A.C. No.

1512 January 29, 1993

1. BARRIENTOS vs. DAAROL
The respondent, already a married man and about 41 years old, proposed love and marriage to
complainant, then still a 20-year-old minor, knowing that he did not have the required legal capacity.
Respondent then succeeded in having carnal relations with complainant by deception, made her
pregnant, suggested abortion, breached his promise to marry her, and then deserted her and the child.
Respondent is therefore guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to the exacting standards of
mental and moral fitness. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the
highest standard of morality. The members are, in fact, enjoined to aid in guarding the Bar against the
admission of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient either moral character or education (In re
Puno, 19 SCRA 439, [1967]; Pangan vs. Ramos, 107 SCRA 1 [1981]).
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen
to be of good moral character and must lead a life in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community.
2. ALAWI v ALAUYA
The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of
law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
3. Office of the Court Administrator vs Lagada
Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in
the private practice of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the
bar or give professional advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that "private practice" of a profession, specifically the law profession
in this case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one's self to
the public as a lawyer.
4. CAYETANO v MONSOD
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.
In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court.
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur
of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor
verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
5. ULEP v The Legal Clinic
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the
incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court.
6. Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.

Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation is in question.
b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require.
Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.

Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,

pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

7. In Re: Integration of the BAR 49 SCRA 22

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important
functions of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can
be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to
contribute to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most
efficient means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all
lawyers to pay annual dues to the Integrated Bar.