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Nature: Administrative Complaint in the Supreme Court.
Facts: Pasay RTC Judge Baltazar Dizon acquitted Lo chi Fai who was
arrested for violating CB circular no. 960 sec. 6 no ones allowed to
take out foreign exchange in any form unless authorized by Central
Bank or international agreements. Tourists/non-residents can only
bring out amount equal to amount they brought in. if you bring in
amount greater than $3K, you need to declare. Punishable by
reclusion temporal or greater than or equal to P50K. Lo Chi Fai
caught 380 pieces of difference currencies totaling to $355,349.57
and was able to show only two Central Bank declarations. Acquittal
based on: (1) no intent, (2) money belonged tom him and associates
coming from abroad not local.
Issue: WON respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetent or gross
ignorance of the law in rendering the decision in question.
Held: Accordingly, the Court finds the respondent guilty of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and consistent with
the responsibility of this Court for the just and proper administration of
justice and for the attainment of the objective of maintaining the
peoples faith in the judiciary, it is hereby ordered that the Respondent
Judge be dismissed from service. All leave and retirement benefits
and privileges to which he may be entitled are hereby forfeited with
prejudice to his being reinstated in any branch of government service,
including government-owned and/or controlled agencies or

accused had criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought
to know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not
essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are mala
prohibita. A judge can not be held to account or answer, criminally,
civilly or administratively, for an erroneous decision rendered by him in
good faith. But these circumstances which make the story concocted
by the accused so palpably unbelievable as to render the findings of
the respondent judge obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the
accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he rendered the
decision in good faith.


THE PHILIPPINES February 1, 2012
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012 G.R. No. 151258
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in
this case the general condemnation of a hazing-related death, they
are still bound to observe a fundamental principle in our criminal
justice system. No act constitutes a crime unless it is made so by
law. Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed
by a large section of the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot
be considered a crime, absent any law prohibiting its commission.
Had the Anti-Hazing Law been in effect then, these five accused
fraternity members would have all been convicted of the crime of
hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment). The
absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however,
that the accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal
liability. The Revised Penal Code also punishes felonies that are
committed by means of fault (culpa).

The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence or gross

ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the accused for violation
of CB Circular No. 960, the prosecution must establish that the

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There is a performance of the intended physical act;




Intod v. CA
G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Facts: Intod and company were tasked to kill Palangpangan due to land dispute. They fired at her room.
However, she was in another city then thus they hit no one.
Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder?
Held: No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines,
Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime
an act which, were it not aimed at something quite
impossible or carried out with means which prove
inadequate would constitute a felony against person or
family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There
must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical
impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to
qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility
occurs where the intended acts even if completed, would
not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would
apply to those circumstances where:

The consequence resulting from the intended act

does not amount to a crime.

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances

unknown to actor or beyond control prevent consummation of
intended crime.
Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a
defense. If the crime could have been committed had the
circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is
no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of
commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense
which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt.
The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical
impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of
accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an
impossible crime.


The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an

act in violation of the law;
There is no intention to perform the physical act;

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The appellants contends that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of
the ransom note was an impossible crime as the crime alleged is not against persons
or property but against liberty, thus it was not covered by par 2 of Art 26. But the court
pointed out that he is surely covered by the 1st par of the same article.
The court held that the act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there
was no inherent

4. People v. Domasian


Case: People v Domasian

On 03.11.82, Domasian asked the victim, Enrico Agra who was then 8 years old, to
accompany him to latters father to obtain a medical certificate. The boy agreed but
then Domasian forced the boy to take a bus to Gumaca instead of going to the
hospital. The boy started to cry and continued crying even if Domasian threatened
him that he would not be returned to his father if he does not stop crying. Then they
went to the market where Domasian handed to a jeepney driver an envelope
addressed to the boys father. After that, they rode a tricycle to San Vicente but the
tricycle driver became suspicious because Enrico would not stop crying. The tricycle
driver reported the matter to the barangay tanod then they went after the Domasian
and Enrico. When Domasian noticed that they were being pursued, he told the boy to
run faster. Somehow he was able to escape leaving Enrico behind.
Enrico met his parents while he was on his way home and on the same day after the
boy was found, the father received an envelope containing a ransom note demanding
for P1 million in exchange for the boy. The father noticed that the handwriting was
familiar. After comparing it with records from the hospital, he gave the note to the
police, who referred it to the NBI for examination.
The NBI test showed that the note had been written by Tan, the other appellant, but
the PC/INPs finding was that Tan was not the writer of the note.
When the boy was shown pictures by the police he was able to identify Domasian as
the one who took him. Domasian was also identified by the classmate of Enrico, who
was walking with the victim when Domasian asked for help, and the tricycle driver
who reported the incident to the tanod.
WON the appellants committed kidnapping or were liable for an impossible crime.

Nature of the Case:

Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo

The court affirmed the decision made by the lower court convicting the two appellants
for the crime of kidnapping


Policeman caught the accused in the act of making an opening with
an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods, in which the owner
was sleeping inside with another Chinaman. He was convicted of
attempted robbery.
W/N accused is guilty of attempted robbery
NO.* The accused did not clearly intend to take possession for the
purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to another. In
the instant case, there is nothing in the record from which such
purpose of the accused may reasonably be inferred. It could only be
inferred that he did intend to enter through force into the store, but not
to take possession of personal property.
Modified to attempted trespass.
* Crime was indeterminate. But what if he said he really intended to
rob the store? Or his wife testifies that he intended to rob the store?
Preparatory act v. act of execution
Immediacy: the capability of observing the act and determining from
the act alone what the intention is.
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Before the act of the person in and of themselves establish the intent,
you cant appreciate the intent; you cant anchor intention on anything
else other than the act itself. Act should unequivocally establish the
intent to commit the
crime. Intent is deduced from the actions, not the statements.

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than
his own spontaneous desistance. There is no attempted rape in this case
because the accused just dragged the victim and held her feet, which are not
indicative of an intent or attempt to rape the victim.

Aurelio Lamahang was caught in the act of using an iron bar to open
the wall of a store of cheap goods, while the owner was sleeping.
After breaking one board and unfastening the other he was caught
by a policeman. He was charged with attempted robbery and an
additional penalty of ten years and one day for being a habitual
delinquent. Lamahang now appeals.
W/N Lamahang is guilty of attempted robbery?
No. He is guilty of attempted trespass to dwelling. There attempt to
commit an indeterminate crime, meaning the crime being committed is
still unknown. The mere fact petitioner is breaking the wall of the
grocery can be a presumption of many crimes, to rob the store, to
kill/injure the owner, to set fire to the store, or any other crime. The
crime of robbery requires that the intent is to use force for the purpose
of gaining possession of another with the intent to gain. But in this
case no such fact can be proven. What can be proven is that he
attempted to gain access into the store without the permission of the
owner, but due to the timely intervention of the policeman no other act
was performed and so from the execution of the act of breaking the
wall the only logical act that would follow is unlawful entry or trespass
there it is the only crime that may be attributed to the petitioner.


People vs. Arnulfo Chavez Orande

Jessica Castro charged the plaintiff Arnulfo Orande for raping
her four times between 1994 to 1996 while the former was still a minor
(between 9-12 years old). The complainant contends that all were
executed by means of threat and intimidation, threatening her of feat if
she resists. RTC convicted Orande two counts of simple rape, one
statutory and one frustrated. The accused appealed that the court had
a grave error on convicting him of frustrated rape despite the fact that
there is no such crime.
Issue:WON there is a crime of frustrated rape?
The court said no, there is no crime of frustrated rape. In
People vs. Orita, it was reiterated that in the crime of rape, the
moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually
attains his purpose and from that moment, all the elements of the
crime is consummated. Since the offender has performed the last act
necessary to the crime, there is nothing more left to be done by the
offender. Thus, it is consummated rape. Also, perfect penetration is
not essential in consummating rape, mere or any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Necessarily, when there
is no penetration of the female organ, the rape is considered
attempted because not all acts of execution was performed.
Considering all the elements and manner of execution of the crime of
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rape and all jurisprudence on the mater, it is hardly conceivable how

the frustrated stage can be committed. WHEREFORE, the court ruled
that the RTC commited an error on convicting Orande the crime of
frustrated rape, for in fact, the rape was consummated. Hence,
Orande should be found guilty of consummated rape rather that

8. Valenzuela













May 19, 1994 4:30 pm: Aristotel Valenzuela and Jovy Calderon
were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within
the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago,
a security guard who was then manning his post at the open
parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw Valenzuela, who was
wearing an ID with the mark Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)
who hauled a push cart with cases of detergent of Tide brand
and unloaded them in an open parking space, where Calderon
was waiting. He then returned inside the supermarket and
emerged 5 minutes after with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and
again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking
space. Thereafter, he left the parking area and haled a taxi. He
boarded the cab and directed it towards the parking space where
Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide
Ultramatic inside the taxi, then boarded the vehicle. As Lago
watched, he proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area and asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the
merchandise but Valenzuela and Calderon reacted by fleeing on
foot. Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards.
Valenzuela and Calderon were apprehended at the scene and the
Valenzuela, Calderon and 4 other persons were first brought to
the SM security office before they were transferred to the Baler

Station II of the Philippine National Police but only Valenzuela and

Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor.

Calderons Alibi: On the afternoon of the incident, he was at the
Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account, accompanied
by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. As the queue for the ATM was
long, he and Rosulada decided to buy snacks inside the
supermarket. While they were eating, they heard the gunshot
fired by Lago, so they went out to check what was transpiring and
when they did, they were suddenly grabbed by a security guard
Valenzuelas Alibi: He is employed as a bundler of GMS
Marketing and assigned at the supermarket. He and his cousin, a
Gregorio Valenzuela, had been at the parking lot, walking beside
the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to
Pag-asa, when they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot
causing evryon to start running. Then they were apprehended by

CA: Confirmed RTC and rejected his contention that it should
only be frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he
was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles
ISSUE: W/N Valenzuela should be guilty of consummated theft.
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated,
o A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for
o It is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but
which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes
o It is attempted when the offender commences the commission
of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts
of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a:

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o subjective phase - portion of the acts constituting the crime

included between the act which begins the commission of the
crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior
if the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense,
o objective phase - After that point of subjective phase has
subjective phase is completely passed in case of frustrated

the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or

consummated necessitates an initial concession that all of the acts of
The determination of whether the felony was produced after all the
acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea - ordinarily, evil intent must
unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime or there can be no crime
In crimes mala in se, mens rea has been defined before as a guilty
mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent and essential for
Statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to supply
what the mens rea of the crime is and overt acts that constitute the crime

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (Elements of Theft):

1. that there be taking of personal property - only one operative act of
3. taking be done with intent to gain - descriptive circumstances
4. taking be done without the consent of the owner - descriptive
5. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things - descriptive circumstances

o U.S. v. Adiao: failed to get the merchandise out of the Custom House
o Dio: Military Police inspected the truck at the check point and found
o Flores: guards discovered that the empty sea van had actually
contained other merchandise as well - consummated theft
o Empelis v. IAC: Fled the scene, dropping the coconuts they had
seized - frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to


perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the felony
cannot attribute weight because definition is attempted
The ability of the actor to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if
o We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the
petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to gain, he acquired
physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable
period of time that he was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking
lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated
stage. Theft can only be attempted (no unlawful taking) or consummated


Three (3) accused were charged with murder. The first one hit the victim
repeatedly with a stone marker, the second one pummeled the victim with his
fists while the third only watched and acted as lookout in case others will try
to intervene. All of them, including the lookout, are guilty of murder and are
accountable for the death of the victim on the principle that the act of one is
the act of all.
Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not necessary to
establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that the acts of the accused, before,
during, and after the commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.


October 22, 2014
G.R. No. 207629
Jurisprudence requires that conspiracy must be proven as the crime
itself. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit
it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same
may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common
understanding among them with respect to the commission of the
offense. It is not necessary to show that two or more persons met
together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of

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an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be

carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the
accused acted in concert, each of them doing his part to fulfill the
common design to kill the victim. There is no clear evidence that
accused-appellants had a common design to kill Maximillian. To recall,
Maximillian's group and accused-appellants' group completely met by
chance that fateful early morning of April 29, 2006 near Gaisano Mall.
They did not know each other before this meeting. The events swiftly
happened, in a matter of minutes, from the meeting of the two groups, to
Maximillian's insulting remark to Jenny, to the scuffle between
Maximillian and accused-appellant Arnel, and to accused-appellant
Arnel's stabbing of Maximillian. The scuffle between Maximillian and
accused-appellant Arnel broke out because the former tried to grab the
latter's arm. It was at this point that prosecution witnesses saw accusedappellant Randy block Maximillian's way and hold Maximillian's hand/s.
Josephine testified that accused-appellant Randy held only Maximillian's
left hand, and Frederick narrated that accused-appellant Randy held both
of Maximillian's hands; but neither of these witnesses was able to
describe the extent that Maximillian's ability to defend himself or flee was
impaired by accused-appellant Randy's hold on his hand/s. Given the
circumstances, the Court has serious doubts that accused-appellant
Randy so acted to ensure that accused-appellant Arnel would be able to
stab and kill Maximillian. It is completely reasonable and plausible that
accused-appellant Randy was merely stepping in to stop Maximillian
from further attacking his cousin accused-appellant Arnel. There was no
proof that accused-appellant Randy had prior knowledge that accusedappellant Arnel carried a sharp weapon with him or that accusedappellant Arnel intended to stab Maximillian.




February 11, 2015

GR. No. 204644
Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that can convince a trial court
of its existence beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, when the co-accused
stated in open court that her fellow co-accused had no participation in the
crime of estafa, such statement was an admission against her interest.
The statement negated the alleged common design or purposeof
conspiracy between her and Benito. It alsomeans that she admitted that
her companions acts can never be attributed to her.



The accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator. His knowledge of
the plot to assassinate the victim, the fact that he had been ordered to scout
for a man who could do the job and his knowledge of the place, date and
time of the assault are sufficient to show unity of purpose. At the very least,
therefore, he had to know the plot and decided to join the execution. From
the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the
offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution.
The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is
immaterial in conspiracy


This is an appeal of defendants Elias Jaranilla, Ricardo Suyo and
Franco Brillantes from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo, which convicted them of robbery with homicide, sentenced each
of them to reclusion perpetua and ordered them to pay solidarily the
sum of six thousand pesos to the heirs of Ramonito Jabatan and the
sum of five hundred pesos to Valentin Baylon as the value of five
The evidence for the prosecution shows that at around eleven o'clock
in the evening of January 9, 1966, Heman Gorriceta, who had just
come from Fort San Pedro in Iloilo City, was driving a Ford pickup
truck belonging to his sister, Remia G. Valencia. While he was in front
of the Elizalde Building on J. M. Basa Street, he saw Ricardo Suyo,
Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They hailed Gorriceta who
stopped the truck. Jaranilla requested Gorriceta to bring them to
Mandurriao, a district in another part of the city. Gorriceta demurred.
He told Jaranilla that he (Gorriceta) was on his way home.
Jaranilla prevailed upon Gorriceta to take them to Mandurriao
because Jaranilla ostensibly had to get something from his uncle's
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place. So, Jaranilla, Brillantes and Suyo boarded the pickup truck
Upon reaching Mandurriao, Gorriceta parked the truck at a distance of
about fifty to seventy meters from the provincial hospital. Jaranilla,
Suyo and Brillantes alighted from the vehicle. Jaranilla instructed
Gorriceta to wait for them. The trio walked in the direction of the plaza.
After an interval of about ten to twenty minutes, they reappeared.
Each of them was carrying two fighting cocks. They ran to the truck.
Jaranilla directed Gorriceta to start the truck because they were being
chased. Gorriceta drove the truck to Jaro (another district of the city)
on the same route that they had taken in going to Mandurriao.
It is important to note the positions of Gorriceta and his three
companions on the front seat of the truck. Gorriceta, as the driver,
was on the extreme left. Next to him on his right was Suyo. Next to
Suyo was Brillantes. On the extreme right was Jaranilla.
While the truck was traversing the detour road near the Mandurriao
airport, then under construction, Gorriceta saw in the middle of the
road Patrolmen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro running
towards them. Gorriceta slowed down the truck after Patrolman
Jabatan had fired a warning shot and was signalling with his flashlight
that the truck should stop. Gorriceta stopped the truck near the
policeman. Jabatan approached the right side of the truck near
Jaranilla and ordered all the occupants of the truck to go down. They
Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it. Suyo did nothing.
Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The shooting
frightened Gorriceta. He immediately started the motor of the truck
and drove straight home to La Paz, another district of the city.
Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta's house.
Gorriceta parked the truck inside the garage. Jaranilla warned
Gorriceta not to tell anybody about the incident. Gorriceta went up to
his room. After a while, he heard policemen shouting his name and

asking him to come down. Instead of doing so, he hid in the ceiling. It
was only at about eight o'clock in the morning of the following day that
he decided to come down. His uncle had counselled him to surrender
to the police. The policemen took Gorriceta to their headquarters. He
Victorino Trespeces, whose house was located opposite the house of
Valentin Baylon on Taft Street in Mandurriao, testified that before
midnight of January 9, 1966, he conducted a friend in his car to the
housing project in the vicinity of the provincial hospital at Mandurriao.
As he neared his residence, he saw three men emerging from the
canal on Taft Street in front of Baylon's house. He noticed a red Ford
pickup truck parked about fifty yards from the place where he saw the
three men. Shortly thereafter, he espied the three men carrying
roosters. He immediately repaired to the police station at Mandurriao.
He reported to Patrol men Jabatan and Castro what he had just
witnessed. The two policemen requested him to take them in his car
to the place where he saw the three suspicious-looking men. Upon
arrival thereat, the men and the truck were not there anymore.
Trespeces and the policemen followed the truck speeding towards
Jaro. On reaching the detour road leading to the airport, the
policemen left the car and crossed the runway which was a shortcut.
Their objective was to intercept the truck. Trespeces turned his car
around in order to return to Mandurriao. At that moment he heard
gunshots. He stopped and again turned his car in the direction where
the shots had emanated. A few moments later, Patrolman Castro
came into view. He was running. He asked Trespeces for help
because Jabatan, his comrade, was wounded. Patrolman Castro and
Trespeces lifted Jabatan into the car and brought him to the hospital.
Doctor Raymundo L. Torres, the chief medico-legal officer of the Iloilo
City police department, conducted an autopsy on the remains of




(2)Bullet wound one centimeter in diameter, penetrating left anterior

axilla, directed diagonally downward to the right, perforating the left
Page 8 of 60

upper lobe of the lungs through and through, hitting the left pulmonary
artery and was recovered at the right thoracic cavity; both thoracic

There was no promulgation of the judgment as to Jaranilla, who, as

already stated, escaped from jail (See Sec. 6, Rule 120, Rules of

Cause of death: Shock, hemorrhage, secondary to bullet wound.

Valentin Baylon, the owner of the fighting cocks, returned home at
about six o'clock in the morning of January 10, 1966. He discovered
that the door of one of his cock pens or chicken coops (Exhs. A and A1) was broken. The feeding vessels were scattered on the ground.
Upon investigation he found that six of his fighting cocks were
missing. Each coop contained six cocks. The coop was made of
bamboo and wood with nipa roofing. Each coop had a door which was
locked by means of nails. The coops were located at the side of his
Baylon reported the loss to the police at Mandurriao. At about ten
o'clock, a group of detectives came to his house together with the
police photographer who took pictures of the chicken coops. The six
roosters were valued at one hundred pesos each. Two days later, he
was summoned to the police station at Mandurriao to identify a
rooster which was recovered somewhere at the airport. He readily
identified it as one of the six roosters which was stolen from his
Gorriceta, Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes were charged with robo con
homicidio with the aggravating circumstances of use of a motor
vehicle, nocturnity, band, contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities and recidivism. The fiscal utilized Gorriceta as a state
witness. Hence, the case was dismissed as to him.

However, the notice of appeal filed by defendants' counsel de oficio

erroneously included Jaranilla. Inasmuch as the judgment has not
been promulgated as to Jaranilla, he could not have appealed. His
appeal through counsel cannot be entertained. Only the appeals of
In convicting Suyo, Jaranilla and Brillantes of robo con homicidio, the
trial court assumed that the taking of the six fighting cocks was
robbery and that Patrolman Jabatan was killed "by reason or on the
occasion of the robbery" within the purview of article 294 of the
In this appeal the appellants contend that the trial court erred in not
finding that Gorriceta was the one who shot the policeman and that
Jaranilla was driving the Ford truck because Gorriceta was allegedly
drunk. Through their counsel de oficio, they further contend that the
taking of the roosters was theft and, alternatively, that, if It was
robbery, the crime could not be robbery with homicide because the
robbery was already consummated when Jabatan was killed.

On February 2, 1967, after the prosecution had rested its case and
before the defense had commenced the presentation of its evidence,
Jaranilla escaped from the provincial jail. The record does not show

After evaluating the testimonies of Gorriceta and Brillantes as to who

was driving the truck and who shot the policeman, this Court finds that
the trial court did not err in giving credence to Gorriceta's declaration
that he was driving the truck at the time that Jaranilla shot Jabatan.
The improbability of appellant's theory is manifest. The truck belonged
to Gorriceta's sister. He was responsible for its preservation. He had
the obligation to return it to his sister in the same condition when he
borrowed it. He was driving it when he saw Brillantes, Jaranilla and
Suyo and when he allegedly invited them for a paseo. There is no
indubitable proof that Jaranilla knows how to drive a truck.

The judgment of conviction was promulgated as to defendants Suyo

and Brillantes on October 19, 1967 when it was read to them in court.
They signed at the bottom of the last page of the decision.

The theory of the defense may be viewed from another angle. If,
according to the appellants, Gorriceta asked Jaranilla to drive the
truck because he (Gorriceta) was drunk, then that circumstance would


Page 9 of 60

be inconsistent with their theory that Gorriceta shot Jabatan. Being

supposedly, intoxicated, Gorriceta would have been dozing when
Jabatan signalled the driver to stop the truck and he could not have
thought of killing Jabatan in his inebriated state. He would not have
been able to shoot accurately at Jabatan. But the fact is that the first
shot hit Jabatan. So, the one who shot him must have been a sober
Moreover, as Jaranilla and his two comrades were interested in
concealing the fighting cocks, it was Jaranilla, not Gorriceta, who
would have the motive for shooting Jabatan. Consequently, the theory
that Gorriceta shot Jabatan and that Jaranilla was driving the truck
Was the taking of the roosters robbery or theft? There is no evidence
that in taking the six roosters from their coop or cages in the yard of
Baylon's house violence against or intimidation of persons was
employed. Hence, article 294 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
Neither could such taking fall under article 299 of the Revised Penal
Code which penalizes robbery in an inhabited house (casa habitada),
public building or edifice devoted to worship. The coop was not inside
Baylon's house. Nor was it a dependency thereof within the meaning
Having shown the inapplicability of articles 294 and 299, the next
inquiry is whether the taking of the six roosters is covered by article
"ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in private building. Any
robbery committed in an uninhabited place or in a building other than
those mentioned in the first Paragraph of article 299, if the value of
the property exceeds 250 pesos, shall be punished by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods provided that any of
1.If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended
2.If any wall, roof, floor or outside door or window has been broken.

3.If the entrance has beer. effected through the use of false keys,
4.If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or
5.If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, has been removed, even if the same be broken open



In this connection, it is relevant to note that there is an inaccuracy in

the English translation of article 302. The controlling Spanish original
"ART. 302.Robo en lugar no habitado o edificio particular. El roho
cometido en un lugar no habitado o en un edificio que no sea de los
comprendidos en el parrafo primero del articulo 299, . . ."(Tomo 26,
The term "lugar no habitado" is erroneously translated as "uninhabited
place", a term which may be confounded with the expression
"uninhabited place" in articles 295 and 300 of the Revised Penal
Code, which is the translation of despoblado and which is different
from the term lugar no habitado in article 302. The term lugar no
habitado is the antonym of casa habitada (inhabited house) in article
One essential requisite of robber with force upon things under articles
299 and 302 is that the malefactor should enter the building or
dependency where the object to be taken is found. Articles 299 and
302 clearly contemplate that the malefactor should enter the building
(casa habitada o lugar no habitado o edificio). If the culprit did not
enter the building, there would be no robbery with force upon things.
(See Albert, Revised Penal Code. 1932 edition, page 688).
Thus, where the accused broke the show-window of the Bombay
Palace Bazar at Rizal Avenue, Manila and removed forty watches
Page 10 of 60

therefrom, the crime was theft and not robbery because he did not
enter the building. The show-window was outside the store. (People
vs. Adorno, CA 40 O. G. 567, per Montemayor, J., who later became a
In the instant case, the chicken coop where the six roosters were
taken cannot be considered a building within the meaning of article
302. Not being a building, it cannot be said that the accused entered
the same in order to commit the robbery by means of any of the five
The term "building" in article 302, formerly 512 of the old Penal Code,
was construed as embracing any structure not mentioned in article
299 (meaning not an "inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship" or any dependency thereof) used for storage and
safekeeping of personal property. As thus construed, a freight car
used for the shipment of sugar was considered a private building. The
unnailing of a strip of cloth nailed over the door, the customary
manner of sealing a freight car, was held to constitute breaking by
force within the meaning of article 512, now article 302. (U.S. vs.
The ruling in the Magsino case is in conflict with the rulings of the
Supreme Court of Spain that a railroad employee who, by force,
opens a sealed or locked receptacle deposited in a freight car, does
not commit robbery He is guilty of theft because a railroad car is
neither a house nor a building within the meaning of article 302 which
corresponds to article 525 of the 1870 Spanish Penal Code. Article
302 refers to houses or buildings which, while not actually inhabited,
are habitable. Thus, a pig sty is not a building within the meaning of
article 302. The stealing of hogs from a pig sty is theft and not
robbery, although the culprit breaks into it. Article 302 refers to
habitable buildings. (Guevara, Revised Penal Code, 1939 Edition,
pages 555-6, citing II Hidalgo Codigo Penal 636-7, 642, which in turn
cites the decisions of the Spanish Supreme Court dated March 2,
As may be seen from the photographs (Exhs. A and A-1), Baylon's
coop, which is known in the dialect as tangkal or kulungan, is about
five yards long, one yard wide and one yard high. It has wooden stilts
and bamboo strips as bars. The coop barely reaches the shoulder of a

person of average height like Baylon. It is divided into six

compartments or cages. A compartment has an area of less than one
cubic yard. A person cannot be accommodated inside the cage or
compartment. It was not intended that a person should go inside that
compartment. The taking was effected by forcibly opening the cage
and putting the hands inside it to get the roosters.
Therefore, the taking of the six roosters from their coop should be
characterized as theft and not robbery. The assumption is that the
accused were animated by single criminal impulse. The conduct of the
accused reveals that they conspired to steal the roosters. The taking
is punishable as a single offense of theft. Thus, it was held that the
taking of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion
cannot give rise to two crimes of theft (People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil.
437, citing decision of Supreme Court of Spain dated July 13, 1894
and 36 C. J. 799; People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320; People vs.
Villanueva, 49 O.G. 5448, L-10239, August 7, 1953).
Nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle are aggravating. Those
circumstances facilitated the commission of the theft. The accused
intentionally sought the cover of night and used a motor vehicle so as
to insure the success of their nefarious enterprise (People vs. Tan, 89
Phil. 647, 660; People vs. Gardon, 104 Phil. 372).
Also to be appreciated against appellants Suyo and Brillantes is the
aggravating circumstance of recidivism which was alleged in, the
information. They admitted their previous convictions for theft (130,
132 tsn; Exhs. I and J; Art. 14[9], Revised Penal Code).
The theft of six roosters valued at six hundred pesos is punishable by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (Art. 309[3],
Revised Penal Code). That penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period because only aggravating circumstances are present
Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual
delinquents. They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2,
Page 11 of 60

With respect to the killing of Patrolman Jabatan, it has already been

noted that the evidence for the prosecution points to Jaranilla as the
malefactor who shot that unfortunate peace officer. The killing was
homicide because it was made on the spur of the moment. The
treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately
adopted by the offender (U.S. vs. Namit, 38 Phil. 926; People vs.
Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738; People vs. Abalos, 84 Phil. 771).

presence at the scene of the crime does not necessarily make a


The twenty-four year old Jabatan was an agent of authority on night

duty at the time of the shooting. He was wearing his uniform. The
killing should be characterized as a direct assault (atentado) upon an
agent of authority (Art. 148, Revised Penal Code) complexed with
homicide. The two offenses resulted from a single act. (Art. 48,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 307; People vs.

The instant case is different from People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568
where the victim was killed on the occasion when the accused took
his chickens under the house. It is distinguishable from the People vs.
Gardon, 104 Phil. 372 and People vs. Salamudin No. 1, 52 Phil. 670
(both cited by the Solicitor General) where the robbery was clearly
proven and the homicide was perpetrated on the occasion of the
robbery. As already noted, theft, not robbery, was committed in this

The evidence for the prosecution does not prove any conspiracy on
the part of appellants Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes to kill Jabatan.
They conspired to steal the fighting cocks. The conspiracy is shown
by the manner in which they perpetrated the theft. They went to the
scene of the crime together. They left the yard of Baylon's residence,
each carrying two roosters. They all boarded the getaway truck driven
The theft was consummated when the culprits were able to take
possession of the roosters. It is not an indispensable element of theft
that the thief carry, more or less far away, the thing taken by him from
its owner (People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665; Duran vs. Tan, 85 Phil.
It is not reasonable to assume that the killing of any peace officer, who
would forestall the theft or frustrate appellants' desire to enjoy the
fruits of the crime, was part of their plan. There is no evidence to link
appellants Suyo and Brillantes to the killing of Jabatan, except the
circumstance that they were with Jaranilla in the truck when the latter
shot the policeman. Gorriceta testified that Suyo did not do anything
when Jabatan approached the right side of the truck and came in
close proximity to Jaranilla who was on the extreme right. Brillantes
pulled his revolver which he did not fire (47, 53-55 tsn). Mere

Jaranilla heard Gorriceta's testimony that he (Jaranilla) shot Jabatan.

Instead of taking the witness stand to refute the testimony of
Gorriceta, Jaranilla escaped from jail. That circumstance is an

The situation in this case bears some analogy to that found in the
People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493 where the homicide committed by a
member of the band was not a part of the common plan to commit
robbery. Hence, only the person who perpetrated the killing was liable
for robbery with homicide. The others were convicted of robbery only.
There is a hiatus in the evidence of the prosecution as to the
participation of Suyo and Brillantes in the killing of Jabatan by
Jaranilla. As already stated, no robbery with homicide was committed.
Therefore, it cannot be concluded that those two appellants have any
responsibility for Jabatan's death. Their complicity in the homicide
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court convicting appellants
Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes of robbery with homicide is
reversed. They are acquitted of homicide on the ground of reasonable
As coprincipals with Elias Jaranilla in the theft of the six fighting cocks,
they are (a) each sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6)
months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as maximum and (b) ordered to
Page 12 of 60

indemnify solidarily the complainant, Valentin Baylon, in the sum of

five hundred pesos (P500). Each appellant should pay one-third of the
As to the liability of Elias Jaranilla for theft and homicide, with direct
assault upon an agent of authority, the trial court should render a new
judgment consistent with this opinion (See Sec. 19, Art. IV,


Separation of Powers, Power of Judicial Review, Suspension by the
Sandiganbayan, Suspension by the Senate

1. The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed

to have effectively excluded members of Congress from Republic Act
No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.

2. The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and

independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive
prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and
effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.

A complaint was filed by employees of the Commission of Immigration
and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner, then Commissioner of
the CID. They alleged that the petitioner gave unwarranted benefits to
several aliens by approving the applications for legalization of stay of
aliens which were disqualified from having their stay in the Philippines
legalized by Executive Order No. 324. This resulted in the filing of
criminal charges against the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan.
The latter then issued a warrant for her arrest and set the amount for
her bail. The petitioner posted bain, and was thus released. After
several motions were filed, the prosecution filed a motion requesting
the Sandiganbayan to issue a suspension order against the petitioner.
This was granted for a period of 90 days. Thus, the petitioner filed a
petition before the Supreme Court questioning the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to suspend a Senator from any government position
for a period of 90 days.



6. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the

Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal mandate
of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more

Separation of Powers




3. The provision allowing the Court to look into any possible grave
abuse of discretion committed by any government instrumentality has
evidently been couched in general terms in order to make it malleable
to judicial interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu.
4. If any part of the Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must
promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.




5. Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the
members of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not
err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

Page 13 of 60

than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the

suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.
7. Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public
officer concerned must be suspended only in the office where he is
alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged.

The rape victim jumped from a window of her house to escape

from the accused; as a result, she suffered serious physical
injuries specifically a broken vertebra which required medical
attention and surgery for more than ninety days. Here, the rape
was complexed with the crime of serious physical injuries, in
accordance with the settled principle that a person who creates in
anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the
latter to try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries the other
person may consequently suffer.

8. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is

distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under
the Constitution.
Suspension by the Senate
9. The suspension contemplated in the constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring
member. This is distinct from the suspension provided under RA 3019,
which is a mere preventive suspension.


The series of acts committed against the seven (7) lot buyers were
not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or
deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different dates and in
separate places, hence, they originated from separate criminal intents
and consequently resulted in separate felonies.




At around 7:00 pm, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday,
Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree. They
noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his
companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a grenade, exploded
ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy
Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by
shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed
to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical
treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the
RULING: Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the
elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual
cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act
Page 14 of 60

is required. A conspiracy must be established by positive and

conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a
person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for
The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not
have any participation in the commission of the crime and must
therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime
as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to
establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in
furtherance of the crime. Neither was it proven that their act of running
away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his
criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that their presence
provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio, is devoid
of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on
record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be
better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime
charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not
commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must
Under the Article 48 (complex crimes), when a single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying
circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of
treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the
maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The
trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty.
Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with
Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
death. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano are
ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they
are hereby ordered immediately RELEASED from confinement unless
they are lawfully held in custody for another cause.

him a conspirator






Murder with multiple frustrated murder. Mere presence

of a person at the scene of the crime does not make

Page 15 of 60


34. PEOPLE v. GENOSA\ People of the
Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa
FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his
wife Marivic Genosa, appellant herein. During their first year of
marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but apparently thereafter,
Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes
their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her
husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and sometimes
beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical
doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing,
appellant and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the
appellant. However, appellant was able to run to another room.
Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged
that the cause of death of the victim was by beating through the
use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and defense of
her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an
URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court
allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of
the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by
qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the
inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial reopening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said

psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly granted

the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the
case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or
psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome plea.
Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman
syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and
admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the battered
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to
prove that she is afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is
repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include
wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any
woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man
once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation,
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized
by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases: (1) the
tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of selfdefense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of
the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant
and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the
Page 16 of 60

battered persons mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from

her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in
order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer
must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual
-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence
perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these
circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under
the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of
violence supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and
Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but
appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in
the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did
appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does
not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of selfdefense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who
resorts to self-defense must face a real threat on ones life; and the
peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the
following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful
aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense.
It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an
imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the
present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic
herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful
aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already
been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his
attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the

danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a

position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and
obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be
clarified that these two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as
well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the
severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon
appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an
illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and
obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when
a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of
passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To appreciate this
circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and (2) this act is not far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery
must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally
axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument
or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been
forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.
Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and
deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by
Page 17 of 60

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have

naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she
suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite
of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and
mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for
parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating
circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the
penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal
as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained for more
than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from
custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A.
9262, otherwise known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that
"xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal"


37. U.S. v. TANEDO

accused went on his way to hunt for wild chickens, meeting the
victim, Feliciano Sanchez, the latter's Mother & Uncle. The
accused went into the forest upon the recommendation of the
deceased to continue his search for the elusive wild chickens.
Upon seeing one, Tanedo shot one, but simultaneously, he heard
a human cry out in pain. After seeing that Sanchez was
wounded, Tanedo ran back to his workers and asked one,
Bernardino Tagampa, to help him hide the body, which they did
by putting it amidst the tall cogon grass, & later burying in an old
well. Only 1 shot was heard that morning & a chicken was killed
by a gunshot wound. Chicken feathers were found at the scene
of the crime. There was no enmity between the accused and the
deceased. Prior to the trial, the accused denied all knowledge of
the crime, but later confessed during the trial. The lower court
found the accused guilty of homicide, having invited the
deceased into the forest & intentionally shooting him in the chest.
Accused was sentenced to 14 yrs, 8 mos & 1 day of reclusion
temporal, accessories, indemnifications & costs. The accused
Issue: WON the accused is guilty

Held: No. The idea that Tanedo intended to kill Sanchez is

negated by the fact that the chicken and the man were shot at the
same time, there having only one shot fired. Also, according to:

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Tarlac

Facts: On January 26, 1909, Cecilio Tanedo, a landowner, went

with some workers to work on the dam on his land, carrying with
him his shotgun & a few shells. Upon reaching the dam, the


Article 1 of the Penal Code: Crimes or misdemeanors are

voluntary acts and omissions punished by law
Article 8: He who while performing a legal act with due
care, causes some injury by mere accident without liability or
intention of causing it.
Page 18 of 60

Section 57 of Code of Criminal Procedure: A defendant in

a criminal action shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt that his
guilt is satisfactorily shown he shall be entitled to an acquittal.


Nature: Appeal from a decision of RTC of Quezon City

In this case there is no evidence of negligence on the part of the

accused, nor is it disputed that the accused was engaged in a
legal act, nor is there evidence that the accused intended to kill
the deceased. The only thing suspicious is his denial of the act
and his concealment of the body.

The court quoted State vs. Legg: "Where accidental killing is

relied upon as a defense, the accused is not required to prove
such a defense by a preponderance of the evidence, because
there is a denial of intentional killing, and the burden is upon the
state to show that it was intentional, and if, from a consideration
of all the evidence, both that for the state and the prisoner, there
is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the killing was
accidental or intentional, the jury should acquit."

Court held that the evidence was insufficient to support the

judgment of conviction.

Decision: Judgment of Conviction is reversed, the accused

acquitted, and discharged from custody.



Around 1AM on May 5, 1993, Eulogio Velasco, flr manager

of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, was sitting outside the pub
while talking w/ his co-worker. Soon, their customer Tony
Dometita came out of the pub and informed him that hell be
on his way home. However, when he was about an arms
length from Eulogio, appellant Robert Castillo came out from
nowhere and suddenly and w/o warning stabbed Tony w/ a
fan knife on his left chest. As Tony pleaded for help,
appellant stabbed him once more, hitting him on the left
hand. Eulogio placed a chair between the two to stop Castillo
from further attacking Tony.
Tony ran away but appellant pursued him. Eulogio came to
know later that Tony had died. His body was found outside the
fence of Iglesia ni Cristo, EDSA. Medico-legal officer testified
that the proximate cause of Tonys death was the stab wound
on his chest.
Appellant Robert Castillo claims that decedent Tony was
attacked by 2 malefactors as testified by one Edilberto
Marcelino, a tricycle driver, who saw men ganging up on Tony
by the compound of Iglesia ni Cristo.
TC did not appreciate Castillos defense of alibi and held that
the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, the
accused having surprised and attacked w/ a deadly weapon.
And although treachery was present, it also held that this was
absorbed by abuse of superior strength.
Appellant contends that the TC showed its prejudice against
him by asking questions that were well w/in the prosecution
to explore and ask.
Page 19 of 60

HELD: Appellant Castillo is guilty of murder for the death of

Antonio Dometita. The allegation of bias & prejudice isnt welltaken. It is a judges prerogative & duty to ask clarificatory
question to ferret out the truth. The propriety of a judges queries
is determined not necessarily by their quantity but by their quality
& in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was
prejudiced by such questioning.
The prosecution was unable to prove the aggr circumstance of
evident premeditation. However, SC held that the killing was
not qualified by abuse of superior strength, contrary to TCs
ruling. The prosecution did not demonstrate that there was a
marked difference in the stature and build of the victim and the
appellant w/c would have precluded an appropriate defense
from the victim.
However, the killing was qualified by treachery. Treachery is
committed when 2 conditions concur: (1) means, methods and
forms of execution employed left the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (2) that such
means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused w/o danger to his person.
These requisites were evidently present when the accused
appeared from nowhere and swiftly and unexpectedly stabbed
the victim just as he was bidding goodbye to his friend. The
action rendered it difficult for the victim to defend himself. The
presence of defense wounds does not negate treachery
because the first stab, fatal as it was, was inflicted on the chest
and hence, rendered Tony defenseless.
Appeal denied, assailed decision affirmed. Award of indemnity
to the heirs of Castillo in the amount of PhP50K.


Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Oriental Misamis

Facts: One morning, Valentin Aguilar saw his neighbor, Josefina

Bandian, got to a thicket apparently to respond to the call of nature.
Few minutes later, Bandian emerged from the thicket with her clothes
stained with blood both in the front and back, staggering and visibly
showing signs of not being able to support herself. Rushing to her aid,
he brought her to her house and placed her on the bed. He called on
Adriano Comcom to help them Comcom saw he body of a newborn
babe near a path adjoining the thicket where the appellant had gone a
few moments before. She claimed it was hers. Dr. Emilio
Nepomuceno declared that the appellant gave birth in her own house
and three her child into the thicket to kill it. The trial court gave credit
to this opinion.

Issue: WON Bandian is guilty of infanticide

Held: No. Infanticide and abandonment of a minor, to be punishable,

must be committed willfully or consciously, or at least it must be the
result of a voluntary, conscious and free act or omission. The
evidence does not show that the appellant, in causing her childs
death in one way or another, or in abandoning it in the thicket, did so
willfully, consciously or imprudently. She had no cause to kill or
abandon it, to expose it to death, because her affair with a former
lover, which was not unknown to her second lover, Kirol, took place
three years before the incident; her married life with Kirolshe
considers him her husband as he considers him his wifebegan a
Page 20 of 60

year ago; as he so testified at the trial, he knew of the pregnancy and

that it was his and that theyve been eagerly awaiting the birth of the
child. The appellant, thus, had no cause to be ashamed o her
pregnancy to Kirol.

Acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. While the version of the

defense is not entirely satisfactory, as in any criminal prosecution,
conviction must rest on proof beyond reasonable doubt. The State
must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the

Apparently, she was not aware of her childbirth, or if she was, it did
not occur to her or she was unable, due to her debility or dizziness,
which cause may be considered lawful or insuperable to constitute the
7th exempting circumstance, to take her child from the thicket where
she had given it birth, so as not to leave it abandoned and exposed to
the danger of losing its life. If by going into the thicket to pee, she
caused a wrong as that of giving birth to her child in that same place
and later abandoning it, not because of imprudence or any other
reason than that she was overcome by strong dizziness and extreme
debility, she could not be blamed because it all happened by mere
accident, with no fault or intention on her part. The law exempts from
liability any person who so acts and behaves under such
circumstances (RPC A12(4)). Thus, having the fourth and seventh
exempting circumstances in her favor, she is acquitted of the crime
that she had been accused of.

weakness of the evidence of the defense. Force and intimidation not


44. Valcesar Estioca vs. People of

PhilippinesGR 173876 (June 27, 2008)

proven. Supposed victims actuations before and during the alleged

sexual assault did not show the kind of resistance expected of a
young woman defending her virtue and honor. A much more vigorous
opposition to the assault on her virtue is only to be expected of an
inexperienced victim on the threshold of womanhood.
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According to the prosecution, accused entered the secluded house of

his 14 year old cousin who was alone in the house. He held a bolo to
her body and succeeded in raping her. She said nothing until her
mother noticed her swelling belly and it was determined that she was
pregnant. Accused put up the defense of denial and alibi.

A number of persons were accused of conspiring and robbing an
elementary school. Oneof which is Boniao who was 14 years old at
thetime of the commission of the crime. They werefound guilty by the
lower court. When the case wasappealed to the CA, RA 9344 took
effect and Boniaowas acquitted since he was a minor at the time
of the crime but without prejudice to his civil liability.Custody was
given to his parents.
Page 21 of 60

Please refer to syllabus for HELD.


GR No. 151085August 20, 2008
The petitioner, Joemar Ortega, who was then 14 years old, was charged with the
crime of rape for allegedly raping AAA, who was about 8 years old. That the rape
happened in 3 occasions, the first one happened sometime August 1999, when
AAA s mother left her in the care of the petitioner s mother, Luzviminda. That
the petitioner woke up AAA and led her in the sala and raped her. The
second occasion happened the next day when the petitioner led AAA into the
bathroom and raped her there. Inall the instances, petitioner warned AAA to
not tell her parents or he will spank her. The third and last time
happened in the house of AAA, where her brother caught her and the petitioner
naked waist down and having intercourse. The brother then told the incident to his
mother. MMM testified that when sheasked AAA what happened, AAA told her that
petitioner inserted his fingers and penis into her vagina. And when MMM examined
the private part of her daughter, she noticed that it was reddish and whitefluid was
coming out of it. MMM called Luzviminda and confronted her about
what happened. Luzviminda then demanded that AAA should be brought to a
doctor for examination. The Rural Health Officer, however, did not find any indication
that AAA was molested. Subsequently, the two families reached an amicable
settlement that requires the petitioner to depart from their house and
stay with ac ertain priest. However, a year later, the family of AAA charged the
petitioner with 3 counts of rape, inwhich the petitioner plead not guilty. The
RTC ruled that the petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt in the
crime of rape and is sentenced to reclusion temporal. The CA affirmed the ruling
of the trial court. During the pendency of the case in the SC, RA 9344 Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act was enacted that establishes a comprehensive system to
manage children in conflict with the law. At the case at bar, because the petitioner was
a minor under 15 years of age at the commission of the crime, he can be relieved
from criminal liability.
Whether or not the petitioner can avail exempting circumstance provided by the
newly enacted law on minors in conflict with law.
RATIO: The petitioner can avail the exempting circumstance that will relieve him
from criminal liability because the law enacted was favorable to the accused, and is
therefore retroactive in application. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act provides that a

child under 15 years of age in the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability, but is subject to an intervention program. Exemption from criminal
liability, however, does not include exemption from civil liability. Section 64 of the newly
enacted law also provides that cases of children under 15 years of age at the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child
shall be referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officer. The Court therefore held that the case against
Joemar Ortega is hereby DISMISSED. Petitioner is hereby referred to the
local social welfare and development officer of the locality for the appropriate
intervention program.


JAURIGUEC.A. No. 384 February 21,
1946Ponencia, De Joya

Avelina Jaurigue and Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, were prosecuted

for the crime of murder for which Nicolas wasacquitted while Avelina
was found guilty of homicide. She appealed to the Court of Appeals
for Southern Luzon onJune 10, 1944 to completely absolve her of all
criminal responsibility for having acted in defense of her honor, to find
inher favour additional mitigating circumstances and omit aggravating

At about 8:00 PM of September 20, 1942, Amado Capina, deceased

victim, went to the chapel of Seventh DayAdventists to attend
religious services and sat at the front bench facing the altar. Avelina
Jaurigue entered the chapelshortly after the arrival of her father for the
same purpose and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the
door.Upon seeing Avelina, Amado went and sat by Avelinas right side
from his seat on the other side of the chapel, and without saying a
word, placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.

Avelina Jaurigue, therafter, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife
which she had in a pocket of her dress with theintention of punishing
Page 22 of 60

Amados offending hand. Amado seized her right hand but she quickly
grabbed the knife on herleft hand and stabbed Amado once at the
base of the left side of the neck inflicting upon him a wound about 4
inchesdeep, which is mortal.

Nicolas saw Capina bleeding and staggering towards the altar, and
upon seeing his daughter approached her andasked her the reason
for her action to which Avelina replied, Father, I could not endure

Amado Capina died a few minutes after. Barrio lieutenant, Casimiro

Lozada was there and Avelina surrenderedherself. Lozada advised
the Jaurigues to go home immediately for fear of retaliation of
Capinas relatives.EVENTS PRIOR:

One month before that fatal night, Amado Capina snatched Avelinas
handkerchief bearing her nickname while it was washed by her
cousin, Josefa Tapay.

7 days prior to incident (September 13, 1942), Amado approached her

and professed his love for her which wasrefused, and thereupon
suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts. She
then slapped him, gave himfist blows and kicked him. She informed
her matter about it and since then, she armed herself with a long fan
knife whenever she went out.

2 days after (September 15, 1942), Amado climbed up the house of

Avelina and entered the room where she wassleeping. She felt her
forehead and she immediately screamed for help which awakened her
parents and brought themto her side. Amado came out from where he
had hidden and kissed the hand of Avelinas father, Nicolas.

Avelina received information in the morning and again at 5:00 PM on

the day of the incident (September 20, 1942) thatAmado had been
falsely boasting in the neighbourhood of having taken liberties with
her person. In the evening,Amado had been courting the latter in


Whether or not the defendant should be completely absolved of all

criminal responsibility because she is justified inhaving acted in the
legitimate defense of her honor.

Whether or not the Court should find the additional mitigating

circumstances of voluntary surrender, presence ofprovocation and
absence of intent in her favour
Whether or not committing said offense in a sacred place is an
aggravating circumstance in this caseHELD:
Conviction of defendant is sustained and cannot be declared
completely exempt from criminal liability. To be entitled toa complete
self-defense of chastity, there must be an attempt to rape. To provide
for a justifying circumstance of self


Phil. 201 (1917)]
November 10, 2010
Facts: During a fiesta, an old man 70 years of age asked the
deceased, Patobo, for some roast pig. In the presence of many
guests, the deceased insulted the old man, saying: There is no more.
Come here and I will make roast pig of you. A little later, while the
deceased was squatting down, the old man came up behind him and
struck him on the head with an ax.Held: While it may be mere trifle to
an average person, it evidently was a serious matter to an old man, to
be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. The
accused was given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense. In this case, the age of the accused
and the place were considered in determining the gravity of the

Page 23 of 60

49. People vs. Benito

48. People vs. Ignas
- 1995 Ignass wife, Wilma Ignas, admitted to having an affair with Lopate.
Afterwards, she went to Taiwan to domestic helper and instructed friend, romenda, to
disclose to husband her extra-marital affair.
- Feb 1996 Romenda revealed the truth to Ignas
- March 10, 1996 when Sanggino was said to kill Nemesio Lopate Agno with a cal
38 that was also of illegal possession. Lopate died by Hypovelemia due to gunshot
wound. - While accused through testimony of Arthur Bomagao,admitted to murder, he
amended this by saying that he was with partner and fellow baker, Ben Anoma the
entire time to which Ben also testified
- Trial court disbelieved this and still found Ignas guilty and charged with Reclusion
Perpetua. Prosecution sought the imposition of the death penalty and which was
granted by trial court through lethal injection.
(1) WON Sanggino was rightly charged with murder
(2) WON special aggravating circumstance of unlicensed firearm is present
(1) NO
- Sanggino was only charged in the original information with unlawful killing and not
murder. Amended information did not also state that any aggravating or qualifying
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and nocturnity were present.
- As 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is to be given effect since it is
favorable to the accused, since no aggravating circumstances were stated in the
informations, Sanggino may only be charged wit homicide under RPC 249.
(2) NO
- elements: (1) existence of subject firearm(2) accused who owned the firearm does
not have the license to possess it.
- Special aggravating circumstance of possession of unlicensed firearm should also
be sufficiently proven. In this case, prosecution did not present any evidence that he
is not a licensed holder of a .38 caliber handgun
o (X) certification from PNP firearms and explosives division that he has no permit
o (X) no officer as witness.

RESULT: Absent any aggravating circumstance, Sanggion is charged with



People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Alberto Benito y Restubog, accusedappelant; motion for reconsideration filed by accused to entitle him to the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense and to disregard the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank.
Date: 1976
Alberto Benito, working as Clerk I, Cash Section, Administrative Division of the Civil
Service Commission was charged with dishonesty and malversation of public funds
amounting to approximately Php 5,000. Charges against him was instigated on
October 21, 1965 by the victim Pedro Moncayo, working as Assistant Chief of the
Personnel Transactions Division and Acting Chief, Administrative Division, and
Benitos superior officer. Benito admitted to CSC Deputy Commissioner Buenaventura
that he had misappropriated his collections and spent the amount in nightclubs and
pleasure spots and for personal purposes.
On November 1965, accused Benito was suspended from office for the charge of
dishonesty. After two months Benito was reinstated but was criminally charged
for qualified theft, malversation of public funds, estafa, and falsification of public
documents, and administratively charged for dishonesty, culminating in his
dismissal from the CSC on February 1966. Benito filed appeal and later on
denied charges against him, despite previous confession

On December 11, 1969, suspect Benito went to the CSC compound

and requested victim Moncayo to help him in his case (he meant to
ask Moncayo to change his report to favor suspects case). The victim
uttered to the suspect, umalis ka nga diyan baka may mangyari pa sa
iyo at baka ipayari kita dito. Suspect Benito left the compound and
returned the following day, December 12, at 11:00. When they met
again, victim Moncayo remarked in the presence of their common
officemates, nagiistambay pala ditto ang magnanakaw. Suspect
Benito, humiliated, left the scene.
At about 5:25 of the same day, December 12, suspect who was
armed with an unlicensed Cal. 22 black revolver loaded with 9 live
Cal. 22 bullets in its cylinder, waited for the victim outside of the CSC
compound. Victim drove his green Chevrolet 2 door car (with plate
number L-10578 Mla. 69) along P. Paredes Street. Suspect with
Page 24 of 60

evident premeditation, surreptitiously followed the victim and when the

latters car was at a full stop due to heavy traffic, suspect shot the
victim 8 times on the head and different parts of the body at close
range causing his death. Suspect then called MPD (Manila Police
District?) Headquarters and voluntarily surrendered and admitted the
Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila
after pleading guilty to the charge of murder of Moncayo, aggravated
by premeditation and disregard of rank, mitigated by the plea of guilty.
After a mandatory review of the death sentence, the Supreme Court
appreciated in Benitos favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender and penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Benito filed a motion for reconsideration to entitle him to the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, and that the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should not be
appreciated against him. Benito contends that Moncayos insulting
remark that a thief was loitering in the premises of the CSC was
tantamount to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt into a
raw wound. He also contends that there was no evidence that he
deliberately intended to offend or insult the rank of Moncayo.
1. W/N Benito is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense. NO.
2. W/N the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should not
be held against Benito. NO.
1. The mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense can
be appreciated where a 6-hour interval transpired between the
alleged grave offense (Moncayos insult against Benito) and the
assassination. There was more than sufficient time to enable
Benito to recover his serenity, but instead of using the time to
regain his composure, he evolved the plan to liquidate victim.
Suspect acted with premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded
2. It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of
the CSC and that the killer was a clerk in the same office, and the
suspect resented the charges instigated against him by the victim.



Phil. 217 (1909)]
November 10, 2010
Facts: For about 5 years, the accused and the deceased lived illicitly
in the manner of husband and wife. Afterwards, the deceased
separated from the accused and lived with another man. The accused
enraged by such conduct, killed the deceased.
Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation
because of jealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot be
considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal
responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate from
legitimate feelings, and not those which arise from vicious, unworthy
and immoral passions.
- 1902- 1905 Augustus Hicks and Augstina Sola were illicitly living together
- Dec 1907 Augustina left Hicks for Wallace Current
- Dec 21 1907 Hicks visited Current and Sola at their home. Hicks after exchanging
words with Current then shot
ISSUE: WON passion/obfuscation is present as mitigating circumstance
- Passion must arise from lawful feelings which jealousy is not. Jealousy arises from
vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
There was evident pre-meditation and reflection to carry out the crime thus couldnt
have been a crime of passion or obfuscation. He looked composed and tranquil when
he committed the crime.

51. CASE DIGEST ON U.S. v. DELA CRUZ [22 Phil. 429 (1912)]
November 10, 2010
Facts: The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his common-law
wife upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a
common acquaintance.
Page 25 of 60

Held: In this a case, the accused was entitled to the mitigating

circumstance of passion or obfuscation. The facts in this case must
be distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where it was found
that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection resolved to kill
the woman who had left him for another man. With a clean and wellprepared weapon, he enetered the house, disguising his intention and
calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order
to successfully accomplish his criminal design. In this case, the cause
of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the accused was his
vexation, disappointment and anger engendered by the refusal of
the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she
had a perfect right to do. In the present case, however, the impulse
was caused by the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and
his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another.
Judgment: Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was
marked with the extenuating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8 mos and 1 day of
reclusion temporal to 12 yrs and 1 day of reclusion temporal.

52. People vs. Rabao

53. People vs. Dawaton

GR No. 1446247. September 17, 2002.

I. Facts:
.:Esmeraldo Cortez was inviting over guests to his house on
September 20, 1998. His brother-in-law Edgar Dawaton and
Leonides Lavares arrived at 12:00 noon. Domingo Reyes
arrivedshortly thereafter. The group, all of which are residents of Sitio
Garden, Brgy. Paltic, Dingalan, Aurora,started drinking. Came 3:00
pm, they decided to transfer to the house of Edgar Dawaton's uncle
Amadoafter the group has finished four bottles of gin.Upon arriving at
the elder Dawaton's house, they proceeded at the balcony and
continued their drinking spree there. The elder Dawaton was not
home at the time of their session. Leonides, due to hisdrunkenness,
opted to sleep on the
or wooden bench on the balcony area, as the three continueddrinking
until they finished another bottle of gin.At around 3:30 pm, Edgar
stood up and left for his house. He went back with a
stainless knifer a n g i n g 2 - 3 i n c h e s i n l e n g t h , a n d u s e d i t
to stab the sleeping Leonides near the base of his
n e c k . Awakened by the sudden attack, Leonides was distraught of
his companion's deed against him. Edgar gave him another stab on
the upper part of his neck, spilling blood on the arm of
Leonides.Leonides tried to escape for his life, but the bigger
Edgar grabbed him from the collar of hisshirt and stabbed
him multiple times. Leonides still managed to move 20
meters away from the elder Dawaton's house, but he dropped in
front of the Cortez residence. From that point, Edgar
continuouslystabbed him until Leonides expired. After the incident, he
fled to the house of his uncle Carlito Baras,w h e r e h e w a s
arrested by the authorities, who found him when
p e o p l e s u r r o u n d i n g t h e b o d y o f Leonides pointed them to
Edgar's whereabouts.Domingo and Esmeraldo was shocked by
the incident. Both failed to convince Edgar to stop stabbing
Leonides, yet they were not able to help the poor victim.
II. Issues
1.Whether or not the sentence of the trial court charging
by treachery is
Page 26 of 60

valid.2 . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e a c c o u n t o f D a w a t o n o n
t h e commission of the murder, is valid.
III. Holding
1.Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the trial
court, with a few modifications on the penalty2 . N o . T h e r e
was no evidence to prove that account, as
s a i d b y D o m i n g o a n d E s m e r a l d o themselves.
54. People vs. Viernes



55. People vs. Abolidor


56. People v. Caliso, 58 Phil. 283



If the accused raped a girl who was entrusted to his care by the
parents, there is betrayal of confidence reposed upon him by the
parents but not an abuse of the confidence of the offended party
(People v. Crumb, 46 OG 6162) since the confidence between the
parties must be personal. But if the offender was the servant of the
family and sometimes took care of the child, whom she later killed,
there is present grave abuse of confidence. (People v. Caliso, 58 Phil.

57. People vs. Lora

58. People vs. Laguardia
59. People vs. Zeta
60. People vs. Barcela







Page 27 of 60

Coming out of Cola Pubhouse along EDSA, Antonio Tony Dometita was
waving goodbye to his friend Leo Velasco (friend and floor manager of the
pubhouse) when accused Robert Castillo suddenly appeared and without
warning stabbed Tony with a fan knife on his left chest. Tony pleaded for help
only to be stabbed once more by the accused on his left hand. Leo helped
Tony thus he was able to run towards the other side of EDSA, the accused
still pursuing him. Tony was later on found dead in front of the INC
Compound in EDSA QC. Tony suffered stab wounds, as well as incised
wounds and abrasions, indicating that he tried resisting the attacks.
RTC ruled that the accused was guilty of murder qualified by the abuse of
superior strength. The court also found treachery but treated it as absorbed
by the qualifier abuse of superior strength as both cannot be separately
appreciated for the same crime.

1. WON Castillo was guilty of murder
2. WON abuse of superior strength and TREACHERY have
been properly appreciated by the RTC.
1. Yes. Court gave credence to the testimony of Leo Velasco.
2. As to abuse of superior strength, NO. As to TREACHERY, YES.
The accused was not proven to have purposely used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the victim.
The murder was qualified by the circumstance of TREACHERY. The two
conditions that make up treachery which are:
1. The means, methods, and forms of execution employed gave the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate;
2. Such means, methods, and forms of execution were consciously and
deliberately adopted by the accused without danger to himself.
Here, the accused suddenly appeared and unexpectedly stabbed Dometita
just as he was saying goodbye to his friend. Said action proved that the
victim was not in the position to defend himself. The presence of defense
wounds does not negate treachery because the first stab was proven to be
the primary cause of death. During the first fatal stab, the victim was
defenseless and unaware of the threat to his life, and during the time that he
was defending himself, he already had a fatal wound in his chest, rendering
him defenseless.



On February 20, 1992, Jeanette Yanson Dumancas was swindled in a

fake gold bar transaction losing P352,000 to Danilo Lumangyao and
Rufino Gargar, Jr.
On Aug. 5, 1992 10:30 AM Mario Lamis, Dominador Geroche,
Rolando Fernandez, Jaime Gargallano, Edwin Divinagracia, Teody
Delgado, Moises Grandeza were planning to abduct Lumangyao &
Gargar Jr. because they swindled the Dumancas family. Col Nicolas
Torres was also informed of the plan of the group.
On August 6, 1992, Jeannette investigated the two abducted and
told the group of Geroche to take care of the two.
On Aug 7, 1992, Gargallano shot Gargar while Geroche shot
Lumangyao. Then the 2 bodies were buried by Pecha & Hilado.
The RTC found the following guilty of:
o Principals by Induction: Jeanette Yanson Dumancas
o Principals by Induction and by Direct Participation and/or
Indispensable Cooperation: Police Col. Nicolas M. Torres
o Principals by Participation:
Police Inspector Adonis C. Abeto
Police Officer Mario Lamis Y Fernandez, Dominador Geroche Y
Mahusay, Jaime Gargallano, Rolando R. Fernandez, Edwin
Divinagracia, Teody Delgado
o Principals by Participation: Cesar Pecha & Edgar Hilado
1. WON Charles Dumancas and Jeannette Yanson Dumancas can
be considered principals by induction?
NO. Jeanette Yanson Dumancas is not guilty as principals by
induction because there are not other evidence that can prove the
shes guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Article 17. Principals The following are considered principals:
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the acts.
2. Those who directly force or induce other to commit it;
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another
act without which it would not have been accomplished.
There are 2 ways of directly forcing another to commit a crime,
namely: (1) by using irresistible force or (2) by causing uncontrollable
fear. Likewise there are two ways of inducing another to commit a
crime, namely: (1) by giving a price or offering reward or promise and
Page 28 of 60

(2) by using works of command. All of the factors arent admissible to

Jeanette. The only evidence that may be considered is the word to
take care of the two w/c may constitute words of command.
Evidenced should the Jeanette meant the to take care of the two is
to allow the law to its course upon cross examination of Moises
Grandeza. This also raises some doubt of what the interpretation of
the phrase. Thus it cannot be concluded since it cannot be concluded
that there is command to kill the victims beyond reasonable by the
vague phase itself.
2. WON Police Inspector Adonis Abeto can be considered
principals by participation?
NO. Police Inspector Adonis Abeto participation was to serve a
search warrant on Helen Tortocios residence (person which Gargar
and Lumangyao told the police officers where the money might have
gone) and that subsequently interrogated Gargar and Lumangyao.

the executor/administrator of the estate of the accused, depending on

the source of obligation upon w/c the same is based as explained
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right
to file a separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action & prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such
case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably w/
provisions of CC A1155, that should thereby avoid any apprehension
on possible privation of right by prescription.



WON Police Col Nicolas M. Torres can be considered principals

by induction?
NO. Police Col Nicolas M. Torres should have been criminally liable
but since his death the criminal liability is extinguished but the civil
liability still subsists.
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused
prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. CC A1157 enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result
of the same act or omission: (a) Law, (b)
Contracts, (c) Quasi-contracts, and (d) Quasi-delicts
Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to 1, 1985 RCP 111, as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against

All were guilty as principals by direct participation, as all 5

accused shot at the victim even if only one shot was fatal,


75. People of the Philippines vs. Allen
Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,

Suspension of sentence; minority. The appellant was 17 years old

when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was
committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation
of the RTCs Decision. It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on
Page 29 of 60

May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision on this case on
September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor. In
People v. Sarcia (G.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, 599 SCRA
20), it was held that while Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that
suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict
with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time
of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law
limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the
maximum age of 21. Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the
age of 21 years can no longer avail of the provisions of Sections 38
and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because this
has already become moot and academic. People of the Philippines
vs. Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011.


G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
FACTS: Eight (8) Informations were filed within the period 21 August 2000 to
23 February 2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon
against Alfredo Bon (appellant), charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB,
the daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial.
The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a
span of six (6) years. Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their
uncle, and both identified him as the man who had raped them.
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape. It further
considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the
relationship of the victims and appellant, the latter being the former's relative
by consanguinity within the third degree.
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos.
6906 and 6908 to attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the
appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the
imposition of death penalty. The proximate concern as to the appellant is
whether his penalty for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law
should be two degrees lower than that of consummated rape, should be
computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE: What is the properly penalty for the crimes convicted?
HELD: The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2
of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold
the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the
accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate.

75.PEOPLE vs ALFREDO BON Case Digest


Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes that
the penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony must be
a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.

Page 30 of 60

The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted
rape is the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly
proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by
her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The
determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails
the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code. Following
the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court
of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape.
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for
attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion
temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower,
or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would
have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment
of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty.
Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since
that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of
death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to
a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining
penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant
would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal.
The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be
punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its
frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be
penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does
not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would
be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony.
Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties
attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in
that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of
penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and
accomplices. In the case of appellant, the determination of his penalty for
attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but
two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his
penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of
Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
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Alfredo Bon was convicted by the trial court of eight counts of rape, the
victims being the minor daughters of his brother. The trial court considered
the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and Bons relationship
with them, and imposed upon Bon eight death sentences.Upon automatic
review, theCourt of Appeals downgraded the convictions in two of the cases
toattempted rape. It held that the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond
any shadow of doubt that Bons penis reached the labia of the pudendum of
the victims vagina. Accordingly, it reduced thepenalties attached to the two
counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
for attempted rape. Subsequently, Republic Act No.9346, titled An Act
Prohibiting theImposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, was enacted.
Section2 of the said law mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court
can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but
must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.
1.)whether the Court should affirm the conviction of Bon for six counts of
rape and two counts of attempted rape, the victims being his then minor
2.) whether the penalty for attempted qualified rape should be computed from
death or from reclusion perpetua. (It had prescribed this sentence prior to the
enactment of Republic Act9346, which ended the imposition of the death
penalty in the Philippines. Under the penal law, the penalty for this crime
should be two degrees lower than that for consummated qualified rape. )
RULING:On the first issue, the Court affirmed the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals. The High Courtsaid that it had been established beyond reasonable
doubt that appellant was guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2) counts of
attempted rape. However, in the light of Republic Act 9346, entitled An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the
appropriate penalties for both crimes
should be amended. Section 2 of this law mandates that, in lieu of the death
penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court could no longer uphold the death sentences
imposed by lower courts. If the guilt of the accused is affirmed, it must
instead impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
whenever appropriate.The Court said that the negation of the word death
as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have the effect of appropriately
downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices, accessories,

Page 31 of 60

frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with our penal laws.
It maintained that if Republic Act 9346 was to be construed in such a way as
to limit its effects only to matters concerning the physical imposition of the
death penalty, an anomalous situation would arise. Under this interpretation,
the penalties for the principals and the accomplices would be equalized in
certain felonies, but not in others

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, upon humiliating his employees, was accused
of multiple grave oral defamation in five (5) separate Informations instituted
by five of his employees, each Information charging him with gravely
maligning them on four different days, i.e., from 9 to 12 April 1980.
On 2 January 1990, after nearly ten (10) years, the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Makati, Br. 61, found petitioner Pablo C. Francisco, guilty of grave oral
defamation, in four (4) of the five (5) cases filed against him, and sentenced
him to a prison term of one (1) year and one (l) day to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional "in each crime committed on each date of
each case, as alleged in the information(s)," ordered him to indemnify each
of the offended parties, Victoria Gatchalian, Rowena Ruiz, Linda Marie Ayala
Pigar and Marie Solis, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P5,000.00
for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit. However, he was acquitted in for
persistent failure of the offended party, Edgar Colindres, to appear and

(a) Whether petitioner is still qualified to avail of probation even after

appealing his conviction to the RTC which affirmed the MeTC except with
Fixing the cut-off point at a maximum term of six (6) years imprisonment for
probation is based on the assumption that those sentenced to higher
penalties pose too great a risk to society, not just because of their
demonstrated capability for serious wrong doing but because of the gravity
and serious consequences of the offense they might further commit.
The Probation Law, as amended, disqualifies only those who have been
convicted of grave felonies as defined in Art. 9 in relation to Art. 25 of the
Revised Penal Code, and not necessarily those who have been convicted of
multiple offenses in a single proceeding who are deemed to be less
Hence, the basis of the disqualification of the petitioner is principally on the
gravity of the offense committed and the concomitant degree of penalty
imposed. Those sentenced to a maximum term not exceeding six (6) years
are not generally considered callous, hard core criminals, and thus may avail
The Court hereby finds the accused Pablo C. Francisco GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in each of the above entitled cases and appreciating in his
favor the mitigating circumstance which is analogous to passion or
obfuscation, the Court hereby sentences the said accused in each case to a
straight penalty of eight months imprisonment, with the accessory penalties
The argument that petitioner had to await the remand of the case to the
MeTC, which necessarily must be after the decision of the RTC had become
final, for him to file the application for probation with the trial court, is to
stretch the law beyond comprehension. The law, simply, does not allow
Accordingly, considering that prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and


Page 32 of 60

probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner appealed from his

conviction by the MeTC although the imposed penalties were already
probationable, and in his appeal, he asserted only his innocence and did not
even raise the issue of the propriety of the penalties imposed on him, and
finally, he filed an application for probation outside the period for perfecting
an appeal granting he was otherwise eligible for probation, the instant
petition for review should
as it
is hereby DENIED.

Facts: On 7 December 1993, Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of

Reckless Imprudence resulting to
homicide, serious physical injuries and damage to property. On 8 March
1994, his application for probation
was granted by the trial court, which imposed upon him terms and
conditions (1) to meet his family
responsibilities, (2) to devote himself to a specific employment and not to
change employment without prior
notice to the supervising officer; and/or to pursue a prescribed secular study
or vocational training, and (3) to
indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of
P98,560.00 as ordered by the Court. On
26 April 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to
cancel Soriano's probation due to
his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a
supplemental motion alleging Soriano's
commission of another crime for which at that time he was awaiting
arraignment. The Zambales Parole and
Probation Office filed a comment recommending that Soriano be allowed to
continue with his probation and
that he be required instead to submit a program of payment of his civil
liability. On 20 June 1994, the trial

Soriano v. Court of Appeals
[GR 123936, 4 March 1999]
Second Division, Quisumbing (J): 4 concur

court denied the prosecutor's motion and directed Soriano to submit a

program of payment of the civil liability
imposed upon him. Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received
information that Soriano's
father, who owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong,
received P16,500.00 as


Page 33 of 60

insurance payment. Said amount was not turned over to the heirs of
Daluyong. Da Maycong considered this a

Issue: Whether the requirement to pay indemnity to the victims heirs, in light
of the convicts application for

violation of the terms and conditions of the probation, and thus, submitted a
manifestation to the trial court

probation, is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

praying that Soriano be made to explain his non-compliance with the court's
order of 20 June 1994, or that he
be cited for contempt for such non-compliance. The trial court granted Da
Maycongs prayers in its 15 August
1994 order, and ordered the Soriano once again to submit his program of
payment. Soriano instead filed a
motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice of the
order dated 20 June 1994., as
his counsel failed to notify Soriano after he received a copy of said order on
23 June 1994. On 4 October
1994, the trial court issued an order declaring Soriano in contempt of court
for his failure to comply with its
orders of 20 June 1994 and 15 August 1994, and revoked the grant of
probation to Soriano and ordered that he
be arrested to serve the sentence originally imposed upon him. Soriano filed
a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the
petition, holding that Soriano's
"stubborn unwillingness" to comply with the orders of the trial court "shows
his refusal to reform himself and
to correct a wrong." Sorianos motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied by the appellate court. Soriano
filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court.


Held: The requirement to pay indemnity to the victim's heirs is not violative of
the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Soriano's application for probation had already been
granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability
was not made a requirement before he could avail of probation, but was a
condition for his continued
enjoyment of the same. The trial court could not have done away with
imposing payment of civil liability as a
condition for probation. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by
law. It is a consequence of
Soriano's having been convicted of a crime, and petitioner is bound to satisfy
this obligation regardless of
whether or not he is placed under probation. There is no reason why Soriano
cannot comply with a simple Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )Narratives
(Berne Guerrero) order to furnish the trial court with a program of payment of
his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the reason why
the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment.
Knowing his own financial condition, he is in the best position to formulate a
program of payment that fits his needs and capacity. Sorianos refusal to
comply with orders cannot be anything but deliberate. He has refused
to comply with the trial court's directive, by questioning instead the
constitutionality of the requirement imposed and harping on his alleged
poverty as the reason for his failure to comply. Since probation is not an
absolute right, and that it is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the
discretion of the trial court. Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions
that may be imposed by the trial court. Having the power to grant

Page 34 of 60

probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.


SCRA 92)
Petitioner Tolentino, who pleaded not guilty to the charge of violation of
Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act, changed his plea of not guilty to the
lesser offense of illegal possession of marijuana, which Judge Alconcel
allowed, sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day to 2
years and 4 months plus fines. The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision
of Judge Alconcel to deny Tolentino's subsequent application for probation on
the ground that "probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense
committed", held that the potentiality of the offender to reform is not the sole
or primordial factor that should be considered and that the demands of
justice and public interest must be observed in the grant or denial of an
application for probation.

serve the ends of justice and the best interest of the public and the applicant.
It was not enough for the respondent court to deny petitioner's application
solely on the report that she was involved in "maisiao" and that she was
facing another preliminary investigation for the "additional shortage" of the
funds of which she had already pleaded guilty.


459) January 29, 1990
G.R. No. L-67301
Petitioner violated the terms and conditions of his probation but contends that
there was no valid reason for its revocation since his probation period had
already terminated on August 10, 1983 (although no order of final discharge
was issued as the probation officer had not yet submitted his final report).
The Supreme Court, in holding that the probation is revocable before the final
discharge of the probationer by the court, held that: (1) the expiration of the
probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation; (2)
nowhere in the provisions of the probation law can be found the ipso facto
termination of probation; (3) probation is not coterminous with its period; (4)
there must first be issued by the court of an order of final discharge based on
the report and recommendation of the probation officer and only from such
issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.


SCRA 187)
January 22, 1981
G.R. No. L-55333
Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for probation by the petitioner,
merely relied on a report of the probation officer which in itself, was mostly
hearsay, and did not give the petitioner a chance to be heard before it issued
its resolution denying the application for probation. The Supreme Court held
that respondent court appears to have wholly relied on the probation report
and did not make its own determination as to whether or not probation would


Neil was first arrested for violation of Section 16 of Republic Act 6425. He
pleaded guilty to the charge, hence, the RTC sentenced him to a prison term
of six years of prision correctional. He filed his application for probation on

Page 35 of 60

the same day. The RTC thus issued a Probation Order covering a period of

After hearing, the RTC revoked his probation. Neil appealed this revocation

six years. While on probation, he was arrested again on two separate

to the CA citing lack of procedural and substantial due process, but the same

occasions, both for violations of Section 16 of RA 6425. Corresponding

was denied by the CA.

Information were filed against him. Because of this, the chief of the Parole
and Probation Office recommended the revocation of his probation, citing
recidivism. He also pointed out Neil is not in a position to comply with the
terms of his probation, in view of his incarceration.
The RTC ordered the revocation of his probation and for him to serve his
sentence. Neil then interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
According to him, he was not accorded due process when his probation was
revoked without giving him an opportune to dispute the allegations. Finding
merit in his petition, the CA ordered the RTC to conduct a hearing on the

Was the revocation of Neils probation proper?

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he
has served out his sentence for another offense while on probation.
Consequently, his commission of another offense is a direct violation of
Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly outlined in
Section 11 of the Probation Law.
Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another
offense shall render the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

Motion to Revoke Provocation. Thus the RTC conducted a full-blown trial to

determine the necessity of revoking his probation. The PPO filed a Violation

Sec. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. A probation order shall take effect

Report where it stated that Neil showed negative attitude towards

upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the

rehabilitation and instead continued with his illegal drugs activities. It also

consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of

filed its Formal Offer of Evidence where it attached a certification from

the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another

another court that Neil has already served his sentence on the other drug

offense, he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he

charges against him. Neil filed his Comment to the formal offer but did not

was placed on probation. (Emphasis supplied)

contest the certification.

Based on the foregoing, the CA was correct in revoking the probation of
petitioner and ordering him to serve the penalty for the offense for which he
was placed on probation.


Page 36 of 60

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe

full obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or
run the risk of revocation of this privilege. Regrettably, petitioner wasted the
opportunity granted him by the RTC to remain outside prison bars, and must
now suffer the consequences of his violation.The Courts discretion to grant
probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant
probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.


(GR. No. 169641, 2009)

Facts: Sarcia was charged with rape. AAA was the five
year-old victim. Some rape details: In 1996, appellant
removed AAAs shorts and underwear. He also removed



his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie

down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her and inserted
his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an upanddown movement("Nagdapadapa tabi"), AAA felt
severe pain and exclaimed Aray. Saricas conviction was
then affirmed upon appeal, crediting AAAs testimony and
her cousins as well, despite certain inconsistencies.
Relevant Fact: Meanwhile, when accusedappellant
was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending
the outcome of his appeal before this Court, (R.A.) No.
9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 took
effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA
decision were promulgated on January17, 2003 and July
14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence
of conviction of accused handed down by the RTC was
not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that
time, in accordance with Article 192 of (P.D.) No. 603, The
Child and YouthWelfare Code, etc. He is now 31 years of
age. Thus, the retroactivity of RA 9344 is at issue which
affords the accused , so long as he was under 18 at the
time of the criminal incident. Automatic suspension of
sentence is also available even if the child reached 18
at the time of the promulgation of judgment(Sec. 38).
Relevant Issue: WON RA 9344 still applies in favor of
Held: NO. But death penalty reduced to reclusion
perpetua. Case remanded to court a quo for appropriate
disposition under Sec.51.
Firstly, Section 38 does not distinguish WON
child is guilty of capital offense or a lesser one, and so
automatic suspension of sentence can be afforded even in
a heinous crime. Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No.
9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
(18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law
limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child
reaches the maximum age of 21. Since he is now already
31 years old, the question on the suspension of sentence
is now moot and academic.
However, he is still entitled to the disposition
measure in Section 51 which reads:. Confinement of
Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other

Page 37 of 60

Training Facilities.A child in conflict with the law may,

after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to
serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular
penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised
and controlled by theBUCOR, in coordination with the


death and increased the civil indemnity to P75,000.00 and awarded

exemplary damages of P25,000.00 aside from the P50,000.00 for moral

SPL: People v. Sarcia

GR No. 169641, Sept. 10, 2009


The case was elevated to the SC for further review.
RA 9344 took effect while the case was pending before the SC.


Medical report on negative lacerations

The CA affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty imposed to

Whether or not accused-appellant was guilty beyond reasonable


A complaint for acts of lasciviousness was filed against accused-


If so, whether or not the penalty imposed was proper.

appellant and upon review of the evidence by the prosecutor the charge was


Can accused-appellant avail of the retroactive effect of RA 9344 with

upgraded to rape.
The prosecution alleged that accused-appellant committed the crime

regard to automatic suspension of sentence.

of rape against AAA who was then 5 years old.

AAA was playing with her cousin and two other children in a

1. Guilty as charged.
Inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin


neighbors house when accused invited her to the backyard of the house and

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor

raped here. AAAs cousin witnessed what happened.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty and imposed the penalty of

details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their

reclusion perpetua as well as civil indemnity of P50,000.00 and moral

and the positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact

damages of P50,000.00.
The record of the case was forwarded to the SC for automatic review

even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their

and then transferred to the CA for appropriate action and disposition.

Accused-appellant denied having committed the crime

testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence


testimonies are not rehearsed

Inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was

interposed the following defenses:








inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the


The inconsistency in the testimonies of AAA and her cousin

victim as a witness. Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes


The inability of AAA to recall the exact date when the crime was

occurred does not ipso facto make the information defective on its face. As


alleged rape was committed


long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the

The delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the
Absence of proof of force or intimidation


actual date when the offense was committed the information is sufficient.
Delay in filing the case (the case was filed 4 years after the
alleged rape was committed) The rape victims delay or hesitation in

Page 38 of 60

reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge nor is it an

commission of the offense. For exemplary damages, the act must be

indication of deceit. In the absence of other circumstances that show that

accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or

the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in

malevolent manner.

the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here, the

3. No suspension of sentence. The promulgation of the sentence of

failure of AAAs parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified

conviction of accused-appellant by the RTC cannot be suspended as he was

by the complainants father in the latters testimony (they had to wait until

about 25 years of age at that time.

they saved enough amount of money for litigation).

Absence of proof of force or intimidation Proof of force,

Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence

intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of

more at the time he/she is found guilty of the offense charged.

statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent

when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.

Medical report on negative lacerations A medical report is not

of a child in conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or

However, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence
until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21.

indispensable in a prosecution for rape. What is important is that AAAs

Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40 to the suspension of sentence is

testimony meets the test of credibility that is sufficient to convict the accused.

now moot and academic.

2. Penalty improper. The proper imposable penalty for accused-appellant is

reclusion perpetua.
Under Art. 335 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for statutory rape is death.
However, accused-appellant is entitled to privileged mitigating circumstance

However, accused-appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under

Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344 which provides for confinement of convicted

of minority because he was 18 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time
when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was
committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in 1996.

Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is

under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and

In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all

ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense

doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to

committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the

the latter.

court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,

Civil indemnity maintained. Imposition of exemplary damages proper. Moral








30,000.00. Reason: award of moral damages is not dependent on the

actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying
circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the


without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence

shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.









circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition

Page 39 of 60

measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the

your RA 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Act), and RA 10591 (Comprehensive


Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act).

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the
court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the
child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict
with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her
disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be

There is an exception to the abovementioned distinction however, as RA

7080 otherwise known as Plunder Law as amended by RA 7659, is an act
malum in se, as explained by Justice Bellosillo in the case of Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 148560, 19 November 2001).

brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age
while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of
sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period
or until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and
Other Training Facilities. A child in conflict with the law may, after
conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and
controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Felony or Offense?
While the two are often used when a person has committed a crime, the two





A felony is an act or omission punishable by the Revised Penal Code. It is


punishable because such acts are inherently evil (acts mala in se). Example
of which are the crimes of Rape (Art. 266-A) and Murder (Art. 248).

Rape; principles in conviction. (J. Abad)

An offense is an act or omission punishable by the special Penal laws as well

In the determination of the innocence or guilt of a person accused of rape,

as violations of local ordinances. Such actions are punishable merely

because it is prohibited by law (acts mala prohibita). Examples of which are


the following well-entrenched principles shall be considered: (1) an

accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more

Page 40 of 60

difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the

The victim testified that when she left the

intrinsic nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually

store with the accused Jacinto, he had carnal

involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme

knowledge of her. She went home crying after the

caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense. Necessarily, the credible, natural, and

The victims father confronted Jacinto and

convincing testimony of the victim may be sufficient to convict the accused.

called the police. AAA underwent a physical check-up

More so, when the testimony is supported by the medico-legal findings of the

which leads to findings that she had been raped.

examining physician.

For his defense, Jacinto interposed an alibi,


that he attended a birthday party at the time of the

Appellee, vs. HERMIE M. JACINTO, Accused-

incident and that the victim merely followed him


when he went to the store.


The RTC found Jacinto guilty beyond

Accused-appellant Hermie Jacinto, is

reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the defense moved to

charged and convicted in the lower courts of raping a

reopen the trial for reception of newly discovered

5-year old child, AAA.

evidence. It is stated that appellant Jacinto was born

Jacinto is neighbors with the family of AAA

on March 1, 1985. This means that at the time of the

for a long time and he was friends with the victims

alleged commission of the crime, he was merely 17

father. The victim AAA knew Jacinto well, as she

years old.

calls him kuya.

d the penalty. The Court of Appeals affirmed

On January 2003, the victims father sent his

the decision.

other daughter, CCC, to the store to buy cigarettes and

ISSUE: Whether or not accused appellant Jacinto

the victim followed her older sister but did not return

should be convicted of rape.

with the latter. The father thought that she was left

What is the imposable penalty on the appellant?

behind to watch television at another house. A witness

HELD/RATIO: Yes, SC confirms conviction.

saw Jacinto with the victim later on, at the store where

However due to the retroactive effect of RA 9344,

the latter was seated in his lap.

and it being proven that Jacinto was a minor at the


Page 41 of 60

time the crime was committed

so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she

The rape that took place has been sufficiently

was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the

proven in the court. Therefore, the Supreme Court

right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in

found sufficient ground for conviction.

accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given

In 2003, at the time of the commission of the

the chance to live a normal life and become a

crime, Jacinto was 17 years old. Though the RA 9344

productive member of the community. The age of the

took effect only in 2006, it is given a retroactive

child in conflict with the law at the time of the


promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not

Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a

material. What matters is that the offender committed

child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)

the offense when he/she was still of tender age.

years of age from criminal liability, unless the child is

RA No. 9344 warrants the suspension of

found to have acted with discernment, in which case,

sentence of a child in conflict with the law

"the appropriate proceedings" in accordance with the

notwithstanding that he/she has reached the age of

Act shall be observed.

In the present case, Jacinto showed
discernment in committing the crime as proven by the
facts that he choose an isolated and dark place to
perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection and he
boxed the victim to weaken her defense. These are
indicative of then 17 year-old appellants mental
capacity to fully understand the consequences of his
unlawful action.
To give meaning to the legislative intent of
the Act, the promotion of the welfare of a child in
conflict with the law should extend even to one who
has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years,


majority at the time the judgment of conviction is

pronounced. According to the law, the appellant may
be confined in an agricultural camp or any other
training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344

84. ADUA v. PEOPLE (559 SCRA 519)

July 23, 2008
G.R. No. 168546
The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344 could no
longer be retroactively applied for petitioners benefit as Section 38 provides
that once a child under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offense charged,
instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the
child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep.
Act No. 9344 provides that once the child reaches 18 years of age, the court

Page 42 of 60

shall determine whether to discharge the child, order execution of sentence,

or extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. However, since petitioner has
already reached 21 years of age or over, he could no longer be considered a
child for purposes of applying Rep. Act No. 9344.


case, his act of waiting for the victims parents to

leave the house before defiling the latter and
threatening to kick her if she should shout prove that
petitioner can differentiate what is right and wrong.
Furthermore, Sec. 38 and 40, suspension of

Robert Remiendo vs. People of the Philippines GR

sentence, can no longer be availed since by the time

184874 (October 9, 2009)

his sentence was imposed by the trial court, he was

Petitioner was a minor whose age is above 15

already 22 years old. Sec 40 provides that If the child

but below 18 years old when he raped a minor when

in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18)

the latter was left alone in her house. In violating the

years of age while under suspended sentence, the

minor, he threatened to kick the latter if she would

court shall determine whether to discharge the child in

shout for help. Petitioner was convicted of rape but on

accordance with this Act, to order execution of

appeal invoked a suspension of sentence pursuant to

sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a

RA 9344. By the time he was convicted by the trial

certain period or until the child reaches the maximum

court and before the case was elevated to the CA, he

age of twenty-one (21) years

was already 22 years old.

Whether petitioner is exempt from criminal


Whether petitioner is entitled to a suspension
of sentence under Sec. 38 and 40 of RA 9344.
No. Since his age is above 15 and below 18,
the finding of discernment is necessary to determine if
he would be exempt from criminal liability. In this


2006(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344)
September 30, 1988
G.R. No. 81381
The petitioner was charged with the crime of grave threats (the crime
was committed on 8 July 1987 and the information was filed only on
Page 43 of 60


17 September 1987 or after the lapse of 71 days), but was only found
guilty by the court of light threats (with a prescriptive period of 2
months or 60 days). The Supreme Court, in agreeing with petitioner's
contention that he cannot be convicted of light threats since it had
already prescribed, held that where an accused has been found to
have committed a lesser offense includible with the graver offense
charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already
prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction a circumvention of
the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the
defendant of the graver offense.


On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed an information for slight physical injuries
(with a prescriptive period of 60 days) allegedly committed by the petitioner
on December 2, 1964. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the criminal
prosecution on the ground that the information having been filed on the sixty
first day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive
period had lapsed. The Supreme Court (in disagreeing with the lower court's
denial of the motion to quash due to the fact that the 60th day fell on a
Sunday and considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a
pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed on the next succeeding
business day) held that "where the sixtieth and last day to file an information
falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended
up to the next working day for prescription has automatically set in.

236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994


Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant, was charged with rape

before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City (Criminal Case No. C-3217). He was
convicted on June 19, 1991. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992, at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma
gastric malingering.
The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal in a
resolution dated May 20, 1992.

Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish his
civil liability?

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by
Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final
and only the
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e.,
liability ex
delicto insenso
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a
separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on

Page 44 of 60

Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced

either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
The appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is dismissed with costs de oficio.






convicted on. On appeal on his conviction, Bayotas died at the
National Bilibid hospital due to Cardio respiratory arrest secondary
to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric
malingering. Consequently the SC in its resolution dismissed the
criminal aspect of the appeal. However it required the solicitor
General to file a comment with regard to the civil liability of the
deceased arising from the commission of the offense charged. In his
comment the Solicitor general argued that the death of the accusedappellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his
commission of the offense charged. The counsel of the appellant
however opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal


1. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
thereon. The death of the accused prior final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising
2. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
Since the act complained is RAPE and there is no separate
civil action against it. The civil obligation in a criminal case
takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability
is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is

SERMONIA, vs. CA G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994

W/N the death









solely on the act complained of rape. Consequently, the appeal is


his criminal





On 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with bigamy

before the RTC of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes
Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera
remained valid and subsisting.

civil liability based

Page 45 of 60

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal
liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.

In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to

quash. On 27 October 1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his
order of denial.

Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January
1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been obliterated by prescription. He avers that since the second marriage
contract was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,
such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is
considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of
1975; hence, prescription commenced to run on the day the marriage
contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.

No. The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of
constructive notice is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal
laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would
amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While
the celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made
of public record by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he
conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of
his previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a
married person. He likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his
bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the bigamous marriage in a
place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place
may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous
marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should be
counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency.

On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period
does not begin from the commission of the crime but from the time of
discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

Whether or not the prosecution of Jose C. Sermonia for bigamy has already


Page 46 of 60


that the crime, has not prescribed as Silvino San Diego stated that he
only discovered the crime sometime in October 1970, and that in the
interest of justice, arraignment and trial is proper to ventilate the
respective evidence of both parties in their total meaning.
Two (2) days later, respondent Judge set aside the grant of motion to
quash. Petitioner Cabral moved for reconsideration of the Order on
the ground that (a) "the judgment of acquittal which became final
immediately upon promulgation and could not, therefore, be recalled
for correction or amendment"; and (b) by instituting Civil Case No.
120-V-74, respondent San Diego lost his right to intervene in the
prosecution of the criminal case. This motion was denied, as well as the
second motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Resolution of March 25, 1975 (granting the
motion to quash and dismissing the Information) based on prescription is a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense
YES. The Resolution of March 25, 1975 dismissing the Information on the
ground of prescription of the crime became a bar to another charge of

Cabral vs Puno
Petitioner Eugenio Cabral was accused of Falsification of Public
Documents for allegedly falsifying on August 14, 1948 the signature of
private respondent Silvino San Diego in a deed of sale of a parcel of
land. Cabral moved to quash the Information on the ground of
prescription of the crime charge, since the said document of sale was
notarized on August 14, 1948 and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan on August 26, 1948. The said notarization caused
the cancellation of the original certificate of title and a new transfer
certificate of title was then issued. On March 25, 1975, the motion to
quash was granted on the ground of prescription. Private prosecutor
filed a motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution. However,
according to petitioner Cabral, respondent San Diego can no longer
intervene in the criminal case, having filed a civil action against the
same accused (Cabral) on the basis of the same factual averments
contained in the criminal information. The Fiscal, upon the order of
respondent Judge Puno, submitted his comment expressing the view

falsification, including the revival of the Information. This is more so,

because said Resolution had already become final and executory.
When the Fiscal moved to reinstate the case on May 21, 1975, or
about two (2) months from receipt of a copy of the order of dismissal,
the same had already long been final.
The Rules of Court is explicit that an order sustaining a motion to
quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code also provides that
"prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of
criminal liability." Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification
under Article 172, sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the Revised Penal
Code, which carries an imposable penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.00.
This crime prescribes ten (10) years. Here, San Diego had actual if
not constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds on August 26, 1948.
While it is true that the offended party, San Diego, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion 'for reconsideration within the reglementary
fifteen-day period, such move did not stop the running of the period
for appeal. He (private prosecutor) did not have the legal personality
to appeal or file the motion for reconsideration on his (San Diegos)
Page 47 of 60

behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case through the private

prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and only
the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have
interrupted the period for appeal.
More important, he lost his right to intervene in the criminal case. Prior
to the filing of the criminal case on September 24, 1974, the spouses
Silvino San Diego and Eugenia Alcantara, on the basis of the same
allegations that San Diego's signature on the deed of August 14, 1948
was a forgery, filed on May 2, 1974 an action against Eugenio Cabral
and Sabina Silvestre, with the Bulacan Court of First Instance (Civil
Case No. 120-V-74) for the recovery of the same property and
damages. It appearing, therefore, from the record that at the time the
order of dismissal was issued there was a pending civil action arising
out of the same alleged forged document filed by the offended party
against the same defendant, the offended party has no right to
intervene in the prosecution of the criminal case and consequently
cannot ask for the reconsideration of the order of dismissal, or appeal
from said order.


November 26, 2014
G.R. No. 194068
The criminal and civil liability ex delicto of a person convicted for murder who
moved for reconsideration of his conviction and died pending resolution, will
be extinguished.




Page 48 of 60




On October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No.
13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
(Committee) which was tasked to inventory all behest loans, determine the parties
involved and recommend whatever appropriate actions to be pursued thereby.
On November 9, 1992, President Ramos issued Memorandum Order No. 61
expanding the functions of the Committee to include the inventory and review of all

Facts: A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in
violation of a city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court
immediately but instead filed it 3 months later. The defendants counsel filed a motion
to quash on ground that the action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal
contends that the filing of the complaint before his office already interrupts the
prescription period.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office
constituting a violation against a special law/ordinanceinterrupts prescription.
Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running
of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have
been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of
the prescriptive period is interrupted.
**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law
which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.




The Memorandum set the following criteria to show the earmarks of a "behest loan,"
to wit: "a) it is undercollaterized; b) the borrower corporation is undercapitalized; c) a
direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal
notes; d) the stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified
as cronies; e) a deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; f) the
use of corporate layering; g) the non-feasibility of the project for which financing is
being sought; and, h) the extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made."
Among the accounts referred to the Committee's Technical Working Group (TWG)
After it had examined and studied all the documents relative to the said loan
transactions, the Committee classified the loans obtained by NOCOSII from PNB as
behest because of NOCOSII's insufficient capital and inadequate collaterals.
Specifically, the Committee's investigation revealed that in 1975, NOCOSII obtained
loans by way of Stand-By Letters of Credit from the PNB; that NOCOSII was able to
get 155% loan value from the offered collateral or an excess of 85% from the required
percentage limit; that the plant site offered as one of the collaterals was a public land
contrary to the General Banking Act; that by virtue of the marginal note of then
President Marcos in the letter of Cajelo, NOCOSII was allowed to use the public land
as plant site and to dispense with the mortgage requirement of PNB; that NOCOSII's
paid-up capital at the time of the approval of the guaranty was only P2,500,000.00 or
Based on the Sworn Statement of PCGG consultant Orlando Salvador, petitioner filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman the criminal complaint against respondents.
Petitioner alleges that respondents violated the following provisions of Section 3 (e)
The respondents failed to submit any responsive pleading before the Ombudsman,
prompting Graft Investigator Officer (GIO) I Melinda S. Diaz-Salcedo to resolve the
case based on the available evidence. In a Resolution dated January 12, 1998 in

Page 49 of 60

OMB-0-95-0890, GIO Diaz-Salcedo recommended the dismissal of the case on the

ground of insufficiency of evidence or lack of probable cause against the respondents
and for prescription of the offense. Ombudsman Desierto approved the
recommendation on May 21, 1999. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it
was denied by GIO Diaz-Salcedo in the Order dated July 9, 1999, which was

The herein assailed Orders being supported by substantial evidence, there is no
basis for the Court to exercise its supervisory powers over the ruling of the
Ombudsman. As long as substantial evidence supports the Ombudsman's ruling, that
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Except as to prescription, the assailed
Resolution dated May 21, 1999 and Order dated July 23, 1999 of the Ombudsman in
OMB No. 0-95-0890 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Whether respondents violated the following provisions of Sec 3 (e) and (g),
specifically corrupt practices of public official, of Republic Act No. 3019 or the AntiGraft
On the issue of whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion in
finding that no probable cause exists against respondents, it must be stressed that
the Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable ground
to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate
courts. Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good and
compelling reasons to indicate otherwise. Said exercise of powers is based upon his
constitutional mandate and the courts will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is
based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by
the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the functions of the office and
the courts, in much the same way that courts will be swamped if they had to review
the exercise of discretion on the part of public prosecutors each time they decided to
file an information or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.
While there are certain instances when this Court may intervene in the prosecution of
cases, such as, (1) when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional
rights of the accused; (2) when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to
avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question
which is sub-judice; (4) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; (5) where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the court has no jurisdiction
over the offense; (8) where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9)
where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
After examination of the records and the evidence presented by petitioner, the Court
finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Ombudsman.
No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the Ombudsman. Grave abuse of
discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty


Page 50 of 60




June 4, 2014
G.R. No. 200148
Rivera was resigned from work. However, her separation pay and other
benefits were withheld. She sent several text messages to the account
manager of her former company. The President of the said company
instituted a criminal action for libel due to the contents of the text messages.
Rivera alleged that libel can no longer prosper due to prescription. "Although
the general rule is that the defense of prescription is not available unless
expressly set up in the lower court, as in that case it is presumed to have
been waived and cannot be taken advantage of thereafter, yet this rule is not
always of absolute application in criminal cases, such as that in which
prescription of the crime is expressly provided by law, for the State not
having then the right to prosecute, or continue prosecuting, nor to punish, or
continue punishing, the offense, or to continue holding the defendant subject
to its action through the imposition of the penalty, the court must so declare.


SCRA 221)
December 18, 2002
G.R. No. 139033
10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violating the Election Code
(whereby he was never apprehended and remained at large), he filed before
the trial court a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the
ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. He based his claims
on Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the period of
prescription shall commence to run from the date when the culprit should
evade the service of his sentence. The petition must be denied since under
Article 93, prescription shall commence to run from the date the felon evades
the service of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the case at bar since the
petitioner was never brought to prison and cannot be said to have escaped

96. PANGAN v. GATBALITE (449 SCRA 144)


Page 51 of 60

January 21, 2005

G.R. No. 141718
Petitioner, who failed to appear during the promulgation of the decision in the
MTC on August 9, 1991, questioned his arrest on January 24, 2000 on the
ground that the same was illegal since the straight penalty of two months and
one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3, Article 93 [of
the] Revised Penal Code. In ruling against the petitioner, the Court held that
the prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code
applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving
sentence which consists of deprivation of liberty. Hence, the period for
prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of

sentence can be
committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the
term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty
before his arrest, and
as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his
service, the period of
prescription never began. However, by this time, petitioner has fully served
his sentence and

G.R. No. 141718 January 21, 2005

should be released unless he is detained for another offense or charge.
Petitioner Benjamin Pangan was found guilty of simple seduction, when his
counsel submitted
the case for a decision without offering any evidence due to his constant
absence during the
hearing. Petitioner was then apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat
Detention Cell at the
order of the trial court. Later, petitioner filed for a Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus, contending that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the ground
that his penalty has prescribed after five years and that having been able to
continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal
liability has long been totally extinguished. The trial court then denied the
said petition.
Whether or not Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code shall apply in the case
at bar
No. Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription
period of penalties
shall commence to run. It shall commence to run from the date the felon
evades the service of his






1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the
offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional
Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the
MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about
nine years.
2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and
detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. Four days thereafter, he
filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles
City, impleading respondent (Acting Chief of Police of Mabalacat,
Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and
unjustified on the grounds that, a) the straight penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years
under No. 3,Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b) having
been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost
Page 52 of 60

nine years, his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished

under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.
3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there
was no evasion of the service of the sentence. Evasion
presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting
in deprivation of liberty.
Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed
The period of prescription of penalties the succeeding Article 93
provides "shall commence to run from the date when the culprit
should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC
discussed how evasion of service of sentence was perfected. It is
provided therein that,
"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service
of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment. To consider properly the meaning
of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be present
these are: (1) the offender is a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is
serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and
(3) he evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of
his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of
his imprisonment by reason of final judgment."
That escape should take place while serving sentence, is
emphasized by the second sentence of Article 157. It provides for a
higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by
means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls,
roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit,
violence or intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts
or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of
sentence is but another expression of the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance

and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means the
unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody.
Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said
to have escaped therefrom.
In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the
record would show, even before the execution of the judgment
for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the
compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of
peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the
execution of his sentence. But it was petitioner who chose to
become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those
who are deserving. Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he
committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

The supposed pardon of the accused was allegedly granted only by the
mother (BBB) without the concurrence of the offended minor, AAA. Hence,
even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that the initial desistance of
the said mother from taking any action against the accused constitutes
pardon, it is clear that upon the authorities cited above, such pardon is
ineffective without the express concurrence of the offended minor herself.


The accused, who was charged with the crime of rape, insists that he was
pardoned by the offended party when she executed an Affidavit of Desistance,
stating that the rape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding. The
Supreme Court did not agree and held that to warrant the dismissal of the
complaint, the victim's retraction or pardon should be made prior to the
institution of the criminal action. Hence, the alleged pardon could not be

Page 53 of 60

considered in his favor since the Affidavit was executed after the present case
was filed.

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Circuit Criminal Court of

Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

FACTS: In the morning of Sunday, April 20, 1969, Santiago

Tumaliuan, a 37-yr old businessman, drove his jeep to Tuguegarao.
He was accompanied by his daughter Vilma, whom he dropped off at
St Paul College, and Fausto Guiyab, Juan Malillin and Patrolman
Cesar Binag who was his escort in civilian clothes. They first played
mahjong at the house of one Mallabo. Guiyab remained in the jeep to
guard it. At noon, they proceeded to the cockpit. Guiyab again
watched the jeep.

At about 4PM, Santiago and Binag left the cockpit. On their way out,
they passed by Antonio Lim and his bodyguard near the exit. Genaro
and Alberto, Lims companions, were standing at the gate talking to
each other. Upon reaching the jeep, Santiago took the drivers seat.
Binag seated himself at the passengers and Guiyab occupied the
back seat. They first went to the gas station to fill up.

Binag saw Genaro and Alberto on the street 10 meters away to his
right. Genaro shouted in Ibanag dialect translated, Fire now. 3
successive gunshots were fired in a few seconds. The 1 st show killed
Santiago hitting him in the head. The 2nd shot was fired at Guiyab
who also shot in the head, killing him instantly. The 3rd shot hit
Patrolman Binag in the jaw. He fell on the cement pavement and lost
consciousness. But before that, he saw Lim firing the first 2 shots w/
his .38 caliber nickle-plated Smith & Wesson revolver. Being a

patrolman himself and having served in the army, he was familiar w/

firearms. Lim was then wearing a yellow polo-jacket. Binag had
known him for a long time since they both came from San Pablo and
used to drink liquor together.

Binag sustained a gunshot wound above the left jaw, near the mouth,
injuring his tongue. If not for blood transfusion, he would have died.
In the hospital, on the night following the shooting, the chief of police
interviewed him and asked him who had fired at him and his
companions. As Binag could not talk, he wrote on a piece of paper
the name of his assailant: Antonio Lim with his bodyguard.

Prior to the shooting, Santiagos brother, Vice-Mayor Carlos

Tumaliuan was charged w/ the murder of Antionio Lims mother and
sister. Moreover, in another case, the brothers of Lim were charged
w/ murder and Binag was a prosecution witness there. Santiago was
known to be financier of his brother, the vice-mayor, while Guiyab was
a buyer of tobacco for Santiago and was responsible for obtaining bail
bonds for the vice-mayor.

HELD: The guilt of Lim was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
shooting was indubitably treacherous for Lim employed a form of
assault w/c directly and specially insured its execution w/o risk to
himself arising from the defense w/c the victims might have made (Art
14 RPC). The surprise assault precluded them from making any
defense at all.

Premeditation was not proven. The prosecution failed to establish (a)

the time when Lim determined to commit the crimes, (b) the act
Page 54 of 60

showing that he had clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient

interval between the determination and the execution that would have
afforded him full opportunity for meditation and reflection and allowed
his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will.

On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were convicted
of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson before the RTC of
Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of Appeal which was

There being no generic aggr/mit circumstances, the penalty of

reclusion perpetua for each of the 2 murders was properly imposed
(Art 64 & 248 RPC). An indeterminate sentence of 6 yrs of prision
correcional, as minimum, to 12 yrs & 1 day of reclusion temporal
minimum, as maximum, is imposed for the frustrated murder.
Judgment affirmed.

accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.

In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court required
Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of
counsel on his misimpression that the motion was necessary for his early
release from the New Bilibid Prison following the grant of a conditional
pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She also stated that Mengote
was also granted conditional pardon and that he immediately left for his
province without consulting her. She prayed that the Court grant Salle's
motion to withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.


After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution which
provides that the President may, except in cases of impeachment or as

Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not

otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant pardon after conviction by final


judgment, the Court required (1) the Solicitor General and the counsel for









executive clemency may not yet be granted to theappellant.

accused-appellants to submit their memoranda on the issue of the

enforceability of the conditional pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or

for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it

waiver of the appeal.

recommended to the President the grant of the conditional pardon despite

the pendency of the appeal.


Page 55 of 60

In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the

Constitution, or "conviction by final judgment," as presently prescribed in

conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable because

Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon

the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the pendency in this

may be extended before a judgment of conviction becomes final.

Court of his appeal.

A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is seasonably
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the conditional

perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the sentence, (c) when

pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable. Citing Monsanto vs.

the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except where the death

Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did not file a motion to

penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d) when the accused applies for

withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have abandoned the appeal by his

probation, thereby waiving his right to appeal. Where the judgment of

acceptance of the conditional pardon which resulted in the finality of his

conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet therefore attained finality, as


in the instant case, executive clemency may not yet be granted to

the appellant.

The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article VII of
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his

the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or

appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable.

conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from his

conviction by the trialcourt. Any application therefor, if one is made, should


not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should not be begun
unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities

Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:

of the Government concerned must require proof from the accused that he
has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal.

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Such proof may be in the form of a certification issued by the trial court

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons,

or the appellate court, as the case may be.

and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a

waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a pardon,

majority of all the Members of the Congress.

commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall

render those responsible therefor administratively liable. Accordingly, those in

Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it may

custody of the accused must not solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the

be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is on appeal. It

release of the accused from confinement.

is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is " final conviction, " as
was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX of the 1973


Page 56 of 60

reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to reclusion

perpetua and to pay 200k and 25k as actual damages
and funeral expenses respectively. Accused Casido and
Alcorin appealed to the courts. But the accused later filed
motion to withdraw appeal without stating the reason for their
actions. The SC later received an endorsement form
Superintendent Tesoro informing the court that both Casido
and Alcorin were released on Conditional pardon. Thus,
following the necessary procedures of submitting certified true
copies of the conditional pardons and their certificates of
discharge signed by the president, Alcorin and Casido were
released for confinement. It was evident that the pardon was
issued during the pendency of their instant appeal, which is
the controversy of this case

WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado is

hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to secure from
the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The
conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect
only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance with this
Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections must exert every
possible effort to take back into his custody the said appellant, for which
purpose he may seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police or the
National Bureau of Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and
Ricky Mengote, G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)

Issue: Whether or not the pardon is valid given that it was

granted during the pendency of the instant appeal


Facts: RTC of Negros Orietal ruled on a Criminal case finding

accused Casido, Alcorin and Francisco Palacios guilty beyond


Held: No it is not valid. This is because Article VII of the

present constitution prohibits the grants of pardon whether full
or conditionalto an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by TC. (Note: Endorsement of pardon was
given earlier than the motion to withdraw the appeal was made
hence, it was still appeal was still pending during the pardon
grant). Thus, pardon can only be granted or process for
pardon shouldnt have begun when the appeal has yet to be
withdrawn. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as
an abandonment or waiver of the appeal and the release of an
accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence, or
parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render those
responsible administratively liable.

Page 57 of 60

The conditional pardons granted in this case of Casido and

Alcorin are void hor having been extended during the
pendency of their instant appeal.


Page 58 of 60


Page 59 of 60


June 25, 2014
G.R. No. 195668

in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of the
amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. Hence,
Inovero and her co-accused were liable to indemnify the
complainants for all the sums paid. The nature of the obligation of
the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime requires
solidarity, and each debtor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. As a co-conspirator, then, Inoveros civil liability was
similar to that of a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law

Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves

the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently


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