142710cr,144396cr

UnitedStatesv.GilbertoValle

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Second Circuit
________
AugustTerm,2014
No.142710crandNo.144396cr
UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA,
Appellant/Appellee,
v.
GILBERTOVALLE,
DefendantAppellee/DefendantAppellant.
________
AppealsfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt
fortheSouthernDistrictofNewYork.
No.12cr847(PGG)PaulG.Gardephe,Judge.
________
Argued:May12,2015
Decided:December3,2015
________
Before:STRAUB,PARKER,andCARNEY,CircuitJudges.
________

No.142710cr,144396cr

Appeals from judgments of the United States District Court

for the Southern District of New York (Paul G. Gardephe, Judge).
The jury convicted Gilberto Valle of one count of conspiracy to
kidnap and one count of improperly accessing a computer in
violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). 18
U.S.C. 1030. Valle moved for a judgment of acquittal, or, in the
alternative, for a new trial, on both counts. The district court
granted Valles motion as to the conspiracy count, concluding that
there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction, and
denied the motion as to the CFAA count, concluding that Valles
conductwascoveredbythestatute.
TheGovernmentappealsfromthedistrictcourtsjudgmentof
acquittalontheconspiracycount,andValleseparatelyappealsfrom
the judgment of conviction on the CFAA count. Because we agree
thattherewasinsufficientevidenceastotheexistenceofagenuine
agreement to kidnap and of Valles specific intent to commit a
kidnapping,weAFFIRMthedistrictcourtsjudgmentofacquittalon
the conspiracy count. Because we find that the district courts
construction of the CFAA violates the rule of lenity, we REVERSE
thejudgmentofconvictionontheCFAAcount.

JudgeSTRAUBdissentsinaseparateopinion.
________
JUSTIN ANDERSON AND RANDALL W. JACKSON
(Hadassa Waxman and Brooke Cucinella, of
counsel), Assistant United States Attorneys for
Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New York, New
York,forAppellant/Appellee.

No.142710cr,144396cr

EDWARD S. ZAS (Robert M. Baum and Julia L.

Gatto,ofcounsel),FederalDefendersofNewYork,
Inc., New York, New York, for Defendant
Appellee/DefendantAppellantGilbertoValle.
Eugene Volokh (Hanni Fakhoury and Jamie
Williams, Electronic Frontier Foundation, San
Francisco, California, on the brief), Scott & Cyan
Banister First Amendment Clinic, UCLA School
of Law, Los Angeles, California, for Amici Curiae
ElectronicFrontierFoundation,CenterforDemocracy
&Technology,MarionB.BrechnerFirstAmendment
Project, National Coalition Against Censorship,
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment, and
LawProfessors.
Stephen L. Braga, Appellate Litigation Clinic,
University of Virginia School of Law,
Charlottesville,Virginia,forAmiciCuriaeFrederick
S.Berlin,M.D.,Ph.D.,andChrisKraft,Ph.D.
Hanni Fakhoury and Jamie Williams (Richard D.
Willstatter, National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers, White Plains, New York, and
Harley Geiger, Center for Democracy &
Technology, Washington, D.C., on the brief),
Electronic Frontier Foundation, San Francisco,
California, for Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Center for Democracy & Technology,
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers,
andScholars.
________

No.142710cr,144396cr

BARRINGTOND.PARKER,CircuitJudge:
This is a case about the line between fantasy and criminal
intent.Althoughitisincreasinglychallengingtoidentifythatlinein
theInternetage,itstillexistsanditmustberationallydiscerniblein
order to ensure that a persons inclinations and fantasies are his
own and beyond the reach of the government. Jacobson v. United
States, 503 U.S. 540, 55152 (1992). We are loathe to give the
government the power to punish us for our thoughts and not our
actions.Stanleyv.Georgia,394U.S.557,565(1969).Thatincludesthe
power to criminalize an individuals expression of sexual fantasies,
no matter how perverse or disturbing. Fantasizing about
committing a crime, even a crime of violence against a real person
whomyouknow,isnotacrime.
This does not mean that fantasies are harmless. To the
contrary,fantasiesofviolenceagainstwomenarebothasymptomof
andacontributortoacultureofexploitation,amassivesocialharm
that demeans women. Yet we must not forget that in a free and
functioning society, not every harm is meant to be addressed with
the federal criminal law. Because [t]he link between fantasy and
intent is too tenuous for fantasy [alone] to be probative, United
Statesv.Curtin,489F.3d935,961(9thCir.2007)(enbanc)(Kleinfeld,
J.,concurring),andbecausetheremainingevidenceisinsufficientto
provetheexistenceofanillegalagreementorVallesspecificintent
to kidnap anyone, we affirm the district courts judgment of
acquittalonthesinglecountofconspiracytokidnap.
In an issue of first impression that has sharply divided our
sister circuits, we must also decide the meaning of exceeds
authorized access in section 1030(a) of the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act (CFAA), which imposes both criminal and civil
4

No.142710cr,144396cr

liability.18U.S.C.1030.Specifically,wemustdeterminewhether
anindividualexceedsauthorizedaccesstoacomputerwhen,with
an improper purpose, he accesses a computer to obtain or alter
information that he is otherwise authorized to access, or if he
exceeds authorized access only when he obtains or alters
information that he does not have authorization to access for any
purpose which is located on a computer that he is otherwise
authorized to access. Because we conclude that the text, statutory
history, and purpose of the CFAA permit both interpretations, we
are required to apply the rule of lenity and adopt the latter
construction.Wethereforereversethejudgmentofconvictionasto
theCFAAcount.
BACKGROUND
GilbertoValleisanativeofForestHills,Queens.Atthetime
oftheeventsgivingrisetohisprosecution,hewasanofficerinthe
New York City Police Department living with his wife, Kathleen
Mangan,andtheirinfantdaughterinForestHills.Vallehasnoprior
criminalrecordandthereisnoevidencethatheeveractedviolently
orthreateninglytowardsanyone.
Vallewas,however,anactivememberofanInternetsexfetish
community called Dark Fetish Network (DFN). He connected
with individuals around the world whom he knew only by screen
namessuchasMoodyBluesorAlyKahn,orbyemailaddresses.
Valle communicated with these individuals by email or web chat,
usually in the late evening and early morning hours after his work
shift. Many of his Internet communications involved the
transmission of photographs of women he knew including his
wife, her colleagues from work, and some of his friends and
acquaintances to other DFN users with whom he discussed
5

No.142710cr,144396cr

committinghorrificactsofsexualviolence.Thesechatsconsisted
of gruesome and graphic descriptions of kidnapping, torturing,
cooking,raping,murdering,andcannibalizingvariouswomen.
Valles online fantasy life was, to say the least, extremely
active during this period. However, there is no evidence that he
ever learned the real identities of the individuals with whom he
chatted,noristhereanyevidencethatheevermadeconcreteplans
tomeetinpersonorspeakbytelephoneorwebcamerawithanyof
them.
In September 2012, Mangan became concerned about Valles
latenight Internet activities after she found several disturbing
images of dead women on a laptop that the couple shared. She
installed spyware on the computer, which recorded each website
entered by the computers users and captured screen shots every
five minutes. With the use of the spyware, Mangan found more
disturbingpicturesandrecordsofwebsitesthatVallevisited.These
included detailed emails and chats where Valle discussed
butchering her and raping and torturing other women whom they
knew.AfterconfrontingValleabouthiscomputeruseandmoving
out of the home with their daughter, Mangan contacted federal
authorities.
Valle was subsequently arrested and charged with a single
conspiracytokidnapseveralofthewomenwhowerethesubjectof
his chats. Although he had chatted with numerous individuals he
met on DFN, the Government identified three alleged
coconspirators:MichaelVanHise,amanfromNewJerseywhowas
known to Valle as mikevanhise81@aol.com and
michael19902135@yahoo.com; an unidentified individual
apparently located in Pakistan who used the screen name Aly
6

No.142710cr,144396cr

Khan; and Dale Bolinger, a man in England who was known to

Valleonlybyhisscreenname,MoodyBlues.AndalthoughValle
haddiscusseduptoonehundreddifferentwomeninhischats,the
indictment alleged five targets of the kidnapping conspiracy:
Kathleen Mangan, his wife; Alisa Friscia, Mangans former
coworker; Andria Noble; Kristen Ponticelli; and Kimberly Sauer, a
formercollegeclassmateofValleswhowaslivingintheBaltimore
area.
Valle was also charged with improperly accessing a
government computer and obtaining information, in violation of
section 1030(a)(2)(B) of the CFAA. As an NYPD officer, Valle had
access to the Omnixx Force Mobile (OFM), a computer program
thatallowsofficerstosearchvariousrestricteddatabases,including
the federal National Crime Information Center database, which
contain sensitive information about individuals such as home
addresses and dates of birth. It is undisputed that the NYPDs
policy, known to Valle, was that these databases could only be
accessed in the course of an officers official duties and that
accessingthemforpersonaluseviolatedDepartmentrules.InMay
2012, he accessed the OFM and searched for Maureen Hartigan, a
woman he had known since high school and had discussed
kidnapping with Aly Khan. This access with no law enforcement
purposeisthebasisfortheCFAAcharge.
The Governments evidence at trial included the chats and
emails between Valle and his alleged coconspirators; testimony
from several of the alleged targets of the kidnapping conspiracy,
including his wife; other evidence seized from Valles computer,
including videos and images he downloaded; his search term and
browser history; and excerpts from a postarrest statement.
7

No.142710cr,144396cr

Followinga13daytrial,thejuryreturnedaverdictofguiltyonboth
counts. Valle subsequently moved for a judgment of acquittal
pursuanttoRule29or,inthealternative,foranewtrialpursuantto
Rule33onbothcounts.
In a thorough and thoughtful 118page opinion, the district
court (Gardephe, J.) granted Valles Rule 29 motion with respect to
the conspiracy charge. 301 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). While
remaining mindful of the jurys critical role in our legal system,
Judge Gardepheacknowledgedhisresponsibilitytoensurethatthe
government satisfies its burden of establishing proof beyond a
reasonabledoubt.Id.at80.Emphasizingtheuniquecircumstances
of this extraordinary case, he concluded that, notwithstanding the
jurys verdict to the contrary, the prosecutors had failed to prove
beyondareasonabledoubtthatValleandhisallegedcoconspirators
hadenteredintoaconspiracytokidnaporthatVallehadformedthe
requisitespecificintenttokidnap.Id.at62,89.
Inreachingthisconclusion,JudgeGardephecitedextensively
to the testimony of FBI Special Agent Corey Walsh, the lead agent
assigned to review and analyze Valles emails and chats whose
testimonyhadformed(inthecourtsview)thecenterpieceofthe
GovernmentscaseandthefoundationofitsargumentthatValle
had acted with criminal intent. Id. at 8384. Agent Walsh testified
that he, along with prosecutors and other case agents, reviewed all
of the emails and chats found on Valles computer and concluded
that Valles conversations with 21 of the 24 individuals whom he
met on DFN were fantasy. SA 8, 128. At the same time, the
prosecution team concluded that Valles conversations with the
threeallegedcoconspiratorscontainedwhattheytermedelements
of real crime because they described dates, names, and activities
8

No.142710cr,144396cr

thatyouwouldusetoconductarealcrime.301F.R.D.at65.There
was no evidence that Agent Walsh or any of the other members of
theprosecutionteamhadanyspecializedtrainingorexperiencethat
would render them particularly competent to distinguish between
realandfantasychats.Indeed,AgentWalshconcededthatthe
fantasy roleplay chats and emails shared many of the same
features as the real chats and emails that purportedly reflected
criminal intent, including dates for planned kidnappings, conjured
actsofsexualviolence,priorsurveillancethatVallefantasizedabout
having conducted, and fantastical elements such as humansized
ovensandrotisseriesforcookingvictims.Id.at6566.
Afteranexhaustivereviewofthechatsandemailsintroduced
at trial, Judge Gardephe concluded that there was no discernible
differencebetweentherealandfantasychats:
Both sets of chats involve discussions about Facebook
photographs of women Valle knows; dates for planned
kidnappings; prices Valle will charge for kidnapping these
women; surveillance Valle has allegedly conducted of these
women; the use of chloroform to incapacitate victims; acts of
sexual violence that will be perpetrated on these women; and
fantasticalelementssuchashumansizeovensandrotisseries,and
the construction of soundproofed basements and pulley
apparatusesthatwillbeusedforpurposesoftorture.

Id.at60.Accordingly,heconcludedthatnoreasonablejurorcould
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegedly real
chats evinced criminal intent any more than did the acknowledged
fantasychats.Id.at84.
The district court further concluded that the Governments
remaining evidence, including Valles Internet search history and
real life encounters with several of the alleged targets, was
9

No.142710cr,144396cr

insufficient to establish either a genuine agreement to kidnap or

Valles specific intent to kidnap in light of the fantastical nature of
the chats and the weakness of the remaining evidence. Id. at 90.
Judge Gardephe stressed, among other things, that there was no
evidencethatanyoftheallegedconspiratorseverexchangedcontact
information or sought to learn each others true identities, and that
the communications were episodic, with months often passing in
between.Id.at60.Whendatesforplannedkidnappingscameand
went, Valle and his alleged coconspirators would simply begin
discussinganotherwomanasapotentialtarget,inthesamemanner
that a consumer of pornography might turn to a different image,
photograph, or movie. Id. at 89. They also had agreed to the
impossible kidnapping three different women in three different
placesspanningthousandsofmilesonthesamedayandVallehad
provided his alleged coconspirators with a veritable avalanche of
false, fictitious, and fantastical information concerning himself and
thestepshehadallegedlytakentofacilitateakidnapping.Id.at61,
90. These facts, Judge Gardephe reasoned, were entirely
inconsistent with the notion that Valle was engaged in a genuine
kidnappingconspiracyand,ontheotherhand,entirelyconsistent
with Valles defense that he was engaged in fantasy roleplay and
thattheintentoftheconversationswassimplymutualfantasizing.
Id. at 60, 90. Accordingly, Judge Gardephe concluded that the
Governments proof had not established Valles guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt and granted Valles motion for a judgment of
acquittal.
Formanyofthesamereasons,JudgeGardepheconditionally
grantedVallesmotionforanewtrialonthegroundthatthejurys
verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Id. at 104.

10

No.142710cr,144396cr

Although the basis for his ruling was limited to the weight of the
evidence,JudgeGardephealsoexpressedseriousconcernaboutthe
prosecutions trial tactics and the effect they may have had on the
jury. Specifically, he questioned the propriety of the prosecutions
repeated references to Valles status as a police officer, such as
argumentsthatitisnotokforsomeoneinthatpositiontoengage
insuchfantasies.Oncetheliesandthefantasticalelements[ofthe
chats]arestrippedaway,JudgeGardepheconcluded,whatisleft
are deeply disturbing misogynistic chats and emails written by an
individual obsessed with imagining women he knows suffering
horrific sexrelated pain, terror, and degradation. Id. at 61. [I]n
whatwasanextraordinarycaseinvolvinghighlyinflammatoryand
emotional subjects, the prosecutions questionable conduct had
raise[d] concerns that the jurys verdict was the product of
disgustandrevulsionratherthanreasonandthatVallehadbeen
heldtoahigherstandardbecauseofhisstatusasapoliceofficer.
Id.at10507,109.
Finally,thedistrictcourtdeniedVallesmotionforajudgment
of acquittal as to the CFAA count. While acknowledging the
existence of a vigorous judicial debate over the meaning of
exceeds authorized access, the court nonetheless concluded that
Valles conduct fell squarely within the plain language of the
statute because Valle had not been authorized to input a query
regarding Hartigans name without a law enforcement reason for
doingso.Id.at111,113.
Valle was sentenced to 12 months in custody (which was
principally a sentence of time served because he had already spent
20monthsinpretrialdetention),oneyearofsupervisedrelease,and
a $25 special assessment. The Government has appealed the
11

No.142710cr,144396cr

judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count and Valle has

appealedhisconvictionontheCFAAcount.
STANDARDOFREVIEW
When reviewing a judgment of acquittal under Rule 29, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government
with all reasonable inferences resolved in the Governments favor.
UnitedStatesv.Anderson,747F.3d51,60(2dCir.2014).Theultimate
question is not whether we believe the evidence adduced at trial
established the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but
whether any rational trier could reasonably reach that conclusion.
UnitedStatesv.Payton,159F.3d49,56(2dCir.1998)(citingJacksonv.
Virginia,443U.S.307,319(1979)).Accordingly,ajurysverdictmust
beupheldifanyrationaltrieroffactcouldhavefoundtheessential
elementsofthecrimehadbeenprovedbeyondareasonabledoubt.
UnitedStatesv.Coplan,703F.3d46,62(2dCir.2012).
Applying this standard does not, however, mean that a
reviewing court must affirm all jury verdicts. If we are to be
faithful to the constitutional requirement that no person may be
convicted unless the Government has proven guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, we must take seriously our obligation to assess
therecordtodetermine...whetherajurycouldreasonablyfindguilt
beyondareasonabledoubt.UnitedStatesv.Clark,740F.3d808,811
(2d Cir. 2014). This standard does not mean that if there is any
evidencethatarguablycouldsupportaverdict,wemustaffirm.In
any criminal trial there is always some evidence of guilt, otherwise
therecouldnothavebeenaprosecution.
Whilewedefertoajurysassessmentswithrespecttocredibility,
conflicting testimony, and the jurys choice of the competing
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, specious

12

No.142710cr,144396cr

inferences are not indulged, because it would not satisfy the

Constitution to have a jury determine that the defendant is
probablyguilty.Iftheevidenceviewedinthelightmostfavorable
to the prosecution gives equal or nearly equal circumstantial
support to a theory of guilt and a theory of innocence, then a
reasonablejurymustnecessarilyentertainareasonabledoubt.

UnitedStatesv.Lorenzo,534F.3d153,159(2dCir.2008).Wereview
the district courts Rule 29 decision de novo. United States v. Reyes,
302F.3d48,5253(2dCir.2002).
DISCUSSION
I
To sustain a conspiracy conviction, the prosecution must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the person charged with
conspiracy knew of its existence and knowingly joined and
participated in it. United States v. Rodriguez, 392 F.3d 539, 545 (2d
Cir. 2004). The Government must also prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt,thatthedefendantpossessedthespecificintenttocommitthe
offense that was the object of the conspiracy here, kidnapping.
United States v. Torres, 604 F.3d 58, 65 (2d Cir. 2010). This
requirement is contextual: the prosecutions proof must be
considered in relation to the rest of the evidence presented at trial,
ratherthaninisolation.Anderson,747F.3dat59.
Attrial,theprosecutionbuiltitscasearoundValleschatsand
emails with his alleged coconspirators. On appeal, it argues that
these communications, taken at face value, were fully sufficient to
establishhisintenttojoinakidnappingconspiracy.GovtOpening
Br.32.Wedisagree.
As previously explained, Valles chats and emails with the
threeallegedcoconspiratorswerepartofamuchlargersetofchats

13

No.142710cr,144396cr

and emails with 24 individuals on DFN. According to the

prosecution, the former were unique because they evinced real
criminalintentwhiletherestdidnot.Afterreviewingthechatsand
emailsintroducedattrial,thedistrictcourtconcludedthatthereal
andfantasychatswereindistinguishable.301F.R.D.at86.
Ourreviewoftherecordyieldsthesameconclusion.Inboth
groups of chats, Valle transmits Facebook images of women and
offerstokidnapandsellthemonacashupondeliverybasis,and
inbothgroupsheexpressesadesiretokidnap,rape,torture,andeat
women whom he knows. In both groups Valle also claims to
conductsurveillanceofpotentialvictimsanddiscusseshisintentions
tokidnapthemusingchloroformandropes.Andinbothgroupshe
describes the various devices he owns that will assist in the
process.Manyofthefantasychatsalsodonotexplicitlystatethat
the participants are engaged in fantasy and are as graphic and
detailed as the real chats. For example, the real chats and the
fantasychatsbothincludehagglingoverthekidnappingfeesthat
Vallewantedtocharge,althoughtheprosecutionarguesthatthis
hagglingisuniquetotherealconspiracywithVanHise.Seeid.at
84.Therealchatsthuscontainthesamecoreelementsasthechats
theGovernmentconcedesarefantasy.1
Moreover,therealchatstakeplaceinthesametimeperiod
astheadmittedly fantasychats.OntheeveningofJuly12,2012,
1

InafantasychatwithTimChase,forexample,ValleandChaseagreeto

kidnapawomanonJanuary27,2012.Vallesuppliesrealpicturesofthe
woman,theyagreeuponapriceof$4,000forVallesservices,andVallestates
thatthewomangoestothegymnightlyandthathehaskeptalogofwhenshe
leavesandreturnshome.Thetwoalsoagreeuponalocationahundredmiles
eastofErieastheplaceofdelivery.AsJudgeGardephefound,thereareno
materialdifferencesbetweenthesechatswithChase,thefantasist,andValles
chatswithVanHise,theallegedcoconspirator.301F.R.D.at8687.
14

No.142710cr,144396cr

for instance, Valle discusses kidnapping Andria Noble with Aly

Khaninarealchatand,anhourlater,discusseskidnappingNoble
with someone else in a chat that was fantasy. The prosecution
thus proposed that Valle simultaneously agreed to kidnap Noble
while also engaging in roleplay about the same woman. This
temporalproximitycastsfurtherdoubtuponanyrationaldistinction
betweenthechats.
Even when taken at face value, the real chats contain
numerous other indicia of fantasy. For example, the prosecution
alleged that Valle formed a genuine agreement with the specific
intent to kidnap three different women in three different locations
onthesameday.First,ValleagreedwithAlyKhantolureMangan
toeitherIndiaorPakistanonFebruary20,2012andtoslaughterher
there. Second, he agreed with VanHise to kidnap Alisa Friscia in
Manhattan on February 20, 2012 and deliver her to an unknown
location in exchange for $4,000 in cash. Finally, Valle agreed with
Aly Khan to kidnap Andria Noble on February 20, 2012 from her
homeinColumbus,Ohio.Onappeal,theprosecutionpositsthatthe
jury could have reasonably concluded that Valle seriously planned
tokidnapMangan,Friscia,andNobleonthesamedayandfailedto
go throughwiththekidnappingsonlybecauseanobstaclearose,
orbecausehehadafearofgettingcaught.GovtOpeningBr.54.
Webelievethatnorationaljurorcouldreachthisconclusionforthe
reason noted by Judge Gardephe: The notion that Valle had
resolvedtolureMangantoIndiaorPakistan[toslaughterwithAly
Khan,] while at the same time kidnapping Andria Noble in
Columbus,Ohio,andkidnappingAlisaFrisciafromtheUpperEast
SideofManhattan,issimplyoutlandish.301F.R.D.at90.

15

No.142710cr,144396cr

In addition to plots that would put the same person in

different places at the same time, the real chats are replete with
referencestofantasticalelementssuchasahumansizedoven,aspit,
and a remote cabin in the woods, none of which Valle owned or
madeanyefforttoacquire.Thefantasticalnatureoftherealchats
isbolsteredbytheentirelyvirtualnatureoftheallegedconspirators
relationships.Vallehadnopreexistingrelationshipwiththosewith
whomhechatted,andheformednorealliferelationshipwithanyof
them.Hedidnotknowtheirrealnamesand,indeed,couldnotbe
sureoftheirgenders,ages,orlocations.Neitherhenorhisalleged
coconspirators made any effort to communicate by telephone, text
message,orwebcamera,muchless meetinperson.Andweeksor
months could go by between Valles chats with any particular
individual. While anonymity is not uncommon in Internet
communications,thefantasticalelementsofthechatscombinedwith
the impersonal nature of the interactions provides pervasive and
unmistakableindiciaofdeepfantasy.2
Consequently,weneedlooknofurtherthantheprosecutions
own work product to find reasonable doubt. The prosecution
divided the exchanges into two groups and undertook to convince
the jury to convict Valle on the theory that one group was fantasy
and the other proved criminal intent. This exercise failed because
2

AsJudgeRichardPosnerobservedinanothercaseinvolvinganindividual
engagedinsexuallygraphiconlinecommunicationswithstrangers,the
defendantmayhavethought(thisiscommoninInternetrelationships)that
theywerebothenactingafantasy.UnitedStatesv.Gladish,536F.3d646,650
(7thCir.2008).Indeed,inGladishtheSeventhCircuitreversedaconvictionfor
attempttoinduceaminortoengageinsexualactivitybecause[the
defendants]talkandhissendingheravideoofhimselfmasturbating(the
basisofhisunchallengedconvictionforviolating18U.S.C.1470)[we]re
equallyconsistentwithhishavingintendedtoobtainsexualsatisfaction
vicariously.Id.
16

No.142710cr,144396cr

the distinction the prosecution urged does not exist in this case.
There is simply no material difference between the two groups of
chats. We do not believe that the prosecution satisfies the proof
beyond a reasonable doubt standard by relying upon a distinction
thatisuntetheredtoreasonorcommonsense.
Perhaps realizing that there is no actual distinction to be
drawnbetweentherealandfantasychats,theprosecutionnow
contendsthatitdidnottakeapositiononewayortheotherasto
whether[Vallesonlinecommunicationswithpeopleotherthanthe
named coconspirators] constituted genuine planning, puffery,
preparatoryconversations,roleplaying,orsomethingelseentirely.
GovtOpeningBr.39.Therecord,however,beliesthisassertion.
Asnoted,AgentWalshwasakeywitnessintheprosecutions
case.Hewastheleadinvestigativeagentandamajorityofthechats
and emails introduced were admitted into evidence through his
testimony. He unequivocally testified, often in response to the
Governments own questions, that the Government considered
Valles chats with 21 other individuals to be fantasy and Valles
chats with the three alleged coconspirators to be real. The
following exchanges between Agent Walsh and AUSA Hadassa
Waxmanondirectexaminationareillustrative:
WAXMAN: When you were reviewing thoseemailsbetween
[Valle]andthetwodozenindividuals,didyouseparatetheminto
groups?
WALSH:

Idid.

WAXMAN:

Whatwerethosegroups?

WALSH:

Ones that I believe that were real and ones thatI

believewerefantasy.
WAXMAN:

Whydidyoumakethatseparation?
17

No.142710cr,144396cr

WALSH:

In the ones that I believe were fantasy,the

individuals said they were fantasy. In the ones that I thought

werereal,peopleweresharing...realdetailsofwomen,names,
what appeared to be photographs of the women, details of past
crimesandtheyalsosaidthattheywereforreal.
WAXMAN:

Whatcausedyoutomakethatseparationbetween

the emails you found that had realistic characteristics and those
thatwerefantasy?
WALSH:

Only my interest in obtaining information about

thatrealcriminalactivity.

SA89.
WAXMAN:

Agent Walsh, approximately how many ofOfficer

Valles emails and electronic chats did you review in connection

withyourinvestigation?
WALSH:

Thousands.

WAXMAN:

We just reviewed over yesterday and today about

40,isthatright?
WALSH:

Thatscorrect,maam.

WAXMAN:

Why did you focus on these 40 particular

communications?
WALSH:

Webelievedthatthesechatsandemailscontained

elementsofrealcrimes.
WAXMAN:

Andwhydidyoucometothatconclusion?

WALSH:

They described dates, names, and activities that

youwouldusetoconductarealcrime.
WAXMAN:

Anddidyoucastasideacertainnumberofemails

aswell?
WALSH:

Yes,maam.

WAXMAN:

Whydidyouchoosenottofocusonthoseemails?

WALSH:

Quitefrankly,maam,theydidntseemrealistic.
18

No.142710cr,144396cr

WAXMAN:

Whynot?

WALSH:

They were clearly roleplay. They used the word

fantasyintheactualchatsoremails.

SA 12526. On crossexamination, Agent Walsh admitted that the

groupingdecisionwasmadebynumerousagentsandprosecutors.
BAUM:

Now, when you made that decision that 21 out of

24participantswithMr.Vallewereengagedinfantasyroleplay,
wereyoutheonlyonewhomadethatdecision?
WALSH:

No,sir.

BAUM:

Howmanyagentswereinvolvedinthatdecision?

WALSH:

Approximatelyeightto10,sir.

...
BAUM:

And how many people from the U.S. Attorneys

Officewereinvolvedinthatdecision?
WALSH:

Abouttwo,sir.

BAUM:

Soeightto10lawenforcementofficersandatleast

twolawyersfromtheU.S.AttorneysOfficedecidedthatoutof24
people that Mr. Valle chatted or emailed with[,] 21 were fantasy
roleplays,isthatcorrect?
WALSH:

Approximately.Yes,sir.

SA12930.Theprosecutionnowurgesthatthedistinctionbetween
realchatsandfantasyroleplaywasVallesdefenseandthatthe
districtcourtappliedthewrongstandardbyforcingtheprosecution
todisprovethedefensetheoryofthecase.Astheexchangesabove
demonstrate, the distinction was introduced and relied on by the
Governments case agent. In any event, intent is an essential
element of the crime that the Government charged. The issue,
therefore, is not whether the prosecution disproved the defenses
theory, but whether the prosecution proved its theory that Valles
19

No.142710cr,144396cr

real chats represented a departure from his otherwise entirely

imaginaryworld.
Alternatively, the Government argues that even if it
introducedthedistinction,itdidnotrelyonorconcedethetruthof
thedistinctionbecauseitdidnotevenintroduceanyofthefantasy
conversationsattrialsothat[a]comparisoncouldbemadewiththe
real chats. Govt Opening Br. 41. A sampling of the fantasy
chats was introduced by the defense in its crossexamination of
Agent Walsh. But regardless of how the exhibits were introduced,
the Governments own investigation concluded that forty chats
permitted the inference of conspiratorial intent, as compared to
myriadotherchatsthatdidnot.TheGovernmentclaimsthatitdoes
not have to prove a distinction between these two sets of chats
because the jury could have rationally found that defendants
charged with attempting or conspiring to engage in criminal,
deviant activity often contemporaneously engage in fantasy
behavior . . . about activity . . . that is similar to the charged
conduct.Id.at43.
This contention proves too little. Once the Government
constructs its case around the theory that a certain group of chats
permitstheinferenceofconspiratorialintentwhileanothergroupof
essentially similar chats is consistent with noncriminal behavior,
some adequate explanation must be forthcoming. Where, as here,
none is, the noncriminal chats are a powerful indicator that a
reasonable juror must necessarily entertain reasonable doubt about
theprosecutionscase.
Unable to materially distinguish the real chats from the
fantasy chats, the Government relies on evidence of real world
stepsthatValletookinordertoprepareforthekidnappings.See,
20

No.142710cr,144396cr

e.g., Govt Opening Br. 5658, 6068. For example, the prosecution
introducedevidencethatValleperformedInternetsearchesforhow
tokidnappeople,howtomakechloroform,andhowtorestrainand
cannibalize people. The prosecution also introduced evidence that
Valle researched prior kidnappings, which it argues permitted the
jurytoinferthatVallewasinterestedinhowthosekidnapperswere
caught so that he could learn from their experiences and avoid
apprehension.Id.at63.
Tobesure,Internetsearchescanprovidesomerelevantproof
of intent. However, an Internet search, in and of itself, is not
criminal. Here, the searches on which the Government relies
occurredinacontextofdeepfantasy.Aswithhischatsandemails,
Valles Internet searches show that he was interested in committing
actsofsexualizedviolenceagainstwomen.Interestmayberelevant
evidenceofintent,butitdoesnotbyitselfproveintent.Nodoubt
some people commit sex crimes because they want to turn their
fantasies into reality, but most people with criminal fantasies
probably refrain from acting on them, because they know it would
bewrong,orbecausetheydonotwanttoriskthepenalties.Curtin,
489F.3dat962(Kleinfeld,J.,concurring).
The Government also relies on at least two occasions when
Valleengagedinactsofsurveillanceofhisintendedvictims.First,
theGovernmentnotesthatValleadmittedinapostarreststatement
that he was on Friscias block on March 1, 2012, two days after he
allegedly agreed to kidnap her with VanHise. Govt Opening Br.
5658. Valle told a government agent that he was on the block to
drop off Mangan to have lunch with Friscia, but both Mangan and
Friscia testified that they had not met for lunch that day. Valle
indicatedtotheagentthathewasontheblockonlyverybriefly,and
21

No.142710cr,144396cr

thereisnoevidencetothecontrary.Thereisalsonoevidencethat
he observed Friscia or her apartment building while he was on her
block.Vallesfalseexculpatoryexplanationforbeingontheblockis
insufficientproofonwhichtoconvictwhereotherevidenceofguilt
is weak. United States v. Johnson, 513 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1975).
As the district court found, no rational juror could conclude from
thisevidencealonethatVallewasengagedinsurveillance.
Second,theprosecutionandourdissentingcolleaguecontend
thatthejurycouldconvictValleofaconspiracytokidnapbasedon
his communications with Moody Blues about Kimberly Sauer. See
GovtOpeningBr.3536.Thisevidenceisinsufficienttoshowthat
Valle agreed or had the specific intent to kidnap Sauer and, in any
event,itdoesnotestablishMoodyBluessintent.
Sauer is a former college classmate of Valles who lives in
Maryland. According to Sauer, she communicated with Valle by
text message approximately ten to fifteen times a year. Mangan
testified that she and Valle made three or four trips to Maryland
during the course of their relationship (from 2009 through
September2012)andthateachtimesheandVallemadeaneffortto
seeSauerwheninthearea.
InJanuary2012,ValleaskedSauerfor her addresssothathe
could send her a Patrolmens Benevolent Association card. The
earliest chat between Valle and Moody Blues introduced at trial
takes place seven months later, on July 9, 2012. During this
conversation,Valledescribedseveralgirlsthathewasworkingon
grabbing . . . for thanksgiving, and told Moody Blues that
Kimberly [is] by far the easiest to kidnap because he could just
show up at her home unannounced. JA 8082. After Valle
suggestedthatmaybeyoucanmakeithereandhelpmewithher,
22

No.142710cr,144396cr

sinceyouhaveexperience,MoodyBluesrespondedthathelivesin
EnglandbutitiseasytogettotheBigapple.JA81.
VallealsotoldMoodyBluesthathewassingle,hadabig
gasoven,andthatnooneisaround[him]foraboutofamile.
JA84.ThetwothendiscussedhowtheywouldtrussupSauerand
cookheronanoutdoorspitatVallesmountainhouse.Duringthis
samechat,approximatelyonehourafterVallewrotethathewanted
to kidnap someone for Thanksgiving, Valle told Moody Blues that
hewasthinkingofaLaborDaycookout...withKimberlyasthe
main course. JA 86. Valle noted that she had been one of my
favoritevictimstofantasizeaboutforalmost10yearsnow.JA86.
AgainduringthesamechatinearlyJuly,VallesentMoodyBluesa
link to a video of Sauer on vacation and volunteered to make
chloroformandbuyrope.MoodyBluesrepliedthatLabourdayis
the3rd[of]September,notalotoftimetosortoutplaneticketsetc.
WillseewhatcheapdealsIcanget.JA90.
One day later, on July 10, Valle sent Moody Blues a word
document,ablueprintofeverythingwewillneedtocarrythisout.
JA100.Thedocument,entitledAbductingandCookingKimberly:
A Blueprint, has a target date of September 2, 2012 for the
abduction. It includes a photograph of Sauer, and accurately
describesherageandmaritalstatusandthatsheisnotadruguser,
doesnothavetattoos,anddrinksonlyoccasionally.Alloftheother
informationinthisdocumentisfalse,includingherlastname,date
of birth, birthplace, and educational history. The entire plan for
abduction set out in the Blueprint is as follows: I will arrive at
somepointSundaynightatherhometokidnapher.Shelivesina
quiet suburban neighborhood (Pictures of her house to be added).
Thedocumentalsolistssomematerialsthatareneeded,includinga
23

No.142710cr,144396cr

car, chloroform, rope, gag, tarp/plastic bags, gloves, and cheap

sneakers.JA26768.AfterreceivingtheBlueprint,MoodyBlues
asked [m]ay I have her address? For Googling using the Map
app?JA101.Valleliedthathewasnotsureofherexactaddress.
Id.ThereisnoevidenceintherecordthatValleeverobtainedanyof
the materials listed in the Blueprint, or that the document was
ever updated with pictures of Sauers house or any additional
information.
At some point prior to July 12, Valle called Sauer to tell her
thathewouldbetravelingtoMarylandwithhiswifeanddaughter
foraweekend.TheymadeplanstomeetforlunchonJuly22.On
July17,ValleinformedMoodyBluesthathewouldbehavinglunch
withSauer.Laterinthischat,MoodyBluesaskedValleifhehada
recipe for chloroform. Valle sent him a link. On July 19, Moody
BluesagainaskedforSauersaddress,andVallerepliedthathedid
not know it by heart. Valle never provided Moody Blues with
Sauersaddress.
On July 20, Valle conducted a number of Internet searches
relating to kidnapping, including how to kidnap someone, how
to chloroform a girl, and kidnapped girl. On July 21, Valle
traveled to Maryland with his wife and daughter. They visited
several college friends, and had the scheduled lunch with Sauer on
July 22. On July 21, Valle texted Sauer [w]e drove by your pink
building today, and she responded Haha yay! JA 237. At trial,
Sauer testified that she understood Valle to refer to her office
building, which has pinktinted windows, but that Valle had never
visitedheratworkandshehadneversenthimphotographsofthe
building.Shedescribedthelunchasfineandpleasant.

24

No.142710cr,144396cr

On the evening of July 22, after Valle returned home, he

emailed Moody Blues that Sauer looked absolutely
mouthwatering.JA117.ValleandMoodyBluessaidnothingmore
about the plot to kidnap Sauer and did not talk again for another
month. On August 21, Valle and Moody Blues began to discuss
KristenPonticelli,arecentgraduateofValleshighschoolwhomhe
didnotknow.JA264.ThereisnoevidenceintherecordthatValle
and Moody Blues ever discussed Sauer or Ponticelli again after
August21.
As Judge Gardephe observed, the chats pertaining to Sauer
arenotmateriallydifferentfromtheotherfantasychats.Allofthe
elements of this alleged plot are equally fantastical, including the
presenceofthenonexistentmountainhouse,thehumansizedoven,
andtheBlueprint.TheplantokidnapSauerintheBlueprint
isnomoredetailedthanistheplaninVallesInternetchatswith
MoodyBlues,nordoesthelistofmaterialsrequireddifferfromthe
typesofmaterialsVallediscussesinhischats.Andcritically,Valle
makes concerted efforts to conceal from Moody Blues any
identifyinginformationaboutSauerthatcouldbeusedinfurtherance
ofakidnappingsuchasherlastname,dateofbirth,andthenameof
heralmamater.AlthoughtheprosecutionspeculatesthatValledid
notshareaccurateinformationaboutSauerbecausehedidnotwant
MoodyBluestoundertakethekidnappingwithouthim,thereisno
evidenceintherecordtosupportsuchaninference.
Thus, the only meaningful difference between this alleged
conspiracyandthefantasychatsistheoccurrenceofValleslunch
withSauerinMarylandduringapproximatelythesametimeperiod
as he discussed kidnapping her with Moody Blues. Although the
Government characterizes Valles communications with Sauer as
25

No.142710cr,144396cr

outoftheblue,therecordshowsthattheycommunicatedbytext
messageintheyearpriortotheallegedkidnappingplotonaregular
basisandthattheymadeanefforttoseeeachotherwhenVallewas
intown.ValledidnothavelunchwithSaueralone,butrathercame
with Mangan and their infant daughter. Moreover, the chats
between Moody Blues and Valle leading up to and following the
lunchmakeitimpossibletoconclude,withoutspeculation,thatthe
lunch was surveillance in furtherance of a genuine conspiracy.
Moody Blues makes only a single reference to purchasing plane
tickets in the July 9 chat, but that suggestion is never brought up
again.ExceptfortheemailrecappingthelunchonJuly22andthe
August24conversationinwhichtheirfocusmovestoPonticelliafter
abriefmentionofSauer,MoodyBluesandValleneveragaindiscuss
Saueroranyplottokidnapher.Infact,MoodyBluesandValledo
notspeakatallforthemonthafterJuly22,andthetargetdateof
September2passeswithnodiscussion.AndVallenevertakesany
stepofanysortinfurtheranceofanallegedkidnapping.
We are in accord with the prosecution and our dissenting
colleague that a jury might be able to distill some incriminating
evidence from all of this. But some evidence is not the test.
Because Valles relationship with Moody Blues is essentially
indistinguishable from his relationship with all of the others with
whomhechatted,weagreewithJudgeGardephethatarationaljury
could not conclude that this evidence was sufficient to meet the
beyond any reasonable doubt requirement. As our case law
instructs:
[I]tisnotenoughthattheinferencesinthegovernmentsfavorare
permissible.Acourtmustalsobesatisfiedthattheinferencesare
sufficientlysupportedtopermitarationaljurortofindthat[each
elementoftheoffense]isestablishedbeyondareasonabledoubt.
26

No.142710cr,144396cr

If the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the

prosecutiongivesequalornearlyequalcircumstantialsupportto
atheoryofguiltandatheoryofinnocence,thenareasonablejury
mustnecessarilyentertainareasonabledoubt.

United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149, 159 (2d Cir.
2008).
Finally, on the basis of this evidence, it is impossible to
determinebeyondareasonabledoubtwhetherMoodyBluesorfor
that matter any of Valles other alleged coconspirators ever had
the specific intent to commit a kidnapping. We have taken a
bilateral approach to the crime of conspiracy: at least two people
must agree. When one of two persons merely pretends to agree,
the other party, whatever he may believe, is in fact not conspiring
withanyone.SeeUnitedStatesv.Bicaksiz,194F.3d390,398(2dCir.
1999). The only evidence the Government offers to demonstrate
MoodyBluessintentisthewordsheusedinthechats.GovtReply
Br. 2122. As we have explained, these chats of real criminal
intent are rife with indicia of fantasy and contain the same
substantive elements as the chats the Government concedes are
fantasy.Theconclusionthatthechatsdonotsupportafindingof
Valles conspiratorial intent applies with equal force to Moody
Blues.
On this record, no reasonable juror could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Valle possessed the specific intent to kidnap
anyone or that he and his alleged coconspirators ever formed an
agreement to actually carry out any of the purported kidnappings.
The mere indulgence of fantasy, even of the repugnant and
unsettling kind here, is not, without more, criminal. We therefore

27

No.142710cr,144396cr

affirmthedistrictcourtsjudgmentofacquittalastotheconspiracy
count.
II
We now turn to Valles appeal of the judgment of conviction
on the CFAA count. We reverse because section 1030(a)(2)(B) is
ambiguous and where, as here, the Government and the defense
bothpositplausibleinterpretationsofacriminalstatute,theruleof
lenityrequiresustoadoptthedefendantsconstruction.AsJustice
Scalia has emphasized, [w]hen interpreting a criminal statute, we
do not play the part of a mindreader. United States v. Santos, 553
U.S. 507, 515 (2008). When a reasonable doubt persists about a
statutes intended scope even after resort to the language and
structure,legislativehistory,andmotivatingpoliciesofthestatute,
Moskalv.UnitedStates,498U.S.103,108(1990),weresolvedoubtsin
favor of the defendant rather than imputing to Congress an
undeclared will to criminalize conduct, Santos, 553 U.S. at 515
(quoting Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)). The rule of
lenity ensures that criminal statutes will provide fair warning of
whatconstitutescriminalconduct,minimizestheriskofselectiveor
arbitrary enforcement, and strikes the appropriate balance between
thelegislatureandthecourtindefiningcriminalliability.SeeYates
v.UnitedStates,135S.Ct.1074,1088(2015);UnitedStatesv.Simpson,
319F.3d81,86(2dCir.2002).
The CFAA imposes criminal and civil liability on one who,
among other things, intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access and thereby obtains
information . . . from any department or agency of the United
States. 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(B). Without authorization is not
defined. However, exceeds authorized access means to access a
28

No.142710cr,144396cr

computerwithauthorizationandtousesuchaccesstoobtainoralter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to
obtainoralter.Id.1030(e)(6).
The dispositive question is whether Valle exceeded
authorized access when he used his access to OFM to conduct a
search for Maureen Hartigan with no law enforcement purpose.
Valle concedes that he violated the terms of his employment by
putting his authorized computer access to personal use, but claims
thathedidnotviolatethestatutebecauseheneverusedhisaccess
to obtain any information he was not entitled to obtain. Valles
OpeningBr.8.Inotherwords,Vallearguesthathedidnotexceed
authorized access because he was otherwise authorized to obtain
the database information about Hartigan; his nonlaw enforcement
purpose in running the search is irrelevant. See id. at 9. The
Government contends that Valle exceeded authorized access
because his authorization to access OFM was limited to law
enforcementpurposesandheconductedasearchforHartiganwith
nosuchpurpose.
The critical term authorization is not defined in the
statute,butwehavepreviouslyrecognizedinconstruingtheCFAA
that authorization is a word of common usage, without any
technical or ambiguous meaning. United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d
504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991). The dictionary defines authorization as
permission or power granted by authority. Random House
UnabridgedDictionary139(2001).3
3

Thus,commonusageof

SeealsoBlacksLawDictionary159(10thed.2014)(definingauthorization
as[o]fficialpermissiontodosomething);WebstersThirdInternational
Dictionary146(2002)(definingauthorizationasthestateofbeing
authorized,andauthorizeastoendorse,empower,justify,permitbyoras
ifbysomerecognizedorproperauthority).
29

No.142710cr,144396cr

authorization suggests that one accesses a computer without

authorizationifheaccessesacomputerwithoutpermissiontodoso
atall.See,e.g.,LVRCHoldingsLLCv.Brekka,581F.3d1127,1133(9th
Cir.2009).
Common usage of authorization is less helpful in
determining when one exceeds authorized access because it can
support both Valles and the Governments interpretation. While
authorization could refer, as the Government contends, to the
purposesforwhichoneisauthorizedtoaccessacomputer,itcould
alternativelyrefertotheparticularfilesordatabasesinthecomputer
towhichonesauthorizationextends.Indeed,byitsplaintermsthe
statute is directed to improper access. The contested language is
not exceeds authorization, however such authorization may be
defined,buttheseeminglymorelimitedexceedsauthorizedaccess.
18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2) (emphasis added). Moreover, because
withoutauthorizationmostnaturallyreferstoascenariowherea
user lacks permission to access the computer at all, one sensible
reading of the statute is that exceeds authorized access is
complementary,referringtoascenariowhereauserhaspermission
to access the computer but proceeds to exceed the parameters of
authorizedaccessbyenteringanareaofthecomputertowhichhis
authorization does not extend. As Judge Kozinski recognized in
United States v. Nosal, it is possible to read both prohibitions as
applyingtohackers:Withoutauthorizationwouldapplytooutside
hackers(individualswhohavenoauthorizedaccesstothecomputer
atall)andexceedsauthorizedaccesswouldapplytoinsidehackers
(individuals whose initial access to a computer is authorized but
who access unauthorized information or files). 676 F.3d 854, 858
(9thCir.2012)(enbanc).

30

No.142710cr,144396cr

Over the past fourteen years, six other circuits have wrestled
withthequestionbeforeus.Mostrecently,theNinthCircuitsitting
en banc in Nosal and the Fourth Circuit in WEC Carolina Energy
SolutionsLLCv.Miller,687F.3d199(4thCir.2012),adoptedValles
construction. Before that, the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuitsadoptedtheprosecutionsinterpretation.SeeUnitedStatesv.
John,597F.3d263(5thCir.2010);UnitedStatesv.Rodriguez,628F.3d
1258(11thCir.2010);IntlAirportCtrs.,L.L.C.v.Citrin,440F.3d418
(7th Cir. 2006); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577
(1st Cir. 2001). If this sharp division means anything, it is that the
statute is readily susceptible to different interpretations.4 We
therefore turn to the legislative history and motivating policies for
furtherguidance.
Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 to address computer
crime, which was then principally understood as hacking or
trespassing into computer systems or data. See H.R. Rep. No.
98894,at369192,369597(1984);S.Rep.No.99432,at2480(1986).
The House Committee Report to the original bill detailed the
existence of hackers who have been able to access (trespass into)
both private and public computer systems as a result of the
corresponding proliferation of computer networking which began
duringthe1970s.H.R.Rep.No.98894,at3695;seealsoid.at3696
(noting the recent flurry of electronic trespassing incidents). The
report described one instance of computer crime in which an
individualstoleconfidentialsoftwarebytappingintothecomputer
4

Thedissentclaimsthatwediscover[]ambiguityinthestatutorylanguage
wherethereisnoneandsummarilyconcludesthatexceedsauthorized
accessobviouslyencompassesascenariowhereauserdidnotcomplywith
restrictionson[his]authorizedaccess.DissentingOp.at2526.This
conclusionis,withrespect,notreasonableinlightofthesecases.
31

No.142710cr,144396cr

system of a previous employer from [the] defendants remote

terminal.Id.at369192.
The Senate Committee Report to the 1986 amendments
specifically described exceeds authorized access in terms of
trespassingintocomputersystemsorfiles.Inheighteningthemens
rearequirementforsection1030(a)(2),theCommitteeexplainedthat
it did not want to hold liable those who inadvertently stumble
into someone elses computer file or computer data, which was
particularlytrueinthosecaseswhereanindividualisauthorizedto
sign onto and use a particular computer, but subsequently exceeds
his authorized access by mistakenly entering another computer or
data file that happens to be accessible from the same terminal. S.
Rep. No. 99432, at 2483. Congress was also careful to note that
section 1030 deals with an unauthorized access concept of
computer fraud rather than the mere use of a computer. Thus, the
conductprohibitedisanalogoustothatofbreakingandentering.
H.R.Rep.No.98894,at3706.Consequently,thelegislativehistory
consistentlycharacterizestheeviltoberemediedcomputercrime
as trespass into computer systems or data, and correspondingly
describes authorization in terms of the portion of the computers
datatowhichonesaccessrightsextend.
The Government relies upon the predecessor language to
exceeds authorized access. As originally enacted, section 1030(a)
made it a crime to knowingly access[] a computer without
authorization,orhavingaccessedacomputerwithauthorization,use[]the
opportunitysuchaccessprovidesforpurposestowhichsuchauthorization
does not extend. Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud
andAbuseActof1984,Pub.L.No.98473,2102(a),98Stat.1837,
2190(codifiedasamendedat18U.S.C.1030)(emphasisadded).In
32

No.142710cr,144396cr

1986, Congress deleted the italicized language and replaced it with

exceedsauthorizedaccess.S.Rep.No.99432,at2486.
The Government argues that no substantive change was
intended because the substitution was made to simplify the
language. Id. Valle cites another provision of the Senate
Committee Report, relating to subsection (a)(3), which states that
Congresshadeliminate[d]coverageforauthorizedaccessthataims
at purposes to which such authorization does not extend, and
therebyremove[d]fromthesweepofthestatuteoneofthemurkier
grounds of liability under which a[n] . . . employees access to
computerized data might be legitimate in some circumstances, but
criminalinother(notclearlydistinguishable)circumstances.Id.at
2494(emphasisadded).HearguesthatCongressthereforeintended
to abrogate any purposebased inquiry by substituting the new
exceeds authorized access language. While a number of courts
havefoundthisargumentpersuasive,see,e.g.,Nosal,676F.3dat858
n.5, we have misgivings. It seems more likely that the Committee
wasmerelyexplainingitsremovalofexceedsauthorizedaccessas
a basis for liability under subsection (a)(3), rather than the
substitution of exceeds authorized access in other provisions of
thestatute,includingsubsection(a)(2).
Nevertheless,wedonotthinkthattheappearanceoftheword
purposesinthelegislativehistoryrendersthestatuteclearforthe
simple reason that even when Congress referenced the users
purposes,itspokeintermsoftheparticularcomputerfilesordata
to which the users access rights extended. The Committees
extensive discussion of subsection (a)(3) is instructive. As initially
enacted, that provision made it a crime to knowingly access a
governmentcomputerwithoutauthorizationorexceedthescopeof
33

No.142710cr,144396cr

onesauthorizationandtherebyuseordiscloseinformation.S.Rep.
No. 99432, at 2494. Subsection (a)(3) therefore swe[pt] in all
computerized government information, including documents that
must, under the Freedom of Information Act [(FOIA)], be
disclosedtoanymemberofthepublicuponproperrequest,while
gloss[ing] over the reality that the existence or exact scope of a
government employees authority to access a particular
computerizeddatabaseisnotalwaysfreefromdoubt.Concerned
that government employees would resolve doubts against
disclosure when responding to FOIA requests, the Committee
revised subsection (a)(3) in three ways, including by removing the
purposeslanguage.Id.
Each of these revisions was directed toward the same
problem:anemployeewithauthorizationtoaccesscertaindatabases
enteringotherdatabasestowhichhisauthorizationdidnotextend.
And, in explaining the revisions, the Committee understood
authorization in spatial terms, namely, an employee going beyond
theparametersofhisaccessrights.Seee.g.,id.at2495(decliningto
apply subsection (a)(3) to access by a Federal employee of
computersofthatemployeesownagency,andexplainingthatthe
revised rule would provide prosecutors a clear, workable rule,
regardlessoftheintricaciesofaparticularagencyscomputeraccess
policies: absent a fraudulent motive, an employee could not be
prosecuted for simple trespass into one of his agencys own
computers)(emphasisadded).Thisunderstandingofauthorization
is, as we have previously explained, consistent with Congresss
discussion of the concept elsewhere. It is likewise consistent with
thestatutesprincipalpurposeofaddressingtheproblemofhacking,
i.e.,trespassintocomputersystemsordata.

34

No.142710cr,144396cr

At the end of the day, we find support in the legislative

history for both Valles and the Governments construction of the
statute. But because our review involves a criminal statute, some
supportisnotenough.Where,ashere,ordinarytoolsoflegislative
construction fail to establish that the Governments position is
unambiguously correct, we are required by the rule of lenity to
adopt the interpretation that favors the defendant. Santos, 553 U.S.
at514;UnitedStatesv.Granderson,511U.S.39,54(1994).Wedonot
thinkittoomuchtoaskthatCongressdefinecriminalconductwith
precisionandclarity.AsChiefJusticeMarshallexplained:
Therulethatpenallawsaretobeconstruedstrictly,isperhapsnot
much less old than construction itself. It is founded . . . on the
plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative,notinthejudicialdepartment.Itisthelegislature,not
theCourt,whichistodefineacrime,andordainitspunishment.

United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). We

decline to adopt the prosecutions construction, which would
criminalizetheconductofmillionsofordinarycomputerusers and
placeusinthepositionofalegislature.
The rolethattheruleoflenityplayswheredoubtremains as
tothereachofacriminalstatutewasdiscussedinNosal,wherethe
Ninth Circuit sitting en banc focused sharply on the same
compellingconcernsthatValleandamiciraiseonthisappeal:
[T]he governments proposed interpretation of the CFAA allows
private parties to manipulate their computeruse and personnel
policiessoastoturntheserelationshipsintoones policedbythe
criminal law. Significant notice problems arise if we allow
criminalliabilitytoturnonthevagariesofprivatepoliciesthatare
lengthy,opaque,subjecttochangeandseldomread.Considerthe
typical corporate policy that computers can be used only for

35

No.142710cr,144396cr

business purposes. What exactly is a nonbusiness purpose? If

you use the computer to check the weather report for a business
trip? For the company softball game? For your vacation to
Hawaii? And if minor personal uses are tolerated, how can an
employeebeonnoticeofwhatconstitutesaviolationsufficientto
triggercriminalliability?

676F.3dat860.TheFourthCircuit,inMiller,agreedwiththeNinth
Circuitandechoedthesameconcerns:
The deficiency of a rule that revokes authorization when an
employeeuseshisaccessforapurposecontrarytotheemployers
interestsisapparent:Sucharulewouldmeanthatanyemployee
whocheckedthelatestFacebookpostingorsportingeventscores
incontraventionofhisemployersusepolicywouldbesubjectto
the instantaneous cessation of his agency and, as a result, would
be left without any authorization to access his employers
computersystems....[W]edonotthinkCongressintended...
theimpositionofcriminalpenaltiesforsuchafrolic.

687F.3dat206.
Weagreewiththe NinthandFourthCircuitsthatcourtsthat
haveadoptedthebroaderconstructionlookedonlyattheculpable
behavior of the defendants before them, and failed to consider the
effectonmillionsofordinarycitizenscausedbythestatutesunitary
definitionofexceedsauthorizedaccess.Nosal,676F.3dat863;see
also Miller, 687 F.3d at 206 ([W]e believe that th[is] theory has far
reachingeffectsunintendedbyCongress.).Thisistheveryconcern
attheheartoftheruleoflenity.
Forexample,inUnitedStatesv.Kozminski,487U.S.931(1988),
the Supreme Court refused to adopt the Governments broad
interpretation of a statute criminalizing involuntary servitude. The
Governmentarguedthatthestatuteshouldcriminalizecompulsion

36

No.142710cr,144396cr

[towork]throughpsychologicalcoercionaswellasalmostanyother
type of speech or conduct intentionally employed to persuade a
reluctant person to work. Id. at 949. The Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation because it would criminalize a broad range of
daytodayactivity,suchasaparentwhocoercedanadultsonor
daughter into working in the family business by threatening
withdrawal of affection. Id. The Court warned that the broader
statutory interpretation would delegate to prosecutors and juries
the inherently legislative task of determining what type of . . .
activitiesaresomorallyreprehensiblethattheyshouldbepunished
ascrimesandwouldsubjectindividualstotheriskofarbitraryor
discriminatoryprosecutionandconviction.Id.
The Government does not reply substantively to Valles
concerns about the rule of lenity or about the risk of criminalizing
ordinary behavior inherent in its broad construction. It merely
states that those concerns must be raised in the first instance by
individuals actually affected by the provision at issue, and that
[t]hose cases will present factspecific questions not relevant here,
including whether the applicable authorization was clearly defined
and whether the abuse of computer access was intentional. Govt
Oppn Br. 15. We disagree. The Government asks that we affirm
Vallesconviction,whichrequiresustoacceptitsconstructionofthe
statute. But our construction of the statute impacts many more
people than Valle. It will not only affect those who improperly
access information from a government computer a result some
readersmightfindpalatablebutalsothosewhoimproperlyaccess
any protected computer and thereby obtain information. 18
U.S.C. 1030(a)(2)(C). As the Ninth Circuit aptly put it in Nosal,
[b]ecauseprotectedcomputerisdefinedasacomputeraffectedby

37

No.142710cr,144396cr

or involved in interstate commerce effectively all computers with

Internet access the governments interpretation of exceeds
authorized access makes every violation of a private computer use
policy a federal crime. 676 F.3d at 859 (citing 18 U.S.C.
1030(e)(2)(B)).
Whatever the apparent merits of imposing criminal liability
may seem to be in this case, we must construe the statute knowing
that our interpretation of exceeds authorized access will govern
manyothersituations.See18U.S.C.1030(e)(6).Itispreciselyfor
this reason that the rule of lenity requires that Congress, not the
courtsortheprosecutors,mustdecidewhetherconductiscriminal.
We, on the other hand, are obligated to construe criminal statutes
narrowly so that Congress will not unintentionally turn ordinary
citizens into criminals. Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863. While the
Government might promise that it would not prosecute an
individual for checking Facebook at work, we are not at liberty to
takeprosecutorsattheirwordinsuchmatters.Acourtshouldnot
uphold a highly problematic interpretation of a statute merely
becausetheGovernmentpromisestouseitresponsibly.SeeUnited
Statesv.Stevens,559U.S.460,480(2010).
CONCLUSION
Forthesereasons,weAFFIRMthejudgmentofacquittalasto
the count of conspiracy to kidnap, and REVERSE the judgment of
conviction as to the count of improperly accessing a computer in
violationoftheCFAA.

38

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE

STRAUB,CircuitJudge,dissenting:

allottedtojuriesinourcriminaljusticesystem.Itisimportanttotherulewhich

requiresjudgestoapplythelawswrittenbythepeoplesCongress,particularly

topoliceconductwhichutilizesofficialdatabasestoaccessinformationabout

citizenswheresuchisnotpartofofficialaction.Becausethemajorityopinion

seekstoenshrinealltheconductinthiscaseinanacademicprotectivehalo,I

finditnecessarytooffertherealisticcontextofthiscontroversy.

Thiscaseisimportant.Itisimportanttotherolewehavetraditionally

Thisisnotacaseaboutgovernmentalintrusionononespersonal

10

inclinationsandfantasiesnorisitacaseaboutgovernmentalpunishmentof

11

onesthoughts.Itis,instead,ajurysdeterminationofguiltforaconspiracy

12

basedondefinitiveconduct.Thisisnotacaseofconfused,accidental,or

13

otherwiseinappropriateuseofalawenforcementdatabase.Itis,instead,a

14

policeofficersuseoftheofficialdatabasetoobtain,outsidetheboundariesofhis

15

officialduties,dataaboutawomanwhomheknew.

16

17

ofthefactsandapplicablelaw.

Havingsonotedthecontextofthisappeal,Inowproceedtopresentation

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE

1
2

***
DefendantAppellant/DefendantAppelleeGilbertoVallewasconvictedby

ajuryofconspiracytokidnap(CountI)andofimproperlyaccessingacomputer

inviolationoftheComputerFraudandAbuseAct(CFAA)(CountII).Valle

movedforajudgmentofacquittalonbothcounts.AstoCountI,theDistrict

Court(PaulG.Gardephe,Judge)grantedVallesmotion,findingthatthe

evidenceattrialwasinsufficienttosupportthejurysverdict,andentereda

judgmentofacquittal.AstoCountII,theDistrictCourtdeniedVallesmotion,

rejectingVallesargumentthattheCFAAdidnotproscribehisconduct,and

10
11

enteredajudgmentofconviction.
ThemajorityaffirmsthejudgmentofacquittalinrespectofCountIand

12

reversesthejudgmentofconvictioninrespectofCountII.Iwouldinstead

13

vacatetheDistrictCourtsjudgmentofacquittalinrespectofCountI,affirmthe

14

DistrictCourtsjudgmentofconvictioninrespectofCountII,andremandfor

15

furtherproceedings.Therefore,Irespectfullydissent.

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

I.

ConspiracytoKidnap(CountI)

TheSixthAmendmentrighttotrialbyjuryisafundamentalreservation

ofpowerinourconstitutionalstructure,Blakelyv.Washington,542U.S.296,306

(2004),andreflectsourdeepcommitment...totherightofjurytrialinserious

criminalcasesasadefenseagainstarbitrarylawenforcement,Duncanv.

Louisiana,391U.S.145,156(1968).Justassuffrageensuresthepeoplesultimate

controlinthelegislativeandexecutivebranches,jurytrialismeanttoensure

theircontrolinthejudiciary.Blakely,542U.S.at306;seealsoUnitedStatesv.

Bailey,444U.S.394,435(1980)(Blackmun,J.,dissenting)(Thejuryisthe

10

conscienceofsocietyanditsroleinacriminalprosecutionisparticularly

11

important.).Inthisstrictdivisionofauthoritybetweenjudgeandjury,

12

Blakely,542U.S.at313,itisthesoleresponsibilityofthejurytoweighevidence

13

andreachtheultimateconclusionofguiltorinnocence,seeUnitedStatesv.

14

Gaudin,515U.S.506,514(1995);Jacksonv.Virginia,443U.S.307,319(1979).

15

Topreservethejurysbroadfactfindingdiscretion,acourtcanentera

16

judgmentofacquittalonlyiftheevidenceofguiltisnonexistentorsomeager

17

thatnoreasonablejurycouldfindguiltbeyondareasonabledoubt.United
3

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

Statesv.Espaillet,380F.3d713,718(2dCir.2004)(internalquotationmarks

omitted).Inmakingthisdetermination,acourtmustdefertothejurys

resolutionofevidentiaryconflicts.Jackson,443U.S.at319;seealsoUnitedStatesv.

Hamilton,334F.3d170,179(2dCir.)([W]emustdefertothejurysresolutionof

theweightoftheevidenceandthecredibilityofthewitnesses,andtothejurys

choiceofthecompetinginferencesthatcanbedrawnfromtheevidence.

(internalquotationmarks,citations,andbracketsomitted)),cert.denied,540U.S.

985(2003).Wethereforeviewtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothe

governmentanddrawallreasonableinferencesinitsfavor.Jackson,443U.S.

10

at319;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Kozeny,667F.3d122,139(2dCir.2011)(notingthe

11

heavyburdenthatadefendantfaceswhenseekingtooverturnajurys

12

verdict),cert.denied,133S.Ct.1794(2013).

13

Themajorityblatantlydisregardstheseconstraintsonacourtsreviewofa

14

jurysverdictandaccordstoitselfthepowertoidentifyanddiscern[][t]he

15

linebetweenfantasyandcriminalintent.Maj.Op.at4.Rather,itwas,and

16

remains,forthejurytodeterminethefactualquestionofwhetherVallehad

17

criminalintent.ThejuryconsideredandrejectedVallesdefensethathewas
4

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

simplypretendingtocommitacrime.Itinsteadfound,beyondareasonable

doubt,thatValleactuallyandgenuinelyconspiredtokidnapsomeone.The

majorityseloquentproseontheimportanceofprotectingthoughtsfrom

criminalpunishment,seeid.at45perhapsbettersuitedforanopinioneditorial

thanajudicialopinionisthusirrelevant,becausethejurydidnotconvictValle

forfantasizing.Wearelefttodetermineonlywhethertheevidence,viewedin

thelightmostfavorabletothegovernment,wassufficientforthejurytoreachits

verdict.

Inreachingitsconclusion,themajoritypayslipservicetothestandardwe

10

applyinevaluatingthesufficiencyoftheevidence,butthenusurpsthejurys

11

rolebyweighingcompetinginferencesandexplanationsoftheevidencerather

12

thanviewingitinthegovernmentsfavor.Suchanundertakingisplainly

13

inappropriateinthiscontext.

14

Perhapsmosttellingly,themajorityimprudentlystructuresitsanalysisto

15

supportitspredeterminedoutcomebyviewingtheevidenceinitsparts,rather

16

thanconsideringthegovernmentscaseinitstotality,UnitedStatesv.Hawkins,

17

547F.3d66,70(2dCir.2008)(internalquotationmarksandbracketsomitted):it
5

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

firstconcludesthatVallesonlinecommunicationsviewedinisolationare

indistinguishablefromthepurportedfantasycommunications,seeMaj.Op.

at14,andthenproceedstorejecttheremainingevidence(ofVallesovertactsin

furtheranceoftheconspiracy)asinsufficientonitsowntosupportthe

conviction,seeid.at2527.Whenconsideredproperlywiththedeferencethat

wemustapply,however,thejurysguiltyverdictonthecountofconspiracyto

kidnapwassufficientlysupportedbytheevidencepresentedattrial.

8
9

A.

TheEvidenceSupportingtheJurysVerdict,ViewedintheLight
MostFavorabletotheGovernment

10

TodecidethatVallewasguiltyofconspiracytokidnap,allthatthejury

11

hadtofindwassufficientevidenceinrespectofoneallegedcoconspiratorand

12

oneintendedvictim.SeeKozeny,667F.3dat13132;UnitedStatesv.Thomas,54

13

F.3d73,81(2dCir.1995).Theevidenceattrialprovidedasufficientbasisforthe

14

jurytoconcludethatVallemadeanagreementwithDaleBollinger,amanhemet

15

ondarkfetishnet.com,tokidnapandmurderKimberlySauer,oneofValles

16

friendsfromcollege.

17
18

DuringtheearliestcommunicationinevidencebetweenValleand
Bollinger,VallesoughtBollingersassistancekidnappingandcannibalizing
6

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

women,notingBollingersclaimedexperience,andsharedpictureswith

Bollingerofpotentialvictims.BollingeracceptedVallesoffer,statingthat,

althoughhelivedinEngland,itwouldbeeasyforhimtotraveltoValleandhelp

him.

ThetwofocusedonKimberlySauerastheirpreferredtarget.Valletold

Bollingerthatshewouldbetheeasiesttoabduct.Appxat81.Heexplained

that,becauseheknewherpersonally,hecouldjustshowupatherhome

unannouncedwithoutalert[ing]herinordertoknockherout...and

kidnapher.Id.at82.VallesuggestedaLaborDaycookout,withSaueras

10

themaincourse.Id.at86.Bollingerrepliedthathewaslookingforwardtoit,

11

id.,andwouldsearchforaffordableplanetickets.

12

Inmultipleconversationsoverthecourseofafewweeks,Valleand

13

BollingercontinueddiscussingthedetailsofabductingandmurderingSauer.

14

Theyconsideredlogisticalandpracticalconcerns.Theyplannedtouse

15

chloroformtoincapacitateher,whichValleofferedtomakehimself.They

16

discussedstalkingSauerintheevening,id.at82,notingthatshelivedalone,in

17

asmallhouse,farfromfamilythatmightnoticeherabsence.Valleofferedtodo
7

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

adryrun,inwhichhewouldshowuprandomlyonedayjustbeinginthe

neighborhood.Id.at93.TheyalsodecidedtocoverthetrunkofVallescarin

plasticbagsanduseglovesandanewpairofreallycheap,commontrainers

thatshouldbedestroyedaftertheabduction,probablybyburning.Id.at95.

Theyagreedthatwhenbuyingmaterialstheyshouldusecash.

TheyalsodevelopedtheirplanstocookandeatSauer.ValleandBollinger

debatedthemeritsofroastingSaueraliveinanovenoroverarotisserie.They

furtherdiscussedhowsheshouldbegaggedandbutchered.Vallepromisedto

getabrandnewsetofknives,andBollingeradvisedthattheywouldneeda

10
11

cleaver,notasaw.Id.at88.
AstheyplottedSauersabduction,BollingerandValleexpressed

12

excitementabouttheirplan.VallesharedhishappinessthatBollingerwason

13

boardandsaidthathelovedimaginingSauerasleeprightnownothavingthe

14

slightestclueofwhatwehaveplanned.Id.at90.WhenBollingerrepliedthat

15

hewaslookingforwardtoitsomuch,Vallesaidthathecouldnotwaittosee

16

thelookonherfacewhenshewakesupnakedandtiedup.Id.at96.Valle

17

notedthatitwasgoodthattheywerebrainstorm[ing],because
8

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

everything[]needstobeperfect.Id.at93.Theywouldtalkingreatdetail

abouteverystep,suggestedValle,beginningwiththeraginherface.Id.

BollingerandValleconfirmedtoeachothertheirgenuineintentionto

followthroughontheirplan.Atonepoint,BollingeraskedValle,YouWILLgo

throughwiththis?Ivebeenletdownbefore.Thatswhyi[sic]tendtowork

alone.Id.at91.Valleimmediatelyrepliedyes,addingthatSauerwould

neverseeitcomingandthathewasanxioustokidnapandeather.Id.Valle

laterstatedthatkidnappingSauerandgettingawaywithitwasanabsolute

truth.Id.at93.

10

Valletookwhatcouldbeviewedreasonablyasconcretestepstofurther

11

hisplanwithBollinger.HesentBollingerablueprintoftheirplot,id.at100,

12

entitledAbductingandCookingKimberly,id.at267,whichwasconsistent

13

withwhatValleandBollingerhaddiscusseduptothatpoint.Vallesearchedthe

14

internetforSauersname,howtokidnapsomeone,id.at383,howtoabducta

15

girl,id.at384,[g]oodmethodstokidnapsomeone,id.,howtoknock

16

someoneunconscious,id.at385,howtochloroformagirl,id.,howtotie

17

someoneup,id.at396,mostsecurebondage,id.,andhowtohogtieagirl,
9

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

id.at388.AndValleplannedatrip,withhiswifeandyoungchild,toMaryland,

whereSauerlived.VallecontactedSauerbeforethetrip,andtheyplanneda

lunchwhileheandhisfamilywereinMaryland.

BeforeleavingforMaryland,VallehadfurtherdiscussionswithBollinger.

ValleexplainedthathislunchwithSauerwouldstimulateideasforhowtocook

her,remarkingthatwhenhesawher,hismouthwouldbewatering.Id.at110.

ThetwoalsodiscussedthelunchasawaytoconfirmtheirchoiceofSaueras

theirpreferredtarget.WhenVallehadamomentofindecisionaboutwhetherto

targetdifferentwomeninsteadofSauer,Bollingeradvisedthatthey[k]eepthe

10

othersassparesandseehowthelunchwithSauergoes.Id.at111.Bollinger

11

furtherwishedVallegoodluck,id.at116,cautionedhimtoactnormally

12

duringthelunchbecausehewouldbeasuspectwhenSauergoesmissing,

13

id.at102andaskedhimtoreportwhathelearned.

14

OnthetriptoMaryland,ValletextmessagedSauerthathehaddriven

15

pastherplaceofwork.Sauerfoundthetextmessagestrangeanddoubtedthat

16

herotherfriendsknewwheresheworked.Shortlyafterhavinglunchwith

10

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

Sauer,VallewrotetoBollingerthatSauerlookedabsolutelymouthwatering.

Id.at117.

B.

TheCrimeofConspiracy

Tobecomplete,aconspiracysimplyrequires(i)anagreementaboutthe

objectoftheconspiracy,(ii)specificintenttoachievethatobject,and(iii)anovert

actinfurtheranceoftheagreement.UnitedStatesv.Wallace,85F.3d1063,1068

(2dCir.1996).Adefendantisguiltyofconspiracysolongasheagreedonthe

essentialnatureoftheplan,whichneednotaccompanyafullyformedplotto

constituteanillegalconspiracy.UnitedStatesv.Eppolito,543F.3d25,47(2dCir.

10

2008)(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealsoUnitedStatesv.Rosa,17F.3d

11

1531,154344(2dCir.),cert.denied,513U.S.879(1994).

12

Theevidenceattrial,viewedinthelightmostfavorabletothe

13

government,supportedthejurysconclusionthatValleandanotheragreedto

14

commitakidnapping,intendedatthetimetodoso,andperformedatleastone

15

overtactinfurtheranceoftheiragreement,suchasVallescreationofthe

16

blueprintormeetingSauerinMaryland.Thejurycouldreachtheconclusion

17

thataconspiracywasformedeventhough,asithappened,ValleandBollinger
11

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

ultimatelymadenoattempttokidnapSaueronLaborDay.Aconspiratorial

agreementisadistinctcrimethatispunishableregardlessofwhethertheplanis

laterabandoned.SeeUnitedStatesv.JimenezRecio,537U.S.270,275(2003)

(explainingthataconspiracyposesathreattothepublicoverandabovethe

threatofthecommissionoftherelevantsubstantivecrime(internalquotation

marksomitted)).

C.

TheJurysReasonableInferences

InspiteofValleandBollingersexpressagreementintheirwritten

communicationstokidnapSauer,themajorityconcludesthatthejuryacted

10

irrationallywhenitfoundValleguiltyofconspiracytokidnap.Themajority

11

reasonsthat,becauseVallefantasizedaboutcannibalismwithothersoverthe

12

internet,itwasirrationaltobelievethatValleandBollingermeantwhattheysaid

13

toeachother.SeeMaj.Op.at25.Inmyview,however,themajorityfailsto

14

respectthereasonableinferencesthatthejurycouldhavemadeindetermining

15

thatVallesplotwithBollingerunlikehisotheronlinecommunicationswas

16

real.

12

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

InstarkcontrasttoanyofVallesotheronlinecommunications,Valletook

actionsintherealworldthatthejurycouldconcludeweredonetoeffectuatehis

plotwithBollinger.VallevisitedSauerinMaryland,drovepastherworkplace,

andhadlunchwithheralunchthatheandBollingerdiscussedasawayto

furthertheirplans.1Butthiswashardly,asthemajoritysuggests,theonly

meaningfuldifference,id.,betweentheplotconcerningSauerandthesocalled

fantasychats.OnlyinVallesconversationwithBollinger,forexample,didthe

juryhaveevidenceofablueprintthatVallemadeoftheplot.

ThejurycouldalsohavefoundthatthenatureofVallesconversations

10

withBollingerweredistinctintenorandtone.ThedetailofVallesplanswith

11

Bollingerwasunparalleledinhiscommunicationswithothers.Andthough

12

Vallemadeallusionstobeingseriousincertainofthesupposedfantasychats,

Asnotedearlier,ValleandBollingerdiscussedthelunchoverthecourseofmultiple
conversationsandexpresslyreferredtoitasawaytoconfirmtheirchoiceofSauerandinspire
ideasforcannibalizingher.Seesupraat1011.Inlightofthesediscussions,itisnotclearhow
themajoritycancontendthatValleandBollingerscommunicationsleadinguptoand
followingthelunchmakeitimpossibletoconcludethatthelunchwasinfurtheranceoftheir
plot.Maj.Op.at26.

13

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

atnopointdidhestatesounequivocally,ashedidtoBollinger,thatitwasan

absolutetruththatheandBollingerwouldkidnapSauer.Appxat93.

OtherevidencefurthersupportedthejurysconclusionthatVallesplot

withBollingerwasmorethanmerefantasy.Vallesinternetsearchesbetween

thedateofhisfirstconversationwithBollingerandhislunchwithSauerwere

particularlyrelevanttohisplanwithBollinger.Themajorityconcedesthat

Vallesinternetsearchescouldhaveprovidedrelevantproofofintent,but

neverthelessdismissesthembecause,initsview,Vallessearchesoccurredina

contextofdeepfantasy.Maj.Op.at21.Thisflawedanalysiscommitsthe

10

fallacyofpetitioprincipii(circularreasoning)becausewhatistobeprovedis

11

implicitlypresumedastrueinthepremise.BlacksLawDictionary1329(10th

12

ed.2014);seealsoAdamsv.Gould,Inc.,687F.2d27,30(3dCir.1982)(explaining

13

thatthefallacyofpetitioprincipiioccurswhenoneassum[es]the

14

conclusion),cert.denied,460U.S.1085(1983);Nicov.CommrofInternalRevenue,

15

565F.2d1234,1238(2dCir.1977)(thiscourtbyallmeanseschewspetitio

16

principii).ThemajorityconcludesthatVallewasengagedinfantasybasedon

17

itsreadingofhiswrittencommunicationsandthenfindshisinternetsearches
14

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

consistentwiththispreordainedconclusion.Thejury,however,mayhave

consideredVallesinternetsearchesindecidingthatveryissuewhetherValle

wasengagedonlyinfantasy.

ThejurycouldhavealsoconsideredVallespostarreststatementtoa

governmentagentthatBollingerwasmoreseriousabouttheirdiscussionsthan

otherindividualswithwhomVallecommunicated.TrialTr.at1031.

Themajorityopiniontakespainstoconjureinnocentexplanationsforthis

evidence.PerhapsValleslunchwithSauerwasjustanormalsocialinteraction.

SeeMaj.Op.at2426.MaybeVallewithheldfromBollingerSauersaddress

10

becausehedidnotintendtoactuallyharmher.Seeid.at2425.PossiblyValle

11

conductedinternetsearchesonhowtokidnapsomeonesimplybecausehehada

12

generalinterestincrimeratherthancriminalintent.2Seeid.at21.Theseare

13

perspectivesontheevidencethatthejuryconceivablycouldhavefound

14

persuasivebutdidnot.Itwasthejuryssoleprerogativetodecidehowto

2Unlikethemajority,thejurydidnotdeterminethatVallewasmerelyinterestedincommitting

actsofsexualizedviolenceagainstwomen,Maj.Op.at21;itconcludedbeyondareasonable
doubtthatValleactuallyconspiredtocommitakidnapping.

15

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

interprettheevidencepresented,andthemajoritysnotionsofhowtheevidence

shouldinsteadhavebeeninterpretedareincompatiblewithourobligationto

respectthejurysfactfindingrolebyviewingtheevidenceinthelightmost

favorabletothegovernmentanddrawingallreasonableinferencesinitsfavor.

SeeUnitedStatesv.Aguiar,737F.3d251,265(2dCir.2013)(Weagreethatmuch

oftheevidencecouldbereadtohaveaninnocentmeaning,butwhenthe

evidenceraisestwopermissibleinferencesthenwemustresolvesuchconflictsin

favoroftheprosecution.),cert.denied,135S.Ct.400(2014);UnitedStatesv.

Friedman,998F.2d53,56(2dCir.1993)(explainingthat[i]tisnotfor[thecourt]

10

toweigh...competinginferencesandexplanationstoascertainwhich

11

explanation[ofdefendantsconduct]ismorelikely);seealso,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.

12

Pavulak,700F.3d651,670(3dCir.2012)(rejectingdefendantscontentionthathis

13

requeststoseeachildnakedwerefacetiousbanterandfantasies,becauseit

14

wasnotforthecourttoweightheevidence),cert.denied,133S.Ct.2047(2013);

15

UnitedStatesv.Dwinells,508F.3d63,74(1stCir.2007)(acknowledgingthat

16

defendantsresponsetochargesofattemptedenticementofaminorthathe

17

wasmerelyroleplayingandthoughtthatthecommunicationsweremutually
16

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

entertainedfantasieswasplausibleandbuttressedby[his]persistent

dodgingofsuggestionsthatheandhiscorrespondentsmeet,butconcluding

thatthegovernmentstheoryofthecase...alsowasplausible,andthat

[w]hentherecordisfairlysusceptibletotwocompetingscenarios,thechoice

betweenthosescenariosordinarilyisforthejury),cert.denied,554U.S.922

(2008).

Foreachassessmentoftheevidencemadebythemajorityincontravention

ofthejurysfindingofguilt,thereisacontrarylightthroughwhichtheevidence

canbeviewedinfact,mustbeviewedthatsupportsthejurysconclusion.

10

Themajoritynotes,forinstance,thatinhisconversationswithBollinger,

11

Valleliedaboutcertainseeminglyimportantfacts(suchaswherehelived,

12

whetherheknewSauersaddress,andwhetherheownedasecludedmountain

13

house).SeeMaj.Op.at2325.ThemajoritysimilarlypointsoutthatValles

14

blueprintofSauersabductionlistedinaccuratelymuchofSauersidentifying

15

information.Seeid.at23.ButVallesmisstatementshardlydemonstratealackof

16

intent.Forinstance,thejurycouldhaverationallyinferredfromtheevidence

17

that,whiletheplanwasstilldeveloping,VallemisledBollingerbecausehedid
17

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

notfullytrusthim.VallesblueprintobscuresinformationaboutSauerthat

couldbeusedtofindhereasily,suchasherlastname,butotherinformationin

thedocumentis,bycontrast,accurate(e.g.,Sauerspicture,maritalstatus,lackof

tattoos).Bollinger,infact,expresslyassumedthatmistrustwasVallesreason

fornotsharingcertaininformation;whenValleclaimednottoknowSauers

address,Bollingerremarked,notlikeIllgetthereadayearly!Appxat101.

AndVallesliesaboutwhathepossessedtofacilitatethecrimesuchasa

secludedmountainhousewereinresponsetoBollingersconcernsaboutthe

planseffectiveness;thejurycouldhavereasonedthatVallefibbedtoensure

10

Bollingersinterest.Vallewouldnotbethefirstdefendanttomisleada

11

coconspirator,andhismisstatementsdonotnegatethejurysverdict.E.g.,

12

UnitedStatesv.Gersh,328F.2d460,462(2dCir.)(statingthattherewasnolessa

13

meetingofthemindsbecausecoconspiratorsdecidedtodeceiveeachother),

14

cert.denied,377U.S.992(1964);cf.UnitedStatesv.Farley,607F.3d1294,1335(11th

15

Cir.)(rejectingdefendantsassertionthathislackofintentwasdemonstratedby

16

liestohiscoconspiratoraboutdetailsintheirplottosexuallyabuseaminor),cert.

17

denied,562U.S.945(2010).
18

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

ThemajoritydiscountsVallesinternetsearchesasdemonstratingmerely

aninterestincriminalactivity.SeeMaj.Op.at21.Butthejurycouldcertainly

reasonablydeducethatVallesinquiriesintohowtoincapacitate,bind,and

kidnapwomenallconductedcontemporaneouslywithhisconversationswith

BollingeraboutabductingSauerprovidedastrongindicationofcriminal

intent.

ThemajoritylikewisesupposesthattheimprobabilityofValleand

Bollingersplotsuggeststhatitwasnomorethanfantasy.ValleandBollinger

metonasexualfetishwebsite,knewalmostnothingabouteachother,barely

10

discussedthelogisticsofBollingertravelingthousandsofmilestoassistValle,

11

developedablueprintthatwasnomoredetailedthan...VallesInternet

12

chats,id.at25,andlettheirtargetdateforSauersabductionpasswithout

13

comment.YetValleandBollingerexplicitlystatedthattheirplanswere

14

incompleteandneededmorework.WhenVallesentBollingertheblueprint,

15

infact,heacknowledgedthatobviouslyalothastobeaddedbecausethey

16

wereinthebeginningstages.Appxat100.Andthroughouttheirdiscussions

17

ofSauer,ValleandBollingercontemplatedadditionaloralternativetargets.The
19

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

evidencesupportstheinferencethatValleandBollingeragreedonabasic

frameworkandsetanaspirationaldatebutthenfocusedonothertargetsor

plansthattheylaterfoundmoreappealing.

ThemajorityalsosuggeststhatthejurylackedevidenceofBollingers

criminalintent.SeeMaj.Op.at27.Tothecontrary,theonlyevidenceattrialas

toBollingerwashiswrittenconversationswithValle,inwhichheunequivocally

establishedintentbyexpresslyagreeingtohelpVallekidnapSauer.The

majoritysanalysisastowhythejuryshouldhavedisbelievedVallesintentis

irrelevanttothequestionofBollingersintent.Whereasthemajoritypointsto

10

VallesotheronlineconversationstocontendthathisstatementstoBollinger

11

werefeigned,nosuchevidenceexistedastoBollinger.

12

D.

TheJurysVerdictWasSufficientlySupportedbytheEvidence

13

Asjudgesreviewingthesufficiencyoftheevidenceinacriminaltrial,

14

giventhegraveimportanceoftheevent,itcanbetemptingtoviewtheevidence

15

inthelightmostconvincingtous,todiscountplausiblefactualinferencesthat

16

wefindunpersuasive,andtoconcludethatifwedonotbelievethattheevidence

17

provedguiltbeyondareasonabledoubt,thennorationaljurorcouldhaveso
20

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

found.That,however,issimplynotthestandardtowhichwearebound,see

Jackson,443U.S.at31819;UnitedStatesv.Josephberg,562F.3d478,488(2dCir.)

(Theweightoftheevidenceisamatterforargumenttothejury,notaground

forreversalonappeal.(internalquotationmarksomitted)),cert.denied,558U.S.

965(2009),andwemustbediligentnottooverreachintothejurysdomain,cf.

UnitedStatesv.Butler,297U.S.1,79(1936)(Stone,J.,dissenting)([T]heonly

checkuponourownexerciseofpowerisourownsenseofselfrestraint.).Our

deferencetothejurysfindingsisespeciallyimportantinaconspiracycase,

becauseaconspiracybyitsverynatureisasecretiveoperation,anditisarare

10

casewhereallaspectsofaconspiracycanbelaidbareincourtwiththeprecision

11

ofasurgeonsscalpel.UnitedStatesv.Santos,541F.3d63,70(2dCir.2008)

12

(internalquotationmarksomitted),cert.denied,555U.S.1122(2009).

13

Here,Ifearthemajoritytreadsbeyondthestrictlimitationsofourreview

14

byimproperlyweighingcompetinginferencesandexplanationsofthe

15

evidenceasifdecidingamotionforanewtrialinsteadofreviewinga

16

judgmentofacquittalratherthanviewingit,aswemust,initstotality,

17

Hawkins,547F.3dat70(internalquotationmarks),andinthegovernments
21

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

favor,seeTibbsv.Florida,457U.S.31,45(1982)(recognizinglowerlimitonan

appellatecourtsdefinitionofevidentiarysufficiencycomparedtoevidentiary

weight);seealso,e.g.,UnitedStatesv.Autuori,212F.3d105,120(2dCir.2000)

(affirminggrantofmotionfornewtrialwhilereversingjudgmentofacquittal).

AllthatwasrequiredtofindValleguiltyofconspiracywasproofofone

agreementwithonecoconspiratortokidnaponetarget,aswellasoneovertact.

SeeWallace,85F.3dat1068.Evenifthegovernmentsevidencewasinsufficient

inrespectofeachoftheotherfourallegedkidnappingconspiracies,seeMaj.Op.

at67,VallesconversationswithBollingeraboutkidnappingandcannibalizing

10

Sauer,togetherwithVallesovertacts,suchashistriptoMaryland,wereenough

11

forthejurytorationallyfindthatVallecommittedthecrimeofconspiracyto

12

kidnap,seeUnitedStatesv.Berger,224F.3d107,113(2dCir.2000)([T]he

13

governmentneed[]only[]proveagreementononeoftheobjectiveschargedin

14

theindictmentinordertoestablishthataconspiracyexisted.).

15

Ofcourse,ajurycanneverdeterminewithcompletecertaintywhata

16

criminaldefendantwasthinkingataparticularmoment.Butherethejuryhad

17

sufficientevidencetoconclude,beyondareasonabledoubt,thatValleand
22

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

Bollingermeantexactlywhattheysaidtoeachother.SeeUnitedStatesv.Rowe,56

F.2d747,749(2dCir.)(L.Hand,J.)(Ajuryalonecouldsaywhetherinsucha

settingtheheareroughttohaveunderstoodthattheutteranceswerenottobe

takenattheirface....),cert.denied,286U.S.554(1932).ValleandBollinger

targetedSauerbecauseshewouldbeeasytokidnap,spenthoursplottingher

abduction,andrepeatedlystatedthattheywereseriousandexcitedabout

theirplan.TheirwordswerecorroboratedbyVallestriptoMaryland,

contemporaneousinternetsearches,blueprintforabductingandcookingSauer,

andpostarrestassertionthatBollingerwasmoreseriousthanotherswith

10

whomVallecommunicated.3Thejurycouldreasonablydeducethatthetenorof

11

VallesconversationswithBollinger,togetherwithhisrealworldactions,proved

12

beyondareasonabledoubtthattheplottokidnapSauerwasnofantasy.We

13

cannotsecondguessthejurysrationalconclusion.SeeJackson,443U.S.at319;

14

UnitedStatesv.AlliedStevedoringCorp.,241F.2d925,930(2dCir.)(L.Hand,J.)

3Thisevidence,viewedinthelightmostfavorabletothegovernmentandinitstotality,

UnitedStatesv.Florez,447F.3d145,154(2dCir.),cert.denied,549U.S.1040(2006),isnotmerely
someincriminatingevidence,Maj.Op.at26,whateverthatmaymean.

23

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

(Whatweightthejuryshouldgiveto[the]evidencewasforthem,andthem

alone,providedthatitsatisfiedtheirmindsbeyondanyfairdoubt.),cert.denied,

353U.S.984(1957).

IwouldthusvacatetheDistrictCourtsjudgmentofacquittalinrespectof

CountIandremandfortheDistrictCourttoconsiderVallesalternative

argumentsforacquittal,whichwereraisedbelowbutdidnotformthebasisfor

theDistrictCourtsdecision.

8 II.

ComputerFraudandAbuseAct(CountII)

Vallewasconvictedofconductingacomputersearchthatexceededhis

10

authorizedaccesstoafederallawenforcementdatabase,inviolationofthe

11

ComputerFraudandAbuseAct,18U.S.C.1030.BecauseIagreewiththe

12

DistrictCourtthatVallesconductisproscribedbytheplainlanguageofthe

13

CFAA,Iwouldaffirmhisconviction.

14

TheCFAAimposescriminalpenaltiesonanyonewhointentionally

15

accessesacomputerwithoutauthorizationorexceedsauthorizedaccess,and

16

therebyobtains...informationfromanydepartmentoragencyoftheUnited

17

States.18U.S.C.1030(a)(2)(B).Thephraseexceedsauthorizedaccessis
24

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

definedasaccess[ing]acomputerwithauthorizationtoobtaininformationin

thecomputerthattheaccesserisnotentitledsotoobtain.Id.1030(e)(6).The

CFAAthereforeprotectsinformationbelongingtotheUnitedStatesbothfrom

thosewholackanyauthorizationtoaccessthecomputersystemandfromthose,

likeValle,whodidnotcomplywithrestrictionsontheirauthorizedaccess.

Theevidenceattrialestablishedthat,byenteringthenameMaureen

Hartiganintoafederallawenforcementdatabase,Valleobtainedinformation

thathewasnotentitledsotoobtain.SeeUnitedStatesv.Valle,301F.R.D.53,

10910(S.D.N.Y.2014).Vallewasinstructedrepeatedlythathehadpermission

10

tousehiscredentialstoaccessthefederalNationalCrimeInformationCenter

11

(NCIC)databaseonlywhenrequiredtodosointhecourseof[his]official

12

dutiesandresponsibilitiesasapoliceofficer,andthattherewerenoexceptions

13

tothispolicy.Appxat6162.Vallewaswarnedthataccessinglaw

14

enforcementdatabasesfornonofficialpurposeswasimproperandthatthe

15

penaltiesforsodoingincludedterminationandprosecution.AndValle

16

concedesthathehadnolegitimatelawenforcementpurposewhenhequeried

17

thedatabaseforthenameMaureenHartigan.SeeValle,301F.R.D.at110(Itis
25

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

undisputedthatVallehadnolawenforcementpurposeforqueryingHartigans

name....).

Themajoritynonethelessholdsthat,becauseVallepossessedthetechnical

credentialstoaccesstheNCICdatabaseandqueryHartigansname,hedidnot

exceedhisauthorizedaccessbysodoing.SeeMaj.Op.at29,3738.Inreaching

thisresult,themajoritydiscoversambiguityinthestatutorylanguagewhere

thereisnone.Undertheplainlanguageofthestatute,Valleexceededhis

authorizedaccesstoafederaldatabaseinviolationoftheCFAA.

Statutoryconstructionmustbeginwiththelanguageemployedby

10

Congressandtheassumptionthattheordinarymeaningofthatlanguage

11

accuratelyexpressesthelegislativepurpose.ShiLiangLinv.U.S.DeptofJustice,

12

494F.3d296,305(2dCir.2007)(enbanc)(internalquotationmarksomitted),cert.

13

denied,553U.S.1053(2008).Congresssaysinastatutewhatitmeansandmeans

14

inastatutewhatitsaysthere.Id.

15

Asthemajorityconcedes,apreponderanceofoursistercircuits

16

interpretingthetermexceedsauthorizedaccesshaveconcludedthatthe

17

statuteunambiguouslyencompassesconductofthetypeengagedinbyValle.
26

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

SeeMaj.Op.at31;seealsoUnitedStatesv.Rodriguez,628F.3d1258,1263(11thCir.

2010),cert.denied,131S.Ct.2166(2011);UnitedStatesv.John,597F.3d263,27073

(5thCir.2010);IntlAirportCtrs.,LLCv.Citrin,440F.3d418,42021(7thCir.

2006);EFCulturalTravelBVv.Explorica,Inc.,274F.3d577,58184(1stCir.2001).

TheEleventhCircuit,inUnitedStatesv.Rodriguez,affirmedtheconvictionofa

SocialSecurityAdministrationemployeewhoobtainedpersonalinformation

aboutformergirlfriendsandotherwomenfromfederaldatabasesthathewas

authorizedtouseonlyforbusinessreasons.628F.3dat126063.Rodriguez

arguedthathedidnotviolateSection1030(a)(2)(B)becauseheaccessed

10

databasesthathewasauthorizedtouseasaSocialSecurityAdministration

11

employee.Seeid.at1263.TheEleventhCircuitrejectedhisargument,explaining

12

thatRodriguezclearlyexceed[ed]hisauthorizedaccessbecausehisaccessof

13

thevictimspersonalinformationwasnotinfurtheranceofhisdutiesasan

14

employee.Id.

15

Similarly,inUnitedStatesv.John,theFifthCircuitfoundthatabank

16

employeeexceededherauthorizedaccesswhen,inordertofacilitatefraud,she

17

accessedconfidentialcustomerinformationincontraventionofheremployers
27

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

restrictionsoncomputeruse.597F.3dat27073.There,ashere,thedefendant

wasawarethatheremployersofficialpolicy,whichwasreiteratedintraining

programssheattended,prohibitedmisuseofthecompanysinternalcomputer

systemsandconfidential...information.Id.at272.

Themajorityconcludesthatthesecourtslookedonlyattheculpable

behaviorofthedefendantsbeforethem,andfailedtoconsidertheeffecton

millionsofordinarycitizenscausedbythestatutesunitarydefinitionofexceeds

authorizedaccess.Maj.Op.at36(internalquotationmarksomitted).Itnotes

concerns,articulatedbytwoofoursistercircuits,aboutthepotentiallyexpansive

10

scopeoftheCFAA.4Seeid.at31,3536,38(discussingUnitedStatesv.Nosal,676

11

F.3d854,85963(9thCir.2012)(enbanc)(observingthatabroadconstructionof

12

theCFAAwouldmakecriminalsoflargegroupsofpeoplewhohavelittle

TheseconcernsaddressSection1030(a)(2)(C)oftheCFAA,whichprohibitsexceeding
authorizedaccesstoacomputertoobtaininformationfromanyprotectedcomputer.18
U.S.C.1030(a)(2)(C).TheCFAAdefinesprotectedcomputeras,amongotherthings,a
computerwhichisusedinoraffectinginterstateorforeigncommerceorcommunication,id.
1030(e)(2)(B),adefinitionthathasbeeninterpretedtoencompassanycomputerwithan
internetconnection,seeUnitedStatesv.Ycel,97F.Supp.3d413,41819(S.D.N.Y.2015)
(collectingcasesandnotingwidespreadagreementinthecaselawthatprotectedcomputer
includesanyinternetconnectedcomputer).VallewasnotchargedunderSection1030(a)(2)(C).
4

28

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

reasontosuspecttheyarecommittingafederalcrime(internalquotationmarks

omitted)),andWECCarolinaEnergySols.LLCv.Miller,687F.3d199,206(4thCir.

2012),cert.dismissed,133S.Ct.831(2013)).

Themajorityopinion,apparentlywithoutirony,concludesthatgiving

effecttotheplainlanguageofthestatutewouldsomehowplaceusinthe

positionof[the]legislature.Maj.Op.at35.Butwhere,ashere,thestatutes

languageisplainandunambiguous,thesolefunctionofthecourtsistoenforce

itaccordingtoitsterms.UnitedStatesv.RonPairEnters.,Inc.,489U.S.235,241

(1989);accordUnitedStatesv.DiCristina,726F.3d92,96(2dCir.2013),cert.denied,

10

134S.Ct.1281(2014).ItmaywellbethattheCFAAsweepsbroadly.Butsuchis

11

amatterforpolicydebate,seeUnitedStatesv.Rodgers,466U.S.475,483(1984)

12

(Resolutionoftheprosandconsofwhetherastatuteshouldsweepbroadlyor

13

narrowlyisforCongress.),andtheCongressisfreetoamendthestatuteifit

14

chooses,seeGriffinv.OceanicContractors,Inc.,458U.S.564,576(1982)(The

15

remedyforanydissatisfactionwiththeresultsinparticularcaseslieswith

29

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

CongressandnotwiththisCourt.Congressmayamendthestatute;wemay

not.).5Anyotherconclusion,whilepurportingtobeanexerciseinjudicial

restraint,wouldtrenchuponthelegislativepowersvestedinCongressbyArt.I,

1,oftheConstitution.DeptofHousing&UrbanDev.v.Rucker,535U.S.125,

13435(2002)(internalquotationmarksomitted);cf.Dennisv.UnitedStates,341

U.S.494,526(1951)(Frankfurter,J.,concurring)([W]emustscrupulously

observethenarrowlimitsofjudicialauthorityeventhoughselfrestraintisalone

setoverus.AboveallwemustrememberthatthisCourtspowerofjudicial

reviewisnotanexerciseofthepowersofasuperLegislature.).

10
11

Themajorityinvokestheruleoflenityinsupportofitsview.SeeMaj.Op.
at3538.Thedoctrineisaruleoflastresort.Oppedisanov.Holder,769F.3d

SeealsoPrincipalDeputyAssistantAttorneyGeneralDavidBitkowerDeliversKeynoteAddressat
GeorgeWashingtonLawReviewSymposiumentitledHackingintotheComputerFraudandAbuse
Act,U.S.DeptofJustice(Nov.6,2015),http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/principaldeputy
assistantattorneygeneraldavidbitkowerdeliverskeynoteaddress(describingproposed
amendmenttoCFAAtoclarifydefinitionofexceedsauthorizedaccess);CyberCrime:
ModernizingourLegalFrameworkfortheInformationAge:HearingBeforetheSubcommitteeonCrime
andTerrorismoftheSenateCommitteeontheJudiciary,114thCong.(2015)(statementofDavidM.
Bitkower,DeputyAssistantAttorneyGeneral,DepartmentofJustice),availableat
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/070815%20Bitkower%20Testimony.pdf
(describingproposedamendmentstolimitbreadthofCFAA).

30

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

147,153(2dCir.2014)(internalquotationmarksomitted),cert.denied,136S.Ct.

211(2015);seealsoRenov.Koray,515U.S.50,65(1995)(Theruleoflenityapplies

onlyif,afterseizingeverythingfromwhichaidcanbederived,wecanmakeno

morethanaguessastowhatCongressintended.(internalcitationsand

quotationmarksomitted)).Itservestoaidthecourtininterpretingacriminal

statuteonlyifthereisanambiguity,anditcannotbeusedtonarrowastatute

thathasanunambiguouslybroadthrust.UnitedStatesv.Litchfield,986F.2d21,

22(2dCir.1993)(percuriam);seealsoAbramskiv.UnitedStates,134S.Ct.2259,

2272n.10(2014)(Thedissentwouldapplytheruleoflenityherebecausethe

10

statutestext,takenalone,permitsanarrowerconstruction,butwehave

11

repeatedlyemphasizedthatisnottheappropriatetest.).

12

Themajorityconcludesthatthesharpdivisionamongoursistercircuits

13

meansthatwhetherthestatuteproscribesVallesconductcannotberesolved

14

simplybylookingatthetextofthestatute,requiringustoturntothelegislative

15

historyandmotivatingpoliciesforfurtherguidance.Maj.Op.at31.Tothe

16

contrary,however,theSupremeCourthasexplainedthat[a]statuteisnot

17

ambiguousforpurposesoflenitymerelybecausethereisadivisionofjudicial
31

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

authorityoveritsproperconstruction.Reno,515U.S.at6465(internal

quotationmarksomitted);seealsoDiCristina,726F.3dat104(Astatuteisnot

ambiguousforpurposesoflenitymerelybecauseit[i]spossibletoarticulatea

constructionmorenarrowthanthaturgedbytheGovernment.(quotingMoskal

v.UnitedStates,498U.S.103,108(1990))).

Therefore,[w]herestatutory...provisionsunambiguouslycoverthe

defendantsconduct,asSection1030(a)(2)(B)clearlyproscribesVallesconduct

here,theruleoflenitydoesnotcomeintoplay.Litchfield,986F.2dat22;see,

e.g.,DePierrev.UnitedStates,131S.Ct.2225,2237(2011)(explainingthattherule

10

oflenitywasinapplicable[b]ecausethestatutorytextallowsustomakefar

11

morethanaguessastowhatCongressintended(internalquotationmarks

12

omitted));Rodgers,466U.S.at484(concludingthatcriminalstatutewasnot

13

sufficientlyambiguous...topermittherule[oflenity]tobecontrolling);see

14

alsoYatesv.UnitedStates,135S.Ct.1074,109899(2015)(Kagan,J.,dissenting)

15

(Lenityoffersnoproperrefugefrom[a]straightforward(eventhough

16

capacious)construction.).Forthesamereason,Ialsohavenooccasiontorefer

17

tothestatuteslegislativehistory.SeeUnitedStatesv.Woods,134S.Ct.557,567
32

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE
1

n.5(2013)(Scalia,J.)(Whetherornotlegislativehistoryiseverrelevant,itneed

notbeconsultedwhen,ashere,thestatutorytextisunambiguous.);Puellov.

BureauofCitizenship&ImmigrationServs.,511F.3d324,331(2dCir.2007)

(Katzmann,J.)(Becausewebelievethelanguageinthestatuteisunambiguous,

weneednotexaminelegislativehistorytodivinethestatutesmeaning.).

IemphasizethatItakenopositionontheapplicabilityofSection

1030(a)(2)(B)inothercircumstancesorthescopeorvalidityofotherprovisionsof

theCFAA,whicharenotatissuehere.6BecauseIfindthatSection1030(a)(2)(B)

oftheCFAAclearlyproscribesVallesconduct,Iwouldaffirm.

ThemajorityapparentlyrulesnotontheissuepresentedonthisappealwhetherValles
conductisproscribedbytheCFAAbutontheapplicationofthisstatutetoother
circumstancesnotimplicatedhere.SeeMaj.Op.at38(explainingthat,[w]hatevertheapparent
meritsofimposingcriminalliabilitymayseemtobeinthiscase,themajorityisconstru[ing]
thestatuteforthepurposesofmanyothersituations).Becausethemajoritysrulingmight
impact[]manymorepeoplethanValle,itrejectsthegovernmentsreasonableproposalthat
weletconcernsabouttheriskofcriminalizingordinarybehaviorbeaddressedinduecourse
whenraisedbyindividualsactuallyaffectedbytheprovisionatissue.Id.at37(internal
quotationmarksomitted).Inmyview,themajoritysapproachisunwiseandimproper.See
Costellov.INS,311F.2d343,348(2dCir.1962)([W]ethinktheexerciseofaproperjudicial
restraintmakesitundesirableforustoreachoutandnowdecidemorethanthecircumstances
ofthiscaserequireustodecide.),revdonothergrounds,376U.S.120(1964).

33

UNITEDSTATESV.VALLE

CONCLUSION

IwouldvacatetheDistrictCourtsjudgmentofacquittalinrespectof

CountI,affirmtheDistrictCourtsjudgmentofconvictioninrespectofCountII,

andremandforfurtherproceedings.Therefore,Irespectfullydissent.

34