CANON/LAWS

STATUTORY BASIS: DISCPLINARY ACTION ON MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME

COURT
1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE XI SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment
WHAT IS IMPEACHEMENT?
It is a constitutional process of removing public servants from office as an
assurance against abusive officials in the country
It serves as protection for the state and not to accomplish criminal
punishment
The objective of impeachment is solely to determine whether or not the
official is still worthy of the trust conferred upon him/her
It is not the determination of criminal guilt or innocence as in a criminal case.

IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES
The Constitution limits the offenses to the following: culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust.
In the 1935 and 1975 constitution, betrayal of public trust was not an impeachable
offense.
Culpable violation of the constitution
For purposes of impeachment, culpable violation of the constitution is defined as
the deliberate and wrongful breach of the Constitution. Furthermore, Violation of
the Constitution made unintentionally, in good faith, and mere mistakes in the proper
construction of the Constitution do not constitute and impeachable offense.
Treason
According to the Revised Penal Code, treason is defined as Any Filipino citizen who
levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies, giving them aid or
comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere.
Bribery
The Revised Penal Code defines bribery in two forms:
Direct bribery is committed by any public officer who shall agree to perform an act
constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of this official duties, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer,
personally or through the mediation of another.
Indirect bribery is committed by a public officer when he accept gifts offered to him
by reason of his office.

Graft and corruption

Any violation of the Republic Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
is an impeachable offense.
Other high crimes or betrayal of public trust
In Francisco Jr. vs. NagmamalasakitnamgaManananggolngmgaManggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., the Supreme Court purposely refused to define the meaning of other
high crimes or betrayal of public trust, saying that it is a non-justiciable political
question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power. However, the Court refuses
to name which agency can define it; the Court impliedly gives the power to the House
of Representatives, which initiates all cases of impeachment.
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT FILED AGAINST JUSTICE CORONA
ARTICLE I
Respondent betrayed the public trust through his track record marked by partiality
and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration from the time of his
appointment as Supreme Court Justice which continued to his dubious appointment
as a midnight Chief Justice and up to the present.
ARTICLE 2
Respondent committed culpable violation of the Constitution and/or betrayed the
public trust when he failed to disclose to the public his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net worth as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
ARTICLE 3
Respondent committed culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayed the
public trust by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII,
section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that [a] member of the judiciary must
be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence in allowing
the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the
issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in creating an
excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to
office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme
Court.
ARTICLE 4
Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed culpable violation of the
Constitution when it blatantly disregarded the principle of separation of powers by
issuing a status quo ante order against the House of Representatives in the case
concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.
ARTICLE 5
Respondent committed culpable violations of the constitution through wanton
arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res

judicata and in deciding in favor of gerrymandering in the cases involving the 16

newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province.
ARTICLE 6
Respondent betrayed the public trust by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee
he created, the authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate an alleged erring
member of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and
jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of Representatives
via impeachment.
ARTICLE 7
Respondent betrayed the public trust through his partiality in granting a temporary
restraining order (TRO) in favor of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her
husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to escape
prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court
decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the
conditions of the Supreme Court's own TRO.
ARTICLE 8
Respondent betrayed the public trust and/or committed graft and corruption when he
failed and refused to account for the judiciary development fund (JDF) and special
allowance for the judiciary (SAJ) collections.

STATUTORY BASIS: DISCIPLINARY ACTION ON LOWER COURT JUDGES AND

JUSTICES
ARTICLE VIII SECTION 11. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reached the age of seventy
years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme
Court en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their
dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

SC ISSUANCES

A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC

THE INTERNAL RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT

RULE 2
THE OPERATING STRUCTURES
Section 3. Court en banc matters and cases. The Court en banc shall act on the
following matters and cases:
(h) cases involving the discipline of a Member of the Court, or a Presiding
Justice, or any Associate Justice of the collegial appellate court;

RULE 4
THE EXERCISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTION
Section 3. Administrative functions of the Court. The administrative functions of
the Court en banc consist of , but are not limited to, the following:
(a) the discipline of justices, judges and court personnel, whether by en
banc or by Division, subject to matters assignable to the Divisions,
disciplinary matters involving justices, judges and court personnel;

AM No. 03-06-13-SC CODE OF CONDUCT FOR COURT PERSONNEL

WHEREAS, the Constitution of the Philippines vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel; thus, it has
disciplinary authority over them and the power to promulgate a code of conduct for
them

[A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC.September 17, 2002]

RE:AUTOMATIC CONVERSION OF SOME ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST
JUSTICES OF THE CA & THE SANDIGANBAYAN, et al.
EN BANC
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated 17 SEPT
2002.
A.M. No. 02-9-02-SC(Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against
Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and
Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar.)
Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and court officials who are
lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action
of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of
breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the
discipline of lawyers.
In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a
disciplinary action against the respondent Justice, judge or court official concerned as
a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be required to comment on the
complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or
otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects
may be incorporated in one decision or resolution.

A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC

RE : Proposed Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
Re Discipline of Justices and Judges
The Court resolved to APPROVE the amendment of Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court regarding the discipline of Justices and Judges, so as to read as follows:
RULE 140

Discipline of Judges of Regular and Special Courts and Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan
SECTION 1. How instituted. Proceedings for the discipline of Judges of
regular and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan may be instituted motu proprio by the Supreme Court or upon
a verified complaint, supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations, or upon an anonymous complaint, supported by
public records of indubitable integrity. The complaint shall be in writing and
shall state clearly and concisely the acts and omissions constituting violations
of standards of conduct prescribed for Judges by law, the Rules of Courts or
the Code of Judicial Conduct.
SECTION 2. Action on the complaint. If the complaint is sufficient in form
and substance, a copy thereof shall be served upon the respondent, and he
shall be required to comment within ten (10) days from the date of service.
Otherwise, the same shall be dismissed.
SECTION 3. By whom complaint investigated. Upon the filing of the
respondent's comment, or upon the expiration of the time for filing the same
and unless other pleadings or documents are required, the Court shall refer
the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report, and
recommendation or assign the case for investigation, report, and
recommendation to a retired member of the Supreme Court, if the respondent
is a Justice of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, or to a Justice of
the Court of Appeals, if the respondent is a Judge of a Regional Trial Court or of
a special court of equivalent rank, or to a Judge of the Regional Trial Court if
the respondent is a Judge of an inferior court.
SECTION 4. Hearing. The investigating Justice or Judge shall set a day for
the hearing and send notice thereof to both parties. At such bearing, the
parties may present oral and documentary evidence. If, after due notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within
ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or within such extension
as the Supreme Court may grant.
SECTION 5. Report. Within thirty (30) days from the termination of the
investigation. the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme
Court a report containing findings of fact and recommendation. The report
shall be accompanied by the record containing the evidence and the pleadings
filed by the parties. The report shall be confidential and shall be for the
exclusive use of the Court.
SECTION 6. Action. The Court shall take such action on the report as the
facts and the law may warrant.
SECTION 7. Classification of charges. Administrative charges are classified
as serious, less serious. or light.
SECTION 8. Serious charges. Serious charges include:
1. Bribery, direct or indirect;
2. Dishonesty and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law (R.A.
No. 3019);
3. Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
4. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order as determined by a
competent court in an appropriate proceeding;

5. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;

6. Willful failure to pay a just debt:
7. Borrowing money or property from lawyers and litigants in a case pending
before the court;
8. Immorality;
9. Gross ignorance of the law or procedure;
10. Partisan political activities; and
11. Alcoholism and/or vicious habits.
SECTION 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records
of a case;
2. Frequent and unjustified absences without leave or habitual tardiness;
3. Unauthorized practice of law;
4. Violation of Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars;
5. Receiving additional or double compensation unless specifically authorized
by law;
6. Untruthful statements in the certificate of service; and
7. Simple Misconduct.
SECTION 10. Light Charges. Light charges include:
1. Vulgar and unbecoming conduct;
2. Gambling in public;
3. Fraternizing with lawyers and litigants with pending case/cases in his court;
and
4. Undue delay in the submission of monthly reports.
SECTION 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge,
any of the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the
Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case
include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than
three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months: or
3. A fine of more than P20,000 00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
C. If the respondent is guilty of a light charge, any of the following sanctions
shall be imposed:
1. A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00 and/or
2. Censure;

3. Reprimand;
4. Admonition with warning.
SECTION 12. Confidentiality of proceedings. Proceedings
regular and special courts and justices of the Court of
Sandiganbayan shall be private and confidential, but a copy
resolution of the Court shall be attached to the record of the
Office of the Court Administrator.

against Judges of
Appeals and the
of the decision or
respondent in the

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 58-06

TO : All Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals
and Judges of the First and Second Level Courts
SUBJECT : Amendment to Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13-SC, Re: Rule on
Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases and Guidelines on
Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary
For your information and guidance, quoted hereunder is a portion of the
Resolution of this Court En Banc dated 07 March 2006, in A.M. No. 05-12-757RTC, Re: Sexual Harassment Committed by Judge Rexel M. Pacuribot, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 27, Gingoog City, which AMENDS Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-0313-SC, Re: The Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases
and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary, to wit:
"NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby Resolved, that in
accordance with Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution vesting this
Court with the power of administrative supervision over all courts and
personnel thereof, inclusive of which is the authority to discipline Judges
and Justices, complaints of sexual harassment against Judges of regular
and special courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals should be excluded from
the jurisdiction of the CODIs. Accordingly, Section 8 of A.M. No. 03-03-13SC, the Rule on Administrative Procedure in Sexual Harassment Cases
and Guidelines on Proper Work Decorum in the Judiciary is hereby
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 8. Jurisdiction, powers and responsibilities of the CODIs.
The CODIs shall have jurisdiction over all complaints for sexual
harassment committed by the officials and employees of the
Judiciary, except those against Judges of regular and special
courts and Justices of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan
and the Court of Tax Appeals, which shall fundamentally adhere
to the proceeding laid down in Section 3 of Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, as amended. TDCAIS
CODI shall:

(a) Receive the complaint, investigate its allegations, and submit

a report and recommendation to the proper court or authority, as
provided for in Section 18 of this Rule;

SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO. 3-89

TO : Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial
Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts, Shari'a District Court and Shari'a Circuit Courts, All Members of the
Government Prosecution Service, and All Members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines
SUBJECT : Complaints Filed with the IBP Against Justices and Judges of the
Lower Courts
For the information and guidance of all concerned, quoted hereunder is the
Resolution of the Court en banc, dated January 31, 1989 clarifying Resolution
dated November 29, 1988 in "Re: Letter of (Acting) Presiding Justice Rodolfo A.
Nocon and Associate Justices Reynato S. Puno and Alfredo Marigomen of the Court
of Appeals:
"The Court NOTED the letter dated December 19, 1988 by Dr. Leon M.
Garcia, Jr., President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to the Supreme
Court seeking a resolution "reconsidering/clarifying" the Resolution of this
Court dated November 29, 1988 relating to complaints filed with the IBP
against justices and judges of the lower courts.
After careful consideration of Hon. Garcia's letter, the Court Resolved to
REITERATE its Resolution dated November 29, 1988 directing that "all
complaints against justices and judges of the lower courts filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline should promptly be REFERRED to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action." This Resolution is properly
regarded as an interpretation of Section 1, second paragraph of Rule 139-B
of the Revised Rules of Court, such that "attorneys in the government
service" should be understood as not including members of the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals and judges of other
courts. In general, the Court is here referring to those who perform judicial
functions and before whose courts the members of the IBP appear in the
exercise of their profession.
The Court still has under consideration the case of fiscals and other
government prosecuting attorneys, as well as government lawyers whose
official duties do not consist of the adjudication of cases or disputes. The
Court will inform the IBP when it shall have reached a conclusion in respect
of fiscals and prosecuting attorneys.
The Court addresses below the "matters which need clarification" set out
in Hon. Garcia's letter:
(1) The IBP (Board of Governors and Commission on Bar Discipline) shall
forward to the Supreme Court for appropriate action all cases involving

justices and judges of lower courts, whether or not such complaints deal
with acts apparently unrelated to the discharge of their official functions,
such as acts of immorality, estafa, crimes against persons and property,
etc.
(2) As noted above, this Resolution as well as our Resolution dated
November 29, 1988 constitute an interpretation of Section 1, Rule 139-B.
(3) In principle, the Supreme Court would not assign complaints filed with
it against justices and judges of the lower courts to the IBP for
investigation after the Supreme Court shall have found a probable cause in
such charges. As a matter of long standing practice, the Court has
assigned complaints against Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Judges to an
Executive Judge of a Regional Trial Court, and complaints against judges of
the Regional Trial Courts to a justice of the Court of Appeals for
investigation, report and recommendation, while a complaint against a
member of the Court of Appeals would probably be assigned to a member
of the Supreme Court for investigation, report and recommendation.
(4) The IBP shall refer to the Supreme Court all cases filed against judges,
including complaints charging judges jointly with practicing lawyers,
whether filed directly with the IBP or transmitted to the IBP by the Office of
the Solicitor General. The Supreme Court will examine these complaints
individually and on a case by case basis. The Court may refer such a case
for joint investigation to an ExecutiveJudge of a Regional Trial Court or to a
justice of the Court of Appeals. There may, however, be instances when
the case against the practicing lawyer may be separable and conveniently
referred to the IBP for investigation.
(5) The Court will scrutinize very carefully any claim by other lawyers in
the government service that complaints against them be referred to this
Court rather than to the IBP. The Court looks forward to comments thereon
by the IBP should such claims be made.
(6) It appears to the Court that the IBP has been quite busy with the
number of cases already referred to it involving private practitioners. The
Court continues to follow the work of the IBP in this area with great
interest and high expectations."

SUPREME COURT MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 09-07

ENJOINING ALL OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY TO
STRICTLY OBSERVE THE PROHIBITION AGAINST GAMBLING OR ENGAGING
IN OTHER FORMS OF GAMBLING WITHIN COURT PREMISES
WHEREAS, the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that any act of
impropriety committed by court personnel "immeasurably affects the honor and
dignity of the Judiciary and the people's confidence in it;"
WHEREAS, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees directs public officials and employees to refrain from doing acts
contrary to good morals and good customs;

WHEREAS, the Supreme Court has always enjoined court employees to adhere to
the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional as well as
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of the courts of
justice;
WHEREAS, the Court has received reports that court employees have been
observed gambling or engaging in other forms of gambling within court premises
(not only in covert places but also in areas which could be easily sighted by other
personnel and the transacting public);
WHEREAS, studies show that gambling is a manipulative and ruinous means of
exploiting the individual's weaknesses, his misplaced belief in and reliance on
luck or "suerte;" and his misapprehension of the role of skill in playing the game;
WHEREAS, the Court has ruled that "gambling is absolutely forbidden at court
premises during office hours;" and that it "generates unwholesome consequences
on the gambler as it diverts his attention from the more important responsibilities
of his job;" and
WHEREAS, in an instance where court employees were apprehended engaged in a
card game within the judge's chambers which game allegedly did not involve
monetary bets, the Court still imposed disciplinary sanctions on the erring
personnel on the ground that such act violated norms of public accountability;
Now, therefore, all officials and employees of all courts under the Judiciary (from
the Supreme Court to the first and second level courts) are enjoined to strictly
heed the prohibition against gambling or engaging in other forms of gambling
within court premises. In order to maintain the highest level of ethical conduct
and morals in the Judiciary, gambling and any forms thereof, regardless of
whether or not they involve monetary bets, shall not be allowed, tolerated or
condoned.
The appropriate administrative disciplinary action shall be taken against any court
official or employee caught gambling or engaging in any form of gambling within
court premises (whether such gambling activities occur during working days or
weekends/holidays; or during office hours or beyond office hours).
In the Supreme Court, the Chief of Staff of the Office of the Chief Justice and the
respective Judicial Staff Heads of the Offices of the Associate Justices, the Court
Administrator, the Clerk of Court and Division Clerks of Court, the Chiefs of Offices
of the different offices, the Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy, and the
Judicial and Bar Council Executive Committee Chairman shall ensure that
personnel in their offices shall comply fully and faithfully with the policy
proscribing gambling and any forms thereof within court premises. They shall
adopt such measures as may be necessary to prevent the commission of all forms
of gambling within their areas of supervision.
The respective Presiding Justices of the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and
Court of Tax Appeals, insofar as their courts are concerned, and the Court
Administrator, with regard to the lower courts, shall see to the implementation of
this Memorandum Circular.
Issued this 18th day of June 2007.
|||(Enjoining All Officials and Employees of the Judiciary to Strictly Observe the
Prohibition Against Gambling or Engaging in Other Forms of Gambling within Court
Premises, SUPREME COURT MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 09-07, [2007])

SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-99

STRICT OBSERVANCE OF SESSION HOURS OF TRIAL COURTS AND
EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF CASES TO ENSURE THEIR SPEEDY
DISPOSITION
TO : All Trial Court Judges and their Personnel and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
To insure speedy disposition of cases, the following guidelines must be faithfully
observed:
I. The session hours of all Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall be from 8:30 A.M. to noon and from
2:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M., from Monday to Friday. The hours in the
morning shall be devoted to the conduct of trial, while the hours in the
afternoon shall be utilized for (1) the conduct of pre-trial conferences;
(2) writing of decisions, resolutions, or orders; or (3) the continuation
of trial on the merits, whenever rendered necessary, as may be
required by the Rules of Court, statutes, or circulars in specified cases.
However, in multi-sala courts in places where there are few practicing
lawyers, the schedule may be modified upon request of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines such that one-half of the branches may hold their trial in
the morning and the other half in the afternoon.
Except those requiring immediate action, all motions should be scheduled
of hearing on Friday afternoons, or if Friday is a non-working day, in the
afternoon of the next business day. The unauthorized practice of some
judges of entertaining motions or setting them for hearing on any other
day or time must be immediately stopped.
II. Judges must be punctual at all times.
III. The Clerk of Court, under the direct supervision of the Judge, must
comply with Rule 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the
calendar of cases.
IV. There should be strict adherence to the policy on avoiding
postponements and needless delay.
Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Rule 30, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure on
adjournments and postponements and on the requisites of a motion to
postpone trial for absence of evidence or for illness of a party or counsel
should be faithfully observed.
Lawyers, as officers of the court, are enjoined to cooperate with judges to
ensure swift disposition of cases.
V. The mandatory continuous trial system in civil cases contemplated
in Administrative Circular No. 4, dated 22 September 1988, and the
guidelines provided for in Circular No. 1-89, dated 19 January 1989,
must be effectively implemented. For expediency, these guidelines in
civil cases are hereunder restated with modifications, taking into
account the relevant provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

A. Pre-Trial
1. Within five (5) days after the last pleading
joining the issues has been filed and served, the
plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set
for pre-trial conference.
2. The parties shall submit, at least three (3) days
before the conference, pre-trial briefs containing
the following:
a. A statement of their willingness to enter
into an amicable settlement indicating the
desired terms thereof, or to submit the
case to any of the alternative modes of
dispute resolution;
b. A summary of admitted
proposed stipulation of facts;

facts

and

c. The issues to be tried or resolved;

d. The number and names of the witnesses
to be presented, an abstract of their
testimonies, and the approximate number
of hours that will be required by the parties
for the presentation of their respective
evidence;
e. Copies of all documents intended to be
presented with a statement of the purposes
of their offer;
f. A manifestation of their having availed or
their intention to avail themselves of any
discovery procedure, or of the need of
referral of any issues to commissioners;
g. Applicable laws and jurisprudence;
h. The available trial dates of counsel for
complete presentation of evidence, which
must be within a period of three months
from the first day of trial.
3. Before the pre-trial conference, the judge must
study the pleadings of every case, and determine
the issues thereof and the respective positions of
the parties thereon to enable him to intelligently
steer the parties toward a possible amicable
settlement of the case or, at the very least, to help
reduce and limit the issues. The judge should
avoid the undesirable practice of terminating the
pre-trial as soon as the parties have indicated that
they cannot settle the controversy. He must be
mindful that there are other important aspects of
the pre-trial that ought to be taken up to expedite
the disposition of the case.

4. At the pre-trial conference, the following shall

be done:
a. The judge with all tact, patience and
impartiality shall endeavor to persuade the
parties to arrive at a settlement of the
dispute; if no amicable settlement is
reached, then he must effectively direct the
parties toward the achievement of the
other objectives or goals of pre-trial set
forth in Section 2, Rule 18, 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
b. If warranted by the disclosures at the
pre-trial, the judge may either forthwith
dismiss the action, or determine the
propriety of rendering a judgment on the
pleadings or a summary judgment.
c. The judge shall define the factual issues
arising from the pleadings and endeavor to
cull the material issues.
d. If only legal issues are presented,
the judge shall require the parties to
submit their respective memorandum and
thereafter render judgment.
e. If trial is necessary, the judge shall fix
the trial dates required to complete
presentation of evidence by both parties
within ninety (90) days from the date of
initial hearing.
5. After the pre-trial conference, the judge should
not fail to prepare and issue the requisite pre-trial
order, which shall embody the matters mentioned
in Sec. 7, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
6. Failure of the plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial
shall be a cause for dismissal of the action. A
similar failure of the defendant shall be a cause to
allow the plaintiff to present his evidence exparte and the court to render judgment on the
basis thereof.
7. Failure to file pre-trial briefs shall have the same
effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.
8. The judge should encourage the effective use of
pre-trial discovery procedures (Administrative
Circular No. 1 dated 28 January 1998, 2.1)
B Trial
1. Unless the docket of the court requires
otherwise, not more than four (4) cases shall be
scheduled for trial daily.

2. The Presiding Judge shall make arrangements

with the prosecutor and the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO) so that a relief prosecutor and a PAO
attorney are always available in case the regular
prosecutor or (PAO) attorneys are absent.
3. Contingency measures must likewise be taken
for any unexpected absence of the stenographer
and other support staff assisting in the trial.
4. The issuance and service of subpoena shall be
done in accordance with Administrative Circular
No. 4 dated 22 September 1988.
5. The judge shall conduct trial with utmost
dispatch, with judicious exercise of the court's
power to control trial proceedings to avoid delay.
6. The judge must take notes of the material and
relevant testimonies of witnesses to facilitate his
decision-making.
7. The trial shall be terminated within ninety (90)
days
from
initial
hearing.
Appropriate disciplinary sanctions may be
imposed on the judge and the lawyers for
failure to comply with this requirement due
to causes attributable to them.
8. Each party is bound to complete the
presentation of his evidence within the trial dates
assigned to him. After the lapse of said dates, the
party is deemed to have completed the
presentation of evidence. However, upon verified
motion
based
on
compelling
reasons,
the judge may allow a party additional trial dates
in the afternoon; provided that said extension will
not go beyond the three-month limit computed
from the first trial date except when authorized in
writing by the Court Administrator, Supreme
Court.
VI. All trial judges must strictly comply with Circular No. 38-98,
entitled "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493" ("An
Act to Ensure a Speedy Trial of All Cases Before the Sandiganbayan,
Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes") issues by the
Honorable Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa on 11 August 1998 and
which took effect on 15 September 1998.
VII.
1. As a constant reminder of what cases must be decided
or resolved, the judge must keep a calendar of cases
submitted for decision, noting therein the exact day,
month and year when the 90-day period is to expire. As
soon as a case is submitted for decision, it must be noted
in the calendar of the judge; moreover, the records shall

be duly collated with the exhibits and the transcripts of

stenographic notes, as well as the trial notes of the judge,
and placed in the judge's chamber.
2. In criminal cases, the judge will do well to announce in
open court at the termination of the trial the date of the
promulgation of the decision, which should be set within
90 days from the submission of the case for decision.
3. All Judges must scrupulously observe the period
prescribed in Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution.
This Circular shall take effect on 1 February, 1999, and the Office of the Court
Administrator shall ensure faithful compliance therewith.
City of Manila, 15 January 1999.
|||(Strict Observance of Session Hours of
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-99, [1999])

Trial

Courts,

SUPREME

COURT

SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-07

GUIDELINES ON THE SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE BY THE MEMBERS OF
THE JUDICIARY
|||(Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-07, [2007])
SECTION 20. Unauthorized Demand for and Receipt of Marriage Solemnization
Fees. The demand for or solicitation, collection or receipt of fees for the
solemnization of any marriage in excess of the amounts stated herein shall be
considered a violation of these Guidelines and shall subject the solemnizing authority
to administrative disciplinary measures.
SECTION 21. Facilitation of Marriage Ceremony. Any judge or employee of
the court who, alone or with the connivance of other court personnel or third
persons not employed by the court, intervenes so that the marriage of

contracting parties is facilitated or performed despite lack of or without the

necessary supporting documents, or performs other acts that tend to cause
the solemnization of the marriage with undue haste, shall be subjected to
appropriate administrative disciplinary proceedings.
SECTION 22. Reporting of Marriages Solemnized. All marriages solemnized
shall be duly entered and indicated in the monthly report of cases to be
accomplished by the solemnizing officer.
SECTION 23. Posting of the Guidelines. All Executive Judges/Presiding
Judges shall post copies of these Guidelines (a) in conspicuous places in their
respective Halls of Justice or courthouses; and (b) on the bulletin board of
each court at the entrance to the courtroom.
SECTION 24. Violations of the Guidelines. Violations of any of the
provisions of the Guidelines shall be ground for the appropriate
administrative disciplinary proceedings.
|||(Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary,
SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 125-07, [2007])

JURISPRUDENCE

Section 8

Tan vs. Judge Usman, AM No. RTJ-11-2666

February 1, 2011
Facts:
Josephine Jazmines Tan (complainant) charges Judge Sibanah E. Usman (respondent),
Presiding Judge of Branch 28, Regional Trial Court, Catbalogan, Samar, with abuse of
power and authority, conduct unbecoming a judicial officer, mental dishonesty, grave

misconduct, gross ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering an unjust order, and
bribery and corruption, in connection with Civil Case No. 7681 and Criminal Case No.
6536.
It appears that complainant, together with his co-plaintiffs in the civil case/coaccused in the criminal case, filed a Motion for Inhibition against respondent. The
movants attached to their motion the Affidavit of complainant.
Complainant claims that during the hearing of the Motion for Inhibition, respondent
became very emotional, coerced her to testify without the assistance of counsel and
demanded a public apology from her; and that while she requested to refer the
motion to the Executive Judge, respondent interrogated her relentlessly following
which he issued an Order of August 28, 2009 finding her guilty of Direct Contempt
and ordered her detention.
In his Answer to the complaint, respondent explained that during the hearing of the
Motion for Inhibition, the employees of the court appeared before complainant but
she failed to name any of them as having allegedly told her that Jaime Cui, Jr. was
bragging that they have disbursed a substantial amount of money to him
(respondent); that Atty. Lee M. Zosa, the private prosecutor in the criminal case, and
Atty. Benly Frederick Bergonio, counsel for the PNB in the civil case, moved that
complainant be cited for Direct Contempt of Court and that she be detained until she
divulges the name of her informant; and that Atty. Jose M. Mendiola, complainants
lawyer, failed to give any comment because, according to him, complainant did not
consult him about the filing of the Motion for Inhibition.
Respondent went on to explain that since he issued his August 28, 2009 Order in an
official capacity, the remedy of complainant was to file a motion for reconsideration
or an appeal, not an administrative case; that he gave complainant a maximum of 30
days detention to give her a wider opportunity to either apologize or divulge the
name of her informant, so that even before the expiration of the period, the court can
lift the Order of Contempt.
Issue:
WON the acts of the judge was gross ignorance of the law or procedure as classified
as a serious charge under Section 8 Rule 140
Ruling:
Yes. Failure to follow basic legal commands as prescribed by law and the
rules is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law. By accepting the exalted
position of a judge, respondent ought to have been familiar with the legal
norms and precepts as well as the procedural rules.
Contrary to respondent's claim, complainant has no remedy of appeal, as the abovequoted Section 2 of Rule 71 shows. And the penalty for direct contempt if
imprisonment is imposed should not, as Section 1 of Rule 71 provides, exceed 10
days. As stated earlier, complainant was detained for 19 days or 9 days more than
the limit imposed by the Rules.
More. Respondent did not fix the bond, in violation of the same Section 2 of Rule 71,
which complainant could have posted had she desired to challenge the order. And on
the same day the Order was issued, respondent ordered the confinement of
complainant to the provincial jail.

Under Section 8 of Rule 140, gross ignorance of the law or procedure (9) is
classified as a serious charge which is, under Section 11 (A), punishable by:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Respondent having been repeatedly penalized by this Court, with suspension and
fine, as shown by the above-listed administrative charges, the recommended penalty
of P21,000 should be increased to P30,000.
WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, Judge Sibanah Usman is
FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Sevilla vs. Judge Francisco S. Lindo, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714

February 9, 2011
Facts:
Daniel G. Sevilla charged Hon. Francisco S. Lindo with delay in the disposition of a
criminal case. Sevilla asserted that Judge Lindo thereby violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that a judge should administer justice
impartially and without delay; that Judge Lindo also violated Section 1, Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court, which mandates that justice be impartially administered without
unnecessary delay; that Judge Lindos unreasonable resetting of the hearings 12
times rendered inconsequential his right to the speedy disposition of his case; and
that such resettings were made upon the instance of Judge Lindo, not upon motion of
the parties.
In his comment dated July 26, 2007, Judge Lindo refuted the charge, claiming that the
postponements were upon valid grounds.
Issue:
WON retired Judge Lindocan be held administratively liable for the numerous
postponements in violation of the Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. Although the postponement of a hearing in a civil or criminal case may at times
be unavoidable, the Court disallows undue or unnecessary postponements of court
hearings, simply because they cause unreasonable delays in the administration of
justice and, thus, undermine the people's faith in the Judiciary, aside from
aggravating the financial and emotional burdens of the litigants. For this reason, the
Court has enjoined that postponements and resetting should be allowed only upon
meritorious grounds, and has consistently reminded all trial judges to adopt a firm
policy against improvident postponements.
Yet, Judge Lindo postponed five hearings for lack of material time without bothering
to state the specific causes why his court lacked material time. He also reset four
hearings supposedly upon the agreement of the parties, which the complainant
credibly denied because that was prejudicial to his interest. He even cancelled the
hearing of May 25, 2007 on the ground that he had to file on May 28, 2007 his
application for compulsory retirement and leave of absence until July 24, 2007, and
set the next hearing on August 17, 2007, when he could have set the hearing sooner
either on May 26 or May 27 in view of his impending long period of absence.
Considering that we cannot discern any rationality for his actions in the handling of
Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260, a simple BP 22 case involving only P2,000.00, we can
only adjudge such actuations as smacking either of indolence and utter inefficiency,
or of bias, if not hostility, towards Sevilla, or both.
As can be seen, Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable postponements
that inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of
Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260 out of manifest bias in favor of the accused, to the
prejudice of Sevilla as the complainant in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260. Thus, he
flagrantly violated the letter and spirit both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer justice impartially
and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
required him as a trial judge "to be prompt in disposing of all matters

submitted to him, remembering that justice delayed is often justice

denied."
That his conduct proceeded from his bias towards the accused rendered his acts and
omissions as gross misconduct. It is settled that the misconduct is grave if it
involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law, or disregard of long-standing rules, which must be
established by substantial evidence; otherwise, the misconduct is only
simple.
Gross misconduct consisting in violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct is a serious
charge under Section 8 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 8.Serious charges. Serious charges include:
(3) Gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
xxxxxxxxxand is punished under Section 11 of Rule 140, Rules of Court, thuswise:
Section 11.Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the
following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court
may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include
accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three
(3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
With Judge Lindo having earlier retired, only the third sanction of fine can be a
practical sanction. WHEREFORE, we find and declare respondent retired Judge
Francisco S. Lindo guilty of grave misconduct, and, accordingly, punish him with a
fine of P21,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

Veloso v. Caminade, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1655

July 8, 2004
Facts:
This is an administrative complaint for sexual harassment separately filed by Atty.
Grace Veloso and Ma. JoeylynnQuiones against Judge Anacleto M. Caminade of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Atty. Veloso, a lawyer of the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO) assigned to the RTC branch presided by Judge Caminade, alleged in her
affidavit that, in the judges chamber, while discussing the case, she was stunned
when Judge Caminade suddenly placed his hand on her right thigh and squeezed it.
He then took her hand and kissed it. She immediately stood up and headed towards
the door leading to the staff room. He, however, caught up with her and placed his
hand on her shoulder. Before she could open the door, Judge Caminade told her "Kiss
ko bi" (Let me kiss you). Atty. Veloso, who was so shocked, retorted "Kalo-odnimo
Judge uy" (You are so disgusting, Judge). She then opened the door and went out of
his chambers.
On the other hand, JoeylynnQuiones, Clerk III in the office of Judge Caminade,
claimed that respondent judge squeezed her hand on three different occasions in
February 2001. Although offended by his actions, Joeylynn opted to remain silent out
of deference to or fear of respondent judge. There was also a time he suddenly
grabbed her right hand and kissed her on the cheek. She was so shocked that she
could not react.
Issue:
WON judge is guilty of gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct
Ruling:
Yes. Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct mandate, respectively, that
"judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of the reasonable observer" and that "judges shall
avoid improprieties and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities." These
very stringent standards of decorum are demanded of all magistrates and employees
of the courts. Judge Caminade's behavior must be sanctioned. We are neither
amused by his claims of innocent playfulness nor impressed by his excessive display
of congeniality. He acted beyond the bounds of decency, morality and
propriety. He failed to meet the standard of conduct embodied in the Code
of Judicial Conduct. His abusive and distasteful acts unmistakably constituted
sexual harassment because they resulted in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for his female subordinates.
Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, considers a
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense. A respondent
found guilty of a serious charge may be meted the penalty of: (1) dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, provided, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months;
or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.

We find it proper to adopt Justice Morales' recommendation to suspend respondent

judge for six months without pay. WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found guilty of
violating Canons 3 and 4 of the new Code of Judicial Conduct by committing sexual
harassment and is hereby SUSPENDED from office for a period of six months without
pay effective immediately, with the warning that a repetition of the same offense
shall be punished with dismissal from the service.

Section 9

ATTY. RANDY P. BARENG, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2246

Complainant, (formerly A.M. OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3219-RTJ)
- versus - JUDGE ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Manila,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 1, 2011
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

FACTS:
Atty. Bareng is the counsel of Romulo Awingan, one of the accused for double
murder, entitled People of the Philippines v. Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Lloyd Antiporda,
Romulo Awingan and Richard Mecate. These two murder cases were consolidated
before the RTC, Manila, Branch 29 but Grulla voluntarily inhibited herself from the
case, and did not resolve the motion for reconsideration and the motion to transfer
the cases. The consolidated cases were subsequently re-raffled to the RTC, Manila,
Branch 19, presided by Judge Daguna.
In her December 9, 2005 Resolution, Judge Daguna granted the private
complainants motion for reconsideration and set aside Judge Grullas October 26,
2005 Order. Accused Awingan, through Atty. Bareng, filed a motion for
reconsideration. Judge Daguna denied the motion in her Order of February 3,
2006. Awingan, thereafter, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the
Court of Appeals (CA), alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Daguna.
During the pendency of the CA petition, Judge Daguna issued warrants of
arrest against all the accused.
The CA granted Awingans petition for certiorari and prohibition in
its November 10, 2006 Decision.[7] The CA found that Judge Daguna acted with grave
abuse of discretion because she arbitrarily and whimsically disregarded the
guidelines for acting on the Peoples motion to withdraw informations and practiced
unreasonable and inexplicable selectivity by not considering all the records available

to her in order to make her independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of
the cases before her.
Since the warrants of arrest against all the accused were still in force, Atty.
Bareng filed before the RTC a Manifestation and Motion, on November 15, 2006,[9] to
inform the RTC of the CA Decision and to ask for its immediate implementation. He
attached a certified copy of the CA Decision.
Judge Daguna denied the motion for lack of merit in her December 4,
2006 Order.
In the Order[18] issued, Judge Daguna stated that she resolved Atty. Barengs
motion for reconsideration on July 31, 2007, but her Order might not have been
released; hence, she directed that the Order be reprinted and the parties be
furnished with copies. Since Judge Daguna denied his motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit,[19] Atty. Bareng filed his notice of appeal[20] on May 20, 2008, after
receiving his copy of the order on May 6, 2008.[21]
On July 8, 2009, Atty. Bareng filed with the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) his complaint-affidavit,[22] charging Judge Daguna with gross misconduct and
manifest abuse of functions of her office, based on the following allegations:
1. That Judge Daguna, in her December 4, 2006 Order, insinuated that there
was pecuniary estimation attached to the manifestation and motion filed by Atty.
Bareng; this, according to Atty. Bareng, was unfair and tainted with malice;
2. That despite Atty. Barengs explanation, Judge Daguna found him guilty of
contempt of court;
3. That he filed a motion for reconsideration and supplement to the motion for
reconsideration;
4. That after the lapse of almost one year, he filed his first motion to resolve;
5. That after more than one month, he filed a manifestation and second
motion to resolve;
6. That Judge Daguna claimed that she had resolved the motion for
reconsideration as early as July 31, 2007 but apparently the order had not been
released; and
7. That he filed a notice of appeal on May 20, 2008 but Judge Daguna had not
acted on the appeal despite his motion to resolve and/or elevate appeal dated June
19, 2009.
In her July 31, 2009 Comment, Judge Daguna denied that the delays
attributed to her were her fault. She blamed her staff for the delay.
While the administrative case was pending, Judge Daguna applied for
disability retirement in late 2009. She was allowed to retire, but because of the two
(2) pending administrative cases against her, the amount of P50,000.00 was withheld
from her retirement benefits to answer for whatever adverse decision the Court may
later impose on her.
In its submission dated February 24, 2010the OCA found no evidence to
sustain the charges of gross misconduct and manifest abuse of functions of her office
against Judge Daguna. The OCA, however, found Judge Daguna guilty of gross
inefficiency.
ISSUE: WON Judge Daguna is liable for gross deficiency for failing to adopt a system
of record management in her court.
HELD:

We agree with the OCAs finding that Judge Daguna is liable for gross
inefficiency for failing to adopt a system of record management in her court. Judge
Daguna violated Rule 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct that provides:
Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities,
maintain professional competence in court management, and facilitate the
performance of the administrative functions or other judges and court personnel.
Rule 3.09 A judge should organize and supervise the court personnel to
ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity.
On July 31, 2007Judge Daguna also resolved Atty. Barengs motion for
reconsideration which was filed on January 31, 2007, or way beyond the required
period. There was also a delay in sending the records of the appealed case to the CA.
Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that A judge shall dispose
of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods.
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 9. Less Serious Charges. Less serious charges include:
1. Undue delay in rendering a decision or order, or in transmitting the records
of a case;
xxx
SECTION 11. Sanctions.
xxx
B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following
sanctions shall be imposed:
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
In addition to gross inefficiency, we find Judge Daguna guilty of delay in
rendering an order, as well as delay in transmitting the records of a case. Based on
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the penalty for a less serious charge is either
suspension or a fine. Considering Judge Dagunas retirement, we consider a total fine
of P15,000.00 to be the appropriate penalty. This fine shall be deducted from
the P50,000.00 withheld from her retirement benefits.

MARIETTA DUQUE,
Complainant,

A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2027

- versus JUDGE
CRISOSTOMO
L.
GARRIDO,
Regional
Trial
Court,
Branch
7, Tacloban City[presently
assigned as Presiding Judge, Branch
13, Carigara,Leyte],
Respondent.

Promulgated:
February 27, 2009

FACTS:
Complainant Marietta Duque charged respondent, Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, Tacloban City, Leyte, with gross violation
of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution for rendering a decision beyond
ninety (90) days in Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 entitled People v Reynaldo
Caones y Royo Sr., et al.
Complainant is the alleged common-law wife of the murdered victim in the
aforementioned case. She alleged that the prosecution filed its Memorandum
submitting the case for resolution on August 10, 2005, but the respondent issued a
Decision on December 12, 2005 which was promulgated on January 27,
2006. Complainant further alleged that neither the offended party nor the handling
prosecutor was notified of the promulgation.
Respondent judge denied the accusation that the decision in Criminal Case
No. 2000-10-580 was rendered beyond the 90-day period as prescribed by the 1987
Constitution.
He explained that while the last pleading - the Memorandum for the
Prosecution - was filed on August 10, 2005, the Order declaring the case submitted
for resolution was issued on September 13, 2005. Respondent further explained that
the Decision dated December 12, 2005 was promulgated only on January 27, 2006
because he was on official leave from December 15, 2005 to January 15, 2006 as he
left for the United States.
Respondent maintained that there was no impropriety or procedural infirmity
in the promulgation of the decision even though the complainant and the handling
prosecutor, Robert M. Visbal, were not present at that time. He reasoned that the
complainant is not entitled to be notified of the promulgation as she is neither the
private complainant nor a witness, while the prosecution was duly represented during
the promulgation by Prosecutor Edgar A. Sabarre who was also assigned in the
RTC. Respondent pointed out that the court had already set the schedule of the

promulgation. Hence, when Prosecutor Visbal opted not to attend, it was for a reason
only known to him.
OCA found respondent judge administratively liable for rendering a decision
beyond the 90-day period in violation of Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Additionally,
respondent was found to have violated the franking privilege under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 26.
ISSUE:
WON respondent is administratively liable for gross inefficiency.
HELD:
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized that the office of a judge exacts
nothing less than faithful observance of the Constitution and the law in the discharge
of official duties.
Section 15 (1), Article VIII of the Constitution mandates lower court judges to
decide a case within the reglementary period of 90 days.
Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct under Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 dictates as
follows:
Rule 3.05 A judge shall dispose of the court's business promptly and decide
cases within the required periods.
Indeed, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done are
indispensable to prevent needless delays in the orderly and speedy disposition of
cases. Thus, the 90-day period within which to decide cases is mandatory. The Court
has consistently emphasized strict observance of this rule in order to minimize the
twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. Any delay
in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the litigant of his right
to a speedy disposition of his case, for, not only does it magnify the cost of seeking
justice, it undermines the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it to disrepute.
As readily gleaned from the records, the last pleading submitted i.e., the
Memorandum for the Prosecution, was filed on August 10, 2005 ]. Thus, the case was
deemed submitted for decision on that date. Accordingly, the decision should have
been rendered not later than November 8, 2005. However, respondent issued it only
on December 12, 2005 which was more than four months after the case had been
submitted for decision.
Respondent Judge Garrido clearly violated both the Constitution and the Code
of Judicial Conduct when he failed to decide Criminal Case No. 2000-10-580 within
the 90-day period to decide cases prescribed for the lower courts.
Failure of a judge, such as respondent herein, to decide a case within the
prescribed period is inexcusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting a
disciplinary sanction.

Under Section 9(1, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, of the
Revised Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or order is categorized as
a less serious charge. Under Section 11(B) of the same Rule, the penalty for such
charge is suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more than P10,000 but not
exceeding P20,000.
For failure of respondent judge in this case to decide Criminal Case No. 200010-580 within the prescribed period and taking into consideration the mitigating
circumstance that it was his first offense, we impose on him a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00).
Respondent must also be penalized for violation of P.D. No. 26 [24] because he
filed his Rejoinder to this administrative case taking advantage of the franking
privilege. Although such privilege is extended to judges, the same refers only to
official communications and papers directly connected with the conduct of judicial
proceedings which shall be transmitted in the mail free of charge. The respondent, in
mailing his Rejoinder, made it appear that the same is an official court process as the
envelope used bears his station and the words FREE FROM POSTAGE. We concur with
the OCA that respondent be admonished for such violation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Crisostomo L. Garrido is hereby found GUILTY
of GROSS INEFFICIENCY for delay in the disposition of a case and for which he is
FINED Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). He is likewise found GUILTY of violation of
Presidential Decree No. 26 for which he is ADMONISHED. He is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of the decision be attached to his personal record.

CIRILA S. RAYMUNDO,
Complainant,

MTJ)

A.M. No. MTJ-09-1738

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2033-

- versus Promulgated:
JUDGE TERESITO A. ANDOY,
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Cainta,
Rizal,
Respondent.

October 6, 2010

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that sometime in 2000, she filed six counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22) against Hermelinda Chang (accused)
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cainta, Rizal. The respondent judge presided
over the court.
Respondent judge declared that the accused had waived her rights to present
further evidence for repeated failure to appear in court despite due notice.
On September 2, 2004, the complainant received a notice from the MTC, setting the
cases for trial anew on November 17, 2004. The date was later moved to December
20, 2004.
On December 20, 2004, the accused and her counsel again failed to appear in
court, prompting the private prosecutor to move for the reinstatement of the
MTCs August 4, 2004 order. The respondent judge granted the motion and declared
the cases submitted for decisionThe accused moved to reconsider this order; the MTC
granted the motion in its order of February 9, 2005. Accordingly, the cases were
again set for hearing on October 12, 2005.
On October 12, 2005, the accused and her counsel again failed to appear in
court despite due notice. The MTC, thus, ordered the direct testimony of the accused
to be stricken off the record, and again declared the cases submitted for decision.
On June 23, 2006, the complainant filed with the MTC an urgent ex parte
motion to render decision. Almost two years later, or on March 12, 2008, the

complainant filed a second ex parte motion to render decision. The respondent judge
did not act on these motions.
Respondent judge, in his defense, stated that he had prepared his decision in
the subject cases, dated July 19, 2008, and had set the same for promulgation
on August 18, 2008, at 8:30 in the morning and that although the undersigned is
aware that heavy caseload is not considered by the Supreme Court as an excuse for
delay in rendering decisions, the undersigned humbly begs this Honorable Offices
utmost consideration, understanding and compassion in evaluating the subject IPI.
The undersigned is due to retire on October 3, 2008.
The OCA found respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a
decision, explaining that while the Court is not unaware of the heavy caseload of
judges, nothing in the records shows that the respondent judge asked for an
extension of time to decide the subject criminal cases. In addition, the respondent
judge failed to consider that the subject cases required a quicker resolution as they
were covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.
HELD:
Yes. We stress at the outset that the subject criminal cases violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 are indeed covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure pursuant to A.M. No.
00-11-01-SC (Re: Amendment to the Rule on Summary Procedure of Criminal Cases).
The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated by the Supreme Court to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive disposition of cases. Section 17 of this Rule
requires the court to promulgate a judgment not later than thirty (30) days after
termination of trial. Trial in the present case originally ended on August 4, 2004.
From this sequence of events, we find it clear that the respondent judge failed
to observe the mandated period of time to decide cases under the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Following Section 17 of this Rule, he should have rendered a decision
within 30 days from the termination of trial on August 4, 2004. His failure to meet this
deadline is a patent indication that he did not take into account and had disregarded
the Rule on Summary Procedure.
At any rate, even if we adopt a liberal approach and consider the subject
cases to be outside the coverage of the Rule on Summary Procedure, the respondent
judge still cannot escape liability.
The Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed before all lower
courts shall be decided or resolved within 90 days from the time the case is
submitted for decision.
In the present case, the subject cases had been submitted for decision
since October 12, 2005. As correctly pointed out by the OCA, while the respondent
judge attributed his failure to render a decision to the heavy caseload in his sala, he
did not ask for an extension of time to decide the cases. This failure to decide within
the required period, given that he could have asked for an extension, is inexcusable;
it constitutes neglect of duty as well as gross inefficiency that collectively warrant
administrative sanction.

Under Rule 140, Section 9(1), as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-810-SC, the respondent judges undue delay in rendering a decision is classified as a
less serious offense. It carries the penalty of suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three months, or a fine of
more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.
Since the respondent judge had been previously found guilty in Blanco v.
Andoy of gross ignorance of procedure and undue delay in the resolution of a motion
(for which he was imposed a P25,000.00 fine with a stern warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely), we impose on him the
maximum allowable fine of P20,000.00. This amount shall be deducted from
respondent judges retirement benefits as the record shows that he had already
retired from the service on October 3, 2008.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Judge Teresito A. Andoy is hereby
found GUILTY of (1) undue delay in rendering a decision and (2) violation of Canon 3,
Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINEof twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00), to be deducted from his retirement benefits

SECTION 10

MARGIE MACIAS CORPUS, complainant, vs. JUDGE WILFREDO G.

OCHOTORENA, RTC BR. 11, SINDANGAN, ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE,
respondent. [A.M. No. RTJ- 04-1861. July 30, 2004]
FACTS:
On February 6, 2001, a verified Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
was filed against Mrs. Macias by Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Mr. Macias), her husband
and incumbent presiding judge of RTC, Branch 11, Liloy, Zamboanga Del Norte. The
case was raffled to the respondents court.1[2] On the same day the Complaint was
filed, the respondent immediately issued Summons to Mrs. Macias.2[3] However, the
Summons was not served on Mrs. Macias for the reason that her whereabouts were
allegedly unknown.3[4] Consequently, Mr. Macias filed a motion to serve summons by
publication. The respondent granted the motion in his Order4[5] dated March 7, 2001,
with the directive that Mrs. Macias should file her answer within 30 days after notice.
Thereafter, Mr. Macias caused the publication of the Summons in the local weekly
newspaper, Tingog Peninsula, based in Dipolog City in its March 11-17, 2001 issue. 5
[6]

1
2
3
4

Mrs. Macias claims she learned of the aforesaid publication of Summons

during the first week of April 2001. Without delay, on April 10, 2001 or within the 30day period to file an answer, she filed a Motion to Dismiss, which she set for hearing
on April 20, 2001.6[7] However, instead of first acting upon the motion, the
respondent judge set the hearing on the merits of the subject case on April 19, 2001,
or one day before.
On April 19, 2001, respondent judge denied the Motion to Dismiss and re-set
the hearing on the merits to April 30, May 2 and 3, 2001. 7[8] After the scheduled
hearings, the respondent judge terminated the proceedings and declared the case
submitted for decision.8[9]
It is in the light of the foregoing that Mrs. Macias believes that the respondent
judge deprived her of the fundamental right to due process with utmost bias and
partiality for Mr. Macias; hence, she filed the instant Complaint containing the abovecited facts before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).
The respondent judge claims that the instant Complaint is fatally defective
because it is not supported by the affidavits of persons who have knowledge of the
facts and documents needed to substantiate the allegations therein. Also, he asserts
that malice, bad faith, and the intention to harass, embarrass and humiliate him had
motivated Mrs. Macias to file the said Complaint.
Finally, respondent judge insists that his Decision9[15] is valid and prays for
the dismissal of the instant Complaint for lack of merit.
In summary, Mrs. Macias now asserts before the Court that the respondent
judges actuations constitute bias, partiality and conduct unbecoming a judge.
Moreover, according to her, what is more glaring and conclusive from the records is
that the respondent is grossly ignorant of the law and procedure. For these
administrative lapses, Mrs. Macias concludes that the Court should sanction him.
ISSUE: WON respondent jusge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.
HELD:

The conclusion is amply supported by the Court of Appeals Decision which

states that the respondent judge totally disregarded Mrs. Macias right to due process
when he proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case completely ignoring the
fact that her Motion to Dismiss, which was filed within the 30-day reglementary
period, was still pending resolution.
What happened in the case is a classic example of railroading or procedural
short-cut. Instead of resolving the Motion to Dismiss, the respondent judge
completely ignored it and proceeded with the trial on the merits of the case by
receiving Mr. Macias evidence ex-parte.

5
6
7
8
9

It is also worth mentioning that, as correctly found by the appellate court,

even if Mrs. Macias failed to file her answer to the complaint after the period therefor
had elapsed, the respondent judge was not authorized to conduct a hearing of the
case on its merits. The Rules of Court prohibits default proceedings in cases involving
declaration of nullity of marriage.10[23]
In that regard, Mrs. Macias had already filed her Motion to Dismiss where she
indicated her address and, hence, can be notified by the Public Prosecutor of his
investigation.11[24]
Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: If the defending
party in an action for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted
is not fabricated. Thus, the report of the Public Prosecutor is a condition sine qua non
for further proceedings to go on in the case. Respondent judge ignored this
procedural rule.
Considering the foregoing, the Court rules that the respondent judge violated
Mrs. Macias right to due process when he completely ignored the pertinent rules. A
judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a modicum of acquaintance with
statutes and procedural rules, it is his duty to keep always abreast with law and
jurisprudence.12[26] When the law or procedure is so elementary, for him not to know
it or to act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.
Under Section 3 in relation to Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
gross ignorance of the law is considered a serious offense, for which a penalty of
either dismissal from the service with forfeiture of benefits, suspension from office for
more than three (3) months but not exceeding six (6) months or a fine of more than
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) but not exceeding Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) may be imposed.
WHEREFORE, Judge Wilfredo G. Ochotorena is found GUILTY of gross
ignorance of the law and incompetence and is hereby FINED the amount of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) to be taken from the amount earlier withheld from his
retirement benefits.

10
11
12

Dagudag v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017

June 19, 2008
Facts:
This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law and conduct unbecoming a judge
filed by retired Lt. Gen. Alfonso P. Dagudag (Gen. Dagudag), Head of Task Force
SagipKalikasan, against Judge Paderanga. On or about 30 January 2005, the Region
VII Philippine National Police Regional Maritime Group (PNPRMG) received information
that MV General Ricarte of NMC Container Lines, Inc. was shipping container vans
containing illegal forest products from Cagayan de Oro to Cebu. The shipments were
falsely declared as cassava meal and corn grains to avoid inspection by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). True enough, ilegal forest
products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. was seized by the DENR. The
items were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently
abandoned by the unknown owner. Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of
replevin for the release of said confiscated products. Respondent Judge issued the
writ despite the fact that an administrative case was already pending before the
DENR. In one session, the judge made use of the words "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" as
well as statements as The problem with you people is you do not use your heads,
and How dare you say that the Court is wrong.

Issue:
WONJudge Paderanga is liable for conduct unbecoming a judge by the use of these
phrases
Ruling:
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of
Canon 6 states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their
knowledge necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should
keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws.
The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make
an exception to this rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and
Edma had not availed of any administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have
dismissed the replevin suit outright.
The OCA found Judge Paderanga liable for using inappropriate language in court:
"We . . . find respondent's intemperate use of "Shut up!" and "Baloney!" well-nigh
inappropriate in court proceedings. The utterances are uncalled for. transcripts of
stenographic notes show that Judge Paderanga was impatient, discourteous, and
undignified in court.
Section 6, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
states that judges shall be patient, dignified, and courteous in relation to lawyers.
Rule 3.04, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should be
patient and courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced. They should
avoid the attitude that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of the courts for
the litigants.
Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their language at all times. They
must refrain from inflammatory, excessively rhetoric, or vile language. They should
(1) be dignified in demeanor and refined in speech; (2) exhibit that
temperament of utmost sobriety and self-restraint; and (3) be considerate,
courteous, and civil to all persons who come to their court.
Section 10 of Rule 140 classifies conduct unbecoming a judge as a light
offense. It is punishable by (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding
P10,000; (2) censure; (3) reprimand; or (4) admonition with warning. However, Judge
Paderanga has two other administrative cases pending against him one, for gross
ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, and grave abuse of
authority, and the other for gross misconduct, grave abuse of authority, and gross
ignorance of the law.
The Court will not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty on those who have fallen
short of their accountabilities. It will not tolerate any conduct that violates the norms
of public accountability and diminishes the faith of the people in the judicial system.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Maximo G.W. Paderanga, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 38, Cagayan de Oro City, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and
UNBECOMING CONDUCT. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES him from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice
to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations

Spouses Jacinto v. Vallarta, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1541

March 10, 2005
Facts:
This case originated from a Complaint filed by Spouses Jesus V. Jacinto and Nenita C.
Jacinto on March 22, 2002. Judge Placido B. Vallarta was charged therein with gross
negligence, gross ignorance of the law, issuance of an unjust interlocutory order, and
vulgar and unbecoming conduct. Their main thrust of their complaint was for issuing
a Writ of Replevin, even if the bonding company that issued the replevin bond was
allegedly not authorized to do business with the MTC of Gapan; and (2) for failing to
act, favorably and with dispatch, on their various Motions and counter-replevin bond
for the release of the truck to them.
These however were not given weight as the facts laid down by complainants are
insufficient to support a finding of gross ignorance of the law. To be held liable
therefor, "the judge must be shown to have committed an error that was 'gross or
patent, deliberate and malicious.'Respondent may have erred in issuing the Writ of
Replevin, but such error has not been shown to be gross or patent. Because
complainants did not furnish this Court a copy of the Complaint in Civil Case No.
4896, there is no basis for showing how they presented the case and the need for a
writ of replevin to respondent. While manifesting palpable impatience bordering on
rudeness, as well as personal disinterest in their cause and problems, his utterances
and behavior fail to support a finding that he acted deliberately and maliciously.
Issue:
WON judge is absolved of administrative liability in light of no findings of gross
negligence
Ruling:
No, he cannot be completely absolved of administrative liability.
Judges are viewed as the visible representations of law and justice, from
whom the people draw the will and inclination to obey the law. Thus, the
official conduct of judges should be free from impropriety and even the
appearance of impropriety. Their personal behavior, not only on the bench and in
the performance of judicial duties but also in their everyday lives, should be beyond
reproach. Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that a "judge should so
behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary.
XXX However, we were dismayed by the attitude shown by Judge
Vallarta and the words from him [were] so surprising that we [did]
not expect to hear from a public servant and from a Judge for that
matter. Instead of giving sound advice to our case, Judge Vallarta
acted otherwise and was totally rude towards us.
Respondent must be reminded that government service is people-oriented.
"Patience is an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark
of culture and good breeding." Impatience and rudeness have no place in
government service, in which personnel are enjoined to act with self-restraint and
civility at all times.

Section 10 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies vulgar and unbecoming
conduct as a light charge, for which a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding
P10,000 may be imposed.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Placido B. Vallarta is found guilty of vulgar and
unbecoming conduct and hereby FINED five thousand pesos.

BAR QUESTIONS

ESSAY
1.

An audit team from the Office of the Court Administrator found that Judge
Contaminada committed serious infractions through the indiscriminate
grant of petitions for annulment of marriage and legal separation. In one
year, the judge granted 300 of such petitions when the average number of
petitions of similar nature granted by an individual judge in his region was
only 24 petitions per annum. The audit revealed many different defects in
the granted petitions: many petitions had not been verified; the required
copies of some petitions were not furnished to the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor; docket fees had not
been fully paid; the parties were not actual residents within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court; and, in some cases, there was no record of the
cross-examinations conducted by the public prosecutor or any documentary
evidence marked and formally offered. All these, viewed in their totality,
supported the improvident and indiscriminate grant that the OCA found. If
you were the counsel for Andy Malasuerte and other litigants whose
marriages had been improperly and finally annulled, discuss your options in
administratively proceeding against Judge Contaminada, and state where
and how you would exercise these options. (2013)

(1) Judge Contaminada may be charged with gross ignorance of the law and
procedure under Section 8 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. The serious infractions
committed by Judge Contaminada were in cases involving petitions for nullity and
annulment of marriage and legal separation, the most disturbing and scandalous of
which was the haste with which she disposed of such cases. For the one year alone,
Judge Contaminida granted a total of 300 petitions of this nature. The audits likewise
showed that she acted on these petitions despite the fact that it was not verified;
that the OSG or the OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition; that the petition
did not recite the true residence of the parties, which should be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court; or that the docket fees have not been fully paid and
jurisdiction over the person of the respondents have not been acquired. Judge
Contaminada had blatantly disregarded of the provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC
(Proposed Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages ) and 02-11-11-SC (Proposed Rule on Legal Separation). She is
thus found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. No less than the Code
of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the laws and maintain
professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good judge. A judge

must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with procedural rules.
When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes the
publics confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the
law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the court
the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judges hands.
Moreover, the reprehensible haste with which she granted petitions for nullity and
annulment of marriage and legal separation, despite noncompliance with the
appropriate rules and evident irregularities in the proceedings, displayed her utter
lack of competence and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of
authority. The administrative proceeding is instituted by filing of a verified complaint
before the Supreme Court supported by affidavits of persons who have personal
knowledge of the facts alleged therein and documents which may substantiate said
allegations.
(2) Another option would be to file for disciplinary action with the Supreme Court for
violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The actions of Judge Contaminada clearly
run against the standards set by the Canon on Competence under the Code of
Judicial Conduct. While not all infractions by a judge constitute gross ignorance of the
law, Judge Contaminadas blatant disregard for the rules and the indiscriminate
granting of annulment and legal separation judgements without sufficient legal basis
speak of his glaring lack of competence as a member of the judiciary.

2.
Judge Horacio would usually go to the cockpits on Saturdays for relaxation,
as the owner of the cockpit is a friend of his. He also goes to the casino
once a week to accompany his wife who loves to play the slot machines.
Because of this, Judge Horacio was administratively charged. When asked
to explain, he said that although he goes to these places, he only watches
and does not place any bets. Is his explanation tenable? Explain. (2005)

No. Judge Horacio can be held administratively liable for going to cockpits because he
openly and deliberately disregarded and violated Paragraph 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. Verily, it is plainly despicable to see a judge inside a cockpit and more
so, to see him bet therein. Mixing with the crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and
bettors is unbecoming a judge and undoubtedly impairs the respect due him.
Ultimately, the Judiciary itself suffers therefrom because a judge is a visible
representation of the Judiciary. Most often, the public mind does not separate the
judge from the Judiciary. In short, any demeaning act of a judge or court personnel
demeans the institution he represents. For going to casino, the Judge may be
administratively liable also for violating Paragraph 22 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
which provides: "The judge should be studiously careful himself to avoid the slightest
infraction of the law, lest it be a demoralizing example to others." Even granting

arguendo that respondent did not gamble or personally play the slot machine, his
mere presence in a casino constituted a violation of Circular No. 4 and, more
specifically, Paragraph 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Thus, under the amended
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a violation of a circular issued by this Court, such as
Circular No. 4, is a less serious charge (Sec. 4.4), while gambling in public is a light
charge (Sec. 5). If found guilty of a less serious charge the respondent may be
punished with a penalty of fine of not less than P10,000 but not exceeding P19,999
(Sec. 10-B.2); and for a light charge, he may be punished with a fine of not less than
P1,000 but not exceeding P9,999 (Sec. 10-C.1). All told, the Court may impose on
respondent Judge a fine of P12,000. (CITY GOVERNMENT OF TAGBILARAN vs. JUDGE
AGAPITO HONTANOSAS, JR, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1169, January 29, 2002

3.
May a judge be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on a
complaint filed by the complainant and the answer of respondent judge? If
so, under what circumstances? What is the rationale behind this power of
the Supreme Court? (1996)

A judge may be disciplined by the Supreme Court based solely on the basis of the
complaint filed by the complainant and the answer of the respondent judge, under
the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The Supreme Court has held that when the facts
alleged in the complaint are admitted or are already shown on the record, and no
credible explanation that would negate the strong inference of evil intent is
forthcoming, no further hearing to establish such facts to support a judgment as to
culpability of the respondent is necessary (In Re: Petition for dismissal of Judge
Dizon).

4.
After being diagnosed with stress dermatitis, Judge Rosalind, without
seeking permission from the Supreme Court, refused to wear her robe
during court proceedings. When her attention was called, she explained
that whenever she wears her robe she is reminded of her heavy caseload,
thus making her tense. This, in turn, triggers the outbreak of skin rashes. Is
Judge Rosalind justified in not wearing her judicial robe? Explain. (2009)

(1) Pursuant to Sections 5 and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to
heighten public consciousness on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, all
Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts shall wear black robes during sessions of
their respective Court. In the case at bar, Judge Rosalinds non-wearing of her
robe due to her medical condition is not excusable. To be exempt from nonwearing of robe, she must first secure a Courts permission. She cannot simply
exempt from complying with requirement.
(2) No, Judge Rosalind is not justified in not wearing her judicial robe. Administrative
Circular No. 25 dated 9 June 1989 (Circular No. 25), provides: Pursuant to Sections 5
and 6, Article [VIII] of the Constitution and in order to heighten public consciousness
on the solemnity of judicial proceedings, Presiding Judges of all Trial Courts are
directed to wear black robes during sessions of their respective Courts. Otherwise,
she would be held administratively liable for violation of a lawful order of the
Supreme Court requiring judges to wear their judicial robe.

5.
Court of Appeals (CA) Justice Juris was administratively charged with gross
ignorance of the law for having issued an order temporarily enjoining the
implementation of a writ of execution, and for having issued another order
for the parties to maintain the status quo in the same case. Both orders
are obviously without any legal basis and violate CA rules. In his defense,
Justice Juris claims that the challenged orders were collegial acts of the CA
Division to which he belonged. Thus, he posits that the charge should not
be filed against him alone, but should include the two other CA justices in
the Division. Is the contention of Justice Juris tenable? Explain. (2009)

(1) As to the orders being collegial acts of the CA Division, Justice Juris could not be
held liable alone. Collegial Division members share any decision on what proceedings
to adopt in the conduct of its business. They act by consensus or majority rule.
Moreover, error or mistake of a judge or a justice, as basis for disciplinary action must
be gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in bad faith. It is only when he acts
fraudulently or corruptly or with gross ignorance that he may be administratively held
liable. He cannot be subjected to liability for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. In this case there is no showing of Justice
Juris acting in bad faith together with the collegiate division.

(2) No, such contention is untenable. The Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals,
particularly Sec. 5, Rule VI thereof, provides that all members of the Division shall act
upon an application for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. However, if only the
ponente is present, then the latter shall act alone upon the application. Thus, if it was
the Division that issued the assailed orders, then all its members should be held

liable. Likewise, if Justice Juris acted alone, then he must bear sole liability. In the
case at bar, Justice Juris seemed to have acted alone.

MCQ

1. Which of the following statements is false? (2005)

a) All administrative cases against Justices of appellate courts and judges of lower
courts fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
b) Administrative cases against erring Justices of the Court of Appeals and
Sandiganbayan, judges, and lawyers in the government service are not automatically
treated as disbarment cases.
c) The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio, or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
prosecute proper charges against erring lawyers including those in the government
service.
d) The filing of an administrative case against the judge is not a ground for
disqualification/inhibition.
e) Trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by
justices of appellate courts and judges of lower courts.

2. Administrative proceedings against Judges of all courts and Justices of

the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan shall be
A. private and confidential
B. public but subdued
C. private but transparent
D. public
(2011)

3. What is the method of national inquiry into the conduct of Supreme

Court magistrates?
(A) Administrative investigation
(B) Disqualification
(C) Impeachment
(D) Disbarment
(2011)