"MEMORY IS THE BELLY OF THE MIND": Augustine's Concept of Memory in Beckett

Author(s): Michiko Tsushima

Source: Samuel Beckett Today / Aujourd'hui, Vol. 19, Borderless Beckett / Beckett sans
frontires: Tokyo 2006 (2008), pp. 123-132
Published by: Editions Rodopi B.V.
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IS THE BELLY OF THE MIND":

MEMORY
Augustine's

ofMemory

Concept

Michiko

in Beckett

Tsushima

It is not only Proustian memory but also Augustinian memory that is important
in understanding memory in Beckett. In his early period Beckett showed an
interest inAugustinian memory, especially the idea thatmemory is a stomach
for themind, and remembering is analogous to rumination. This article shows
how this aspect of Augustinian memory is evoked inKrapp's Last Tape and
How It Is. Further it develops an understanding of Beckettian memory as an
externalized container of the past (e.g., a tape-recorder and a sack) and dis
cusses it in relation toAnzieu's concept of "the Skin Ego" as a psychical con
tainer.

1. Introduction
theme of memory
in Beckett's work has often been discussed
in
relation to the idea of memory
in Proust. The "involuntary memory"
that Beckett discusses
in his book on Proust has been especially
stressed. In Proust, Beckett observes that unlike "voluntary memory,"

The

is based on our will and intelligence, "involuntary memory" can

evoke the past in its fullness through some immediate and fortuitous act
of perception that is related to bodily perception. In the same way that
the "long-forgotten taste of a madeleine
steeped in an infusion of tea"

which

lost paradise of childhood in Proust,

transports the narrator to a whole
characters to their past and
transports Beckettian
bodily perception
enables them to relive their past.

Yet it isnot onlyProustianmemorybut also Augustinianmemory

that is important

to understanding

memory

in Beckett's

work.

In

Augustine, thatwhich grounds the self is foundnot in reason or the

intellect but in the memory,

searching

for God

through

or to be more
the act

concrete, in the process

of remembrance.
Similarly,

of

in

Beckett (as well as inProust), thebasis of subjectivityis found in the

in both Augustine
and
and life are inseparable
memory. Memory
Beckett. Here we should also note that the aspect of Augustinian mem
ory that attracted Beckett was not necessarily related to Augustine's

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124

Michiko Tsushima

beliefs. Rather, it seems that, for Beckett, Augustine's

philosophical
is a kind of source from which he
work, especially the Confessions,
takes interesting phrases and sentences that he later transforms and
interest in "the
recall Beckett's
incorporates into his own work. We

"Do
shape of ideas" in the sentence he presumed to be by Augustine:
not despair; one of the thieves was saved. Do not presume; one of the
thieves was damned" (see Cronin, 232).
like to focus on two aspects of Augustinian
In this article I would

thoughtthat interestedBeckett: namely, (1) Augustine's idea that

from themind, and (2) his idea thatmemory is a
memory is different
for the mind, and the act of remembering resembles that of
Last
ruminating, or chewing food over again.1 I will look at Krapp's
sec
terms
How
It
in
of
the
terms
and
Is
in
of
both
of
these
ideas
Tape
stomach

ond idea.

Interest

2. Beckett's

inAugustinian Memory
before writing Dream

toMiddling
of Fair
According
in
"immersed
himself
the
of St.
Beckett
Women,
Confessions
deeply
in
novel
from
this
work
his
and
used
many quotations
Augustine"
a
to
Beckett
of 1931,
described
letter MacGreevy
(Knowlson,
114). In
himself as "phrase-hunting in St. Augustine." He read the Confessions
to Knowlson,

in the translation of E.B.

Pusey,

and from time to time consulted

the

Latin original (See Beckett 1999, 11). In theDream notebook, the

notebook thathe keptbetween 1930 and 1932,we findmany quotations

from the Confessions.

The most relevant to our discussion

is the follow

ing:

[1]Mind notmemory:
When with joy I remembermy past sorrow,themind hath
joy, thememoryhath sorrow;themind upon thejoyfulnesswhich
is in it,is joyful,yet thememoryupon thesadnesswhich is in it,is
not sad. ...The memory is thebelly [ticked]of themind & joy&
sadness the sweet and bitterfood;which, when committedto the
are, as itwere, passed
cannot taste.
but
stowed,

memory,

into the belly, where

they may be

(Augustine,qtd. inBeckett 1999,25-26)

is a famous passage from book 10, chapter 14, of The Confessions.

As the phrases underlined by Beckett suggest, he pays attention to two
aspects of memory described by Augustine. First, we see thatBeckett is
This

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Augustine's Concept ofMemory

inBeckett

125

interestedin the idea thatthememory isdifferent

from themind.While
themind is affectedbywhat is in it,thememory isnot affectedbywhat
is in it. Indeed, Beckett modifies

the firsthalf of the quote and incorpo

rates it intoDream ofFair toMiddling Women andMore Pricks than

Kicks (81):
After a moment's
hesitation he [Belacqua]
stated his absurd di
lemma as follows: 'When with indifference I remember my past
sorrow, my mind

has

indifference, my memory

has

sorrow. The

which is in it, in indifferent;

mind, upon the indifference
yet the
memory, upon
said the Alba.
row

is in it, is not sad.' 'Da capo,'

indifference I remember my past sor

the sadness which

'When with

[...].

(1992, 235-36)
is not af
is that memory
Apparently, what is important for Beckett
fected by what is contained in it; thememory is regarded as something
insensitive or inhuman like a machine.
idea that the
Secondly, Beckett pays attention to Augustine's
a
is
stomach for the mind. Augustine writes, "we might say
memory
that thememory is a sort of stomach for themind, and that joy or sad
ness are like sweet or bitter food" (220). Memory
is considered to be a
container that stores food. Furthermore, Augustine points out the simi
"Perhaps these
larity between the acts of remembering and mminating:
emotions [desire, joy, fear, and sorrow] are brought forward from the
memory by the act of remembering in the same way as cattle bring up
food from the stomach when they chew the cud." He depicts the act of

remembering as that of "chewing the cud," of 'chewing over' what is

stored inmemory (221). Thus theDream notebook shows that Beckett
was interested in at least two aspects of memory presented in the Con

fessions.
inKrapp's
3. 'Chewing the Cud'
two aspects of Augustinian

The

inKrapp's
a
dark
den,"
place
evoked

Last Tape
memory that we have discussed are
Last Tape. In this play, which is set in "Krapp's
like a cave, a "wearish old man" who is near death

triesto recordhis retrospectiveof theyear on his sixty-ninth

birthday,

following the custom that he has continued for many years. Before he
starts recording, he listens to the tape that he recorded thirty years be

fore.He hears thevoice of his youngerselfwho had just turnedthirty

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126

Michiko Tsushima

says that he has just been listening

tape we hear Krapp-at-39
to the tape of a still earlier Krapp
that was recorded at least ten or
twelve years earlier.
On the stage, the audience sees Krapp-at-69
and a tape recorder

nine. On

with

mind
who

reels of tapes. We could say that the former corresponds to the

the character
and the latter to the memory in Augustine. Krapp,
on
the
is
old
and
weak.
Yet
his
appears
stage
despite
physical limi

tations, he expresses

emotions

unrestrainedly;

the audience

sees him

cursing, smiling, laughing, or showing impatience while listening to his

voice on tape. In contrast, the tape recorder is insensitive and inhuman,
although it is faithful in the sense that it can record and store any words

together with pauses, nuance, intonation, and rhythm. It is a memory

machine which does not have any emotion. In itpast emotions and sen
sations are neutralized, or inAugustine's words, they "lose taste." Thus
we could say that the difference between Krapp-at-69
and the tape

recorder with its reels of tapes corresponds to the difference between

mind and memory inAugustine.
The other aspect of Augustinian memory that interested Beckett is
thatmemory is a stomach for the mind, and the act of remembering is
to the act of ruminating. In the same way that Augustine
analogous
Last
regards memory as a stomach that contains past emotions, Krapp's
Tape presents memory as a tape recorder with reels of tapes, that is, as

a container which holds past sensations and images. And Krapp's

act of
to
can
his
voice
and
moments
his
be
past
listening
past
remembering
seen as the act of ruminating. In listening to his past voice, he reflects
on his past experiences such as sitting outside by the canal watching his
mother's window during her dying days, seeing a vision on a memora

ble night inMarch at theend of thejetty,and havinghis last love affair

ina puntdriftingina lakebeforeagreeing to end therelationship.Thus

we

see the subject who

'chews on' the images of past moments,
the subject who reexperiences past moments retained

other words,
his memory.

in

in

In this regard, it is importantto note that thisplay begins with

Krapp's

act of taking out a large banana

from a drawer of the table,

peeling itand eating itmeditativelywhile pacing to and fro at theedge

of the stage. This act of eating a banana suggests that the act of chewing
and that of remembering the past are inseparable from each other.
act of eating a banana at the beginning of the play can be con
Krapp's

sideredas a kind of switch thatswitchesKrapp to a mode of reliving

thepast. In thismode, he can be liberated
from thethingsin thepresent,
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Augustine's Concept ofMemory

inBeckett

127

from the everyday with its depressing realities. Indeed after eating the
banana, Krapp starts preparing to listen to the tape of his past. Uttering
the word 'spool' with relish and a smile, he starts poking at the boxes

and picks up box three,and opening it,peers at thereels inside.Then he

takes out spool five and peers at it, and loads it on the tape recorder and
rubs his hands in anticipation. It is as if he were about to taste some
food. This scene where hearing, taste, touch, and sight are interestingly

mingled with each other indicates

and chewing the cud.

the analogy

between

remembering

This strikingimage of eatinga banana is repeated in theplay, for

says he has just eaten three

example, when the voice of Krapp-at-39
bananas in his den. The play repeats Krapp's movement of retailing to
his den, eating bananas,
listening to the tape, and recollecting the past.

But as Krapp
the beginning

treads on the skin of the banana, slips, and nearly falls at

of the play, this state of indulgence in recollection sym

by the act of eating bananas is soon destroyed. He is forced to

face his present self who is in complete solitude, misery, and despair.

bolized

Ifwe consider thattheact of eating is a bodily act, theact of re

Last
membering, which is inseparable from that of eating inKrapp's
as
a
can
act.
takes
also
be
bodily
Remembering
place in
Tape,
regarded
or
more
to
in
the
weak
and
be
the body,
deteriorating body of
specific,

the character who physically exists on stage. As Ulrika

Krapp-at-69,
is
Maude
observes, "what is distinctly Beckettian about the memories
the plainly corporeal nature of the recollections,"
and, "the past is

sedimentedin thebody itself (119), so too theact of rememberingor

Last Tape involves bodily senses,

ruminating past moments inKrapp's
and
hearing. Indeed, Krapp's Last Tape is full of
especially touch, taste,
involving tactile sensations which are inseparable
bodily movements

from the act of remembering; for instance, fumbling in the pockets,

feeling about inside the drawer, stroking the banana, rubbing his hands,

moving his lipswithoututteringany sound, touchingthebanana in the

pocket, and so on.

in the Sack inHow It Is

4. Fragmentary Memories
Last Tape two aspects
have seen how inKrapp's

We

of Augustinian

memory thatBeckett paid attentionto in his Dream notebook are

evoked.

InHow

It Is, Augustinian

memory

as a stomach

that contains

food is found in the image of the sack theman crawling throughthe

mud and the dark carries with him.

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128

Michiko Tsushima

How It Is consists of three parts. In part 1 theman takes a journey

towards Pirn. Finding the sack just after he starts his journey, he de
to
scribes it as follows: "the sack sole good sole possession
coal-sack

thefeel small ormedium five stone six stonewet jute I clutch it" (8).

During his journey, he crawls dragging the sack, which contains tinned
fish, such as herring, prawns, and sardines, and a tin-opener. Also he
murmurs about his world and the fragmentary memories of life in the
light above as he hears it uttered by a voice within him. He can catch

what is said insidehim infragmentsandmurmur itforthonlywhen his

panting stops. This internal voice was
heard "quaqua on all sides."

said to be once an external voice

the relation between the sack and memory

in
discussing
It Is, we should note that the character crawling in the mud and
dark is different from Krapp: whereas Krapp can be regarded as an
of his past and recollects them,
individual subject who has memories
the character inHow It Is cannot be considered as an individual subject.
Before

How

He is not reallydifferentiated
from thematernalmud inwhich he lies
and crawls;

the mud, which

is depicted

as having

the "warmth of pri

meval mud" (11), fillshis mouth and engulfshim. Existing eithernot

yet or no longer, he cannot be considered to be a subject with an indi
vidual memory. Indeed, in one fragment, talking about the image of a
woman (perhaps themother) who sits watching theman (or boy) work
ing at his table, he says that it is neither a dream nor a memory: "that's
all itwasn't a dream I didn't dream that nor a memory I haven't been
this time itwas an image the kind I see sometimes see
given memories
in themud part one sometimes saw" (11). All he does is quote or repeat
internal words
obscure, fragmentary words heard within him. These

concern theprevious life in the light,a lifebefore thisone, as well as

his present life.

In returning to the motif of the sack inHow It Is, we can say that
the sack recalls Augustine's memory as a stomach where food is stored.
In this text, at one level the sack is described as
something that contains

tinned food and a tin-opener, but at another level, it is presented as a

container of images, episodes, and scenes of his life in the light above
could say that exactly like a herring and a prawn in the
ground. We

sack that are in "the tins in the depths of the sack hermetically under
vacuum [...] for ever sealed" (92), the
images of the past life in the light
are "hermetically under vacuum [...] for ever sealed" in the tins stored
in the sack.

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Augustine's Concept ofMemory

To put it in another way,

inHow

inBeckett

It Is we

129

see a parallel

between

eating the tinnedfood and recollectingthe imagesof theman's life in

the light. During the journey in the mud in part 1, the man opens tins
with the tin-opener and eats the food they contain. He also tells us of

thefragmentary
memories of his life in the lightabove, inotherwords,

he quotes or repeats what the voice within him says: "past moments old
dreams back again [...] memories
I say them as I hear them murmur

them in themud" (7). The fragmentary

memories of thepast thatthe

man

take on the form of images. These images of his previous

life appear and disappear on the screen of mud. Ifwe think that rumina
tion involves bringing back to themouth what is contained in the stom
quotes

ach and reexperiencing

it, this act of repeating the fragmentary words
resembles the act of ruminating. What was once heard outside is inter
nalized, and theman repeats thewords as he hears them inside himself
and reexperiences

these internal words

in the form of images. Thus

the

existenceof the sack inHow It Is involvestheact of ruminatingon the

past.

This sack further

remindsus ofWinnie's bag inHappy Days. The

isWinnie's

sole possession
and contains her daily necessities. On
bag
the stage she repeats taking them out, using them, and putting them
back. In the same manner as Winnie
takes out various daily necessities

from her bag, she quotes famous lines from classical

literature that she
remembers imperfectly. At a metaphorical
level we can think thatWin
nie's bag contains words of the past and her act of recollecting them is
analogous to that of ruminating.
To return toHow It Is, it is important to note that the sack is said

tobe indispensableto the lifeof theman crawling in themud. Like the

mud,

it is something that keeps him going. The man murmurs,

"the sack

my life thatI never letgo [...]" (35).We often findhim clasping the
sack to his bellywith his knees drawnup and his back bent in a hoop:
"knees drawnup back bent ina hoop I clasp the sack tomy belly I see
me now onmy side I clutch it the sackwe're talkingof the sackwith
one hand behindmy back I slip itundermy headwithout lettingitgo I
never let itgo" (10). This posture remindsus of thatof a fetus in the
The sack is described as having several uses. It is used
as a larder, a pillow for the head, a friend to turn to, a thing to embrace,
and a surface to cover with kisses. But there are occasions when it is

mother's womb.

said to be somethingfarmore than these things.In one fragmentit is

said that the sack is something to cling to, in the same way as the man
"who falls out of thewindow" "clutches [...] thewindow-sill"
(66). The

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130

Michiko Tsushima

importance of the sack, the object

thatwe cling to, goes beyond

its use

fulness.The only thingthatis sustainingthe lifeof thecrawler,thesack

this container of fragmentary memories

remainswhen everythingelse is gone (105).

is also

the only thing that

5. The Externalized
and "the Skin Ego"
Container
have seen Augustine's
concept of memory being evoked

inKrapp's
as a stomach

We

Last Tape and How It Is. In particular, his idea of memory

for the mind, that is to say, the memory as a container of the past is
in Augustine
the memory
is
found in both works. However, whereas
located inside the self, inBeckett thememory as a container of the past
Last Tape,
the self and thus externalized. In Krapp's
thememory appears on the stage as a tape recorder with reels of tapes;
itbecomes a machine that can be seen, heard, and touched by the actor
and seen and heard by the audience. InHow It Is, thememory is sym
is brought outside

as the sack that theman carries with himself. We can consider

the tape recorder or the sack not merely as an external thing but as a
part of the self, as an externalized form of what is inside the self. To be
more precise, it is an externalized form of a mental image of memory.
in particular its con
Dicker Anzieu's
concept of "the Skin Ego,"
bolized

taining function, can help us understand such an image of memory.

Anzieu defines "the Skin Ego" as "a mental image of which the Ego of
the child makes use during the early phases of its development to repre
sent itself as an Ego containing psychical contents, on the basis of its
one of the
experience of the surface of the body" (40). For Anzieu,
seven functions of "the Skin Ego"
is "the containing function." In this
function, the young child has a mental representation of itself as a psy
chical container, a psychical envelope, or a containing sac; it is called

"the sac Skin Ego" (107).2Writing that"The sensation/imageof the

skin as sac is awakened, in the very young infant, by the attention to its
bodily needs it receives from itsmother," Anzieu explains that themen

tal representation of "the Skin Ego" originates from the interplay be

tween themother's body and the infant's (101). And, referring to Rene
Kaes's
view, Anzieu
says one aspect of this function is that the con
tainer forms "a passive receptacle where the baby may store its sensa
tions/images/affects, which

in this way,

are neutralized

and preserved"

(101). Thus Anzieu points out the existenceof an archaic topology in

the Ego of the young child becomes aware of the existence of

itself and acquires a mental representation of the skin as the sac which
contains and retains psychical contents.

which

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Augustine's Concept ofMemory

inBeckett

131

Ifwe look at memory inKrapp's

Last Tape and How It Is in light
of "the Skin Ego," we might be able to say that thememory as the con
tainer of the past corresponds to "the sac Skin Ego," a mental represen
tation of an Ego as a psychical container. In this sense, the tape recorder

inKrapp' Last Tape or the sack inHow It Is shouldnot be considered

as things that are external to the human being. They could be

regarded as something like the mental representation of an Ego as the
sac or a psychical container. In Beckett, the psychical container goes

merely

outside of thehuman being and reveals itselfas a tangiblethingthat

located inside the body in what

past images. The memory
the
mind" is placed outside the body.
termed "a stomach for
Augustine
In this regard, we could say that the memory shown as a container of
contains

the past in Beckett transgresses the boundary separating interior and

Last Tape and How It Is, this con
exterior. Significantly, inKrapp's
of Beckett's
tainer of past images is presented as the sole possession
their
lives.
the
that
sustains
characters and
only thing

Notes
For a discussion of Augustine's theory of memory, see, for example,
1.
Bourke (142-65), O'Connell (120-34), Rist (73-85), and Teske (148-58).
The idea of the psychical container inAnzieu comes fromWilfred Ru
precht Bion who was Beckett's analyst at the Tavistock Clinic. See, for in
stance, Anzieu, 38-39, 101.
2.

Works

Cited

Anzieu, Didier, The Skin Ego, trans. Chris Turner (New Haven: Yale UP,
1989).
Augustine, Confessions, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1961).
Beckett, Samuel, Proust (London: Chatto & Windus, 1931).
-, Happy Days (New York: Grove, 1961).
-, How It Is (New York: Grove, 1964).
-, More Pricks thanKicks (New York: Grove, 1972).
-, Krapp's Last Tape, in The Collected Shorter Plays of Samuel Beckett (New
York: Grove, 1984), 53-63.
Dream
-,
of Fair toMiddling Women, ed. Eoin O'Brien and Edith Fournier
(Dublin: Black Cat, 1992).

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132 Michiko Tsushima

-, Beckett's Dream Notebook, ed. John Pilling (Reading: Beckett International

Foundation, 1999).
Bourke, Vemon J.,Augustine's Love of Wisdom: An Introspective Philosophy
(West Lafayette: Purdue UP, 1992).
Cronin, Anthony, Samuel Beckett: The Last Modernist (New York: Da Capo,
1997).
Knowlson, James,Damned toFame: The Life of Samuel Beckett (New York:
Touchstone, 1996).
in
Maude, Ulrika, "The Body of Memory: Beckett and Merleau-Ponty,"
Beckett and Philosophy, ed. Richard Lane (London: Palgrave, 2002),
108-22.
O'Connell, Robert J.,St. Augustine's Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul (Cam
bridge: Harvard UP, 1969).
Rist, John,Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1994).
Teske, Roland,
Companion

in The Cambridge
"Augustine's Philosophy of Memory,"
toAugustine (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001).

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