7KH8QLTXHQHVV3URRIIRU)RUPVLQ5HSXEOLF

5LFKDUG'3DUU\

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 23, Number 2, April 1985,

pp. 133-150 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/hph.1985.0026

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v023/23.2parry.html

Access provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid (2 Sep 2015 13:29 GMT)

The Uniqueness Proof for

Forms in Republic lo
RICHARD

D. P A R R Y

IN THIS PAPER I o f f e r an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the a r g u m e n t at the b e g i n n i n g o f

Repttblic l o (597cl-d3). T h e a r g u m e n t - - s o m e t i m e s called the T h i r d Bed Arg u m e n t ( T B A ) - - s h o w s that the F o r m o f bed is unique. T h e a r g u m e n t is
interesting because it uses the O n e - O v e r - M a n y principle (OM), which justifies positing Forms. But unlike the use o f O M in the first T h i r d Man A r g u m e n t ( T M A ) o f Parmenides (131al-b2), the use o f the OM in T B A does not
p r o d u c e an a r g u m e n t which is liable to b e c o m i n g an infinite regress. Since
the T B A is in every o t h e r respect a classic s t a t e m e n t o f the theory o f F o r m s
usually associated with the m i d d l e dialogues, we can conclude that this theory is not metaphysically b a n k r u p t , as it is sometimes claimed. W h a t e v e r the
p r o b l e m s with the T M A , they do not infect the whole t h e o r y o f F o r m s in the
middle dialogues because t h e r e is at least one instance o f a clear enunciation
o f the t h e o r y which does not fall p r e y to the infinite regress o f the T M A .
I n Section 1 o f this p a p e r , we analyze the T B A and a d d three a s s u m p tions necessary to m a k e it valid. As well, we explain these a s s u m p t i o n s a n d
o f f e r textual evidence for t h e m . In Section 9, we survey recent c o m m e n t a r ies on the T B A a n d d e f e n d o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n against these c o m m e n t a r i e s .
In particular we show that, u n d e r o u r interpretation, the T B A is not liable
to b e i n g t u r n e d into an infinite regress o f F o r m s o f bed. In Section 3, we see
what implications this latter fact has for a theory o f F o r m s which holds that
the F o r m o f f is, in s o m e way, itself f. W e show in what way this central
doctrine o f the m i d d l e dialogues theory o f F o r m s can be held without threat
o f inconsistency or infinite regress. I n Section 4, we a p p l y o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f the T B A to the T M A , showing that the fallacious step o f the T M A can be
I would like to thank Anthony Nemetz, Nicholas Smith, and E. W. van Steenburgh who
were kind enough to discuss this paper with me, as well as an anonymous referee for the Journal
of the History of Philosophy. All internal references to the Greek text are from Burnet's edition.

[133]

I34

JOURNAL

OF THE

HISTORY

OF PHILOSOPHY

b r o u g h t to light by considering the i m p o r t a n t differences between the two

arguments.
1,

At Republic lO (597cl-d3) Socrates argues that there will be only one F o r m o f

bed, which he calls that which is bed. H e says that the god will not make
m o r e than one bed in n a t u r e - - b y the latter phrase is meant a F o r m - - n o r
will two such things arise. T h e a r g u m e n t to back up at least the first part o f
this claim is simply put: if he m a d e as few as two ~ then again a one (bed in
nature) would arise, whose f o r m the two (original beds) would have, and this
one would be that which is bed and not the two. So, the god, knowing all this
and wishing to be the real bed m a k e r o f the real being and not (just) a m a k e r
o f a bed, makes one (bed) in nature.
T h e calculation involved in this passage could be r e n d e r e d :
(I) I f he m a d e as few as two
(x) (a) again a one (bed) would a p p e a r
(b) whose f o r m the two would have and
(2) (a) this one would be that which is bed and
(b) not the two.
I f we look at the calculation closely we see that some assumptions are
made. For the calculation to work, then, these suppressed assumptions need
to be a d d e d to derive both part (1) and part (2). In this section we add these
assumptions. In effect, the assumptions show that the one which appears is
the one F o r m over m a n y and that everything which is a bed besides this one
F o r m derives its character f r o m this Form. T h e latter assumption is o f crucial i m p o r t a n c e because it allows the F o r m o f f to be f without participating
in a n o t h e r F o r m o f f; the F o r m is non-derivatively f. T h e significance o f this
assumption will be e x p l o r e d in subsequent sections; but, for the present,
suffice it to say that using it, we a r g u e that the T B A is not liable to an
infinite regress. In any event, f r o m these assumptions we construct the interpretation whose outline is the following. T h e god makes the F o r m o f bed
(called that which is bed). This F o r m is a p a r a d i g m which has or exhibits the
character for which it is a p a r a d i g m ( T h e ruling m e t a p h o r o f the passage is
craft, in which the craftsman looks to a p a r a d i g m as his guide [cf. Cratylus,
389a5-b6]). I f the god were misguided, he would make two such t h i n g s - two Forms which are duplicates o f one another. Just as the first was a bed,
the two would be beds. But their being d i f f e r e n t means that, by o u r assump-

The Republic of Plato, James Allen, ed. (Cambridge: the University Press, 1969), 2:391,

note for 597Cl9.

T H E U N I Q U E N E S S PROOF
c a n b e the F o r m

tions, neither
Thus,

the one over many

t h a t w h i c h is b e d . T h e
on it--because

o f b e d ( t h a t w h i c h is b e d ) n o r t h e p a r a d i g m .

principle

dictates that there be another

t w o h a v e its c h a r a c t e r - - i . e . ,

it is t h e p a r a d i g m

OM

of the One-over-Many

is n o t f a r

our

accustomed

of the principle:

method:

(eidos) for each group

OM depends

we are

The justification
of this whole

passage

to positing

some

the

(596a5-8)

let us begin our investigation

accustomed

some

for adding

one

using
form

of many, which bear the same name. 3 The addition of

on taking the two to be beds in some sense, otherwise the third

bed could not be the Form

We can add this principle
(I)

T o (1) t h e r e n e e d s t o b e a d d e d

principleJ

to find. At the beginning

Plato states a version

F o r m , i.e.,

their being beds depends

and they are not.

We turn to the specific assumptions.

version

~35

If he made

o f b e d , as it is s a i d t o b e . 4
to the calculation:

as few as two such things 5

See H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Bahimore: the Johns Hopkins
Press, 194~), t : 260, note 17o; Colin Strang, "Plato and the T h i r d Man," Plato: A Collection of
CriticalEssays, edited by G. Vlastos (Garden City: Doubleday, a971), l: 192.
This formulation should be compared with that at 5o7a6-blo, which is very close to the
present one. J. A. Smith, in "General Relative Clauses in Greek" (Classical Review 31 [ 1917]: 6 9 71), argues that this passage in Book lo means either that every group bearing the same name
has a Form or that the Form posited in each case is one. For grammatical reasons he denies the
former, affirming the latter. In the light of 5 o 7 a 6 - b l o we can see that we are not restricted to
these two alternatives. T h e principle at 596a5-8 can also mean that we posit one Form for each
group which we posit as a many, leaving it indeterminate what constitutes a many.
4 See D. R. Duff-Forbes, "The Regress Argument in the Republic," Mind 77 (x968): 4o7; I.
M. Crombie, "Duff-Forbes on Republic lO," Mind 8o (]971): 286; K. W. Mills, "Crombie on
Republic 597c, '' Mind 82 0973): 6o2.
5 T h e first statement in the calculation is not definite about the two things the god is
making. T h e natural assumption seems to be that he is making two beds in nature or two Forms
of bed. If we use the phrase "bed in nature" we have no difficulty in stating such a case. But if
we use the phrase (which occurs just before the calculation), "that which is bed," we have
considerable difficulty in even stating the case. We cannot say that the god is making two that
which is bed; and substituting "those which are beds" seems utterly unwarranted. The difficulty
seems to be that the phrase "that which is bed" indicates uniqueness. Using the phrase to
describe a case where uniqueness is violated is impossible. For this reason, probably, at 597c4
Plato says that the god did not make two such things. T h e vagueness of this phrase allows the
following reading. Suppose two cases of bed making. The first case (at 597ca-3) is the one in
which the god makes one bed in nature, that which is bed. The second case is described in (I),
the one in which he makes two such things. (This last result could be accomplished in two ways.
T h e god could make that which is bed and then duplicate it; or he could simultaneously make
two items exactly alike, one of which created alone would be that which is bed. Since the former
is the easier for my argument, I suppose the latter.) Both Forms of bed do not have to be that
which is bed; they are twins one of whose members would be that which is bed if it occurred
alone. This reading allows us to say that the two are beds and, if we choose, that each is a Form.
But it does not necessitate our saying that each is that which is bed, i.e., the Form of bed.

136

J O U R N A L O F - T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
(1) ([i] G i v e n

that we are accustomed

each group

to positing some one form for

o f m a n y 6) (a) a g a i n a o n e ( b e d i n n a t u r e )

p e a r , (b) w h o s e f o r m

would

ap-

the two would have and

(9) (a) t h i s o n e w o u l d b e t h a t w h i c h is b e d a n d
(b) n o t t h e t w o .
This formulation
way. The

one

there would
would

o f O M e x p l a i n s w h y t h e o n e is r e q u i r e d

which

appears

answers

not be one Form

be illegitimate.

Thus

to the OM

over many
the one

because

in the following
without

the one

and the positing mentioned

which

appears

is t h e o n e

Form

i n (i)
over

many.
Now we turn to the justification
beds have

the form

or character

that the two have the character

for the next steps. (lb) says that the two

of the one.

In our interpretation,

saying

o r f o r m o f t h e o n e d o e s n o t tell u s p r i m a r i l y

a b o u t t h e i n t r i n s i c q u a l i t i e s o f t h e t w o b e d s ; r a t h e r it tells u s a b o u t a r e l a t i o n

This reading allows us to see what is wrong with the attempts of Strang and Crombie to treat
this argument as a reductio ad absurdum where the absurdity is a contradiction. Strang's version
of the contradiction: "There cannot be two Forms; for suppose there were two, they would not
be Forms at all, but something else would be the Form" (192). This reading is consistent with
the sense of duo toiautai (two such things) if "there were two" is eliptical and means there were
two Forms of bed. What follows in the text is not that they are not Forms at all, as Strang says,
but that they are not the Form of bed. Strang does not distinguish between the two bed's being
Forms of bed and each's being the Form of bed. Crombie's version of the contradiction is better
on this latter point because it has each of the two beds being both the Form of bed and not the
Form of bed. But then he takes duo toiautai to be more specific than seems sensible; he assumes
the god to make two that which is bed (286).
Both interpretations have a further difficulty. Not only do both abstract from its context the
argument; they seem to forget the context. It is significant that both expurgate the language of
making; restoring it shows a contradiction cannot be intended. If making two of these things is
impossible because contradictory, either the misguided god would make two things which both
are and are not Forms (Strang) or he would make two things each of which both is and is not
the Form of bed (Crombie)--this result cannot be stated sensibly. But further, from a contradiction everything or nothing follows: the g o d - - w h o is said to know the import of the a r g u m e n t - cannot conclude from the argument that he will end up making a bed instead of the Form of
bed. On the other hand, our interpretation preserves the result of this calculation: if the god
makes two such things---two Forms of bed both pretending to be that which is b e d - - h e ends up
not making the Form of bed, that which is bed, contrary to his intention. If our interpretation is
a reductio, it is not a reductio to a contradiction. See also K. W. Mill's objection in "Crombie on
Republic 597c, '' 6o2.
6 T h e r e is one obvious difficulty with adding this version of OM. The assumption, in its
formulation at 596a5, talks in terms of form (eidos), which is a neuter noun in Greek. Oa) talks
in terms of "one" in the feminine, not in the neuter. In fact, the "one" in Oa) refers to the one
bed in nature at 597c~; "bed in nature" is feminine. However, the bed in nature at 597c~ is the
Form of bed mentioned earlier at 597 c t - 3 . We know this because the bed in nature at 597c2 is
called in the next line "that which is bed"; that which is bed and the Form of bed are identified
at 5 9 7 a l - 2 . So, "one" in Oa) has as its antecedent the formula which, in turn, refers to the
Form of bed at 5 9 7 c l - 3 ; the use of OM is appropriate at (1).

THE UNIQUENESS PROOF

137

t h e y n o w h a v e to t h e o n e b e d o v e r t h e m a n y . W h e n t h e o n e a p p e a r s , t h e t w o
a r e a l r e a d y b e d s , else t h e r e w o u l d b e n o n e e d f o r a o n e . N o w , t h e t w o g a i n a
n e w r e l a t i o n , i.e., a r e l a t i o n to t h e o n e b e d o v e r m a n y s u c h t h a t t h e f o r m
h a d b y t h e t w o is m o r e p r o p e r l y a t t r i b u t e d to t h e o n e . T h u s , t h e o n e F o r m
o v e r m a n y is, i n s o m e s e n s e , a b e d a l t h o u g h it n e e d n o t b e a b e d i n t h e s a m e
s e n s e as A g a t h o n ' s b e d is a b e d . T h e n , t h e two a r e s e e n as r e l a t e d to t h e o n e
i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e f o r m o r c h a r a c t e r t h a y h a v e is to b e i d e n t i f i e d as its
f o r m (e.g., J u n i o r h a s his d a d ' s n o s e , n o t vice v e r s a ) . T h e locus classicus f o r
this i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f t h e t h e o r y o f F o r m s i n t h e m i d d l e d i a l o g u e s is a
f a m o u s p a s s a g e i n t h e Phaedo (1 o o c 4 - 6 ) . " I f a n y t h i n g is b e a u t i f u l b e s i d e s t h e
beautiful

i t s e l f it is b e a u t i f u l

only through

participation in the beautiful

itself" (ei ti estin allo kalon plan auto to kalon, oude di'hen allo kalon einai ~ dioti

metechei ekeinou tou kalou). 7

W e o f f e r , t h e n , this a s s u m p t i o n as t h e first s t e p to fill t h e g a p : "(ii) g i v e n
t h a t if a n y t h i n g h a s t h e f o r m o f b e d b e s i d e s t h a t w h i c h is b e d t h e n it h a s t h e
f o r m o n l y t h r o u g h p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h a t w h i c h is b e d . " T h i s a s s u m p t i o n c a n
be paraphrased

to r e a d " t h a t w h i c h is b e d is t h e p r i m a r y b e d f r o m w h i c h all

o t h e r b e d s d e r i v e t h e i r f o r m o r c h a r a c t e r . ''8

7 Vlastos at one point advanced a tripartite ontology of (a) paradigmatic Forms, (b) things, (c)
the character of those things (Platonic Studies, 23, 85, passim). Our interpretation depends on
nothing so formal. Clearly there is a paradigm. There are also two things which are beds; but to
say that they have the character of bed is just another way of saying that they are beds. In this
interpretation it is not necessary to give the character of bed the quasi-substantial status given the
immanent characters in Phaedo ~2oD ff nor even to go beyond ordinary language into Aristotelian metaphysics. We shall, however, adopt Vlastos's usage of 'Form'--with upper case 'F'--as
referring to the paradigm--and 'form' with lower case 'f'--as referring to the perceptual characteristic. Our present passage uses eidos in both those senses (cf. Platonic Studies, 344, note 7).
s This section of the interpretation offered in this paper owes much to those commentators
who are in sympathy with the position on Plato's theory of Forms propagated by R. E. Allen's
"Participation and Prediction in Plato's Middle Dialogues," Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, edited
by R. E. Allen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1965), 43-6o. Cf. Thomas Wheaton Bestor,
"Plato's semantics and Plato's Parmenides," Phronesis 25 (198o): 38; Robert Barford, "The Context of the Third Man Argument in Plato's Parmenides,"Journal of the History of Philosophy 16
(1978): 4-5. The point about the non-derivative nature of the Form is most explicitly made by
William J. Prior in "Parmenides 132c-133 a and the Development of Plato's Thought," Phronesis
~4 (1979) 23o-4o. Prior's argument deals with the imitation argument, or the second version of
the Third Man Argument. But what it has to say applies to Forms in the middle dialogues in
general. "Thus, while it is not illegitimate to demand an account of the attribution of the
property to the paradigm (the Form), it displays a misunderstanding concerning the nature of a
paradigm tfieory to demand the same kind of account given for other objects" (237). I take it that
this claim precludes looking to another Form, in a one over many strategy, for an account of
why the Form is f. And if one looks to the Form itself for an account of its being f, surely the
Form is non-derivatively f. Actually, looking to the Form itself for such an account seems to
collapse the notion of an account.
Other evidence for the position that Forms are non-derivative is in Fujisawa's study !n

138

J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

We take (ii) to imply that the F o r m o f bed is a paradigm and thus is a bed
in the way in which a p a r a d i g m is that for which it is a paradigm. 9 In two
places the a r g u m e n t implies that the F o r m has the character o f bed. First o f
all, the a r g u m e n t implies that the "first" F o r m o f bed--i.e., the one at whose
creation a right thinking god would stop--is itself a bed, as we can see f r o m
the following a r g u m e n t . Let X be the first Form; and let Y and Z be the pair
which the w r o n g thinking god would make. Y and Z are said to be two such
things (scil. as X is); p r e s u m a b l y they would be like X except that they would
be doubles while X is single. But Y and Z are both beds (if Y and Z were not
beds there would be no n e e d for a one to arise). It is impossible to conceive
that X alone does not have the character o f bed but that making two X's
confers that character. Second, the genitive o f possession in (l b) implies that
the one which arises has the character o f bed. T h e two beds are said to have
the character or f o r m of the one which arises (h~s ekeinai an au amphoterai to
eidos echoien); since being a bed is the character the two have, being a bed is
the c h a r a c t e r o f the one which arises--i.e., the one is a bed. '~

which he argues that the language of participation is proper to particulars. Cf. Norio Fnjisawa,
"l~XEtv, bt~e~etv, and Idioms of 'paradeigmatism' in Plato's Theory of Forms," Phronesis 19
(1974): 34-36. Fujisawa also says that the Form does not have f although it is f. This seems to
contradict what we have previously said about serf-predication. However, Fujisawa seems to
assume that something has f if and only if it participates in the Form of f. This assumption is an
overinterpretation of Phaedo looc4-6 , upon which he relies heavily. The other evidence in his
study shows only that a particular's having f should be explicated by that particular's participating in the Form of f. It does not show that every instance of having f is an instance of
participation. In any event, it is not clear that there is a substantive disagreement with Fujisawa's
reading of participation. We are not maintaining that the Form has f through participation;
indeed, we are denying precisely that notion.
Unfortunately, his reading ofPhaedo lOOC4 - 6 is not as definitive as he thinks. Fujisawa seems
to take this statement by itself to mean that the beautiful itself does not participate in anything. But
this statement merely does not require the beautiful itself to participate in anything.
9 Cf. G. C. Nerlich, "Regress Arguments in Plato," Mind 59 (196~ 88-9o; of course, we do
not agree that the TBA is liable to an infinite regress.
~o A position, such as Strang's 093), which denies that the Form o f bed-has the character
because it is the character does not square with the text. If that which is bed is the character of
bed it would be w r o n g - - i f not impossible--to say, as Plato does, that the two beds would have
the form or character of that which is bed (h~s ekeinai an au amphoterai to eidos echoien). I f 'that
which is bed' means the character of bed, such a statement implies that the two beds have the
character of the character of the bed. But then they would not have the character of bed but
whatever character characters might be supposed to have. Rather, one ought to say, as Cherniss
does, that the two beds would have that which is bed. O f course, one might object that a less
rigorous reading o f this Greek phrase would allow "whose" to be analogous to the "whose" in
"the brown whose color the two had." Even if this usage is not grammatically questionable
("whose color" seems to mean only "which") at least "whose" would be ambiguous between the
genitive of possession and this other genitive, which is not possession (brown does not have its
color; it is its color). But Strang's point is that Plato meant to deny, in this very statement, that
the Form possesses the character. It is very difficult to believe that Plato introduces this denial

THE UNIQUENESS PROOF

139

O f c o u r s e , e v e n if (ii) says t h a t t h a t w h i c h is b e d is the p r i m a r y b e d f r o m

w h i c h all o t h e r b e d s d e r i v e their c h a r a c t e r , it says n o t h i n g a b o u t the o n e
( F o r m ) w h i c h w o u l d a p p e a r if the g o d w e r e to m a k e two beds. B u t (lb) says
that the two w o u l d h a v e the c h a r a c t e r o f the o n e which w o u l d a p p e a r . T h u s ,
(ii) by itself c a n n o t e x p l a i n w h y t h e two h a v e the f o r m o r c h a r a c t e r o f the
o n e w h i c h a p p e a r s , i.e., (lb). I n o r d e r to e x p l a i n w h y the two have the f o r m
o r c h a r a c t e r o f the o n e we m u s t m a k e a n o t h e r a s s u m p t i o n . First, we recall
that the o n e w h i c h a p p e a r s is the o n e F o r m o v e r m a n y . N o w , if we a s s u m e
that the o n e F o r m o v e r m a n y is t h a t w h i c h is bed--"(iii) given that the o n e
F o r m o v e r m a n y is t h a t w h i c h is b e d " - - t h e n , with (iii), we can explain w h y
the two h a v e the f o r m o r c h a r a c t e r o f the o n e w h i c h a p p e a r s . F r o m (ii) a n d
(iii) we c a n c o n c l u d e that, since the o n e w h i c h a p p e a r s is the o n e F o r m o v e r
m a n y , it is also t h e b e d itself f r o m w h i c h all o t h e r beds derive their f o r m .
T h u s , the two b e d s w o u l d d e r i v e their f o r m o r c h a r a c t e r f r o m the o n e w h i c h
a p p e a r s , i.e., (ab). M o r e o v e r , since the o n e w h i c h a p p e a r s is the o n e F o r m
o v e r m a n y , by (iii) it w o u l d be that w h i c h is bed, i.e., (2a).
T h i s identification o f the o n e F o r m o v e r m a n y a n d that which is b e d - i.e., (iii)--is c o n t a i n e d in the i m m e d i a t e c o n t e x t o f the T B A , at 5 9 7 a l - 9 :
"did we n o t j u s t say t h a t he [the m o r t a l c r a f t s m a n ] does n o t m a k e the F o r m ,
which we say is t h a t w h i c h is bed, b u t s o m e p a r t i c u l a r bed." T h e r e f e r e n c e to
the p r e v i o u s s t a t e m e n t - - " d i d we n o t j u s t s a y " - - s h o w s that ' F o r m ' in the
p r e s e n t p a s s a g e r e f e r s to t h e o n e F o r m o v e r m a n y at 5 9 6 a 5 - b l o . T h e r e is
also the s a m e identification b e t w e e n the o n e F o r m o f f o v e r m a n y a n d that
w h i c h is f in B o o k 6 ( 5 o 7 a 6 - b l o ) - - a passage with striking similarities to
596a5-blo

and 597al-2.

We predicate 'to be' of many beautiful things and many good things, saying of them
severally that they are, and so define them in our s p e e c h . . . And again, we speak of a
self-beautiful and of a good that is only and merely good, and so, in the case of all
the things that we then posited as many, we turn about and posit each as a single idea
or aspect, assuming it to be a unity and call it that which each really i s . . . And the
one class of things we say can be seen but not thought, while the ideas can be thought
but not seen.~
P u t t i n g these two a s s u m p t i o n s into the calculation we obtain:
(I) I f he m a d e as few as two (such things),

using an ambiguous phrase one of whose meanings---in fact, the more obvious--is the very
opposite of what he meant. Cherniss also argues that the Form of bed is the character of bed;
but it is unclear whether he is also denying altogether that the Form is a bed because his
assertion of the denial is so guarded (296-97) .
1, Plato: The Republic, translated by Paul Shorey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1935), 2: 97.

14o

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

(x) (a) ([i] given that we are accustomed to positing some one Form for
each group of many) again a one (bed in nature) would appear

(b) ([ii] given that if anything is a bed besides that which is bed then it
has the form of bed only through participation in that which is
bed. And [iii] given that the one Form over many is that which is
bed) the two would have the form of the one,
(2) (a) this one would be that which is bed and (b) not the two.
The logic of the argument at 5 9 7 c l - d 3 should be clear so far. There is
one outstanding question, however. Why are the two not that which is bed,
i.e., what explains (2b)? (ii) answers this question. If that which is bed is the
primary bed from which all other beds derive their form or character then
neither of the two beds can be that which is bed, as we can see from the
following argument.
Let us suppose two cases, modelled on the two cases of the calculation. In
one case, X is the f itself from which all other f's derive their form. Of X it is
true to say that if anything is f besides X it is f only through participation in
X. Let us suppose another case in which there are two duplicate items like X
insofar as possible. We label these items Y and Z. They stand in the same
relations--i.e., if Y stands in any relation R so does Z, and vice versa; thus
both are pretenders to the title "the f itself from which all other f's derive
their form." T h e n either (a) Y and all other f's derive their form only by
participation in Z and Z and all the other f's derive their form only by
participation Y; or (b) Y does not derive its form only by participation in Z
and Z does not derive its form only by participation in Y.
If (a) is true, then neither Y nor Z will be f's only by participating in the
other, contrary to hypothesis. Under (a), both of the following would be
true: (1) if anything is f besides Y it is f only by participation in Y; (2) if
anything is f besides Z it is f only by participation in Z. The "anything" in (1)
covers Z; thus Z is f only through participation in Y. In turn, "anything" in
(2) covers Y and thus Y is f only through participation in-Z. However,
mutual participation, under the conditions of (ii), is ontological bankruptcy.
Compare: if Jones has money only by borrowing from Smith and Smith has
money only by borrowing from Jones, then neither could earn, steal, inherit,
and so on. Nor could either have any originally. But then, if neither has any
originally, earns any, etc., neither can borrow from the other. Consequently,
neither has any money. If Y and Z are both f only by participation in the
other, then neither is f only by participation in the other.
If (b) is true then neither Y nor Z is the f itself from which all other f's
derive their form or character. Y does not derive its form from Z and vice
versa. Thus, neither of the following will be true: (l) if anything is f besides

THE UNIQUENESS PROOF

141

Y it is f only t h r o u g h participation in Y and (2) if anything is f besides Z it is

f only t h r o u g h participation in Z. T h u s the a r g u m e n t might be summarized:
Y and Z c a n n o t both be the p r i m a r y f f r o m which all o t h e r f's derive their
character; since Y and Z are duplicates, neither can be the primary f. So by
(ii) neither o f the two beds can be the primary bed f r o m which all o t h e r beds
derive their character. By (iii), neither can be the one F o r m over m a n y and
this title goes to a third.
Finally, it is clear that Plato t h o u g h t that neither o f the two beds is the
F o r m o f bed and that somehow their duplication disqualifies them f r o m
being the F o r m o f bed. (ii) gives a reason for this disqualification which
d e p e n d s on the duplication. In fact, this a r g u m e n t bears many striking parallels to the a r g u m e n t at Timaeus 3 o c l - 3 1 b 3. T h e r e the F o r m o f the Intelligible Animal which embraces all o t h e r Intelligible Animals is said to be
unique because t h e r e could not be two such things. Only one F o r m can
include all the others. '~ In the Republic, the F o r m o f bed is not, o f course, all
inclusive; but it does stand in a u n i q u e relation to all o t h e r beds. By "unique"
is m e a n t a o n e - m a n y relation such that only one thing can be the one---e.g.,
the largest tomato in Georgia. Just as the Intelligible Animal which embraces
all o t h e r Intelligible Animals stands in such a unique relation to all o t h e r
Intelligible Animals, so the F o r m o f bed f r o m which all o t h e r beds derive
their character stands in a unique relation to all o t h e r beds. In both cases,
only one such thing can hold the s u p e r o r d i n a t e position.
2.

This i n t e r p r e t a t i o n differs in i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m those given by a

g r o u p o f c o n t e m p o r a r y commentators. T h e s e c o m m e n t a t o r s can be identified by the fact that they r e a d the a r g u m e n t at Republic l o in the light o f the
infinite regress a r g u m e n t at Parmenides 1 3 2 a l - b 2 , as that a r g u m e n t has
been analyzed by G r e g o r y Vlastos in his articles " T h e T h i r d Man A r g u m e n t
in the Parmenides" a n d "Plato's ' T h i r d Man' A r g u m e n t (Parm. 132ax-bg):
T e x t and Logic" ( T M A II)? s Such commentators, while not always agreeing
with Vlastos in details, do i m p o r t issues s u r r o u n d i n g Vlastos's t r e a t m e n t o f

,2 Cf. my "The Unique World of the Timaeus'Journal of the History of Philosophy 17 0979):
X-lO. Cf. A. Nehamas, "Self-Predication and Plato's Theory of Forms" American Philosophical
Quarterly 16 0979): 97-98.
'~ Gregory Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides," Studies in Plato's Metaphysics, R. E. Allen, ed. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965): 231-63; Gregory Vlastos,
"Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (Parm. 132Ax-B2); Text and Logic," in his Platonic Studies,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 342-65. The latter will be hereafter referred to
as TMA H.

142

JOURNAL

OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

the T M A a n d some o f the assumptions---or versions o f those a s s u m p t i o n s - he introduced. 14 In c o n s e q u e n c e most think that the a r g u m e n t at Republic lO
is at least liable to b e c o m i n g an infinite regress in the way that T M A does.
We will consider these interpretations in this section. Doing so will help us to
see that the T B A , a c c o r d i n g to o u r interpretation, is not liable to an infinite
regress.
It will be recalled that Vlastos adds to the text o f the a r g u m e n t in the
Parmenides two assumptions: (SP) Self Predication Assumption: "Any F o r m
can be predicated by itself" and (NI) N o n - I d e n t i t y Assumption: " I f a n y t h i n g
has a certain character, it c a n n o t be identical with the F o r m in virtue o f
which we a p p r e h e n d that character. '''5 From these assumptions and the
premises in the text, Vlastos derives the infinite regress which is the conclusion o f the T M A .
Using these assumptions in the T B A , one could reason (a) that the two
Forms o f bed are beds (SP) and (b) that neither can be that by which they are
a p p r e h e n d e d as beds (NI). T h u s , there must be a third bed. However, if SP
and NI are assumed in the T B A then it too generates, in the by now familiar
fashion, an infinite regress o f Forms o f bed.
First o f all, what we wish to show is that NI, in its various formulations, is
not a p p r o p r i a t e in Republic lO, 5 9 7 c l - d 3. I f NI is not a p p r o p r i a t e then the
T B A is not liable to an infinite regress g e n e r a t e d by NI. Second, we wish to
show that without NI, or some equivalent principle, the T B A cannot be
t u r n e d into an infinite regress at all. T h u s , we conclude that the T B A is not
liable to an infinite regress.
T h e reason given by Vlastos for i n t r o d u c i n g NI in the T B A is that without it we c a n n o t explain why one o f the two beds is not the one over many. '6
But we have seen that N I is not n e e d e d to do this; (ii) is sufficient. Moreover, in the context o f the a r g u m e n t at the beginning o f Republic lo, (ii) is
preferable to NI. First o f all, (ii) occurs in the middle dialogues in an explicit
fashion; N I does not. Second, as we have seen the two beds are disqualified

,4 K. W. Mills applies P. T. Geach's analysis of the TMA to this argument. Geach's analysis
is an answer to Vlastos's first article on the TMA. While Mills does not say that the argument in
Republic lo is doomed to an infinite regress, he does import into his analysis of the argument
enough of Geach's analysis of the TMA to make an infinite regress possible. Cf. Duff-Forbes,
"The Regress Argument"; Nerlich "Regress Arguments"; Mills, "Crombie on Republic"; Strang,
"Plato and the Third Man"; and S. Marc Cohen, "The Logic of the Third Man," Philosophical
Review 8o 097 l): 448-75, especially 469-71.
,5 Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument," 236-37; the subsequent modifications of these
assumptions made in TMA H do not affect the points being made here.
,6 Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument," 263. We also agree with Bluck in denying the
universality of NI in Plato's theory of Forms, referred to by Vlastos in this passage.

THE UNIQUENESS PROOF

143

f r o m being the F o r m o f bed because they are duplicates. (ii) gives a reason
for this disqualification which d e p e n d s specifically on the duplication; it is
because t h e r e are two o f these things that neither can be the f itself f r o m
which all o t h e r f's derive their character. But NI works its disqualification
without specific r e f e r e n c e to duplication; the two are disqualified by NI
because they are beds, not because they are duplicates. T h i r d , NI does not
explain (lb)--i.e., that the two beds have the form or character o f that one
which appears. NI assumes that they both have the character; then it only
explains why the two are not the one which arises--(2b). In fact, using SP,
NI, a n d OM, (~b) becomes otiose; the T B A o u g h t to read: if the god m a d e
two such things (they would both be beds--SP), again a one would a p p e a r - OM. T h e two are not that which is b e d - - N I ; the one is that which is bed.
(lb) is left out altogether. I f we include it, we need some f u r t h e r assumption
to explain why the two beds have a relation to the one which appears such
that they have its f o r m or character.
T h e i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between (ii) and NI is that the f o r m e r does not
require a F o r m to participate in a n o t h e r F o r m in o r d e r to be f but the latter
does. T h e d i f f e r e n c e implies that the T B A avoids an infinite regress o f
Forms, We can see this consequence o f assuming (ii) instead o f NI if we try
to generate an infinite regress f r o m the T B A , u n d e r o u r interpretation. I f
we apply OM to the g r o u p consisting o f the two beds and the Form, we shall
posit a one for this new group. An infinite regress seems just to about to
start. But b e f o r e we set o f f on this regress, we must ask, inspired by Vlastos,
w h e t h e r the o n e posited for the new g r o u p is the same as the third bed o r
w h e t h e r it is d i f f e r e n t f r o m the third, i.e., is it a f o u r t h bed? I f they are not
different, t h e r e is no infinite regress.
But n o n e o f o u r assumptions forces us to say that the one F o r m posited
for the new g r o u p , constituted by the third bed and the two, is d i f f e r e n t
f r o m the third bed. By contrast with the way NI generates an infinite n u m ber o f Forms, the T B A generates only the third bed. First o f all, (ii) and (iii)
d o not require a separate, f o u r t h bed in which the third bed must participate
in o r d e r to be a bed since (iii) says that the third bed is that which is bed and
(ii) explicitly e x e m p t s that which is bed f r o m having to participate in a F o r m
o f bed in o r d e r to be a bed. Second, (ii) and (ii) would require a separate,
f o u r t h F o r m o f bed only if the third bed were a duplicate. I f there were
a n o t h e r F o r m o f bed exactly like the third bed neither could be that which is
bed. But o u r hypothetical case does not envision a duplicate for the third
bed. T h u s , without some f u r t h e r assumption to differentiate the third and
" f o u r t h " beds, (ii) and (iii) d o not show the " f o u r t h " bed posited by OM is
d i f f e r e n t f r o m the third bed.
O f course, o n e might object that OM by itself---i.e., (i)--is sufficient to

144

J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

g e n e r a t e an infinite regress. O n e m i g h t claim that, according to OM, the

one is always a d i f f e r e n t entity f r o m each o f the many. ~7 This position
would imply that no m a t t e r what kind o f things constitute the m a n y - - - e v e n
if it c o n t a i n e d a F o r m o f f as well as f t h i n g s - - t h e one F o r m posited by
O M would h a v e to be distinct f r o m that original Form. It would be h a r d to
i m p r o v e on Vlastos's c o u n t e r a r g u m e n t to this claim in the context o f the
T M A . 's I n what follows we will a r g u e that, in the relevant passages o f
Books 6 a n d 1o, O M by itself is not sufficient to g e n e r a t e an infinite
regress.
N e i t h e r in B o o k 6 n o r l o does O M say that the F o r m is an entity distinct
f r o m each o f the m a n y no m a t t e r what kind o f things constitute the many. It
is clear f r o m 5 o 7 b 1 - 1 o , for instance, that the envisioned case o f application
o f O M is with a g r o u p o f p e r c e p t u a l particulars a n d that the one is distinct
f r o m the m a n y because it is a d i f f e r e n t kind o f entity f r o m the particulars;
the F o r m is intel]igible a n d the m a n y perceptual. In Book 1o as well, the one
is an intelligible entity a n d the m a n y are perceptual. In both cases, the F o r m
is said to be an ontologically d i f f e r e n t kind o f thing f r o m particulars. T h e
implication is that, in these contexts, one a n d m a n y are distinct because o f
this ontological difference.
Simply because the o n e is always ontologically d i f f e r e n t in kind f r o m
sensible particulars, we c a n n o t conclude that, w h e n the m a n y includes both
the F o r m o f f a n d f sensible particulars, the one is distinct f r o m each o f the
many, including the F o r m o f f. C o n s i d e r the following. At Rep. 5 9 7 c l - d 3
the O M posits s o m e o n e F o r m o f b e d for the two beds. According to Rep.
5 9 7 a l - 2 this F o r m is that which is b e d - - i . e . , the F o r m o f bed. T h e n , in o u r
hypothetical case, we m a y g r o u p this F o r m with the two beds. By OM, again
we m a y posit s o m e o n e F o r m o f bed for this new group. Again, according to
Rep. 5 9 7 a a - 2 , the F o r m we j u s t posited is that which is b e d - - i . e . , the F o r m
o f bed. Now we have used the s a m e definite description to i'efer to what we
posited in the two cases. H o w do we know that what we posited in the first
case is d i f f e r e n t f r o m what we posited in the second? N o t h i n g in the f o r m u lations o f O M at 5 o 7 b 1 - 1 o a n d at 5 9 6 a 5 - 8 tells us how to answer this

,7 Cf. Henry Teloh and David James Louzecky, "Plato's Third Man Argument," Phronesis
17 0972): 87-88. The authors incorporate nonidentity into a version of the OM; they claim
that the TMA could not get started without incorporating nonidentity. Cf. Bestor, "Plato's
semantics," 73-74, note 12. However, the passages from the Republic do not require anything as
sweeping as nonidentity to be incorporated into OM.
,8 See Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument," ~38, where he says that without NI "there
is... nothing to keep us from saying that they (a, b, c, and F-ness) are all apprehended as F in
virtue of F-ness itself." Cf. TMA H in Platonic Studies, 35 L

THE U N I Q U E N E S S PROOF

145

question. I n these two f o r m u l a t i o n s , the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n o n e a n d m a n y

d e p e n d s o n a d i f f e r e n c e in kind; b u t we are n o t n o w d e a l i n g with the
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n intelligibles a n d particulars.
I n fact, at Rep. 5 o 7 b 1 - 1 o a n d 5 9 6 a 5 - 8 , w h a t tells us h o w to distinguish
o n e f r o m m a n y is the c o n t e x t w h e r e the c o n c e r n is with the d i f f e r e n c e
b e t w e e n intelligibles a n d sensibles. A n d it is the carefully c o n t r i v e d c o n t e x t
o f the T M A w h i c h m a k e s it plausible to a p p l y O M to a g r o u p consisting o f
F o r m a n d particulars. E v e n t h e n , in o r d e r to posit a s e p a r a t e F o r m f o r this
g r o u p it is n e c e s s a r y to a s s u m e N I . U n d u e fixation o n the n o t i o n that the
T M A is a universal a r g u m e n t can m a k e us o v e r l o o k the f u n c t i o n o f its
c o n t e x t in g u i d i n g the a p p l i c a t i o n o f OM. T h e p r o b l e m with o u r h y p o t h e t i cal case is that t h e r e is n o c o n t e x t to help us to see w h a t is the n a t u r e o f the
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n o n e a n d m a n y . A s s u m i n g N I in this case w o u l d p r o v i d e
context. B u t to d o so we p r o b a b l y w o u l d d r o p the c o n t e x t u a l distinction
b e t w e e n o n e a n d m a n y w h i c h d e p e n d s o n the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n intelligible
a n d p a r t i c u l a r a n d substitute the distinction i n t r o d u c e d by NI. Mixing the
two distinctions, b a s e d as they a r e o n v e r y d i f f e r e n t principles, c o u l d lead to
logical i m p r o p r i e t y .
T h e p o i n t is, h o w e v e r , t h a t O M by itself ("we are a c c u s t o m e d to positing
s o m e o n e F o r m f o r e a c h m a n y " ) does n o t i m p l y a n y t h i n g a b o u t the status o f
the one. '9 W e m u s t d e p e n d o n the c o n t e x t to tell us a b o u t this status. O n e
c a n n o t with O M a l o n e g e n e r a t e an infinite regress. A n d we have seen t h a t
O M - - i . e . , (i)--(ii), a n d (iii) d o n o t g e n e r a t e an infinite regress. T h u s , the
T B A , u n d e r o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , is n o t liable to b e c o m i n g an infinite regress.
.

T h e p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n calls into q u e s t i o n the influential claim that the

t h e o r y o f F o r m s in the m i d d l e d i a l o g u e s is basically flawed. Vlastos's interp r e t a t i o n has it t h a t the infinite regress o f the T M A in the Parmenides
(132a l - b 2 ) reveals a d e e p a n d serious p r o b l e m b e c a u s e the c o r r e c t analysis
shows Plato c o m m i t t e d to b o t h N I a n d SP. H o w e v e r , if o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is
correct, Plato d o e s n o t use N I in the T h i r d B e d A r g u m e n t o f Republic lo.
Since Republic lO c o n t a i n s all the o t h e r e l e m e n t s o f the t h e o r y o f F o r m s in

,9 Indeed, Fine argues that OM never posits an ontologically separate one but only a univo~alis in rebus. Gail Fine, "The One Over Many," Philosophical Review 89 (1980): 197-94o. On page
235 we read "It is tempting to infer that Plato uses his one over many assumption only where
non-separated forms are in view; once separated forms are introduced, the one over many is
quietly replaced . . . . " The present interpretation of 597cl-d3 contradicts this claim as does the
passage at 5o7b5-1o. It is not so clear, however, that either contradicts the claim that OM by itself
does not warrant the positing a Form which is separate. Cf. Fine's treatment of the passages in
Rep. 596a ff and 597a-b (236-4o). She does not deal with the argument at 597cl-d3 .

146

JOURNAL

OF T I I E H I S T O R Y

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

the middle dialogues but d e p e n d s u p o n (ii) r a t h e r than NI, it would a p p e a r

that the t h e o r y is not based, at least in all its instances, u p o n NI. Since NI
requires the Form o f f to participate in a n o t h e r Form in o r d e r to be f and
(ii) does not so require, we can conclude at least that the theory does not, in
all o f its instances, d e p e n d on the F o r m o f f participating in a n o t h e r F o r m in
o r d e r to be f. In fact, in what follows we shall argue that Plato is not
committed to NI even in the T M A . But first we will show that NI is not
pervasive in the t h e o r y o f Forms by considering Vlastos's claim in both o f his
articles on the TMA.
Vlastos a r g u e d in his first analysis o f the a r g u m e n t that the T M A is a
" 'record o f honest p e r p l e x i t y ' - - a n expression o f philosophical puzzlement
due to the failure to identify the tacit assumptions which e n t e r e d into the
premises o f this and o t h e r objections marshalled in the Parmenides against
the t h e o r y o f Ideas. ''~~ Plato, it is thought, was faced in the T M A with the
effects o f an incompatible set o f assumptions in his theory o f Forms in the
middle dialogues. In particular, the separation between Forms and particulars, on the one hand, and the self-predication o f Forms, on the other, a r e - when their implications are exposed--inconsistent. ~' In the wake o f this
account, we are left to suppose that either Plato did not see the inconsistency
and c o n t i n u e d to m u d d l e t h r o u g h or he did see the inconsistency and courageously gave up one o f the supports o f his middle dialogue t h e o r y - although we c o n t i n u e to find vestiges o f both parts o f this theory in Plato's
later technical vocabulary.
In T M A H, Vlastos revises some o f the steps and assumptions o f his
earlier analysis in o r d e r to take into account some o f the criticisms. T h e
following are the new formulations: "(1) I f any set o f things share a given
character t h e n there exists a u n i q u e Form c o r r e s p o n d i n g to that character;
and each o f these things has that character by participating in that Form. ''22
( T h e latter, o f course, is a version o f OM.) SP is effectively the same. NI
reads: " I f anything has a given character by participating in a Form, it is not
identical with that Form. ''~3 (In what follows, 'NI' will stand for this version.)
T h e s e steps imply that Largeness participates in LargenessH; in turn, this
result contradicts (~) since it says that there is m o r e than o n e F o r m for large.
(1), SP, and NI are an inconsistent triad; SP and NI are no longer inconsistent by themselves.
In this version (1) is somewhat d i f f e r e n t f r o m its original version. O f

~~ Vlastos, "TMA II," 343~ Vlastos, "The Third Man Argument," 253-54.
~ Vlastos, "TMA II," 348.
,3 Ibid., 351.

THE UNIQUENESS PROOF

147

special note is that it is now a universal proposition designed to apply to

Forms as well as particulars. Vlastos argues that 13ea2 (hotan poll'atta megala
soi doxei einai) " w h e n there is a n u m b e r o f things which seem to you to be
great TM is a universal claim, m e a n t to cover all cases, including those in
which a F o r m is a m o n g the large things/5 H e admits that the second part o f
(1) " . . . and each o f these things has that character by participation in that
Form," has no explicitly textual warrant. ~6 O f course, it is part o f the earlier
context o f the a r g u m e n t that particulars partake o f Forms ( 1 3 o e 5 - 1 3 1 a t ) ;
but in fact ~32a2-4 does not m e n t i o n participation. F u r t h e r on, however, at
1 3 9 a 7 - 8 (hOi tauta panta megala phainesthai) and at 13')bl (h6i tauta panta
megala estai) we find phrases which seem to imply participation. In o r d e r to
explain how these phrases apply to F o r m and particular, thus making the
regress possible, it is assumed that the m a n y participate in the one and that,
if the m a n y contain a Form, that F o r m would participate in the Form over
that many, i.e., (a) all f's participate in a unique F o r m which c o r r e s p o n d s to f
(even when the f is the F o r m o f f). This latter is, o f course, really the second
part o f (1). But the point is that (a) is an assumption and not part o f the text.
( l ) - - m i n u s (a)--SP, and NI are not inconsistent and do not generate an
infinite regress, whereas (a), SP, and NI do generate the regress. But what is
i m p o r t a n t is that we have f o u n d in (a) the real culprit in the case o f the
honest perplexity. (a) asserts that all f's participate in a Form; we can call this
assertion the universality o f participation. W h e n the F o r m o f f is in question
(a) requires that the F o r m participate in a n o t h e r Form or in itself. NI closes
the possibility o f participation in itself; thus the F o r m is required to participate in another. But given the way NI is now formulated, everything turns
on ( a ) i i . e . , the universality o f participation. Without (a), NI does not apply
to Forms; t h e n Forms do not have to participate in a Form to be f. Moreover, w h e n we contrast (a) with (ii) we recall that (ii) does not require the
F o r m to participate in anything, including itself, in o r d e r to be f#7
Which o f the two, (a) or (ii), is m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e as Platonic doctrine?

'z4 Plato: Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Htppias, Lesser H~ppias, translated by H. N. Fowler
(London: William Heineman, 1926), 217.
'~ Vlastos, "TMA II," 344-45, note lo.
'~ Ibid., 348-49, note 28.
47 Cf. Alexander Nehamas, "Participation and Predication in Plato's Later Thought," Review of Metaphysics 36 (December 1989): 343-74- Nehamas denies that participation of Forms is
a part of the middle dialogue theory of Forms. He does interpret passages in the second hall of
the Parmenides as allowing, but not requiring, self participation--and as, thus, introducing a
radically different theory of Forms. If, however, we assume--as Nehamas seems to---that the
first part of the dialogue is a discussion of the middle dialogue theory of Forms, the present
point stands.

x48

JOURNAL

OF T H E

HISTORY

OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Given t h a t (a) d o e s n o t o c c u r explicitly in the text a n d that (ii) d o e s - - i n the

Phaedo--the latter has m o r e textual w a r r a n t . M o r e o v e r , (ii) is clearly c e n t r a l

to the t h e o r y o f F o r m s in the m i d d l e dialogues. B u t we can still ask, if Plato
h a d explicitly c h o s e n (ii) o v e r (a), a n d a d d e d it to the set SP a n d N I , w o u l d
he have lost s o m e t h i n g essential to that t h e o r y o f F o r m s ? Does this t h e o r y
r e q u i r e a F o r m o f f to participate in a F o r m o f f in o r d e r to be f? T h e T B A
shows t h a t the F o r m o f bed has the f o r m o f bed in s o m e sense; it is called
b e d as m u c h as a n y o t h e r F o r m in the m i d d l e dialogues is called by its
a p p r o p r i a t e term. B u t the a r g u m e n t c o n t a i n s no a s s u m p t i o n which r e q u i r e s
the F o r m o f b e d to participate in itself o r a n o t h e r F o r m o f bed. Since
establishing the validity o f an a r g u m e n t - - i . e . , the T M A - - w a s the o n l y reason f o r a s s u m i n g (a) in the first place, we have n o r e a s o n f o r a s s u m i n g (a) in
the T B A since it is n o t n e c e s s a r y f o r the validity o f that a r g u m e n t .
W h a t d o e s this analysis o f the T B A have to d o with the T h i r d M a n
A r g u m e n t o f the Parmenides? Since that a r g u m e n t is quite c o m p l e x , with
m a n y h i d d e n d e p t h s , a n d since this p a p e r is really a b o u t the T B A - - a n
a r g u m e n t with d i f f e r e n t n u a n c e s - - o n l y a s u g g e s t i o n can be o f f e r e d . As we
have seen, the i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in o u r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is the rejection o f (a)
in f a v o r o f (ii). T h u s , the T B A stands, regress free, o n (ii), which d o e s n o t
r e q u i r e the F o r m o f b e d to p a r t i c i p a t e in itself o r in a n o t h e r F o r m o f bed in
o r d e r to be a bed; by c o n t r a s t the application o f N I to the F o r m o f large in
the T M A r e q u i r e s that F o r m to participate in a n o t h e r F o r m o f large in
o r d e r to be large. (ii) in effect says that only f's besides the p r i m a r y f r e q u i r e
a s e p a r a t e F o r m o f f in o r d e r to be f, i m p l y i n g that N I does n o t a p p l y to the
F o r m o f f, the f itself f r o m w h i c h all o t h e r f's derive their f o r m . B u t if N I
does n o t a p p l y to the F o r m o f f, n o regress results. M o r e o v e r , if N I d o e s n o t
a p p l y to the F o r m o f f, t h e n a p p l y i n g it to the F o r m o f f is a fallacy. ~8 Finally,
if the a p p l i c a t i o n o f N I to the F o r m o f f is a fallacy t h e n it s h o u l d be possible

~s Some of the commentators on whom we have relied also hold that the TMA is fallacious
and they do so on the basis that the Form is in some way primary--i.e., non-derivative--and its
participants are derivative. Cf. Allen, "Predication and Participation," 46-47 and 59; Bestor,
"Plato's semantics," 57-58; Barford, "Context of the Third Man," 4-5; Fujisawa, "l~xetv," 3439. However, unlike the present interpretation, these construe the difference between Form
and particular in such a way that "f" is not predicated of Form and particular with the same
sense. Then the claim is made that OM does not apply in the second step of the first TMA
because a, b, c, and F-ness are not all f in the same way. However, it is not at all clear that any of
these interpretations avoids the dilemmma posed in Roger Shiner, "Self-Predication and the
'Third Man' Argument," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (197o): 371-86. By contrast, the
interpretation offered here allows there to be some similarity of meaning between "f" in "derivatively f" and "f" in "non-derivatively f." The regress does not depend on particulars and Form
being in some sense all f's but upon the failure to see the difference between derivative and
non-derivative f.

TIlE UNIQUENESS PROOF

149

to avoid so applying it. T h e r e should be a "suspicious" step in which the

opportunity to apply NI to the Form of f arises because of a misunderstanding or an ambiguity.
C o m m e n t a t o r s have pointed out that Plato seems to have indicated that
the suspicious step of the T M A is the second (132al). ~9 " I f in the same way
you regard, in y o u r mind, all these things--the large itself and the other
large t h i n g s - - w o u l d not some one large again appear, by which all these
must a p p e a r large?" (Ti d'auto to mega kai taUa to megala, ean h6saut6s t~i psuch~i
epi panta id~is, ouchi hen ti au mega phaneitai, h6i tauta panta anagk~ megala
phainesthai;) I f one cannot so regard the large itself and large things, then
the regress does not begin. Now, "in the same way" can mean a n u m b e r of
things: (a) "as all f," (b) "as all having a c o m m o n character [e.g., f or f,]," or
(c) "in the s a m e way as before [i.e., in the same way as the first group]." T h e
suggestion offered here is that (c) is the reading which shows the T M A to be
fallacious. It is wrong to look at the group containing the Form of f and f
participants in the same way as one looks at the group containing only f
participants. T h e g r o u p containing the Form and the participants cannot be
r e g a r d e d in the same way as the group of large things in the first step are
regarded because all the f's there are derivatively f and the group containing
the F o r m a n d the other f's contains some m e m b e r which, though it is f in
some sense, is not derivatively f.
T h e F o r m stands in an epistemological and metaphysical priority to the
particulars; they d e p e n d on it for explaining and for having whatever property the Form is the Form for. T h e Form, in turn, depends on no other
Form for having whatever property it is the Form for; nor does it d e p e n d on
a n o t h e r Form for explaining or clarifying that property. If one realized that
difference between F o r m and participant, it would be impossible to regard
the Form and the other f's in the same way as the f's alone. After seeing the
difference between the Form and participants, one would see that the f's
alone in the first step need g r o u n d i n g but that Form and the other f's are a
closed system. T h e group consisting of Form and f participants is not in
need of grounding; the f's are derivative from the Form already there and
that Form is not derivative o f anything. I f one regarded the two groups
differently for this reason he would not see the second group in such a way
that a n o t h e r Largeness would appear by which the members of the second
group are large, i.e., the opportunity to apply NI does not arise u n d e r this
understanding.
Even if this suggestion for seeing the fallacy in the T M A is not accepted,

~9 Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism, 297; Barford, "Context of the Third Man," 3.

150

JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

the present i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f the T B A still calls into question the influential

claim that the correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f the T M A reveals a d e e p and pervasive p r o b l e m within the whole t h e o r y o f Forms in the middle dialogues. I f
o u r a r g u m e n t a b o u t the T B A is correct, there is a step in the T M A which
Plato did not have to accept in o r d e r to maintain the theory o f Forms
associated with the middle dialogues, in which Forms are paradigms o f that
o f which they are Forms.

Agnes Scott College