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Facts:
This case is in relation to writ of injunction and temporary
restraining order filed by the Province of North Cotabato
against the Government of the Philippines Peace Panel
(GRP) regarding MOA-AD (Memorandum of Agreement
on the Ancestral Domain) between the GRP and MILF.
3. Is MOA-AD unconstitutional?
Answer to issue #1. Yes,. Concrete acts under the MOAAD are not necessary to render the present controversy
ripe.
Court Ruling:
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Issue:
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since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS
III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III,
the international community will of course reject it and will
refuse to be bound by it.
Facts:
This case was initiated during the transition of
government from the Japanese occupation to US military
occupation in the Philippines. The petitioner Co Kim
Cham filed for a mandamus that the respondent judge of
the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in
a civil case against Eusebio Tan Keh which happened
during the Japanese occupation.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance on the
civil case filed by Co Kim Cham against Tan Keh based
on the proclamation issued by General Douglas
MacArthur which had the effect of invalidating and
nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgement of the
court of the Philippines under the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
established during the Japanese military occupation.
Issue:
Should the Philippine government, the so called
Philippine Republic established during the Japanese
occupation a de facto government and will the judicial
proceedings remain valid?
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and proceedings of the courts of justice of those
governments, which are not of a political complexion,
were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well-known
principle of postliminy (postliminium) in international law,
remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.
Court Ruling:
Yes, it is a De Facto government as it was established
and maintained by military forces who invade and occupy
a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force.
The government established in the Philippines, under
the so-called Philippine Republic, during Japanese
occupation, was and should be considered as a de facto
government; and that the judicial proceedings conducted
before the courts which had been established in this
country, during said Japanese occupation, are to be
considered legal and valid and enforceable, even after
the liberation of this country by the American forces, as
long as the said judicial proceedings had been
conducted, under the laws of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines
The governments by the Philippine Executive
Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
the Japanese military occupation being de facto
governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts
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Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper party to bring
the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the
accumulation of a great number of small contributions.
The names of the contributors do not appear in the
record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted
with the title to their respective contributions. The
beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their
heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the
original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It
would be impracticable for them to institute an action or
actions either individually or collectively to recover the
$80,000. The only course that can be satisfactorily
pursued is for the Government to again assume control
of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was
originally destined.
Court Ruling:
Yes, the Philippine government can file a suit on behalf of
the donors and beneficiaries of the relief funds as Parens
Patriae.
The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands
in complying with their duties conferred upon them by
law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting
to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will this be
seen that those governments were something more, as
we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.
It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only
persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment
to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the
cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither.
Issue:
Can the state interfere on matters pertaining to
expressing freedom of speech and freedom to exercise
religious belief?
Court Ruling:
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Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus based
on a theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the
enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the
Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime
of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the reason that the sovereignty
of the legitimate government in the Philippines and,
consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino
citizens thereto was then suspended; and that there was
a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
Issue:
Can the charge of treason be suspended when there is
change of sovereignty?
Court Ruling:
No, because it is an offense against the same
government and the same sovereign people.
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and
prohibition proceedings challenged the validity of the writ
of execution to garnish the funds of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines issued by the respondent Judge
Guillermo Villasor.
The petitioner alleged ground of being excess of
jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion and prayed that
the writ of execution must be nullified.
Judge Guillermo Villasor on a Special Proceedings
favored P.J Kiener Co., Gavino Unchuan and
International Construction Corporation against the
petitioner, confirming the arbitration award in the amount
of Php 1, 712, 396.40. Judge Villasor, issued an order
declaring the decision final and executory, directing the
Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City, as well as Manila
to execute the said decision.
The funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on
deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their
branches are public funds duly appropriated and
allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, as per Certification by the AFP Controller.
Issue:
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Magasaysay and was reserved for settlement
purposes.Under the administration of NARRA, a tract of
land situated in the Municipality of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur, the Land Authority started sub-diving and
distributing the land to the settlers.
Issue:
In the case at bar, can the state invoke its immunity from
suit for the recovery of property?
Court Ruling:
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of nonsuability of the State has proper application in this case.
The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the
Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing
the State to court just like any private person who is
claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the
recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action
in personam. It is an action directed against a specific
party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only
such party or parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the
private respondent herein, is directed against the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic
Act No. 3844.
By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the
complaint is clearly a suit against the State, which under
settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a
showing that the State has consented to be sued, either
expressly or by implication through the use of statutory
language too plain to be misinterpreted. There is no such
showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint itself
fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a
fatal defect, and on this basis alone, the complaint should
have been dismissed.
The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of
immunity from suit when the case was tried before the
court a quo, as alleged by private respondent, is not fatal.
It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by
the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings."
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Answer to issue # 2.
Claimants have to prosecute their money claims against
the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating
that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law
waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the
general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by
any Court against the Government of the (Philippines),
and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act
327 for filing money claims against the Government must
be strictly observed.
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent
to be sued by private parties either by general or special
law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of
execution" and that the power of the Courts ends when
the judgment is rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs or execution or
garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on
obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements of
public funds must be covered by the correspondent
appropriation as required by law. The functions and
public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed
to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public
funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law.
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If the funds appertained to one of the regular
departments or offices in the government, then, certainly,
such a provision would be a bar to garnishment. Such is
not the case here. Garnishment would lie. Only last
January, as noted in the opening paragraph of this
decision, this Court, in a case brought by the same
petitioner precisely invoking such a doctrine, left no doubt
that the funds of public corporations could properly be
made the object of a notice of garnishment. Accordingly,
this petition must fail.
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Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not
possessing juridical personality under the law, is
incapable of suing and being sued.
Facts:
Issue:
This case was in effect to the abolishment of National
Airports Corporation by Executive Order No. 365. To take
its place Civil Aviation Authority was created.
Before the National Airport Corporations was abolished,
Philippine Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airport
Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking on
Bacolod Airport no. 2 for the period up to and including
July 31, 1948. National Airports Corporations since
already abolished, was not able to make any payment to
Capitol Subdivision Inc. who is the owner of the land
used as airport. Therefore, the owner of the land, Capitol
Subdivision Inc, filed a case against Philippine Airlines.
Philippe Airlines countered a 3rd party complaint against
National Airport Corporation, by that time already
dissolved, and served summon to Civil Aeronautics
Administration. Philippine Airlines believes that National
Airport Corporations and its predecessors in interest
should pay the Capitol Subdivision Inc. the reasonable
rentals for the use of their land.
The counsel of the National Airports Corporation filed a
motion to dismiss the ground that the court lacks
jurisdiction to entertain a 3rd-party complaint first,
because the National Airports Corporation "has lost its
juridical personality," and, second, because agency of the
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Judge Romeo N. Firmes decision:
Facts:
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 2.
Answer to issue # 1.
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OF
THE
Facts:
This case is an appeal of both parties from the judgment
of the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila in favor
of Merrit again the Government of the Philippine Islands .
Counsel for the plaintiff complaint for limiting general
damagaes. Whilst, the Attorney-General on behalf of
Government of the Philippine Islands urges that the the
trial court erred: (a) in finding that the collision between
the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the
Philippine Islands is liable for the damages sustained by
SEC. 2.
passage.
Issue:
HON.
Facts:
This is a suite against US Air Force officials n relation to a
bidding conducted for a barber services in their station at
Clark Air Base. The United States of America was not
impleaded in the complaints but has moved to dismiss on
the ground that it is in effect suit against USA to which it
has not consented. It is now contesting the denial of its
motions by the respondent judges.
The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over other
bidders who claimed that Dizon made a bid for four
facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, which was
not included in the invitation to bid.
The other bidders complained to the Philippine Area
Exchange (PHAX). PHAX, explained that the Civil
Engineering concession had not been awarded to Dizon
as a result of the February 24, 1986 solicitation. Dizon
was already operating this concession and the expiration
of the contract had been extended from June 30, 1986 to
August 31, 1986. They further explained that the
solicitation of the CE barbershop would be available only
by the end of June and the private respondents would be
notified.
The other bidders filed a complaint to compel PHAX and
the individual petitioners to cancel the award to Dizon, to
conduct a rebidding for the barbershop concessions and
to allow them by a writ of preliminary injunction to
continue operating the concessions pending litigation.
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Issue:
Can the US invoke their state immunity?
Court Ruling:
Concerning G.R. No. 76607, we also find that the
barbershops subject of the concessions granted by the
United States government are commercial enterprises
operated by private person's. They are not agencies of
the United States Armed Forces nor are their facilities
demandable as a matter of right by the American
servicemen. These establishments provide for the
grooming needs of their customers and offer not only the
basic haircut and shave (as required in most military
organizations) but such other amenities as shampoo,
massage, manicure and other similar indulgences. And
all for a fee. Interestingly, one of the concessionaires,
private respondent Valencia, was even sent abroad to
improve his tonsorial business, presumably for the
benefit of his customers. No less significantly, if not more
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Respondents
Opposition
likewise
alleged
that
Ambassador Soeratmin and Minister Counsellor Kasim
can be sued and held liable in their private capacities for
tortious acts done with malice and bad faith.
On May 17, 2001, the trial court denied herein petitioners
Motion to Dismiss. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration subsequently filed.
Issue:
Having established that the Embassy of Indonessia have
engaged into contract, has it waives it immunity from
suit?
Court Ruling:
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Issue:
Can the USA Navy invoke state of immunity from suit?
Court Ruling:
Yes. The officers of the US Navy was performing a
governmental functions.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
Facts:
Fernando A. Froilan purchased a vessel for FS-197 for
P200,000 from the Shipping Commission, paid only
P50,000 as down payment and the balance will be paid
in installment.
To secure the payment of the balance, he executed a
chattel mortgage of said vessel in favor of the Shipping
Commission.
Froilan was not able to pay the mortgage, Shipping
Commission took possession of said vessel and
considered the contract of sale cancelled. Shipping
Commission chartered and delivered said vessel to Pan
Oriental Shipping Co. subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines.
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Issue:
Can Shipping Commission invoke its immunity from suit?
Court Ruling:
The other ground for dismissing the defendant's
counterclaim is that the State is immune from suit. This is
untenable, because by filing its complaint in intervention
the Government in effect waived its right of non-suability.
The immunity of the state from suits does not deprive it
of the right to sue private parties in its own courts. The
state as plaintiff may avail itself of the different forms of
actions open to private litigants. In short, by taking the
initiative in an action against a private party, the state
surrenders its privileged position and comes down to the
level of the defendant. The latter automatically acquires,
within certain limits, the right to set up whatever claims
and other defenses he might have against the state. The
United States Supreme Court thus explains:
Facts:
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against the government the claim for moral damages
have no valid basis.
The court dismissed the case filed by Amigable on the
ground that , t it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's
cause of action for the recovery of possession and
ownership of the portion of her lot in question on the
ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction to hear, try and decide plaintiff's claim for
compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00, the
same being a money claim against the government; and
that the claim for moral damages had long prescribed,
nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the
government had not given its consent to be sued.
Issues:
1.Can DPWH invoke its immunity from suit?
2.If they can be sued, will they be liable?
Court Ruling:
Answer to issue # 1. No. DPWH cannot invoke its
immunity from suit in the case at bar..
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of
Cebu, involving a claim for payment of the value of a
portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, held that where the government
takes away property from a private landowner for public