November 19, 1990

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HEHERSON T.

ALVAREZ, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
ERNESTO F. HERRERA, JOSE D. LINA, JR., JOHN OSMEA, VICENTE T. PATERNO,
RENE A. SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, MAMINTAL ABDUL J. TAMANO,
WIGBERTO E. TAADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, JOSEPH ESTRADA, SOTERO LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., SANTANINA
RASUL, VICTOR ZIGA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME, HON. CARLOS DOMINGUEZ,
HON. FULGENCIO FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES QUISUMBING,
HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON. ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE CONCEPCION, HON.
LUIS SANTOS, HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, HON. RAINERIO REYES, HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM and HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO,
respondents.
Melencio-Herrera, J.:
SUMMARY: President Cory Aquino vetoed provisions in the 1989 and 1990 budgets which
prevented the Executive from augmenting appropriations disallowed or reduced by Congress
using savings from other appropriations. The Senate assailed the veto. Asked to delineate the
boundaries between the other two branches of government, the Supreme Court held that the
veto was valid, the provisions being general in scope and not bound to specific appropriations
(in violation of the Constitution). The provisions were held to be the embodiment of a general
policy measure intended to limit the power of the Executive in altering the budget after Congress
has submitted the bill to the President for her signature. Such measure must be enacted
separately and cannot be included as a condition in the appropriations bill. Four justices
dissented.
DOCTRINE: Under the item-veto power, the President can validly veto any distinct and
severable portion of appropriations, revenue, or tariff bills, regardless of whether such portion is
an item or a provision.
Conditions and limitations in appropriations bills must be so connected to money items of
appropriation that they logically belong in a system of expenditures; otherwise they must be
treated as distinct and severable portions for purposes of the veto power (Henry v. Edwards).
The constitutional power of augmentation is not self-executing and must be enabled by statute.
NATURE: Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus with prayer for issuance of Preliminary
Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order filed directly with the SC, assailing the constitutionality
of an act of the President.
FACTS
Dec. 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill 19186, which is the General Appropriations
Act for the Fiscal Year 1989 (1989 BUDGET). It was then presented to then President C.
Aquino for approval.
o The Budget eliminated or decreased some items proposed by the
President.
Dec. 29, 1988 The President signed the 1989 Budget into law, it becoming RA 6688.

The President vetoed 7 Special Provisions and a General Provision, Section

55, which reads:
o
"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended
Appropriations Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of
appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to
Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been
disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of
appropriations authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of
appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding
appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."
o Essentially this was a no-augmentation provision, the Executive taking the
position that such provision was unconstitutional for derogating the power of the
President.
Feb. 2, 1989 The Senate adopted Resolution 381, resolving to:
o disregard the veto of Section 55, taking the position that such veto is
unconstitutional
o authorize the Senate Finance Committee to bring suit in the name of the Senate
to assail the veto of Section 55 before the Supreme Court
April 11, 1989 The present suit was filed. SC did not issue a restraining order.
Sep. 7, 1989 The petition was given due course and the parties were required to
submit memoranda.
Jan. 19, 1990 - The suing Senators filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit
Supplemental Petition, because Sec. 16 of the 1990 Budget (RA 6831) was similar to
Sec. 55 of the 1989 Budget, thus it was also vetoed by the President; and the Senators
wanted to assail the 1990 Budget veto as well. The motion was granted.
The SC heard the parties on memoranda and oral argument, and the case was deemed
submitted for deliberation on Aug. 14, 1990.
o

ISSUE (HELD): W/N the veto of the no-augmentation provisions in the 1989 and 1990 Budgets
was valid (YES, with 4 justices dissenting; 2 took no part)
RATIO
ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES
Senate
o The assailed provisions are not unconstitutional because the power of the
President and Heads of Constitutional Commissions under Const., Art. VI, Sec.
25[5] must also be provided for by Congressional act.
o The Presidential power to line-veto appropriations bills is limited to items. If the
President objects to a provision of the bill, the item-veto power cannot be
invoked; she must thus veto the entire bill.
o The line-veto power does not include the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions. Such is a usurpation of the legislative power which violates the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Executive (thru Sol-Gen)
o The issue is a political question
o The Congress could override the veto anyway
o Sec. 55 is a rider to the 1989 Budget and must therefore be vetoed

The power of the President under Const. Art. VI, Sec 25[5] has already been
provided for in Secs. 44 and 45 of PD 1177, as amended by RA 6670
o The Constitution empowers the President to veto provisions or other distinct
and severable parts of an Appropriations Bill.
POWER OF THE SC TO DECIDE THE ISSUE
Demetria v. Alba: [W]here the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary, to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law x x x and which power this Court has exercised in many
instances"
CASE AT BAR: The constitutionality of an Executive Act is being assailed by the Senate.
There is an actual case or controversy between the Senate and the Executive which can
be taken cognizance of by the Court.
SC is not encroaching on the powers of the other two branches but is simply determining
the scope of the intersecting powers of the Legislative and the Executive with respect to
the power of the President to veto appropriations bills.
Sanidad v. COMELEC: SC has open discretion to entertain taxpayers suits. [since the
Senators were also suing as taxpayers]
Tolentino v. COMELEC: Senators have personality to sue when a constitutional issue is
raised.
NOT A POLITICAL QUESTION: SC has been given jurisdiction to delimit constitutional
boundaries. The 1987 Constitution mandates that it do so
o Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
SC HAS DECIDED SIMILAR CASES BEFORE: Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (62
Phil. 912) upheld an exercise of the Governor-Generals veto power, but the US SC
reversed (292 US 410) because it did not involve an appropriations bill. Bolinao
Electronics v. Valencia (11 SCRA 486) struck down a Presidential veto of a condition or
restriction in an Appropriations Bill.
SC can therefore resolve the case.
EXTENT OF THE PRESIDENTS ITEM-VETO POWER
The question is: can the President veto the provisions in an Appropriations bill?
Const. Art. VI, Sec. 27 embodies the veto power. Paragraph (1) refers to the general
veto power, while Paragraph (2) is known as the item-veto or line-veto power, which
gives the President veto power over a specific item or items in appropriations, revenue
and tariff (ART) bills.
The President is not allowed to veto an item partially, allowing a portion of it to stand.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE PROVISION
o Power to veto items in ART bills first provided for in the Jones Law of 1916.
o 1935 Constitution - Retained and expanded the power. Art. VI, Sec. 11(2)
provided:
o

x x x When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items

of the same, the President can not veto the provision without at the same
time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates x x x.
o 1973 Constitution - Restated the power in a more compact form, removing the
term provision.
o 1987 Constitution Reproduced the 1973 terms, only replaced Prime Minister
with President. The term provision was still absent.
ITEM AND PROVISION DISTINGUISHED
o Bengzon v. SoJ: Items are particulars, details, distinct and severable parts of
the bill. Item is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision
of law which happens to be in the appropriation bill.
o Commonwealth v. Dodson: Item is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a
stated purpose
1935 SCOPE OF THE ITEM-VETO POWER REMAINS DESPITE OMISSION OF THE
TERM PROVISION
o SC: Notwithstanding the removal of the term provision in the current
Constitution, the extent of the veto power as defined in the 1935 version has not
been changed.
o The basic principle still stands: A distinct and severable part of a bill may
be the subject of a separate veto (citing Bengzon v. SoJ and 2 Bernas)
o Senates argument that a provision cannot be vetoed singly without vetoing the
whole bill disregards this basic principle.
TRUE SENSE OF PROVISIONS IN APPROPRIATIONS BILLS
o Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25[2] mandates that any provision in the budget shall relate
specifically to some particular item therein.
o Same section mandates that budget provisions shall be limited in their
operation to the appropriations to which they are related. A provision in an
appropriations bill does not relate to the entire bill.
o ASSAILED SECTIONS IN THE 1989 & 1990 BUDGETS DO NOT CONFORM
TO THIS PRINICPLE THEY ARE INAPPROPRIATE.
Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 do not relate to any particular appropriation.
They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in
the final form of the Appropriations Bill. To discover these disapproved
items, one must go back to the Presidents Budget Proposal; ergo they do
not appear on the face of the Bill.
Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are more in the nature of expressions of
Congressional policy on augmentation from savings rather than of
budgetary appropriation.
As such, being inappropriate provisions, they must be treated as items for
purposes of the veto power.
Henry v. Edwards: The Legislature cannot circumvent the veto power by
smuggling policy measures into appropriations bills by masking them as
conditions or limitations on a budgetary item. Such inappropriate
provisions in an appropriations bill must be treated as items for purposes
of the veto power.
SC, quoting Bengzon v. SoJ: "The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the
legislative department of the government, but in this respect it is a grant of power to the
executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat

the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the
Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict
construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as
they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the
Legislature."
SECTION 55 & SECTION 16 ARE INAPPROPRIATE RESTRICTIONS ON THE BUDGET
RULE: Congress is allowed to place restrictions, qualifications, or conditions on items of
the budget; and the President may not veto these conditions while allowing the item itself
to stand, i.e., the condition and the item must be vetoed together (Fairfield v. Foster,
Commonwealth v. Dodson, Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia).
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term,
not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation (Henry v.
Edwards).
APPROPRIATENESS TEST: Conditions and limitations must be so connected to money
items of appropriation that they logically belong in a system of expenditures. (Henry v.
Edwards)
CASE AT BAR: Applying the appropriateness test, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 do not pass as
appropriate conditions, however artfully drafted they have been.
o Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are actually general law measures [see section on True
Sense] more appropriate for separate legislation and not to be smuggled into the
budget.
o Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 do not show a necessary connection with a schedule of
expenditures, because they refer to items not found in the enrolled bill or Budget
itself. [also see section on True Sense]
o Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 even provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been
disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific
purpose is provided in this Act.
o The two provisions are a general curtailment of the power to augment from
savings a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an
appropriation bill.
o Not being budget item restrictions, the Bolinao Electronics case is inapplicable,
because that case involved Pres. Macapagals veto of a budgetary condition
attached to an appropriation for assistance to TV stations.
POWER OF AUGMENTATION & VALIDITY OF THE VETO
POWER OF AUGMENTATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR BY STATUTE
o The power of the President to augment from savings [as provided for in Const.,
Art. VI, Sec. 25(5)] has been upheld by the SC in Demetria v. Alba.
o However, the power lies dormant until authorized by law; and the augmentation
must come from another item in the same branch or constitutional body.
o SC upheld the Executives contention that the power had already been
activated by Sec.44 of the Budget Reform Decree [PD 1177, as amended by
RA 6670]. Sec. 45 of the same law allows the President to cover deficits using
savings from other items of appropriations within the same branch.
o The 1989 [Sec. 12] and 1990 [Sec. 16] Budgets themselves authorize the
augmentation of savings. There is thus no question that the statutory authority
for the augmentation power has already been given. Augmentation does not
violate the doctrine of separation of powers for the transfer is made within one
branch of government and not from one branch to another.

ASSAILED SECTIONS HAVE BEEN VALIDLY VETOED FOR VIOLATING THE

AUGMENTATION POWER
o Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 impair the constitutional and statutory authority to
augment any item or appropriation from savings.
o The President is not given the power to rewrite the budget because the
augmentation can come only from savings and should only be made within the
same department or branch.
o SC reiterated that Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are limitations on a special power which
have been inserted into an appropriation measure. An appropriation bill is a
legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of
augmentation from savings cannot be considered a specific appropriation of
money. The President was therefore justified in vetoing the provisions.
o If Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 were intended to repeal PD 1177 as amended, then there
is all the more reason that these should have been enacted in a separate
measure, because implied repeals are not favored.
o Neither can it be said that PD 1177 had been repealed by the 1987 Constitution
because the latter provided that all laws and other executive issuances not
inconsistent therewith shall continue to be in force (Art. XVIII, Sec. 3).
o If the Legislature believed that the veto was unconstitutional, they should have
just overridden the veto. The veto is constitutional, so they cannot say that there
is nothing to override.

DISPOSITION: Petition dismissed.

Cruz, J., dissenting:
Sec. 44 of PD 1177 is not germane to the purpose of the whole law, which deals only
with the form, content, and preparation of the budget. The subject matter of Sec. 44
properly belongs to the General Appropriations Act.
Congress may validly withdraw the statutory grant of the power of augmentation; and it
did so when it passed Sec. 55 and Sec. 16. Congress can withdraw the power anytime
and it was clearly the intention of Congress to do so when it passed the assailed
sections.
The power of augmentation is a power of Congress which has been merely delegated to
the President and the Heads of the Constitutional Commissions.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting:
The majority opinion gives the power of augmentation a far wider scope than the
Constitution envisions. In effect, the Executive can now order all agencies to save 10%
of their budgets; and the President may validly transfer this accumulated savings to
other items anywhere within the Executive Branch which Congress may not have
prioritized or even included in the budget [In effect Justice Gutierrez foreshadowed
DAP].
The decision in effect grants fiscal autonomy to the Executive when the Constitution did
not vest it with such power, which has been confined to the Judiciary and Constitutional
Commissions.
In the same way that Congress cannot add to the Executives budget proposal, neither
can the Executive restore or add what Congress has removed or subtracted.

That the Constitution no longer includes the term provision under the item-veto power
only means that the power to veto provisions has already been withdrawn. The item-veto
power is limited to items only.
Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 are neither riders nor are they inappropriate provisions. A rider is a
provision or an amendment totally unrelated to the law to which they are included, e.g.,
the Spooner Amendment establishing a Civil Government in the Philippines, which was
included in the Army Appropriations Act.
o CASE AT BAR: The assailed sections refer to items reduced or removed from the
very same bill (the Appropriations Bill).
Echoing Justice Cruz, Sec. 55 and Sec. 16 merely withdrew the power to augment;
essentially, Congress giveth, Congress taketh away.
Where Congress expressly states that our limited funds should not be spent on a
particular function or office, we should not give the President the power to appropriate
through transfers of funds the money to maintain the abolished or greatly reduced
function or office. The power of augmentation is intended to save programs or projects
agreed upon by both the President and Congress where the funds allocated turn out
to be inadequate.

Padilla, J., dissenting:

VETO HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
o Sarmiento v. Mison: SCs duty is to construe the Constitution according to what it
says and provides, and not according to how the Legislature or the Executive
wants it construed.
CASE AT BAR: The construction given to the item-veto power is bereft of
any indication that such construction has been intended by the framers of
the Constitution; and it unduly tilts the balance of power in favor of the
Executive.
VETO WAS A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
o Transfers from savings are allowed to augment any appropriation pertaining to
the office which produced the savings.
o Congress simply wanted to disallow the Executive from augmenting any
appropriation which has been disallowed or reduced by Congress. Such a
provision is meant to prevent the Executive from rendering meaningless the
Legislatures act of disallowing or reducing an appropriation.
o The veto was therefore an undue encroachment on the exercise of legislative
power. The Bolinao Electronics ruling should apply.