall be considered void. The existing rules of evidence shall be

Section 24. Grounds for reprimand, suspension or revocation of registration certificate. Any of the following
shall be sufficient ground for reprimanding a physician, or for suspending or revoking a certificate of
registration as physician:
(1) Conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude;
(2) Immoral or dishonorable conduct;
(3) Insanity;
(4) Fraud in the acquisition of the certificate of registration;
(5) Gross negligence, ignorance or incompetence in the practice of his or her profession resulting in
an injury to or death of the patient;
(6) Addiction to alcoholic beverages or to any habit forming drug rendering him or her incompetent to
practice his or her profession, or to any form of gambling;
(7) False or extravagant or unethical advertisements wherein other things than his name, profession,
limitation of practice, clinic hours, office and home address, are mentioned.
(8) Performance of or aiding in any criminal abortion;
(9) Knowingly issuing any false medical certificate;
(10) Issuing any statement or spreading any news or rumor which is derogatory to the character and
reputation of another physician without justifiable motive;
(11) Aiding or acting as a dummy of an unqualified or unregistered person to practice medicine;
(12) Violation of any provision of the Code of Ethics as approved by the Philippine Medical
Association.
Refusal of a physician to attend a patient in danger of death is not a sufficient ground for revocation or
suspension of his registration certificate if there is a risk to the physician's life.
Section 25. Rights of respondents. The respondent physician shall be entitled to be represented by counsel or be
heard by himself or herself, to have a speedy and public hearing, to confront and to cross-examine witnesses
against him or her, and to all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution and provided for in the Rules of Court.
Section 26. Appeal from judgment. The decision of the Board of Medical Examiners shall automatically
become final thirty days after the date of its promulgation unless the respondent, during the same period, has
appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service and later to the Office of the President of the Philippines. If the
final decision is not satisfactory, the respondent may ask for a review of the case, or may file in court a petition
for certiorari.

Section 27. Reinstatement. After two years, the Board may order the reinstatement of any physicians whose
certificate of registration has been revoked, if the respondent has acted in an exemplary manner in the
community wherein he resides and has not committed any illegal, immoral or dishonorable act.
ARTICLE IV
PENAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS
Section 28. Penalties. Any person found guilty of "illegal practice of medicine" shall be punished by a fine of
not less than one thousand pesos nor more than ten thousand pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, or by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Section 29. Injunctions. The Board of Medical Examiners may file an action to enjoin any person illegally
practicing medicine from the performance of any act constituting practice of medicine if the case so warrants
until the necessary certificate therefore is secured. Any such person who, after having been so enjoined,
continues in the illegal practice of medicine shall be punished for contempt of court. The said injunction shall
not relieve the person practicing medicine without certificate of registration from criminal prosecution and
punishment as provided in the preceding section.
Section 30. Appropriation. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby appropriated, out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum of twenty thousand pesos.
Section 31. Repealing clause. All Acts, executive orders, administrative orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 32. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval: Provided, That if it is approved during the
time when examinations for physicians are held, it shall take effect immediately after the said
examinations: Provided, further, That section six of this Act shall take effect at the beginning of the academic
year nineteen hundred sixty to nineteen hundred sixty-one, and the first paragraph of section seven shall take
effect four years thereafter.
Approved: June 20, 1959
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8981
AN ACT MODERNIZING THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, REPEALING FOR
THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THREE,
ENTITLED "CREATING THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION AND
PRESCRIBING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS," AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines Congress assembled:
Section 1. Title This Act shall be called the "PRC Modernization Act of 2000."
Section 2. Statement of Policy The State recognizes the important role of professionals in nation-building and,
towards this end, promotes the sustained development of a reservoir of professionals whose competence has
been determined by honest and credible licensure examinations and whose standards of professional service and
practice are internationally recognized and considered world-class brought about the regulatory measures,
programs and activities that foster professional growth and advancement.
Section 3. Professional Regulation Commission There is hereby created a three-man commission to be known
as the Professional Regulation Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, which shall be attached
to the office of the President for general direction and coordination.

Section 4. Composition The Commission shall be headed by one (1) full-time Chairperson and two (2) fulltime Commissioners, all to be appointed by the President for a term of seven (7) years without reappointment to
start from the time they assume office. Appointments to a vacancy that occurs before the expiration of the term
of a Commissioner shall cover only the unexpired term of the immediate predecessor. At the expiration of the
Chairperson, the most senior of the Commissioners shall temporarily assume and perform the duties and
functions of the Chairperson until a permanent Chairperson is appointed by the President.
The Chairperson or Commissioner shall be at least forty (40) years of age, holding a valid certificate of
registration/professional license and a valid professional identification card or a valid certificate of competency
issued by the Commission or a valid professional license issued by any government agency, familiar with the
principles and methods of professional regulation and/or licensing and has had at least five (5) years of
executive or management experience: Provided, That, one (1) of the Commissioners must be a past
Chairperson/member of a Professional Regulatory Board.
Section 5. Exercise of Powers and Functions of the Commission The Chairperson of the Commission, and the
Commissioners as members thereof shall sit and act as a body to exercise general administrative, executive and
policy-making functions of the Commission. The Commission shall establish and maintain a high standard of
admission to the practice of all professions and at all times ensure and safeguard the integrity of all licensure
examinations.
The Chairperson shall act as the presiding and chief executive officer of the Commission. As presiding officer,
he/she shall preside over the meetings of the Commission sitting as a collegial body. As chief executive officer
of the Commission, he/she shall be responsible for the implementation of the policies and the programs adopted
by the Commission for the general administration of the Commission. He/she shall perform such other activities
which are necessary for the effective exercise of the powers, functions and responsibilities of the Commission.
Section 6. Compensation and Other Benefits The Chairperson shall receive compensation and allowances
equivalent to that of a Department Secretary while the Commissioners shall receive compensation and
allowances equivalent to that of an Undersecretary. The Chairperson and the members of the Commission shall
be entitled to retirement benefits provided under Republic Act Numbered Fifteen Hundred and Sixty Eight, as
amended by Republic Act Numbered Three Thousand Five Hundred and Ninety Five.
Section 7. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Commission The powers, functions, and
responsibilities of the Commission are as follows:
(a) To administer, implement and enforce the regulatory policies of the national government with
respect to the regulation and licensing of the various professions and occupations under its
jurisdiction including the enhancement and maintenance of professional and occupational standards
and ethics and the enforcement of the rules and regulations relative thereto:
(b) To perform any and all acts, enter into contracts, make such rules and regulations and issue such
orders and other administrative issuance as may be necessary in the execution and implementation of
its functions and the improvement of its services;
(c) To review, revise, and approve resolutions, embodying policies promulgated by the Professional
Regulatory Boards in the exercise of their powers and functions or in implementing the laws
regulating their respective professions and other official actions on non-ministerial matters within
their respective jurisdictions;
(d) To administer and conduct the licensure examinations of the various regulatory boards in
accordance with the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission; determine and fix the

places and dates of examinations; use publicly or privately owned buildings and facilities for
examination purposes; conduct more than one (1) licensure examination: Provided, That, when there
are two (2) or more examinations given in a year, at least one (1) examinations shall be held on
weekdays (Monday to Friday): Provided, further, That, if only one (1) examination is given in a year,
this shall be held only on weekdays: Provided, finally, That, the Commission is also authorized to
require the completion of a refresher course where the examinee has failed to pass three (3) times,
except as otherwise provided by law; approve the results of examinations and the release of the same;
adopt measures to preserve the integrity and inviolability of licensure examinations; appoint
supervisors and room watchers from among the employees of the government and/or private
individuals with baccalaureate degrees, who have been trained by the Commission for the purpose
and who shall be entitled to a reasonable daily allowance for every examination day actually attended,
to be determined and fixed by the Commission; publish the list of successful examinees; provide
schools, colleges and universities, public and private, offering courses for licensure examinations,
with copies of sample test questions on examinations recently conducted by the Commission and
copies of the syllabi or terms of specifications of subjects for licensure examinations; and impose the
penalty of suspension or prohibition from taking licensure examinations to any examinee charged and
found guilty of violating the rules and regulations governing the conduct of licensure examinations
promulgated by the Commission;
(e) To admit the successful examinees to the practice of the profession or occupation; cause the entry
of their names on its registry book and computerized database; issue certificates of
registration/professional license, bearing the registrants name, picture, and registration number,
signed by all the members of the Board concerned and the Chairperson, with the official seal of the
Board and the Commission affixed thereto which certificate shall be the authority to practice; and at
the option of the professional concerned, ministerially issue the professional identification card, to be
used solely for the purpose of identification, upon payment of the appropriate amount: Provided, That,
marine deck and marine engineer officers shall also be issued endorsement certificates exclusively by
the Commission pursuant to the 1978 and 1995 Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention, to the exclusion of any other government agency, Section 1(2) of
Executive Order No. 149, Series of 1999 and provisions of other existing laws, executive orders,
administrative issuance/regulations to the contrary notwithstanding:Provided, further, That, once a
certificate of registration/professional license, or certificate of competency, in the case of marine deck
and engine officers are issued, this cannot be withdrawn, cancelled, revoked, or suspended except for
just cause as may be provided by law after due notice and hearing;
(f) To have custody of all the records of the various Boards, including examination papers, minutes of
deliberation, records of administrative cases and investigations and examination results for control
and disposition;
(g) To determine and fix the amount of fees to be charged and collected for examination, registration,
registration without examination, professional identification card, certification, docket, appeal,
replacement, accreditation, including surcharges and other fees not specified under the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Hundred Sixty Five as amended by Republic Act Numbered Sixty Five
Hundred and Eleven or to charge and collect reasonable fees at the rates higher than the rates
provided thereunder subject to the approval by the Office of the President.
(h) To appoint subject to the Civil Service laws, rules, and regulations, officials and employees of the
Commission necessary for the effective performance of its functions and responsibilities; prescribe
their duties and fix their compensation subject to the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Six

Thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty Eight and allowances including other fringe benefits; and to
assign and/or reassign personnel as the exigency of the service requires subject to the Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations; and to organize or reorganize the structure of the Commission; and create
or abolish positions or change the designation of existing positions in accordance with a staffing
pattern prepared by it and approved by the Office of the President upon the recommendation of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to meet the changing conditions or as the need
arises: Provided, That, such changes shall not affect the employment status of the incumbents, reduce
their ranks and/or salaries nor shall result in their separation from the service;
(i) To submit and recommend to the President of the Philippines the names of licensed/registered
professionals for appointment as members of the various Professional Regulatory Boards from among
those nominated to fill up vacancies pursuant to the provisions of Executive Order No. 496, Series of
1991;
(j) Upon recommendation of the Professional Regulatory Board concerned, to approve the registration
of and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration/license and professional identification card
with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his state or country and
whose certificate of registration issued therein has not been suspended or revoked: Provided, That, the
requirements for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same
as those required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines and that the laws of such foreign
state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the same basis and
grant the same privileges as those enjoyed by the subjects or citizens of such foreign state or
country: Provided, further, That, the Commission may, upon recommendation of the Board
concerned, authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration/license or a special temporary permit
to foreign professionals who desire to practice their professions in the country under reciprocity and
other international agreements; consultants in foreign-funded, joint venture or foreign-assisted
projects of the government, employees of Philippine or foreign private firms or institutions pursuant
to law, or health professionals engaged in humanitarian mission for a limited period of
time: Provided, finally, That agencies, organizations or individuals whether public or private, who
secure he services of a foreign professional authorized by law to practice in the Philippines for
reasons aforementioned, shall be responsible for securing a special permit from the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), pursuant to
PRC and DOLE rules:
(k) To authorize any officer of the Commission to administer oaths:
(l) To supervise foreign nations who are authorized by existing laws to practice their professions
either as holders of a certificate of registration and a professional identification card or a temporary
special permit in the Philippines; to ensue that the terms and conditions for their practice or of their
employment are strictly complied with; to require the hiring or employing government agency or
private entity/institution to secure a temporary special permit from the concerned Board subject to
approval by the Commission and to file a criminal complaint against the head of the government
agency or officers of the said private entity/institution, who shall be liable under the penalty provided
for in the concerned professional regulatory law or the penalty imposed pursuant to this Act, when the
professional was hired and allowed to practice his/her profession without permit; to file upon due
process request for deportation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID); and to
supervise professionals who were former citizens of the Philippines and who had been registered and
issued a certificate of registration and a professional identification card prior to their naturalization as
foreign citizens, who may, while in the country on a visit, sojourn or permanent residence, practice

their profession: Provided, That, prior to the practice of their profession they shall have first been
issued a special permit and updated professional identification card by the Board concerned subject to
approval by the Commission and upon payment of the permit and annual registration fees;
(m) To monitor the performance of schools in licensure examinations and publish the results thereof
in a newspaper of national circulation;
(n) To adopt and institute a comprehensive rating system for universities, colleges, and training
institutes based on the passing ratio and overall performance of students in board examinations;
(o) To exercise administrative supervision over the various professional regulatory boards and its
members;
(p) To adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement
policies with respect to the regulation and practice of the professions;
(q) To implement the program for the full computerization of all licensure examinations given by the
various professional regulatory boards including the registration of professionals not later than the
year 2003 and other operations of the Commission;
(r) To investigate and decide administrative matters involving officers and employees under the
jurisdiction of the Commission;
(s) To investigate motu proprio or upon the filing of a verified complaint, any member of the
Professional Regulatory Boards for neglect of duty, incompetence, unprofessional, unethical, immoral
or dishonorable conduct, commission of irregularities in the licensure examinations which taint or
impugn the integrity and authenticity of the results of the said examinations and, if found guilty, to
revoke or suspend their certificates of registration and professional licenses/identification cards and to
recommend to the President of the Philippines their suspension or removal from office as the case
may be;
(t) To issue summons, subpoena and subpoena duces tecum in connection with the investigation of
cases against officials and employees of the Commission and the members of the Professional
Regulatory Boards;
(u) To hold in contempt in erring party or person only upon application with a court of competent
jurisdiction;
(v) To call upon or request any department, instrumentality, office, bureau, institution or agency of the
government including local government units to render such assistance as it may require, or to
coordinate or cooperate in order to carry out, enforce or implement the professional regulatory
policies of the government or any program or activity it may undertake pursuant to the provisions of
this Act;
(w) To initiate an investigation, upon complaint under oath by an aggrieved party, of any person,
whether a private individual or professional, local or foreign, who practices the regulated profession
or occupation without being authorized by law, or without being registered with and licensed by the
concerned regulatory board and issued the corresponding license/professional identification card or
temporary or special permit, or who commits any of the prohibited acts provided in the regulatory
laws of the various professions, which acts are criminal in nature, and if the evidence so warrants, to
forward the records of the case to the office of the city or provincial prosecutor for the filing of the
corresponding information in court by the lawyers of the legal services of the Commission who may

prosecute said case/s upon being deputized by the Secretary of Justice;


(x) To prepare an annual report of accomplishments on the programs, projects and activities of the
Commission during the year for submission to Congress after the close of its calendar year and make
appropriate recommendations on issues and/or problems affecting the Commission, the Professional
Regulatory Board, and the various professions under its jurisdiction; and
(y) To perform such other functions and duties as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act, the various professional regulatory laws, decrees, executive orders and other administrative
issuance.
Section 8. Regional Offices The Commission is hereby authorized to create regional offices as may be
necessary to carry out their functions mandated under this Act.
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Responsibilities of the Various Professional Regulatory Boards The
various, professional regulatory boards shall retain the following powers, functions and responsibilities:
(a) To regulate the practice of the professions in accordance with the provisions of their respective
professional regulatory laws;
(b) To monitor the conditions affecting the practice of the profession or occupation under their
respective jurisdictions and whenever necessary, adopt such measures as may be deemed proper for
the enhancement of the profession or occupation and/or the maintenance of high professional, ethical
and technical standards, and for this purpose the members of the Board duly authorized by the
Commission with deputized employees of the Commission, may conduct ocular inspection in
industrial, mechanical, electrical or chemical plants or establishments, hospitals, clinics, laboratories,
testing facilities, mines and quarries, other engineering facilities and in the case of schools, in
coordination with the Commission on Higher Education (CHED);
(c) To hear and investigate cases arising from violations of their respective laws, the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder and their Codes of Ethics and, for this purpose, may issue
summons, subpoenaand subpoena duces tecum to alleged violators and/or witnesses to compel their
attendance in such investigations or hearings: Provided, That, the decision of the Professional
Regulatory Board shall, unless appealed to the Commission, become final and executory after fifteen
(15) days from receipt of notice of judgment or decision;
(d) To delegate the hearing or investigation of administrative cases filed before them except in cases
where the issue or question involved strictly concerns the practice of the profession or occupation, in
which case, the hearing shall be presided over by at least one (1) member of the Board concerned
assisted by a Legal or Hearing Officer of the Commission;
(e) To conduct, through the Legal Officers of the Commission, summary proceedings on minor
violations of their respective regulatory laws, violations of the rules and regulations issued by the
boards to implement their respective laws, including violations of the general instructions to
examinees committed by examinees, and render summary judgment thereon which shall, unless
appealed to the Commission, become final and executory after fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice
of judgment or decision;
(f) Subject to final approval by the Commission, to recommend registration without examination and
the issuance of corresponding certificate of registration and professional identification card;
(g) After due process, to suspend, revoke or reissue, reinstate certificate of registration or licenses for

causes provided by law;


(h) To prepare, adopt and issue the syllabi or tables of specifications of the subjects for examinations
in consultation with the academe; determine and prepare the questions for the licensure examinations
which shall strictly be within the scope of the syllabus or table of specifications of the subject for
examination; score and rate the examination papers with the name and signature of the Board member
concerned appearing thereon and submit the results in all subjects duly signed by the members of the
Board to the Commission within ten (10) days from the last day of examination unless extended by
the Commission for justifiable cause/s; and subject to the approval by the Commission, determine the
appropriate passing general average rating in an examination if not provided for in the law regulating
the profession; and
(i) To prepare an annual report of accomplishments on programs, projects and activities of the Board
during the year for submission to the Commission after the close of each calendar year and make
appropriate recommendations on issues or problems affecting the profession to the Commission.
Section 10. Compensation of the Members of the Professional Regulatory Boards The members of the
Professional Regulatory Boards shall receive compensation equivalent to, at least, two salary grades lower than
the salary grade of the Commissioners: Provided, That the Chairperson of the Regulatory Board shall receive a
monthly compensation of two steps higher than the members of the Board, and: Provided, further, That they
shall be entitled to other allowances and benefits provided under existing laws.
Section 11. Person to Teach Subjects for Licensure Examination on all Professions All subjects for licensure
examinations shall be taught by persons who are holders of valid certificates of registration and valid
professional licenses of the profession and who comply with the other requirements of the CHED.
Section 12. Assistance of Law Enforcement Agency Any law enforcement agency shall, upon call or request
of the Commission or of any Professional Regulatory Board, render assistance in enforcing the regulatory law
of the profession including the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder by prosecuting the violators
thereof in accordance with law and the rules of court.
Section 13. Appropriations The amount necessary to carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be
charged against the current years appropriations of the Professional Regulation Commission. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the continued implementation of this Act shall be included in the succeeding
General Appropriations Act.

(b) In case the offender is an officer or employee of the Commission or a member of the regulatory
board, he/she shall be removed from office and shall suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification from public office to addition to the penalties prescribed in the preceding section of
this Act;
(c) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years and one (1) day to six (6) years or a fine
ranging from Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) to not more than Forty-nine thousand pesos
(P49,000.00), or both imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court, shall be imposed upon the
accomplices. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from two (2) years and one (1) day to four (4)
years or a fine ranging from Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to not more than Nineteen thousand
pesos (P19,000.00), or both imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court, shall be imposed
upon the accessories.
Section 16. Penalties for Violation of Section 7 Subparagraph (1) by Heads of Government Agencies or
Officers of Private Entities/Institutions Any head of a government agency or officer(s) of a private
firm/institution who violates Section 7 subpar. (1) of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less
than six (6) months and one (1) day to not more than six (6) years, or a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) to not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) or both at the discretion of the
court.
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations Within ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the
Professional Regulation Commission, together with representatives of the various Professional Regulatory
Boards and accredited professional organizations, the DBM, and the CHED shall prepare and promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations needed to implement the provisions of this Act.
Section 18. Transitory Provisions The incumbent Commissioner and two (2) incumbent Associate
Commissioners shall serve as Chairperson and Commissioners respectively under the terms for which they have
been appointed without need of new appointments. The incumbent Executive Director shall likewise serve as
Assistant Commissioner without need of new appointment.
Section 19. Separability Clause If any provision of this Act or the application of such provision to any person
or circumstances is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act or application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstance shall not be affected by such declaration.

Section 14. Authority to Use Income In addition to the annual appropriations of the Commission provided
under the Annual General Appropriations Act, the Commission is hereby authorized to use its income not
exceeding the amount of Forty-five million pesos (P45,000,000.00) a year for a period of five (5) years after the
effectivity of this Act to implement the program for full computerization of the operations of the Commission,
subject to the usual accounting and auditing requirements.

Section 20. Repealing Clause Republic Act. No. 546, Presidential Decree No. 223, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 657, Republic Act No. 5181, and Executive Order No. 266, Series of 1995 are hereby
repealed. Section 23 (h) of Republic Act No. 7836, Section 4 (m & s). Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7920,
and Section 29 of Republic Act No. 8050, insofar as it requires completion of the requirements of the
Continuing Professional Education (CPE) as a condition for the renewal of the license are hereby repealed. All
other laws, orders, rules and regulations or resolutions and all part/s thereof inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Section 15. Penalties for Manipulation and Other Corrupt Practices in the Conduct of Professional
Examinations

Section 21. Effectivity This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation, whichever is earlier.

(a) Any person who manipulates or rigs licensure examination results, secretly informs or makes
known licensure examination questions prior to the conduct of the examination or tampers with the
grades in professional licensure examinations shall, upon conviction, be punished by imprisonment of
not less than six (6) years and one (1) day to not more than twelve (12) years or a fine of not less than
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to not more than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or
both such imprisonment and fine at the discretion of the court.

Approved: December 05, 2000


MALACAANG
Manila
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 541 August 20, 1974

ALLOWING FORMER FILIPINO PROFESSIONALS TO PRACTICE THEIR RESPECTIVE


PROFESSIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES.
WHEREAS, a considerable number of Filipino professionals have, with the passage of time, gone to other
countries to pursue further studies and/or take up specialized studies in their chosen fields of endeavor while
others emigrated to other lands in search of better job opportunities;
WHEREAS, since their departure from the Philippines some of these professionals have become naturalized
citizens of their host countries so that they are now barred from the practice of their profession in our country;
WHEREAS, a considerable number of these erstwhile Filipino professionals are now desirous to come home
under the Balikbayan Program and, while here, would like to serve our people or share their advanced
knowledge and expertise with their local professional colleagues;
WHEREAS, for the sake of faster national development our government is now trying to attract these erstwhile
Filipino professionals to return and reside permanently in the Philippines so that they can provide the talent and
expertise urgently needed by the homeland;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order the following:
Section 1. The provisions of all existing laws, rules and regulations, decrees, orders, and instructions to the
contrary notwithstanding, professionals who were formerly citizens of the Philippines and who have previously
passed licensure examinations in the Philippines for the practice of their profession, may, while in this country
on a visit, sojourn or permanent residence, practice their profession: Provided, That they are professional
practitioners of good standing prior to their departure from the Philippines and in their adopted country:
Provided further, That prior to the practice of their profession they shall have first registered with the
Professional license fee; and Provided finally, That they shall pay the corresponding income tax due on all
incomes realized by them in the practice of their respective professions in the Philippines.
Section 2. The Professional Regulations Commission shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to
implement and carry out the purposes of this Decree.
Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, this 20th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventyfour.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24119

August 8, 1925

FELIX MARQUEZ, petitioner,


vs.
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and THE SECRETARY-TREASURER OF THE BOARD
OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, respondent.
M.H. de Joya for petitioner.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for respondents.


STREET, J.:
This is an original proceeding in this court by which the petitioner, Felix Marquez, seeks to obtain a writ
ofmandamus against the respondents, the Board of Medical Examiners, requiring them to admit the petitioner to
the physicians' examinations conducted, or to be conducted by the respondents in the City of Manila. To the
original complaint the respondents answered, and to the answer a demurrer was interposed in behalf of the
petitioner.
It appears that petitioner is a graduate of the Chicago Medical College, having received the degree of M.D.
from said institution on June 8, of the year 1922. No question appears to have been made by the respondents
with respect to the petitioner's qualifications of the physician's examinations in other respects, but they have
denied him admission to the examinations on the grounds that the Chicago Medical College, where the
petitioner was graduated, has been classified as a Class C medical college by the National Medical State Board
of the United States. For this reason the respondents, in accordance with the regulations of the board now in
effect, have denied the requisite standing to said institution and excluded petitioner.
It is not denied by the respondents that prior to the adoption of the present regulations, and prior to the date
when the Chicago Medical School was classified as a Class C medical college, the Board of Medical Examiners
for the Philippine Islands had accepted diplomas of graduation from said medical college as sufficient proof of
proficiency in medical knowledge to admit a graduate to the examinations held in these Islands; and as late as
October 29, 1923, said board accepted favorably upon the application of one Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin, who was
graduated from said school in the year 1921. At the time said candidate was admitted, however, the regulations
denying the requisite status to the Chicago Medical College had not been made effective, and they had been
made effective by proper authority before the present petitioner had submitted his application.
In the argument for the petitioner it is admitted that under Act No. 3111, and the regulations now in force, the
petitioner is disqualified to take the examinations; but it is pointed out that at the time he began and even when
he conducted his course in the Chicago Medical School, said institution was still recognized as a reputable
medical institution; and the question submitted is whether the petitioner's case should be governed by the law
and regulations in force at the time of his enrollment in and graduation from the Chicago Medical School, or by
those in force at the time he filed his application for admission, on or about September 26, 1924. It is submitted
for the petitioner that his case should be governed by the law and regulations at the time of his graduation. To
hold otherwise, it is insisted, is to make the law retroactive in effect and to do irreparable damage to the
petitioner, who has pursued his work in the institution referred to in good faith, believing that said school had
the status necessary to qualify him from examination.
The position taken by the petitioner is, we think, untenable. The question whether a medical institution is "a
reputable medical school," in the sense intended by the law, is vested in the Board of Medical Examiners, and
although the action taken by them may conceivably, in isolated cases, result in hardship, nevertheless the
interests of the public require that the board should be free to exercise its judgment and discretion without
reference to the effect of the determination of the question in particular instances. There can in the nature of
things be no vested right in an existing law, which would preclude its change or repeal. No one who has
commenced preparation in a particular institution has any inchoate right on account of that fact. If the law were
otherwise upon this point, it would be impossible for the Board of Medical Examiners to give effect to the
knowledge which they from time to time acquire as to the standing of medical schools; and an intending
physician, upon matriculating in a particular college, takes upon himself the risk of changes that may be made
in the standing of the institution by the board.

The demurrer to the answer is not well taken. The answer is therefore declared sufficient, and the petition
dismissed, with costs, So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25135

September 21, 1968

PHILIPPINE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, petitioner,


vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS and JOSE MA. TORRES, respondents.
Seva-Albert-Vergara and Julio V. Presbitero for petitioner.
Regino Hermosisima, Jr., for respondent Jose Ma. Torres.
Solicitor General for respondent Board of Medical Examiners.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Original action for certiorari and mandamus, against the Board of Medical Examiners and Jose Ma. Torres, to
annul a resolution of the former and a certificate issued by the same authorizing the latter to practice medicine
in the Philippines without examination.
The facts are not disputed. Jose Ma. Torres hereinafter referred to as respondent is a Spanish subject and a
member of the Missionary Sons of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, otherwise known as the Claretian
Missionaries. Having graduated from the University of Barcelona, Spain, with the degree of Licentiate in
Medicine and Surgery, he is entitled, under the laws of Spain, to practice medicine and surgery throughout the
territory thereof.
On January 21, 1955, respondent was granted special authority to practice medicine in Lamitan, Basilan City,
where he resides, pursuant to Section 771(e) of the Revised Administrative Code reading:
SEC. 771. Persons exempt from registration. Registration shall not be required of the following
classes of persons: . . .
(e) In cases of epidemic or in municipalities where there is no legally qualified practicing physician,
or when the circumstances require it, in the interest of the public health, the Director of Health may
issue special authorizations, to all medical students who have completed the first three years of their
studies, or to persons who have qualified in medicine, and to graduate or registered nurses, who may
request it.
This authority was revoked, on November 8, 1960, by the then Secretary of Health, upon the ground that "the
conditions under which it was granted no longer obtained in Lamitan Basilan City, there being enough
practising physicians in that locality." Said officer restored the authority on December 19, 1960, to be revoked
again, on January 22, 1963. It was renewed once more, on September 1, 1963, and, once again, it was revoked
on February 10, 1964, upon the recommendation of the Board of Medical Examiners hereinafter referred to

as the Board. On motion for reconsideration filed by respondent, the Board issued, on April 6, 1965, its
Resolution No. 25, series of 1965, which was approved by the President, granting respondent a certificate to
practice medicine in the Philippines without the examination required in Republic Act No. 2882, otherwise
known as the Medical Act of 1959. The resolution relied therefor upon The Treaty on the Validity of Academic
Degrees and The Exercise of the Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State,
signed at Manila on March 4, 1949, and ratified on May 19, 1949. 1
Petitioner herein, Philippine Medical Association, is a domestic corporation. On June 14, 1965, it addressed the
Chairman of the Board a communication requesting reconsideration of said resolution No. 25, upon the ground
that, pursuant to said Medical Act of 1959, respondent has to take and pass the examination therein prescribed,
before he can be allowed to practice medicine in the Philippines. This letter was followed by another, dated
October 6, 1965, to which said Chairman replied on October 8, 1965, stating "that the final decision on the
matter will have to come from the President of the Philippines upon whose authority said resolution has been
finally approved and implemented."
Thereupon, or, on October 18, 1965, petitioner commenced the present action, for the purpose stated at the
beginning of this decision, upon the theory that the Board had violated Republic Act No. 2882 in granting
respondent's certificate for the general practice of medicine in the Philippines without the examination
prescribed in said Act; that the Board had exceeded its authority in passing said Resolution, because of which
the same is null and void; that the Board should, therefore, be ordered to cancel the certificate issued in
pursuance of said resolution; and that petitioner has no other plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In their respective answers, respondents admit the basic facts, but not the conclusions drawn therefrom by the
petitioner and allege that the resolution in question is sanctioned by the provisions of the Treaty above referred
to; that petitioner has no cause of action; and that the petition should be dismissed for failure of the petitioner to
exhaust the available administrative remedies.
Respondents cite the cases of Costas vs. Aldanese2 and Almario vs. City Mayor 3 in support of the theory that
petitioner herein has no sufficient interest or "personality" to maintain the present case. In the first case, it was
held that the President of the Association of Philippine (Marine) Engineers4 had no particular "individual"
interest, and, hence,no cause of action for mandamus to compel the Collector of Customs to implement section
1203(j) of the Administrative Code, providing that steamers making round trips of more than 48 hours or
travelling at night shall carry the complement of marine engineers therein specified. In the second case, a
citizen of the Philippines, as such, who is not an Applicant for any stall or booth, or the representative of any
such applicant, stallholder orany association of persons who are deprived of the right to occupy stalls in said
market, "is not the real party in interest who has the capacity, right or personality" to bring an action
for mandamus, to compel the office of Pasay City to comply with the provisions of Republic Act No. 37, by
ejecting, from the public market of said City, stallholders who are not nationals of the Philippines.
Said cases are not in point. To begin with, both are actions for mandamus, whereas the case at bar is mainly one
for certiorari. Although, petitioner herein, likewise, seeks a writ of mandamus, directing the Board to cancel the
certificate of registration issued to the respondent, this would be a necessary consequence of the writ
of certiorariannulling the disputed resolution. Moreover, said two (2) cases were commenced by individuals,
who, as such, had no special interest in the relief therein prayed for. Indeed, in the Almario case it was intimated
that the result might have been otherwise had it been brought by an "association" whose members have an
interest in the subject matter of the action.
This was confirmed by PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez,5 in which we sustained the right of the Philippine
Constitution Association to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3836, insofar as it allowed

retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to members of Congress and to elective
officials thereof. Further authority in favor of petitioner herein is supplied by Nacionalista Party vs. F. Bautista
Angelo 6 in which the Nacionalista Party successfully impugned the validity of the designation of the then
Solicitor General as Acting Member of the Commission on Elections.
It is our considered opinion that the view adopted in the last three (3) cases should be maintained and that, in
line therewith, petitioner herein has sufficient interest to prosecute the case at bar and a cause of action against
respondents herein.
As regards their objection based upon petitioner's failure to appeal to the President, suffice it to say that the rule
requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies is concededly subject to exceptions, among which are cases
involving only questions of law or when jurisdiction is in issue7or the action complained of bears the approval
of a department secretary, as the disputed resolution, which was approved by the Executive Secretary "by
authority of the President," or as an alter ego of the Executive. 8 The case at bar falls under these exceptions to
said rule.1awphl.nt
The main issue herein hinges on the interpretation of Article I of the Treaty aforementioned, reading as follows:
The nationals of both countries who shall have obtained degrees or diplomas to practice the liberal
professions in either of the Contracting States, issued by competent national authorities, shall be
deemed competent to exercise said professions in the territory of the Other, subject to the laws and
regulations of the latter. When the degree or diploma of Bachelor, issued by competent national
authorities allows its holder without requiring further evidence of proficiency to pursue normally
higher courses of study, he shall also be deemed qualified to continue his studies in the territory of
either Party in conformity with the applicable laws and regulations of the State which recognizes the
validity of the title or diploma in question, and with the rules and regulations of the particular
educational institution in which he intends to pursue his studies.
This Treaty provision was the subject matter of our resolution of August 15, 1961, in connection with the
petition of Arturo Efren Garcia for admission to the Philippine Bar without taking the Bar Examinations. After
completing, in Spain, the course prescribed therefor, Garcia had been graduated from the College of Law of the
Universidad Central de Madrid with the degree of "Licenciado en Derecho", which entitled him to practice law
in Spain. Having invoked the provisions of said treaty in support of his claim of exemption from the requisite
bar examinations, this Court denied his petition upon the ground, among others ". . . that the privileges provided
in the Treaty invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting
State in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession; and Section 1 of Rule 127, in connection
with Sections 2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law, require that before anyone can practice the legal
profession in the Philippines he must first successfully pass the required bar examinations; . . ."

against nationals of the Philippines.


WHEREFORE, we hold that said Treaty merely extended to diplomas issued or degrees conferred by
educational institutions of Spain the same recognition and treatment that we accord to similar diplomas or
degrees from local institutions of learning; that holders of said Spanish diplomas or degrees must take the
examination prescribed by our laws for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from educational institutions in
the Philippines; that resolution No. 25, series of 1965, of respondent Board is violative of Republic Act No.
2882 and hence, null and void; and that, respondent Board of Medical Examiners should be, as it is hereby
ordered to cancel the certificate of registration, for the practice of medicine in the Philippines, issued in favor of
respondent Jose Ma. Torres, without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78164

July 31, 1987

TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO, in


their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the school year
1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National Medical Admission
Test
(NMAT).petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the BOARD OF MEDICAL
EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However,
the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT)
required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public respondents, and administered by the private
respondent, the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM).

We find no plausible reason to depart from this view. On the contrary, we reiterate the same, inasmuch as the
theory of respondent herein cannot be accepted without placing graduates from our own educational institutions
at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Spanish graduates from Spanish schools, colleges or universities. Indeed, the latter
could under respondent's pretense engage in the practice of medicine in the Philippines without taking the
examination prescribed in Republic Act No. 2882, whereas the former would have to take and pass said
examination. Worse still, since as we ruled in the Garcia case the benefits of the aforementioned Treaty
cannot be availed of in the Philippines except by Spanish subjects, the result would be should respondent's
contention be sustained that graduates from Spanish schools of medicine would be entitled to practice
medicine in the Philippines without examination, if they were Spanish subjects, but not if they are Filipinos.

On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, a
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f)
of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and
from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for
admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the
NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.

Surely said treaty was not made to discriminate against Philippine schools, colleges or universities, much less

Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the Order of the

respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical Act of 1959"
defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization and
regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the
supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. (Underscoring
supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of (a) the Secretary
of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health
or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of Higher Education or his duly authorized representative;
(d) the Chairman of the Medical Board or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the
Philippine Medical Association; (f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a
representative of the Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe equirements for admission into a recognized college of medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges of medicine,
to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus, instruments, appliances,
laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating and delivery rooms, facilities for
outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and practical instruction in accordance with modern
trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of teaching
personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree of Doctor of
Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical school that has
exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental curriculum may prescribe
admission and graduation requirements other than those prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only
exceptional students shall be enrolled in the experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a register of
those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of twenty-five pesos each
which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for training which
comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. The medical college may admit any student who has not been convicted
by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral turpitude and who presents (a)
a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for

entrance to a medical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral
character issued by two former professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate.
Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition
to the preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx

xxx

x x x (Emphasis supplied)

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and dated 23 August
1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an
additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987. This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the selection of
applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to improve the quality of medical
education in the country. The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the
NMAT, shall be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the
other admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for
the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college may give
other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of eligibility for
admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's personality to complement the
information derived from the NMAT.
xxx

xxx

xxx

8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA), or
admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the school year, 198687, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for entrance to
medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April 1987, respondent Center
conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to enjoin the
enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed statute and administrative order. We regard
this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of
preliminary injunction only when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case
of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of constitutionality,
aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental issue is of course the
constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their assertion, violated
by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2381, as amended, and MECS Order
No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall

promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and social well being. It shall
inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in public and civic
affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts,
culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress and to promote total
human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study,
subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the government is
enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously undertaken to demonstrate to what
extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative order they assail collide with the State policies
embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies
upon them. This burden is heavy enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather
than abstract, in character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of
necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of Article II is cast, in
language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives of State policy and therefore highly
generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their case, even a prima facie case, and we are not
compelled to speculate and to imagine how the legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could
possibly offend the constitutional provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners have failed to
demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that provision. On the contrary we may
note-in anticipation of discussion infra that the statute and the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact
designed to promote "quality education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in
relation to Section 5 (3) of Article XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not
to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education " accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but
rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as
amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by
failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The
general principle of non-delegation of legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more
fundamental rule of the separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of
government,1must be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959,
deal with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of medicine in our
present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc.
vs. The Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of powers and that
is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate potestas non potest delegare, adopted
this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press,
1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has

been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption,
within certain limits of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and
England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil. 318,
1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly
growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by the legislature, and toward the approval
of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr.
Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily
met.The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the
policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative
objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit
upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the nondelegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an "unfair,
unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process. Again, petitioners have
failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it "unfair" and "unreasonable" or
"inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is an unnecessary requirement when added on top
of the admission requirements set out in Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission
requirements established by internal regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners
arguments thus appear to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But
constitutionality is essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or
competence to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative
regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and administrative provisions
impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid exercise of the police power of the state. The
police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the
sovereign to secure and promote an the important interests and needs in a word, the public order of the
general community.6 An important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well
being of the population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental effort
and regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation between the
prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the
securing of the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. 8 That the power to regulate
and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to

practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who
wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as
valid exercises of governmental power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational
requirements i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to
the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the
state.10What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of access to medical
schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the
improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in
the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit
in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical
schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of
"improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of such
admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America (the Medical College
Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other countries with far more developed educational
resources than our own, and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to
prove otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end
of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and
minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion of the MECS Order which
provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission
during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score than that established for
an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and
capricious." The force of this argument is more apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school
years may be dictated by differing conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score
for a given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score
established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the current year; the
average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current year,
and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless of changes in circumstances from
year to year, may wen result in an unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from
being arbitrary or capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to
meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a condition for
admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional imposition.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial court denying
the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989
THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, in her
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman, Board of
Medical Education, petitioners,
vs.
HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth Judicial
Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE
FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent.
Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.

NARVASA, J.:
Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises and regulates the
country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the order issued by
respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining
the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian
College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).lwph1.t
The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of producing
physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and
order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a
temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first
proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal
College of Medicine.
In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education (BME)
authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines.
The, report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for
medical schools. 1 The, team of inspectors, composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines
Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the

school 2 upon the following findings, to wit:


(a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because of its
inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim
culture and welfare;
(b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a "balanced
humanistic and scientific" education;
(c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training of its students in the major
clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS;
(d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time, resulting in
shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality
teaching.
The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the Board of Medical
Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors 3 for a re-evaluation of the College. After inspection, the
team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the school. 4
The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors. 5 A year thereafter, the
College failed another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to continue as a medical school
conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of Medical Education determining the eligibility
of medical schools for government recognition. The, College was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the
survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and studentry. 6 The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo
Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition.
Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of the College, effective
the end of the school year 1988-1989. The, College however succeeded in having the Board form yet another
team to review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria
Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there
had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the library, serious
deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite
inadequate with no prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was) below par
from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and preparedness
at various stages of medical education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of
serious development efforts in academic medicine i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no serious
effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, the recommendation was to close
the College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical schools. 7
In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees,
Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong
instead proposed a gradual phase-out starting the school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate the students
and staff and to minimize financial loss. 8 The, Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its
operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being "final and
unappealable." The, College was, however, assured of assistance in the relocation of its students and in its
rehabilitation as an institution for health-related and paramedical courses. 9
The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
Secretary. 10 On February 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb"
the contested decision, affirmed it. 11

On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent Judge
Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports,
questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation.
The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May 10, 1989. 12 His Honor ruled that
the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and on such basis sustained the
claim of the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard manner" by a team of
inspectors who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the
findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his philosophy ocular inspection of the College
disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-existent, and that on the contrary, the
laboratory and library areas were "big enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going
on smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection."
The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all levels of the medical
college and in its pre-board review classes. 13
Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989 as having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a restraining order against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal
of the action instituted in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the respondent College to desist
from advertising and admitting students, and the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction
order.
The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on the ground that the
closure order against which it was directed was issued without factual basis and in violation of the right of the
College to due process of law, and that it violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to the effect that the
penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the last evaluation, which in this instance
was made, on June 18, 1988.
Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports
that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin with, no
law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this
Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and
orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards
required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power
or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any
Court would have the competence to do so.
The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution.
As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to
review and reversal by any court.
Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case exercised so
whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction or
stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled it becomes the Court's duty to rectify such
action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly
apply. Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the

Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful
to keep its exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave
to the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by an educational
institution of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute
its over judgment for that of said office.
In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of grave abuse of discretion
containing the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct.
From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance
with the minimum standards established for a medical college. The, first survey, that undertaken by the
Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in the school as to
constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made by as many
different committees or teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results
of that first survey. Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President.
Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the
validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the
school starting in 1989. The, respondent College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made, as
early as 1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times thereafter until it was finally
approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was confirmed by the Office of the President. Said
respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of all these, the time for its definite closure had
been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the
relocation of its students before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After having
resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it, without success, it sought to obtain from
the respondent Court the relief it could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a
deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its closure as of June, 1989
openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old students.
Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the
power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions
where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the
respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly
taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single ocular inspection, done
after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more
qualified inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of
the evaluating team came from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine, 14 and their
judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to
the school could hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities
and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally
interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the
proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government; involving the exercise of
judgment and findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling
under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of
facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts. 15 There are, to be sure,
exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case.
The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the College was
given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard
after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to have up to the

desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary
Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical
Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to
the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of
a lack of opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling
complained of.
There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated NMCS ORDER No. 5, Series
of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein snowed, which in
this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The, provision referred
to reads:
The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for failure to comply
with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.:
xxx
c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government; authority to operate, for failure to
fully comply with the prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the last evaluation
conducted on the school.
It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation therein contemplated
where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the prescribed requirements," i.e., has not
complied with some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3) years from the last evaluation is quite
distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar where respondent school was found to have deficiencies so
serious as to warrant its immediate closure. Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the
withdrawal or cancellation of government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last
evaluation conducted on the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year
waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary
of Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an
educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3)
years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or cancellation of the government;
authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far from nominal and, to repeat, are different from
those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in question. There had never been a recommendation that the
College be granted an opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had been
that it be forthwith closed, its discovered deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to
be irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time the
petitioner school had already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the
original recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as already mentioned, the
subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years, served but to confirm the validity of that initial
proposal for its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision,
paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial compliance therewith.
Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to be served
by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand
would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have acted within the scope
of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand
cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of
whether or not respondent medical institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its
continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining order issued
by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set
aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385.

After hearing, the respondent judge rendered a decision on July 4, 1989, declaring the challenged order invalid
and granting the petition. Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong held that the petitioner had been deprived of his right
to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of the police power. 3

SO ORDERED.

We cannot sustain the respondent judge. Her decision must be reversed.

Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 4 this Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit
the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and preparation for a
medical education. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano declared for a unanimous Court:

Melencio-Herrera, and Sarmiento JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS) and DIRECTOR OF CENTER
FOR EDUCATIONAL MEASUREMENT, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REY C. SAN DIEGO and JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, respondents.
Ramon M. Guevara for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
The issue before us is mediocrity. The question is whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again.
The petitioner contends he may not, under its rule thath) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time.
The private respondent insists he can, on constitutional grounds.
But first the facts.
The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. 1 When he
applied to take it again, the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule. He then went to
the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his admission to the test.
In his original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality
education. By agreement of the parties, the private respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition. 2 In an amended petition filed with leave of court, he
squarely challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the above-cited
rule. The additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection.

Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to
medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the pratice of medicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized
as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical
educational requirements-i.e., the completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical
school-for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate
exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we have before us in the instant case
is closely related: the regulation of access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985,
as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the
professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the
quality of those admitted to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is
sought by selectivity in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things,
of limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical
studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of
maintaining, high standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in
particular, in the current state of our social and economic development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means of achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country."
Given the widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in
the United States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite
probably, in other countries with far more developed educational resources than our own,
and taking into account the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove
otherwise, we are entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance
in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
However, the respondent judge agreed with the petitioner that the said case was not applicable. Her reason was
that it upheld only the requirement for the admission test and said nothing about the so-called "three-flunk
rule."

We see no reason why the rationale in the Tablarin case cannot apply to the case at bar. The issue raised in both
cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This may be gauged at least initially by the admission test
and, indeed with more reliability, by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the
former in the regulation of the medical profession.
There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that the power is validly
exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 5
In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method.
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power. It is the right and
indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to
whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary
or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical
profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors.
While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor.
This is true of any other calling in which the public interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the
bridge to one's ambition. The State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that
they are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in a manner that will
best promote the common good while also giving the individual a sense of satisfaction.

have also qualified are denied entrance. In other words, what the equal protection requires is equality among
equals.
The Court feels that it is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the
Constitution: one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. The private
respondent has failed the NMAT five times. 7 While his persistence is noteworthy, to say the least, it is certainly
misplaced, like a hopeless love.
No depreciation is intended or made against the private respondent. It is stressed that a person who does not
qualify in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent unfit for any work or occupation. The only inference is that
he is a probably better, not for the medical profession, but for another calling that has not excited his interest.
In the former, he may be a bungler or at least lackluster; in the latter, he is more likely to succeed and may even
be outstanding. It is for the appropriate calling that he is entitled to quality education for the full harnessing of
his potentials and the sharpening of his latent talents toward what may even be a brilliant future.
We cannot have a society of square pegs in round holes, of dentists who should never have left the farm and
engineers who should have studied banking and teachers who could be better as merchants.
It is time indeed that the State took decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing
the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. Otherwise, we
may be "swamped with mediocrity," in the words of Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking in intelligence
but because we are a nation of misfits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13, 1989, is
REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who wants to be a
lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and adviced. Of course, he may not be forced to
be a plumber, but on the other hand he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who
has demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing, however appropriate
this career may be for others.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The Constitution also provides
that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic requirements. 6

SECOND DIVISION

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better prepared. Where even
those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our already crowded medical schools, there is all
the more reason to bar those who, like him, have been tested and found wanting.
The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-taken. A law does not
have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution.
There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students and other students who
are not subjected to the NMAT and the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of
the people, unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The accountant,
for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not hold the same delicate
responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be similarly treated.
There would be unequal protection if some applicants who have passed the tests are admitted and others who

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. 144681

June 21, 2004

PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION (PRC), CHAIRMAN HERMOGENES P. POBRE,


ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARMANDO PASCUAL, BOARD OF MEDICINE, CHAIRMAN
RODOLFO P. DE GUZMAN, JOSE S. RAMIREZ, JUANITO B. BILLOTE, RUBEN R. POLICARPIO,
EDGARDO T. FERNANDO and RICARDO D. FULGENCIO II, petitioners,
vs.
ARLENE V. DE GUZMAN, VIOLETA V. MENESES, CELERINA S. NAVARRO, JOSE RAMONCITO
P. NAVARRO, ARNEL V. HERRERA and GERALDINE ELIZABETH M. PAGILAGAN, ELNORA R.
RAQUENO, MARISSA A. REGODON, LAURA M. SANTOS, KARANGALAN D. SERRANO,
DANILO A. VILLAVER, MARIA ROSARIO L. LEONOR, ALICIA S. LIZANO, MARITEL M.
ECHIVERRI, BERNADETTE T. MENDOZA, FERNANDO F. MANDAPAT, ALELI A. GOLLAYAN,
ELCIN C. ARRIOLA, HERMINIGILDA E. CONEJOS, SALLY B. BUNAGAN, ROGELIO B.
ANCHETA, OSCAR H. PADUA, JR., EVELYN D. GRAJO, EVELYN S. ACOSTA, MARGARITA
BELINDA L. VICENCIO, VALENTINO P. ARBOLEDA, EVELYN O. RAMOS, ACHILLES J.
PERALTA, CORAZON M. CRUZ, LEUVINA P. CHICO, JOSEPH A. JAO, MA. LUISA S.

GUTIERREZ, LYDIA C. CHAN, OPHELIA C. HIDALGO, FERNANDO T. CRUZ, MELVIN M.


USITA, RAFAEL I. TOLENTINO, GRACE E. UY, CHERYL R. TRIGUERO, MICHAEL L.
SERRANO, FEDERICO L. CASTILLO, MELITA J. CAEDO, SAMUEL B. BANGOY, BERNARDITA
B. SY, GLORIA T. JULARBAL, FREDERICK D. FRANCISCO, CARLOS M. BERNARDO, JR.,
HUBERT S. NAZARENO, CLARISSA B. BACLIG, DAYMINDA G. BONTUYAN, BERNADETTE H.
CABUHAT, NANCY J. CHAVEZ, MARIO D. CUARESMA, ERNESTO L. CUE, EVELYN C.
CUNDANGAN, RHONEIL R. DEVERATURDA, DERILEEN D. DORADO, SAIBZUR N. EDDING,
VIOLETA C. FELIPE, HERMINIO V. FERNANDEZ, JR., MARIA VICTORIA M. LACSAMANA,
NORMA G. LAFAVILLA, RUBY B. LANTIN, MA. ELOISA Q. MALLARI, CLARISA SJ. NICOLAS,
PERCIVAL H. PANGILINAN, ARNULFO A. SALVADOR, ROBERT B. SANCHEZ, MERLY D. STA.
ANA and YOLANDA P. UNICA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeks to nullify the D E C I S I O
N,1dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283. The appellate court affirmed the
judgment2 dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case
No. 93-66530. The trial court allowed the respondents to take their physicians oath and to register as duly
licensed physicians. Equally challenged is the R E S O L U T I O N3 promulgated on August 25, 2000 of the
Court of Appeals, denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila.
They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of
Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as
successful examinees in the medical licensure examination.

Perpetual Help College of Medicine showed that the scores of Fatima College examinees were not only
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. He concluded that there must be some unusual
reason creating the clustering of scores in the two subjects. It must be a cause "strong enough to eliminate the
normal variations that one should expect from the examinees [of Fatima College] in terms of talent, effort,
energy, etc."5
For its part, the NBI found that "the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the [1993] Physician
Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions."6
On July 5, 1993, respondents Arlene V. De Guzman, Violeta V. Meneses, Celerina S. Navarro, Jose Ramoncito
P. Navarro, Arnel V. Herrera, and Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan (Arlene V. De Guzman et al., for brevity)
filed a special civil action for mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction docketed as Civil
Case No. 93-66530 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 52. Their petition was adopted by
the other respondents as intervenors.
Meanwhile, the Board issued Resolution No. 26, dated July 21, 1993, charging respondents with "immorality,
dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit" in connection with the Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne examinations. It
recommended that the test results of the Fatima examinees be nullified. The case was docketed as Adm. Case
No. 1687 by the PRC.
On July 28, 1993, the RTC issued an Order in Civil Case No. 93-66530 granting the preliminary mandatory
injunction sought by the respondents. It ordered the petitioners to administer the physicians oath to Arlene V.
De Guzman et al., and enter their names in the rolls of the PRC.
The petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the
mandatory injunctive writ, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 31701.
On October 21, 1993, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 31701, with the dispositive portion of
theDecision ordaining as follows:
WHEREFORE, this petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction issued by the lower court against petitioners is hereby nullified and set aside.

Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from
Fatima College in the two most difficult subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (BioChem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven
Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99%
in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. The Board also observed that many of those
who passed from Fatima got marks of 95% or better in both subjects, and no one got a mark lower
than 90%. A comparison of the performances of the candidates from other schools was made. The
Board observed that strangely, the unusually high ratings were true only for Fatima College
examinees. It was a record-breaking phenomenon in the history of the Physician Licensure
Examination.

Arlene V. de Guzman, et al., then elevated the foregoing Decision to this Court in G.R. No. 112315. In
ourResolution dated May 23, 1994, we denied the petition for failure to show reversible error on the part of the
appellate court.

On June 7, 1993, the Board issued Resolution No. 19, withholding the registration as physicians of all the
examinees from the Fatima College of Medicine.4 The PRC asked the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
to investigate whether any anomaly or irregularity marred the February 1993 Physician Licensure Examination.

On December 13, 1993, petitioners counsel failed to appear at the trial in the mistaken belief that the trial was
set for December 15. The trial court then ruled that petitioners waived their right to cross-examine the
witnesses.

Prior to the NBI investigation, the Board requested Fr. Bienvenido F. Nebres, S.J., an expert mathematician and
authority in statistics, and later president of the Ateneo de Manila University, to conduct a statistical analysis of
the results in Bio-Chem and Ob-Gyne of the said examination.

On January 27, 1994, counsel for petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion stating the reasons for her nonappearance and praying that the cross-examination of the witnesses for the opposing parties be reset. The trial
court denied the motion for lack of notice to adverse counsel. It also denied the Motion for Reconsideration that
followed on the ground that adverse counsel was notified less than three (3) days prior to the hearing.

On June 10, 1993, Fr. Nebres submitted his report. He reported that a comparison of the scores in Bio-Chem
and Ob-Gyne, of the Fatima College examinees with those of examinees from De La Salle University and

SO ORDERED.7

Meanwhile, on November 22, 1993, during the pendency of the instant petition, the pre-trial conference in Civil
Case No. 93-66530 was held. Then, the parties, agreed to reduce the testimonies of their respective witnesses to
sworn questions-and-answers. This was without prejudice to cross-examination by the opposing counsel.

Meanwhile, to prevent the PRC and the Board from proceeding with Adm. Case No. 1687, the respondents

herein moved for the issuance of a restraining order, which the lower court granted in its Order dated April 4,
1994.
The petitioners then filed with this Court a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 115704, to annul
the Ordersof the trial court dated November 13, 1993, February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994. We referred the
petition to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506.
On August 31, 1994, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order/preliminary injunction is GRANTED and the Orders of December 13, 1993, February 7, 1994,
February 28, 1994, and April 4, 1994 of the RTC-Manila, Branch 52, and all further proceedings
taken by it in Special Civil Action No. 93-66530 are hereby DECLARED NULL and VOID. The said
RTC-Manila is ordered to allow petitioners counsel to cross-examine the respondents witnesses, to
allow petitioners to present their evidence in due course of trial, and thereafter to decide the case on
the merits on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Costs against respondents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The trial was then set and notices were sent to the parties.
A day before the first hearing, on September 22, 1994, the petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion praying for the partial reconsideration of the appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506,
and for the outright dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. The petitioners asked for the suspension of the
proceedings.
In its Order dated September 23, 1994, the trial court granted the aforesaid motion, cancelled the scheduled
hearing dates, and reset the proceedings to October 21 and 28, 1994.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the partial motion for reconsideration in CAG.R. SP No. 34506. Thus, petitioners filed with the Supreme Court a petition for review docketed as G.R. No.
117817, entitled Professional Regulation Commission, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.
On November 11, 1994, counsel for the petitioners failed to appear at the trial of Civil Case No. 93-66530.
Upon motion of the respondents herein, the trial court ruled that herein petitioners waived their right to crossexamine the herein respondents. Trial was reset to November 28, 1994.
On November 25, 1994, petitioners counsel moved for the inhibition of the trial court judge for alleged
partiality. On November 28, 1994, the day the Motion to Inhibit was to be heard, petitioners failed to appear.
Thus, the trial court denied the Motion to Inhibit and declared Civil Case No. 93-66530 deemed submitted for
decision.
On December 19, 1994, the trial court handed down its judgment in Civil Case No. 93-66530, the fallo of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering the respondents to allow the petitioners and
intervenors (except those with asterisks and footnotes in pages 1 & 2 of this decision) [sic],9 to take
the physicians oath and to register them as physicians.
It should be made clear that this decision is without prejudice to any administrative disciplinary action
which may be taken against any of the petitioners for such causes and in the manner provided by law
and consistent with the requirements of the Constitution as any other professionals.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.10
As a result of these developments, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 118437, entitled Professional Regulation Commission v. Hon. David G. Nitafan, praying inter alia,
that (1) G.R. No. 118437 be consolidated with G.R. No. 117817; (2) the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
August 31, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 be nullified for its failure to decree the dismissal of Civil Case No.
93-66530, and in the alternative, to set aside the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, order the
trial court judge to inhibit himself, and Civil Case No. 93-66530 be re-raffled to another branch.
On December 26, 1994, the petitioners herein filed their Notice of Appeal11 in Civil Case No. 93-66530,
thereby elevating the case to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37283.
In our Resolution of June 7, 1995, G.R. No. 118437 was consolidated with G.R. No. 117817.
On July 9, 1998, we disposed of G.R. Nos. 117817 and 118437 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 117817 is DISMISSED for being moot. The petition in G.R.
No. 118437 is likewise DISMISSED on the ground that there is a pending appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Assistant Solicitor General Amparo M. Cabotaje-Tang is advised to be more circumspect in
her dealings with the courts as a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with accordingly.
SO ORDERED.12
While CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 was awaiting disposition by the appellate court, Arnel V. Herrera, one of the
original petitioners in Civil Case No. 93-66530, joined by twenty-seven intervenors, to wit: Fernando F.
Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo, Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A.
Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. Mallari-Largoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S.
Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M. Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S.
Lizano, Elnora R. Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez,
Maria Rosario L. Leonor-Lacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. VicencioGamilla, Herminigilda E. Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P.
Navarro, manifested that they were no longer interested in proceeding with the case and moved for its
dismissal. A similar manifestation and motion was later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan,
Michael L. Serrano, Norma G. Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabara, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda
G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B. Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C.
Cundangan, Frederick D. Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L.
Castillo, Karangalan D. Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. The
Court of Appeals ruled that its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 would not apply to them.
On May 16, 2000, the Court of Appeals decided CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, with the following fallo, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the
same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.13
In sustaining the trial courts decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that the respondents complied with all the
statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examination for physicians in February 1993. They all
passed the said examination. Having fulfilled the requirements of Republic Act No. 2382,14 they should be

allowed to take their oaths as physicians and be registered in the rolls of the PRC.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS HAVE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION FOR MANDAMUS
AGAINST PETITIONERS IN THE LIGHT OF THE RESOLUTION OF THIS HONORABLE
COURT IN G.R. NO. 112315 AFFIRMING THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DECLARING
THAT IF EVER THERE IS SOME DOUBT AS TO THE MORAL FITNESS OF EXAMINEES,
THE ISSUANCE OF LICENSE TO PRACTICE MEDICINE IS NOT AUTOMATICALLY
GRANTED TO THE SUCCESSFUL EXAMINEES.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR MANDAMUS COULD PROCEED DESPITE THE
PENDENCY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1687, WHICH WAS PRECISELY LODGED TO
DETERMINE THE MORAL FITNESS OF RESPONDENTS TO BECOME DOCTORS.15
To our mind, the only issue is: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error of law in sustaining the
judgment of the trial court that respondents are entitled to a writ of mandamus?
The petitioners submit that a writ of mandamus will not lie in this case. They point out that for a writ of
mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded
and it is the duty of the respondent to perform the act required. Thus, mandamus may be availed of only when
the duty sought to be performed is a ministerial and not a discretionary one. The petitioners argue that the
appellate courts decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 upholding the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No.
93-66530 overlooked its own pronouncement in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The Court of Appeals held in CA-G.R.
SP No. 31701 that the issuance of a license to engage in the practice of medicine becomes discretionary on the
PRC if there exists some doubt that the successful examinee has not fully met the requirements of the law. The
petitioners stress that this Courts Resolution dated May 24, 1994 in G.R. No. 112315 held that there was no
showing "that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in rendering the questioned judgment"
in CA-G.R. SP No. 31701. The petitioners point out that our Resolution in G.R. No. 112315 has long become
final and executory.
Respondents counter that having passed the 1993 licensure examinations for physicians, the petitioners have the
obligation to administer to them the oath as physicians and to issue their certificates of registration as
physicians pursuant to Section 2016 of Rep. Act No. 2382. The Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283,
found that respondents complied with all the requirements of Rep. Act No. 2382. Furthermore, respondents
were admitted by the Medical Board to the licensure examinations and had passed the same. Hence, pursuant to
Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, the petitioners had the obligation to administer their oaths as physicians and
register them.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state or the
sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.17 Section 3 of Rule 6518 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure outlines two situations when a writ of mandamus may issue, when any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person unlawfully (1) neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust, or station; or (2) excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office
to which the other is entitled.

We shall discuss the issues successively.


1. On The Existence of a Duty of the Board of Medicine To Issue Certificates of Registration as Physicians
under Rep. Act No. 2382.
For mandamus to prosper, there must be a showing that the officer, board, or official concerned, has a clear
legal duty, not involving discretion.19 Moreover, there must be statutory authority for the performance of the
act,20 and the performance of the duty has been refused.21 Thus, it must be pertinently asked now: Did
petitioners have the duty to administer the Hippocratic Oath and register respondents as physicians under the
Medical Act of 1959?
As found by the Court of Appeals, on which we agree on the basis of the records:
It bears emphasizing herein that petitioner-appellees and intervenor-appellees have fully complied
with all the statutory requirements for admission into the licensure examinations for physicians
conducted and administered by the respondent-appellants on February 12, 14, 20 and 21, 1993. Stress,
too, must be made of the fact that all of them successfully passed the same examinations.22
The crucial query now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that petitioners should allow the
respondents to take their oaths as physicians and register them, steps which would enable respondents to
practice the medical profession23 pursuant to Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959?
The appellate court relied on a single provision, Section 20 of Rep. Act No. 2382, in concluding that the
petitioners had the ministerial obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as
physicians. But it is a basic rule in statutory construction that each part of a statute should be construed in
connection with every other part to produce a harmonious whole, not confining construction to only one
section.24 The intent or meaning of the statute should be ascertained from the statute taken as a whole, not from
an isolated part of the provision. Accordingly, Section 20, of Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended should be read in
conjunction with the other provisions of the Act. Thus, to determine whether the petitioners had the ministerial
obligation to administer the Hippocratic Oath to respondents and register them as physicians, recourse must be
had to the entirety of the Medical Act of 1959.
A careful reading of Section 20 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with
respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners "shall sign and issue certificates of
registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." In statutory
construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an examinee
satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physicians license, the Board is obliged to administer to him his
oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 2225 of the Medical Act of
1959.
However, the surrounding circumstances in this case call for serious inquiry concerning the satisfactory
compliance with the Board requirements by the respondents. The unusually high scores in the two most difficult
subjects was phenomenal, according to Fr. Nebres, the consultant of PRC on the matter, and raised grave doubts
about the integrity, if not validity, of the tests. These doubts have to be appropriately resolved.
Under the second paragraph of Section 22, the Board is vested with the power to conduct administrative
investigations and "disapprove applications for examination or registration," pursuant to the objectives of Rep.
Act No. 2382 as outlined in Section 126 thereof. In this case, after the investigation, the Board filed before the
PRC, Adm. Case No. 1687 against the respondents to ascertain their moral and mental fitness to practice
medicine, as required by Section 927 of Rep. Act No. 2382. In its Decision dated July 1, 1997, the Board ruled:
WHEREFORE, the BOARD hereby CANCELS the respondents[] examination papers in the

Physician Licensure Examinations given in February 1993 and further DEBARS them from taking
any licensure examination for a period of ONE (1) YEAR from the date of the promulgation of this
DECISION. They may, if they so desire, apply for the scheduled examinations for physicians after the
lapse of the period imposed by the BOARD.
SO ORDERED.28
Until the moral and mental fitness of the respondents could be ascertained, according to petitioners, the Board
has discretion to hold in abeyance the administration of the Hippocratic Oath and the issuance of the certificates
to them. The writ of mandamus does not lie to compel performance of an act which is not duly authorized.
The respondents nevertheless argue that under Section 20, the Board shall not issue a certificate of registration
only in the following instances: (1) to any candidate who has been convicted by a court of competent
jurisdiction of any criminal offense involving moral turpitude; (2) or has been found guilty of immoral or
dishonorable conduct after the investigation by the Board; or (3) has been declared to be of unsound mind. They
aver that none of these circumstances are present in their case.
Petitioners reject respondents argument. We are informed that in Board Resolution No. 26,29 dated July 21,
1993, the Board resolved to file charges against the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine for
"immorality, dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in the Obstetrics-Gynecology and Biochemistry examinations." It
likewise sought to cancel the examination results obtained by the examinees from the Fatima College.
Section 830 of Rep. Act No. 2382 prescribes, among others, that a person who aspires to practice medicine in
the Philippines, must have "satisfactorily passed the corresponding Board Examination." Section 22, in turn,
provides that the oath may only be administered "to physicians who qualified in the examinations." The
operative word here is "satisfactorily," defined as "sufficient to meet a condition or obligation" or "capable of
dispelling doubt or ignorance."31 Gleaned from Board Resolution No. 26, the licensing authority apparently did
not find that the respondents "satisfactorily passed" the licensure examinations. The Board instead sought to
nullify the examination results obtained by the respondents.
2. On the Right Of The Respondents To Be Registered As Physicians
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established by law. If no
legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of mandamus is a legal
remedy for a legal right.32 There must be a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded.33 It is long established rule that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by
the government.34
It is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right35 of every citizen to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.36 But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people.37 Thus, persons
who desire to engage in the learned professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers. This regulation takes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance among those who would practice medicine. In a previous case, it may be recalled, this Court has
ordered the Board of Medical Examiners to annul both its resolution and certificate authorizing a Spanish
subject, with the degree of Licentiate in Medicine and Surgery from the University of Barcelona, Spain, to
practice medicine in the Philippines, without first passing the examination required by the Philippine Medical
Act.38 In another case worth noting, we upheld the power of the State to upgrade the selection of applicants
into medical schools through admission tests.39

It must be stressed, nevertheless, that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A
political body that regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such
privilege in accordance with certain conditions. Such conditions may not, however, require giving up ones
constitutional rights as a condition to acquiring the license.40 Under the view that the legislature cannot validly
bestow an arbitrary power to grant or refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike
down license legislation that vests in public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some
ordinarily lawful business, profession, or activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the
guidance of said officials in the exercise of their power.41
In the present case, the aforementioned guidelines are provided for in Rep. Act No. 2382, as amended, which
prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the qualifications of candidates for the
board examinations, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for denying the issuance of a
physicians license, or revoking a license that has been issued. Verily, to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
Furthermore, it must appear that he has fully complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by the
law and the licensing authority. Should doubt taint or mar the compliance as being less than satisfactory, then
the privilege will not issue. For said privilege is distinguishable from a matter of right, which may be demanded
if denied. Thus, without a definite showing that the aforesaid requirements and conditions have been
satisfactorily met, the courts may not grant the writ of mandamus to secure said privilege without thwarting the
legislative will.
3. On the Ripeness of the Petition for Mandamus
Lastly, the petitioners herein contend that the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the petition for
mandamus below for being premature. They argue that the administrative remedies had not been exhausted. The
records show that this is not the first time that petitioners have sought the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530.
This issue was raised in G.R. No. 115704, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals, where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34506. On motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506, the appellate
court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the prayers for the nullification of the order of the trial
court and the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530 were inconsistent reliefs. In G.R. No. 118437, the
petitioners sought to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 34506 insofar as it did not
order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 93-66530. In our consolidated decision, dated July 9, 1998, in G.R. Nos.
117817 & 118437, this Court speaking through Justice Bellosillo opined that:
Indeed, the issue as to whether the Court of Appeals erred in not ordering the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 93-66530 sought to be resolved in the instant petition has been rendered meaningless by an event
taking place prior to the filing of this petition and denial thereof should follow as a logical
consequence.42 There is no longer any justiciable controversy so that any declaration thereon would
be of no practical use or value.43 It should be recalled that in its decision of 19 December 1994 the
trial court granted the writ of mandamus prayed for by private respondents, which decision was
received by petitioners on 20 December 1994. Three (3) days after, or on 23 December 1994,
petitioners filed the instant petition. By then, the remedy available to them was to appeal the decision
to the Court of Appeals, which they in fact did, by filing a notice of appeal on 26 December 1994.44
The petitioners have shown no cogent reason for us to reverse the aforecited ruling. Nor will their reliance upon
the doctrine of the exhaustion of administrative remedies in the instant case advance their cause any.
Section 2645 of the Medical Act of 1959 provides for the administrative and judicial remedies that respondents
herein can avail to question Resolution No. 26 of the Board of Medicine, namely: (a) appeal the unfavorable

judgment to the PRC; (b) should the PRC ruling still be unfavorable, to elevate the matter on appeal to the
Office of the President; and (c) should they still be unsatisfied, to ask for a review of the case or to bring the
case to court via a special civil action of certiorari. Thus, as a rule, mandamus will not lie when administrative
remedies are still available.46 However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply
where, as in this case, a pure question of law is raised.47 On this issue, no reversible error may, thus, be laid at
the door of the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, when it refused to dismiss Civil Case No. 93-66530.
As we earlier pointed out, herein respondents Arnel V. Herrera, Fernando F. Mandapat, Ophelia C. Hidalgo,
Bernadette T. Mendoza, Ruby B. Lantin-Tan, Fernando T. Cruz, Marissa A. Regodon, Ma. Eloisa Q. MallariLargoza, Cheryl R. Triguero, Joseph A. Jao, Bernadette H. Cabuhat, Evelyn S. Acosta-Cabanes, Laura M.
Santos, Maritel M. Echiverri, Bernadette C. Escusa, Carlosito C. Domingo, Alicia S. Lizano, Elnora R.
Raqueno-Rabaino, Saibzur N. Edding, Derileen D. Dorado-Edding, Robert B. Sanchez, Maria Rosario LeonorLacandula, Geraldine Elizabeth M. Pagilagan-Palma, Margarita Belinda L. Vicencio-Gamilla, Herminigilda E.
Conejos, Leuvina P. Chico-Paguio, Elcin C. Arriola-Ocampo, and Jose Ramoncito P. Navarro manifested to the
Court of Appeals during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, that they were no longer interested in
proceeding with the case and moved for its dismissal insofar as they were concerned. A similar manifestation
and motion were later filed by intervenors Mary Jean I. Yeban-Merlan, Michael L. Serrano, Norma G.
Lafavilla, Arnulfo A. Salvador, Belinda C. Rabarra, Yolanda P. Unica, Dayminda G. Bontuyan, Clarissa B.
Baclig, Ma. Luisa S. Gutierrez, Rhoneil R. Deveraturda, Aleli A. Gollayan, Evelyn C. Cundangan, Frederick D.
Francisco, Violeta V. Meneses, Melita J. Caedo, Clarisa SJ. Nicolas, Federico L. Castillo, Karangalan D.
Serrano, Danilo A. Villaver, Grace E. Uy, Lydia C. Chan, and Melvin M. Usita. Following these manifestations
and motions, the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 decreed that its ruling would not apply to them.
Thus, inasmuch as the instant case is a petition for review of the appellate courts ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
37283, a decision which is inapplicable to the aforementioned respondents will similarly not apply to them.
As to Achilles J. Peralta, Evelyn O. Ramos, Sally B. Bunagan, Rogelio B. Ancheta, Oscar H. Padua, Jr., Evelyn
D. Grajo, Valentino P. Arboleda, Carlos M. Bernardo, Jr., Mario D. Cuaresma, Violeta C. Felipe, Percival H.
Pangilinan, Corazon M. Cruz and Samuel B. Bangoy, herein decision shall not apply pursuant to the Orders of
the trial court in Civil Case No. 93-66530, dropping their names from the suit.

Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 166097

July 14, 2008

BOARD OF MEDICINE, DR. RAUL FLORES (now DR. JOSE S. RAMIREZ), in his capacity as
Chairman of the Board, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, through its Chairman,
HERMOGENES
POBRE
(now
DR.
ALCESTIS
M.
GUIANG), Petitioners,
vs.
YASUYUKI OTA, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 849452 dated November 16, 2004 which affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 22, Manila, dated October 19, 2003.4
The facts are as follows:
Yasuyuki Ota (respondent) is a Japanese national, married to a Filipina, who has continuously resided in the
Philippines for more than 10 years. He graduated from Bicol Christian College of Medicine on April 21, 1991
with a degree of Doctor of Medicine. 5 After successfully completing a one-year post graduate internship
training at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, he filed an application to take the medical board
examinations in order to obtain a medical license. He was required by the Professional Regulation Commission
(PRC) to submit an affidavit of undertaking, stating among others that should he successfully pass the same, he
would not practice medicine until he submits proof that reciprocity exists between Japan and the Philippines in
admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine. 6

Consequently, this Decision is binding only on the remaining respondents, namely: Arlene V. de Guzman,
Celerina S. Navarro, Rafael I. Tolentino, Bernardita B. Sy, Gloria T. Jularbal, Hubert S. Nazareno, Nancy J.
Chavez, Ernesto L. Cue, Herminio V. Fernandez, Jr., Maria Victoria M. Lacsamana and Merly D. Sta. Ana, as
well as the petitioners.

Respondent submitted a duly notarized English translation of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Philippine Embassy to Japan, Jesus I. Yabes; 7 thus, he was allowed

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision dated May 16, 2000,
of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the judgment dated December 19, 1994, of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer
the physicians oath to herein respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate
court, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of
mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283 is
NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.

In spite of all these, the Board of Medicine (Board) of the PRC, in a letter dated March 8, 1993, denied
respondent's request for a license to

SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

to take the Medical Board Examinations in August 1992, which he subsequently passed. 8

practice medicine in the Philippines on the ground that the Board "believes that no genuine reciprocity can be
found in the law of Japan as there is no Filipino or foreigner who can possibly practice there." 9
Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus against the Board before the RTC of Manila on
June 24, 1993, which petition was amended on February 14, 1994 to implead the PRC through its Chairman. 10
In his petition before the RTC, respondent alleged that the Board and the PRC, in refusing to issue in his favor a
Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine, had acted arbitrarily, in clear contravention of the
provision of Section 20 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2382 (The Medical Act of 1959), depriving him of his
legitimate right to practice his profession in the Philippines to his great damage and prejudice. 11
On October 19, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision finding that respondent had adequately proved that the

medical laws of Japan allow foreigners like Filipinos to be granted license and be admitted into the practice of
medicine under the principle of reciprocity; and that the Board had a ministerial duty of issuing the Certificate
of Registration and license to respondent, as it was shown that he had substantially complied with the
requirements under the law.12 The RTC then ordered the Board to issue in favor of respondent the
corresponding Certificate of Registration and/or license to practice medicine in the Philippines. 13
The Board and the PRC (petitioners) appealed the case to the CA, stating that while respondent submitted
documents showing that foreigners are allowed to practice medicine in Japan, it was not shown that the
conditions for the practice of medicine there are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant, hence,
reciprocity was not established; also, the power of the PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of
medicine is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not compellable by a writ of mandamus.14
The CA denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the RTC. 15
Hence, herein petition raising the following issue:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING
THAT RESPONDENT HAD ESTABLISHED THE EXISTENCE OF RECIPROCITY IN THE
PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BETWEEN THE PHILIPPINES AND JAPAN. 16
Petitioners claim that: respondent has not established by competent and conclusive evidence that reciprocity in
the practice of medicine exists between the Philippines and Japan. While documents state that foreigners are
allowed to practice medicine in Japan, they do not similarly show that the conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by a foreign applicant. There is no reciprocity in this case,
as the requirements to practice medicine in Japan are practically impossible for a Filipino to comply with. There
are also ambiguities in the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, which were not clarified by respondent, i.e.,
what are the provisions of the School Educations Laws, what are the criteria of the Minister of Health and
Welfare of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are
the same or better than graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the
preparatory test for the National Medical Examination. Consul General Yabes also stated that there had not been
a single Filipino who was issued a license to practice medicine by the Japanese Government. The publication
showing that there were foreigners practicing medicine in Japan, which respondent presented before the Court,
also did not specifically show that Filipinos were among those listed as practicing said
profession.17 Furthermore, under Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, 18 the power of the
PRC and the Board to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to
the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, which power is discretionary and not ministerial, hence, not
compellable by a writ of mandamus.19
Petitioners pray that the CA Decision dated November 16, 2004 be reversed and set aside, that a new one be
rendered reinstating the Board Order dated March 8, 1993 which disallows respondent to practice medicine in
the Philippines, and that respondent's petition before the trial court be dismissed for lack of merit. 20
In his Comment, respondent argues that: Articles 2 and 11 of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan and
Section 9 of the Philippine Medical Act of 1959 show that reciprocity exists between the Philippines and Japan
concerning the practice of medicine. Said laws clearly state that both countries allow foreigners to practice
medicine in their respective jurisdictions as long as the applicant meets the educational requirements, training
or residency in hospitals and pass the licensure examination given by either country. Consul General Yabes in
his letter dated January 28, 1992 stated that "the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine

in Japan after complying with the local requirements." The fact that there is no reported Filipino who has
successfully penetrated the medical practice in Japan does not mean that there is no reciprocity between the two
countries, since it does not follow that no Filipino will ever be granted a medical license by the Japanese
Government. It is not the essence of reciprocity that before a citizen of one of the contracting countries can
demand its application, it is necessary that the interested citizens country has previously granted the same
privilege to the citizens of the other contracting country. 21 Respondent further argues that Section 20 of the
Medical Act of 195922 indicates the mandatory character of the statute and an imperative obligation on the
part of the Board inconsistent with the idea of discretion. Thus, a foreigner, just like a Filipino citizen, who
successfully passes the examination and has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications, is entitled as
a matter of right to the issuance of a certificate of registration or a physicians license, which right is
enforceable by mandamus.23
Petitioners filed a Reply24 and both parties filed their respective memoranda 25 reiterating their
arguments.1avvphi1
The Court denies the petition for lack of merit.
There is no question that a license to practice medicine is a privilege or franchise granted by the
government.26 It is a right that is earned through years of education and training, and which requires that one
must first secure a license from the state through professional board examinations. 27
Indeed,
[T]he regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method
of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the power to regulate and control the practice of medicine
includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well
recognized. Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first
to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements i.e., the completion of
prescribed courses in a recognized medical school for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state." 28
It must be stressed however that the power to regulate the exercise of a profession or pursuit of an occupation
cannot be exercised by the State or its agents in an arbitrary, despotic, or oppressive manner. A political body
which regulates the exercise of a particular privilege has the authority to both forbid and grant such privilege in
accordance with certain conditions. As the legislature cannot validly bestow an arbitrary power to grant or
refuse a license on a public agency or officer, courts will generally strike down license legislation that vests in
public officials discretion to grant or refuse a license to carry on some ordinarily lawful business, profession, or
activity without prescribing definite rules and conditions for the guidance of said officials in the exercise of
their power.29
R.A. No. 2382 otherwise known as the Medical Act of 1959 states in Section 9 thereof that:
Section 9. Candidates for Board Examinations.- Candidates for Board examinations shall have the following
qualifications:
1. He shall be a citizen of the Philippines or a citizen of any foreign country who has submitted competent and
conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his countrys
existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice medicine under the same rules and regulations

governing citizens thereof;


xxxx
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 22330 also provides in Section (j) thereof that:
j) The [Professional Regulation] Commission may, upon the recommendation of the Board concerned, approve
the registration of and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration with or without examination to a
foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country: Provided, That the requirement for the registration or
licensing in said foreign state or country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the
laws of the Philippines and that the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to
practice the profession on the same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign
state or country: Provided, finally, That the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary
evidence, confirmed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit
citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
The Commission is also hereby authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain privileges to
foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some additional
requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his country;
xxxx
As required by the said laws, respondent submitted a copy of the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan, duly
authenticated by the Consul General of the Embassy of the Philippines in Japan, which provides in Articles 2
and 11, thus:
Article 2. Anyone who wants to be medical practitioner must pass the national examination for medical
practitioner and get license from the Minister of Health and Welfare.
xxxx
Article 11. No one can take the National Medical Examination except persons who conform to one of the
following items:
1. Persons who finished regular medical courses at a university based on the School Education Laws
(December 26, 1947) and graduated from said university.
2. Persons who passed the preparatory test for the National Medical Examination and practiced clinics
and public sanitation more than one year after passing the said test.
3. Persons who graduated from a foreign medical school or acquired medical practitioner license in a
foreign country, and also are recognized to have the same or more academic ability and techniques as
persons stated in item 1 and item 2 of this article. 31
Petitioners argue that while the Medical Practitioners Law of Japan allows foreigners to practice medicine
therein, said document does not show that conditions for the practice of medicine in said country are practical
and attainable by a foreign applicant; and since the requirements are practically impossible for a Filipino to
comply with, there is no reciprocity between the two countries, hence, respondent may not be granted license to
practice medicine in the Philippines.
The Court does not agree.
R.A. No. 2382, which provides who may be candidates for the medical board examinations, merely requires a
foreign citizen to submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of

Foreign Affairs (DFA), showing that his countrys existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice
medicine under the same rules and regulations governing citizens thereof.
Section (j) of P.D. No. 223 also defines the extent of PRC's power to grant licenses, i.e., it may, upon
recommendation of the board, approve the registration and authorize the issuance of a certificate of registration
with or without examination to a foreigner who is registered under the laws of his country, provided the
following conditions are met: (1) that the requirement for the registration or licensing in said foreign state or
country are substantially the same as those required and contemplated by the laws of the Philippines; (2) that
the laws of such foreign state or country allow the citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession on the
same basis and grant the same privileges as the subject or citizens of such foreign state or country; and (3) that
the applicant shall submit competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the DFA, showing
that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the profession under the rules and
regulations governing citizens thereof.
The said provision further states that the PRC is authorized to prescribe additional requirements or grant certain
privileges to foreigners seeking registration in the Philippines if the same privileges are granted to or some
additional requirements are required of citizens of the Philippines in acquiring the same certificates in his
country.
Nowhere in said statutes is it stated that the foreign applicant must show that the conditions for the practice of
medicine in said country are practical and attainable by Filipinos. Neither is it stated that it must first be proven
that a Filipino has been granted license and allowed to practice his profession in said country before a foreign
applicant may be given license to practice in the Philippines. Indeed, the phrase used in both R.A. No. 2382 and
P.D. No. 223 is that:
[T]he applicant shall submit] competent and conclusive documentary evidence, confirmed by the Department of
Foreign Affairs, showing that his country's existing laws permit citizens of the Philippines to practice the
profession [of medicine] under the [same] rules and regulations governing citizens thereof. x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
It is enough that the laws in the foreign country permit a Filipino to get license and practice therein. Requiring
respondent to prove first that a Filipino has already been granted license and is actually practicing therein
unduly expands the requirements provided for under R.A. No. 2382 and P.D. No. 223.
While it is true that respondent failed to give details as to the conditions stated in the Medical Practitioners Law
of Japan -- i.e., the provisions of the School Educations Laws, the criteria of the Minister of Health and Welfare
of Japan in determining whether the academic and technical capability of foreign medical graduates are the
same as or better than that of graduates of medical schools in Japan, and who can actually qualify to take the
preparatory test for the National Medical Examination respondent, however, presented proof that foreigners
are actually practicing in Japan and that Filipinos are not precluded from getting a license to practice there.
Respondent presented before the trial court a Japanese Government publication, Physician-DentistPharmaceutist Survey, showing that there are a number of foreign physicians practicing medicine in
Japan.32 He also presented a letter dated January 28, 1992 from Consul General Yabes, 33 which states:
Sir:
With reference to your letter dated 12 January 1993, concerning your request for a Certificate of
Confirmation for the purpose of establishing a reciprocity with Japan in the practice of medical
profession relative to the case of Mr. Yasuyuki Ota, a Japanese national, the Embassy wishes to

inform you that inquiries from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health and
Welfare as well as Bureau of Immigration yielded the following information:
1. They are not aware of a Filipino physician who was granted a license by the
Japanese Government to practice medicine in Japan;
2. However, the Japanese Government allows a foreigner to practice medicine in
Japan after complying with the local requirements such as holding a valid visa for the
purpose of taking the medical board exam, checking the applicant's qualifications to
take the examination, taking the national board examination in Japanese and filing an
application for the issuance of the medical license.
Accordingly, the Embassy is not aware of a single Filipino physician who was issued by the
Japanese Government a license to practice medicine, because it is extremely difficult to pass the
medical board examination in the Japanese language. Filipino doctors here are only allowed to
work in Japanese hospitals as trainees under the supervision of a Japanese doctor. On certain
occasions, they are allowed to show their medical skills during seminars for demonstration
purposes only. (Emphasis supplied)
Very truly yours,
Jesus I. Yabes
Minister Counsellor &
Consul General
From said letter, one can see that the Japanese Government allows foreigners to practice medicine therein
provided that the local requirements are complied with, and that it is not the impossibility or the prohibition
against Filipinos that would account for the absence of Filipino physicians holding licenses and practicing
medicine in Japan, but the difficulty of passing the board examination in the Japanese language. Granting that
there is still no Filipino who has been given license to practice medicine in Japan, it does not mean that no
Filipino will ever be able to be given one.
Petitioners next argue that as held in De Guzman, its power to issue licenses is discretionary, hence, not
compellable by mandamus.
The Court finds that the factual circumstances of De Guzman are different from those of the case at bar; hence,
the principle applied therein should be viewed differently in this case. In De Guzman, there were doubts about
the integrity and validity of the test results of the examinees from a particular school which garnered unusually
high scores in the two most difficult subjects. Said doubts called for serious inquiry concerning the applicants
satisfactory compliance with the Board requirements. 34 And as there was no definite showing that the
requirements and conditions to be granted license to practice medicine had been satisfactorily met, the Court
held that the writ of mandamus may not be granted to secure said privilege without thwarting the legislative
will.35
Indeed, to be granted the privilege to practice medicine, the applicant must show that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. It must also appear that he has fully complied with all the

conditions and requirements imposed by the law and the licensing authority.36
In De Guzman itself, the Court explained that:
A careful reading of Section 20 37 of the Medical Act of 1959 discloses that the law uses the word "shall" with
respect to the issuance of certificates of registration. Thus, the petitioners [PRC] "shall sign and issue
certificates of registration to those who have satisfactorily complied with the requirements of the Board." In
statutory construction the term "shall" is a word of command. It is given imperative meaning. Thus, when an
examinee satisfies the requirements for the grant of his physician's license, the Board is obliged to administer to
him his oath and register him as a physician, pursuant to Section 20 and par. (1) of Section 22 of the Medical
Act of 1959.38
In this case, there is no doubt as to the competence and qualifications of respondent. He finished his medical
degree from Bicol Christian College of Medicine. He completed a one-year post graduate internship training at
the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, a government hospital. Then he passed the Medical Board
Examinations which was given on August 8, 1992 with a general average of 81.83, with scores higher than 80
in 9 of the 12 subjects.
In fine, the only matter being questioned by petitioners is the alleged failure of respondent to prove that there is
reciprocity between the laws of Japan and the Philippines in admitting foreigners into the practice of medicine.
Respondent has satisfactorily complied with the said requirement and the CA has not committed any reversible
error in rendering its Decision dated November 16, 2004 and Resolution dated October 19, 2003.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice

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