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JOHN DILWORTH
currentessay. I shall concentrateon visual artworks, such as paintings or drawings, but the
points made will be general enough to potentially apply to other artforms as well.3
There are additional reasons that a double
content approachto artworksis desirable.First,
an argumentfrom the methodology of the cognitive sciences is relevant: paradigm cases of
meaning, such as word, sentence, or propositional meaning, are typically analyzed in
broadly symbolic or representationalterms, so
similar approachesshould be promisingfor any
artistic kinds of meaning as well. Second, the
primary importance of perception in understanding visual artworksimplies the relevance
of cognitive analyses of perceptual processes,
which also normally regard perception of any
kind as a broadly representationalprocedure
involving the processing of perceptualcontent.
Hence, for this reason, too, one would expect
representational content-based approaches to
any kind of artisticmeaningto be promising.
As for why two general kinds of content are
being postulated,ratherthanjust one, the basic
idea is as follows. The perceptionof artworks,
as with perceptionin general, involves at least
two hierarchically-relatedstages. The first is a
preliminary low-level stage that is relatively
unconceptualized-the province of stylistic,
medium-related,expressive, and so forth kinds
of aspectual meaning. The second is a higherlevel, more conceptualized stage, associated
with subject matter content, which initially
occurs in perception only as encoded by the
low-level content and, hence, requiresa higherlevel interpretationor decoding during the perceptual process. Such a two (or more) level
account of perceptualand conceptual structure
is becoming increasinglyplausible in cognitive
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250
science, given the wide variety of recent arguments for the existence of nonconceptualcontent as a distinctive category over and above
more traditional conceptual, subject-matterrelatedkinds of content.4
In addition,the specifically artistic aspects of
representational artworks could then be
explained in terms of the characteristicrichness
of aspectual content, in both perceptual and
nonperceptual ways-as compared with their
subject matter content, which they share with
more prosaic or utilitarianrepresentationssuch
as snapshots. Also, some of the intuitions of
Richard Wollheim and others concerning the
"twofoldness" of the perception of artworks
could then be explainedin termsof the simultaneous perceptionof both kinds of content.5Thus,
in sum, there is a strong initial presumptionin
favor of attempts such as mine to analyze all
artisticmeaning in terms of content-and, with
theoreticalsimplicity in mind, to assume that a
single category of lower-level aspectual content, covering all broadly contextual factors, is
all thatis needed in additionto higher-level subject mattercontent.
Clearly,we must avoid trivializingthe double
content thesis by broadening the concept of
contentto include any kind of meaningfactoror
component as a kind of content of an artwork.
Thus it is only specifically representational
kinds of content that will be discussed here,
kinds thatcan be closely relatedto some reasonably clear concept of artistic representationor
symbolization.
I. INITIALEVIDENCEFOR STYLISTICCONTENT
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252
interestingdifferences in the modes of signification of indication and representation,which
are worthyof furtherpursuitelsewhere.
IV. MOREON THE RELATIONSOF INDICATIONAND
REPRESENTATION
Another, more currently relevant, basic question that must be asked about the relations of
indicationand representationis as follows. Presumablypictorialcontentof each kind-aspectual and subject matter-is at least partly
perceptual, that is, some of each kind can be
seen when looking at a picture.Also, both kinds
have some spatial extent, in that, for example,
impressionist stylistic elements are spread out
over the surface of a canvas, as is the relevant
subject matter.But what prevents each kind of
content from competing with the other for the
viewer's attention? To put the matter another
way, how is a perceiverof a pictureable to distinguish aspectualfrom subject matterinformation when any given region of the canvas has to
supply both kinds?
A rough sketch of a solution to these problems could proceed as follows. Stylistic and
othercontextualelementsprovidea kind of toolbox of possible aspectualeffects, which are then
arranged,using appropriatevariationsin shape,
texture, and color, to simultaneously provide
subjectmatterinformationas well. Thus, a perceiver can both perceive the stylistic elements
and the subject matterand appropriatelydistinguish them, because the subjectmatterinformation is providedby appropriatevariationswithin
the stylistic content. Presumably some such
account must be correct, because the physical
surface of a typical impressionist painting is
entirely covered with configurations of paint
that are closely associated with impressionist
style so that thereis no mannerin which subject
matterinformationcould be provided,otherthan
by appropriatevariationswithin the stylistic and
otheraspectualcontentelements of the painting,
since subject mattercontent itself has no such
close associationwith the physical painting.
To put the relevant epistemic issue more
explicitly, stylistic content has an epistemicpriority over subject mattercontent, both because
of its uncontroversialassociation with purely
physical or configurational properties of the
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253
In the preceding two sections, potential conflicts were discussed between aspect contentsuch as impressionist style-versus subject
matter content, in cases where each is derived
from the same area of a picture,and a decoding
solution was suggested, according to which
aspectualcontent includes a coded form of subject mattercontentthatis decoded by perceivers
to extractthe desired content.
However, even if such a solution is persuasive for the epistemic and otherreasons already
given, it has not yet been explicitly shown that
some simpler solution is not equally goodsuch as a descriptive solution, according to
which a single area of a picture has different
characteristicsor properties,some of which are
aspectualcharacteristicsand othersof which are
subject matter characteristics.In other words,
though concrete physical objects must compete
for space in the world, a single physical object
in a given place can have many differentproperties, some of which might include, in the
abstract,compatible aspectual and subject matter properties. To rule out such a descriptive
analysis as a general account,it would be sufficient to find cases, if any, in which each kind of
content has necessarily conflicting characteristics in the same area of a picture,hence preventing any purely descriptive separation of
aspectualfrom subjectmattercontentwhile also
showing the need for a decoding solution.
In fact, arguablyany case of perceptualambiguity, of the kind discussed in the previous
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254
section, can provide such an example, as will
now be shown using a related case. Around
1967, Andy Warhol produced a "red-faced
Marilyn"portrait,in which the actuallight pink
color of MarilynMonroe's face is replacedwith
a strongred color.13(In the discussion below, it
is assumed that 'red' refers to some specific
strong shade of red that is inconsistentwith the
same area also being pink.) Now on a literal
reading of this picture, its subject matteris not
simply Marilyn'sface, but more specifically her
red face, in that, on this interpretation,the picture representsher as having a red face. To be
sure, this would be a misrepresentationsince
she did not actually have a red face, but that
would not prevent her from being represented
thus if Warholhad wished to do so.
Nevertheless, such a literal interpretation
seems implausible, even though perceptually
possible, for example, because the portraitis of
a famous person, so that this interpretation
would also involve attributingunlikely intentions to Warhol, such as that he was saying
throughhis work "See, I'm deliberatelymaking
a mistake, even though everybody knows it to
be a mistake,"which would be puzzling at best.
Instead, it seems likely that, insofar as the
unusual red color is meaningful at all, it
provides some aspectual, expressive content
concerning its normal, pink-skinned subject
matter-for example, as linguistically translated, that it expresses what it is like to see
Marilyn with her normal pink skin color in the
reddishglare of fame and media publicity.14
However, to the extent that this expressive
aspectualinterpretationis plausibleor correct,it
provides a potential example of conflicting
aspectualversus subjectmatterpropertiesin the
same area of the picture, with the red aspectual
content conflicting with the pink (nonred) subject matter content. But, of course, no single
such area could both provide uncoded red
information or content and uncoded pink
informationor content. Hence, at least one of
them must be present only in encoded form to
restore consistency to the informational situation. Given the weight of the previous arguments in favor of its being the subject matter
contentthatis encoded, the preferredsolution is
as follows. The physical redness of the portrait
should be interpreted as uncoded or explicit
expressive red content, while that same red
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The results achieved so far will now be integrated into a somewhat more focused or sharpened double content view. Though the main
goal of this paperhas been to initially show how
nonsubject-matterkinds of artistic meaning
could be explained in aspectual content terms,
255
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256
One important question remaining to be discussed is that of how, on this broadly symbolic
account of representation,viewers of artworks
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Thus an importanttask for artists who wish
theirwork to be properlyunderstoodis to somehow ensure that resolution of conflicts at the
intermediate stage of processing is relatively
straightforward-and certainly not intractable-for viewers, without specialized knowledge or learning techniques being requiredby
them. Arguably the best, if not the only, completely general-purpose method for ensuring
this is for artiststo follow a principleof aspectual parsimony (AP) in creating their works,
namely to ensure that only a relatively limited
amount of the content in their works is aspectually active or nonneutralso thatthe majorityor
predominantamount of it will be aspectually
neutral.
The result of artists following the aspectual parsimony principle should be that a
viewer's intermediate processing of a picture
would result in a majority or predominant
amount of the subject matter content having
been correctly decoded, since its corresponding aspectual content was aspectually neutral
to begin with.
Thus at this stage, in effect there is alreadya
kind of "majorityvote" in the perceptualdata
for one overall subject matter interpretationof
the picture,which, if accepted,would enable the
conflicting elements to be resolved in postintermediate processing (as discussed below). The
routine acceptance of such majority votes as
binding on, or regulativefor, such laterprocessing embodies the third major conventional element in pictorial processing, naturally labeled
the majorityvote (MV) principle.
Given acceptance of the MV principle,
postintermediate processing would proceed
roughly as follows. First, for each conflicting
factor in the picturewhose subject matteris not
consistent with the majority vote, assume that
instead it has that subject mattercontent S that
is most consistent with the majorityvote for the
general subject matter of the picture. Then,
reinterpretthe relevant aspectual data at that
point in the picture-previously assumed to be
aspectually neutral-so that it is instead interpreted as aspectually contrastive data that
encodes, in an appropriatenonneutralway, the
assumed subjectmatterS. Following this procedurefor all conflicting elements should result in
a single consistent overall interpretationof the
picture that has full specificity both for the
X. HARDERCASES
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259
WesternMichiganUniversity
Kalamazoo,
Michigan49008
Dilworth@wmich.edu
INTERNET:
1. Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach
to a Theory of Symbols (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1968).
2. Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the
Foundations of the RepresentationalArts (HarvardUniversity Press, 1990). Only fiction is "representational"in his
special sense.
3. See my book TheDouble Contentof Art (New York:
PrometheusBooks, 2005) for a general account, though the
currentpaperintroducesadditionalconsiderations.
4. For example, see Essays on NonconceptualContent,
ed. York H. Gunther(MIT Press, 2003).
5. See, for example, RichardWollheim, Painting as an
Art (PrincetonUniversity Press, 1987). I provide a double
content analysis of twofoldness in Chapter 6 of my The
Double ContentofArt.
6. For example, Wollheim, Painting as an Art, p. 46.
7. To be sure, this claim of conceptual separabilityis
consistent with holding that episodes of artisticallyoptimal
perception of a particular impressionist painting would
involve an experience of both kinds of content in an
integrally-relatedway-of these particular impressionistic
stylistic elements in the service of this particular subject
matter.Thus the currentanalytical exercise of distinguishing different kinds of content does not undercutplausible
claims about the inseparabilityof content elements in adequate experiences of artworks,as discussed in Chapter6 of
my TheDouble ContentofArt.
8. Cases of representationof indefinite entities such as
a man, or nonexistententities such as SantaClaus, must not
be overlooked.
9. For example, RichardWollheim distinguishesrepresentations of particular objects or events from representations of objects or events "that are merely of a particular
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