Nico's new note is stylish fluff, I will be interested when there is actual content.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
i agree with the sentiments behind nico's claims moreso than yours. While I agree with a lot of stuff i
agree with you, it is simply not practical in a larger scale.
i want to get more into laurelle and such
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Sentiments are not the basis of a sound philosophy.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
the issue is that your philosophy kind of occludes the possibility of speaking outside sentiment/passions
it has a lot of contradictions like that
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
That isn't contradiction, it's consistency.
It doesn't occlude the possibility of speaking with consistency or passions that are aware of such
Zurvan Goshayeshi
i think that's the function of empirical science
but there are questions that science cannot validate
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Empirical science has refused to revolutionize itself based on its own findings
Zurvan Goshayeshi
i think virtuality is kinda unfounded and leads to more scientific questions, it just can't be validated
hence my point about derrida
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Derrida is contradictory to himself.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
derrida isn't perfect either, but as a neuroscientist with a background in philosophy of mind and
neurophilosophy, i can't take deleuze's ontology seriously on a more basic level
it still leaves a lot of doubts and holes
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
The point is that you cannot reconcile science with Derrida.
Deleuze can be, however.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
some aspects of deleuze can be reconciled with science
but not the whole of it
also they're both anti-essentialists
so that kind of... already prevents the possibility of full reconcilation
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Scientific inquiry has no use for essences, false.
There is no obstacle between Deleuze's theories and science, but Derrida is simply totally
irreconciliable.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
there are obstacles...
for example, virtuality is unfalsifiable
plane of immanence is unfalsifiable too
well maybe not in the future for plane of immanence
but virtuality definitely is unfalsifiable
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Plane of immanence is consistent with scientific findings. The plane of consistency or pure difference
sets the stage of the empirical, meanwhile the Aristotelian ontology continues to presume the static and
we continue to think in its ways like manipulating the corpse of a dead god. It's possible to think of
essences in Deleuze in a certain way, if you really want to, though it does not possess the same nature
as in being ontology, it is gone into in that paper I put into the Post Left vs. Post Right called Material
Theory of Signs.
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
*it is present in
Zurvan Goshayeshi
Yeah, I agree with you on plane of immanence.
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
That's a very simple introductory example. Virtuality is more inherent in the sense of the faciality of
phenomena, indeed the surface. I can explain it quite simply on a more immediate level. One perceives
visually through light, for example, but one only perceives the wavelength of light as it reflects, but this
is only a mode of perceiving, it is only a way of seeing, a surface.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
Faciality is just the mirror face experiment.
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Well, it applies to all senses, etc
Zurvan Goshayeshi
That is not a defense.
That is just description.
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
It's scientific hence why it is a description. So your alternative is that sight is actually some kind of
fundamental reality?
It's merely a mode.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
Saying it's merely a mode doesn't answer anything.
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
What kind of answer do you think you will receive?
Zurvan Goshayeshi
How does this mode relate to the reality we interact with in daily basis? Why can I not see your mode?
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Why do you think you would need to see the mode that isn't contingent within the same causal factors?
Zurvan Goshayeshi
What I am saying, is if you believe virtuality to be internal, then it's just representationalism. If you are
an externalist, then that's just voynich.
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Let me think for a second in those terms, since I usually don't look at it as externalism vs. internalism.
I really don't think it makes sense to use either term, because everything is internal to the plane of
immanence.
Anything called representationalism would be problematic because it would be representing some kind
of identity when difference is infinitely divisible
Zurvan Goshayeshi
everything is internal is panexperientialism
that is, that matter has an inner mental life or something
it being concurrent...
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
No, I am neutralist, it is not matter or mental
These are only modalities.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
i don't see how everything can be internal
i was going on a tangent
science cannot falsify that
which is my point
it is highly dubious
i don't see how it is infraempirical either, it's rationalistic
"everything is internal to the plane of immanence" How do you posit such a thing?
By what reason do you proceed to such a claim? Obviously there isnothing infraempirical there
it's a rationalistic claim
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Unless you have observed something external to the interconnectedness of causal phenomena, there is
nothing external to it.
It's immediate.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
just because it is interconnect does not mean the world is experienced as internal modes
it does not necessarily entail that
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
The problem is there is no evidence to the contrary that denies immediate phenomenology vital to all
empiricism, there is no need to shoot yourself in the foot
The burden of proof is on the counterclaim
Zurvan Goshayeshi
my point was, the mode of perceiving is a fluff term, saying it's just a mode while paradoxically
claiming virtuality is inherent in surface of phenomena is begging the question
it's just representationalism, you even claimed it to be inherent
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Mode is not a fluff term, it implies the lack of a singular way of understanding characteristic of Being
ontology
Zurvan Goshayeshi
that still does not explain how visual percept relates to the neural machinery
is virtuality just in the brain, because that is representationalism, and using new terms like surface
seems to just sophism to give the impression of bringing in a new dialectic
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
My view is anti-dialectic.
It's not representationalism in the slightest.
Dialectic is a construct based on the idea that two identities are interacting
there are none.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
saying stuff like qualia being on a different scale and it being a surface effect doesn't answer anything
about its relation
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
The job of philosophy of science is to ACCOUNT for the data not to do science, duh
Let me get my labcoat bro
Zurvan Goshayeshi
it's unfalsifiable for one, it doesn't say anything on its ontological characteristics, etc
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Just let me get it
lol
Zurvan Goshayeshi
the issue is we have a gap between the data
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
I've seen no better answer, and Derrida is no answer.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
like the data of my personal experience and the data of the mechanical, third-person activity
i mean schopenhauer gives an answer, but i'm not convinced by him either
that ontologistics video which i have saved
let me make the point, simply
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
The problem is that I think one assumes there is some way to reduce experience and there is no, the
becoming is immediate.
*not
Zurvan Goshayeshi
let's say we look at a mirror together, you see the mirror as blue and with different reflection and i see it
as red with different reflection. Of course, we agree difference is constitutive and foundational, but my
question is how can our different percepts exist side by side simultaneously. Where and what is the
content of the experience itself and how does it relate to the supposedly colorless world?
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
No answer is going to satisfy you I think
Zurvan Goshayeshi
there are senses we can never experience
like electroreception
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
I'm not dismissing the importance of scientific research into this.
Into any endeavor
Zurvan Goshayeshi
laurelle argues that plane of immanence always involves a splitting, and i forget what the implication
is, but i think it's that whole non-philosophy approach he has
Zurvan Goshayeshi
"let's say we look at a mirror together, you see the mirror as blue and with different reflection and i see
it as red with different reflection. Of course, we agree difference is constitutive and foundational, but
my question is how can our different percepts exist side by side simultaneously. Where and what is the
content of the experience itself and how does it relate to the supposedly colorless world? "
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
Zurvan Goshayeshi
i thought you missed it my bad
even at the smooth infiniteness of plane of immanence?
there is no body without organs then
that is a thought without image
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
The splitting is what the body without organs is dude.
Difference differs from itself, it is pure consistency
Identity cannot do this.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
what i think is plane of immanence has depth
the thing is you do a good job viewing things horizontally
but not so much vertically
because even with a stream of difference
you have to explain how we simultaneously see different images simulatneously in the mirror
because if difference is constitutive and foundation, within the simulanteity or one flow of reality, you
must explain the different qualia
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
That wouldn't be in contradiction to plane of immanence, it's just a matter of explaining causal
differences in affects
Zurvan Goshayeshi
but there is a fundamental difference in explaining this affect
in the sense the same language of the surface affects or affects we see in physical sciences doesn't work
here
it's like explaining the affects in Bodyworld
where did all of those experiences occur
i'm not trying to spatialize experiential content, just saying how it's mysterious and virtuality doesn't
explain it
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
There are different kinds of becoming, we covered this before, sympathetic communion. It's only a
consequence of interrelation, the only proceeding answer is another kind of interrelation because
becoming is infinite and has no final answers.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
you don't get what i'm saying
i know that is a differen tkind of becoming
but it has one characteristic no other kind of becoming has
it is private
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
It's only as private as a campfire occurring at one point of a field and not everywhere else on earth.
Zurvan Goshayeshi
but you just said everything is internal
so maybe it's not private?
see the issue
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
It is internal but it is not intelligence
Zurvan Goshayeshi
it could be virtuality is on a continuum with everything else
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
There is no reason for it to bridge
Zurvan Goshayeshi
or that it is fragmented
obviously within physical live there is a continuum of difference, a transference of states of constant
becoming, constant novelty
bodies being connected, splintering
but the issue is with virtuality
what i am saying is there is viable reason to think virtuality could be very much the same
or not, idk
virtuality is a nebulous postulation
i agree plane of immanece and difference is constitutive and foundational makes more sense though
and is consistent
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
I feel like we are continuously coming back to the hard problem lol I feel like it is just not as significant
to me, but I understand your concern, we should research more
Zurvan Goshayeshi
virtuality can be more like the akashic records or an individual computer harddrive
idk
or anything in between or we
w/e*
that's what i'm saying
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
I use Ockham's Razor so that's not a worry to me, but you are right, it could be something like that for
all we know, but I distrust the fanciful ideas outright
Zurvan Goshayeshi
idk, it's pretty significant to me because it has some pretty big implications and it's where the main
claims of buddhist and even daoist practice come in, the elements that people consider superstitious
outright and dismiss, which makes it more into a feel-good medicine then
ockam's razor doesn't work in serious scholarly philosophy
it's like the bad aspect of analytic philosophy
i can just use ockam's razor and be an eliminativist
idk, i'm just going to focus on other stuff
i do think metaphysics is important, but it should lay off ethics and practical stuff in day-to-day affairs
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
To me eliminativism is not entirely at odds with difference, etc. the main difference is that experience is
not the same as folk psychology
Zurvan Goshayeshi
like, if virtuality were to be more "fanciful" it could give more incentive for compassion and reform
societies in beneficial way or whatnot
in eliminativism, there is no experiential content at all
just brain activity, so it is at odd
hence, we come back to nico
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
And my view is that it's all difference not even brain activity proper
Zurvan Goshayeshi
uh
i agree, it's all difference... i agree difference is constitutive and foundational. I just have justified
suspicion on the way virtuality is posited, that's it
i mean we agree there, but it doesn't say that much except we will invariably come to more relations
Batraghor Tshathoqqua
I will read more about virtuality and see if I can find a better answer or if we together (or me alone) can
formulate an adjustment