, .

itary
view
THE
OF M

#&~

1W6

In This Iss?(e

* Intelligence
+ Thoughtson War
~ Howto shoot a Duck

September
65

UNITED STATES ARMY COMMANO

AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS
COMMANDANT
Maj

Gen Harrg

J. Lendeg,

Jr.

ASSISTANTCOMMANDANT
Brig Gen E. C. Townsend

Military Review

Professional Journal of the US Army

How to Shoot a DrfclI

... .

Kinesthetic Warfare

Air Mobility

Maj Donald J. Haid, USA

Cot Robert B. Rigg, USA

13

Col Wladimir A. de Favitski, French Army

20

Second Thoughts on War

Intelligence

The Far North

.
.

.
.

Khrmen and Matsu

Unified Force

.
.

Quelling Mutinies

.
.

.
.

The Nonprofessional

.
.

Prudence Military Necessity

Communist Errors

Casualty Handling

Army Hospital Ships

Necessity for Change

33

45

Maj J. N. Elderkhs, British Army

48

Lt Col William E. Burr 11,USA

54

Col Shaukat Riza, Pakistan Army

80

.
.

39

Lt Col Chen Wei-ya, CNMC

.
.

23

Lt Col Fielding L. Greaves, USA

.
.

Brian Bond

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

Maj Pierre Vincendon, French Army

.
.

.
.

.
.

.
.

Edmund McCaffrey

62

Lt Col Robert W. Selton, USA

66

Lt Col D. W. Pratt, USA

78

Stanley L. Falk

85

Maj Clinton E. Granger, Jr., USA

92

Militar yNote

Militar yBook

..

..

....97

...107

The M81itary Raview, a publication of the UNITEO STATES ARMY, provides a forum for the expression
of military thought with emphasis on doctrine concerning the division and higher levels of command.
The VIEWS expressed
US Army or the Command

in this magazine ARE THE

and General Staff College.

AUTHORS

and

not necessarily

those

of the
8

Editor in Chief

Col DonaldJ. Delaney

Assistant Editor

Lt ColAlbert N. Garland

Features Editor

Maj Robert L. Burke

r
Layout Editor

Capt John A. Maclntyre, Jr.

SpanishAmerican Editor

Major RerreRamos

Brazilian Editor

Lt Col Luiz de A. Araripe

Assoqiate Editor

Lt ColAlgmJ. Hughes

ArmyWarCollege

Production Officer
MajNormanC, Murray
i
Staff Artist

Charles A. Moore

MILITARY flEVIEW-Pubhshed
monthly by the U S Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leaw
enworth, Kansas, m Eng16h, Spamsh, and Portuguese Use of funds for printing of th!s pubhcatton has
been approved by Headquarters, Department of the Army, Za May 1965.
Secmrdclass postage paid at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Subscription rate% $3.50 (US currency) a
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the Pan Amerman Postaf Umon (mcludirrg Spain); $450 a year m all other countries. Address subscrlp
lion mad to the Book Department, U S Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kairsas 66027.

The Military

Review

announces

the selection

from the July 1965 issue as a MILITARY

China-Burma-India:
Colonel Charles
By almost

standards,

any

Command

of the following
AWARD

article

ARTICLE:

Command

USA

the direction

II violated

The author,

the U. S. Army

in Combhed

J. Canella,

during World War

rules of war.

Study

REVIEW

of military

the basic concepts

presently

assigned

and General

study of the ccmcepts and procedures

uni@e opportunity
to develop valuable

Staff

operations
of management

in the CBI
and the

to the staff and faculty

College,

points

out that

of
a

employed in the CBI provides a

lessons for the conduct of future

combined operations.

COMING:
The British Army in the Far East, by General Sir Reginald Hewetson,
Kermit Roosevelt Lecturer for 1965; Computers and Service Schools, by
Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Ablett; and Allied CommandEuropes Mobile
Force by Colonel James G. Holland, Jr.

tiow

to
Major

i)onald

J. Haid,

The views expressed

in this ar.

title ar the authors and are not

necessa !
il~ those of tke Depart~nent

rmy, Department
of De.

of the
fewer o the U. S. Arrng Command
and Ge era,l staff Co/lege,-Edttor.

{~

ducks could shoot back,

be so many duck
hunters. Although probably spuri
ous, this remark ie widely attributed
to an ArmY general in answering a
question about the necessity of arm
~lIE

there

wouldnt

Soptoinbcr
13fi5

a Duck

shoot

United Statea

Arnrg

ing helicopters. Like so many maxims,

the answer contains truth and false
hood, wisdom and folly.
The individual who posed the ques
t ion may have beeu stopped for the
moment, but the question has been
asked a thousand times before and
since. It has been asked by reporters;
it has been asked by generals in blue
uniforms; it has been asked by gen
erals in green uniforms; and it has
been anawered
truthfully,
falsely,
wisely, and foolishly. Helicopter arma
.,

SHOOTA OIJCK
tnent may have developed too far for
the question to be meaningful any
longer.
There is, however, a question that
has seldom been posed and never been
answered:
What
happens
when
armed helicopter meets armed heli
copter ? My aim, here, is to justify
the question. If facts can be mar
shaled in a logical fashion, if atten
tion can be focused on the problem,
then, hopefully, the technicians and
the tacticians can solve the problem
and answer the question properly.
Army Aviation Program
Until the Korean War, organic
Army aviation was entirely confined
to the employment of small, fixedwing aircraft used for directing ar
tillery fire and for carrying out OCCZI.
simml liaison missions. The helicopter,
despite interest dating back to Leo
nardo da Vinci, did not become prac
tical until after World War II, but
the success of the helicopter in medi
cal evacuation missiom+ in Korea as
sured it a place in the military air
craft inventory. The combination of
the establishment
of a separate Air
Fore> in 1947 and the helicopters
success ]n Korea resulted in the de
velopment of what has come to be
known as the Army Aviation Pro
gram.
Barely two decades have passed

Major Donald J. ffaid, a veteran

Army
aviator,
has ffown with
7th
Armv in Europe and 8th A rm~ in
Korea and has served as Chief of the
US A rmg A uiation Human Research
Unit. He is currentlv
with the 145th
Aviation Battalion in Vietnam. This
article is baaed on a treatise prepared
6U Majur Haid while a student in the
1964-65 Regular Cmeree of the U. S.
Arrnzs Command
and General
Stag
College.
4

since the first Piper Cubs were as.

signed to a few artillery battalions.
The Army, however, now operates
more than 6,000 aircraft, and aviators
comprise the third largest group ofofficers in the Army. To its credit, the
Army has never lost sight of the fun
damental mission of Army aviation
to support ground combat; nor has
Army aviation lost its fundamental
characteristicthat
of being organic
to tactical Army units.
Although the small aviation section
gave way to the aviation company,
and the company to the battalion, the
aviation unit remains organic to the
brigade, division, corps, and field
army. And although the aircraft have
become bigger and more sophisti
cated, the missions more dumerous
and more complicated, the phrase
Army aviation is always used with
only one word capitalized and always
in that particular order.
In both World War II and Korea,
Army aircraft relied on their slow.
speed maneuverability for protection
against enemy fire. The classical lin.
ear alignment of forces usually fur
nished a visual indication of friendly
and enemy territory,
There were
losses to enemy fire in both wars, but
Army aircraft were not unacceptably
v@erable.
Transport Helicopters
The advent of the troop transport
helicopter created a new problemat
one particular moment in time and
space, the transport helicopter was
considered to be unacceptably vulner
able. That was the moment when the
helicopter
was
stationary+
ither
hovering or Pandingwhile it disem
barked its load of fighting troops.
Since the moment of vulnerability
was, after all, brief, the Army began
to experiment with the idea of delivMilitaryReview

SHOOTA DUCK
ering suppressive fire from the heli
copter. Originally conceived to he a
large volume of essentially unaimed
fire designed solely to force the enemy to keep his head down until onr
troops could disembark, assemble, and
take UP the fight, the use of suppress
ive fire marked the actual birth of
the armed helicopter in the US Army.

the nap-of-the-earth
flying that the
Army will have to live with in lim~
ited or general war: it will be appli
cable regardless of the nuclear environment.
Although
the details
are still
shrouded in the secrecy of intelli
gence . reports
and studies,
every
major power in the world today is ex-

US Am

A UH.1

helicopter in flight firing an SS-11 missile

Development in weapons and tac

tics eirrce World War 11 have paral
leled the development of Army avia
tion. They have, at the came time,
imposed certain limitations.
Except
in thoee areaa known to be absolutely
secure, the Army aviator must fly at
an altitude low enough to be below the
acquisition level of radar and infra
red weapons and close enough to the
terrain to make attack by high-per
formance enemy aircraft
infemible.
In most cases, this will mean treetop
level, or, if possible, below, This is
September1SS5

perimenting
with helicopter arma~
ment. Since the arming of a helicopter
involves no secret or complicated proc
ess, this fact is not really surprising.
What ie strzbrge is the difference in
weaponry and philosophy among the
Varioue countries. Since there has
not yet heen a war in which both sides
have employed armed helicopters,
there will he, presurnnbly, at leaat as
much diversity in the field of tactics,
Ultimate weapona have come and
gone-from
Hannibala elephants, to
the Iongbow, to gunpe+yder, to the
5

SHOOTA OUCK
nuclear weapon. The armed helicopter
is certainly not an ultimate weapon.
But the development of the armed
helicopter employing effective tactics
may well become a significant element
of combat power in future wars.
Algerian Revolt
For a period of seven yearsfrom
the m]ddle of 1955 until 1962tbe
French colony of Algeria writhed in
the agonies of revolution. Our inter.
eet in the Algerian revolt centers
around the fact that, for the first time
in history, armed helicopters were
extensively used.
At first, the French simply la?hed
an ordinary pintle-mounted nrachine
gun in the doorways of their Vet-to/
44 s. When they received the more
powerful CH-34S, they began to uee
more than one machinegun. After dis
covering the limitation
of the smallcaliber
machineguns,
the French
turned to rockets, wire-guided mis
siles, and even mu ltiweaprm instalki
tions. Eventually, they achieved their
greatest success with a World War II
Mawscr 20-millimeter cannon which
they were able to mount so as vir
tual~ to el}minate the problems of
recoil and vihrwt ion.
Pierre Habot ]s a lieutenant com
mtinder m the French Navy. He is
also an aeronaut]ca.1 engineer und
.comhat pllut. He flew in World War
11 until the French surrendered and
then went underground for the rest
of the war wztb tbe mayuw. He later
for France in Indocbina,
flew fighters
until D]en B]wt Phu, A httk while
later h~ turned up flying helicopters
against the rebels in Algeria. While
there, he was in on most of the heli
copter armament experimentation.
Before the war ended, Babot had
be,en sh]pped to Frunce and put m
charge of all Frtinch helicopter iirmaS

ment development. He was instru.

mental not only in the development
of the Mauser 20-millimeter inetaOa
tion, but also in the design of what
was, perhaps, the first true weapons
helicopterthe Atocmfte III. Before
the first armed f7H-f flew in Vietnam,
Bahot wae helping to design and pro
duce a 20-millimeter automatic can
non for the A{ouette 111. This weapon
would not only fire a 20-miHimeter
round with an explosive warhead, but
the gun, including its mount and
sight, weighed less than 50 pounds.
Orbital Fire
In addition to their obvious success
in technology, Babot and the French
also developed the first known tactic
for employing armed helicopters
orbital fire. The helicopter would
cruiee along until it spotted a band
of guerrillas. Then, from an altitude
of about 1,000 feet, the helicopter
would begin to circle its quarry. By
the time the angle of hank PIUS the
angle of depression of the weapon
reached 90 degrees, the gunner was
not only shooting straight down, but
he was doing so with deadly accuracy.
The 20-millimeter cannon and or
bital fire notwithstanding,
Pierre
Babot and the French Army felt that
there were no urriversd principles te
b~ derived from their experiences in
Algeria. It had been a special kind of
war, fought under special circum
stances, with equipment w ited to the
tiask. If they learned anything from
seven years employment of armed
belmopters, it was that they wanted
a flexlble 20-milIirtreter automatic
cannon that weighed uo more than 50
pounds.
(:olonel Jay f). Vanderpool is not
even a rated US Army aviator. al
thuugh it is widely suspected that he
has done his share of flying. In 1956
MllltaryRoview

SHOOTA DUCK
he was assigned to what was then the
Combat Development Office of the
Aviation .School at Fort Rucker, Ala
bama. Vanderpool and his staff be
gan testing the feasibility
of the
transport helicopter as a weapons
platform. And they did not limit
themselves to the considerations
of
defensive fire alone. A wide range of
weapons was tested on various heli
copters.
The experiments were both inge
nious and imaginative. Hampered by
a lack of funds, facilities, and official
encouragement, the development was
spurred by the enthusiasm and ini
tiative of Colonel Vanderpool and his
staff of young aviators.
ACRCompany
To facilitate selling the idea that
we should arm our helicopter, a unit
known as the 8305th Aerial Combat
Reconnaissance (ACR) Company was
organized at Fort Rucker. Influential
visitors to the US Army Aviation
Center viewed demonstrations
of
armed helicopters
staged
by the
8305th.
By 1960 it had become apparent
that
machineguns,
rockets,
and
guided missiles offered the greatest
immediate promise for use on our
helicopters. But the essentially un
aimed character of suppressive fire
remaided predominant,
and only in
the guided-missile field was any at
tempt made to achieve the accuracy
necessary to attack point Pargets.
The US Army Aviation Test Board,
then under the US Continental Army
Command ( USCONARC ), began tu
attack some of the technical problems,
even while the ACR company dealt
with the concepte. Armament systems
for helicopters had always begun by
taking some existing weapon and at
tempting to mount it in some fashion
Sqrtember1965

on the helicopter. For the first several

years of the feaaihility studies at Fort
Rucker, all experiments
were con
ducted with existing ground weapons.
although, rather late in the period,
experiments were made with actual
aircraft weapons.
As long as the principal concept
was that of unaimed suppressive fire,
any weapon that the helicopter could
lift was reasonable. Under this pro
gram, such pros&ic considerations as
ammunition feeding, effect of recoil
on structural membeks, in-flight re
loading, and ammunition lnad capa
bilities posed tbe major problems.
Degradation
of aircraft perform
ance wae accepted as a necessary evil.
Quite hy chance, this degradation
generally manifested itself by reduc
ing speed and payload rather than in
dangerous flight characteristics.
The
Fort Rucker people, Cnlonel Vander
pool, the ACR company, and the Avia
tion Test Board had their meet eig.
nificant success with a dual .30-cali
ber machinegun kit (precursor of the
Xlff ), the 4.5-inch rocket (later
abandoned in favor of the 2.75-inch
rocket ), and the French SS-11 (a
wire-guided
missile originally
d&
signed as a surface-to-surface,
anti
tank weapon ).
No Approved Doctrine
I?ven though the concept of the
armed helicopter was considered feas
ible, there was no accepted or tw
prnved doctrine as to which aircraft
would he armed, with what weapons,
or in what quaat it ies. To remedy this
bwk of offimal doctrine. USCONARC
convened an ml hoc committee on
army aircraft armament systems. In
two months during the summer of
1961, the committe+five
generals
tind 14 field grade officers-formu
7

SHOOTA DUCK
lated much of what is now our doc
trine for helicopter armament.
The data and the report prepared
by that committee will atend as mile
stones in the history of the develop
ment of the armed helicopter, al
though events did alter some of their
recommendations. The committee felt
that the division aviation battalion,
the brigade aviation section, the ar
mored cavalry regiment, and the air
cavalry troop should have armed heli
copters. They recommended that no
aircraft
he armed with more than
one weapon system and that transport
helicopters not be armed. They set
forth three categories of weaponrylight weapons, ~rea weapons, and
point weaprms. They ako pointed up
the necessity of developing a helicop
ter weapon with an air-to-air capa
bility.
Vietnam Conflict
Just like the French in Algeria and
Indochina, we found ourselves in 1961
fighting a ragged, poorly equipped,
guerrilla enemy o~er some of tbe
worst Jungle, mountain, and ricepaddy terrain in the world. Just like
the ?&ench, we found t~t only by
using helicopters
could we move
swiftly enough to match the guerrilla
advantage jn surprise, stealth, and
initiative.
For more than a year, three com
panies of ancient CH-21s flew the
soldiers of Vietnam into battle with
tbe Viet Cong guerrillas. And then
it happened. We awoke one day to
discover that those ragged guerrillas
were shooting at our helicopters. A.Yif
by magic, machineguns began appear
ing lashed in the doorways. And tbe
cry went back to USCONARC for heli
copter armament. BY this time, how
ever, it was generally accepted that
it would be better to provide armed
8,

escort helicopters than to try to bur.

den the tired, old CH-21S with any
more weight.
By 1962 a company of UH-1 heli
copters had been mustered in Oki
nawa. Although there had been much
scurrying about in the research and
development agencies, there was still
no production-model
weapon system
for the UH-I. By a combination of
soldierly zeal and outright thievery,
the UH-Is were finally equipped with
machineguns and sent to Vietnam.
Under tbe title Utility
Tactical
Transport Helicopter Company, the
armed UH-I .s began flying shotgun
for the airmobile assauIts that the
Vietnamese Government was launch
ing against the Viet Cong.
UH.1s Successful
The armed UH-Is were an immedi
ate succesk The early IYH-IA models
were soon replaced with UH-lBS and
the homemade weapons with the
quadruple 7.62-millimeter machinegun
system. In this system, a World War
II turret mount was used to provide
flexibility to a pair of M60 light ma
chineguns. These were mounted, one
pair on each side of the helicopter,
and were aimed and fired as a unit
by a gunner seated in the copilots
seat. Later on, the utility tactical
tmmsport was also equipped with 2.75
inch rocket launchers to supplement
the fire of the machineguns.
The
SS-21 ~missiies were not used because
they were expensive and because
there were few suitable hard tar
gets to be found.
Just like the French, we had tried
machineguns,
rockets, and guided
missiles. The Viet Cong began to dis
cover that the armed UH-1s made a
great deal of noise, but that even a
ragged guerrilla
could enjoy the
, thrill of shooting at a helicopter if
MilitaryReview

I
he stayed well hidden. Fortunately,

I the guerr@as were no more accurate

~with their weapone than were the

i UJ7-Is. Suppressive
fire worked.
Aimed fire was just not within our
capabilities.
An even more shattering discovery
wae made when the Viet Cong eud
denly turned UP with some .50-caliber
machineguns. Now, they could ac

SHOOTA OUCK
pression cm our senior officers in Viet
nam. Reports began flowing to Wash
ington comparing the cost effective
ness of the armed T-.% with that of
the armed UH-1.
By 1963 there were a great many
officers who had heen to Vietnam, seen
Army hviation at work, and bleseed
the armed helicopter. With something
like two-thirds of the. Army forces

;HOOTA OUCK
trying to derive universal principles
from a very special kind of war. In
my opinion, if the trend continues,
we shall find ourselves with an avia
tion element admirably suited to fight
in Vietnamand nowhere else.
Front Page News
Because we are an airminded peo
ple, news stories are even more sen
sational if they involve the shooting
down of aircraft. Somehow the stories
conjure up memories of Eddie Ricken
hacker and the sensational air battles
of World War Ii and Korea. In Viet
nam news correspondents found a new
wrinkle. They could actually go along
as passengers in the helicopter and
thereby write, with thrilling authen
ticity, of their experiences under fire.
The supposed vulnerability
of our
helicopters became front page news;
the facts of the matter eeem to indi
cate that the problem has been over
stated.
To the layman, and even to veteran
pilots, the helicopter looks too incon
gruous to fly, It looks as though you
could throw a handful of pebbles into
itsy-otor blades and cause it to thrash
itself to pieces. Even the earliest heli
copters used for medical evacuatimr in
the Korean War put the lie to this.
Although often fired npon at pointblank range, the pilots discovered
that the bullets made neat little holes,
but that the machine went on flying.
Those early helicopters vibrated so
much under the best of circumstances
that even a rotor unbalanced by bullet
hoIes would still operate. Although
much bas been made of the vulnera
bility of the helicopters in Vietnam,
the documented facts indicate that, in
the light of hours and missions flown,
we have sustained greater losses from
materiel failure and pilot error than
we have from enemy small arms fire.
10

There is no recorded instance of a

helicopter in combat being shat dow~
by a fighter aircraft. Aside from the
fact that the helicopter is quite at
home in the nap-of-the-earth flight
regime, it is asking too much to bs.
Iieve that any fighter pilot would care
to venture among the tree limbs at
supersonic speeds to engage a ma
chine that can fly from zero to 100
knots, not to mention backwards and
sideways. Simply by using camou
flage paint on the rotor blades, the
helicopter has demonstrated that it
can be flown at treetop level virtually
undetected by tbe pilot of a highfly.
ing jet.
Needless to say, when the jet is it
self at ~a low altitude, the pilot is
hardly in a position to be looking
around for an unwary helicopter.
Yes; SAY the critics, bnt we will
have special low-performance aircraft
to use as helicopter hunters. Asids
from the fact that the feasibility of
this approach has yet to be demon
strated, one respects that the 150 to
250-knot, fixed-wing aircraft might
find itself unacceptably vulnerable to
the fires of ii,s quarry.
Infrared Weapons
Even if the helicopter manages to
~~dyr~~I~~d the acquisition ]evels of
antiaircraft
weapons,
there is still the doomsayer who feels
that
the
shoulder-fired,
infrared
weapon will end the helicopters sig
nificance on the battlefield. Admit
tedly, the infrared weapon is in its
infancy, but already tests have been
run pitting these weapons in simu
lated combat against the helicopters.
The tests were large] y discredited
when it was discovered that the only
way tbe testers could get any date
waa by requiring the helicopters to
arrive over specified pointe, at stipWitary IIeviw

~
ulated times, and then take absolutely
no evasive action.
Prior to this arrangement, the gun
ners bad been completely unsuccessful
; in even figuring out the direction
from which the helicopter was coming
&hen they heard its engine. The facte
suggest that there may be quite ade
quate means of shielding the infra
red emiesions of the helicopter. And
it might not be too optimistic to pre
dict that someone will invent a mis
sile that will home in on an infrared
weapon.
VulnerabilityMyth
The perpetrators
of the myth of
helicopter vulnerability have been un
successful in their efforts largely be
cause no one seriously believee that
there is any requirement
for the
Army aviator to be, like Achilles, in
vulnerable on the battlefield. The av
erage Army aviator, as a matter of
fact, considers himself to be far less
vulnerable than the infantry soldier
with his rifle for firepower and his
feet for mobility.
There might he, however, some
compelling questions that need an
swere in the area of the vulnerability
of a helicopter to an enemy armed
helicopter, It is thie question that hae
puzzled some of the best minds in the
armies, of Germany,
France,
and
Britain. One can only surmiee that
it is also the subject of thought on the
other side of the Iron Curtain.
Oddly enough, one of the major un
solved problems in helicopter arma
ment ie the question of who ehould
operate the weapon. By operate, I
mean the total tasktarget
acquisi
tion, aiming, and firing the weapon.
The simplest
helicopter
weapon
syetems are the MI and M$? systems
on the OH-19 and OH-29 observation
helicopters. These are dual, fqed,
September19S5

SHOOTA DUCK

machinegun systems which are aimed

and tired by the pilot who simply
points his helicopter in the direction
of a target and pressee the trigger to
fire. By interspersing
ball ammuni
tion with tracer bullets, the pilot can
bring the stream of bullets around
and o~ the targetas long as they
last.
Sighting System
The 2.75-inch rockete are also fixed,
but operation of the eystem requires
the services of both the pilot and his
copilot or gunner. Lack of an ade
quate sighting system for the rockete
has usually necessitated
having a
machinegun mounted to assiet in lay
ing the rockets.
The SS-11 wire-guided missile ia
fired entirely by someone other than
the pilot. This is aleo true of the lf6
quadruple
machinegun system. The
latter, though, can be fired by the
pilot in the fixed, but not in the flex
ible, mode.
There are cogent reaeons for argu
ing that the beet syetem is one
which places the weapon in the
hands of the pilot. On the other eide
are the advocates of using a copilot
or gunner, thus leaving the pilot free
to fly, navigate, and observe. Need
less to say, tbe problem of who will
shoot has not yet been resolved.
Aside from the arguments regard
ing the kind of weapon best suited
for arming a helicopter, there is the
less obvious problem of whether the
weapon should be rigidly mounted on
the longitudinal axia of the helicop
terse certain Marine Corps experte
contend-or
whether
the weapon
should be flexible in both azimuth
and elevatiouas the French insist.
Again, it seems sufficient to point out
that the problem still exists.
A more complex problem is involved

SHOOTA DUCK
with the question of how to teach heli
copter gunnery. Aside from the fact
that no one really knows the best way
to do this, it should be evident that
the training problems will vary from
weapon system to weapon system and
. from pilot-trainee to gunner-trainee.
Besides, there are today more than
6,000 rated aviators who have never
fired any kind Qf weapon from any
kind of helicopter. It would certainly
be difficult to estimate the order of
magnitude of the training problem
when we have ~ large numbers of
armed helicopters, not to mention
three or four different weapon sys
tems.
Surely, some research in the selec
tiOn and motivation of armed heli
copter pilots will be necessary. Not
every aviator will want to be a
tiger; not all who do will have the
aptitude. The heterogeneous aviation
unit may not be the ideal environment
for a daring and aggressive armed hel
icopter pilot. This is not to suggest
that the only choice is to be a tiger
or a pussycat, hut it is certainly true
that the average aviation unit is thor
oughly imbued with tbe idea of safe
flyi~
These and other organizational
problems may add weight to consid
eration of homogeneous light observa
tion helicopter and utility tactical
transport companies. It is far more
likely that tbe necessary esprit de
corps could be fostered in a unit in
which all tbe aviators had received
the same indoctrination and training.
If one grants tbe premises that
have been presented, it becomes pos
sible to single out one, perhaps over
riding, problemthat of what kind

12

of weapon, what kind of training, and

what kind of tactics to use when the
armed helicopter, on same future bat
tlefield, meets an enemy armed heli
copter. We can justify tbe arming of
a helicopter for self-clef ense and even
for offensive tactics. It is even pOs
sible to hope that our technology wiO
permit the resolution of the questions
about who should handle the weapon
and whether it should be fixed or flex
ible. We can surely decide, in time,
whether rockets are better than mis
siles and whether ball ammunition is .
better than explosive warheads.
One recalls the old cliche that the
best weapon to use against a tank is
another tank. Will this be the only
answer to the ultimate problem of
armed helicopter versus armed heli
copter ? If it is, then it is time to de
sign antihelicopter weaponsj develop
helicopter:fighting
tactics, and train
pilots in helicopter-to-helicopter com
bat.
Certainly, we must recognize that
there are many unresolved problems
in weaponry, tactics, doctrine, and
organization. But our past efforts will
have been in vain and the lives of the
men lost in Vietnam will have been
wasted if our helicopters are shot out
of the air the first time they run up
against
an enemy who is also
equipped with armed helicopters.
&rf it j~ true that the hardest part
of solving a problem is recognizing it,
then let us recognize it. Let us con
cede that it exists; let us direct the
efforts of our scientiata, our indus
tries, our tacticians, and our pilots
toward finding the best weapon, the
best tactics, the best way to shoot a
duck if you are that duck.

MilitarfReview

h.

. *
w

KltfESTHETIC
WARFARE
Modefor the Future Colonel Robert B. Rig% United States Armg

VOLVING in the veh~cles, weap

ons, and military means that
American technology promises to pro
duce ie a slightly new form of land
warfare that may someday be termed
kinesthetic, This form of warfare has
its roots in blitzkrieg, but blitzkrieg
is to the past and present what kines
thetic warfare is to the future.
t
0 1966 by Colonel
Robert
B. Rigg.
AllRiEhbReserved.

September
1965

Kinesthetic warfare is not alone

ultraswift
motion and impact, it is
aIso perception. Thus, the foundation
of such a mode of warfare would reet
not only on unusual mobility PIUSfire
power, but also on a high order of ,
reconnaissance,
modernized
target
acquisition means, and military in
telligence. The term and concept of
kinesthetic is derived from kinesthe
13 ,

KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
sia meaning originality: kimein, to
move + aisthi%+is, perception.
It might appear that this is a trite
play on words or semantic doodling.
Actually, it is not, for the basic term
is descriptive of a form of future
warfare that will be:
Best suited for a war of quick
decision.
Served
by vehicles, weapons,
and means yet to come,
Four-DimensionalCombat
Kinesthetic Warfare will be rapid
movement, maneuver, and destruction
by virtue of its rapid target finding
and sensing. This form of warfare is
four-dimensional
in character:
It is
ultraperceptive in its first dimension.
It is through the air in its second.
Thus, in consequence to these, its
third dimensicm is velocity, while its
fourth is shock impact.
In combat ar hitecture, then, these
dimensions cot! bine to where the
shockpower and Iimpact of certain US
Army forces w Auld be multiplied on
the battleground
in disproportional
favor to their numerical strength.
These forces, designed for deep-in
pehtrations
of rapid order and vioe
Ience, would be so organized,
quipped, armed, and transported as to
permit them to operate with more
precision and speed than the normaI
and heavier combat forces.
Colonel Robert B. Rigg is with the
US Armu Combat Development
CO*
mand Institute
of Advanced
Studies,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
Dur
ing World War 11 he served in Eu
rope as a military observer with So
viet Army
units
and other Allied
mi{itarrj
forcee. He is a graduate
of
the United States Arm~ War College,
and wrw previously
a88&tL?d
to the
stafl of the Commander
in Chief,
.Pa@c.
14

In a sense, one may ask: 1s this

just blitzkrieg
with better equip.
ment ? No, not quite the case.
Blitzkrieg Warfare
Blitzkrieg is not eempletely sya.
orrymous with kinesthetic
warfare
because the latter embraces not only
ultraswift motion, but also extreme
depth of operation and perception,
This brand of perception would em
brace much more ra~id, accurate, and
automated reconnaissance and intel
ligence than we have today. Once such!
a perception system is attained, it
wouId produce unusuaI arrays of
deep-in targets well in the enemys
rear areas.
Whereas in the past an airborue
division jumped deep inside enemy
territory to attack one target area for
a few days, future striking forces of
the type, envisioned would be able to
attack several deep-in targets in the
same few days. These forces, for ex.
ample, should be able to engage, ea
circle, destroy, and disengage rapidly.
Falsely implied here may be hit-and
run tactics. On the ccertrary, the re.
Iated tactics would be deep in, bit
finish, and runand only in an ex
treme circumstance,
hit and mu
where survival becomes paramount.
The con~ept of kinesthetic warfare
does not vwualize an entire army or
~ field army specially organized for
this form of combat. It does envisage
some elements of about corps size
that wouid be organized and equipped
for such combatperhaps
one els
ment per field army.
To wage kinesthetic warfare, tac
tical (air) mobility must not only be
of the highest order, but balanced and
integrated in terms of the.:
Individual
soldier.
Combat unit and system.
Logistical
unit and system.
MilitaryRoW

.?
KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
Military hisfiry provides a library
of evidetye to the effect that the
progrsss and pattern. of combat is
directly related to the excellence and
limitations of logistics. Tactical and
logistical elements must be closeIy
related in respect to air mobility.

also require organic aircraft for ite

role.
Kineethetie forces will be cost!y
eIementS in terms of materiel and
dollar investment, plus logistical support. They wiK be costly to organize
and ma~ntain, particularly
in war.

Amv N.iLIe Featwe

The foundation for kinesthetic warfare has been laid over the pact decade and a
half in the Armys buildup of Army aviation and its general quest for improved
mobility

Combat unite moved by air must be

supported logistically by air.
In general terms, the pattern envisages a field army that will have
ultramobile striking
elements, and
that these kinesthetic
combat elements will be air transported and air
supported for swift and deep strikes
of bold and multiple nature. Part of
tbe field army will largely move and
fight overlandbut
that part will
Swdmrbw 19S5

But it is essential to weigh their cost

agairmt the value of the results which
kinesthetic forces could help to attain. By virtue of their character and
mode of operation, kinesthetic forces
could serve to shorten a war.
The daily average cost of World
War II was something on the order
of 221 million dollars; the Korean
War about 91 million dollars. It may
be assumed with some degree of
15,

KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
safety that a future war of limited
nature could come to a daily average
of 150 to 200 million dollars--m an
assumed average of about 175 mil
lion dollars per day. Possessed of a
distinctly superior co~bat mobility
inherent in kinesthetic forces, a f u
ture US ArmY would{ likely shorten
a limited war. If a two-year war could
be shortened by only 46 daye, a dollar
saving of approximately
7.8 billion
dollars could be achieved. lhe saving
in human sacrifice and suffering is
obvious, and hefein lies a value that
has no dollar price tag.
While the Armys future quest for
mobiiity must be measured against
the prime objective of victoryand
an early victory, if possible--it must
also be weighed against the human
and dollar costs that would be incur
red if it had to go to war just on a
military-technological
par with an
enemy.
Foundation and Principle
The foundation for kinesthetic war
fare has been laid over the past dec
ade and a half in the Armys Resea~ch
and Development Program, its build
up f Army aviation, and its general
ques$ for Improved mobility. The llth
Air Assault Division recently tested
a component of this foundation.
There is still more to be accomplished,
developed, and proved.
In respect to new hardware and re
lated aircraft,
kinesthetic
warfare
may be a decade or two distant. But
the foundation exists today not only
in concepts, but in American military
mindsand the effort has momentum.
In essence, this effort can best be
labeled as the principle of invoking
obsolescence: endeavoring to attain
such military technological superior
ity in firepower, mobility, and intel
ligence so as to render obeole~e a large
16

segment of any enemys armament

and materiel inventory.
The US creation of a really new
tdtramodemized form of tank, for ex.
ample, could render the USSRS enthe
inventory of armor obsolete--m at
least force the Soviet Union into a
major conversion program. The crea
tion of a distinctly new and ultraper
ceptible combat intelligence system
eorrld make enemy forces much more
volnerahle than they are now. The
Armys recent air-assault tests rep
resent a step in the direction of try
ing to attain the means to fight that
will not be in the image of an enemys
meansplainly the principle of in
voking obsolescence in enemy ranks.
This principle is in motion, but it
requires continual injection
of em
phasis, originality, and imagination
that will give us more than just a tra
ditional edge or a modernized margin
of military-technological
superiority
over potential enemies. This ie espe
cially true with respect to combat in
telligence and mobility since the at
tainment of intelligence and mobility
superiority
can multiply firepower
effects and impact.
Intelligsncs Perception
For thie form of warfare ever to
be a reality, there must be consider
able advances made in the field of
intelligence
collection
0$ erational
means. Ultramobility and the ability
to penetrate deep into enemy terri
tory wiH be relatively meaningless unIees the intelligence gathering capa
bility matches up. The requirement,
then, is for long-range reconnaissance
means which are speedy, accurate,
and ultraresponsive.
What such future reconnaissance
vehicles will be, no one quite knows.
They may be embodied in earth sat
ellites and long-range Ping Pong
MilitsryReview

KINESTHETIC
WARFANE
missiles, or some new means as vet
undiscovered. The means probably
will be multiple rather than singular
in nature.
Is there hope that such sophisti
cated intelligence gathering
means
can be attained? It would seem so
considering the advancee American
technology is making. Some 15 years
ago it would have sounded outlandish
to predict that an orbiting communi
cation satellite could in one day ex
change with earth stations the num-

VS AmvJ

A future army will leap over the trsdi.

terrain and man-made harriers to
embrace a cuuntry or continent within
a ahurt capsule of time

tiOiIal

ber of worde equal to 6,000 novels.

This the Courier experimental satel
lite did in 1960.
What else is needed to make kines
thetic warfare a reality? Tbe answer
lies in a yet to be created family of
air vehicles. Kinesthetic warfare re
quires the depth of military penetra
tion in combat at least equal to pres
ent-day airborne troops. Such forcee
Mitlember
1965

mnst be able to strike deep in. Beyond

this, kinesthetic forces must have a
second-wind mobility which airburne
troups do not poseess.
Second-wind mobility meane that
troops uperating deep in enemy terri
tory must be capable of moving tac
tically by-their own organic air means
to attack a geries of objectives. Since
these forces must pussess such mubil
ity unce delivered, it is axiomatic that
their tactical vehicles be air vehicles.
Thus, the aircraft for such a fight
ing force would be of fuur general
categories:
Armed
tactical tranaport
air
craft ,,carrying cumbat troops.
Air-to-giound
attack
aircraft
for the traditional air suppurt ru~e,
but traveling with the tactical forma
tions.
Logistical transport
aircraft.
Interceptor
aircraft.
Aircraft Profiles
Certain general aircraft
profiles
can index the future requirements.
One approach to attain better than
foot or ground vehicular mobility is
the concept of placing each individual
soldier in a su-called flying platform
or its future equivalent. Except for
special purpose units, this concept
should be largely discarded. Profile
number one, then, takes the form uf
individual flying platforms for special
purpose use in mountains and jungles,
but the over-all military-air
invest
ment will not be in large swarms of
these vehicles.
Profile number two cuuld be in sev
eral imagea. These images could
range from small team air vehicles to
combat unit transports
of heavier
variety. The fm%er would embrace a
flying platform or vertical takeoff
landing-short
takeoff and landing
(VTOL-STOL)
craft
carrying
a
17

KINESTHETIC
WARFARE
three-man gun crew and pilot gunner,
whereas the latter image would be a
vehicle that could carry up to a pla
toon of riflemen or an equivalent load.
Dual.Purpose Armament
Both images should be compatible
in speed, hut the smaller vehicle
should be able to land in almost the
space of the vehicle itself. Both should
have dual-purpose
armamentma
chineguns, recoilless rifles, or other
weapons that are mounted in the air
craft for air-to-ground fire and yet
can be of the breakaway type which
can be conveniently removed from the
vehicle for ground fighting use.
In present-day terms, one can vis
ualize the so-called flying saucer as
the first image, and the larger STOL
VTOL aircraft as the second. These
are but the prototypes of the more
sophisticated
vehicles requiredand
to come.
A third profile may suggest itself
in the form of a much larger capacity
air vehicle. This concept should be
rejected, however, because we do not
want large packages of men and ma
teriel in one aerial basket to the point
whWe the enemy is given just a few,
large, profitable targets. Instead, it is
better to place the military eggs in
multiple baskets, thus reducing single-shot liabilities. At the same time,
we would be protecting
ourselves
more by providing masses of targets
to the enemy rather than a few large
ones.
Since kinesthetic forces would be
entirely supplied by air, a logistical
cmgo aircraft of some form is neces
sary. The crane-type helicopter with
a detachable cargo pod is presently a
possible prototype, but other aircraft
designs could emerge in the future.
In kinesthetic warfare, supplies would
be both dropped and air landed,
18

Supplies to be dropped will not al.

ways parachute
down. Technology
promises to improve on the parachute,
and it may be that revolving packagw
can be developed to slow vertical de.
scent of supplies as nature has done
in the spinning seed of a maple tree.
Landing supplies by aircraft will
be carried out by STOL or VTOL
aircraft, a process that will have dual
value where evacuation of casualties
and selected prisoners represents the
return load.
Additionally, drone aircargo car.
riers may become a reality; they
could be template flown by remote
computers, and would be very useful
on the more dangerous missions.
Interceptor
aircraft
would form
the tactical air command umbrella to
keep enemy aircraft off the back of
kinesthetic forces. It would be desir
able for such aircraft to have the
duality to serve also as air-to-ground
attack vehicles.

Drone Reconnaissance Vehicles

Since a high order of intelligence
is necessary to secure profitable tar
gets for kinesthetic war task forces,
the importance of drone reconnais
sance aircraft and missiles is evident.
Over and above just seeking to find
and report enemy targets by such
means is an additional goal for which
we should strive.
Plainly, the concept of one machine,
man, or means finding a target, and
another man and weapon system
shooting and destroying that target, ,
is going to become largely obsolete
in the future. The requirement, then,
will be to combine the seeing eye re
connaissance vehicle with a destruc
tive weapon to create a single pack
age capable of performing both func
tions.
The combat reconnaissance drone
MilitaryReview

KINESTHETIC WARFARE
of the future must not be
viewed alone in isolation boOth teym~
of a single characteristic,
but in
twins of the complete combat cycle
of find, fix, and deetroy. The creation
of these weapone would place some
segmente of combat in a stage ad
vsnced even beyond kinesthetic war
fsre, a tactical stage that might be
termed remote-control warfare. For
strategic distances at fixed targets,
we already have this in the intercon
tinental ballistic missile. But for tac
tical and operational level warfare
and against moving targets, we do not
have this complete package.
Some futurs army is going to fight
with certain portions of its men in
or missile

swarms of low-flying aircraft, leap.

ing the traditional terrain and man.
made barriers to arrive at multiple
points of its own chooeing, departing
from these destructive
scenee to
sweep and swarm in order to create
others. This will be kinesthetic war.
fare, fotw-dimensional combat of a
swift and violent nature that will see
military forces embrace a country or
continent within a short capsule of
time. This is the essence ofia concept
pureued today in the United Statee,
because US Army planners adhere to
this rather singular but traditional
goalwe do not want to fight in the
came image and terms of any of our
potential enemiee.

As a general rule, we visualize the future battlefield as one requiring

more dispersion and greater mobility, employing either nuclear or corrven
tiond operations.
We must alsn consider the possibility of employment of
Army forces in counterinsurgency operations in remote areas of the world.
To accomplish these missinns effectively certain advances in tirepnwer are
required.
Major

General

Frank

T. Mildren

.
$eptcmbor
1965

19

AIR MOBILITY

AND

GROUND FORCES

Colonel Wladimir A. de Favitski,

Fi

IREPOWER now dominates the

uclear battlefield, shaping all
doctrine and dictating tbe employ
ment of ground units. There is at
least a possibility, however, that this
may not always he the case. The ad
vent of the new airmobile forces may
restore to maneuver many of the tac
tical opportunities
which have thus
far heen considered out of the ques
t ion.
Nuclear weapons are not equally ef
fective in all tactical circumstances.
In order to achieve a high order of
destruction, they must be used against
forces which have concentrated and
present a signithnt
tiarget density.
No ,enemy commander will consider
20

French

Arm#

such a concentration unless he has

to do it in order to fuRill his assigned
mission.
It is possible to force him to con.
eentrate by opposing him with ones
own strong, concentrated force, but
this, in turn, creates a lucrative tar.
cet which the enemv commander mav
Th18 article was translated
and
digested from the original, pub
lished in LABM$E (France) Feb
ruary 1965, under th title,

A6
ro?nobilitc$ et Forces Terrestres.
Translation
by Mr. LaVergne
Dale, Leavenworth,
Kansas.
Colonel de Favit8ki ie amrigned
to the French
Armv
General
Staff.

MilitaryReview

.:)
AIR MOBILITV
choose to attack with his own nuclear
weapons. The price that must be paid
for strength is increased vulnerabil
ity; the longer it lasts, the more dan
gerous it is. Alrmobile forces, can
greatly decrease this vulnerability by
making it possible to concentrate
quickly, engage the enemy, and then
rapidly disperse.
MobililYand Vulnerability
Greater speed also provides in
creased security
in exploiting the
neutralization obtained with nuclear
weapons. Exploitation forces must be
highly mobile in order to obtain max
imum profit from the neutralization
effect of this fire and to avoid the
nuclear reactions of the adversary.
Groundmobile units, always hampered
by the natural difficulties of the ter
rain, are likely to move even slower
on a nuclear battlefield which is dotted
with contaminated zones and obstacles
created by nuclear explosions.
The reserve, aiways a vital part of
tbe commanders plans, must also be
able to move rapidly. In a system built
up around the tactical nuclear weapon,
the meet dependable reserve is con
stituted by the nuclear weapons avail
able. But there are cases in which the
commander must use conventional
troop reservee,
particularly
when
forces infiltrate his position or units
become so interlocked with friendly
forces that nuclear bursts are unsafe.
Tbe reeerve has to intervene in
time. Considering the size of the zones
of action in nuclear operations, the
increased terrain difficulties, and the
time required to assemble dispersed
units, there is reason to doubt the
usefulness of earthbound
reserves.
They may be able to do no more than
secure small zones adjncent to their
assembly areas. Outside these zones,
it will be necessary to cdl on mobile
September1905

reserves unaffected by terrain obsta

cles.
The vulnerability of forces tied to
the ground deserves some attention.
Even when they are dispersed, Iarge
ground units are faced with a di
lemma. If they disperse enough to
avoid being neutralized by nuclear
weapons, they will be incapable of
defeating the enemy in ground combat.
To be sure, the increase of armor
and tbe possibilities of digging in of
fer some unite reasonable chances of
surviving the devastating salvos of
the adversary. But it will never be
more than random nnits, and the co
herent structure of the parent organi
zation will have dieappeared.
Airmolrile Units

Although tbe aircraft of airmohile

units are more fragile, they will actu
all y be less vulnerable to nuclear fires
because of the rapidity with which
they can concentrate and disperse, and
because of the suddenness with which
they can ehift their combst power.
They could, in fact, remain dispersed
until the moment of their interven
tion, thus eliminating any possibility
of nuclear damage. As targets, they
would be too fleeting to be destroyed.
The ways to escape from the paths
beaten by the track vehicles appear
to converge in the direction of air mo
bilityin the domaiu which extends
from just above tbe surface of the
ground to the tops of the cottonwoods.
Experiments dealing with this mat
ter have already been conducted for
several years in tbe United States, and
tbe problem is being studied in Yiet
nam where helicopter-borne
opera
tions are a normal occurrence. In
other armies, efforts are being made
to, perfect a combat helicopter capa
ble of fulfilling at least a part of the
missions now assigned to tanks. New

AIR MOBILITY

methods such as air-cushion vehicles,

ducted propeller,
and flexible wings
are being tested and could lead to new
typss of airmobile vehicles.
In view of the rapid progress being
made in the formation of airmobile
units, it seems fitting to attempt to
define as accurately as possibk the role
of this adaptation of ground forces.
- We have already noted that, al
though the airmobile forces have less
than
other
over-all
vulnerability
ground forces, their materiel is much
more vulnerable. Furthermore,
air
craft cannot yet navigate adequately
under all conditions of weather and
visibility. Nor can these airmobile
forces secure the ground as well as
conventional units. Moreover, the nu
clear vulnerability of ground units re
sults from the need to concentrate and
the lack of means to do it quickly.
These considerations suggest a for
mula for ground forces, at some ech
elon, which wouk! associate:
Mechanized
units with an am
phibious capability to hug tbe terrain
and control axes and corridors fav
orable to tanks, while infantry in hel
icopters or fixed-wing airplanes per
form the same task in zones not suit
able for )arge, mechanized units.
airmobile
units
Low-altjtude,
equipped with air-to-surface missilee
capable of rapidly concentrating fwe
power at a given point, and dispersing
before tbe enemy can react.

22

The task of the mechanized units

would be reconnaissance and harass
ment. Units would be so dispersed and
so fluid that they would not constitute
targete which could be seized or at
tacked with nuclear fire. They would
have lese firepower than the airmobile
units whose task would be sudden,
brief, and violent intervention.
Both categories of forces comple
ment each other, and their close coor
dination within the ground forces as
a whole is needed.
Even this cursory examination of
air mobility reveals that the list of
problems still unresolved is a king one,
It includes these important ones:
The capabilities
and lim / tations
of air mobility.
The relative importance of air
mobile forces within
the ground
forces.

.
The echelon at which they should
be employed with conventional forces.
The organization
and equipmsnt
of the airmobile unit.
More advanced studies may show
that todays solution would end in an
impasse in the foreseeable future, or
they may conclude that airmobile
forces will once again return maneu
ver to its former tactical importance.
What is needed now is to take the
next step in development and to pre
pare for the future. It is not only
trees that require 20 years for growth.

MilitaryREVIEW

SECOND
THOUGHTS
ONWAR

A ConversationWith B. H. I.jddell Hart

Brian Bond

This gear marks a notewo?lhy

stage in the long career of Cap
Hart, British Army, Retired. His 70th birthdag
will be honored by a Festschrift
edited by Professor Michael Hozu
ard; his memoirs mill be published in two volumes; and this month
ke ?uill be in the United Stutes as Distinguished
Visiting
Profes
sor at the University
of California.
In this conversatio?t
he answers questions
by Brian Bond, lec
on various aePects of his
turer in History at Liverpool University,
thinking on military matters. Mr. Bond is the author of Some At
tractions
and Pitfalls
of Military
History
which a?JPeaved in the
February
1965 iesue of the MILITARYREvIEw.-t?ditor.

tain B. H. Liddell

September1965

23

Tfffstf6tfTS ON WAN
BOND

hr 1944 you published a stimulating book entitled THOUGHTS ON WAR

which embodied the essence of your military thinking between the
wars. In the Preface you remarked that this wss a necessary prelimi.
nary to an ultimate complete synthesis. Has the revolutionary change
in the whole nature of war marked by the development of nuclear
weapons made you feel that a general survey on Ilausewitzian fines
is no longer worth attempting?

. .

LIDDELL
HART

Certainly such a survey would now be mainly nf historical interest.

since the explosion of the first atemic bombs in 1S45, the theory of
war has been in a state of flux, and in my view the traditional notion
-of la grande guerre is as dead as a doernail. Nevertheless, a compre
hensive study ef strategy on Clarrsewitziarr lines could well aid the
process of readjustment to modern conditions of fimited warfare. I
sherrld still like to attempt such a study if time, and age, allow.

THOUGHTS ON WAR revealed how assiduously you developed and chis

eled away at your ideas through regular notebook jottings. I know
you are still an indefatigable recorder of thoughts and conversations,
and I wonder how your present concerns compare with those of the
1920s and 1930s. I have in mind that in those days you were a mili.
tary correspondent trying to influence events from day to day, whereas
now your position is one of greater detachment. I would expect your
main interests now to be with historical reappraisals?

BOND

LIODELL

BONO

24

HART

Yes, you are right on the mark. To put it mildly, I find much of the
writing on contemporary milita~ affairs full of jargon and repetition
+-n short, boring. since World War N, 1 have frequently set out my
views on the most hopeful strategy for the West, and these have
come to be adopted after a thne. But it is a tedious process, and I
find more interest in the reappraisal of historical events.

In 1934 you noted: The more 1 study war, the more I come to feel
that the cause of war is fundamentally psychological rather than PO
Iitical or economic. . . . Until we understand war in the fullest
Military

Review

THOUWITS

ON WAR

sense which involves an understanding of men in war, among other

elements, it seems to me that we can have no more prospect of pre

venting war than the savage has of preventing plague.

Would you agree that there is still a dearth of books which imagi
natively and successfully portray mens reactions in war? I sometimes
think that THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE remains unsurpassed althougli,
of course, Stephen Crane was not writing from experience.

lIDDELL HART

Well, harclly a dearth. i think you overvalue THE RED BADGE OF COURAGE for, althoogh I would still include it in recommended reading lists
as a remarkable work of imagination, I have reservations about it
which probably arise because Crane then lacked a firsthand experience
of battle.
The bock which particularly exerted a formative influence on my
thoughtas a complement te my own experience in the First Werld
Warwas Ardant du Picqs BATTLE STUDIES: AHCIEHT AND MODERN
BATTLE. Ferdinand Fochs book on THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR put me
on to Ardant du Picq, and I read him (in French, I think) about 1920.
This was before the spate of war beoks sirch as C. E. Montagues
DISENCHANTMENT, and it clicked with my ewn reflections. It stressed,
for example, that, despite all the talk and propaganda, swords and
bayonets rarely crossed in action-battles
were decided, rather, in
the troops minds.
Of modern writers, S. L. A. Marshall, in books like PORK CHOP HILL
and THE RIVER ANO THE GAUNTLET, is particularly good in conveying
the feel of combat. I do have reservations about the possibility of
such detailed reconstructions of battlefield events because of my ex
perience of the faltitrility of human memory-which
natorally tends to
be all the greater when witnesses are trying to recollect .exactfy what
happened in the heat of action. With a fast-moving tight, the difficulty
increases. But I immensety admire Slam Marshalls work on such
case histories-better
work than anyone else has done in that way.

BOND

I wonder if you still believe that philosophers wo~d make the best
rulers? I doubt whether men without the lust for power would do even
as well in office as those with it; after all, in any realistic setting, they
would be subject to enormous pressures from discontented and ambi
tious contenders. Do you think you yourself would have been corrupted
by power if you had held, say, an important hfinistry in the 1930s or
1940s?

Septembsr1965

25

.
THOUGHTS

ON WAR

.LIODELL HART

Not professional philosophers, But I would stand by what 1 then wrote,

You put it too strongly in saying a lust for power; I would say, rather,
a liking for responsibility. So many men are worriad by responsibility
and find it weighs on them, whereas I have never felt this wax indeed,
I should have always welcomed more of it.
I would also make a distinction between wanting to exercise effective
influence and wanting to hold office-its the tendency to covet and
then cling to office that corrupts. As for my own career, I think I was
fairly realistic. It was Lestie Here-Belishas compromises on key is.
sues, in the hepe of easing acceptance of the general policy of reform
and modernization, that stultified the effect of Ids efforts without
appeasing his critics. He came to recognize that himself in retrospect,
after his removal from the War Office.

BONO

Arent you really asking for wise professional politicians who will seek
expert advice?

LIOOELL HART

Yes, even a philosopher in my sense would need a suitable team of

coworkers-men who weuld be mentally and merally ready to recoin.
mend radical change instead of sitting on the fence. I have made this
point strongly whenever I have been approached in recent years about
undertaking an official task in Whitehall.

\
BONO

in 1936 you noted that gas was playing a decisive part in the Italian
conquest of Ethiopia. It has always puzzled me why gas was not em
ployed in the Second World War. Is this a curious case where popular,
antiwar sentiment and emotionalism has prevented the use of a rela
tively indestructive weapon, or do you think soldiers and governments
have been restrained by more practical considerations?

LIDDELL HART

A mixture of reasons and feelings. Between the wars, conventionafiq

was the dominant factor, and in this respect it is significant that
little was don~ to develop nonlethal types of gas. During the Second
World War mutual deterrence was the main explanatio~ both sides
knew the other had new lethal gases available, and there were also

26

Military Review

THOUGHTS

ON WAR

many practical problems which were thought to outweigh possible ad

vantages.

The same considerations apptied to what is called strategic bombing

-direct attack on industrial targets and tha opposing peoples morale.

N would only Ire urdcashed if either side thought it had an overwhelm

ing advantage.

BONO

The moral issues involved in strategic bombing seem to me hopelessly

muddled on the British side.

IIDDELL HART

1 quite agree. Indeed, Adolf Hitler was more restrained at first and
concentrated on specific military objectives, whereas the British
started area bombing, and pure terror bombing, in a thoughtless, as
WON as ruthless, way. Hitler gave repeated warnings over the bomb.
ingof Berlin before hestruck tiackat London. Also, the Germans took
more care to avoid cultural objectives than we did.

N was only after the destruction of the lovely medieval towns of Lu

heck and Restocktargets chosen because they were so inflammable
and undefendedthat Hitler started Ids Baedeker raids on cities like
Exeter and Canterbury. He naively expected the British Government
to be deterred by these reprisals, on the mistaken supposition that
the English were culture minded.

<
BOND

I think the destruction of Oxford and Cambridge would have appalled

thegovernment,
andlmsurprised
they were spared.

UDDELL HART

I doubt it. Besides Lubeck and Restock, we devastated Cologne, Oresden, and Rouen. Bonn wasaparticularly
scandalous example-it was
of no military significance, but happened to suit the test conditions
of a new radar device, called G-H, which we wanted to try out.
Incidentally, I think Noble Franklands recent book on THE BOMBING
OFFENSIVE AGAINST GERMANY is an axcellent summary, but it rather
glides over the moral issue. i wouid also question hisviawtbat
the
traditional objectives of theenemys armed forces stillheldgood
in
an age of airpower.

$erdanrher1965

27

THOUGHTS

ON WAR

BOND

It seems to me that airborne forces in World War II fell far short of

the potential achievements which YOU anticipated in the late 1930s
What was the reason for this, and how would YOU assess the value of
airborne forces at the present time?

LIOOELL HART

Your opening remark rather astonishes me. If You look UP in THE M. I

FENCE OF BRITAIN, or my THOUGHTS ON WAR, I think You will see
that airborne forces did not fall short of the potential achievements
that I anticipated but, rather, exceeded them. Wherever surprise was
attained, and while it persisted, they achieved dramatic results in
capturing key points behind the enemys front and thus paving the
way for the advance of the armored forces. The invasion of Belgium
and the Netherlands in May 1940 were the most striking examples.
The basic limitation of airborne forces is that, once they are dropped,
their mobifity disappears, and their power to hold the points tFrey
capture depends on whether, and how soon, they can be reinforced.
As to the present prospect for airborne forces, I would say that both
their value and their timitations remain. If suitably used; and if they
can be quickly reinforced, they are the best possible thr.opener~
Moreover, their value can be increased by the development of trarw
port aircraft, or of hovercraft, that are capable of carrying something
more powerful than fight tanks.

BOiO

THOUGHTS ON WAR reveals in a concentrated form your habitual con

tern to make every sentence tell. It abounds in sinuous imagery, puns,
paradoxes, and sentences that are concentrated and nutty, that sut
:
gest more than they say; and which leap out at the readers eye and
I
sink deeply into his memory. The nearest stylistic comparison that
comes to mind is Henry D. Thoreau, the author of WALOEN, OR LIFE
IN THE WOOOS, although you do not share his metaphysical intent.
Have there, in fact, been any models for your style?

LIOOELL HART

None at all. My aim has always been to be as intelligible as possible.

General sir Ivor Maxse impressed this on me early in my career in
an amusing way. He used to say It has got to be clear to ordinary
soldiers, and even bloody fools. When I drafted a new paper for him
he would ring for Ids aide.de.campl saying with a cbrsckle, If he can
understand it, anyone will.

20

Military Fiefiew
I

TiiOtJSHTS ON WAR

b
..

BOND

Two comments on my style particularly pleased meJohn Buchans

remark that I was a master of metaphor; and Samuel J. Hoares that
1 possessed the un-English gift of generalisation. But, on the whole,
my prose style has been tbe product of constant practice in chiseling
away, like a sculptor, at tbe material. I have never tried to imitate or
borrow from other writers.

I feel that your thoughts on war were written on the assumption that
they could be useful in preparing officers for command in the next war.
Would there be any pointor, indeed, possibility-of
writing such a

book today?

lIOOELL HART

Well, that was always part of tbe object, hut my basic aim bas been
to show, and urge, tbe value of thinking more clearly and cooly aboot
warin tbe deep conviction that, if yoo wish for peace, you must
understand war. I dont think there would be much point in writing to
instruct officers in the techniques of command in modern conditions,
but, on the higher level of operational direction, books of tbe kind I
write are as relevant as ever.

BOND

tin the 1930s you frequently expressed regret about the lack of good
military history books, remarking for example: !The field of military
history is, on the whole, a peculiarly barren one. The soil is stony and
the tillage poor. The main reason for this, in your opinion, was that
the subject had been left largely to soldiers. Would you agree that
things are much better now and, if so, why?

LIOOELL HART

There has certainly been a marked improvement, and the reason is

simply that there are better brains in tbe field. For example, tbe Brit
ish and United States official histories of tbe Second World Waral
thougb far from faultless-are

at least written by scholars with a

sound academic training. Soldiers who lack any such training1 was
indebted to some of my teachers at Cambridge-are

apt to have dif- F

ficulty in developing tbe historical point of view.

.
September1965

2a.

.
THOUGHTS

ON WAR.

BONO

More tffan once you suggest that commander$ might read works of
military fiction with profit, such as for ideas on the use of ruses, I
know you have admired books by Frederick Britten Austin, John Bu.
than, and C. E. Montague for this reason, but can you recommend any
published since 1945?

LIOOELL HART

For tactical instruction I would add to the fist Sir Ernest Ounlop Swin.
ton and Bernard Newman. Strategically, and prophetically, Britten Aus
tiits books were of outstanding value to students of military history,
and its a pity he is now so little read. The First World War produced ,
a large number of works of fiction which were worth reading from
the professional officers point of view.
I find it difficult to think of comparable books written since t945. I
rate Wilfiam Oenis Johnstons NINE RIVERS FROM JOROAN highly, and
there are several interesting ones on the French Army such as Paul.
Henri Simons PORTRAIT OF AN OFFICER. But as with an earlier ques
tion, tbe answer seems to be that conditions have, changed so drasti
cally that few fiction writers are concerned any longer to inculcate
practical lessons.

BOND

Between the wars, one of your preoccupations was to reduce the av

erage age of generals who would command in the event of war. YOU
demonstrated by historical analysis that the great majority of famous
generals had been under 45 at the time of their triumph, and pre.
dietedvery accurately, I thinkthat 46 would be about the limit
for successful field commanders in the coming war. Is this one of the
lessons of history that has been learnedfor example, in the British
Army of the 1960s?

LIDDELL HART

30

Partially learned, but no more. In peacetime, promotion inevitably

slows down, bowever it may have accelerated in war. The factor of
age is taken into account more than it was before 1939 although, of
course, the desirabifify of young commanders has to be reconciled
with the problem of providing a worthwhile career for officers as a
whole. During Here-Befishas tenure of the War Office, we were able
to reduce the average age in the top posts from 63 to 53. My own
target was 43, and I was well aware that a 10 years reduction was
not enoogh, although it was the utmost possible on financial grounds.

Militarytlcviw

THOUGHTS

BOND

You need some kind of

French

Revolution

purge

a Joseph

to

get

that

type

of officer

ON WAR
corpsa

Stalin.

.
IIOOELL HART

In this respect, the new states that have surunr? up since 1945 have
an enormeus advantage. I suppose the Israeli a~med services provide
the outstanding example of a young, and progressive, officer cerps
where men can reach the top in their early thirties.

BONO

In 1903 General Sir Ian Hamilton made the incredibly bold suggestion
that the army would benefit tremendously if all its officers could have
university training, preferably before being commissioned. Thirty years
later
of
and

you

advocated

university
the

right

that

;fellowships

the
to

perspectiveto

services
enable
study

should

pro.~ising

provide

the

officers

to get

equivalent
t~me

war.

have been made in thi: direction,

Since 1945 some token gestures

but the military authorities still seem to doubt the value of a period

of academic study as distinct from the professional training offered

at the Royal Staff College. From the national viewpoint, I em sure

such officers would be an invaluable stimulus in the universities.

LIDOELL HART

I entirely agree. The British Army remains sadly backward in ita atti
tude to the higher educatien of efficers. In 1937 I urged that entry
into the army fer officers should be entirely through the universities
the courses being subsidized by the stateinstead of through the
military colleges. War came while the matter was still under discus
sion, and nowadays the number of university entries is much lower
than between the wars.
In the United Statea it is commonplace for officers to take a degree,
and a considerable number work for a Ph. O. I know of one now spend.
ing three years studying fer a Ph. O. en armered warfare. Many of the
officers who study at St. Antonys College, Oxford, consult meis-.
raelis, Frenchmen, Germans, and Australians. But I have not ceme
upon any British efficers who are taking such a degree.
Your secendary peint is also importantthe universities would Un.
deubtedly benefit from a Ieavaning of mature men who would previde
variety and stimulus to the undergraduates of today, who mostly have
come straight from schoel.

September 1SS5

31,

THOU6HTS

OH WAR

BOND

In rereading THOUGHTS ON WAR, I have often been struck by the

similarity between your outlook and that of Bertrand Russell. AH your
writing is permeated by a faithor hopein mans capacity to rea.
son unemotionally and objectively, particularly in all questions where
the use of force

is concerned.

It must

have

been

very

difficult,

indeed,

preserve such an optimistic outlook in the period between the wars.

How much confidence have you now in the mental outlook of the men

to

responsible

LIODELL HART

BOND

defense

of this

country

and of the West?

It was, indeed, difficult to remain optimisfio between the wars, but

as my THOUGHTS ON WAR reveal, I was then more hopeful of making
converts by persistently arguing my points in what still seems te me
a restrained manner. From what I hear, things have not improved much,
if at all. Perhaps there is a better realization of the need for objet.
tive thinking-less
trade unionism among officers. But against this
there are now so many checks on free expression due te security aod
censorship that things seem worse now than 30 years ago. In the
f930s the War Office complained about the unconventional views of
writers like myself and J. F. C. Fuller, but at least they usually let
them pass and be published.

Finally,

a very

personal

question.

In 1934

you wrote:

As one matures

become more critical and at the sama time more chari

table. Has this broadly been your own experience
ovar the 30 years
since you wrote those words?
one

LIDDELL

for the

HART

should

I think it has, but that is hardly for me to say. You most ask my wife .
and secretaries. They seem to think that Jm apt to be too charitable
and too lavish of my time over other peoples manuscripts. J think the
difference in my attitude today compared with when I was composing
those THOUGHTS ON WAR is that then I tended to assume that people
could learn to think objectively about history and wan now, I just ac
cept that few people can reason objectively about anything. 1 stilt
strive to pursue that aim, but I see the absurdities of life more than
I did. i have come to see its nonsense, but one must try to five as if
it could make sense.
\

32

Military

Rsvieir
I

INTE1lIGENCE
KEYTOVICTORY
Lieutenant Colonel Fielding L. Greaves, United States Armg

LINDMANS Buff is a chil~s

game. Its ingredients
are fun
and laughter, its penalties nothing
more serious
than
an Occasjona]
stubbed toe or skinned knee.
But for the -military commander in
combat, Blindmans Buff is a sure
prelude to disaster. Heavy casualties
and loss uf initiative are the ingredi
ents, defeat the inevitable penalty,
It is the role of intelligence to reSeptember19s5

move the blindfold from the eyes of

the commander, to reveal for him the
information
he needs on which to
base his decisions.
The profession of &-ms is some
times said to be the workYs ~e~Ond
oldest profession. Whether or not it
is the worlds second oldest profes
sion, within the military profession,
intelligence is seemingly the second
oldest specialty, the scout being jun
3$

INTELLIGENCE

ior only to the tighter himself. When

the first military scout waa sent out
oh an intelligence mission must be
forever lost in the mists of prehistory,
but evidence can be found in the
abundant historical records available
to us attesting to the antiquity of in
telligence.
Ancient Spies
In tbe Book of Numbers, chapter
13, for example, one reads that before
leading his people into Canaan, Moses
selected 12 agbnts, one from each
tribe:
And Moses sent them to spg out
the land of Canaan, and said rmto
them, Get zou UP this way southward,
afid go up into the mountain:
and see
tke land, what it is; and the people
that dwellefh
fherein,
u,hether they
be strong or ?~%eak,few or many: and
/chat fhe land is that fheg dwell in,
n,hef her it be good or bad; and what
cities
they be fhaf theu dwell in,
whether in tenfs or in strongholds;
and what fhe land is, whether it be
fat or lean, zchether there be wood
fherein, or nof. And be ye of good
courage, and bring of the fruit of the
iand> Now the time was the time of
fhe first ripe grapes.

Theyear was about 1200 B.C.

A iittle later one reads, in the sec.
ond chapter of Joshua, of an early

Lieutenant
Colonel
Fielding
L.
Greates is with the Ofiee of the As
sistant Chief of Staff for intelligence,
Department
of the Arvnv. He served
i?z Europe during World War II, and
subsequentl~
was stationed
in Ger
many, China, and Turkey, and was
assigned
to the Brifish Crown CO1OTZII
of Hong Kong. FoUozoing kis com
pletion qf the 1961 Regular Course of
the U., S. An?rtIJ Command and Gen
eral Sfaff College, he served for three
yeffrs on the facultti.
34

tactical intelligence mission. In this

irrstance, Joshua, one of the agents
sent earIier into Canaan, in hia turn
sent two spies into the city of Jericho.
Even more ancient than those in.
tel]igence missions is the account of
the Battle of Kadesh. Kadesh was the
scene of a clash in 1288 B.C. between
two mighty kingdoms, and the out
come ended forever the hopes of the
one to invade and conquer the other,
Both Egyptian and Hittite accounts
of the battle, and of a subsequent
treaty, have survived toourtime,
and
both record the key role played by
intelligence.
Fidse Infnrmstion

Ramses II of Egypt, marching

northward along the Orontes Rivet,
reached a point about halfway be
tween the present-day cities of Horns
and Dam4seus when he fell victim to
a counterintelligence gambithe took
at face value false information prO
vided him by two Hittite agents. Ac
cepting them as deserters from the
Hittite Army, and believing theirre.
port that King Muvattallish and bis
Hittite warriors had withdrawn far
to the north, he allowed his strung
out and divided forces, moving with
out adequate reconnaissance, to be
ambushed and taken in flank while on
the march, and a large part of his
army was routed.
The victorious Hittites then fell to
looting the camp of the foremost
Egyptian march unit, whkh had en
camped earlier, and in their eager
pursuit of plunder they failed to sta
tion sefurity guards. This, combined
witbthe timely arrival of an Egyptian
detachment which had marched by a
different route, prevented the com
plete destruction of Ramses army
The heavy Egyptian losses, brought
about as a result of their intelligence
MilitaryReview

<
faiIure, however,
dashed Ramses
hopes of defeating the Hittites, and
had the longer range effect of halting
Egyptian expansion to the north.
The 300 Spartane of Leonidas, to
gether with their alliee, held the pass
at Thermopylae against overwhelm
ing odds until the perfidious Ephial
tes furnished intelligence information
to Xerxes on the secret pathway over
Anopaea Mountain to the rear of the
Spartan position+
Similarly, it was information of a
way UP a cliff, together with the
French failure to provide security
there, which permitted Major Gen
eral James Wolfe to move hie troops
by night to the Plains of Abraham,
where the next morning he defeated
General Louis Joseph de Montealm be
fore the citadel of Quebec.
Inadequate Reconnaissance

Gentleman Johnny
Burgoynes
habitual failure to provide adequate
reconnaissance, together with his er
roneous appreciation
of the effects
which-his use of Indians would have
on the attitude of potential loyalists,
led to the steady decimation of his
forces and their ultimate surrender
at Saratoga.
In 1862 General George B. McClel
lans 70,000 men of the Army of the
Potomac faced General John B. Ma
gruders 15,000 troops
defending
Yorktown. Magruders defense was
so adroit, and McClellans intelligence
so bad, that the latter was induced to
waste a month besieging Yorktown,
giving Confederate
General Joseph
E. Johneton time to move a large
force to the defense of Richmond.
Union cavalry reconnaissance was
inept at this time, and McClellans
intelligence
work was performed
largely by civilian detectives headed
by AlIan Pinkerton.
A consistent
$eptember1965

fault of this intelligence service was

its groes overestimation
of enemy
strength.
In this instance, it esti.
mated the Confederates opposing McClellan at twice the strength of the
Army of the Potomac.
World War II Examples

The bland assumption that the Ar

dennes area was not suited to modern
mechanized warfare, and the failure
of Allied intelligence to anticipate or
discover the German buildup there,
permitted the Nazis to assemble and
Iaunch the force which outflanked the
Maginot Line in 1940 and ultimately
brougbt about the coliapse of France.
This same area saw a later intel
ligence failure, the dark December
episode of 1944 known as the Battle
of the Bulge. Information was there
to indicate an impending German at
tack, but intelligence failed to inter
pret the signs correctly, probably be
cause of a prevalent view that the
fighting spirit of Germany was gone,
that the Wehnnacht was about to ex
pirs-a
costly intelligence mistake.
At the Battle of Midway, when Ad
miral Chester W. Nimitz deployed
bis naval task forces to meet the
vastly superior fleet strength of Ad
miral Isoroku Yamamoto, it was, in
the final analysis, intelligence which
won the day. As Admiral Samuel E.
Morison records:
. .. Nim{tz had the inestimable adz,antage of knouing
when and where
the ene?]zy intended toattack.
But for
early and abundant decrypted
intelli
gence, arcd, what it9as7>zore important,
the prompt piecing together
of these
bit~ and scraps to. make a pattera,
David
United
States
Nauv
could
never have coped with the Japanese

Goliath.
Although Tarawa wasan American
victory, an intelligence failure re
35

INTELLIGENCE

.mdted in landing craft grounding

some 450 meters from shore, forcing
the marine landing force to wade that
entire distance exposed to a murder
ous fire. A large part of the first days
1,500 casualties were thus directly
attributable to faulty terrain intelli
gence.
General Douglas MacArthurs mas
terful uee of terrain intelligence, tO-

telligence failure. Security was nrac.

.
tically nonexistent, and Fidel Castro~s
intelligence was aware of the impend.
ing landing, as evidenced by the fact
that the landing force waa met and
destroyed on the beach. Althaugh it
was known that the security was bad
and that rumors and reports were
even appearing in the public press of
an impending operation, the force

US Am

US troops head for the heath on Wohai Island dnring the Inchon landing operations
in 1950
-gether with the failure of North
Korean intelligence to anticipate his
move, saw the daring and eminently
successful landing at Inchon, deep in
the enemy rear, This was counterbal
anced later by the failure of Ameri
can intelligence fully to appreciate
Chinese Communist intentions prior
to their massive intervention south
of the Yalu.
The Bay of Pigs is another classic
example, this time of a three-way in
36

was sent in. And the appreciation of

the attitude and intentions of the
Cuban populace at large-that
the
people would rise to support the land
ingproved disastrously wrong.
The number of such examples is
legion. Speaking of legion-consider
hnw the three legions of Quintilius
Varus were annihilated in A.D. 9 in
the Teutobu rger Wald by the German
Arminius. Varus fault, as the reader
may have guessed by now, was faulty
MilitaryIteview

INTELLIGENCE

reconnaissance-lack
of intelligence.
The reader may exercise his imag
ination to consider how the outcomes
of these battles cited might have dif
fered had the quality of the intelli
gence available to the commander
been different. Rather than extend
the liet indefinitely, we will coneider
only two more battles, claesic battlee
which have received much attention
from students of military history.
Cannae

The Battle of Cannae has been held

up as a model for the tactical double
envelopment, as an excellent example
of the defensive-offensive battle, and,
above all, ae the claesic battle of an
nihilation. It is also a prime example
of the role of intelligence as the key
to victory.
Roman habitual failure to provide
adequate reconnaieeance had earlier
allowed Hannibal
to destroy two
Roman Armies, one at the Trebbia
in 218 B.C. and the other at Lake
Trasimeno the following year. Han
nibals inteRigence chief had spice in
Rome itself, and Hannibal wae well
informed not only of the mood pre
vailing at the capital, but also of the
quality of the newly raieed levies led
jointly by the coneule Luciue Aemil
ius Paulue and Marcus Terentius
Varro, levies which outnumbered his
own army nearly 2 to 1.
In addition, he wae aware that
Paulus was a conservative,
experi
enced soldier, while Varro was impet
uons, a newly elected consul with
little or no previous military experi
ence. And he knew tbe key fact
that when two consuls took the field
together, they commanded on alter
nate days. He knew when the eager
but unskilled Varro would be in com
mand. On that fateful eummer day
September1965

in 216 B.C., therefore, he made hie

move and hrred Varro into battle.
The Carthaginians
also took ad.
vantage of the occaeion to practice
two deceptions. Early in the action,
we are told by Livy, a party of come
500 Numidian horsemen pretended to
defect from Hannibals army, were
accepted
as defectore,
and were
passed to the rear of the cavalry on
the Roman left. From that vantage
point they later struck the Roman
rear and haetened their defeat. Later,
in the main infantry battle, Hanni
bals thin but carefully placed infan
try center allowed itself for a time
to be pushed back to form a pocket,
anchored by stronger units on both
flanks, into which the eagerly ad
vancing Roman infantry was first
lured, then compressed before being
hit in flank and rear, and, thereby,
annihilated.
Tannenberg

Tbe other claesic battle is Tannen

berg. It, like Cannae, ,is taught both
at the United States Military Acad
emy to cadets and at tbe United
States Army Command and General
Staff CORege to more senior practi
tioners of the military art. The em
phasis ie always placed on tbe skiR
ful use by the Germans of their
interior lines, and their brilliant ap
plication of aIl of the principles of
war.
But again, Tannenberg
is more
than just an example of masterful
tactics, or of the application of the
principles of war. It is a classic ex
ample of both victory and defeat owed
to intelligence-good
intelligence on
the part of tbe Germans, faulty intel
ligence on the part of the Russians.
Russian
communication
problems
and equipment shortages led to their
extensive reliance on commercial tele
37t

INTELLIGENCE

phone and telegraph facilities.

On
two successive
daystwo
critical
days ae it turned outthe Russians
used radio to communicate in un.
coded, clear text their troops loca.
tions and planned moves. German in
telligence, in historys first use of ra
dio intercept, correctly estimated that
the broadcast
were genuine and not
Russian efforts at deception.
General
Paul von Hindenburg
was, thereby,
emboldened
to strip
the
German
forces from opposite
General
Pavel
K. Rennenkampfs
Ist Army,
and to

mass all his forces to meet General

Alekeandr
Samsonovs
2d Army,
leaving only a single cavalry division
as a screen to delay the Ist Army.
An additional bit of intelligence in
formation was available to the Ger
man intelligence staff, namely, that
Rennenkampf
and Samsonov were
not kindly disposed
toward
one
another and, therefore, might not be
ardent iB coming to one anothers as
sistance. A German officer then on
Von Hindenburgs staff had, as an
observer in Manchuria during the
Russo-Japanese War, seen those same
two individuals engaged in a fist fight
on th e railway station platform at
Mukden. It is interesting how such
seemingly trivial affairs may contrib
ute to great events in later times.
On the Russian side of the inteRi
gence battle, in addition to the lack of
commurucation
seeurity, there was
another
serious
shortcoming.
The
reconnoitered
generally
Russians
adequately to their flanks, but con
ducted practically no reconnaissance
to their front. Thus, tbe 1st Army
dawdled instead of knifing through
tbe hne cavalry division opposing it.
Thu~ too, 2d Army marched head
long :into the German trap, Samsonov

38

himself being unaware of the danger

nntil an entire corps had been deci.
mated.
By then it was too late; his army
was doomed. This lack of adequate
reconnaissance
by the Russians is
doubly curious, inasmuch as all three
Russian
commandersboth
army
commanders and their superior, Gen
eral Jilinski, the army group tom.
manderwere
generals of cavalry,
that branch of the service most closely
devoted to the business of reconnais
sance.
Without his precise knowledge of
the present and future positions of
tbe main Russian forces, Von Hin.
denburg would have been unbeliev.
ably reckless to move units as he did
to meet and destroy tbe 2d Army.
Had tbe Russians reconnoitered ag
gressively to the front, 1st Army
would not have been deceived and de
layed by a mere division of cavalry,
and 2d Army,
instead of blundering
headlong into disaster, would have
had time to form up properly to meet
the Germans at Tannenberg.
Thue, both Cannae and Tannen
berg, long cited as claesic examplee of
the battle of annihilation, are also
classics of another sort-classic
bat
tles won, and lost, by intelligence.
It matters not what the field of en
deavor or the professionwbether
battle or commerce or politics, med]
cine or footballthe basic rule is uni.
versal end invariable. To make a good
decision, the decision maker requires
good information.
In the conflicts of today and to
morrow, we can never lose sight of
the lesson learned from the battles of
yesterdayintelligence
is tbe key
which unjocke the door to victory.

Military Review

Tllne
F

; dn
on?

Major Pierre Vincendon,

KEY position of Free World

defense in 1950the Arctic
today seems to be losing ground in the
minds of the leaders in charge of our
security. IS this to say that the Far
North has lost its importance and is
no longer worth considering in the
setting up of US strategy?
September19S5

French

Arm#

Certainly not. Despite the develop

ment of nuclear weapons and nuclear
arsenals, the strategic importance of
tbe arctic regions still remains excep
tional.
Not only ie this true from both the
economic and the scientific points of
view, it is true also and chiefly from
39

THE FAR NORTH

a military viewpoint.
ceptional geographical
its control, if not its
for the United States
for the Free World.

The Arctics ex
situation makes
possession, 1vital
and, therefore,

Strategic Definition

Having no natural boundaries, the

Arctic can be defined in many ways
according to the nature of the study
and the criteria chosen. A strategic
definition must refer chiefty to the no
tions of aecesa and control.
The US Army defines the arct~c, or
polar, regions % those areas charac
terized by having an average temper
ature for the warmest month of the
year of less than zero degrees centi
grade. This is primarily a logistical
definition. Many geographer
refer to
the latitude, and select hlgtr latitude
countries as opposed to middle and
low latitudes; this definition encom
passes in tbe Arctic alI the areas north
of the 60-degree parallel.
On the other hand, geologies adopt
the permafrost criteria and describe
the Arctic as the area of continuous
permafrost. Others relate the bound
aries of the polar regions to the tree
line.
A\ strategic
definition,
though,
should refer to human, political, eco
nomical, scientific, geographic, and
military
criteria.
The human, and
subsequently the political, aspects be
ing rather nonexistent, the Arctic or
-Far North can be defined as those

Major Pierre Vincendon is a. 8tu

dent at the Armed Forbes Sta17 Col
lege. He has served
with airborne
t?_OOp8in Indochina and Algeria and
as Chief of Air Support
Operations
for the f+ench Polar Expeditions
to
Greeniand
in 1951, I!Z56, and 1959.
This art{cle was prepared
bv Major
Vincendon while a student in the 1964
65 Regular Course of the U. S. Armg
Command and General Stuff College.
40

areas surrounding tbe Arctic Ocean,

representing
the roof entrance to
the American and the Eurasian Con
tinents and controlling the northern
routes between and within those con
tinents.
This definition includes not onIy the
territories north of the 60th parallel,
but also a few key positions wh]ch,
although located south of this latitude,
obviously represent an arctic interest
places such as Kodiak, Umnak, Fort
Chime, ShefferviRe, and Goose Bay-.
all on the North American side; and
Petropavlovsk and Magadan-on
the
Soviet side.
Importance Recognized
It is not surprising,
therefore, to
realize that the importance of tbe Far
North has long been recognized. [u
fact, interest in the Arctic, primarily
in the b$ginning, slowly evolved into
a strategic interest. It was not until
World War 11, however, that the true
importance of the Arctic was generally
recognized.
Interest in the Far North began
with the acceptance of the concept of
tbe earth as a globe and tbe desire of
the western European countries to find
an economic sea route to the Far East
and the fabulous Cathay of Marco
Po1o. With this goal in mind, the re
search of a northwest sea route began
with John Cabot in 1496, followed by
Sir Martin Frobisher in 1576 and
other explorers and scientists like Sir
John Ross and Sir John Franklin in
the 19th centuryexpeditions
spon
sored either by tradesmen or by gov
ernments, But tbe northwestern route
was not opened until the beginning of
our century, an achievement which be
longs to the most famous of the polar
expiorersRonld Amundsen in 1903
06.
On the Russian side, the interest in
MilitaW

Review

THE FAR NORTH

tha Far North followed the same goal

-trade. The Russian efforts led them
in the 18th century to the discovery
of Alaska and the extension of their
tfade as far south as San Francisco,
&,lifornia. After the revolution of

Abraham Lincoln and Andrew John

son, dimly recognized the strategic
importance of the Far North. His con
cept, chiefly related to the control of
the Atlantic and Pacific approaches to
the North American Continent, looked

\--=
1917, Lenin, recognizing the need for
a short sea route between the Barents
and the Bering Seas, ordered the start
of work on the now famous G1avsev
morput.
Thus, in Russia, as in the United
States and the western
European
countries, the conquest of the Arctic
started long hefore the steam era and
followed the same purpose-trade.
Along with the advent of the first
steamers, William Henry Seward, Sec
retary of State under Presidents

S@xilher1965

the acquisition of Alaska, Green

land, and Iceland hy the United Statee.
In fact, it only led to the purchase of
Alaska in 1867.
Many years later, World War H
created the need for a secure air route
from the United States to Europe, and
led in 1943 to the construction
of a
to

North

Atlantic

air route.

Goose Bay,

Sondrestram Fjord, and Keflavik air

fielde etill mark this route which is
now used primarily by commercial air
planes.
41

THE FAR NORTH

If some economic interest

came
about becauie of the presence of the
military facilities, much more impor
tant factors led the surrounding coun
tries of the North Pole to take advan
tage of the economic possibilities the
Arctic could offer. In fact, despite hard
conditions of living, the Far North
has a great economic importance be
cause of the mineral resources it pos
sesees and the routes of communica
tion it offers. ,
Ecooornic Resources

The importance
of the mineral
riches was recognized at the end of
the 19th century with the discovery
of gold in Alaska and Siberia; today,
tbe Soviets still take a good part of
their gold supply from east Siberia.
Somewhat later, the improvement of
the means of research and communi
cations led to the discovery of so-called
strategic orespetroleum in Canada
and Siberia; nickel in the vicinity of
Murmansk and Norilsk; lead in Can
ada, Siberia, and east Greenland; coP
per in Murmansk and Anchorage; and
tungsten,
platinum,
and uranium,
es~cially in Canada.
Too, the Soviets, in need of in
creased food production, are now try
ing to exploit the partially frozen
grounds to feed the Siberian popula
tion. Unfortunately,
in this area ae
- in many others, we lack information
pertaining to the results obtained.
But the main economical importance
of the Arctic lies in the short routes
of communication it can offer either
within the Soviet Union or between
Europe and North America.
On the Soviet side, the northern sea
route, when open, shortens by 30 per
cent or more the distance between So
viet Europe and Soviet Asia. If we
crmsider that a single ship carries 10
times more supply than a train, we
42

can then understand the tremendous

efforts made by the Soviets to keep
this route open as long as pOssible
during the year.
on tbe western countries side, the
interest in the Far North lies in the
air routes from North America to Eu.
rope and Japan which, besides being
the shortest, are the meet secure be
cause of the low altitude of the tropo.
pause above the polar regions6,000
to 9,000 meters above the North Pole~
versus 15,000 meters above the equa.
torial line.
Undersea Routes
Furthermore,

beyond the current

realities, a still better use can be ex.
petted from the Far North. Some au
thors are even suggesting the opening
of an underice sea route to be ex
ploited by commercial submarine ships
linking North America to Eurasia be
neath the North Pole-obviously the
shortest route.
More than air and sea routes, how
ever, an undersea route needs a better
knowledge of tbe land and sea masses.
This necessary knowledge can only be
provided by scientific research. But
scientific exploitation of the North
Pole regione will take place not only
because of the interest in better ex
ploitation of its possibilities; it will
be aimed as well at adding to our
knowledge of the earth, which is use
ful to the setting up of any strategy.
Arctic environmental conditions, fOr
example, do not only affect the polar
regions; they have an almost equal
effect on conditions farther south. For
instance, the earths atmosphere and
oceans are considered to be an im
mense beat engine through which
there is a constant interchange of
energy between the heat source and
the heat sink. Detailed investigations
in the area of tbe heat source, the
Military Review

THE FAR HORTH

Tropics, are incOmpIete and remain

unusable withOut comparable investi
gations in the area of the heat aink,
the Arctic. And the arctic climate
which results from this energy ex
change affecte, on a glohid basis, such
environmental factors as meteorology,
oceanography, glaciology, and hydrolWY.
Now, the need for further observa
tions has led to the setting up of So

have more than 10 of these agencies;

France had the Paul-Emile Victor Ex
pedition; Denmark, Switzerland, Nor
way, England, and West Germany are
also interested in the Greenland ice
cap etudiesfor a better knowledge
of their-own coyntries.
The Soviets have aIso made a con
siderable effort in the Arctic, and their
more than 100 research stations ex
ceed by far the combined efforts of
the other nations. It ia also int~rest
ing to note that most of the Soviet
agencies are managed by military peo
ple.
Military Significance

---- .
..- .

$f,

#r.

US N.w

The North pole as seen from the peri.

scope of the US nuclear submarine Sea
Dragon

viet and United States weather sta

tions, including the famous drifting
stations.
All these areas of interest and, of
course, the need for man to Iive and
, exploit tbe Arctic justify the numer
ous arctic research agencies in the
world. The United States and Canada
September1965

Even if, with the advent of the new

weapon systems, the immediate de.
fense of the North American Conti
nent no longer reIies on the polar con
cept, the Far North still retains a
tremendous military importance. It is
in the center of the most industrialized
part of the northern hemisphere and
at the onty junction area between the
greatest continents and oceans of the
earth.
There are five primary reasons why
this is so:
. The arctic route will remain, at
least for a few more years, the most
dangerous avenue of approach for a
nuclear strike. The North Pole is still
the shortest way from Siberia to
North America, and the same missile
flying over the pole can carry a much
heavier warhead than it can over the
ocean.
Tbe Arctic still remains
a key
position in the North American warn
ing system. The satellite warning eys
tems, even the secret ones, must not
be considered 100 percent dependable
and, due to tbe importance of the
threat,
must be complemented by
ground-based installations.
The Far North is still the only
43

{
THE FAR NORTH
invasion route available
to an aggres
sor to enter tbe North American
Con
tinent. Although
not a serious threat
at the moment,
this possibility
must
he taken into consideration.
In the

present state of the political situation

and technol~gy, it is not reasonable to
consider either sea or southern land
avenues of approach as a threat to the
United States. The Alaskan route, if
not easy, is still the only route avail
able. The Dor$et Eskimo tribes bor
rowed it many centuries ago to come
from Siberia to Alaska; suffice it to
say that, a century ago, Alaska be
longed to the czar.
The
Far North controls the
northern Pacific and, particularly, the
Atlantic sea routes. Airbases at Goose
Bay in Labrador, BW8 on the west
coast of Greenland, Keffavik in Ice
land, and Bodo in Norway permit their
occupants to control the whole North
Atlantic Ocean and, of course, the two
Soviet entrances to that oceanthe
Murmansk route and tbe Baltic Sea
passes. Medium-range planes based at
those four sites could deny the North
Atlprrtic waters to Soviet ships and
protect efficiently convoys between
North America and Europe.

The same science, the progres~

of which took some of the defensive
importance away from the Arctic,
granted it, by tbe same token, an in.
creased offensive interest. During the
paat few years, submarines of the US
Pacific and Atlantic Fleets have deni.
onstrated that nuclear-powered sub.
marines could be operated in the Arc.
tic Ocean during any season of the
year and could transit the very shallpw
areas avoiding ice of prohibitive draft.
Now, the industrialized complexes of
the Soviet Union, the satellite coun
tries, and northern Red China are
within range of the new Polaris mis
siles of a single submarine surfacing
near the North Pole.
Thus, the Arctic, which ,was for a
long time the terrain of only adven
turers and explorers, has taken on tre
mendous strategic importance.
Tomorrow, perhaps, should Red
China put a hand on the Siberian ter
ritories and develop sufficient missiles
for her new nu.clear weapons, the Arc
tic would be the only route opened to
her for an attack on the United States,
and, unfortunately, it can be expected
that the Red Chinese leaders will not
be so prudent as the Soviets have been.

44

Witsry

Reviaw

flND
MllTSU

Lieutenant C&meI Chen Wei-ya, Chinese

The views expressed in this article

are the authors and are not neces.

.rarily those of the Department

of

the Army, Department

of Defense,

or the U. S. Armg Command

and

General Staff College.Editor.

YING astride the Communistheld Fukien coast of mainland

China, overlooking the seaports of
Amoy and Foochow, the Kinmen and
Matsu Island complexes today stand
on the frontiers of defense in the west
ern Pacific. The flag of the Republic
of Chha flies from their peaks.
The Kinmen Island complex ia lo
cated near the southeast coastline of
September
1965

Nationalist

Marine

Corps

mainland China. It consists of Big

~lnmen, Little Kinmen, and 12 smaller
islands.
Approximately
eight
kilometers
from the mainland and shout 200 kilo.
meters from Taiwan, Big Kinmen,
shaped like a butterfly, has an area of
160 square kilometers. The island is
22 kilometers long and variea from
four to 15 kilometers wide. The first
inhabitants came from the mainland.
in the fourth century, Subsequently,
patriots defying new dynasties often
made their way to these islands to live
in freedom.
Kinmen

wae one of the baeee of

4s

,<
KINMEN AND MATSU

Chong Cheng Kung, who fought the

Manchu invaders for many years after
the downfall of the Ming dynasty in
1644. Some 8,000 emigrants from Kin.
men have settled widely overseas,
mainly in Singapore, Malaya, Indone
sia, and the Philippine.
The only port available in the Kinmen Island complex is on Kinmen Is.
land. It can accommodate ships up to
10,000 tons, but is considered a poor
anchorage whdn the southerly winde
are strong.
Chief Industry
Agriculture is the chief industry,
w,ith three-fifths of the land area un.
der cultivation. Rice is imported from
Taiwan, but otherwise Kinmen is selfsufficient in food. The islands inhab
itants produce sweet potatoes, peanuts,
wheat, sorghum, soybeans, barley, veg
etables, fruit, and a famous but potent
wineKaoliangwine. The land is gen
erally owned by the man wbo tine it.
In administration,
Kinmen is a
county of Fukien Province. It has
six townships, 54 villages, and 561
ne~hborboods,
\vith a total civilian
population of some 55,000. The bulk
of the people are farmers; others are
engaged in fishing, carpentry, stone
carving, masonry, and in trade. Tbe
dialect, traditions, and customs are tbe
same as thoee found in southern Fu
kien.

The offshore islande which make up

the Matsu group lie 240 kilometers
to tbe north. Some 180 kilometers
northwest of Keelung in north Taiwan,
Lieutenant Colonel
Chen
We&~~,
served in the Chinese Army and Chi
nese Air Force during Wwid War II.
A 1964 graduate of the Command and
Staff Course,
United States Marine
Corps Schools, Quantico, Virginia,
he
is presently
with
Chinese
Marine
Corps Headquarter
in Taiwan.

4a

Matsu is, like Kinmen, a county of

Fukien. The group consists of the ie.
lands of Nankantang, which has an
area of 17 square kilometers; Peikan.
tang, which has 13; Heichuan, five;
Turrgchuan, four; and Kaoteng, two
square kilometers.
The civilian population of the Matau
group is under 14,000, and the islands
are rockstudded and have only 1,512
acres of arable land. The chief crops
are sweet potatoes and vegetables;
rice must he imported from Taiwan.
About 81 percent of the people de.
penal on fishing for a livelihood, and it
is, perhaps, significant that Matsu is
named for tbe patron goddes$ for
fishermen.
Compared with Kinmen,, Matsu is
less developed and prosperous, but its
defense installations are similar.
Politico-Military Value
Kinmen is the heavily fortified bss

tion wbicb lies athwart the entrance

to Amoy Bay and thereby denies Corn.
munist ships the use of this important
port. For those on the mainland, Kinmen is a visible eymbol of the Repub.
lic of China.
Just as Kinmen bottlee up Amoy,
so does Matsu block access to the sea
port of Foochow, the capital city of
Fukien Province.
The Republic of China believes tlat
Kinmen and Matsu must be defended,
because:
. The islands provide an early
warning system which is essentisl to
the safeguarding of Taiwan.
A close watch can be kept on
Communist military activities from
Foochow in the north to Amoy in tbe
south.
Any attempt
to invade Taiwan
would have to be mounted from ports
more distant than Amoy or Foochow.
An invasion fleet would, therefore, he
MilitaryRevise

,,
KINMEN ANO MATSIJ

exposed fOr a 10nger period and would

run a great risk of being destroyed.
Modern landing ships would be re
quired rather
than the motorized
junks now on hand.
In inyading Taiwan, the Commu
nists would risk counterinvaeion by
the forces based on, the offshore is
lands.
Most of the military facilities of
Kinmen and Matsu are underground,
and Big Kinmens ability to withetand
enemy attack has often heen compared
to Malta and Gibraltar. Huge tunnels
carved out of solid rock link the vital
defenses, strongpoint by strongpoint,
defense line by defense line.
Such tunnels lead to emplacements
for 155-millimeter guns, 8-inch how
itzers, and 240-millimeter howitzers
with their long ranges. They also

connect and supply antiaircraft

guns
and machinegun nests that are pro
tected by rock or heavy concrste for
tifications.
The radar system probee 260 kilo
meters into the mainland, putting all
Communist activities along the coaet
under constant surveillance.
Today, those offehore islands have
two faces, one ie on the surface; an
other is under tbe ground. On the
surf ace you can see the people peace
fully leading their daily livee. Under
the ground, the lights are always shin
ing; the maps are open and posted;
the heavy guns are constantly point
ing toward the enemy; and communi
cations are always operating.
These are the combat outpoets of
Kinmen and Matsu. This is the for
ward edge of freedom and democracy.

SUBSCRIBERS
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i.

S8ptember 1SS5

47!

Major J. N. Elderkin, Briti8h

The dissimilar
backgrounds of the
three services are seen bv many peo
ple as obstacles to the elimination
of
their overlapping
functions.
In this
article, a British officer presents his
personal
views on what should be
done to provide unified forces within
his own national defense establish.
m ent.Editor.

HE time has come to lay the

foundation for a defense force
which will be efficient and strictly pro
fessional. By 1970 the services should
be moving rapidly toward a force in
48

AI-IW

which the relationship between sailor,

soldier, and airman is comparable to
that which exists in the army today
between gunner, engineer, and infan
tryman. Certain steps should be taken
now to make this integration easier.
Service education must produce
leaders with a common set of values
and absolute mutual trust in each
other. These essentials are not en
tirely absent today, but, because the
three services have grown up slmost
independently, each has sought to es
tablish its own loyalties and traditions.
This has led to the inculcation of pride

MilitaryRwiw

A UNIFIED FORCE

and prejudices and all too frequently

to the adOptiOn of isolationist policies.
So deeply. ingrained are these loyal
ties that they sometimes lead to the
clouding of Otherwise intelligent judg
ments. Support for a polify may be in
fluenced not by military expediency,
but by a desire to maintain the power
and authority of a particular service.
Training Cadeta

The root of the problem of produc

ing a British defense force unified in
spirit lies in the training of officer ca
dets. A central defense academy on
the lines of that established by India
at Khadskvasala or by Canada at
Kingston would provide all officers
with a common foundation. Even if
only the first year of the course were
to be spent in a common school before
heginning specialist training, it would
etill be worthwhile. Much of the cur
riculum at the present service colleges
is academic and does not demand spe
cialized facilities.
The impact of such a change on the
public should not be ignored; all are
likely to see in it a sign that the serv
ices really are determined to forget
past jealousies and to blend themselves
into a versatile and modern force. No
other single change is likely to produce
such far-reaching and beneficial re
sults.
The three services place different
emphasis upon technical training and
the importance of scientific underThis article was digested from
the orig{nal
which
was
the
Trench Gascoig%e First Prize Es
sag for 1968, published
in the
JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL UNITED
SERVICE INSTITUTION
(Great
Britain) November
196J. Copy
righted @ 1964 by the JOURNAL
OF THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE
INSTITUTION.
SSpteiaher19S5

standing. The Royal Air Force (RAF)

is essentially a modern technical serv.
ice. So complex are modern aircraft
and weapon systems that every pilot
and air commander has to be some
thing of a technician.
Tbe naval engineer largely trains
apart from the executive officer, but,
aboard ship, life is such that contact
between specialist and executive offi
cere is closer than in the army. A sci
entific approach is aleo fostered hy
the specialization by eeamen in sub-
marines, navigation, and communica
tions, as well as by the existence of
tbe Fleet Air Arm as an integral
.
part of the navy.
Technical Services

In tbe army the technical servicee

have never been accorded the same
status as the so-called teeth arms.
Except for the officers of tbe Royal
Engineers, who have often been able
to enjoy the best of both worlds, the
technically trained officer has usually
been denied any real opportunity to
influence army doctrine. The postwar
creation of the technical staff might
aPPear to have raised the level of sci
entific awareness in the army, but it
has, in fact: tended to aggravate
rather than to relieve the situation.
The general staff officer, while ten&
ing to rsgard technical matters as be
ing outside his scope, has continued
to monopolize appointments concerned
with all types of policy.
The shortcomings of the system are
not fully apparent until tbe armys
requirements come into contlict with
those of the other services. In such
circumstances the scientifically minded
sailor or airman is likely to confound
the soldier who still prefers to look
upon war as an art.
AK three services run their own
colleges to train specialists to degree
49

A UNIFIED FORCE

$tandards, and 10 percent of the army

officers are university graduates. Ci
vilian scientists are nonetheless being
obtained to direct operational research
and development and to advise on de.
fense probleme at the highest level.
The analytical and critical approach
of the trained scientific mind ia in
valuable, but there is an increasing
danger that important military deci
sions may be taken without a proper
understanding
of service needs and
operational realities. This danger will
persist untiJ the armed forces can pro
duce from their number a succession
of high-caliber officers with sound sci
entific training.
If a defense university could be es
tablished, it might then be possibJe to
give applied military science a much
higher academic standing than it en
joys today. Moreover, while such a
move might involve an initial rise in
costs, it wouJd eliminate the triplica
tion of expensive laboratory facilities
and make better use of the available
academic staff. It could also provide
a much-needed bridge between the
scientific civiJ service and the armed
forces.
Join$ Staffs

Tbe last war proved the need for

a body of officers trained for service
on joint staffs. Since 1948 the Joint
Services Staff CoJlege has been run
ning courses for officers with about
18 ~,ears service. At a lower level,
there hasin recent years been increas
ing emphasis on joint training at
the single-service colleges and cm the
cross-assignment
of students.
The success of these moves makes
the establishment of a single coJlege
which could undertake all staff train
ing tbe next Jogical step. The coJleges
would cease to he single service in
outJook or composition and would be
50

come divieions of the Junior Defense

Staff ColJege. As long as the present
colJeges retain their independence,
they wilJ continue to vie with each
other over both resources anddectrine,
Rationalization

The reluctance of the services to

change established patterns has Jed
to the survival of a host of quaint and
often illogical organizations;
ecca
sionaJ1y, too, it leads to tbe perpetra
tion of new anomaiies. Too often the
value of tradition is overstated when
changes in service matters are pre
pesed, and the ability of strong lead.
ers to foster esprit de corps in a very
short time is ignored.
In recent years come steps have been
taken to cut out duplication of effort
by the device of one service assuming
responsibility for a particular require
ment in ? particular area. Unfortu.
natelyj the contentious issues havs
been sidestepped, andchanges have so
far been of a minor nature. The army
has assumed responsibility for baking
bread in Hong Kong, and the air force
is providing medical services in Aden,
but no attempt has heen made to re
consider the place of the Fleet Air
Arm, the RoyaJ Marines, the RAF reg
iment, and the Army Air Corps.
The advent of vertical takeoff and
landing aircraft does much to demolish
the somewhat specious argument that
seaborne aircraft are so specialized
that their operation should be reserved
to seamen. The search for a common
aircraft to meet tbe requirements of
naval and air staffs has taken pJace on
both sides of the AtJantic. In both this
country and in the United States, it
was bedeviJed by sectionaJ interests.
If naval aircraft were to be manned
by the RAF, there would be a much
greater incentive to make land and
carrier-based squadrons interchangeMilitary RevisW

A UNIFIED FORCE

able, and airmen would acquire a closer

insight into the problems of the fleet.
The Army Alr Corpe operates air
craft for liaison and unarmed recon
naissance. The value placed on the
aircraft by brigade commanders il
lustrates in a minor way the impor
tance of linking air and ground opera
tions. However, because these aircraft

eaeier for /he eventual introduction

of closer, air logistical support, which
ie both technically poeaible and opera
tionally essential.
Transference to the RAF of the re
sponsibility for all air operations, in
cluding that of helicopters, is likely
to result in savings in training estabIiahments, better nae of technical man-

Modern aircraft, such as the Vulcan bomber shown here, are so complex that air
force officers must acquire a solid baae of techriical knowledge
are manned by army officers, RAF pilots miss a great opportunity of working in close contact with army formations in the field.
If responsibility for light aircraft
were given to the RAF, not only would
the air force gain additional aircraft
to operate, but a constant flow of
young pilots would gain firsthand
knowledge of the army at brigade
level. The way would also be made
September1965 .

power, and considerably greater op

erational
flexibility
and efficiency.
Above all, because operations are so
entwined, demarcation
between the
services would be blurred, and the air
force would regain the close contact
with land and sea operations which
was evident in the early days of avia
tion.
The Royal Marinea are the outstand
ing example of the merits of true in
51

A UNIFIED FDRCE

tegration, but their very success bas

led to the creation of a private empire
which is not always in the best in
terests of the services as a whole. The
amphibious skiIls of the marine, which
are essential as long as we retain our
worldwide commitments, are no more
than tbe very skills which should be
common to the whole army. It is,
therefore, suggested that control of
the Royal Marines should pass to the
army and that marine officers should
cease to have a career structure of
their own.

Communications

The prime importance of communi

cations is well recognized. In White
hall, joint signal committees of many
kinds are inconstant session. Even so,
operating techniques used by signal
ers in the different services still differ
widely.
Current guides to the planning of
joint operations emphasize tbe need to
ensure that both ends of any commu
nication link are operated by men who
wear the same color uniforms. This is
a state of affairs which imposes un
necessary
handicaps
and also one
which could be rectified.
The)prospect
of the establishment
of a British satellite communication
system should provide the incentive to
draw all service signal interests to
gether and establish a joint signals
school. Such a school would achieve
p~actical standardization at the lower
levels, and also lead to the wider ac
ceptance of standard equipment.
There are many undramatic ways
in which service administration
can
be improved. The adoption of a com
mon code of law and disciplinary reg
ulations has at last been achieved. A
common legal service is a logical con
sequence, ae would be an integrated
provost corps. Tbe unification of med.
52

ical and dental services is viewed by

some as the best way to use available
manpower and to continue to draw
enthusiastic men unattracted by the
National Health Service. In tbe dO.
mestic field there can be no sound rea.
son for each service having its own
regulations for the furnishing and al
location of married quarters or for
the payment of traveling allowances.
Rank Structure
In order to make the intermingling

of tbe three services as simple and as

free of friction as possible, it is jm
portant that the present differences
in rank structure be eliminated.
The most serious divergence occurs
at the commander-lieutenant
colonel
level. On joint staffs of equal rank,
the army member is likely to be four
or five years older than his natal and
air opposit~ numbers. Furthermore,
with the advent of a common promo
tion roll for all officers twos tarand
above, it is essential, if only in the
interests of equity, to ensure that of
ficers reach this level at approximately
the same age; at present, the RAF bas
a lead of about two years over the
other two services.
The solution to tbe problem iscom
plicated by well-established army pol
icy concerning appointments to the
command of battalion-sized units. Sue-,
cess in such an appointment is made
essential for an officer aspiring to
further promotion, but peacetime com
mand is not normally given to officers
before they reach their 42d year.
The only practical alternative is for
the army to bring about a progressive
reduction in the age at which com
mand appointments are made. While
such a reduction would involve tbe
declaration of limited redundancy, it
would undoubtedly be welcomed by the
army. Because it would take some
Military Review

A UNIFIED FORCE

germs fOr the change tO hecOme fully

effective, some adjustment to rates of
pay is necessary in order to bring all
officere more nearly into line, on an
apfor-age basis, than they are today.
Now is the time to ltZYthe founda
tions of a unified British defense
force. Powerful and valuable as tra
dition may be, it must not be allowed

to deter logical eteps in the evolution

of the armed services.
The changes and developments out
lined should take place in the next five
years. Their sole object is to make
possible a vigorous and etlicient de.
fense force which will uphold the beet
of pact traditions and set standards
which will be envied the world over.

COMMENTS INVITED

The Military
rial publiehed.

Review
An opposite

welcomee

your commente

viewpoint

on any mate

or a new line of thought

of your ideae. If you

will assist ue and may lead to publication
are an authority
on a certain subjeet, why not write an article
for our consideration
haps we can aseist

Sepfember1335

? If You have
you in developing

only an idea,
an acceptable

query

ue; per

article.

53

Quelling

Mutinies

Lieutenant Colonel William E. Bum II, United

.Wates Armg

.
Ten,

nine,

eight,

8even,

six,

five,

four,

three,

two,

one, he 8md. At

the

end

of the countdown,
tfle murine8 fired a rocket 8hell into one of the barracks. It
tore off .wrt of the roof and 8hattered
the windoum. The rebels 8tarted
to run
out,

um,ing

white

hnndkerchief8.

Tfte

HIS incident at the barracks of

a mutinous army marked the
completion uf a successful application
of military power which appears to
have been largely overlooked in US
military circles. This oversight is unfortunate;
the incident provides an
excellent example of the flexibility of
military
response which has been

54

mutinu

WU8 over.

stressed in recent years as being es

sential to the most effective realiza.
tion of US national power.
Although it has become common to
speak of the flexible use of military
power, many people stilI think of the
application of armed force in the
sense of large formation
and major
deployments, such as the Korean War
MilitaryIfmiow

or

the activities

related

to

the

1962

Cuban missile crisis.

Using large formations
and exe
cuting major deployments are, of
cwree, eesentiat parts of the military
repertoire; but just as necessary is
tbe ability to apply miIitary power
deftly, precisely, and, one might say,
almost gently. Not too long ago, a ma
jor power gave a superior demonstra
tion of not only military deftness,
but also politico-military savoir-faire,
when, in response to cane from the
heads of the governments of several
newly independent states, its military
forces subdued the mutinous armies
of tbe small states.
Causes of Mutinies

The three countries, comprising an

area the size of Europe and inhabited
by 25 million people, were newly in
dependent. In each, the major power
had previously trained a small army
and officered it with its citizens. When
the colonial authorities left the coun
tries, their officers stayed on at the
request of tbe indigenous govern
ments. Additionally,
the ex-colonial
power maintained a military base in
one of the countries.
There are many opinions about the
causes of the mutinies. Shortly be
fore they occurred, an apparently proLieutenant Colonel William E. Burr
11 is zoith the US Arm~ Combat De.
veloprnents Command Institute
of Ad
vanced Studies,
Carlisle
Barracks,
Pennsylvania..
His assignment
in
cltide duty with the 10lst
Airborne
Division in Wo~ld War II; As8istant
Secretary of the General Staff, Ofice
of the Chief of Staff, Washington;
and
the Militarg
A88istance
Advisory
Group in Taiwcn.
Colonel Burr is a
US Army War Col[ege graduate and
ho[d8 an M.A. degree in International
Relations
from
George
Washington
University.
Ssptember1965

Communist coup overthrew the fledg

ling government of a neari.ry cou,ntry.
On the day before the mutinies took
place, a key figure in the Communist
coup arrived in the capital of one of
the countries for a few days of rest
and conferences with political leadere. On the next day, members of the
army of that country mutinied, im
prisoned 29 of their foreign officers,
and marched to the capital to demand
higher pay and an all-nativ~ officer
corps.
Despite the seemingly obvious con
clusion one can draw f mm the Com
munist coup leaders arrival the day
before the uprising, much of the in
formed opinion is that this was a co
incidence, and that the armies of the
three countries revolted primarily be
cause of low pay and the desire to be
rid of their foreign officers.
Similar Situations

The situation was relatively similar

in each country. After the rebellion
of part of the army in the first coun
try, the remainder mutinied on the
following day, also deposing foreign
officers and demanding, in addition,
pay higher than the prevailing $15 a
month, and promotions of natives to
the positions formerly held by the
foreigners.
As this occurred, the
Prime Minister of the second coun
try, foreseeing the possibility of eim
ilar dissatisfaction
in his army, or
dered loyal police posted at key loca
tions. On the next day, he expressed
confidence in the foreign officers in
his army and described plans for the
conversion of the officer corps to na
tive personnel.
Nonetheless, on the day after that,
part of the second army rebelled and
detained the Minister of Home Affairs
and the foreign commander of the
army. The Prime Minister- then re

55

MUTINIES

quested troops from the major power

tb help in restoring law and order.
On the same day, the Prime Min
ister of the third
countryalso
having forebodingsrequested
that
troope from the major power be ready
. to support him if the need should
arise. It did on the next evening when
part of his army mutinied against its
foreign officers and broke into the ar
mory. On the same evening, the Presi
dent of the first country finrdly asked
for foreign military help in his coun
try.
For two days the capital of the
first country had been terrorized by
half of its army. Rebellious troope oc
cupied the armory, airport, post office,
telephone exchange, radio station,
main roads, and bridges. The govern
ment was in hiding. By the time the
President
appealed to the foreign
power, there had been four days of
rioting and looting in which at least
24 persons had been killed.
Battalions Alerted

The major power, though, had not

been idle. It had focused attention on
the area, and had noted the prelimi
nary events; its subsequent
actions
were 1n step with the events, On the
day of the first mutiny,
an aircraft
carrier
with a marine
battalion,
hel
icopters,
and jet fighters
aboard set

sail for tbe area accompanied by a

destroyer. Another battalion, normally
stationed at the base retained by the
major power in one of tbe countries,
was rushed back to it by air from a
training exercise.
In the home country of the major
power, a third battalion was alerted.
A frigate with an army company stood
offshore prepared to evacuate the
great powers subjects if necessary.
An&her ship, in the area as the re
cult of the earlier coup, picked up an
ea

army company and waa prepared for

action. By this time the carrier and
the destroyer were also standing off
the coast.
In purely military terme, the great
powers troops were not confronted
with a particularly formidable target,
The armies of tbe three countriee had
formerly heen six battslione of the
great powers colonial forces. In fact,
the army of each country was out
numbered by the police and other se.
curity forcesin one country by bet
ter than 4 to 1.
Delicate Preblem

The problem for the great power,

therefore, was not one of slugging it
out with a formidable military opps.
nent. Far from that, it was a delicate
problem of many sensitive partspro
tecting its subjects, preventing tbe
new nations from dissolving into
chaos, and assisting these countries
which, after years of colonialism,
could not be abandoned to founder in
their own difficulties. Solutions had
to be found which would not discredit
the governments which were calling
on the former colonial power. The mil
itary miseion was not just to conquer,
or to defeat, but somehow to restore
and rectify.
On the fifth day after the first mu
tiny, and only two days after the first
request for help, the great powers
forces struck a eeries of well-arranged,
coordinated blows at several points.
At dawn, the destroyer opened with
a barrage from its main armament.
The din thundered over the ocean as
the sailors slammed the ehells into the
breeches and pulled the lanyards. Only
one element was miseingthe. recoil.
The naval guns were firing blanks.
After 20 minutes of this noisy
preparation, helicopters lifted off the
carrier carrying 60 marinee. In the
MllitarY ROVi8W

,.
lead helicopter was the officer who, a
week before, had been the foreign com
mander of. the army which he was
now oppoeing.
tie Objective
The objective of the assault was a
guard room which served as the cen
ter of the mutiny. As the helicopters
landed near the objective, the marines
fanned out rapidIy, moving at a
crouch, weapone at the ready. No shots
were fired. The former commander
took an electric megaphone and, in the
local Ianguage, called on the mutineers
to surrender.
When his repeated calls went un
answered, he gave a countdown which
was folfowed by one round from a
rocket launcher into the roof of the
building. Two mutineere were killed,
the roof was damaged, and all the
windows were blown out. Except for
some 30 stragglers who were rounded
up in the next day or two, the muti
neere capitulated.
The assault had
taken 40 minutes.
Elsewhere in the country, the great
powers forces struck swiftly from the
sir. One element restored order 725
kilometers west of the firs~ action
where a native battalion had revolted.
Another airborne element, some 420
kilometers south of the first action,
also disarmed mutineers.
In one of the other countries, a
rebellious army battalion had seized
the armory and armed iteelf. Elements
of the great powers troops, in six
armored cars, approached the parade
ground, then occupied by about 150
rebels, As the armored
cars ap
proached, a sniper fired on them from
a nearby roof.
The cars halted. One moved closer,
slewed its turret around, and raked
an empty hut with a long burst from
its .50.caliber machinegun. The rebels
tiptwnber 1365

MIJTINIE3

gave up. Concurrently,

another upris
ing was being quelled at a post in a
distant part of the country.
In the third countryat a rebellious
military camp-30 men from the great
powers forces armed with subma
chineguns buret through the main
gate of -the camp before dawn. Ob.
taining eurprise, the foreign soldlers,
who had been flown in, secured the
guardroom and eeized the armory be
fore the mutineers awoke. While these
brave men succeeded, 450 other great
power troops surrounded the camp.
There were 300 mutineers captured.
By the fifth day, 5,300 great Power
troopz were reported to be in the
three countries.
Nothing
could have beerz more re
assuring
. . . than the manner
of
these troops arrival. Within hours of
their landing, the mutineer.c were dis
armed . . . [the capital] woe rekuzed,
and a...
militarg
band was giving
a concert
in the capitaSs central
park. . . .
a

This comment by a correspmrdent

of a national magazine is typical of

many which described the situation.

In the words of another:

. . . once the three . . . governments

had called in . . . troops to quell their

armg mutinies
the soldiers
finished

the job in a sjngle morning with no

soldiere

more than six . . . [native]

killed. . . .

Two Aspects

There are two important aspects

of this operation. The first is that

it is a fine example of pOlitico-mili

tary coordination-of
the successful

and timely application of military

force to achieve a national objective.

It ie obvious that the great powers

and military
leaders

governmental
worked hand in glove in the period

51

MUTINIES

preceding the actual crisis. A battal

ion was alerted in the home country
several days before a request for
troops was received from the troubled
governments. The battalion arrived in
one of the countries by air on the day
.of operation. The carrier with the
marine battalion aboard, accompanied
by the destroyer, started from its base
early and played a major part in the
operation. Other units were pre-posi
tioned.
In other words, as soon as the gov
ernment leaders ~etected an impend
ing crisie, the military leaders were
given adequate guidance and began
the appropriate preparations. The re
sult was that the military elements
were in position to move effectively
when it was time to strike.
The other aspect, and one which is
equally important, is that when the
military forces went into action, they
performed in a fashion which was
completely suitable to the accomplish
ment of the political objective. No un
necessary damage was caqsed; no tindue casualties were suffered on either
side. Operations were characterized by
the use of blanks, electric megaphones,
and Wing for shock effect-not to kill
or woundand the use of psychology.
Familiar &round
One can say that tbe troops of the
major powers were operating in their

own backyard. They had governed

these areas as colonies for genera
tions, and their citizens still ran the
armies at the time of the mutinies.
This begs the question.
The point is that the great powers
officers demonstrated
they had not
wasted those yearsthey understood
what they had to deal with. Ifl they
had used blank artillery shells and
. demonstration
bursts of fire on oP
ponents who turned out to be unim
58

pressed, the results couId have been

disastrous and the ensuing fighting
bloody.
As

it was, they

gave

an excellent

example of the employment of means

which were appropriate to the situa.
tion. By the use of blanks in the de
stroyers guns, electric megaphones,
helicopters, persuasion, surprise, dem.
onstratilon firing, and other measures
by exercising military power force
fully, yet with great restraintthe
commanders accomplished their mis
sion with great speed and practically
no bloodshed. Six natives were k]lled.
There were no great power casualties.
1bus, political foresight and mili
tary skill combined in almost. perfect
harmony to accomplish a national ob
jective. The great power deeired te
support the three new governments
against their rebellious armies. The
mutinies had to be put down quickly,
but without causing lasting scars and
hatreds,
Work in Harmony

The great power had well-trained,

strategic reserve units with excellent
long-range mobility. In thie case,
when the crisis began to loom, the gov
ernment and the military
leaders
worked together closely. Units were
alerted
and repositioned;
detailed
plans were made.
When the time came, tbe military
actions were swift and effective. The
troops who went in were properly
equipped and trained. The ease with
which they performed a mission that,
improperly handled, could have been a
blood batb, was so deceptive as te re
sult in the entire incide~t failing te
receive tbe attention wh?ch it prop
erly deserves.
There is no concrete lesson here,
such as always carry blanke for your
destroyer guns. That lesson, along
Mimary

mevisw

MUTINIES

with a number Of others of a similar

nature, is available
for those who want
to study the tactical details of tbe
operation.
~The lesson which isstressed here is
a much broader one. When a govern
ment has foresight, and brings its mil

MILITARY

REVIEW

+ Designed
@ Ready
+ Black

to hold

FILE

itary leadera in on the planning, and

the military leaders are properly in
formed, understand the situation, and
lead well-trained
troops,
military
power can be employed in a timely
fashion with skill, and with great ben
efit to the nation.

BOX

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Saptomhei1965

39

Colonel .%aukat Itiza, Pakiatan Armg

HE nonprofessional looks upon

weapons and battles as separate
themes. He believes that one need not
encumber the other. He believes that
the violence of combat can he dupli
cated with clever words.
Between the weapon and its em
ployment, there is an almost infinite
field ~of knowledge to be m=tered.
First are the characteristics
of weap
ons. These may be termed known con
stants. Then there are tbe known vari
ables of terrain, weather, and enemy
opposition. Finally, there are the im.
measurable variables of training, mo
rale, leadership, and fate.
For every weapon there are a num
ber of combinations of terrain and
weather in relation to enemy opposi
tion, but there is only one combination
which gives optimum results. This
combination may be conventional or
unconventional, and it is tbe only cor
rect combination. Anything else is less
effective and, therefore, incorrect and
unprofessional.
60

Consider. the number of weauons at

various echelons. Try to work&t the
possible permutations
and combina
tions of these with the known and the
unknown variables. The optimum em
ployment for even a single weapon is
not easy to discover,
With every change in weapon char
acteristics,
the
entire
panorama
terrain,
of weapon combinations,
weather, enemy opposition, training,
morale, and leadership has to be re
considered. The evaluation and inas
tery of these changes are not accom
plished in one easy lesson.
It has become fashionable in some
circles to ridicule the professional soldierhis appearance, his impatience
with rhetoric, his skepticism of the
untried, and his distrust of the purely
academic.
Thi8 article

was digested

from

m
Military ft@vi8W

THE NONPROFESSIONAL

There are nonprofessionals who be:

lieve that the professional attitude is
rigid, inflexible, and incapable of
le~rning anything new. They try to
discover shortcnts, which is like at.
tempting abstract art before knowing
the rudiments of elementary drafts
manship.
The professional
soldier tries to
learn through war. When war is
not available, he exercises for war or
devotes every available minute to
study and thoughts on war.
The uninitiated believe that formal
military education is an unnecessary
man-made hindrance to burgeoning
military genius. In their search for
shortcuts to military success, they dis
miss standards
of performance
as
rigid, unimaginative military formu
las. They rate individual idiosyncra
sies higher than the ability to work
with battalions, divisions, and armies.
They think that combat is a circus
where unorthodox performance is the
key to military fame.
In a free society it is proper that
budding military geniusee should con
tinue to offer gratuitous advice to pro
fessional soldiers. In order to avoid
frustration, however, the geniuses are
requested to remember that weapons
kill and they also maim and frighten.
In battle the soldier is called upon
to overcome his fear and his instinct
to flee from danger, and to obey or
ders. The deliberate suppression of a

September19S5

natural instinct is a difficult achieve

ment. It is accomplished through dis.
cipline and continuous repetition of
simple acts in obedience to superior.
orders. No one has yet discovered a
shortcut.
An army is designed to obey a single
will. Its ability to re$pond to a single
will is one of the measures of its ef
fectiveness. This is also the funda
mental difference between an orga- ,
nized force and a collection of indi
viduals.
The response to a single will is en.
sured through a chain of command,
a staff system, and a military vocabu
lary defined in training pamphlets.
The training pamphlets and manu
als provide standarda of performance.
The standards enable the commander
to plan operations according to what
can or cannot be achieved by various
components of hia command. if there
is no measure of performance, then
the commander has no basis for plan
ning, and will never know wbetber his
orders can be carfied out successfully.
A force wherein every individual
has his own standards of performance
cannot respond to a single will and
can no longer be called an organized
force. Regardless of tbe quality of
genius, ignorance or disregard of the
military facts of life will lead an army
to disaater.
It will be nonprofessional.

61

PRUDENCE

MILITARY

NECESSITY

Edmund McCaffrey

ITH these words Theodore

Roosevelt stepped into the
Presidency on 4 March 1905:

But jwstic~ and generosity

in a ruz
count most
tion, as in fin ind{v{dual,
rchen shown not bg the weak but by
the strong. While ever careful to re
frain from wronging others, we mu8t
be no less insistent that we are not
toronged
ourselves.
We wish peace,
but we wish the peace of ju8tice, the
peace of righ teouwteas.

The Presidential power which Mr.

Roosevelt assumed that day required
leadership qualities of the higheet de
gree in order to ensure true peace.
Indeed, the exercise of any power,
62

whether it be political, military, or

religious, requires highly perfected
moral virtues. If thie was true in the
time of Theodore Roosevelt, it is even
more true today in a divided world
possessing unique weapons of de
struction.
Physical qualities of men and na
tions are extremely important in any
politico-strategic
situation;
hut as
Karl von Clausewitz noted, hardly
more than the wooden handle, while
the moral are the noble metal, the
real, brightly polished weapone. In
moral
powers,
listing
the chief
Clausewitz cited the talents of the
commander, the military virtue of the

Military

Review

PRUDENCE

armY, and natiOnal feefing as being

the most important in war.
In milita~y affairs, aa well as in
political affaire, the talent of the com
m%der is pivotal, and the basic vir~
tue which underlies command talent
and leadership and which dieposes
one to proper action is prudence.
Prudence is part of that superior
moral force necessary to obtain vic
tory on the field or behind the desk.
A nation or service can build many
kinds of models, but if prudence is
absent from strategic thought, those
models will be useless, and, in all
probability, will not conform to the
true reality of the situation.
NegativeQuality
What is prudence and why is it a
military
necessity ? Unfortunately,
the term in many circles has lost its
pristine brilliance and basic connota
tion. Today, prudence is often con
ceived as a negative qualit yit f re
quently ie used to mean a certain
vacillation or a pacifistic attitude.
More often than not it means dont
get involved, or dont get hurt.
Another insidious connotation is that
of a ehieId of inaction. These concepts
are all negative and are destructive
to strategic thinking; they repreeent
the very antithesis of leadership.
The virtue or moral power of pru
dence is positive. It does not avoid
action; it takes a stand with dignity
and firmness, yet always open and
questioning. It is a vital factor which
Reverend
Edmund
McCaffrey,
Or
der of Saint Beu.edict, a Roman Cath
olic prieet, is an instructor
of POliti
cal Science at Belmont Abbey College
in NoTth Carolina. He holds an M.A.
degree, and is preserztlv
enrolled in
the Graduate
School at the Catholic
University
of America,
Washington,
D. C.
Septembm 1965

brings into being meaningful 16ader

ship and dedicated service. Thie vir
tue which gives vitality to eervice is
the Aristotelian concept of right rea
son about things to be done.
pilot Virtue
For the field commander, correct or
incorrect action can mean ]ife or
death to hk men. To the military
planner, correct or incorrect action
can mean the strengthening or weak
ening of his service and nation. The
military specialist must acquire and
develop this virtue so that his actions
will conform to right reason. Prn
dence will make him sensitive to the
needa of national security in order to
secure the goal of all military operationepeace. Indeed, if the common
good of a nation is to be achieved, it
can only be obtained through right
action guided by all the virtues. The
pilot virtue ia prudence.
This pilot virtue muet be the guide
in decision makkrg. It must be based
on a healthy realism, but should never
be overcautious
or afraid of new
formulas. Yet it is safe, and when
national security is involved-and
to
day the very foundations of Western
civilization are at stake-unproved
formulas that are baeed on semantics
and highly unrealistic myths are not
prudentially safe. This is why Gen
eral Thomae S. Power, United States
Air Force, Retired, correctly chal
lenges certain disarmament
propos
als, Because of the present confron
tation, he prudently notee that:
The baet n,a~ to deter nuclear -~oar
toda~ is through overwhelming
mili
tary superiority-a
proven, aemcessful
formula. There is no harm in ezamin
,,. ing anotheT philosophy,
btit I would
recommend
caution before the nation
discards
an old and proven formula.
General Powers judgment is based

63

,.

PRUDENCE
1

on a correct concept of prudence.

True prudence is alert and ready for
the unexpected, a concept which de
mands a knowledge of reality, For
the military leader this means doing
ones homeworksearching
for the
I
facts, seeking advice, understanding
all views, having a knowledge of the
technical realities of the strategic sit
uation and the philosophical strata
which underlie the foundation
of
this situation. He will know general
and universaI pr@ciples, and yet be
fully cognizant of the total factual
situation to which these principles
must be applied. General Power rec
ognizes these intricaciesintricacies
which. penetrate to the heart of So
viet philosophy.
Military Necessity

Prudence ie seen as a military ne

cessity because it is a leadership vir
tue. The prudent leader inspires con
fidence in his men, and this confidence
will show itself in -times of stress.
Prudence makee one alert to the
needs of the men and, hence,prevents
demoralization.
It promotes a com
prehensive perspective-the
good of
the ~en is seen as the good of the
Army, and this promotes the good of
the nation and thus promotes the
global and ethical good of mankind.
Military leadership is:
. . . the art of influencing and di
recting men in such a way as to ob
tain the{r willing
obediewe,
conjf
dence, respect, and lopal cooperation
in order to accomplish
the mission.

This is a gigantic task which re

quires prudential management. If the
mission is to be accomplished, then all
tbe personal qualities of the! leader
must be brought into high walief in
order to gain the obedience,! loyalty,
and confidence of the men tq accom
plish thie goal.
,
e4

The leadership traits and princi.

pies should all be developed and exer.
cised under the guidance of the piIot
virtue prudence, because prndence iI.
Iuminates the standards
of action.
The standard of prudence, on the
other hand, is reason applied to real.
it y, and he is prudent who acts in
accordance with objective reality.
The prudent officer, then, attempts
to see the entire situation.
This
means, among other things, that be
will seek a wide range of opinions,
Prudence prevents that narrowness
which is reflected by a closed mind.
It opens the door to truth because iti
seeks reality. Prudence is not know
it-aIIness and narrow in the sense
that it refuses to have opposition.
Prudence does not breed a cowed and
submissive group, but devekips and
encourages, initiative.
Decisiveness

Prudence is not plodding but de

cisive, and decisiveness is essential
to gain the strategic advantzge in to
days crisis and thus to ensure peace.
It is the necessary tool of the leader,
military or otherwise, needed to pen
etrate the core of complex human
problems and, thereby, helping to se
cure solutions compatible with the
existing situation and with ultimate
reality. This virtue, like all virtues,
is not acquired overnight. We cannot
six-week course in prudence,.
but our training and leadership sem
inars must focus on this most im
portant factor in military affairs. A
seminar on prudence is as important
as a seminar on power.
In the present world revolutionary
situation, where new devices of de
struction and power have been de
vised, the role of this pilot virtue be
comes increasingly evident, Prudence
gives stature to service and teaches

givea

MilitaryRariw

PRUDENCE
how to be politically

adept and mili

tarily sound. No leader can be with
out it. Indeed, it is neceseary for any
fruitful life. Prudence givee insight
and courage, insight into what is to
be done, and courage to implement
it at all levels-diplomatic,
economic,
political, social, and military.
Prudence is necessary on the mili
tary as well as the political level of
leadership. It helps form the good
man, for moral virtue cannot be with
out prudence. Aristotle declared that
it belongs to a good man to Be able to

rule well and to obey well. These are

military virtues and prudence is their
escort. Prudence is, indeed, tbe hall
mark of tbe professional.
If this virtue is developed and
strengthened
by the professional,
that peace of righteousness which
Theodore- Roosevelt spoke of will be
fulfilied and, then:
No weak nat{on tkd ac.fe nmznftdlg
and justly shotdd ever have cauee to
fear us, and no strong power should
ever be able to single w out as a
eub ject for insolent aggression.

The professional soldier dedicates himself to perfecting the skills re

quired for successful military campaigns. He does it in order not to have
to use those ekilis in war. He knows there is a value and purpose other
than actual, all-out combat for maintaining a costly, well-equipped, care
fully trained military organization.
Secretarg

September1965

of the Air Force Eugene

M. Zuckert

S5

Communist Errors in
the Anti-Bandit

War

Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Selton, United .Sfate8 .&-my

N A dreary night near the end of August 1949, the Iast bedraggled rem
nants of a once victorious Communist guerrilla force fled by individual
infiltration from the Grammos Mountains in northern Greece to the sanctuary
of Albania. Thie Communiet force had almost subjugated Greece in three years
of bloody guerrilla warfare. Why had it failed?
66

Military Revizw

ANTI-BANDIT

The Anti-Bandit War (1946-49) in

Greece was. the opening battle of the
cold war. It terminated in victory for
tire Westa victory that was not only
in ite traditional
meaning
military

but, for Greece, was victory

total sociopolitical context.

in its

Background.
The Communist

forces which en
gaged the West in thie, the first com
bat of the cold war, and which almost
succeeded in taking over Greece, had
their origins in the mountains of
Greece during World War H.
The Communist Party of Greece
(KKE), long accustomed to under
ground operation under the regime of
Greek strong man Joannes Metaxas,
responded to the World War II Ger
man occupation of Greece by forming,
in September 1941, the National. Lib
eration Front ( EAM), a political co
alition dominated
by Communists.
Some six months later the EAM an
nounced the formation of the National
Popular Liberation Army (ELA.S).
This army was controlled by the
hard core of the IHCE, but by no
means did Communists constitute a
majority or even a significant number
of the rank and file. To many, the
ELA.S offered the only opportunity to
fight the invader; to othere it gave
vent to antimonarchist or anti-MetaxLieutenant
Colonel Robert W. Sel
ton is with the Military
Assistance
Division,
United
States
European
Command.
He is a graduate
of the
U. S. Armg Command
and General
Staff College and holde an M.A. in
International
Relations
from Ameri
can University,
Washington,
D. C. He
eerved in Europe during World War
11, euae Assietant
Military
AttachJ to
Greece from 195S to 1956, and was as
signed to the Ofice of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Military Operations
fvom 1959 to 196.9.
Sapteihhar19S5

WAR

ae feelings; and etill others fell for

the Communist line. Whatever the mo
tivation of those in the ranks, the
ELAS
leadership organized a disci
plined and effective guerrilla force
which soon reached a strength of some
20,000 fighters-the
largest guerrilla
force in Greece.
On occasion, the ELAS fought tbe
German occupation force?, but as the
war wore on an increasingly large
portion of ite politico-military activity
turned to eliminating competing Greek
guerrilla organization
and to prepar
ing for the postwar era.
Greece Evacuated

The German Army began ita evacu

ation of Greece in early October 1944.
British units landed in Greece on 4
October, followed shortly by military
units of the Greek Government-in
exile which had been fighting along
side other Allied forces in Italy. Fric
tion immediately developed between
the ELAS and the liberation forces on
the matter of formation of a new
Greek Army. Within a month of the
liberation, a new era of violence wae
upon Greece.
,
On 6 December the ELAS attacked
the government buildings in Athene
and the British troope guarding them.
During the next 10 daye, the ELAS
constricted
tbe Anglo-Greek forcee
into an ever-tightening
perimeter in
the center of Athens. Military defeat
at the bands of the Communists was
narrowly averted only when two com
plete Britieh divisions and an Indian
brigade were rushed from Italy. On
Christmas day, Prime Minister Win
ston S. Churchill arrived in Athena
to direct the British counterattack.
Anglo-Greek attacks thereafter were
successful in driving the ELAS from
tbe area, and the Communists sued
for an armistice.

ANTI-BANDIT

WAR

The resulting Varkiza agreement

gave the initial impression that na
tional unity would now result, but it
only proved to be another example of
a Communist provisional withdrawal
@ one area in order to renew the of
fensive later in another area undw
more propitious eircmmstances.
Hard-core Communists, who could
not expect to benefit by the partial

In May 1945 Nikos Zachariades, the

Moscow-trained prewar leader of the
KILT who had spent the war in a Ger
man concentration camp, returned to,
Greece and replaced the wartime
leader of the party.
Zacbariades
brought with bim a more international
viewpoint than that held by tbe local
homegrown leadership.
The intimacy of the KKEs affilia
)

(
)

YUGOSLAVIA

..\
4..+

BULGARIA
_-..Xc,c,

.<--$%=+,

-.

H! JOUS&
<,

ONN

amnesty provisions of Varkiza, re

mained in the mountains where they
would form the nucleus of a new Com
mnnist Army. They cached arms in
mountain redoubts, and sent potential
Greek Communiet leaders to Albania,
Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia fOr training.
It has been estimated that from 4,000
to 8,000 persons received this training.
68

tion with Moscow was no longer in

doubt.
The coordination
between
Greek and Yugoslavian Communist
Parties became very close. In fact, the
coordination with Yugoslavia became
too close as small elements of both par
ties splintered to form a Macedonia
Communist Party and advocated the
often proposed Autonomous MaceMilitaryReview

, ANII.BANDIT

dorda to the embarrassment

of both
the KK.E and Marshal Tito.
Bandit activity in the mountains
broke out on an increaeed scale in the
sp~ing of 1946, partly as a result of
the March elections which established
a Greek Government pledged tO the
restoration of the monarchy. BY uti
lizing the retufhing officers from the
northern training camps and exploit
ing continuing economic distress and
political instability, the KKE was able
to launch a planned program of ter
rorism to secure recruits and suppliee,
as well as to disrppt the economy. The
initial attacks were on isolated officials
and rightwing citizene.
gendarmerieDetachments
Then as the gewhvrzeriea police
force responsible for all areas not cov
ered by rrietropolitan police forces
dispersed into small detachments to
protect the citizens, these isolated
Jaukzrrner% detachments
were at
tacked. After the return of King
George II in September 1946, there
was ariother marked upturn in bandit
activity, and the Communist Leader
ship in Athens openly acknowledged
their connection with these bands.
Toward the end of 1946 General
Markos Vafiades, a former political
commissar of the ELAS, was made
commander in chief of the postwar
Cornmurrist guerrilla
forces. These
forces took the name of the Demo
cratic Peoples Army (DAS).
The gendarmerie
was soon forced
to consolidate its personnel, and again
the small villages were exposed to ban
dit plunder and forced recruitment
techniques. Attacks on villages were
not limited to northern Greece, but
spread throughout the mainland. It
has been speculated that the DAS was
attempting to create the impression
that the raids represented a grassSepternberlW

roots,

nationwide

civil

war

WAR

in order

to provide propaganda support for the

vitriolic attacks on the West then be
ing launched by the Soviet bloc in the
United Nations.
This tactic backfired when the
United Natione Commission of Inves.
tigation concluded in early 1947 that
Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent Al.
bania and Bulgaria, was supporting
the fighting, and clearly implied that
the grassroots element was minimal.
By the end of 1946 the bandits were
attacking gendarmerie posts of 30 or
40 men, and, by the time the United
States became involved in the Greek
fighting in the spring of 1947, the
bandits
had already grown bold
enough to attack Greek Army frontier
posts along the northern borders. At
the time of the proclamation of the
Truman doctrine in March 1947 her.
aiding the initiation of US involve
ment on the Greek scene, it has been
estimated that the strength of the
DAS had grown to a figure somewhere
between 14,000 and 17,000 men.
VictoryWithin Grasp
The DAS enjoyed a tactical advan
tage over the Greek National Army
(GNA ) which few guerrilla forces
have enjoyed so early in a campaign.
The Greek Communists had had three
years of recent, modern guerrilla ex
perience with the ELAS. In addition,
many of their officers had received
valuable supplementary
training
at
the hands of Yugoslav partisan in
structors. Centuries of Turkish occu
pation of Greece had fostered a tradi
tion of hillsmen plundering the more
prosperous plainsrnen in the ante
cedent of guerrilla operations.
Since mountains cover more than
two-thirde of the mainland and are
the normal home of 40 percent of the
population, topographically the coun
69

ANTI-BANDIT

WAR

try provides almost optimum condi

tions for waging guerrilla warfare.
The bandits enjoyed logistical support
from a privileged sanctuary which was
out of reach of their opponents. The
seething unrest of the population
caused by economic privation and po
litical uncertainty added to these or
ganizational, operational, and logisti
cal advantages.
The DA.S maintained a terrorism
campaign throughout all of Greece
during 1947, attacking isolated vil
lages to obtain supplies and recruits
and fleeing before government forces
could arrive. It sought to avoid open
combat with the GNA, although it
would raid small, isolated detach
ments of the gendarmerie and, if re
quired, would attack army units in
order to secure passage across the
northern border. Through terrorism
and propaganda the Communists ex
tracted subservience, concurrence, or,
at least, nonresistance from the in
habitants of a number of villagee.
Base Areas Established

During 1947, too, base areas in the

rugged Grammos and Mount Vitsi
area% adjacent to the Albanian and
Yugoslavian borders were established,
and a crude but effective supply sYs
tem running down the Pindus Moun
tain chain was set UP to support those
bands which operated in the barren
mountains of central Greece.
Although these base areas were ini
tially vast areas of hidden supplies,
they gradually developed into a crude
logistical complex which served as an
intermediate station between the satel
lite sources and tbe bands operating
farther south. Eventually, they could
not be concealed, and DAS tactics were
directed toward diverting the GNA
away from these areae and finally to
defending them.
70

On 24 December 1947 the formation

of a provisional Democratic Govern.
ment in the Grammos area was an.
nounced. The US Department of State
issued notice th~t recognition of thig
group by other governments wonld
have serious implications.
The DA.$
launched ite first Iarge-scaie attack of
the war with the objective of secur.
ing Konitea in northern Greece near
the Albanian border as a capital for
the new government.

First Setback

There was speculation that, had the

attack succeeded, Soviet bloc recogni
tion of the new government in its new
capital would have been consummate.
But the GNA stood firm at Konitsa
and gave the DA.S its first setback.
This failure to take and hold any ten.
ter of population suitable for the seat
of a government was the major short
fall of Communist objectives through
the close of 1947.
The DAS, though, had expioited the
lack of aggressiveness showpr by the
GNA and had abducted large numbers
of unwilling recruits to organized
training camps in Albania, Yugosla
via, and Bulgaria. With the assistance
of Communist countries on the north
ern border of Greece, the guerrillas
had established strongholds at eight
separate points along the northern
border, and controlled large areas of
mainland .Greece.
During early 1948 the DAS ex
panded its battalions and grouped
them into brigades, and by May
formed its first division. Regardless
of organization, the actual fighting
strength of the DAS in Greece was
maintained at a fairly constant fignre
in the vicinity of from 20,000 to 25,000
personnel. This strength
was aug
mented inside of Greece by some 50,
000 collaborators,
such as informers,
Military

R.swiew

ANT1.BANltlT WAR

spies, recruiters, and suppliers, Out.

side of Greece, approximately 11,000
additional able-bodied guerrillas were
offjred sanctuary behind the northern
frontiers On a rotational baeis.
Logistically, the DAS continued its
buildup of the Grammos and Vitsi
base areas. Probably one-third of the
bandit strength wae in each of these

Until late 1948 the DAS continued.

to avoid combat with the GNA, When
Grammos and Vitsi were attacked by
the GNA, the Communists first sought
to utilize attacks in other parts of
Greece to divert the GNA from key
DAS areae.
The Grammos
redoubt
area was -finally abandoned under re
lentless GNA pressure
in Auguet

Greek National Army troops attacking Grammos Ridge on 28 August 1949

areas; only some 7,000 men had to be
supported throughout
the reet of
Greece, The supply of these forces
was accomplished by pack train down
the Pindus range, although alternate
lines of communication,
to include
ships, were sometimee used.
Mines, a tremendously
effective
guerrilla weapon, were the heaviest
items transported
down the Pindus.
Heavy weaponsantiaircraft
and an
, ~titank cannonwere to be found only
.in tbe Grammos and Vitsi concentra
tions where they could be supported
from the sanctuary across tbe horder.
Septsmber1965

I 948. Contrary to former practice,

however, the DAS dug in and tenaci
ously held Vitki against all GNA at
tacks for the remainder of the year.
Following the successful stand on
Vitsi, the Communists launched a ma
jor winter
counteroffensive.
Their
mining and demolition tactics took a
heavy toll of vehicles, bridges, rail
roads, technical works, and water sys
tems. During December the guerrillas
mounted attacks in force againat a
number of medium-sized towns in cen
tral and northern Greece. Two of them
Karditsa
and Niaousta-held
out
71

ANT}-BANDIT

WAR

until the GNA could effectively coun

terattack but a thirdKarpenision
was completely sacked after being OC.
rupied by the DAS for 16 days.
Toward the cIose of 1948, the ad
vantage in the Anti-Bandit War ap
. peared on balance to lay with the DA.S.
The accomplishment of KKE political
objectives seemed within the military
grasp of the DAS. Yet within six
months this cause had all but collapsed.
In large measure, it was due to Com
munist errors~rrors
that stemmed
from political aid military decisions
which had far-reaching psychological,
logistical, and tactical implications.
Tbe political decisions involved re
lations with Marshal Titos Yugosla.
via after the Tito-Cominform (Com
munist Information Bureau ) split and
were played out within the framework
of a dichotomy within the KKE which
reflected the milieu of world commu
nism; the military decisions involved
largely the role to be played by the
guerrillas.
Macedonia

Question

That area of tbe Balkans generally

referred to as Macedonia comprises
within
the
present-day
territory
boundaries of Greece, Yugosbia,
and
Bulgaria. The heterogeneous groups
within the area have long been pawns
in the game of Balkan power politics.
A proposal for establishing an autono
mous Macedonia within a Balkan Con
federation had been an element of
Marxist programs even before World
War 1. The idea was reintroduced by
the Bulgarmns at the First Congress
of the Balkan Communist Federation
in Sofia in June 1923. From that time,
Bulgarian
elements had advocated
an
autonomous
Macedonia
and were par
ticularly
active to thie end during tbe

. Bulgarian World War 11 occupation of

Greece.
72

At the risk of oversimplification, it

appears that the minimum pOstwar ob
jective of the Bulgarian Communist
Part y toward the Macedonia
ques.
tion was to keep Bulgarian Macedonia
out of Titos hands while striving for
a longer range plan of detaching Greek
and Yugoslavia Macedonia to form a
greater Macedonia closely linked to
Bulgaria.
On another side of this comples tri
angle, Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia had
announced as early as 29 November
1943 that Macedonia was one of the
six Federal Republics of Yugoslavia.
Tito, of course, intended to hnld that
part of Macedonia within his then cur
rent frontiers while his maximum ob
jective was probably to bring about a
union of Bulgarian and Greek Mace
donia with Yugoslavia.
,
6reek ComqrunistSide
On the thirdGreek Communist
side of the Macedonia triangle, na
tional interest was still inchoate, and
a major dichotomy was in the making.
When Nikos Zachariades, th> Moscow.
trained leader of the KKE, regained
control of tbe party and injected an
externally
oriented
perspective to
party affairs, relations between the
I(KE and all three northern neighbors
became cordial. Zachariades condoned,
if not supported, an international
Communist approach to an autono
mous Macedonia.
General Markns, who assumed com
mand of the DAS in December 1946,
was also Moscow trained. His natural
sympathies proved to be with the na
tionalist wing of the KK.E rather than
internationalist
with
Zachariades
leanings. Translated in terms of the
Maeedonian question, Markos opposed
any approach which condnned an au
tonomous Macedonia at the expense of
Greek territorial integrity.
Military Review

ANTI-BANDIT

Direct evidence presented in recent

writings tends to substantiate the be
lief that Tito and the Yugoslav parti
sans were primarily responsible for
the encouragement and support of the
Anti-Bandit War. The United Nations
Commission of Investigation
clearly
established the flow of arms and per
sonnel from Yugoslavia into Greece
snd the provision of safe haven in
Yugoslavia to bandits fleeing from the
GNA during the early stages of the
conflict.
Greek Commurrist sources, as well
as Yugoslavian sources, have reported
that Titos assurance of support to the
KKE was the key element in the de
cision of the February 1946 Plenum
of the Central Committee of the KKE
to launch the so-called third round.
It can be established that, from the
start of hostilities, Markos relied rhore
heavily on support from Tito than
from Albania or Bulgaria. Markos, as
a military commander, regardless of
pelitical implications,
could be ex
pected to establish a close workhrg re
lationship with the primary source of
his logistical supportYugoslavia.
Tito.Cominform Split
Then, of course, occurred the Tito-

Cominform split. The Cominform,

which consisted of two representatives
from the Central Committees of each
of the nine participating
Communist
Parties, was established in late Sep
tember 1947. Although initially di
rected against the imperialist camp
and its directing force the USA, the
Cominform soon became primarily an
instrument to ensure a more complete
control by the USSR of tbe internal
affairs of other Communiet Parties.
i The first m..d of the Comm.nist attemptto
takemm GIWW c.lmimitcd with a. abortive
mutinyat wrtai. Greek unit
m theMiddle
E..l
,rh. .woml ,,,,,.,! WI. lbe ~@ein
k April1i144.

t,,
t.ke o,.

he, IQ44,,tt,rn,,t of the AI.AS

,.. The Ant,-Umdit War .x,
hptember 1365

Atb

lhe third mum!,

WAR

Since Marshal Tito was adamant in

his efforts to maintain a degree of au
tonomy from Soviet dominance, it
was all but inevitable that a rupture
would occur. At a Cominform confer
ence in Bucharest in June 1948, to
which Yugoslavia had declined an in
vitation, the Yugoslavian Communist
Party was expelled from the interna
tional Organization for deviation from
the correct path to socialism. After the
expulsion of Tito, it is probable that
Stalin
exploited
the Cominforms
newly established relations with the
KKE to assist in the Soviet objective
of isolating and destroying Tito.
Recencitiation
Tito presumably still hoped for
some kind of reconciliation, and did
not immediately take any precipitous
action along the Greek horder. It is
not improbable that Tito initially
thought he conld hold the allegiance
of the KKE. The close liaison between
Markos and Tito continued well past
the June 1948 Tito-Cominform split.
Supplies were only gradually reduced,
and Greek guerrillas continued to be
granted sanctuary as late as 8 July
1949. The Greek guerrilla radio
Free Greecealso continued to op
erate in Yugoslavia until early 1949.
Coincidental with the Yugoslavian
ouster, Bulgarian influence in the Bal
kan councils of the Cominform rose
appreciably and, with it, the Bulgar
ian position on Macedonia. By late
1948 Bulgarian
Communists
again
were proposing an autonomous Mace
donia.
Within the inner circles of the KKE,
these Bulgsrian proposals were inter
preted as the,,precursor of Cominform
policy which, indeed, they proved to
be. Zachariades, seeing the handwrit
ing on the wall, began an indoctrina
tion campaign to secure the adherence
13,

ANT1-BANDtT WAR

.
of the rank and file of the KK.E to the
Cominform
position
against
Tito.
Markos, on the other hand, retained
his close relationship with Tito.
In early 1949 the Cominform de
clared for the establishment of an in
dependent Macedonia. The KKE was
trappedit had tochooee between the

successful GNA attack on Grammo~,

a Communist strongholdZachariades
blamed the Grammos defeat on poor
military leadership and began purg
ing some of Markos subordinates; at
the same time, be avoided a direct con.
frontation with Markos.
In November Markos published a

US Arm

A m-ouD of wisoners. includine men, women. and children, cavtured by the Greek
\

National Army during the Grammos campaign

Stalinist-dominated
Cominform
with
an autonomous
Macedonia,
and 1ito
with a somewhat
flexible Macedonia.

The KK.L stalled through its Fifth

-Plenum in January with a rather
vague statement on .Macedonia, but on
1 March 1949 Radio Free Greece an
nounced what was tantamount to a
KKE acceptance of the Cominform PO.
sition.
%
While these divergencies within the
KKE and between the KK.E and the
DAS were coming to a head, another
issue arose. At the Fourth Plenary
Session of tbe KK.E on 20 August
1948-held at the same time as the
li

pamphlet condemning political inter

ference in tbe military execution of
tbe war and criticizing Zachariades
handling of the KKE. Markos ad
vanced the time-honored concept that
the guerrillas should not stand and
fight regular troops in position war
fare. Zachariades, though, felt that tbe
time was ripe for decisive victory
over the GNA. As a result of his dis
agreements with Zacbariades, Markos
was formally relieved from command
of the DAS and expelled from the
KKE at the Fifth Plenary Seesion, an
action justified as required by the
state of Markos health.
MilitaryReview

ANTI-BANDIT WAR

Zachariades had surrounded him

self with amateur etrategiste with an
ELAS background who 10nged for the
glory of commanding divieione and
@rpe. Their advice apparently
led
Zachariades to think that the DAS
could organize divisions and hold
ground like any other armY. In addi
tion, his logisticians advieed him tO
hold the border areae, and his political
commiseare pointed to the increased
political control inherent in larger
formations. Markos, on the other hand,
had favored the use of guerrilla war
fsre ae a war of attrition.
Consequences

The dichotomy between the political

leadership of the KKE and the mili
tary leadership of the DAS which re
sulted in the removal of Markos had
three far-reaching consequences: po
litico-psychological, logistical, and tac
tical.
Psychologically, Zachariades
sup
ported the Cominform position on an
autonomous Macedonia. Henceforth,
no amount of doubletalk could convince
the Greek guerrilla that the KKE was
following a nationalist cause, and the
motivation to fight and die for an in
ternational cause was significantly ab
sent among the traditionally nation
alistic Greek people.
Logistically, Zachariades primacy
over the pro-Tito Markoe reeulted in
Marshal Titos final resolution to close
the Yugoslav-Greek border to further
resupply of the DAS; supplies slowed
to a trickle by January 1949, and the
hnrder was officially closed in July.
Tactically, the DAS was placed un
der the command of Ioannidis, who
followed Zachariades directive to hold
ground and stand and fight the GNA.
As subsequent events would prove, this
decision not only violated the princi
ples of guerrilla warfare, it also ig
fepternbsr1965

nored available intelligence on the im

proving capability of the GNA.
Communist Defeat
errors
Communist

alone did not

bring about the defeat of the DAS.
Many other factors were present. On
21 January 1949, for example, Gen
eral Alexander Papagos, the World
War II commander in chief of the
Greek armed forces, again accepted
appointment as their commander in
chief. He rapidly brought the combat
efficiency of the forces to a high level,
and agg~essiveness and mobility were
streesed in tactical units. The will to
fight, to close with and destroy the
guerrilla,
reasserted iteelf within the
GNA.
Additionally, the cumulating impact
of US military assistance began to
be felt by early 1949. The initial be
lief held by the US military miesions
to Greece during mid-1947that mil
itary aid could be limited to mattere
relating strictly to supplyhad heen
proved invalid. By early 1948 the US
advisore were providing aggressive as
sistance in the form of operational
advice.
It was not until July 1948, bowever,
after the arrival of Lieutenant Gen
eral James A. Van Fleet, that US
military personnel assumed advisory
responsibilities for the training of the
GNA infantry.
Ironically, or, perhaps, by intention,
the KKE decieion to stand and fight
occurred about the time that US mili
tary assistance was reaching fruition
under the aegis of General Papagos,
who accepted much of the advice of
the US military advisora and imple
mented many of the plans which Gen
eral Van Fleet advocated.
The impact of Greek national re
surgence, coupled with the relief of
General Markos, was not long in mak
15

ANTI-BANDIT

WAR

ing itself felt. The DAS had suffered

nearly 33,000 casualties during 194S
a figure which represented almost a
150-percent turnover.
Nevertheless,
Zachariades,
moti
vated largely hy his personal feud
, with Markos, drove the DAS into the
winter counteroffensive of early 1949.
Temporary gains in the Karditsa, Nia
ousta, and Karpenision areas were
more tham offset by the punishment
taken when the bandits attempted to
hold these gains against determined
GNA counterattacks. Zachariades con
tinued to drive the DAS against pre
pared GNA positions, and in Febru
arv launched a desperate attack on
Florins; the attack was repulsed with
heavy guerrilla losses.
Morale Affected
The KKE support of the Comintern
(Communist
International
) objective
of establishing
an independent
Mac
edonia had a most serious effect on the
morale
of the guerrillas,
Surrenders
started
to show a gradual
increase
as the impact of the desertion
of the
nationalist
cause by the KK.E leader

ship began to be felt within the ranks.

For the first time, informers began to
repo> t bandit movement and activities
to the GNA in time to be of opera
ti
tional. use.
For the first time, too, recruitment
became of major concern to the DAS;
youths from the mountain villages no
longer volunteered to join the demo
cratic cause after it had divested it
self of its nationalist facade. As a re
sult, the DAS resorted to terrorism
and fomed abduction to replace its
ever-increasing battle casualties.
Although women had long served
the DAS as frontline soldiers, recruit
ment of women by terrorism now be
came commonplace. Children were
@ken as hostages to secure the faith
76

ful service of the parents. It has been

estimated that by March 1949 almost
one-fourth of the members of the DAS
were female. The blind excesses corn.
mitted hy the KKE alienated the pop
ulation in ever-increasing numbers.
Border Is Closed

The closing of the Yugoslav border

in July 1949 was a severe blow to the
KKE cause. The closing of tbe border
effectively neutralized 4,000 guerrillas
then in Yugoslavia and cut off 2,500
more in Bulgaria from the main con.
centrations in the Vitsi and Grammos
areas.

The 20,000-odd bandits then in

Greece were distributed roughly onethird in Vitsi, one-third in Grammos,
and one-third in the remainder of
Greece. Of the latter, from 2,500 to
3,000 were located in Thrace and west
ern Macedonia. Since the GNA con.
trolled the open plains between Thrace
and the Vitsi-Grammos area, Titos
act isolated the Thracian bandits who
had formerly maintained contact with
those in Vitsi and Grammqs via Yu
goslavia.
It should also be remembered that
Yugoslavia had initiated a significant
portion of the supplies se~t to the DAS
even though they may have crossed the
border at points along the more cov
ered Albanian border.

General Papagos challenged Zach

ariades decision to stand and fight on
10 August 1949. Four GNA divisions
Iaurrcbed a coordinated attack against
the guerrilla redoubt in the Vitsi area.
The concerrtration of force, status of
training of the GNA, and the superi.
ority of equipment soon made itself
felt. Within three days the GNA, with
effective air support from the Royal
Hellenic Air Force, had overrun Vitsi

~SeeColonelTheodomio.I%math.nwiades,
.Th!

13andftsLa.t Stand i Gwe.e,,rMilitary R.vfQW,

February 1951.IIP 22.31.

Militarf Rwiew

ANTI-BANDIT
which demonstrated
the fu
tility of guerrillas standing to fight
well-trained and well-equipped reguIq forcee.
Following UP their advantage, the
GNA launched an aseault on the
Grammos redoubt on 24 August with
a night attack designed to envelop
the north flank of the guerrilla poei
tion and eeal the Albanian border.
Four GNA divisions and five raiding
force groups overran the Grammos
position and collapsed the guerrilla
defense by 27 August. One American
observer stated: The guerrillas were
beatenthey did not give UP.
The DAS had operated under near
optimum guerrilla conditions. during
tbe period from mid-1946 to approxi
mately mid-1948. The guerrilla opera
tion of that period reveal a maximum
exploitation of the advantages which
en joyedexperienced
the bandits
leadership; a psychological environ
ment nurtured in guerrilla tradition;
favorable terrain; privileged sanctu
ary; adequate logistical support; a
population torn with eeonomic priva
tionand political uncertainty; andna
tional sectirity forces that were poorly
trained, equipped, and led. Guerrilla
tactics were primarily haeed on bitand-run raids, terrorism, and avoiding
open combat with regular forces ex
cept under
advantageous
circum
stances.
Initial Communist success, the pros
pects of ultimate victory, and the at
trition of prolonged combat eventually
led to a dichotomy between the leader
ship of the KKE and the leadership

a battle

-September 1965

WAR

6f t%e DAS, a dichotomy exacerbated

by the first rupture of the monolithic
unity of the then Communist bloc
the Tito-Cominform
split of June
1948. The party leadership under Zach
ariades, loyal to the Cominform, pre
vailed over the DAS leader, General
Markos, toward the end of 1948, and
the army commander wae relieved of
his commandant
expelled from party
membership.
The change in DAS leadership re
sulted in far-reaching politico-psycho
logical, Iogietical, and tactical implica
tions. Zachariades, a Comintern-ori
ented Communist, allowed the KKEto
be maneuvered into the position of
supporting tbe Comintern position on
the Macedonia
issue ae opposed to
the traditional
Greek national poei
tion. This action cost the DA.S that
sector of popular support
which
equated communism with a nationalist
cauee.
As a result of the loss of this sec
tor of support, the DAS resorted to
blind excesses of terror and destruc.
tion to secure replacements for com
bat casualties. This, in turn, further
alienated the popular base of support.
From tbe logietic point of view, the
anti-Tito orientation of the new DAS
leadership resulted in the closing of
the principal DAS line of supply
across the Yugoslavian border.
Tactically,
the DAS,
driven by
Zachariadee, overconfidently elected to
stand and fight .the GNA which by
then wae rapidly improving incomhat
efficiency. Thie proved to be the un
doing of the DAS on the field of battle.

11

Stanley L. Fstk

URING the unsuccessful Brit

ish attack on the Spanish Car
ibbean port of Cartagena in 1741, the
sick and wounded troops of the as
ssult force were placed on board what
were called, with less truth than
charity, naval hospital ships. There,
in the shocked words of surgeons
mate Tobias Smollett,
they lan
guished in want of every necessary
comfort and accommodation.
Without adequate care, food, or
medical attention, the casualties, as
Smollett described them:
. . . were pent-up bet ween decks in
small vessels where they had not room
to sit upright;
they wallowed in filth;
myriads
of ~aggots were hatcJted in
the putrefaction
of their sores, which
had no othe.y dressing
than that of
being washed b.g the?nselves in their

September1965

own allowance of brandy; and nothing

wae heard but groans, lamentations,
and the [angtcage of despair, invoking
death to deliuer
them fronz their
miseries.

The so-called hospital ships in the

British Fleet, before Cartagena were
a far cry from the clean, comfortable,
well-equipped and staffed vessels that
saw service in the Allied cause dnring
World War II. But the development
of hospital ships as we knowt.them
was a long time in coming.
Indeed, it was well over a century
after Cartagena before the concept
of hospital ships as sanctuaries for
evacuating the sick and wounded, im
mune from capture or attack, was
specifically accepted as a principle of
international
law. The Geneva Con
vention of 1864 and the Hague Con
85.

HOSPITAi

SHIPS

of 1899 and 1907 established

the principles urider which modern
hospital ships operate.
According to these treaties:
ventions

Military
hospital ships, that is to
skips constructed
or- fitted out
by States special[g and solely with a
riew to assisting
the wounded, sick,
and shipwrecked,
t!ze namn of which
shall hate been communicated
to the
belligerent
Powers at the commence=
??lent of hostilities,
and in any case
before they are emploged, shall be re
spected and carmot be captuved while
hostdities
/ast.
say,

The Geneva and Hague agreements *

further stipulated rules for the con
duct of hospital ships, their markings
and identification, and the behavior
of their cre\w, staffs, and passengers.
Army Assumes Responsibility
During
World War I the US Navy

\\as responsible
for carrying
all
\vounded, sick, or Injured
from
France back to the United States,
\rlth the llur~a of M~dl~ine and
Surgery in charge of caring for the
patients. In World War II, however,
the LS Army decided to assume the
responsibility of using ]t> own hos
pita~ ship. tu evacuate Army sick and
wounded.
In the peacetime
years before
-.
Stanley L. Falk w- ~he author of
Disarnrament
!n Hz.st,, rira[ Perspec
tive; whtch ap~eared in the Decem
ber 1364 issue af the MILITARY RE
VIEW. A member of tbc irrstractwrral
stafl of the fndustt-ial
CalleUe of the
Armed Fur-cex, he rrcezued his Ph. D.
degree in history
from Gwrgitown
University.
He is a graduate
of fke
US Army LarIguage .%hool, served in
the occupation of Jal)an as an Army
his forian and languagp
ofjicer, and
formerly
wa.v with the <)fice, Chipj
of Military
Hist,, ry, Department
of
tl!e Army.

86

Pear] Harbor, the Army had taken

over the job of returning sick or in.
jured soldiers from points overseas,
The number of patients to be evac.
uated for prolonged or specialized
hospitalization
during this period
was small, though, and the Army
Transport Service (then a part of
the Quartermaster Corps ) carried the
men in the hospitals of the few Army
transports that it operated.
When the United States entered
World War II, the question arose of
whether the Navy should once again
asaume responsibility
for overseas
evacuation. Major General James C.
Magee, Surgeon General of the Army,
felt that it should not. He argued
that Army-controlled
ships should
continue to evacuate Army patients
in order to provide unin~errupted
medical care and administrative con.
trol under a single agency.
The newly established Army Serv
ices of Supply supported this view,
and Army transports
retained the
Job of returning
militar~ patients
from overseas. The Army Transpor
tat ion Corps, now organized as a sep.
mate technical service on the general
lines of the old Army Transport Serv
ice, \vas made responsible for evac
uation.
No Hospital Ships Available

While the Army thus kept the right

to evacuate its own patients, it soon
found itself in the curious position
of having no hospital ships with
which to do the job. Tbe standard
Army transports could carry patients
in their regular hospitals, but such
faci 1ities provided neither adequate
comfort nor sufficient care for the
>ick and wounded. Equally important,
they offered no guarantee
against
enemy attack.
It was soon clear that only hospital
MOitaryReview

HOSPITAL SHIPS

ships could Provide the assurance

maximum comfort
as well as safety,

of
and medical
care,
In
for patients.

J~nuary 1942 an Army request for

money to build six hospital ships was
turned down. 13ecauee of the critical
shipping shortage immediately after
Pearl Harbor, the Army could not se
cure authorization to convert trans
ports into hospital ships. Not until

It was armed, traveled in convoy,

and was not registered as a hospital
ship in accordance with the 1907
Hague Convention. Since the Acadia
conformed with none of the interna.
tional regulations governing hospital
ships, it was subject to attack and did
not fill the need for a safe method of
transporting
patients.
Meanwhile, it had become clear

Carrying 35o nurses as overseas replacements, the US Army hospital ship Marigold
docks in Honohdu Harbor in 1945

April was the partial conversion of a

single vessel authorized.
This vessel, the Acadia, became an
ambulance ship rather than a hospital
chip, and made its first voyage as an
*mbulance ship servicing North Af
rica in December 1942. It was a troop
ship that carried 1,100 soldiere out
boond and had expanded hospital fa
cilities to permit evacuation of 530
patients on the return voyage.
Mptembsr1965

that the Navy

had no intention of op
erating
hospital ships eligible for
protection under the Hagne Conven
t ion. Instead, the Navy preferred to
use troop-currying
evacuation ships
or hospital vessels operating with the
fleet, neither of which met the Hague
requirements,
In May 1942 the Army tried again.
It requested authorization to use le
gally designated hospital ships as the

87

IfOSpITAL SHIPS

primary meana of evacuating pa

tients. And to thie end it asked for
six hulls to be converted to hospital
ships.
Because of the continuing scarcity
of shipping, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
directed that troop transports
con
tinue to be the normal means of re
turning patients to the United States.
The Chiefs did, nevertheless, order
three hospital ships to be procured
and registered
in order to supple
ment the troop transports
in this
work.
Unsatisfactory Arrangement

Under this directive the War Ship

ping Administration
was to provide
three hulls to the Navy, which would
then convert them to hospital ships
in accordance with designs furnished
by the Army. Navy crews would man
the ships along with Army medical
personnel. The Army would direct op
eration of the vessels, but they were
to be assigned to the Naval Transport
Service.
The Army regarded this arrange
ment as far from satisfactoryand
delays in completion of the ahips,
arising from the split responsibility,
seekrad to support the Army view.
Not until the summer of 1944 were
the three vessels ready. Named Comf
ort, Mercy, and Hope, they were put
into service as soon as they were com
pleted. For the Army, the only re
deeming feature wae that, thanks to
changed
circumstances,
the ships
were to operate under Army Trans
portation Corps control.
Actually, the first Army hospital
, ships to see service in World War 11
had gone into action much earlier,
primarily as a result of local action
overseas. While the planners in Wash
ington discussed evacuation policy or
took slow steps to convert transports
88

into hospital ships, overseas Corn.

manders had to solve the immediate
problem of safely evacuating patients
from the war zones.
Pacific Area
In the Pacific, as early as three
weeks after Pearl Harbor, General
Douglas MacArthur had designated
the Mackwr, then in ManiIa harbor,
as a hospital ship under the. regula
tions prescribed by international law.
The Mrzctan evacuated patients and
other passengers
to Brisbane, but
was not used again as a hospital ship
after it reached Australia.
In 1942 MacArthur converted two
Dutch vessels under his control, the
Tasman and Maetsuycker,
and used
them as hospital ships to evacuate pa
tients within the Southwest Pacific
theater.
In the North African and Mediter.
ranean
theaters,
British
hospital
ships supplemented US Army trans.
ports,
evacuating
some American
sick and wounded to hospitals in the
7
United Kingdom.
These improvisations were neces
sary because it was not until 1944
that Army hospital ships began to ar
rive overseas in any significant num
bers. Several did not reach war areas
until 1945.
The first of these was the ambu
lance ship Acadia. Converted to a hos
pital ship in May 1943, and registered
as such under tbe Hague Convention,
the Acadia continued to service the
Mediterranean
theater.
The next month, as a result of
strong recommendations by tbe Sur
geon General, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff agreed to amend their policy of
using Army transports
as the pri
mary meana of evacuating patients.
The Chiefs directed that Conventionprotected hospital shipa were to be
MilitaryRsview

HOSPITAL SHIPS

used whenever powible to evacuate

the so-called helpless fraction of the
sick and wounded. This helplees frac
tion consisted Of patients needing
c&siderable medical care en route
and unable to abandon ship in an
emergency without assistance.
There were 24 veesels to be con
verted to hospital ships15 by tbe
end of 1943, four more by the follow
ing June, and the remaining five by
December 1944. The Army would do
the work of conversion and, with the
exception of the three hospital ships

devote any substantial part of their

efforts to tbe conversion program.
By the end of 1943, however, three
hospital ships had been converted and
had gone into service; 19 more sailed
for overseas areas in 1944, the major
ity departing after D-day in Europe.
An additional four joined the hospital
fleet in the first half of 1945, bring
ing the total in service to 26, with
three others still in the conversion
process when the war ended that sum
mer.
Of the vessels converted to hospi-

US ..lm Photos

The US Army hospital ship Acadia

at the Charleston port of embarkation in 1943

te be operated by the Navy, WaS tO

crew, staff, and run the vessels.
Work on converting these vessels
to hospital chips moved slowly, far
too
slowly in the Army view. Not only
were there serious bottlenecks in pro
curing raw materizfs and specialized
equipment, but shipyards were far
too busy with other commitments to
September1935

tal ships, tbe majority had been pas

senger or troopship. Nearly a dozen,
however, were originally freighter.
At least one, tbe Francis Y. Slanger,
was a former Axis vessel. Another,
the Republic, still being converted at
the ware end, was a World War I ac
quisition from Germany.
The 26 Army hoepital SKIPS placed
89

HOSPITAl

SHIPS

in service could carry a totaI of nearly

.17,000 sick and wounded, with indi

vidual ship capacity generally rang
ing from 300 to 700 patients.
Most

of the shipa were slow, with cruising

speeds from 11 to 14 knots. They all

carried civilian operating crews and

military medical staffs. They served
every major theater of operations ex
cept the China-Burma-India
theater
and evacuated nearly 100,000 patients
from 1943 through 1945.
Only one wss ever attacked in de
fiance of the Geneva and Hague Con
ventions. This was the Comfort, hit
by a Japanese kamikaze plane in April
1945 while evacuating wounded from
Okinawa. The Comfort did not sink,
but there was heavy loss of life on
board.
Marigold Converted
The kfa~igold, which saw consider

able service in the Pacific, was, per

haps, typical of Army hospital ships.
BuiIt in 1920 and originally named
Fithnore,
it served in
the President
World War H as a troop transport to
the Aleutians until its conversion to
a hospital ship at Tacoma, Washing
ton.
with a gross weight of 11,350 tons
and a speed of 13 knots, tbe Marigold
carried an operating crew of 121 civil
ians and the 210 members of the
Armys 212th Hospital Ship Comple
ment. It had space for 761 patients,
of which 617 were bed patients and
the rest ambulatory.
In accordance with international
law, the Mangold was unarmed. Its
hull was painted white, with a green
band running all the way around the
ship. A huge red cross was centered
on each side of the vessel, and other
red crosses were painted on the deck
and funnel. Lifeboats and Iiferafts
were also white with red crosses.
.,
90

From dusk to dawn, the entire ship

was ablaze with lights.
The Marigolds first voyage as a
hospital ship was to ItaIy in July
1944. In October it sailed from
Charleston,
South
Carolina,
to
Finschhafen,
New Guinea. It re
mained in the Southwest Pacific for
several months, stopping at MiIne
Bay, Biak, Leyte, Lingayen Gulf,
Subic Bay, and Manila, before return
ing to Los Angeles with a load of pa.
tients in May 1945.
Repairs kept the Marigold in port
for two months, but in July it sailed
again for Manila. With two other hos
pital ships, it picked up American
prisoners of war at Yokohama, and
was back once again in Los Angeles
in December. The ship made its final
voyage in February 1946, sailing once
more for Manila and returning in
May to the west coast, where it was
decommissioned as a hospital ship.
Valuable Role
Army hospital ships, it is clear,
played a valuable role in delivering
the helpless fraction ~f the sick
and wounded from their mieeries.
C o m f o r t a b I e, clean, excellently
equipped, and with first-class medical
staffs, they provided a welcome haven
and a safe voyage home for many
thousands of serious casualties. But
they were late in entering service,
delayed initially by the need to use
all available shipping as troop trans
ports, and later by material and
equipment shortages and the backlog
of work in shipyards.
As a result, Army hospital ships
were unable to handle more than a
fraction of the total number of pa
tients evacuated. The amount they
carried in each year of the war never
exceeded about ~0 perceht of the
total sick and wounded ev~uated anMilitary Review

nually to the United States. To this,

of course, must be added the thou
sands of patients they carried from
,forward to rear areas in overseas
theatera.
Of the sick and wounded returned
to the United States, most traveled
on standard troop transportsin
the
hospitals of these ships if they were
bed patients and in the troop berths
if they were ambulatory. Indeed, by
late 1944 the capacity of ships like
the Queen Marv and Queen Elizabeth
had been increased to provide for be
tween 2,500 and 3,000 patients.
A great
number
of sick and
wounded troops were evacuated from
overseas theaters by air. In 1945 the
percentage of patients returned by
air reached 22.5, a greater number
than arrived in American ports on
Army hoepital ships that year.
By mid-August 1!45 all Army bat
tle casualties echedtded to be returned
from Europe and the Mediterranean
had reached the United States. The
subsequent release of hospitdl ships
and troop transports
to the Pacific
meant that all battle casualties from
that area could be evacuated by the
beginning of December.
By the end of 1945, 12 of the 26
Army hospital ships were removed

Scpt8mber1965

from their protected status, to be

used as troop transports. In January
1946 the number of Army hospital
ships in service dropped to eight,. and
other decommissioning
followed as
the need for these vessele continued
to decline.
The Army had entered World War
11 with the idea of evacuating its
own wounded, sick, and injured. With
not a single hospital ship in service
at the time of Pearl Harbor, it had
overcome difficulties and raised a fleet
of more than two dozen of these
mercy vessels.
Despite the fact that the majority
of Army hospital ships did not eee
service until late in the war, and that
some were decommissioned shortly
thereafter,
overseas theaters
never
faced an unmanageable backlog of pa
tients.
The initial employment of
transports
to carry military
casual
ties and the subsequent combination
of transports, hospital ships, and air
craft proved more than adequate to
meet all evacuation needs.
.
Thanks to these riieasures, Ameri
can soldiers badly wounded in World
War 11 never had to endure the
wretched and miserable conditions
described by Tobias Smollett 200
years earlier.

91

The Neeessity
for Change
Major Clinton E. Granger, Jr., United

FFENSIVE and defensive com

bat are generally recognized as
the two fundamental forms of mili
tar> operations conducted as a part of
ground warfare. Each is, in turn, sub
divided into many specialized modifi
cations, with this diversity being com
bined in an almost unending variety
of the two forms.
Arbitrary divisions of the various
forms of ground operations have heen
established. Even a casual analysis,
however, provides abundant examples
of types of actions that do not lend
. themselves readily to any cataloging,
whether the basis is alphabetical, di
rectional,
organizational,
or some
other convenient arrangement of the
actions concerned.
Categorizing the forms of warfare
92

States

@ny

.
can never be completely accurate, hut
it is, nevertheless, a definite require
ment for any military organization. It
is necessary to establish common tm
derstanding of terminology and con
cepts, and to create a body of sup
porting techniques and accepted prac
tices in support of particular types of
military operations.
Acceptance of common definitions
and implications is essential to opera
tions in the field. Some of the greatest
military blunders in history have re
sulted from misunderstood orders
frequently because the choice of lan
guage in the order allowed two indi
viduals to interpret the same words
quite differently. Consider the impli
cations of an order to assume the de
fense.
MilitaryReview

CHANGE

Misinterpretation
of such an order
wotdd appear to be unlikely; yet de
fense is a broad area of action, and
~e type of defense desired must be
further defined to ensure compliance.
In fact, a definition of the type of de
fense desired will depend to a large
extent on the level of command at
which the orders may be issued.
Recognize Definitions

The simple defense also has a vari

ety of implied problems. It ie not so
simple at all, for after we have care
fully defined our terms, we must en
sure that all concerned fully recognize
these definition. Consider the confu
sion inherent
in a situation where
simple definitions are not accepted, or
are misunderstood. Suppose that de
fense means dig in and hold at all
costs to one man, when the com
mander issuing the order was think
ing in terms of a mobile defense. The
result would be chaos in the disposi
tions on the ground, in the supporting
fire plan, tbe barrier plan, the diver
sions and deception,
and in the lo
gistic plans required to support the
operation.
It should be equally clear that a
comprehension of terms and their im
plications hy commanders at all levels
is not sufficient. While the ultimate
decision will, of course, reet with the
commander, the staffs at all levels
must correctly interpret the same inMajor Clinton E. Gvanger, Jr., prese
ntly

assigned

to the Ist Armored Di

Texas, has served
with the ~5th Infantry Division in the
Far East, and with 9fh Corps Head
quarters on Okinawa. A graduate
of
the Armed
Fovce$ Staff College in
June of this year, he is the author of
Philosophy of the Attack:
which ap
psared in the Febrctary 1965 issue of
the MILITARY REVIEW.

vision, Fort Hood,

September 1965

formation
to permit preliminary plan
ning and coordination, and to imple
ment the commanders will in the
thousand little ways that are essential
to success.
Occasionally, victory crowns one
bold man who acts decisively; more
frequently, defeat ia the lot of the
military organization where there ia
no decisive error, but rather the cu
mulative effects of incorrect or poorly
accomplished work on the part of
many people and agencies. BattIes can
be won and lost by degrees, and it ie
on]y the additive effort of all con
cerned that will actually result in a
decisive effort or action, regardless of
the form of warfare.
Professional Knewledge

There should be little queetion that

all officers and key noncommissioned
officers sbould possess a basic under
standing of the various forms of war
fare and the implications of each. This
is no mere matter of perfecting a
dictionary, for this already exists.
Rather, it is a matter of educating the
leaders and staff personnel in sufi
cient detail of the implied aspects of
terms defining the variations on the
forms of war.
For the most part, thie education is
currently accomplished in our service
schools for the officer personnel; a
similar program for senior noncom
missioned officers would prove equally
valuable. Some of this professional
knowledge ia obtained through pri
vate study, and some through prac
tical experience, but neither can take
the place of formal classroom presen
tations by well-trained instructor.
The steps necessary to establish a
military climate where a decision and
an order will be understood in all ita,
detail by all concerned can beat be ac
cornplished through a comprehensive
93

CHANGE

military education program. Perhaps

a military training program would
represent a better choice of words.
Yet the subject matter is not the
learned application of techniques, but
more properly the education of the
mind alone--a process of definitions
and implied activities
on a broad

It takes only one short experience

with a cnmbined headquartersat
any levelto convince even the most
skeptical that we take for granted
much of our understanding of mili.
tary terms. The most striking ex.
ampk3S come
in conjunction with
combined efforts involving the Corn.

US

Arnw

It is bnly the additive effort of all concerned that will actually result in a decisive
effort or action, regardless of the form of warfare

range, rather than a limited response

to a small number of situations.
Another phase of this same problem
involves military operations of the
United States which are no longer
unilateral. The North Atlantic Treaty
. organization,
Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization, and alliances with in
dividual nations all complicate the
problem of achieving a common un
derstanding on which standard prac
tjces and doctrine can be based.
94

monwealth. The United Kingdom, Aus

tralia, New Zealand, or almost any of
the nations with English as a basic
tongue are the most startling, for it
soon becomes obvious that, while the
language is tbe same, the meanings
vary in some rather critical instances.
It is obvious that the differences
that occur when a combined staff is
formed are infinitely more complex
where English is not the native Ian
guage of all of the personnel.
,

MilitaryReview

CHANGE

This is not a problem that is capa

ble of comPlete resolutionfew arebut it does have a partial solution
which haa already
been accepted
~and implemented. Education, either
through training in military schools
in the United States, or through
courses conducted through the Mili
tary Assistance Advisory Groups and
missions, offers a high probability of
achieving a degree of common under
standing.
Yet there is a pitfall in this sYs
tem, and it must be fully recognized
to make the best use of tbe human re
sources available.
Cmapartmented Tlairddng
We have a complex system of mili
tary tactical and technical instruction
built up step by step on the basis of
an organizational pattern within the
according
to fairly
rigid
US Army
definitions

of

terms

and

clear-cut

re

for all elements con

cerned. The necessity is not ques
tioned, but the system does impose a
limiting factor for many individuals
who are a product of this carefully
planned education.
This limiting factor is compart
mented thinking, the inherent inabil
ity of many individuals trained under
this system to add a dash of imagina
tion to the school solution. Of course,
there is no actual limitation imposed
on the individual by the course of in
struction itself; the limitation lies in
the mind of the student at the end of
the courses of instruction. He has been
conditioned to think in specific terms,
in terms of specific solutions to a
given set of circumstances. He reacts,
like Pavlovs dog, to an external stim
ulus, according to his training.
With respect to the technical neces
sity for teamwork, for interpretation
of orders received, this is ail very well.
lated

actions

Se)dsmber 1965

However, in terms of the ability of

the individual to recognize variation
in the situations, and to alter the set
pattern of response to certain stimuli
when an opportunity may present it
self, the result has built-in limitations.
Historical Proof
Ther6 is far tou much historical
proof of the inability of the individ
ual to vary from the responees that
he has been taught as correct. The
British failure to recognize the impli- ~
cations of the rifle and barbarian tac
tics; the horrible waste of men in the
frontal attacks of the trench warfare
of World War I; the turtlelike French
attitude
with the Maginot line in
World War IIthere are plenty of
examples from which to choose. The
basis for these examples ia quite sim
ple-commanders
and staff officers
had developed set patterns of thought,
and were bound to these patterns by
the very nature of their training. At.
times, the narrow military mind ac
tually has been so.
This inability to remain flexible,
or to adapt to change, either through
the evolution of equipment or to al
tered circumstances,
has been re
marked on by marry individuals. And
it must be accepted that a large meaa
ure of the inability to adapt is a hu
man trait which cannot be erased. Sol
diers of one generation will cling to
the standards
and solutions which
they were taught in their earlier
years;
perhaps because they saw
these solutions work effectively in a
combat situation; perhaps because it
is easier to embrace a solntion which
is not controversial; perhaps because
part of the testirig of units in the
Army Training Testa places emphasie
on the accepted type of solution; per
haps because mental inertia is quit?
normal in a human being.
95

CHANGE

Regardless of reason, our-system of

instruction is one of the fundamental
roots; the categorization and catalog
ing of data is one of the primary
causes. Compartmented
thinking is
not creative, nor is it capable of ready
adaption to changing conditions.
Now we have a true dilemma. The
only rational approach to the instruc
tion necessary to ensure common un
derstanding is in a regimented, cate
gorized curriculum; yet this solution
leads to regimented, categorized, and
compartmented minds.
The solution? There is no simple
solution. The first step is an individ
ual one, and the biggestrecognition
of the problem. Second may be the
exercise of care in formal instruction
not to reward wild thinking, but
to combine creative and unusual ap

proaches to any problem with SOIU.

tions designed to emphasize princi.
pies.
Yet this will not solve the entire
problem. One cannot teach imagina
tion; the behavior pattern of a man
cannot be altered to modify his
thought
processes in our service
schools. Perhaps the best we can do
is to make the individual aware that
the military art remains an art be
cause of the factor of change. Unlike
a science, applications of the rules
which were effective yesterday may .
be invalid in the light of tomorrows
developments.
The ultimate choice between medi
ocrity and an imaginative victory lies
within each man; perhaps the best
we can do is to help him to under
stand the necessity for change.

. . . one requirement of Army leadership stands out to me as being

common to all our Ieaders, from the sqgad or crew to tbe senior field com
mander. That requirement is this: we must impart to our people a senee of
importance in what they do hy giving them challenges to respond to, recog
nition for achievement, and a sympathetic attitude toward honest mistakes.
General

96
.

Harold

K. Johnson

Military Review

UNITED STATES
New

Sight

Space Launch Vehicle

The Army is evaluating a special

sight for use aboqrd aircraft and hel- ,
icopters. The sight is designed to
dampen out vibrations and motions
caused by the enginea and the aircraft

The National Aeronautics and Space

Administration
has begun rehearsals
space launch
with the A tkzs-Centaur
vehicle for the first US soft landing on
the moon.
Late this year, a Surveyor space
craft, boosted by the Atlas-Centaur,
is scheduled to make its first test
flight.
Both the .Atlas and the Centaur
stages for the first flight are now un
dergoing preliminary testing for the
mission.News release.
Diving Sets

Phifm Corwmt

,.>,

flight motions. This damping action

will enable the gunner to keep hia tar
get witbin the field of view provided
by the aigbts optics.
The sight was designed to mate with
the Shillelagh, a line of sight, com
mand-guided missile currently planned
aa the main armament of the General
Sheridan armored reconnaissance air
borne assault vehicle.News release.

Two new diving acts are being ear

marked as suitable for military pro
curement to fill an immediate require
ment of tbe Army Special Forces.
The sets are self-contained, open
and closed-circuit units, composed of
commercially available components.
Tbe open-circuit aet operates to
depths of more than 200 feet, and is
useful except when maximum security
from detection is required. It elimi
nates the depth limitation and inher
ent dangers involved in oxygen-re
breathing
SCUBA
(Self-Contained
Underwater Breathing Apparatus) op
erations. The closed-circuit diving set
which has an operational depth of 25
feet does not cause telltale surface
bubbles.US Army release.

TbeMILITARYBEVIEW and the U. S. Army command..d GeneralStaff

Colke smnm.,no re
sm.si~nlityfor accuracyof imf..m.ti..
.cmtainedin the MILITARY
NOTES .<.tic.?
of tht. mb
Iic.timt.Itemsare Pri.tid m. . semiceto the readers.No of ficinl
.tid.menunt cdthe mews,minion.,

or factual.I.tements is inte.ded.TheEditor.

Septembert965

97

MILITARY NOTES
The 1st Cavalry Oivision
heavy equipment which had to be car.

The new airmobile division activated by tbe Army at Fort Benning,

Georgia, represents a major advance
in the use of aircraft on the battlefield
(MR, Aug 1965, P 97).
During World War II the old triangular division had only 10 aircraft.
By the Korean War it contained 26.
When the pentomic division was organized, this number grew to 49, and
then came another large increase, as
the new ROAD. (Reorganization Objective Army Divisions ) was author-

ried into battle. There was, in addi.

tion, a high monetary cost attached to
airmobile units.
Development programs
extending
over a period of years reduced these
problems until it became apparent that
airmobile units were feasible.
The logistic requirements for an
airmobile divisicm are not particu
larly easy to relate to those of an infantry division. The average daily con. ,
sumption for an airmobile division, as

1S1CAVALRY DIVISION (AIRMOBIIE)

xx

I
x

ml

DIVISION hRTllURY

AIR C8VNRY

m@J@l
SICNhL

SWADRON

BhlTMIOM

BRIGADE
Iuhouummr

U161HE[R
WIAL1OII

Q@@

WIMON

El
SUPPORT

6ROUP

COMMhMO

EJ&

LIGHT

Amum

BmmN

BuTKRY

BATTNIONS

MA!4EUViR BA1lALIOW-

15181 OFFICERS MB
m
16W

iULlcOPm

BA,U,,OS

WICOPTM

BAM1!B!4

MEN

AIRCRAFT

VEHICLES

.OME BR16MF HUDOOkRTERS

WD lllRil 14AN1M

ONIAIIONS WIU MAW Ml MRBORN1 CkPh81UTV

8V1MOM

GfMIRhL

SUPPOR1 COMPNIV

%%

FIVE INFMIIRY BhlThLlONS

.-MhNUJVIR 84TTAWIS
AS RIOUIREO

WILL 81 flSSIGNKITO BRIGhOIS

THR1l 81RBORNE lMiflklRY84TTAUONS

ized 101 aircraft. By comparison the

airmobile division contains 434 air. craft, nearly all helicopters.
The organization of an airmobile
division was never really considered
practicable, however, due to the low
speed and capacity of helicopters, the
high maintenance requirements they
imposed upon support units, and the
98

computed in recent exercises, was 550

tons, as compared with 450 tons for
an infantr~ division accomplishing the
same mission. Most of the 100 addi
tional tons required was for petroleum,
oils, and lubricants. War games indi
cate that the airmobile division can
accomplish its mission more quickly,
however, and that it can do it with
MilitaryReview

 MILITARY NOTES

US Arnw

The VH.1 Iroquois is the standard utifity helicopter. It is capable of launching SS.11
antitank missiles or 2.75-inch rockets, or firing 7.62-millimeter maehineguns.

half the total tonnage required for an

infantry division.
It is apparent that the airmobile di
vision can be rapidly deployed, and, in
fact, the official estimate is that it
can be moved almost twice as fast as
the ROAD infantry division. Except
for the Chinook helicopters, which are
transportable in C-233S, the entire
division can be carried by Air Force
C-130 aircraft.
Air Force support of the airmobile
division will include: strategic airlift,
fighter cover, close air support, tacti
cal air reconnaissance, and air resup
ply to the rear of the division zone.
Most of the personnel are armed
with the Ml 6 rifle. Shortly after the
activation of the division, an intensive
.f@ember1965/

training program began to qualify

new members with the weapon and
to teach them the skills and techniques
required
in airmobile
operations.
These include: escape and evasion,
sling loading, rappelling, suppressive
fire from helicopters,
parachuting,
cargo net climbing, and aircraft load
ing.
The aerial rocket battalion of the
division artillery includes 36 UH-i
helicopter
armed with the XM.S kit
forty-eight
2.75-inch
folding fin
rocket tubes. Accuracy of the system
is 10 to 15 roils in both deflection and
range at ranges from 1,000 to 2,000
meters. This battalion is normally
used to reinforce the fires of the 105
millimeter, direct support battalions.
99

MILITARY NOTSS

USArm!
The six OV-1 Mohawks in the
airmotile
division
will
beus-+
for reconnaissance and
surveilbmce missions
using infrared
scanners.
Cameras.
and sideloo~lng
airborne
radar
The aircraft at the top carries a SLAR.
(SL4R).

US Anm

The Armys standard c=~O hefiCO@rt

1
100

the C~-47 ChinOOk

?mitery Review

MILITARY NOTES
Research And Cargo Ships

Task organization of the division

while training at Fort Benning placed
}hree airborne infantry battalions un.
der the 1st Brigade, three infantry
battalions with the 2d Brigade, and
two infantry battalions with the 3d
Brigade. The organization ie flexible
md may be tailored to fit the miesion.
The support command now includes
an administrative
compaony, a trans
portation battalion (aircraft mainte
nance and supply), a maintenance bat
talion, a medical battalion, a supply
and service battalion, and an attached,
direct support chemical platoon.
The 1Ith Aviation Group, organic
t~ the division, contains two aasault
helicopter battalion
and an assault
support helicopter battalion. It also
irrcludea a general support aviation
company, a provisional
pathfinder
company, and a weather detachment.
Its mission is to provide aviation
support to the division, including:
Simultaneous
airlift of the as
sault elements of three infantry bat
talions and two 105-millimeter field
artillery batteries.
Armed
escort and suppressive
fires,
Aerial surveillance and target ac
quisition.
c Aviation support for division
headquarters and other unite not au
thorized organic aircraft.
Also presently attached to ths divi
sion is the 10th Aviation Group. It
includee four Caribou companies, two
medium helicopter companiea, and an
air traffic company.
Among the units kept under divi
sion control in the present task or
ganization are the military
police
company, the signal and engineer bat
tslione, and the air cavalry squadron.
News item.
.%ptember
1SS5

The Navy has two new shipsa

speedy roll-on roll-off cargo vessel and
a modern escort research ship. Both
were launched in April, one in the
Pacific and one in the Atlantic.
The USNS Sea Lift was lannched
at Seattle, Washington, and will be,
placed in service early in 1966. Its
roll-on roll-off configuration includes
a stern ramp, side ports, and interior
ramps, permitting rapid loadiing and
unloading.
Like its predecessor, the USNS
Comet, the vessels primary mission
will be transporting military wheeled
and tracked vehicles.
The USS Glowr was Ianncbed at
Bath, Maine, and is an experimental
ship for weapons and equipment used
in antisubmarine
warfare. It will be
fitted with such armament as the
ASROC
(Antisubmarine
Rocket) and
the DASH.
(Drone
Antieubnaamne
Helicopter).

The ships testa will include new

propulsion systems, a new propeller
designed to reduce noise, and gyro
scopically controlled fin stabilizers to
reduce rolling.DOD release.
Tropical Boot
A new tropical

boot ia being pur

chased by the Defense Supply Agency.
It bas a synthetic rubber traction sole
and heel vulcanized to the upper part
of the boot, which ia a combination of
leather and fabric.
A removable innersole of stainless
steel covered with plastic ie also avail
able for use with the boot.
The protective innersole
affords
some protection against the spikes,
fishhooks, and bamboo stakes ueed by
guerrillas in southeaat Asia. A pair
of tbe innersoles weighs 4.5 ounces.
News item.
101

MILITARY NOTES
Phoenixr Missile
The Navy Phoenix

Joint Production

missile and the

missile control system that launches it
are designed to have capabilities ex
ceeding those of any other air-to-air
system now operational.
The system has been under develop
ment as tbe long-range armament for
tbe F-llIB,
the Navy version of the
all-service interceptor.
The Phoenix system consists of t~e
soIid propellant missile itself, t~e
XAZM-54A; an advanced radar and
the AN/
missile control system,
A WG-9; and the MA U-48A missilehomh launcher. The mission of the
Plzoeni.r system will be to maintain
air superiority over distant objective
areas such as beachhead landings, as
well as over the Navys fleets in antiair warfare. To accomplish this job,
the system will be able to lock on an
enemy aircraft in any kind of weather
and launch the Phoenix missile. The
missile will then take over and 4rrter
cept the target..News release.

The Department of Defense and the

Italian Ministry of Defense have con.
eluded an agreement for a joint pro.
duction of medium tanks for the Ital.
ian Army.
The first tanks (approximately 20
percent of the total) will be furnished
by the United States directly from
stateside production, thereby acceler.
sting delivery of the new vehicles to
the Italian Army. The remaining
tanks will all be built at Italian plants
under technical arrangements
being
developed by the United States prime
manufacturer
and Italian manufac
turers.
Ml 1.3 armored personnel carriers
are already being produced in Italy
in Italian-United
States cooperative
production. The two countries also co
operate in research and d&elopment,
with exchange of technical data on
specific projects and production of sci
entific material of common interest.
DA release.

SKIP-I

.
.

General
Dunmnw.

C.mmrat!..

A ship that will skim over water at a speed of 50 knots per hour is being
built by a defense firm, and will be used as a research vehicle to verify labora
tory theories of both design and performance.
Tbe seven-meter vessel, designated SKIP-I, will ride approximately 30 centi
meters above the water on a cushion of air provided by a 180-horsepower lift
fan. The vehicles forward propulsion will be provided hy a pair of sternmounted, 115-horsepower engines turning variable pitch propellers .News re
lease.
102

Military Review

MILITARY NOIES
Bomb Alarm System

The Air Defense -Command (ADC)

operates a bomb. impact detection or
Jomb alarm syetem for the North
American Air Defense
Command
(NORAD) which would provide al
most inetant notice if a nuclear deto-

An optical sensor

mounted on a pole

nation occurred on or near a critical

area of the United States.
This leased system came under op
erational control of the ADC in midSeptember 1962.
The bomb alarm system consiets of
pole-mounted, bucket-shaped,
optical
sensing devices located around each of
99 target areas. Each area has three
sensors situated approximately 120 de
grees apart and 18 kilometers from
the estimated ground zero.
The detecting device for this eys
tem was developed to operate on the
therms] radiation energy of the ex
plosion because of ite high energy,
high speed of transmission,
and the
fact that the radiation hae a unique
wave shape that distinguishes it from
all natural sources of radiation.
The detectors are used in groups of
Wtamber 1965

three, located at inte~va}s several kilo

meter distant from the center of the
area under observation. A centrally
located explosion would be reported by
aR three detectors. At thie dk.tance,
there is time for the detector to re
port th~ event before the arrival of
the blaet wave which might deetroy it
or its connecting wires. Connecting
wires and other eystem elements will
be outside the central area. If the
blast were close enough to one of the
detectore to destroy it before it could
report, the other two detectors in the
group would send the alarm.
The reaction end of the bomb alarm
system ie at the Combat Operations
Center of NORAD, the Strategic Air
Command, the Pentagon, and other
vital military command posts. At these
nerve centers, tbe information that a
nuclear detonation has occurred would
appear as a red light bebind a glass
map of the United States. The red
light indicates tbe specific area that
hae been bit.US Air Force release.
Pendulum Astrolabe
Development of a new 60-degree
penduknn astrolabe for observing the
position of celeetial bodies to deter
mine astronomic latitude and longi
tude has been announced by the Army.
Compact and battery operated, the
new astrolabe weighs Iese than 34
pounds and is designed to work in tern.
peratures ranging from minue 40 to
plus 125 degreee Fahrenheit.
In addition to second-order astro
nomic surveye, the astronomic position
established by the instrument can be
used for identification of locations, ea
tabliehing a datum for isolated aerial
and general surveys, and establishing
control pointe for treatment of deflec
tion of the vertical in geodetic eur
veying.US Army release.

10s

MILITARY NOTES

Gas Turbine Generator

A portable,
100-kilowatt
set,
bine-driven
generator

FRANCE
gas

tur

designed
for nse in mobile battlefield systems, is
undergoing engineering design tests.
Prime mover for tbe set is a light,
compact, single-cycle, 270-horsepower
gas turbine engine designed to operate
on any liquid fuel, including diesel,
kerosene; .lP-4, and combat ga901ine.
Tbe set is suitable for any applica
tion requiring a portable power supply
with precise ,frequent y and voltage
control, such as radar, missile ground
support, or checkout and launching
equipment.
A completely self-contained unit
including engine, generator controls,
and intake and exhaust silencersit
weighs approximately
1,300 pounds
and measures 92 inches in length and
36 inches in width and height.
Advantages of gas turbine genera
tor sets are their relatively small size
and weight, which could mean fewer
vehicles required to move them, and
fewer moving parts. This makes tur
bines potentially easier to maintain
aqd to supply with spare parts. One of
the major disadvantages, which is ex
phted to be overcome eventually, is
the turbines high fuel consumption
which is 3 to 4 times that of a dieeel
engine.US Army release.
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Missiles

A European source reports that the

United Arab Republic has built ap
250 surface-to-surface
proximately
missiles on single launching ramps.
They include the Al Zajir rockets with
I, IOO-pound warheads and a range of
235 miles and the Al Kakir rockets
with larger warheads and a range of
375 miles. These rockets, however, are
not believed to have a modern guid
ance system.News item.
104

Naval Oeveloomerits

Accordin& to unofficial sources, a

helicopter carrier, two frigates, seven
submarine, two supply ships, two sur.
vey
service

ships,
during

and

one
the

tanker

entered

year. The new

Jearme rfArc, tem
past

helicopter carrier
porarily named La Rdsolue, is also
fitted as a command ship. A third frig
ate of the Commandant
Rividre class
has begun trial rnns and is expected
to enter service in the near future,
as will the new assault landing ship
Ouragan.
Two of the four Surcouf class de
stroyers being rearmed with Tartar
missiles have rejoined the fleet; the
remaining two are expected to reenter
service sometime this year.
The French Fleet now includes the
modern, aircraft carriers Foch and
Chnnenceuu, the aircraft carrier Ar
the
helicopter
carrier
rornarzches,
cruis
Jeanne dArc, the antiaircraft
ers Co&rt and De Grasge, 18 modern
destroyers, 31 frigates, 22 submarines,
and a number of small ships.
The first French nuclear-powered
submarine, armed with 16 missiles, is
expected to be operational by the mid
dle of 1969.News item.
SWEDEN
Wiggen Aircraft
In future years, Sweden plans to
make Viggen aircraft the backbone of
her air force. Fighter, attack, and re
connaissance versions of the Viggen
will replace the Lansen, a fighter and
reconnaissance plane, and the Drake%
The new Viigen aircraft reportedly
will fly at a speed of Mach 2.5 to 3,
require a 600-meter runway, and be
able to take 15ff and land on those
highways designed for use as airstrips.News item.
MilitaryReview

US ArmII

US Army engineers plan to complete

a 93-kilometer-long road in Thailand
by the summer of 1966. The Bangkok
Bypass Road, as it is called, will open
up 250,000 acres of rich but hitherto
unproductive land for agricultural de
velopment in eastern Thailand.
This road is one of several economic
snd civic action projects being accom
plished under the over-all supervision
of the US Navy with the US Army
performing the construction work.
Construction has been under the
supervision of the 809th US Army
Engineer Battalion and the 561st En
gineer Construction
Company with
Thai Army engineer elements at
tached.
Because of the monsoon season,
which lasts about five months of each
year, actual highway work has been
somewhat curtailed except during the
dry season. Last summer.the battalion
$eptember 1985

began spreading the surface asphalt,

produced in a 100-ton-per-hour plant.
The road, about 75 percent complete,
goes through jungle and rice paddies
northeasterly
from Chachoengsao, a
point east of Bangkok and about 25
kilometers northeast of the Gulf of
Siam, to Kabinburi. Buses and trucks
are already using part of the road
carrying people and produce to Cha
choengsao and thence into Bangkok.
Since construction of the road began,
a number of new towns, farms, busi
nesses, and homes have been estab
lished along the right-of-way.
The road is 7.5 meters wide with
double eurface treatment ehoulders of
2.3 meters on either side. The wide
shoulders are new to Thailand and
provide a margin of safety not found
in other Thai roads. Bridging com
prises about 25 percent of the road ef
fort.DOD release.
105

MILITARY NOTES
Soviet Marine Conrs

AUSTRALIA
Oanvin Air tSafanse

Australias northern defenses are to

be strengthened in the near future by
the presence of Bloodhound surface-to
air missiles at Darwin.
The missile launchers will be incor
porated into the air defense system
together with jet interceptors and a

Bloodhound

prepared for launching

light antiaircraft
battery.
Facilities
to be prepared prior to the arrival of
the Bloodhound units include concrete

l~unching pads.News

release.

USSR
Military Service
The compulsory term of service for
Soviet soldiers with a university edu
cation has been reduced to one year.
The new regulation applies primarily
to army and navy personnel. Instead
of the customary three years, they
must serve only one year in the mili
tary, and then may fill vacancies in
the teaching profession, industry, or
agriculture
for the next two years.
This
of the
military

item.
106

measure
500

is expected
million

budget

The Soviets ~eportedly have deve

oped a type of marine corps as elit
troops. The Soviet Union has also re
grouped forces stationed in East Ge
many, withdrawn them from the Iro
Curtain, and deployed them so as t
enable them to operate from the dept
of the area, according to unoffici
sources.
The striking power of the 80 Sovi
and East European divisions whic
are west of the Ural has been in
creased by new weapons and wae sup.
plemented by the creation of tbe ne
marine force, which may indicat
new Soviet strategy and tactics. Th
Red Marine Corps is expected to en
able tbe USSR to intervene directl
with Soviet troops and not to lim
herself to support of native and inf
trated ,troope in military action. Th
new Soviet force reportedly alread
comprises 196,000 men.News item

rubles

to save
by

which

part
the

is to be cut.News

JAPAN
Defense Budget
Japan allotted 300 billion
her 1965 national budget for
purposes. This is an increase
percent over the previous
News item.

yen o
defens
of nin
year.

GREAT BRITAIN
Deployment Of Forces
Britains total force of 393,000 serv
icemen, which includes all servicss,
broadly deployed as follows:
241,0
Britain
62,0
Germany, including Berlin
Mediterranean
23,0
East of Suez
58,0
9,0
Other locations
Units east of Suez are reinforced b
Gurkha forcee totaling 14,000.New
release.

M6ilary
Ifev

BOOKS
INSIDE HITLERS HEADQUARTERS, 1939-45.
By Walter Warlimont. Translated From the
6erman by R. H. Barry. 656 Pages. Frede~
ick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1664.$9.95.
BY COL

As

WILMOTR. MCCUTCHEN,USA

Alfred Jodls principal

assistant
in the Wehrntac7zt supreme
headquarters (OKW) during most of
the war, General Warlimont is partic.
ularly fitted to recount
the operations
of this

General

headquarters,

and

has

set

forth

in clear military terms its achieve

ments and shortcomings.
His account has special appeal for
those interested in strategic command
organizations. The authors sober ap.
praisal shows that the German exam
ple of such a staff never had a chance
to prove itself, due to the personality
of Hitler and his chief military as
sistants, Wilhelm Keitel and Jodl.
As a result, long-range strategy was
almost always inadequately
consid
ered; Germany, in essence, fought a
general war with only limited objec
tives. Morenver, the OKW was never
given the opportunity to exercise di
reetion over the total war effort since
the function and processes of com
mand were exercieed by Hitler, with
increasing interference in the smalleet
detail as war progressed.
The many extracts from official or
ders, briefing conference records, and
war diaries included with the authors
personal experiences round out this
story. The reader has the feeling that
he is eavesdropping on Hitler and his
aides during the crucial hours of the
war.
saptsmber1965

POLITICAL POWER: USA/USSR. By Zbigniew

Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington. 436
Pages, The Viking Press, Inc., New York,
t 964.$7.50.

BY LT COL ROBERTL. BRADLEY,USA

A readable, comparative analysis of
the political systems of the United
States and the Soviet Union by an
expert in US policymaking (Professor
Huntington) and a student of Soviet
affairs (Professor Brzezinski).
The authors compare the general
characteristics
of the two systems,
focusing on the relationship between
political power and the policymaking
process.
They examine the ideas which gov
ern the use and direction of power,
its effect on citizens, the origin and
characteristics
of political leadership,
and the nature of policymaking in
each state.
They then examine specific exam
ples of similar issues which have con
fronted both countries, and demon
strate some rather striking parallels
and contrasts, especially with respect
to agricultural
abundance and scar
city, civil-military
relations in the
MacArthur and Zhukov cases, crisis
response in Cuba and Hungary, and
alliance management with respect to
France and Cuba.
The book ia not a general survey,
but an analysis in depth of both sys
tems. Any reader will learn from it
a great deal about the Soviet Union
and will gain a better understand
ing of the United States.
107

MILITARY BOOKS
NEW PERSPECTIVES IN ORGANIZATION RE
SEARCH. Edited by William W. Cooper, Har
old J. Leavitt, and Maynard W. Shelly Il.
GOG Pages. John WNey & Sons, Inc., New
York, 1964.$12.50.

GENERALS VS. PRESIDENTS. Neomilitarism

in Latin America. By Edwin Lieuwen. 160
Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York,
1964.$4.50.

BY LT COL CHARLESB. ABLETT, USA

This rather brief volume describes

the factors involved in seven militsry
actions against constitutional govern.
ments in Latin America. The period
covered begins with the fall of Pres
ident Arturo Frondizi of Argentina
in 1962 and concludes with the flight
into exile of Brazils President Jo&i
Goulart.
The author describes these military
actions as a response to the deep.
seated social crisis which engulfs all
of the Americas and not simply the
desire of a few generals for greater
power. The problems of the hemis
phere need solutions which Mr. Lieuwen says are currently offered only
by the democratic left. He argues that
the military is conservative and that
assertion of the traditional role of pro
tector of the constitution and nation
is only a rationalization.
In this analysis, the military is act
ing as part ofand often at the insti.
gation ofthe Ianded oIigarchy which
sees its position jeopardized. Often,
the military sees itself in danger of
eradication by leftist regimes. Recent
US policies regarding this problem are
discussed in some detail.
Lieuwen does not predict that the
continent will explode. He cites the
military of Venezuela and El Salvador
which have supported gradual reform,
and the younger officers who have a
greater social awareness. It is in this
future that the author has hope, but
it is not a hope for immediate democ
racy since Mr. L1enwen sees the mili
tary institution as developing its own
ideology and methods along the lines
of Nasserism.

This book consists of papers sub

mitted by various authors to two sem
inars dealing with research into or
ganizations. Subject matter and view
points cover a wide range. There is
the humanist approachthe view
that organizations are predominantly
collections of human beings and re
tain, even in the aggregate, the char
acteristics
of human nature. Then
there is the mechanist approach,
which holds that procedures, tasks, au
thority systems, and the communica
tions which bind individuals together
are the dominant elements character
izing an organization.
hot all papers fall clearly into either
category. Many take a broad look
across parts of both approaches;
others focus on narrow procedural
techniques of research suitable for
either view of organizations.
Chapters entitled Information Con
tl~l in Command-Control
Systems
Engineering
Systems
Ap
and
proaches to Organizations
are the
most significant
for the military
reader.
FROM WILSON TO ROOSEVELT. Foreign Pol
icy of the United States, 1913-1945. BY
Jean-Baptiste Ouroselle. Translated by Nancy
Lyman Roelker. 469 Pages. Harvard Univer
sity Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1963. $6.95.
BY 1ST LT CHARLESE. BEARD,USA

A candid account of American for

eign policy during the first half of this

century. The author is a professor at

the foundation Nationale des Sciences

and director of the Cent? d.Etude des

Relations
1d8

Irzternationales
!

RY

JOHN R. CAMERON

Military Review

MILITARY BOOKS
WflVE1l. Scholar and Soldier. BY John Coa
IIel.574 pages. klarcourt,Brace & World,
inc.,New York, 1964.$8.75.

A thoroughly
documented, readable
account of Lord Archibald WaveRs
life through June 1941. Unfortunately,
the biography does not include those
years when Lord Wavell served as
Supreme Commander of the Allied
Forces in the Southwest Pacific and,
later, as Viceroy and Governor Gen
eral of India.
OLD MYTHS AND NEW REALITIES. BY Sen
atorJ. William Ftdbright. 147 Pages. Random
Houso, Inc., New York, 19B4. $1.45 paper
bound.

BYLT COL WILLIAM I. GOSUON,USA

On 25 March 1964 Senator J. Wil
liam Fulbright, Chairman of the Sen
ate Foreign Relations Committee, ad
dreased the Senate on specific areas
where, he believed, our policies are
at least partially based on cherished
myths rather than objective fact. . . .
According to Senator Fulbright, the
maater myth of the cold war is that
the Communist bloc is monolithic
in its determination
to destroy the
Free World. .He feels the Soviet Union
has ceased to be totally and implacably
hostile to the West and has demon
strated a new willingness to honor
mutually advantageous arrangements.
The book comprises a series of com
mentaries based on speeches that Sen
ator Fulbright has made in recent
years \vith some expansion of the ideas
he has expressed in them. His speech
of March 1964, Old Myths and New
Realities, provides the title for tbe
book as well as its general theme. It
is a major document of American for
eign policy and presents an alterna
tive approach to many current prob
lems.

MILITARY HISTORY

WILSON. Confusions and Crises 1915

1916. By Arthur S. Link. 386 Pages.
Princeton University Press, Princeton,
.N. J., 1964.$8.50,
The fourth volume of Professor

Links definitive biography of Wood

row W~lson, a study of a significant

phase of Americas growing,-np proc

ess and an important period of US

history.

INFERNAL MACHINES. The Story

of Confederate Submarine and Mine

Warfare. BY Milton F. Perry. 231

Pages. Louisiana
State University

Press, Baton Rouge, La., 1965.$5.95.

A good account of a little-known

subject written by the museum cura

tor of the Truman Library, Independ
ence, Missouri.

THE GREAT WAR 1914-1918. A Pic

torial History. By John Terraine. 400
Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York,
1965.$15.00.
A highly descriptive narrative and
300 outstanding photographs-of World
War I.
THE COMPACT HISTORY OF THE
REVOLUTIONARY WAR. By Colonel
R. Ernest Dupuy and Colonel Trevor
N. Dupuy, United States Army, Re
tired. 510 Pages. Hawthorn Books,
Inc., New York, 1963.$6.95.
The fifth in a series of compact mil
itary histories of the United States
and her wars.
THE ORDEAL OF SAMAR. BY Jo
seph L. Schott. 301 Pages. The BobbsMerrill Co., Inc., Indianapolis, Ind.,
1964.$4.50.
This is the story of a military cam
paign and a court-martial in the Phil
ippine Islands in 1901 and 1902, when
America was taking her first uncer
tain steps in becoming a world power.
109

September1965
.

MILITARY BOOKS
THE GREAT OESIGN: Men and Events in the
United Nations From 1845 to 1963. By Cor
nelia Meigs. 319 Pages. Little, Brown &
Co., Boston, Mass., 1964.$6.00.

BY

COL JAMES J. FREPA,

USA

The United Nations has become

such an accepted part of international
life that the events and personalities
which shaped it are sometimes for
gotten. Miss Meigs, whose talents have
generally been focused in other liter
ary fields, sets the record aright. The
Great Design pays tribute to those
who have pcured their genius into
making the United Nations a work
able plan for world peace, and chroni
cles its major events.
THE POLITICS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE.

By Alvin J. Cottrell and James E. Oough:rty.

246 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New
Yorkr 1964.$5.00.
NATO IN QUEST OF COHESION. Edited by
Karl H. Cerny and Henry W. Briefs. Fore
word by General Larwis Norstad. 460 Pages.
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York, 1965.
$8.00.
BY LT COL ROBERTL. BRADLEY,USA

The diversity
of national views
wi$hin the North Atlantic Treaty Or
ganization forms the common subject
matter of these two hooks. Although
each differs in style and treatment of
material, both focus on the key is
sues and current problems of NATO.
A common thread between both
books is tbe recognized problem of
giving Europeans a greater voice in
alliance policy, particularly with re
spect to nuclear strategy and planning
for the use and control of nuclear
weapons. Both highlight the problems
facing NATO: the value of the first
is its balanced perapeetive; the second
provides clear illumination
of the
areas of agreement and the argu
ments supporting disagreement.

INTRODUCING SOCIAL CHANGE: A Manual for

Americans Overseas. By Conrad M. Arem.
berg and Arthur H. Niehoff. 214 Pages. Af
dine Publishing Co., Chicago, Ill., 19G4. $4.9s,
BY LT COLJOHNA. HUGHES,JrL, USA

The authors have combined their

knowledge of anthropology with field
experience to isolate basic problems
facing Americans in overseas areas.
These problems are examined fol
lowing a discussion of fundamental
~ultura] distinctions and differences,
between American and other social
mores. Illustrations
run the gamut
from
murder
in Somalia to the latrine
problem in India. The psychology
of what the authors term culture
shock is evaluated, and meaaures for
diagnosis and field treatment are
given in laymans language,.
American military men of all grades
preparing for an overseas assignment
can use this book as a supplement to
the usual country study. Those who
have returned from such an assign
ment will discover the xeasons why
they found things as they were.
THE GOOSE STEP Is VERBOTEN. The Ger
man Army Today. By Eric Waldman. 294
Pages. The Free Press of Glencoe, New
York, 1664.$5.95.

BY LT COLSAMUELL. CROOK,SR., USA

This analysis of German rearmam
ent
is based upon 4,660 interviews
of German officers and soldiers as well
as a number of academic and political
personalities. It covers the prepara
tory phase of German rearmament
and analyzes the background and pe
litical conflicts which led to the basic
military legislation.
An excellent history of German re
armament and an objective evaluation
as an influence in
of the Bundeswehr
German political decisions.

MilitarySlsview

110

MILITARY BOOKS
THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CHARLES DE
sAU1lE.
A Critical Assessment. BY Paul
.
Reynaud,Former Premiar of Franca.- Trans
lated by MervYn Savill. 160 Pages. The
tiyssey Press, New York, 1964.$3.95.

BY COLHERMANW. LANGE,USA
Among great statesmen,
few
have
been so difficult to fathom as the cur
rent leader of France.
Paul Reynaud tackles the heart of
the problem with this critical assess
ment of General Charles de Gaulles
foreign policy.
He concludes that De Gaulles ac
tions and reactions are merely a re.
fleclion of his irreconcilable grudges.
He feels that, although his political
system is open to attack, De Gaulles
unrivaled reputation
cannot be op
posed.
The disastrous effect of the mis
takes committed under this system
will be forgotten when the situation
ie back to normal, when the Consti
tution is no longer undermined by
one-man rule.
SUBMARINES IN COMBAT. Compiled by Rear
Admiral Joseph B. Icenhower, United States
Navy, Retired. 160 Pagas. Franklin Watts,
Inc.,New York, 1964.$5.95.
BY MAJ JACKG. CALLAWAY,USA

The author, a 1936 graduate of the

US Naval Academy and a submariner,
has compiled into a single volume
some of tbe entertaining and exciting
etoriee of submarine combat actions
of two World Wars.
These are narratives of the hero
ism of courageous captains and crews
among them are Red Ramage of
the IJSS
Parche
against an enemy
convoy, Giinther Prien of U-47 in
Scapa F1ow, and Commander Yahaehi
Tanabee sinking of the Yorktosorz at
the Battle of Midway.
Seetember1965

THE COLD WAR. A Re-appraisal. Edited by

Evan Luard. 347 Pages. Frederick A. Prae.
ger, Inc., New York, 1964.$6.50.
BY COL ARTHURA. OLSON,USA

This work is based on a series of

individual studies by recognized po
litical science experts and occasionally
affords the reader a British slant.
A unique feature of the book is a
provocative study concerning polycen
trism in the West. The writers gen
erally relate the vagaries of polycen
triem to the relationship between the
Soviet Union and her Eastern Euro
pean satellites.
Thie volume should prove to be of
general interest to the military reader
and of particular interest to students
of international relations and political
science.
6UYING AIRCRAFT: Matdriel Procurement
for the Army Air Forces. United States Army
in World War N Special Studies. By Irving
Brinton HoNey, Jr. 643 Pages. Superintend
ent of Documents, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, D. C. $4.75.

This 59th volume of the UNITED

STATESARMY IN WORLDWAR II his
tory series covers procurement in the
broadest sense of the word.
Professor Honey haa written the
book for the ambitious young staff
officer of tomorrow as well as the gen
eral reader, and it is, as a result, both
lively reading and educational.
lt covere air procurement as prac
ticed before and during the war, and
describes the impact of PO1itiCalt eco
nomic, legal, and military problems on
the program.
This volume, the seventh in the Spe
cial Studies subseries, is a valuable
text for the student of logistics and
is clearly of interest to those concerned
with national defense.
111

MILITARY BOOKS

THE NEMESIS OF POWER. The German Army

in Politics 1918-1845. Second Edition. By
John W. Wheeler-Bannett. 831 Pages. St.
Martins Press, Inc., New York, 1984.$15.00.

NATO IN TRANSITION: The Future of the

Atlantic Alliance. By Timothy W. Stanley.
417 Pages. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New
York, 1965.$7.50.

BY LT COL ALBERTN. GARLAND,USA

BY 1ST LT FRANZ L. HELBIG, USA

a well-known and
The author,
highly respected British writer, has
again revised his work on the German
Army in the years between the Armis.
tice of November 1918 and the uncon
ditional surrender at Reims, France,
7 May 1945.
*Although tie admits that much work
has been accomplished on recent Ger
man history during the past few years,
the author finds no cause to alter my
interpretations
of either the Army in
German politics between the two
world wars or the role played hy the
military in the opposition to Hitler.
He has included in his bibliography
what he considers the most important
of the recent publications and has
made minor amendments to the text,
but not a \vholesale revision.
Almost a classic in its field, TAe
Nemesis of Power is as important a
military history as it is a political
history. In the light of todays events,
~ts le.ssOns Of the past assume increa~.
mg Importance and cry out for re
membrance.
INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY FORCES. The
Question of Peacekeeping in an Armed and
Oisarming World. Compiled by Lincoln P.
Bloomfield. 307 Pages. little, Brown & Co.,
Boston, Mass.r 1984.$5.00 clothbound. $2.50
paperbound.
BY LT COL SAMUEL L. CRCIOK,SR.,
USA

This book contains an interesting

theoretical approach to the require
ment for international forces, and, at
the same time, presents the practical
obstacles to successful employment of
those forces to keep the peace.
112

A review of the political, economic,

and structural matters which influence
the future of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. Mr. Stanley con.
eludes that, for the sake of progres
sive growth, it is ezaential to create
first a partnership of the many, wittin
which the European nations can coa.
Iesce at their own pace.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE ANO THE AM.

BASSADOR. Jackson Subcommittee Papers
on the Conduct of American Foreign Policy,
Edited by Senator Jfemy k!. Jackson. ZO{
Pages. Frederick A. Praager, Itrc.,New York,
1964.$4.50 clothbound. $?.95 paperbound,
BY LTCOLRALPHM. HOFMANN,USA

This two-part book deals with the

role of the Secretary of State and an
American Ambassador. ~t presents the
findings of Senator Jacksons sub.
committee on National Security Staff
ing and Operations and then offers
statements made before the subcom.
mittee by some witnesses. Among the
statements
are those of Secretary
Dean Rusk and Ambassador Averell
Harriman.
The volume covers some of the vital
problems which confront the Presi
dent, the Secretary of State, aird an
American Ambassador in the fields of
national security organization, coor
dination, planning, action, administra
tion, and communications. Everyday
actions and decisions that each of the
three persons must take are carefnlly
analyzed and discussed.
A useful reference work for anyone
studying the daily practical problems
of the conduct of US foreign policy.

MilitaryReview