PEOPLE vs.

TAMAYO
385 SCRA 413
FACTS: Lilia Fuentes was having dinner with her husband, Leodegario, and their
six children in their house when they heard the dogs barking. Leodegario was
about to check why the dogs were barking when three persons whom she
identified as Rolando Tamayo, Julio Tamayo and Florencio Patalinghug, Jr.,
suddenly barged into their house through an unlocked kitchen door. Rolando
came first, followed by Julio who was holding a flashlight and Florencio who
entered last. Julio focused the flashlight on Leodegarios face and seconds later,
Rolando shot Leodegario on the chest. After shooting Leodegario, Rolando fired
his gun again, this time hitting Renante, 18-year old son of Leodegario and
Lilia. Overcome with fear, Lilia embraced her other children who were
crying. She saw Rolando aiming his gun at them. She heard three clicks from
the gun but fortunately the gun did not fire. Thereafter, Rolando, Julio and
Florencio left, dragging Renante out of the house. Lilia then gathered the rest of
her children and, while going down the stairs of their house, Lilia saw Natividad
Tamayo, the wife of Julio, hurriedly walking away from their house. Lilia and her
children went to the house of their neighbor, Helen Ambos, to seek refuge. After
an hour, they proceeded to the house of Amalia Fuentes, Lilias niece, and
stayed there until the morning of the following day. That day, the dead body of
Renante was found some 200 meters away from their house.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is murder.

RULING: YES. Under our penal law, treachery is present when the attack is
sudden and unexpected, and renders the victim unable to defend himself. Even
if the attack is frontal, treachery may still exist when it is done in a sudden and
unexpected manner, and the victim is not given any chance to retaliate and
defend himself, thus ensuring the safety of the malefactors. In the present case,
it is obvious that the victims were caught off-guard by the unexpected attack of
the assailants. The victims were having dinner when Julio, Rolando and
Florencio surreptitiously entered their house and, without warning, shot the
victims who were at that time unarmed and completely unaware of any
impending danger to their lives. There was no way the victims could have
defended themselves from the assailants treacherous attack.

However, the prosecution was not able to prove evident premeditation. For
this circumstance to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as that of the
killing, of the following elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that he clung to his determination; and (3)
sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself
time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. None of these elements was
proven in this case. Evident premeditation could not therefore aggravate the
offense committed.

PEOPLE vs. DOMINGO

383 SCRA 43

FACTS: Complainant Raquel Indon and her minor children Melissa, Michelle,
Marvin and Jeffer were sleeping inside their house when she was awakened by
the sound of appellant kicking their door open. She immediately recognized the
accused, since the kitchen light illuminated his face. Armed with a screwdriver
and a kitchen knife, appellant cut the cord of the mosquito net and repeatedly
stabbed her, using the six-inch screwdriver. When she tried to escape from the
room, four-year-old Marvin rushed towards her. She then grabbed him and ran
towards the gate. However, before reaching the gate, she fell down and
appellant stabbed her right leg. The appellant then proceeded to stab Marvin,
hitting the latter twice on the arm and twice on his left chest. Marvin died on 3
April 2000 as a result of these injuries. After stabbing Marvin, appellant returned
back to the house, towards Raquels two daughters Michelle and Melissa.
Melissa died because of the stab wounds that the appellant inflicted on her; while
Michelle, who was able to hide under the papag merely sustained serious
physical injuries. The appellant also attacked two-year-old Jeffer by striking him
on the head with the screwdriver, but the latter managed to run to the house of
Raquels sister-in-law. Raquel got up and ran for help, but the appellant followed
her. Their neighbor, Ronaldo Galvez, came to their rescue and tried to subdue
the appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed is murder.

RULING: Raquel Indon, Michelle Indon, Melissa Indon, Marvin Indon, and Jeffer
Indon were merely sleeping inside their bedroom and had not even given the
slightest provocation when appellant attacked them without warning.
Furthermore, the killing of Marvin Indon and Melissa Indon, both minors who
could not be expected to defend themselves against an adult, was considered
treacherous, and would sustain a conviction for murder. The penalties imposed
were adjusted accordingly. Appellants conviction for frustrated homicide in
Criminal Case No. 1499-M-2000 was affirmed, since prosecution failed to prove
appellants treachery or evident premeditation in his assault against Rolando
Galvez, who came to the scene of the crime to subdue the appellant.

Qualifying circumstance of treachery was firmly established. Marvin Indon and

Melissa Indon were both minors when they were killed by the appellant. The
killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous. Moreover, the victims in this
case were asleep when appellant barged into their house and attacked their
family. The attack was clearly unprovoked, and they were defenseless against
him.

PEOPLE vs. LAGO

358 SCRA 440

FACTS: Accused Reyderick Lago testified that accused Cozette Aragon who was
his classmate in English approached him and asked him to accompany him to
the house of his uncle to get a project and collect his salary. Aragon also invited
Lisbog to go with them. Thereafter, he came to know that Diadid also proceeded
to the house of Aragons uncle at the back of Don Bosco in Kalentong.
Upon entering the gate of the house, Aragon opened the jalousie window with the
use of a beinte nueve balisong and unlocked the door. Aragon let them in.

Lisbog was instructed to wait outside. While he was seated on the sofa, Aragon
and Diadid went inside the room. Suddenly, he heard somebody was groaning
from the room. Afraid, he immediately left the place and went to the house of his
grandmother in Mandaluyong who advised him not to leave the place anymore.
On cross-examination, he testified that Cozette Aragon was his classmate in one
of his back subjects at Jose Fabella Memorial School. Lisbog was also his
classmate. He did not know personally Jayson Diadid and Dennis Sison. He
admitted that when he heard the groaning inside the room, he did not bother to
verify what was happening. He went out of the house immediately and did not
attend his classes anymore. He stopped schooling.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide.

RULING: Although Aragon avers that it was only Diadid who did the stabbing, the
latters act is deemed to be the act of all. This Court has ruled that whenever a
homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did
not all actually take part in the homicide; that is, unless it appears that those who
did not do so endeavored to prevent the homicide.
The elements of this special complex crime are the following: (1) the taking of
personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person; (2)
the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi;
and (4) by reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its
generic sense) is committed.
The records and the pleadings show that all the above-mentioned elements
are present in the case at bar. Appellant and his cohorts broke into the house of
Aragons uncle took the victims wallet and cash, wrist watch and several pieces
of jewelry amounting to P67,000 and, in the course of the robbery, stabbed and
killed the victim.

PEOPLE vs. SULTAN

331 SCRA 216

FACTS: One evening she was on her way home from a visit to her cousin she
was accosted by someone, later identified as accused-appellant Fernando L.
Sultan, who pointed a sharp instrument at her neck and announcing it was a
"hold-up." He grabbed her and brought her to his house along where he, through
threat and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of her. After satisfying his lust, he
ordered her to put on her bra and panty, tied her hands and went out of the room
to smoke. After ten (10) to fifteen (15) minutes, he came back, untied her, and
once again with threat and intimidation sexually abused her. Thereafter, he tied
her hands and told her that he loved her and that he would answer for what he
had done to her.
In her effort to release herself from his clutches she "agreed" to elope with
him. Perhaps convinced that she was going to run away with him, he allowed her
to go home at noon to get her things. She immediately reported the abuse to her
sister, who immediately reported the same to his friend, a police officer. The
accused was arrested the next morning and brought to the police headquarters
for further interrogation.
ISSUE: a. Whether or not the accused is guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape.
b. Whether or not in being raped twice, every count of rape should be
treated as aggravating circumstance.

RULING: A. YES. Accused-appellant might not have employed force in

committing the rape but he definitely used intimidation which was sufficient to
make complainant submit herself to him against her will for fear of life and
personal safety. Intimidation is subjective so it must be viewed in the light of the
victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, and
not by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear, as in the present
case, fear that if the complainant does not yield to the bestial demands of
accused-appellant something would happen to her at that moment or even
thereafter.

The record shows that the prosecution has established that he committed
both robbery and rape with the intent to take personal property of another
preceding the rape. Under Art. 294, par. (1), of the Revised Penal Code, "x x x

[a]ny person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons shall suffer: 1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, x x x when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape x x x x"
B. Complaining witness Juditha Bautista was raped twice on the occasion
of the robbery. The Court realized that there was no law providing for the
additional rape/s or homicide/s for that matter to be considered as aggravating
circumstance. It further observed that the enumeration of aggravating
circumstances under Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive, unlike in Art.
13 of the same Code which enumerates the mitigating circumstances where
analogous circumstances may be considered, hence, the remedy lies with the
legislature. Consequently, unless and until a law is passed providing that the
additional rape/s or homicide/s may be considered aggravating, the Court must
construe the penal law in favor of the offender as no person may be brought
within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the statute. Under this view, the
additional rape committed by accused-appellant is not considered an aggravating
circumstance.

LAUREL vs. ABROGAR

G.R. No. 155976, January 13, 2009

FACTS: PLDT, the holder of a legislative franchise to render local and

international telecommunication services under Republic Act No. 7082 asserts
that Baynet conducts its ISR activities by utilizing an IPL to course its incoming
international long distance calls from Japan. The IPL is linked to switching
equipment, which is then connected to PLDT telephone lines/numbers and
equipment, with Baynet as subscriber. Through the use of the telephone lines
and other auxiliary equipment, Baynet is able to connect an international long
distance call from Japan to any part of the Philippines, and make it appear as a
call originating from Metro Manila. Consequently, the operator of an ISR is able
to evade payment of access, termination or bypass charges and accounting
rates, as well as compliance with the regulatory requirements of the NTC. Thus,
the ISR operator offers international telecommunication services at a lower rate,
to the damage and prejudice of legitimate operators like PLDT.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of theft, that is whether or not
PLDTs business of providing said telecommunication services, are proper
subjects of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: Yes. The words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code
must be considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory
definition of "taking" and movable property indicates that, clearly, not all personal
properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only
movable properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of
occupation by another are proper objects of theft. According to Cuello Callon, in
the context of the Penal Code, only those movable properties which can be taken

and carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Intangible
properties such as rights and ideas are not subject of theft because the same
cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated.
Thus, movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
should be distinguished from the rights or interests to whom they relate. A naked
right existing merely in contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to
the person who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or
larceny. Such rights or interests are intangible and cannot be "taken" by another.
On the other hand, goods, wares and merchandise of businessmen and credit
cards issued to them are movable properties with physical and material existence
and may be taken by another; hence, proper subjects of theft.

GAVIOLA vs. PEOPLE

480 SCRA 436

FACTS: The RTC convicted Alfonso Gaviola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of qualified theft. On September 6, 1997 at 7:00 AM, Jovencio Mejarito,
a nephew of Cleto Mejarito, and a barangay councilman saw Gavino Gaviola,
Rodrigo Gaviola and Domingo Caingcoy climbing the coconut trees and
deliberately took, harvested and gathered 1500 coconuts thru the supervision of
Alfonso and Leticia Gaviola from the plantation of Cleto Mejarito without his
authority and consent. The said accused admitted that the coconuts were taken
upon his instruction but insisted that the trees were planted from the lot he
inherited from his father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said accused is guilty of qualified theft.
RULING: Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code states that theft is committed by
any person, who with intent to gain but without violence, against or intimidation of
neither persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latters consent. Theft is likewise committed by: (1.) Any person who,

having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or
to its owner; (2.) Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property
of another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and (3.) Any person who shall enter an enclosed state or a field
where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent
of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather fruits, cereals or
other forest or farm products. Thus, the elements of theft are: 1). That there be
taking of personal property; 2) that said property belongs to another; 3) that the
taking be done without the consent of the owner and 5) that the taking be
accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things. According to Article 310: Qualified theft - The crime of theft
shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degree than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic
servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the
premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any
other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. For one to be guilty of
theft, the accused must have intent to steal (animu furandi) personal property,
meaning the intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of
personal property which intent is apart from but concurrent with the general
criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo. Thus, petitioners
claim of good faith in taking the coconuts from private complainants land is a
mere pretense to escape criminal liability.

LUCAS vs. CA
389 SCRA 749
FACTS: Luisito Tuazon testified that on 8 June 1990 he arrived home from work
at around six o'clock in the morning to find the door of his house ajar. No one
else was at home since his wife was in Singapore and his children were with his
relatives. His television set and stereo component were missing, as well as an
electric fan, kitchen utensils, cassette tapes and toys, cash in the amount
of P20,000.00 and jewelry of his wife worth P10,000.00.
Patrolman Edgardo Fuentes responded to Luisito's call for help. Pat.
Fuentes testified that in the early morning of 8 June 1990 a certain Tuazon
arrived at the police outpost in Tayuman and asked for help concerning a
burglary in his house. He conducted an investigation of the house and its
surroundings and recovered an empty bag where the cash and jewelry were
placed. He returned to the outpost but was asked to come back by the same
Tuazon who had found some of the stolen items outside a neighbor's house.
These were the television set, the stereo component, electric fan, toy cars and
cassette tapes.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was conspiracy among the accused, hence is guilty
of the crime of theft.

RULING: YES. To sustain a conviction for theft, the following elements must be
present: (1) personal property of another person must be taken without the
latter's consent; (2) the act of taking the personal property of another must be
done without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon
things; and, (3) there must be an intention to gain from the taking of another
person's personal property.
Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to
commit the crime. It may be deduced from the concerted acts of the accused,
indubitably demonstrating their unity of purpose, intent and sentiment in
committing the crime. Thus, it is not required that the accused were acquainted
with one another or that there was an agreement for an appreciable period prior
to the occurrence. It is enough that the accused acted in concert at the time of
the commission of the offense and that they had the same purpose or common
design, and that they were united in its execution.
In the case before us, Lucas, Navarro and Lovena demonstrated their
agreement to commit the theft by their unified acts of taking Luisito Tuazon's
personal belongings away from his home and boarding a tricycle together to
leave the locus criminis. Conspiracy can be inferred from their actions.

PEOPLE vs. MANERO

374 SCRA 667

FACTS: At 5:00 o'clock, Fr. Tulio Favali arrived at Km. 125 on board his
motorcycle. He entered the house of Gomez. While inside, Norberto, Jr., and his
co-accused Pleago towed the motorcycle outside to the center of the highway.

Norberto, Jr., opened the gasoline tank, spilled some fuel, lit a fire and burned
the motorcycle. As the vehicle was ablaze, the felons raved and rejoiced.
Upon seeing his motorcycle on fire, Fr. Favali accosted Norberto, Jr. But
the latter simply stepped backwards and executed a thumbs-down signal. At this
point, Edilberto asked the priest: "Ano ang gusto mo, padre (What is it you want,
Father)? Gusto mo, Father, bukon ko ang ulo mo (Do you want me, Father, to
break your head)?" Thereafter, in a flash, Edilberto fired at the head of the priest.
As Fr. Favali dropped to the ground, his hands clasped against his chest,
Norberto, Jr., taunted Edilberto if that was the only way he knew to kill a priest.
Slighted over the remark, Edilberto jumped over the prostrate body three (3)
times, kicked it twice, and fired anew. The burst of gunfire virtually shattered the
head of Fr. Favali, causing his brain to scatter on the road. As Norberto, Jr.,
flaunted the brain to the terrified onlookers, his brothers danced and sang "Mutya
Ka Baleleng" to the delight of their comrades-in-arms who now took guarded
positions to isolate the victim from possible assistance.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a conspiracy on the part of all of the accused,
hence guilty of the crime of murder, attempted homicide and arson.

RULING: YES. There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an

agreement to commit a crime and decide to commit it. It is not essential that all
the accused commit together each and every act constitutive of the offense. It is
enough that an accused participates in an act or deed where there is singularity
of purpose and unity in its execution is present.
From the foregoing narration of the trial court, it is clear that appellants
were not merely innocent bystanders but were in fact vital cogs in perpetrating
the savage murder of Fr. Favali and the attempted murder of Rufino Robles by
the Manero brothers and their militiamen. For sure, appellants all assumed a
fighting stance to discourage if not prevent any attempt to provide assistance to
the fallen priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez to stop Robles
and the other occupants from leaving so that the wounded Robles may die of
hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, these were overt acts to ensure success of the
commission of the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the conspiracy. The
appellants acted in concert in the murder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted
murder of Rufino Robles. While accused-appellants may not have delivered the
fatal shots themselves, their collective action showed a common intent to commit
the criminal acts.

ABUNDO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

205 SCRA 108
FACTS: On October, 1985, in Virac, Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, a public officer, being then
the District Engineer of the Department (then Ministry) of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) Office, Virac, Catanduanes, and as such have access and
control of the motor pool of the DPWH, committing the offense in relation to his
duties, and taking advantage of his official position, with intent to gain and with
grave abuse of confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take and steal, without the consent of the government, the chassis of Willys Jeep
valued at P15,000.00 in the Inventory and Inspection Report of Unserviceable
Property dated December 2, 1982, of the DPWH, Virac, Catanduanes, to the
damage and prejudice of the government.
The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was properly convicted of qualified theft.
RULING: No. It is universally recognized that the crime of theft implies an
invasion of possession, and this doctrine is well accepted in both the commonlaw and civil law jurisdictions. It follows therefore, that there cannot be theft when
the owner has voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. A felonious
taking characterizes the crime of theft. The facts clearly show that there was no
furtive taking or unlawful asportation, in the criminal sense, of the chassis. The
physical and juridical possession of the subject chassis was transferred to the
petitioner, at his request, with the consent of the Motor Pool Officer, Engineer
Alberto. The delivery of the chassis to the petitioner was properly documented. A
taking which is done with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the
property is not felonious. Lack of malice or criminal intent on the part of petitioner
was sufficiently established in this case.

Since the prosecution failed to prove that theft was committed by Abundo, it is
unnecessary to discuss whether the theft was simple or qualified.

PEOPLE vs. SALVILLA

184 SCRA 671

FACTS: The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade.
When they entered the establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee
thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and announced to her that it
was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant
Salvilla pointed his gun at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters,
Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told the former that
all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get
a paper bag wherein he placed P20,000.00 cash and handed it to Appellant.
Thereafter, Severino pleaded with the four accused to leave the premises as they
already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused Simplicio
Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his
two daughters, and Rodita, were herded to the office and kept there as hostages.
UItimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police
and military authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This
resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary Choco as well as to the accused
Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower
extremity just below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The
medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of hemorrhagic shock
when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major
operations during the course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30,
1986."
ISSUE: Whether the crime of robbery was consummated or was merely
attempted.

RULING: The crime of robbery in this case was consummated. There is no

question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property
belonging to another. This is known as the element of asportation the essence of
which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity
and consent and without the animus revertendi.

Those factual allegations of the appellant that while the "giving" has been proven,
the "taking" has not, are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard
employee, testified that upon demand by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00
inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused
Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the
P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita declared that the Mayor handed the
amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she
thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore,
sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987, pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money
demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of
the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.

ROQUE vs. PEOPLE

444 SCRA 98

FACTS: Antonio Salazar (Salazar) is a member/depositor of the Basa Air Base

Savings and Loan Association Inc. (BABSLA) as evidenced by his passbook No.
1359. He was made to sign two ledgers when he opened his savings account.
On November 16, 1989, Salazar made a deposit of P2,000 at the BABSLA;
however, he did not make any withdrawal, nor did he authorize anyone to do the
same on that date or on November 17, 1989 or for the whole month of November
of that year. Salazar disclosed that around July 1990 he heard that the funds of
other depositors were missing inside the BABSLA and were supposedly
clandestinely circulating around the base. Prodded by this news, and
considering that the balance in his passbook was P46,000, he went to the
BABSLA to withdraw P40,000, but was informed that his balance at the BABSLA
was insufficient to cover the withdrawal. He was not allowed to withdraw.
Rosalina de Lazo, the general manager, informed him that several withdrawals
were made on his account amounting to P30,500, as evidenced by three (3)
withdrawal slips. Included among these withdrawal slips is one with the amount

of P10,000, dated November 16, 1989. Salazar claimed that the signature
appearing on said withdrawal slip was not his signature. He does not personally
know who made the withdrawal ofP10,000. Salazar assumed that the one in
control of the funds made the withdrawal.

ISSUE: Whether or not qualified theft may be committed when the personal
property is in the lawful possession of the accused prior to the commission of the
alleged felony?

RULING: YES. In the present case, what is involved is the possession of money
in the capacity of a bank teller. In People v. Locson, the this Court considered
deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material
possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to money
received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the purpose of
servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical possession
remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited
cases, beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for
personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the
teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places money in the tellers
possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified
theft would be committed.

PEOPLE vs. BUSTINERA

431 SCRA 284

FACTS: From the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City
finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified
theft for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows: The
undersigned accuses Luisito D. Bustinera of the crime of Qualified Theft,
committed as follows: That on or about 25 December up to the 9 January 1997 in
Quezon City, the said accused being then employed as one of the taxi Drivers of
Elias S. Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs in Diliman, Quezon City, and
as such has free access to the taxi he drives, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of confidence
reposed upon him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of the
owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate
No. PWH-266worth PHP 303,000.00 belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the
damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of PHP
303,000.00.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused- appellant had intent to gain when he failed
to return the taxi to its garage?
RULING: Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor
vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,
by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT
PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now covered by the anticarnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery. The anticarnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery and theft
included in the RPC. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain, of a
motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. Since
appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the
anti-carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as
the said motor vehicle does not fall within the exceptions mentioned in the anticarnapping law

PEOPLE vs. SALONGA

359 SCRA 310

FACTS: On October, 1986 the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding one another, and
as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust
Company, without the knowledge and consent of the owner take and carry away
the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to
sign the said check and have the said check deposited in the account of
Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact
there is no such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby
causing the preparation and use of a simulated check described as Check No.
013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized,
through which they succeeded in its encashment, enabling them to gain for
themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of
Metrobank and Trust Company in the total amount of P36,480.30.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified theft through falsification of commercial document with the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

RULING: The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of

Commercial Document. The information alleged that the accused took
P36,480.30 with grave abuse of confidence by forging the signature of officers
authorized to sign the subject check and had the check deposited in the account
of Firebrake Sales and Services, a fictitious payee without any legitimate
transaction with Metrobank. Theft is qualified if it is committed with grave abuse
of confidence. The fact that accused-appellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank
had custody of the aforesaid checks and had access not only in the preparation
but also in the release of Metrobank cashiers checks suffices to designate the
crime as qualified theft as he gravely abused the confidence reposed in him by
the bank as assistant cashier. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the
imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and
medium periods and one year of each additional ten thousand pesos in
accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However,
under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is
punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than that specified in

Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two (2) degrees higher than prision
mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion temporal in its medium
and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank officers
authorized to sign the subject cashiers check was resorted to in order to obtain
the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. As correctly held by the
courts a quo, falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means
to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex crime. Hence, we
apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, x x x where an
offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the more
serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that
qualified Theft is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates
which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal Code with prision
mayor in its minimum period, the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.

CARLAGA vs. CA
358 SCRA 583

FACTS: Ricardo offered to supply Canuto Duran, an undercover agent, with

electrical materials, saying that he has a cousin from whom he can procure the
same. Canuto purchased small electrical wires which, according to Ricardo,
came from his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga, nicknamed Totoy. Ricardo introduced
Canuto to Jonathan. It turned out that Jonathan was the assigned driver of
DLPC Service Truck. Ricardo accompanied Canuto to Jonathans house to get a
roll of electric items. He gave the money to Ricardo; Ricardo, in turn, gave it to
Jonathan. Thereafter, the police apprehended them. Ricardo revealed that he
acted as a fence for his cousin, Jonathan Cariaga and Canuto Duran; that the
items that Canuto Duran bought from Jonathan, thru him, were DLPC
properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of qualified theft.

RULING: YES. The information alleged that petitioner was an employee of

DLPC; that he had access to the electrical supplies of said company; and that
with grave abuse of confidence, he stole electrical materials belonging to
DLPC. The prosecution established that petitioner who was permanently
assigned as driver of Truck S-143 had charge of all the DLPC equipment and
supplies kept in his vehicle, including lightning arresters, cut-out and wires,
which were generally used for the installation of transformers and power lines;
and specifically stored therein for emergency operations at night when the
stockroom is closed. While the mere circumstance that the petitioner is an

employee or laborer of DLPC does not suffice to create the relation of confidence
and intimacy that the law requires to designate the crime as qualified theft, it has
been held that access to the place where the taking took place or access to the
stolen items changes the complexion of the crime committed to that of qualified
theft. Thus, theft by a truck driver who takes the load of his truck belonging to his
employer is guilty of qualified theft as was proven in this case. The trial court
correctly considered petitioners use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the
crime as a generic aggravating circumstance thus raising the penalty to its
maximum. While the aggravating circumstance of by means of motor vehicle
was not alleged in the information, there is evidence that the same was
employed to facilitate the commission of the crime. A generic aggravating
circumstance may be proved even if not alleged. The theft could not have been
effected without the aid of the motor vehicle, as proven by the prosecution, the
service truck was used in storing and then transporting the stolen electrical
materials to the place where they were sold.

QUINAO vs. PEOPLE

335 SCRA 741

FACTS: As borne out by the evidence, both the accused and private complainant
are claiming ownership over the land in question. Complainants witness
Bienvenido Delmonte declared that accused Salvador Cases and Conchita
Quinao, together with their other close relatives suddenly appeared and while
there, with the use of force, violence and intimidation, usurped and took
possession of their landholding, claiming that the same is their inheritance from
their ascendants and while there, accused immediately gathered coconuts and
made them into copra. Complainant was forcibly driven out by the accused from
their landholding and was threatened that if he will try to return to the land in
question, something will happen to him. Complainant was thus forced to seek
assistance from the Lapinig Philippine National Police. Complainants witness

further declared that the actual primitive owner of the land in question was Angel
Pelison but the land was purchased by his grandfather Petre Delmonte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of usurpation of real property.

RULING: YES. In order to absolve herself of any liability for the crime, petitioner
insists that the elements of the crime are not present in this case. Specifically,
she maintains that she owns the property involved herein. The matter on the
ownership of the lot in question, however, had long been settled when the Court
of First Instance of Samar, Branch III, Thirteenth Judicial Region, adjudicated
said lot to private complainants predecessors-in-interest.
The requisites of usurpation are that the accused took possession of
anothers real property or usurped real rights in anothers property; that the
possession or usurpation was committed with violence or intimidation and that
the accused had animo lucrandi. In order to sustain a conviction for "usurpacion
de derecho reales," the proof must show that the real property occupied or
usurped belongs, not to the occupant or usurper, but to some third person, and
that the possession of the usurper was obtained by means of intimidation or
violence done to the person ousted of possession of the property.
We fully agree with the findings of both the trial court and the CA on the issue of
the ownership of the lot involved in this case. The evidence on record sufficiently
refuted petitioners claim of ownership.

ONG vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 165275, September 23, 2008

FACTS: Petitioner had for years been buying jewelry from Gold Asia which is
owned and operated by the family of Rosa Cabuso (the private
complainant). While she normally bought jewelry on cash basis, she was
allowed to issue postdated checks to cover the jewelry she bought in December
1994 up to February 1995, upon her assurance that the checks would be funded
on their due dates. When, on maturity, the checks were deposited, they were
returned with the stamp Account Closed.

Petitioner, denying having intended to defraud the private complainant, gave her
side of the case as follows: On December 12, 1994, all the personal checks she
had issued matured at the same time, but as her business was faring poorly, she
was not able to fund those which she issued to the private complainant. On her
request, however, the private complainant allowed her to pay on installment the
amounts covered by the checks and she had in fact paid a total of P338,250, a
fact admitted by the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable ground for the
crime of estafa.

RULING: NO. Although the earlier quoted paragraph 2(a) and the immediately
quoted paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 have a common element false pretenses
or fraudulent acts the law treats Estafa under paragraph 2(d) by postdating a
check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Thus, under paragraph 2(d),
failure to fund the check despite notice of dishonor creates a prima
facie presumption of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act, which is
not an element of a violation of paragraph 2(a).
Under paragraph 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge
of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent,
which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply
with a promise, no Estafa can be deemed to exist. Notice of dishonor being then
an element of a charge under Article 2(d) under which petitioner was clearly
charged, failure to prove it is a ground for acquittal there under.
Suffice it to state that petitioners defenses of good faith and lack of criminal
intent, defenses to a malum in se like Estafa, are not difficult to credit. For, on
notice of the lack of sufficient funds in her bank account, to cover the Allied Bank

check, petitioner offered to pay in installment, to which the private complainant

agreed, the amount covered by the said check, as well as the others. As
reflected above, the prosecution stipulated that petitioner had made a total
payment of P338,250, which amount is almost one-third of the total amount of
the ten checks or more than the amount covered by the P76,654 Allied Bank
check.

VELOSO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 149354, January 18, 2008

FACTS: Ramon had a friendly bet with the petitioner Ramon on whether or not
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. would win as a Senator. Ramon assured that Marcos, Jr.
is a sure winner, but petitioner claimed otherwise. They both agreed that the
loser will host a dinner for ten (10) persons. After the elections, official results
showed that Marcos, Jr. lost in his senatorial bid. Hence, petitioner won in the
bet.

Ramon, the loser, informed Eva to reserve table for dinner and that he for
it as his commitment to petitioner. He asked for four (4) additional tables be set,
promising he would pay for the same. The Sales Invoice for the additional four
tables amounted toP11,391.00. When the Sales Invoice was presented to
petitioner, he refused to pay. He instructed her to send it to Congressman
Cuencos office as he was always present there. It turned out, however, that he
was no longer reporting at that office. Hence, the bill was sent to his address but
still, he refused to pay. The lawyer for the restaurant sent a demand letter to
petitioner, but to no avail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of estafa under Article 315 (2)(e) of
the Revised Penal Code.

RULING: NO. After a careful review of the records of the case, we found no
reversible error in the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court thus
adopts its findings of fact and conclusion of law.

We reviewed the records very closely and found that petitioner and his
guests, occupying four tables, ate the food he ordered. When asked to pay, he
refused and insisted he was a mere guest of Ramon. It bears emphasis that the
understanding between petitioner and Ramon was that the latter would pay for
only one table.
We agree with the Solicitor General in his brief for the People that
petitioner employed fraud in ordering four additional tables, partaking of the food
ordered and then illegally refusing to pay, which makes him liable for estafa
under Article 315 (2)(e) of the Revised Penal Code.