The Taliban: Exporting Extremism

Author(s): Ahmed Rashid

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1999), pp. 22-35
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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The

Taliban:
Extremism

Exporting

Ahmed Rashid

REWRITING

THE

RULES

OF THE

GREAT

GAME

the destabilizing
radical
export of Afghan-style
term in the American
political lexicon. But in
Central
and South Asia, where
the repercussions
of the superstrict
Taliban rule of Afghanistan
have been widely felt, the word has become
all too familiar. As political
economic meltdown,
fragmentation,
"Talibanization,"
Islam, may be a new

ethnic and sectarian warfare, and Islamic fundamentalism

tighten their
on Pakistan
and much of the rest of the region, the dangerous
grip
new leaders is no
a local affair.
behavior of Afghanistans
longer
More

is seeping through its porous

chaos inAfghanistan
borders. The ongoing civil war has polarized the region, with Pakistan
and Saudi Arabia backing the Taliban regime while Iran, Russia, India,
and four former Soviet Central Asian republics support the opposition
Northern Alliance. The confrontation
is producing enormous economic
as the
on
disruption throughout the area,
Afghan warlords' dependence
smuggling and drug trafficking grows insatiable.
Into the political vacuum left by 20 years of war and the collapse of
stable government has marched a new generation of violent fundamen
talists, nurtured and inspired by the Talibans unique Islamist model.
in
of foreign radicals now fighting alongside the Taliban
Thousands
and more,

Ahmed

Rashid

has covered

the war

in Afghanistan

for 20 years. He is
for the Far Eastern

and Central Asia Correspondent

Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Economic Review
and author of The Resurgence
of Central Asia:
Nationalism?
Fundamentalism

[22]

and

the forthcoming
in Central Asia.

Taliban: Militant

Islam,

Islam
Oil,

or
and

The Taliban: Exporting

Extremism

are determined
to
Afghanistan
someday overthrow their own regimes
and carry out Taliban-style
Islamist revolutions in their homelands. For
militants who took over parts of
example, the Chechnya-based
Dagestan
in July included in their ranks Arabs,
most of
and
Pakistanis,
Afghans,

whom had fought inAfghanistan. So had the 800 Uzbek and Tajik

inAugust. The
gunmen who took over parts of southern Kyrgyzstan
state breakdown in
offers
from
militants
Pakistan, Iran, the
Afghanistan
Central Asian republics, and Chinas
predominantly Muslim Xinjiang
a
deal:
province
tempting package
sanctuary and financial
support
through smuggling.
s sole response so far has been its
Meanwhile,
Washington
single
minded
to justice the Saudi-born
obsession with bringing
terrorist
a
Usama bin
Ladin?hardly
comprehensive
policy for dealing with
this increasingly volatile part of the world.
ForWestern
can
nations to presume that
they
safely exploit the vast

oil and gas riches of Central Asia without first helping

bring peace to

is unrealistic to the extreme. A new Great Game

is being
Afghanistan
in
the
are
no
At
stake, however,
played
region.
longer questions of
mere
or
to
influence
who
build
oil
and gas pipelines
political
gets
where. These
issues will be irrelevant unless theWest
figures out how
to stop the
inAfghanistan?and
fast.
spreading conflagration

THE

STUDENTS WHO

CAME IN FROM THE COLD

For Afghanistan
between
civilizations

to be at the center of both

dialogue and conflict
is nothing new. The
country's location at the
crossroads between
the Arabian
Iran, Central Asia,
Sea, and India
a
has given itsmountain
passes
strategic significance for centuries. At
certain times,
has
acted as a buffer between
Afghanistan
competing
empires and ideologies; at others it has served as a corridor through
which
armies marched.
efforts to colonize
the country,
Repeated

most recently by the British and the Soviets, have failed and in the
process

the Afghans

given

The United
Soviet
troops

a fierce

sense of
independence

States, patron of the Afghan

and pride.

rebellion against the

invaders, walked away after the Soviet Union

in 1989. The
once on the frontline
Afghans,

withdrew

its last

of the Cold War,

were leftwith a devastated country.One million had died

during the
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November/December

1999

[23]

Ahmed Rashid
occupation. But only three years later, when Kabul fell to the
who had fought off the Soviets, gory civil war again
mujahideen
countries trying to carve
gripped the country, fueled by neighboring
areas
war
out
has pitted the majority Pushtun
of influence. The civil
east
in the south and
of the
population
against the ethnic minorities
and Turkmen.
Uzbek, Hazara,
north?Tajik,
in late 1994 as a
The predominantly
Pushtun Taliban
emerged
movement
messianic
made up of taliban (literally, students)
from
Islamic madrasahs (seminaries) who were living as refugees in Pakistan.
to
establish law and order,
bring peace to Afghanistan,
They vowed
disarm the population,
and impose sharia (Islamic law).Welcomed
by
awar-weary
Pushtun population,
the Taliban were at first remarkably
ten-year

successful and popular. Until they captured Kabul in 1996 they expressed
no desire to rule the country. But ever since then?abetted
by their
Pakistani and Saudi backers and inspired by ideological mentors
such
as bin Ladin?the
Taliban have committed
themselves to conquering
more.
the entire country and
overran much
of northern Afghanistan,
In 1998, the Taliban
(made up of non-Pushtun
minorities)
pushing the Northern Alliance
into a thin sliver of territory in the northeast. This victory further
as Iran threatened to invade and accused Pakistan
polarized the region,
the Taliban.
of supporting
The nature of the Taliban?who

are and what

they
they represent?
has been difficult for outsiders to understand because of the excessive
secrecy that surrounds their leaders and political structure. The Taliban
do not issue policy statements or hold regular press conferences. There
Because
and
of the ban on photography
is no Taliban manifesto.
even
new
not
look
know
what
their
leaders
do
television, Afghans
Muhammad
like. The one-eyed Taliban
leader, Mullah
religious
and so remains amystery.
Umar, does not meet with non-Muslims
Historically,
country where

was
a
conservative
Muslim
Afghanistan
deeply
tribal custom, prevailed
sharia, as interpreted by Afghan
in Afghanistan
But the Islam traditionally
practiced

for centuries.
was also
immensely

tolerant?of

other Muslim

sects, other religions,

and different lifestyles. Until 1992,Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews all played
a
was

significant
not

an

[24]

role in the country's

bazaar

economy

issue.

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78No. 6

and sectarianism

this
the bloody
civil war has destroyed
1992, however,
one another
in
tolerance,
setting sects and ethnic groups against
away
The once-unifying
factor of Islam
formerly unimaginable.
a lethal weapon
in the hands of extremists
and a force
has become
and fragmentation.
for division
are Sunni Muslims,
percent of Afghans
although Shiites
Ninety
some
among the Hazaras and
Tajik clans settled in central
predominate
Since

Islam in Afghanistan
believed in minimum
Traditional
Afghanistan.
as
government with as little state interference
possible. Ajiother key
to
tolerance was the enormous popularity
factor contributing
Afghan
branch of Islam.
and undogmatic
of Sufism, amystical
the Taliban
Before
arrived, none of Islam's extreme orthodox
as the conservative Wahhabis
from Saudi Arabia?had
sects?such
ever found a home in
But the Taliban emerged at a critical
Afghanistan.
as the country was fractured
juncture,
by warlords, Pushtun hegemony
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November/December

1999

[25]

Ahmed Rashid
an
vacuum grew within
the Islamist move
ideological
dissipated, and
awell-worn
ment. The Taliban began as reformers,
tradition
following
on the familiar notion of
war
inMuslim
history based
jihad?holy
not sanction the
against infidels. Jihad, however, does
killing of fellow
or sect. Yet the Taliban has used it
on the basis of
Muslims
ethnicity
_
to do
just that. This appalls non-Pushtuns,
accuse
who
the Taliban
of using jihad as a

The Taliban have

cover

a new

created

radical model for

Islamic

revolution.

to exterminate

them.

The Taliban's anomalous

interpretation of
Islam emerged from an extreme and perverse
of Deobandism,
interpretation
preached by

Pakistani mullahs (clerics) inAfghan refugee

a branch
of Sunni
camps. Deobandism,
that aimed to
India as a reform movement
Islam, arose in British
as it
to live within
the confines
regenerate Muslim
society
struggled
to harmonize
state. The Deobandis
classical
of a colonized
sought
Islamic

texts with current

on, a few Deobandi

realities?an

aim the Taliban

has ignored.

established inAfghanistan,
were more
not
in
successful
but they
hugely popular. They
a
set
Pakistan, however. Pakistani Deobandis
up
political party, the
a
stance.
with
anti-American
(jui),
strong
Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam
the few Deobandi
the war against the Soviets,
Afghan
During
were
that
then
the
Across
existed
border, however,
groups
ignored.
in Pakistan's
of madrasahs
the jui used the war to set up hundreds
Early

madrasahswert

were

free
refugees and young Pakistanis
offering Afghan
Deobandi
education,
food, shelter, and military
training. These
run
in
madrasahs, however, were
by barely literate mullahs untutored
the original reformist Deobandi
agenda. Saudi funds and scholarships
to
Wahhabism.
ultraconservative
brought them closer
isolated until Pakistan's
1993
Still, the jui remained politically
Prime
Minister
victorious
with
the
it
allied
itself
when
elections,
Pushtun

belt,

a part of her
Bhutto, becoming
ruling coalition. For the first
close
time the jui gained access to the corridors of power, establishing
links with the army, the Inter-Services
Intelligence agency (isi) and the
In 1996 the Taliban handed control of training camps
Interior Ministry.
over to jui factions, thus enhancing their image among
inAfghanistan
the new generation of Pakistani and Arab militants who studied there.

Benazir

[26]

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78No. 6

The Taliban: Exporting

Extremism

the main
jui and its many breakaway factions have become
and foreign students to fight for the Taliban.
recruiters of Pakistani
Between
80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis
1994 and 1999, an estimated
The

militants
These battle-hardened
trained and fought in Afghanistan.
own
now
stability, and the support the
gravely threaten Pakistan's
receives from Pakistans Deobandi
Taliban
network, quite separate
ensures even
it
the
from
from military
gets
government,
supplies
into Pakistani
greater Taliban penetration
society.
the Taliban
and the jui, funded by
The joint venture between
and supported by the Pakistani
Saudi Wahhabis
isi, has become an
new markets
in Central Asia and
seeking
ever-expanding
enterprise,
in
traditions?but
beyond. The Taliban may have debased Deobandi
a new, radical model
so
for Islamist
doing
they have promoted
revolution. Unlike their predecessors, the Taliban have little knowledge
of Islamic and Afghan history, o? sharia or the Quran. Their exposure
to the radical Islamic debate around the world
is minimal;
indeed,
no discussion.
are so
in
their
beliefs
that
admit
they
they
rigid

THE NEXT TO FALL: PAKISTAN AND KASHMIR

The

recruits it has
purist ideology and the Pakistani
in Pakistan.
nurtured have had immense cross-border
repercussions
an
in
An already fragile nation
the midst of
identity crisis, economic
sectarian
ethnic and
meltdown,
division, and suffering under a rapacious
ruling elite unable to provide good governance, Pakistan could easily
led not by established,
be submerged by a new Islamist wave?one
more mature Islamist
groups.
parties but by neo-Taliban
a
such
neo-Taliban
had
become
By 1998,
parties
major influence
in the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan
and the North West Frontier
In those regions, they had begun banning
Province.
television and
as
such
videos, imposing sharia punishments
stoning and amputation,
to
Pakistani
and forcing women
Shiites,
assassinating
adopt the
restrictive Taliban dress code. Their influence is now starting to creep
outside the Pushtun
belt to Punjab and Sind. Of the 6,000-8,000
Taliban's

Pakistani militants who joined theTaliban for their July 1999 offensive
the majority were, for the first time,
against the Northern Alliance,
not Pushtuns
s support for
but Punjabis. The Pakistani government
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1999

[27]

Ahmed Rashid
is thus coming back to haunt it, even as Pakistans
remain oblivious of the danger and continue their support.
the Taliban

even
Afghan
policy have become
support given to the Taliban by two extremist jui
the Sipah-Sahaba Pakistan and the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.

The contradictions
more acute due to the
splinter groups,

leaders

in Pakistans

Both groups have killed hundreds of Pakistani Shiites and allegedly

twice tried to assassinate

Prime Minister Muhammad

Nawaz
Sharif.
When
Sharif responded with a crackdown against them in
Punjab,
their leaders took refuge inKabul and came under Taliban
protection?

the sameTaliban still backed by Islamabad.

Pakistan

believes

that aTaliban-controlled

Afghanistan

will

be an

conflict with
ally and give its army strategic depth in its ongoing
India. In particular, Islamabad considers support for the Taliban nec
essary because of its dispute with India over Kashmir. The Taliban,
in Pakistan,
and bin Ladin's terrorist network all
to
s con
Kashmiri
give major support
insurgents resisting New Delhi
trol of Indian Kashmir.
Islamabad therefore cannot drop its support
cause it espouses.
for them without
affecting the Kashmir
Yet the increasing
Islamicization
of the Kashmiri
struggle has
undermined
both the Kashmiris' own demand for self-determination

Deobandi

groups

from India and Pakistan's

bid to win

international

mediation

of the

movement
is losing world sym
dispute. The Kashmiri
independence
as more and more Pakistani and Arab recruits
pathy
join the fight and
turn it into a Taliban
jihad. The longer this goes on, the less chance
there will be that the territorial dispute will ever be peacefully resolved.
Day by day, the danger grows for Pakistan, Kashmir, and India itself.

DOMINOES:

With

their

crisis-torn

CENTRAL

porous

economies,

ASIA,

IRAN,

AND

weak
and
borders,
security apparatuses,
the five former Soviet Central Asian republics?

Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,

have every reason to fear the turmoil emanating
The

threats

include

CHINA

the flow

of drugs

and Uzbekistan?

from Afghanistan.
and weapons
and a possible

flood of refugees if theNorthern Alliance

is defeated.

But Central Asia's leaders, who have not changed since the Soviet
era, are growing increasingly authoritarian. Their rigged elections and
[28]

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Volume y8No.

AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS

Putting
in

a new
on radicalIslam:
women
face
Afghan

Taliban-mandatedburqasy

Kabul, November

i??8

restrictions on political parties have undermined

Islamist movements
leaving underground

democratic alternatives,
as the
only political
a fertile
and unemployment
provide

poverty
opposition. Widespread
for
base
young militants.
recruiting
the recent Afghan civil war, the newly independent Central
During
who
Asian states supported their ethnic kin in northern Afghanistan,
a buffer
fundamentalism.
against the spread of Pushtun
provided
now
been virtually eliminated. The Taliban
control
That buffer has

and Tajikistan.
territory bordering Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Afghan
Yet apart from Turkmenistan,
which has declared
itself neutral in
the Afghan
conflict, these states continue to support the weakened

Northern Alliance. Ahmad ShahMasud,

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

the alliance s ethnic Tajik

November/December1999

[29]

Ahmed Rashid
a
military commander, keeps major resupply base in southern Tajikistan,
where he receives arms from Russia and Iran.
earlier this year, Tahir Yuldashev,
the leader of the
Meanwhile,
of Uzbekistan
Islamic Movement
(imu), fled to Afghanistan. Yuldashev
one
is allegedly
of the masterminds
behind the assassination
attempt
in
six
Islam
A.
when
Uzbek
President
Karimov
against
February,

bombs inTashkent killed 16people andwounded 128.InMay, theTaliban

to set up a
training camp in northern
military
sources in the
just a few miles from the border. Multiple
_
several hundred
region say he is training

allowed Yuldashev
Afghanistan,

Islamist militants

from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,

as well
as
from
and Kyrgyzstan,
Uighurs
province in China.
Xinjiang
the imu.
Taliban
officials deny helping
its revenge.
a request to
Yet in June, the Taliban
rejected
to Uzbekistan.
in
And
extradite Yuldashev
imu
another
late August,
leader, entered southern
Juma Namangani,
some
800 militants,
seized villages and hostages,
with
Kyrgyzstan
to
the war in
For Central Asians,
invade Uzbekistan.
and threatened

By harboring
dissidents, Kabul
gets

Afghanistan

is now truly coming home.

the imu are not Deobandis,

they
the Taliban

Although
habism and have

are influenced

byWah
in their areas of

code
tried to impose
influence. Although Uzbeks have historically been suspicious of the Push
tuns, the Taliban offer the imu a sanctuary from Karimov's crackdown,
and the means to finance themselves through the drug trade.
weapons,
Iran is also threatened by the Taliban. The Shiite regime inTehran

because it is backed by a
fundamentalism
has long opposed Pushtun
because it is Sunni-dominated. Moreover,
regional rival?Pakistan?and
the Afghan
the Taliban are virulently and violently anti-Shiite. During
war
Hazaras. They
against the Soviets, the Iranians backed the Shiite
have now extended military
groups in
support to all non-Pushtun
came to a head in late 1998, when the
the Northern Alliance. Matters
Iran threatened
executed 11Iranian diplomats inMazar-i-Sharif.
to invade Afghanistan,
and war was narrowly avoided.
The Taliban now harbor various Iranian dissidents. They have given
Wal Jamaat, made up of Sunni
sanctuary to the small Ahl-e-Sunnah
leaders of the principal
Iranians opposed to the Tehran regime. And

Taliban

[30]

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The Taliban: Exporting

Extremism

Iranian opposition
fre
group, the Iraq-based Mujahideen-e-Khalq,
an
visit
and
the
Kandahar
have asked
Taliban for
quently
operational base.
of the Taliban.
too, has been affected by the ascendance
war in
until February 1999, when
Beijing shunned the civil
Afghanistan
it first made overtures to the Taliban in an attempt to stem the tide of
China,

Afghan heroin flooding Xinjiang. The heroinwas helping fund Islamist

to
and other
opposition
Beijing among the Uighurs
Muslim
ethnic groups. Uighur militants have trained and
fought with
theAfghan mujahideen
since 1986, and Chinese officials say the arms and
explosives the rebels have used against Chinese security forces come from
Taliban officials have assured China
that they are not
Afghanistan.
some
are known to be
harboring fugitive Uighurs, but
Uighur militants
and nationalist

involvedwith Yuldashev andwith bin Ladin?if

not theTaliban itself.

reasons for this

are amixture of
regional adventurism
insist that
naivete, frustration, and ideology. At one level, the Taliban
Afghan tribal tradition obliges them to give sanctuary to guests such as
the Uighur rebels or bin Ladin. But the Taliban are also furious with Iran
and Uzbekistan
for their military support of the Northern Alliance. And
The Taliban's

its rejection by the international commu

nity and theMuslim world, which has refused to recognize the Taliban
government. By harboring dissidents, Afghanistan
gets its revenge.
"Our prestige is spreading across the region because we have
truly
some
and
this
makes
the
Americans
and
Islam,
implemented
neighbors
Information
Minister
Amir
Khan
very nervous,"
says Afghan

Kabul

is deeply frustrated with

Muttaqi. That

is putting it lightly. As militants from around the

world flock to it for sanctuary, Kabul only increases its support for
the wave of Talibanization
it hopes to unleash on the region and
beyond.

BLOWBACK

With

the

active
of the cia and Pakistan's
isi,
encouragement
to turn the
a
war
jihad into global
Afghan
waged by all
states against the Soviet Union,
Muslim
some 35,000 Muslim
radicals
from 40 Islamic countries joined
1982
Afghanistan's
fight between
and 1992. Tens
came to
of thousands more
study in Pakistani
more than 100,000
madrasahs. Eventually
radicals
foreign Muslim
who wanted

were directly influenced

by theAfghan jihad.
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1999

[ 31 ]

Ahmed Rashid
where they trained became
camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan
virtual universities
in Algeria,
for promoting
radicalism
pan-Islamic
The

Egypt, Yemen,
Americans woke

the Philippines,
and Bangladesh.
Sudan, Jordan,
to
in
the
when
1993,
up
danger only
Afghan-trained

Arab militants blew up theWorld Trade Center inNew York, killing

six people

and

injuring 1,000. The bombers

had defeated one superpower?the
Afghanistan
would defeat a second.
One

of the main

believed

that, just as

Soviet Union?they

recruiters of Arab militants

for the Afghan

jihad
was bin Ladin. As the richest and
to
Saudi
highest-ranking
participate
isi and Saudi intel
in the struggle, he was heavily patronized
the
by
in
Bin
Ladin
left
but returned inMay 1996.
1990
ligence.
Afghanistan
on
his former patrons and issued his first "Declaration
Soon he turned

of Jihad" against the Saudi royal family and theAmericans, whom he

accused

of occupying

his homeland.

Striking up a friendship with Umar, the Taliban chief, bin Ladin

to Umar's

moved

base

in Kandahar

in early 1997. Bin Ladin reunited

in Afghanistan
still remaining
after

and rearmed the Arab militants

the war against the Soviets, creating the "055" brigade. The Taliban
or
had no contact with Arab Afghans
pan-Islamic
ideology until
then. But Umar was quickly influenced by his new friend and became
on Americans,
the United Nations,
increasingly vociferous in his attacks
Muslim
and the Saudis and other pro-Western
regimes. Recent
statements
reflect a bin Ladin-style
and
Taliban
outrage, defiance,
never
used before his arrival.
that the Taliban had
pan-Islamism
After

the August

in Kenya and
of U.S. embassies
1998 bombings
terrorist
States accused bin Ladin of financing

the United
Tanzania,
A
camps in Somalia, Egypt, Sudan, Yemen, Egypt, and Afghanistan.
at bin Ladin's camps in
fired cruise missiles
few days later, America
20 militants but leaving his network
eastern
killing nearly
Afghanistan,
the
bin Ladin's
demanded
unharmed. Washington
extradition;
Taliban

refused

to

comply.
notoriety has created major problems for Pakistan and
allies in the region who have rec
Saudi Arabia?two
key American
is reluctant to help the
Pakistan
the Taliban government.
ognized
the Saudi terrorist gives valuable
States capture bin Ladin;
United
to the Kashmiris
and the jui would protest if Islamabad was seen
help
Bin Ladin's

[32]

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Volume?8No. 6

The Taliban: Exporting

to doWashington's

finance

Saudi

dilemma

to be carried out if bin Ladin

in Pakistan,

States.
is even worse.

Saudi Arabia

has

relations with

the Taliban

is

helped
for
their
and has provided crucial military
support
in
this all ended after the U.S.
embassy bombings

the Taliban

offensives.
Africa.

in July the jui issued death

bidding. Already

threats to all Americans

extradited to the United
The

Extremism

The

But

Saudis

suspended

diplomatic

and ostensibly ceased all aid, although they did notwithdraw diplomatic
to flow. Like Pakistan,
continue
and private donations
recognition
like to leave bin Ladin in Afghanistan.
Saudi Arabia would
His arrest
and trial in the United
States could be highly embarrassing,
exposing
his continuing
with
members
of
the
sympathetic
relationship
ruling
elites and intelligence

services of both

FLOWER

countries.

POWER

In
Kandahar,
poppy fields stretch as far as the horizon.
set
the Taliban have
Herat,
up model farms where farmers learn the
best methods
of heroin cultivation. The U.N. Drug Control Program
tons of
reports that Afghanistan
produced 4,600 metric
opium in
as in the
as much
now
1999?twice
year. Afghanistan
previous
three times more opium than the rest of the world put
produces

Around

in Taliban-controlled
percent of it is cultivated
together. Ninety-six
the Taliban
the largest heroin producer in the world.
areas, making
tax from
The Taliban
collect a 20 percent
opium dealers and
that goes straight to the Taliban war chest. The
transporters?money
a similar tax on
Northern Alliance
imposes
opium shipments crossing
into Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan. Drug dealers operate the only banking
farmers credit in advance of their
system in the country?offering
states
criminalized
has weakened
poppy
crop. This
economy
throughout
Whereas

the region.

was
Afghan opium
exported to theWest
through Pakistan
in the 1980s, there are now
export routes through Iran, the
multiple
so do
Persian Gulf states, and Central Asia. As these routes
expand,
the beneficiaries. U.S. officials claim that, with most of his bank accounts
frozen, bin Ladin now finances his operations through opium. Chinese

officials report that drug smuggling from Afghanistan

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS-

November/December

1999

is similarly
[33]

Ahmed Rashid
has drawn a
government
funding the Uighur opposition. Uzbekistan's
link between Afghanistan
direct drug-smuggling
and the Ferghana
imu is based. The civil war in
was
Valley, where the
Tajikistan
partly
fueled by Afghan drugs, and Pakistan's economy has been crippled by
to governments
them. Furthermore,
in the region, heroin
according
are
now
is growing: there
addiction
five million
addicts in Pakistan,
one
in Iran, and
in China, largely inXinjiang.
three million
million
consumer
the smuggling of
Meanwhile,
goods, fuel, and foodstuffs
is
further
havoc. The
contraband
through Afghanistan
wreaking
in the 1950s, when
trade developed
Pakistan
landlocked
granted
the right to import duty-free goods through the port of
Afghanistan
Karachi under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement
(atta). Many
of these imported goods were resold in Pakistani bazaars, but with the
in
opening of Central Asia and Iran and the arrival of the Taliban
1994, this trade has expanded enormously.
and Pakistani truckers smuggle goods across a huge
Today Afghan
the Caucasus, Central Asia,
swath of territory that includes Russia,
in the 1980s, but
Iran, and Pakistan. Atta was worth only $50 million
to $128 million

in 1992-93 and then jumped to $266 mil

first year of Taliban
lion in 1994-95?the
conquests. A 1999World
Bank study estimates that the smuggling trade between Pakistan and
alone amounted to $2.5 billion in 1997, equivalent to more
Afghanistan
estimated gdp. Add to that the smuggling
than half of Afghanistan's
to and from the rest of the region and the total rises to $5 billion.
it increased

smuggling has crippled local industry in all the affected states;

cannot
local factories
with
compete
foreign-made,
smuggled,
consumer
creates
The
also
smuggling
huge losses in
duty-free
goods.
revenue
to
customs
Pakistan's Central
and sales taxes. According
to 30 percent of
Board of Revenue, Pakistan's losses in 1998 amounted
tax on the
the government's
total revenues of $6 billion. The Taliban
source of income after
was its
drugs.
second-largest
smuggling trade
in Turk
New
transport and smuggling mafias have developed
and Iran. They are ignored by their
menistan, Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan,
that benefits
due to a web of corruption
everyone
governments,
all these
Not surprisingly,
from border guards to cabinet ministers.
transport mafias are keen supporters and major funders of the Taliban.
formal
And this illegal economy is only expanding, since Afghanistan's
This

[34]

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS-

Volume78No. 6

The Taliban: Exporting

one

Extremism

is devastated,
The Afghan
infrastructure
are
virtually absent, and abject poverty is
to
factories,
today has 6 working
compared

remains nonexistent.
health care and education
rampant. Afghanistan
220 in 1979. Fighting

and smuggling

AND

THE

WEST

offer the only employment.

SLEEPS

ON

of arms and ammunition

once
to the
States abandoned Afghanistan
the United
mujahideen,
Soviet troops withdrew. America gave its allies in the region, Pakistan
civil war.
and Saudi Arabia, a free hand to direct the ensuing Afghan
never
a
the end of the Cold War, Washington
After
developed
new
area. The United
States dealt with
strategic framework for the
a
as
came
issues
fashion, pursuing
up in haphazard,
they
piecemeal

After

providing

billions

of dollars'worth

were driven more

by
single-issue
agendas that
war.
than
the
of
the
civil
goal
politics
ending
note of U.S. reluctance to get involved
took
Afghanistan's
neighbors
and stepped up arms supplies to their Afghan
proxies.
What
the United States needed and still needs to do is to put serious
arms into
states to halt the
pressure on neighboring
supply of
with local U.S. allies such as Pakistan, Saudi
Afghanistan?beginning
That may convince Iran and Russia to do the
Arabia, and Uzbekistan.
same. If the flow of weapons
ceases and
are curtailed
drug exports
by
united regional resolve, the Afghan warlords will see their main sources
of support dry up and may then be forced to negotiate an end to the war.
constantly
changing
domestic American

This

is the track that the U.N.

mediator
for Afghanistan,
Lakhdar
two
success
has
Brahimi, has pursued for the past
years. His lack of
on
been directly related to the lack ofWestern
pressure
neighboring
states to end their interference. Most
civilians still believe
Afghan
that Americans
hold the key to ending foreign interference. Despite
for America
record, there is still enormous goodwill
Washingtons
But until the United
States demonstrates
among ordinary Afghans.
an international
to mobilize
that it has the determination
effort for
ending outside
will
Terrorism
expand. These
United
States,

chaos will only spread.

interference, Afghanistans
new adherents
there. The drug trade will
develop
are costs that no
the
country?not
Afghanistan,
or
to bear.?
its allies, China,
Iran?can
hope

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS-

November/December

1999