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Mixed Signals: Radio Broadcasting Policy in India

Author(s): Kanchan Kumar


Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 22 (May 31 - Jun. 6, 2003), pp. 2173-2182
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly
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Mixed
Radio

Signals

BroadcastingPolicy

in

India

Broadcasting in our country continues to be governed by two archaic legislations and


regulated through an assortment of laws that have been scripted as expedient measures to
tackle high priority short-termdemands. There exists no comprehensivepolicy that takes
into account the contradictorypulls surroundingbroadcasting in India.
KANCHAN KUMAR

he principlesand practicesof broadcastingas they have FM transmittersto runradiostationsin the campusesis being
existedandevolved in Indiaare audiblyreflectedin the projectedas a move to open up the broadcastingsectorfor nonkeyissuesthatthemediaplannersandpolicy-makershave profitsocial sectorby allowingcommunityradiostations.While
is not unwelcomeas it dilutessomesoughtto resolveat differenttimes in morethan75 yearsof its the policy pronouncement
existencenow.Thediscoursesandimperativesat anygiventime whatthe hegemonyof the state and marketover broadcasting,
with regardto Indianbroadcastinghave been quite in conflict but to open it up for an urban,educated,elite coterie in areas
witheachother.Thestate'smonopolyoverbroadcasting
is under thatare alreadywell servedby mediabetraysthe fundamental
attack,while anxietyis being expressedfor regulatingthe in- philosophybehindcommunityradioas the world understands
vasionfromsatellitebecauseof its perceivedimpacton national it today.The historicalphilosophyof communityradio is to
cultureand culturalidentities.While privatebroadcastersare use this mediumas the voice of the voiceless, the mouthpiece
seekingfree marketfor media, and consumersare demanding of oppressedpeople and generallyas a tool for development
the right to choose, there is worry over the increasing [AMARC 1998].
It is mere tokenismto say that these stationswould provide
commercialisation
andhomogenisationof mediacontentthatis
its
service
function.
thwarting public
space for developmentand change-orientedcontent.If it does
ruralorpoorpopulaceto disseminate
However,a temporalperspectiveof thehistoryof broadcasting notenablethemarginalised,
in Indiashowsthatcertainvitalconcernshavebeenignoredover their own messages and to challenge the mainstreamunderseveralerasthoughthey find a consistentmentionin the reports standingof social issues, the whole purposeis lost. But the
of variouscommitteesperiodicallyappointedby thegovernment governmentis contentwith postponingthe criticaldecision of
of Indiato examinemedia-relatedissues. Some such perennial allowingautonomousbroadcastingspaces to communitiesand
of powerandcontrol
questionsrelateto people's access to communicationtechno- thesocialsectorasthatentailsre-distribution
and
media
audience
for
over
resources
and
The
content,
logies
participation
perpetuating
technologies. historyof thebroadpluralityof ideas and facilitating self-representationthrough castingsystemin Indiais witnessto the fact thatone of the main
popularandcommunitybasedmedia.Thesesubjectsarediscern- factorsthat perpetuatesstatusquo is the desire of the state to
ible in thefascinatingdebateson the natureof appropriate
media retaincontrol.Infact,theattitudeof successivegovernmentseven
in
in
are
documents
that
aftermorethanhalfa centuryof independencehasunmistakable
India
and
should
conceptualised
policy
ideallyformthe underpinningsof the broadcastingscenarioin tracesof the normsset by the Britishwho introducedorganised
the country.
broadcastingin the country.
An analysisof the broadcastingformandfunctioningin India
revealsthatthe attemptsto addresssuch persistentinadequacies
Legacy of Indian Broadcasting
orto balancethedilemmasfacingbroadcasting
havebeenmarked
The firstregularradioservicewas inauguratedin Indiaby the
by pressuresotherthanthose of publicserviceandthe pressing
demandsby civil society.As a result,broadcastingin ourcountry IndianBroadcastingCompany(IBC) with the openingof the
continuesto be governedby the archaicIndianTelegraphAct BombayStationon July 23, 1927.l The then viceroy of India,
of 1885 and the IndianWirelessTelegraphyAct of 1933 and LordIrwin,inauguratedthis 1.5 KW stationwith an effective
regulatedthroughan assortmentof legislationthat have been rangeof 30 miles (48 kms.).Thiscameaboutsevenmonthsafter
scriptedas expedientpopulistmeasuresby suave politiciansto the creationof the BritishBroadcastingCorporation(BBC) in
tacklehighpriorityshort-termdemands.Thereexists nothingin the UK in January1927 as a publiclyfundedorganisationwith
the formof a comprehensivepolicy thattakes into accountthe JohnReithas its first directorgeneral.Indianbroadcastinghas
contradictory
pulls of the concernssurrounding
broadcastingin borrowedmuchof its programming
pattern,philosophyandeven
Indiaandplacesits rolewithinthecontextof new socio-political talentfor developmentfrom the Corporation.However,except
and techno-economicrealities.
for the firsttwo yearsandeight months,whenbroadcastingwas
Anexampleof howgovernmentsappropriate
andco-optfervent operatedas a commercialventure,it has beenundergovernment
concernsand give them an interpretation
that is convenientto controlin Indiatill recentlywhen it has takenon the avatarof
theirpoliticalinterestsis therecentpublicpolicypronouncement a public corporation.2
to grant'communitybroadcasting'licences to establisheduniIt is interestingto observethe similaritiesbetweenthe maiden
versities,colleges andschools.This decisionto allow settingup Report on the Progress of Broadcasting in India issued from the
Economicand PoliticalWeekly May 31, 20032173

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office of thefirstcontrollerof broadcasting,


governmentof India,
Lionel Fielden on June 3, 1939 and the contentcategoriesof
statisticsin the AnnualReportof All IndiaRadiopublishedby
PrasarBharatiin 2002. This goes to show that the parameters
to validateperformanceand define what "putsnationalbroadcastingon a properfooting"3do notseem to haveundergoneany
prominentchangeseven afterindependence.The interestsof the
Britishgovernmentlargelyguidedthe expansionof radioduring
the colonialperiodandimportancewas given to the economic,
strategic,engineeringandadministrativeaspects.In this report,
Fieldenincluded"a historicalsurveyof broadcastingin India"
as "noseparatereportonIndianbroadcastinghadpreviouslybeen
issued".The prototypesof such reportspassed on from our
colonisersto the presentheads of governmentare modelledto
projectthe top-down'reach'of the medium,which is soughtto
be justifiedin termsof growth,spread,coverageof areaandof
population,listenershippercentages,programmingpatternsand
the numberof languagesof broadcast.
The IndianBroadcastingCompanystartedin 1927, went into
liquidationby March1930. Fielden'sreportascribesthis failure
to high prices of receiving sets at Rs 500 for a four valve set,
an undercapitalisedcompany, and to "Indianconditionsand
traditions"that were "by no means as favourableto the rapid
growthof broadcastingas those of the west" [Fielden1939:3].
Ironically,he also acknowledgeslater, that slow increaseof
licensedlistenerscould have been owing to the small coverage
radiusof the two stations(thesecond 1.5 KWstationwas started
in Calcuttain August 1927) and successive curtailmentof expenditureby the government resulting in low standardof
programmes.A decisive factor he says was "undoubtedlythe
greatdifficultyin collectingboth the licence fees andthe 'tribute"' [Fielden 1939:3].
In April 1930, governmentof India took over broadcasting
following 'universal'representationsfor action from existing
licenceholdersanddealersof wirelessequipmentwhowerestuck
with stockpilesof broadcastingkits and it was placed in the
of industriesandlabouras 'IndianStateBroadcasting
department
Service'.To dealwiththe allegedevasionof paymentof licence
fee andtomonitorpossessionof wirelessgear,theIndianWireless
TelegraphyAct of 1933was broughtintoforce,whichmadethe
possessionof radioreceiversand wirelessequipmentwithouta
licence an offence.
The Indiangovernment'scurrentmonopolyover radio and
televisionbroadcastingderives from this act togetherwith the
IndianTelegraphAct, 1885 (and its subsequentamendments)
which gives exclusive privilegesof the establishment,maintenanceandworkingof wirelessapparatus
to thecentre.Withthese
two laws and some othermeansof obtainingsufficientrevenue
in place, broadcastingturnedinto a profitableventureby 1934,
and the "governmentfelt justifiedin embarkingon a policy of
development"[Fielden1939:6]. As the years 1931-34hadseen
an increasein the listenershipof radioalthoughtherewere no
newstationsaddedandnoimprovements
inprogramming.
Fielden
attributesthis spurtto the startingof the empireservice of the
BBC in December1932 and "theconsequentpurchaseof sets
by a large numberof Europeansin India"[Fielden 1939: 2].
Fieldenhimselfarrivedin Indiain the year 1935withthebrief
to workoutthe developmentschemefor Indianbroadcastingfor
whichRs 20 lakh,(laterraisedto Rs 40 lakh)were allotted.He
andH L Kirke,technicalexpertfromBBC, felt thatthe amount
was disproportionately
inadequatefor a countrylike India,

2174

InEuropewhichmaybe comparedwithIndiafrompointof view


of size andcoverage,thereareover 100highandmediumpower
a totalcost of 10 crorerupees.Fromthis
stations,representing
it is clearthatthe service,whichcanbe givento Indiafor a sum
of 40 lakhs,will be poor [Fielden1939:11].
Theirreportmaderecommendations
forexpansionof broadcasting to ruralareas,statingthatthoughIndianStateBroadcasting
Service was more a commercialthan social service, "theidea
of self-supportingservice was wrong and governmentshould
devote the limitedfunds availableto 'unremunerative'
stations
in ruralareas."Theemphasison planningtheyfelt wouldinitially
bringfunds"onlyfrom the sophisticatedlistenerswho can pay
for theirentertainment,"
but therewas a possibilityto "provide
a servicebothforthetownsandfor thevillages;whichhaswithin
it the seed of developmenton atself-supporting
basis"[Fielden
1939:13].
January1, 1936saw the settingup of the 20 KWDelhi Station
from18,Alipurroadas thefirstnewcentreunderthenewscheme
of expansion and developmentof Indian broadcasting.4On
June8, 1936,the nomenclatureof the IndianStateBroadcasting
ServicechangedtoAll IndiaRadio(AIR).5 AhmedShahBokhari
joinedAIRas stationdirectorin March1936on deputationfrom
theGovernment
CollegeLahoreandbecamethedeputycontroller
of broadcastingin June 19366 andC W Goyder,anotherexpert
fromBBC, becameAIR's first chief engineerin August 1936.
Goyder,who differedwith Kirke'splanfor mediumwave transmitters,is rememberedfor the shortwave coverageof the entire
country,which he achieved with Fielden's backing by 1938
[Luthra1986;Baruah1983].WalterKaufman,directorof western
musicprogrammesin Bombay,composedAIR's signaturetune
in the year 1936 [MIB 1978].
Broadcastingbeganin Indiaas a privateamateurventure,but
even afterit rolledinto the handsof the Britishgovernment,the
Indianprincelystateswere given the rightto constructand use
transmittersand to collect fees for receivingsets as stipulated
in thegovernmentof IndiaAct 1935.Thisis anamusinghistorical
nuggetbecauseafterindependence,thoughthe Indiangovernment has emulatedBritish rules, guidelines and plannedapproachesto broadcasting,it has kept broadcastingfirmlyin the
hands of the governmentat the centre [Ninan 1998]. Bokhari
succeededFieldenas the controllerin 1940 andwas at the helm
of AIR till almostthe end of war. With the declarationof the
second world war all expansionplans were stayed but urgent
of centralised
stepsweretakento increasethehoursof transmission
news bulletinsin variousIndianlanguages(totaling27 in a day)
to counterNazi propagandaand to promotethe allied cause7
[Luthra1986, MIB 1978].
In 1937 AIR was transferredfrom the departmentof labour
and industriesto the departmentof communications.It was
relocatedto the departmentof informationand broadcasting,
set up in 1941, which, afterindependence,becamethe ministry
of informationandbroadcasting(MIB)in 1947. AIR movedto
itsnewBroadcasting
Housein ParliamentStreetinFebruary1943
andin the sameyear,the controllerof broadcastingdesignation
was changedto directorgeneral[Baruah1983, Chatterji1991].
On June3, 1947 viceroy LordMountbatten,JawaharlalNehru
andMohammadAli Jinnahmadetheirhistoricbroadcastson the
partitionof India.Thetransferof poweronthemidnightof August
14-15, 1947was broadcastlive withJawaharlalNehru'sfamous
speech 'Trystwith Destiny' which is preservedin the archives
of AIR[Baruah1983].ThefirstandtheonlytimeGandhijivisited
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the BroadcastingHouse in Delhi was on Diwali in 1947 when


he addressedrefugeesat the Kurukshetra
camp [Luthra1986].
The responsibilityof the broadcastingto 'serve' the public
that'inform,educateandentertain'waspart
throughprogrammes
of thepaternalistic
Reitheanlegacy with whichAIR set outafter
independenceto 'improve'the massesby giving themnot what
they soughtto hear,but what they ought to hear.As affirmed
by all the ensuingAnnualReportsof AIR and also posted on
itswebsite,theobjectivesof broadcasting
inIndiaseekto "provide
information,educationand wholesomeentertainment,
keeping
in view the motto,'BahujanHitaya;BahujanSukhaya',i e, the
benefitandhappinessof largesectionsof the people,"andstrive
to "produceandtransmitvariedprogrammes
designedto awaken,
inform,enlighten,educate,entertainand enrichall sectionsof
thepeople,withdueregardto the factthatthe nationalbroadcast
audienceconsists of a whole series of public"(AIR web site).
Witha view to realisethese objectives,a regime of planned
developmentof broadcastingto coverthe country,as kickedoff
by Fieldenandreworkedby Goyder,was broughtback to life.
Overthe years,with allocationof fundsmadein all subsequent
FiveYearPlans(FYPs),All IndiaRadiohasdevelopedinto"one
of the largestmedia networksin the world"and boasts today
of a networkof 209 broadcastingcentres (which include 113
regionaland76 local radiostations)and 149 mediumwave, 55
high frequency(SW) and 131 FM transmitters.The broadcast
coverageof 89.66 percent by areais receivedby 98.84 percent
of the peoplein 24 languagesand 146 dialectsin home service.
AIR broadcastsin 26 (10 Indianand 16 foreign)languagesin
its externalservices.As againsta mere 2,75,955 receivingsets8
in 1947,now thereareabout12.5 crore(7.1 croreFMsets)radio
sets in about11.7 croreradiohouseholdsin the countrywiththe
numberof averageactuallistenersof AIR on any day in radio
homesalloverIndiaestimatedat 30.4 crore[PrasarBharati2002].

stationswith one KW mediumwave transmitterswas takenup


to expandradiobroadcastinginfrastructure
in statecapitalsand
in borderareasand to includethe linguisticand culturalareas
that had remaineduncovered.
At thetimeof independence,the AIR networkhadsix stations
located at Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta,Madras, Lucknow and
WhiletheBarodaStationwas takenoverin 1948,
Tiruchirapalli.
in 1950, all the otherfour 'native'stationsbelongingto former
princelystates,Hyderabad,
Aurangabad,
MysoreandTrivandrum
were integratedwith AIR. By 1950, the numberof stationshad
risenfrom 11 to 25 andAIR networkwas in a positionto serve
listenersin all regionallanguagesbutcouldembraceonly 21 per
centof thecountry'spopulationand12percentof its area[Baruah
1983]. The Staff TrainingInstitutewas startedin July 1948 to
impartin-servicetrainingto variouscadresof the programme
andadministrative
staff of AIR andDoordarshan.
Broadcasting
alongwith post,telegraphs,telephonesandwirelesswas placed
in the UnionList of the SeventhScheduleon January26, 1950
underthe newly effective Constitutionof India.
In the secondphaseof AIRnetworkexpansion,whichbecame
partof the Five Year Plan,the existing stationswere upgraded
or replaced by stations of higher power (MIB, 1966). It is
interestingto notethatduringthefirstFYPperiod,six new radio
stationswere openedand a few stationsclosed down12keeping
the numberof broadcastingcentresalmostconstantat 26, by the
end of the plan.Severallow-powertransmitters
were upgraded,
new
no
transmitters
were
set
although
up. Thoughthe numbers
remainedunchanged,thereachof broadcastingswelledmanifold
covering46 per cent of populationand 31 per cent in termsof
area[PrasarBharati2002]. Severalhighpowermediumandshort
wave transmitters
wereinstalledduringthe secondFYP andthe
third FYP undertookto execute an ambitiousmediumwave
expansionschemewiththe primaryobjectiveto extendthe AIR
networkto the whole country.
In the years subsequentto independence,Indiahad ventured
Planned Growth of Infrastructure
outto becomeprogressiveandindustrialisedin keepingwiththe
Thehistoryof the growthof broadcastingnetworkandexpan- west-inspireddominantparadigmof developmentof the 1950s
sion of its coverageis chronicledin the All IndiaRadioannual through1970s.Mass mediawere seen as instrumentsto change
reports,inbooks,9almostallof whichhavebeenwrittenbyformer themindsetof thepeopleandto createa climateformodernisation
AIR officials,and in a couple of governmentpublications.The anddevelopmentthroughcentralisedeconomicplanning,largeandtheexpansionof basiccommunication
reportsof committeessetupfromtimeto timeto reviewthestatus scaleindustrialisation
of broadcastingin India also recount majorlandmarksin its infrastructure
[Lerner1958, Schramm1964, Rogers 1976].The
progress.The firstformalreview of the workingof the official ChandaCommitteeendorsedthis view and expressedits dismediain India?1came about with the appointmentby MIB of satisfactionwith the place given to the developmentof mass
a committeeunderthe chairmanshipof Asok K Chanda,former communicationin India. It felt that the media had not been
auditorgeneral,governmentof India,in 1964 to, amongother adequatelyharnessedfor informing,educatingand enthusing
things,"examineandevaluatetheoperations,
policies,programmes peopleto participateactivelyin the social andeconomicdeveland productionof the variousmedia units of the ministry."It opmentprogrammes.
Thecommitteeobservedthatradiohadnot
was a time when there "hadbeen persistentcriticismboth in been accordedprioritywith respectto the allocationsmade in
parliamentandthe pressof the deficienciesof All IndiaRadio," successive plans:
andalso "abelatedrealisationin official quartersthatthe media
...despiteits own evaluationthatthe planshavefailedto evoke
of masscommunication
hadlargelyfailedto inform,educateand
the expectedresponsein the country,the PlanningCommission
entertainthe people and to enlist theircooperationin fulfilling
has persistently
overlookedthe potentialityof radioin enlisting
the plansof social and economicdevelopment"[MIB 1966:2].
public cooperationin implementingplans and programmes
At the time when the ChandaCommitteesubmittedits report
designedto bringprogressandprosperityto the community.In
on RadioandTelevision(April18, 1966),All IndiaRadio(AIR)
to regardbroadcasting
as a routinefunctionof thestate
continuing
had acquireda fairlyextensiveset-upwith the MIB embarking andgivingit routinetreatment,
theCommissionhasalsoignored
theexperienceof othercountries,whichhaveaccelerated
thepace
on a two-phaseplan for expansionof broadcastingservice. In
of development
by imaginativeuse of radioandtelevision[MIB
the initial phase, with SardarVallabhaiPatel,1l the first and
1966:10].13
ostensibly the most influentialminister for informationand
at thehelm of affairs,a schemeto buildup 'pilot'
broadcasting,,
Commentingon thepoliciesandplansof thetechnicalcoverage
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2175

of AIR, the Committee reiteratedthe need for additionalmeasures


to facilitate wider coverage and stressed the need for a 'reasoned'
review of the direction of quantitative expansion, in order to
ensure a balanced growth of AIR network, selection of ideal
locations and procurementof standardisedequipment which may
even be indigenously produced.
We have found that neither the location of the transmittersnor
their procurementis always determined on technical considerations. Regional pressuresfor transmittershave often lead to the
choiceof unsuitablelocationsforthe coverageintended.Similarly,
politicalconsiderationshave intervenedin the selection of sources
of supply [MIB 1966:33].
The reportpointed out that lack of funds and faulty orientation
were factors inhibiting the potential of AIR's rural broadcasts
and the impact of its external services.
Its transmittersand studio equipment are insufficient, largely
obsolete or obsolescent, its broadcasts cannot even reach the
sensitive areasof north-eastFrontier,let alone projectthe correct
image of Indiaoverseas or counteractunfriendlypropaganda,and
its planning and administrativestaff are lacking in vision and
imagination [MIB 1966: 12].
The Chanda Committee pointed out that deficiencies, both of
the instruments of transmission and reception, were rendering
ruralservices ineffective. Community listening was suffering on
account of maintenance of receiving sets. It suggested that to
make coverage of ruralareas meaningful mass production of low
cost transistorisedsets and their distribution was essential 14. The
reportemphasised that for qualitative improvement of coverage;
at least two-channel transmission be provided in all regions. The
report recommended that low-power transmittersbe installed in
each compact agricultural area that would primarily deliver
services for ministry of health, agriculture and education. It
suggested that such local transmitterscould operate on frequency
modulation (FM), which AIR was proposing to introduce only
in the metros, and that a plan to manufacture FM receiving sets
also be drawn up simultaneously.
In countriesso large and varied as India, most states have groups
withdifferentcultures,customsandtraditions.The Stationsshould
be placed to caterto theirdivergentneeds and requirements.Yet,
for example, the Ranchi Station located at the centre of the tribal
beltof ChhotaNagpurcan provideonly snippetsof song anddrama
for tribalcommunity.The commissioner of scheduledcastes and
scheduledtribeshas complainedthatAll IndiaRadiohas not given
much time and attention to the tribal people [MIB 1966:29].
However, it was only in July 1977 that the first FM service
started from Madras and it was not until October 30, 1984 that
the first local station was established at Nagercoil in Tamil Nadu.
The lacuna observed in the working of the planning and development unit of AIR was that on one hand, advice of technical staff
was overlooked by higher officials to accommodate political
factors, while on the other, no programmeofficial was associated
with the structuringof a broadcasting centre. Hence the stations
were being built without any insight into the scope and objectives
of its programmes leaving very little flexibility for programme
planners who had to fit their content to the available facilities.

National, Commercial and Rural Broadcasts


The Chanda Committee castigated AIR's programme policy

in the two decadesof its functioningafterindependenceon the


groundsthat the governmentwas overlooking development

2176

built with public


imperativesand thata technicalinfrastructure
resourceswas being misused for propagandaof public policy
andas a vehiclefor settingpoliticalagendas.Centralisation
and
bureaucratisation
were resultingin improperselectionof talent,
curbing of staff enterprisefor adventurousprogrammes,inadequateremunerationto artistesand indifferencein content,
qualityand presentationof programmes.The inquiriesby the
committeebroughtto theforefrontwhatlistenerslongknew,that
AIR programmeswere dull and draband low on variety.They
did not engage with contentiouspoliticalmattersor even those
of civic consequence.A 'psychologyof conformity'prevailed
in AIR as recruitmentof directingstaff ensuredunquestioning
compliance,influentialpeoplemonopolisedtalksanddiscussions
andeven amongthem,eminentpeople criticalof administrative
policies were avoided [MIB 1966].
Othervisible trendsduringthis periodwere the remodelling
of programmestowardsa new nationalistimage,a countrywide
broadcastof nationalprogrammesand the promotionof Hindi
asthenationallanguage.OnJuly1952,thefirstnationalprogramme
of music went on air. In Octoberthe same year the national
orchestra('Vadya Vrinda') was set up in Delhi under the
of PanditRaviShankar.Thecarnaticviolin-player
conductorship
T K Jairamlaterjoined the orchestraas the second conductor
[Baruah1983].The nationalprogrammeof talks(English)went
on airin April 1953. Regionalnews bulletinswere startedfrom
Lucknow (Hindi) and Nagpur (Marathi)on April 15, 1953.
Nationalprogrammesof operas,plays andfeatureswere started
in 1956 andAIR came to be knownas Akashvani15from 1957
[PrasarBharati
2002]. OnJanuary25, 1958,anunusualbutshortlived experimentin the use of folk mediafor social communication was launchedas an annualfestival 'Songs of Nation
Builders'in which folk musiciansand dancersfrom different
parts of India presentedsongs with a developmentalcontent
[Baruah1983].
B V Keskar,country'slongestservingministerof information
and broadcastingfor 10 years from 1952, patronisedIndian
classicalandfolk musicandharbouredan unconcealedaversion
for 'cheapand vulgar'film music.16As AIR's classical music
contentrose to nearly50 per cent, Indiansswitchedto Radio
Ceylon'scommercialservicethatplayedall the film songs that
AIR's holierthanthoudignityandconformationto 'good taste'
and seriouspurposedid not permit[Page and Crawley2001].
TheIndiangovernmentwas slow in respondingto thechallenges
of foreigncompetitionposed by RadioCeylon (a phenomenon
repeatedwith televisionin the 1990s)buteventuallydid launch
an entertainment
channel,Vividh Bharati,broadcastingIndian
film music and other entertainmentfare on October3, 1957.
Commercialadvertisingwas introducedin the Bombay-PuneNagpurchainof VividhBharatistations10 yearslater,in 1967
[Baruah1983].Thishadbeenone of themajorrecommendations
of theChandaCommittee.At presentthereare36 VividhBharati
and commercialbroadcastingstationsoperatingin the country
[PrasarBharati2002].
The ChandaCommitteeattributedthe lack popularityof AIR
programmesalso to the absence of any system for audience
researchto gauge the extent and quality of listening of each
programmethatshouldideallyformthebasisof policydecisions
by plannersfor makingprogrammeseffective and appealing.
Listener'sresearchis an integralpartof mostbroadcasting
systems.Withouta continuousandintimatetouchwithits audience
a broadcasting
systemcannotfulfilthepurposeforwhichit exists
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in pref- RadioForumsto institutefaithin radio'senormouspotentialto


norcan it ensuremaximumlisteningto its programmes
erenceto others.Withouta review,moneyandeffortmightbe carrydevelopmentalmessagesto poor, ruralIndianhouseholds
whichdo notattractlistening. andthat"giventherightapproachandthe opportunityto discuss
wastedin producing
programmes,
Thereis also tiheattendantriskof listenerstuningin into other and find solutionsto local problems,the farmeris receptiveto
broadcasts,which have undesirablefeaturesboth morallyand new ideas and techniques"[MIB, 1966:11].
politically[MIB 1966:58].
These observationswere validatedin the 1960s when AIR
This lack of systematicsurveyof preferencesof listenersor of playeda pivotalrole in disseminatinginformationof new techthe impactof broadcastswas even morepronouncedin case of niquesandpracticesto propelthe greenrevolution.It servedas
ruralservices.The committeeascertainedthatabsenceof news, a linkbetweenthe agricultureextensionserviceandfarmers.Its
views and feedbackalong with unduepublicityof government experimentalbroadcastsfrom TrichinopolyStation in 1966
policies had maderuralprogrammesunattractiveand villagers launchedin the fertilerice growingareasof TamilNaduhelped
wereunableto identifywith themowing to pedanticandstilted persuadefarmersto adopthigh yielding varietiesof rice. It led
language and references to peculiar agriculturalinputs and to the new varietybecomingknownas 'RadioPaddy'[Pageand
chemicals.
Crawley2001].
The earliestattemptsat ruralbroadcastinggo back to 1935,
whenprivatestationsin North-WestFrontierProvince(NWFP)
Media Misuse and Quest for Autonomy
and the United Provincesstartedprogrammesfor ruralaudiences.AIR incorporatedthese stations into its network and
The ChandaCommitteeattributedthe failureof AIR to give
ruralprogrammeswere startedat Delhi, Madrasand Lucknow 'purposeand substance'to the programmesand to reflect the
stationsin 1936,1938and1939respectively[MathurandNeurath development imperatives of national reconstruction to
1959].Ruralservicebecamean integralcomponentof all AIR organisationaldeficiencies,inadequatefinancialresourcesand
stationsfrom 1965 when Farmand Home Units were also es- overcentralisation.
tablishedin 10 AIRstationsto providesuitabletechnicalsupport
... it is notpossiblein the Indiancontextfor a creativemedium
to farmers.Now all regional stations house these units and
toflourishundera regiment(sic)of departmental
likebroadcasting
ruralbroadcastsare a crucial output of AIR [Baruah 1983,
rulesandregulations.It is only throughan institutional
change
thatAIR can be liberatedfromthe presentrigid financialand
Chatterji1991].
AIR's broadcastingto ruralareaswas designedessentiallyto
administrative
proceduresof government(MIB, 1966:177).
garnersupportfor the nationalenterpriseof all-rounddevelopThe committeerecommendedthe settingup of two separate
ment,to carryinformationof practicaluse to villagers,widen autonomouspublic corporationsfor radio and television. The
[Mathur attemptwas to reconcile autonomywith controlby endowing
knowledgeof nationalidealsandtoprovideentertainment
andNeurath,1959].Thebroadcastsusedregionallanguagesand AIR (andDoordarshan)with sufficientlibertyin financialand
local dialectsand were meantfor communityratherthanindimanagerialmatters,while retainingclearly defined areas of
viduallistening.Provisionwas also madein the Five-YearPlans
regulationby the state.The committeewas averseto AIR being
to provide communitylistening sets in villages. Though the
employedas aninstrumentof thegovernmentandalso to it being
numberof receivingsets hadescalatedto 150,000by 1965-66, entrustedinto
privatehands.It is notablethatthe committeewas
this schemedid not thrivebecauseof problemsof maintenance in favourof
allowinguniversities,municipalcorporations,and
of receivingsets.By the 1970sthetransistorrevolutionhadtaken state
All theseproposalswere
governmentsto installtransmitters.
over and the scheme was withdrawn[Chatterji1991].
'carefullyconsidered'in 1970 by the government,but it was
Althoughthe use of radiofor developmentwas a cornerstone declaredthat,"thepresentis not an opportunetime to consider
of publicservicebroadcasting
policyin India,no attemptto solicit the conversion of AIR into an autonomouscorporation".17
even
in
the form of feedback,was made However, TV was
participation
people's
separated from AIR under the name,
inFarmRadioForumswasconducted "Doordarshan"
till 1956when,anexperiment
on April 1, 1976 [MIB 1978].
with the assistanceof UNESCO in 150 villages across five
AIR was blatantlymisusedas 'a governmentorgan'18during
It was basedon a Canadianmodeland the national
districtsof Maharashtra.
emergencyin 1975.Inheraddressto theAIRstation
wasdesignedtoestablishtwo-waycommunication
betweenvillage directorson
September9, 1975, IndiraGandhisaid,
audiencesand programmerproducersof the radiostation.The
... while anybodyis in governmentservice,they areboundto
theme of the ruralradio forums was 'Listen, Discuss, Act!'
If theyfeelthatthegovernment
obeytheordersof thegovernment.
[SinghalandRogers2001:70]. A pioneeringeffortfor its time,
policyis notright,theyareunableto obey,theyhavesomeother
"radiofarmforumas an agent for transmissionof knowledge
viewswhichtheywantto express,nobodyis stoppingthemfrom
wheretheywill havethat
provedto be a successbeyondexpectation"[MathurandNeurath resigningandjoininganyorganisation
freedom[GOI1977:8].
1959:105]and was "verysuccessfulin communicatingknowlin
Severalconstraintswere imposedon radioandtelevision,the
edge of agricultural
techniquesandencouragingparticipation
'AIR code' (for broadcasters)was declaredobsolete and there
decision-making"[Page and Crawley2001: 328].
Between 1959 and 1964 the movementgained strengthand was a clampdownon oppositionalviews. The then ministerof
it was claimedthat there were 7,500 forums in 30 odd radio informationand broadcasting,V C Shulkla, instructedAIR
stationsin thecountryin 1964afterwhichnothingis heardabout stationdirectorsthatAIRwas nota forumrunby thegovernment
them[Chatterji1991].AIR failed to capitaliseon lessons learnt to debate on the conflicting ideologies but to make people
fromthe farmforumsprojectandit remainedjust an experiment 'understand'government policies. Further,as governments
(like the SITEandKhedaprojectsin the case of televisionlater) wererunby parties, media must reflect the policies of the
in developmentpotentialof communityinvolvementin media. partyin power. Credibilitytook a backseat,as AIR became a
However,the ChandaCommitteeevokes the success of Farm propagandatool for the prime ministerand her policies, but

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2177

proved counter-productive during the elections as it further


precipitated the existing demand for autonomy for the government-run media.
After the termination of emergency, the country's first nonCongress government pledged "genuine autonomy" to the electronic media. The WhitePaper on the Misuse of the Mass Media
was commissioned, followed by the constitution of a working
group headed by former newspaper editor, B G Verghese, in
August 1977 to look into autonomy for the electronic media. The
group was mandated:
To examine the functional, financial and legal aspects of the
proposal to give full autonomy to Akashvani and Doordarshan,
consistentwith accountabilityto parliament,keeping in mind the
different forms of autonomous organisations existing in
otherdemocraticcountries in the matters of broadcasting [MIB
1978:7, 37].
The working group proposed the formation of an autonomous
National Broadcasting Trust, 'Akash Bharati', "a non-profit
makingbody, an essential public service licensed to operate under
a parliamentarycharterand accountable to the parliament"[MIB
1978: 21]. The apex of the trustwas to consist of a boardof trustees
('nyasis'), between 12 and 21 in number, drawn from among
eminent men and women sensitive towards the role of the media.
Attributing the haphazard growth of broadcast media to the
absence of a well-defined national communication policy, the
group observed that the commitment to 'open government','a
dialoguewith thepeople', the thrusttowardsparticipativedevelopment from below, and decentralisation in political and economic
decision-making imply the need for democratising communications through a 'transfer of power'.
As massmedia,radioandtelevision mustfit into a widerperception
of a nationalcommunicationpolicy or philosophy. Such a policy
would be presumed to envisage a web of vertical and lateral
communicationdesigned to facilitate the transmissionof informational, educational, and cultural messages not merely from
governmentto people but from people to government.People to
people, masses to decision-makers,rural to urban,the young to
the rest andso on, at all levels and as a circularflow with switches
for cross-culturalexchange.Dissenting voices andminorityvoices
must be heard to complete the true harmony of national debate
and expression [MIB 1978:18].
The working group was not in favour of two separate trusts
for radio and TV though it urged for a distinctive identity for
the two mass media under an integrated charterof Akash Bharati.
Among the specific aims of the trust, the group included the task
to produce and transmit varied programmes designed for all
sections of the people. It emphasised that 'mass' does not necessarily imply a 'monolithic or homogeneous' national audience
and that the trend in the world was towards catering to area and
culture specific minority audiences [MIB 1978]. The group also
identified that the trust should be authorised to grant licences
to franchise stations through a board for education and extension
broadcasts. These educational stations would not broadcast news
bulletins of their own and not take up any commercial broadcasting.
The misuse of media as a publicity vehicle had not ceased even
during the tenure of a government that had promoted autonomy
for broadcastmedia. However, in terms of opening up the media,
it did introduce party election broadcasts in May 1977, 15 years

introducedin parliament,but it lapsed afterthe dissolutionof


the Lok Sabha in 1979 when the governmentfell. When the
Congressgovernmentreturnedto power in 1980, it decided
against freeing the media from government control, and
instead,heraldedan era of commercialisationeven before the
satelliteinvasionof the 1990s. Withthe ninthAsian Gamesin
andto switchto colour
1982begana move to set up transmitters
on television.The expansionof televisionin the countryentered
a new phaseas the multinationalsandIndianmonopoliesstarted
dictatingterms.
This periodwitnessedmore directivesfrom the government
in the formof policy guidelines.In 1980,an advisorycommittee
media
was createdfor restructuring
headedby G Parthasarathi
organisationto facilitate a more professionaloutlook. News
Policy for Broadcast Media released in May 1982 was one of

the productsof this committeeand the guidelinesthereinare


followed to this day [Ninan 1998]. These cover wide-ranging
topics relatedto news coverage particularlythose considered
crucialfor nationaldevelopment,nationalintegrationandmaintenanceof communalpeace [MIB1982].Thedocumentoutlines
some themesthat requirespecial coverage,one of them being
the achievementsandproblemsof developmentandlays emphasis on theuse of AIRandDoordarshan
news-gatheringapparatus
"tomakea deliberateeffortto explorenew areasof development
in suchactivities
andnationbuildingnews.People'sparticipation
shouldbe duly highlightedas also the significantwork being
done by voluntaryagencies"[MIB 1982:3].
In December 1982, a working group on software for
Doordarshanheadedby P C Joshi was appointedto "prepare
a softwareplan for Doordarshan,takinginto considerationthe
mainobjectivesof televisionin assistingin the processof social
and economic developmentof the country and to act as an
effective medium for providing information,education and
entertainment"
[MIB 1985:7].Besides suggestingseveralsteps
forrestoringthedevelopmentfunctionof television,theworking
group's report, An Indian Personality for Television, drew

attentionto the frequentuse of nationalcommunicationframework to present 'a Delhi-centric view of India'. It offered
insights into opportunitiesand dangersof the technology-led
communicationrevolutionand emphasisedthe need to evolve
"ourown versionof communicationrevolution."19The report
commentedextensively on how "communicationshould help
to createa participatorymodel of development,a participatory
ruralcommunityin which informationflows not only downwards,from governmentsto the people but also upwardsfrom
people to the government"[MIB 1985 Vol 2: 30]. The report
refersto the Germandramatist,Brecht'sstatementaboutradio
being equally relevantfor television and urges for changing
televisionto 'receiveas well to transmit',and"tolet the listener
speakas well as to hear"with a view to "turningthe audience
not only into pupils but into teachers".
AnnotatingMcLuhan,the reportsays, "any softwarewhich
is weak
does notevolve outof some formof publicparticipation
in authenticityandappeal",andhencetheneedforincorporating
"an intimate,participatorydown-upwardsorientation"in television and for encouraging"people to be participantsin the
processof generatingsoftware"[MIB 1985:13].The counsels
of the workinggroup hold good for radio too, but the copies
of this publicdocumentarenot availableeasily for referencein
aftertheElectionCommissionhadrecommendedtheirtransmis- the departmentsconcerned.Neither the recommendationsof
sion [Thomas1990]. A watered-downAkash BharatiBill was VergheseCommitteenorthoseof the JoshiCommitteeto render

2178

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radioandtelevisionindependentandto discouragetheirmisuse needs of both advertisersand viewers and the adaptationsthat


were warrantedto make the prevailingsystemin Doordarshan
by the governmentwere implemented.
and AIR commerciallyeffectual [MIB 1996b].
In July 1997, the UnitedFrontgovernmentdecidedto notify
Prasar Bharati Bill vs Political Will
PrasarBharati,which hadbeen languishingsince August1990.
wereoverlookedand
Nothingwas doneto facilitateautonomytill about1989when TheSenguptaCommitteerecommendations
anon-Congress
inordertokeepitscampaignpromise what came aboutwas dilutedautonomy.The act was brought
government,
of autonomyfor state media,openedAkash Bharatifor recon- into force on September15, 1997 and PrasarBharati(Broadsideration.The bill thatwas producedin parliamentwas called castingCorporationof India)was establishedon November23,
PrasarBharati.It differedin significantways fromthe exercise 1997. Amendmentsto augmentautonomyconferredby it were
undertaken11 years earlierby the Verghese Committeeand made in October 1997 by introducingsome of the changes
illustratinghow thinkingon the subject of autonomyfor the suggestedby the SenguptaCommittee.
Hostilitieswith the MIB, controversies,conflicts at the topgovernmentmediahadevolved.Thefirstwasenvisagedas a trust,
thesecondas a corporation.
AkashBharatiprovidedfortrustees, level, dearthof funds,unframedrulesandregulationsforrecruitPrasarBharatifor a boardof governors[Ninan 1998].
ments,andcontrolby governmentcadrehavemarkedthe period
The Akash Bharati Bill recommendedgrantingbroadcast following the settingup of PrasarBharati.Withjust over half
franchiselicences to Universitiesand othereducationalinstitu- of the membersnominatedto its board,it is being lookedat "as
tionsthroughits LicensingBoard,while the PrasarBharatiBill a signboardmore than a board."20
No significantchanges are
of 1989.Both the draftswere similarin termsof the objectives visible in the workingpatternof AIR, except an elongationin
of servingthe rural,illiterate,underprivileged
populations,pro- the chain of command.It still continuesto be centralisedand
in its functioningandretainsits role andreputation
vidingadequatecoverageto languagesof variousregionsof the bureaucratic
country,informingand stimulatingnationalconsciousnessin as a propagandatool for the government.
BothAIRandDoordarshan
regardto thestatusandproblemsof women,andkeepingin mind
supportanenormousstructurethat
the needsandinterestsof young, social andculturalminorities, keepsgrowingendlesslyas a medium,butin termsof messages,
the tribalpopulation[Thomas1990]. The autonomygrantedby there is minimalmanoeuvrabilityand negligible scope for inthe bill thatwas finally passed in 1990 was watereddown by novativeprogramming
as "bigpeoplecontinueto addresssmall
amongotherthings, the supplementaryprovisionfor incorpo- people."21Theyareunableto meetwiththediverseexpectations
rationof a parliamentary
committeeto oversee the functioning of differentsections of the society or play a constructiverole
of the Corporation.Parliamentpassed this bill, but the govern- in socialchangeor nationbuildingefforts.Withthe macro-level
mentfell beforeit could be notified.This act was then kept in mediaenvironmentincreasinglybecomingchallengingandcomcold storagefor seven years till it was notified in 1997.
petitiveowingtotheeffectsofglobalisationandcommercialisation,
On the autonomyfront, no advancementwas made by the theroleof PrasarBharatias a publicservicebroadcaster
becomes
Congressgovernmentto executePrasarBharati,as amendments even morerelevant.But the lack of politicalwill and faultyapto the act were still not complete.The ministrythat had been plicationappearsto be killingan otherwiseworkableproposition.
avoidingputtingits own house in orderwith respectto granting An attemptto revitalisethe role of PrasarBharatiin the status
autonomyspranginto actionas cable-deliveredforeignsatellite of a public service broadcasterwas made by setting up of the
channelsstartedmakingrapidinroadsinto the countryin the PrasarBharatiReviewCommittee22thatsubmittedits reporton
1990s.The exigencyfor autonomywas expressedfor becoming May 20, 2000. The committeewas of the opinionthat:
competitiveand commerciallyup-marketas also the need for
The publicservicebroadcaster
plays a key role in any society,
monitoringthe use of airwaves(discussedin ensuingsectionof
especially,in a largeandthrivingdemocracy.It mustbe a part
the article).Thegovernmentabruptlylaid downthe CableTeleof 'civilsociety',independent
of anddistinctfromthegovernment.
visionNetworks(Regulation)Actin March1995toregulatecable
In fact, the publicservicebroadcaster
must act as one of the
bedrocksof society,andseektocontinuously
television and to influence cable distributionin favour of
enlargetheso-called
'publicsphere.Itmustplayhostto informeddebate,providespace
Doordarshan.Though AIR was not facing competitionfrom
foralternative
anddissentingviewpoints,be a voiceof thevoicethesedevelopmentswere sendingloudand
privatebroadcasters,
less andgive substanceto thephrase"participatory
clear signals that it was time to sit up and take notice.
democracy"
[MIB2000a: 16].
Meanwhile,a high powercommitteethathadbeen appointed
in 1995to remodeltherole,organisation,andfunctionsof Prasar Thecommitteereiteratedthatmarketforcescannotbe expected
Bharatiin the contextof the influx of foreignsatellitechannels to take care of these objectivesand for PrasarBharati,as the
revenuemaximisationneednot be an immein the 1990sfurnishedits report.This committee,[MIB 1996a] publicbroadcaster,
headedby Nitish Sengupta,put forwarda provision,to be in- diategoal andadvertisingrevenueearnedshouldnotbe the only
cludedin the PrasarBharatiAct, for an independentRadioand yardstickfor judging its performance:
Alternative
TelevisionAuthorityof Indiato grantlicences to domesticor
indices- relatedtoaudiencesizeandshareprogramme
content
and
satellite
channels
and
them
to
from
Indian
impact,channelreachandloyalty- aremoremeaningful
foreign
permit
uplink
andmustbe used (MIB,2000a:81).
soil [Ninan1998].Thecommittee'srecommendations
withrespect
to PrasarBharatisoughtto dispensewiththe changesintroduced The committeesuggestedseveral amendmentsto the Prasar
in the 1989 draftbeforethe Bill was finalisedin 1990. In order BharatiAct 1990 to enableit to survivein a highlycompetitive
to cope withunprecedented
reductionin budgetarysupportfrom environmentcreatedby global mediatechnologyand to create
the government,the MIB decided to refurbishthe system for publicservicecontentof highestquality.The committeereiterandAll IndiaRadio. ated its faith in decentralisationand devolutionand in its recmarketingcommercialtimeon Doordarshan
A committeeheadedby SiddharthaSen set out to examinethe ommendationsandemphasised that the local stations must
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2179

involve local groups and voluntary organisations in programme


Article 19(1)(a).It should be operatedby a public statutory
or corporations...[as
cited in MIB 1997].
corporation
production.It also recommended giving serious consideration to:
...the franchising of local radio stations by Prasar Bharati to
Thejudgmentdidnot,however,endorsedismantling
of controls.
selectedlocalcommunityandvoluntarygroupson anexperimental Private
if permitted,cannotbe left to the market
broadcasting,
basis. Now that FM radio has been privatised, we do hope that forces.It
needs to be regulatedin the largerpublicinterest.The
the long-standingopposition and aversion to such a worthwhile
observations
of the SupremeCourtin this regardareas follows:
step will fade away [MIB 2000a: 37].

Liberalisation, Privatisation and Regulation


The broadcastingdialogue assumed an altogether new dimension withthe adventof cable operatorsand the beaming of satellite
channels by Hong Kong-based STAR TV into India in the year
1991. Conditions for broadcasting changed radically [Pavarala
and Kumar2001a]. Faced with the eventuality of private sector
competition, autonomy, genuine or otherwise, for state-owned
mediaseemed inevitable. At the same time, the governments were
faced with a new set of questions, which they were quite ill
equippedto resolve. What should be the structure of regulatory
system to take account of the invasion via satellites, and of the
new media technologies? What was to be the fate of national
(readpolitical) objectives? Competition in programming as well
as commerce or advertising was another unfamiliar territory.All
these concerns coupled with a few other landmarkdevelopments
saw the revival of some of the critical issues concerning broadcasting in India after three decades of unimplemented good
intentions.
In February 1995, the Supreme Court delivered a historic
judgmentin Ministry of Information and Broadcasting vs Cricket
Association of Bengal http://www.mib.nic.in/information&b/
POLICY. The court ruled that:
Airwaves constitute public property and must be utilised for
advancingpublic good [operativepart of judgment available on
MIB web site].
The spiritof thejudgment was to spell the end of the government
monopolyof broadcasting.But it was not in favour of deregulation
of airwaves for use by the private business firms. It stated that,
"no individualhad a right to utilise them (airwaves) at his choice
and pleasureand for purposes of his choice including profit".
In two separate concurring judgments, the court said the right
of free speech guaranteed by Article 19(1) (a) did not include
the right to use airwaves which were public property.
Fromthe standpointof Article 19(1)(a) what is paramountis the
rightof thelistenersandviewersandnot the rightof the broadcaster
- whetherthe broadcasteris the state, public corporationor a
privateindividualor body.
While the freedom guaranteedby Article 19(1) (a) does include
the rightto receive and impartinformation,no one can claim the
fundamentalrightto do so by using or employing public property.
Only where the statute permits him to use the public property,
thenonly - and subject to such conditions and restrictionsas the
law may impose - he can use the public property,viz, airwaves.
Inotherwords,Article 19(1)(a) does not enable a citizen to impart
his information,views andopinion by using the airwaves.He can
do so without using the airwaves [as cited in MIB 1996d].
Broadcasting media as a whole should promote freedom
of expression and speech and, therefore, should be able to
enjoy freedom from government monopoly and control subject
to certain regulation by a public body. In this connection, the
court decreed:
The broadcastingmedia should be underthe controlof the public
as distinct from government. This is the command implicit in

2180

Theairwavesor frequenciesarea publicproperty.Theiruse has


to becontrolledandregulated
in theinterests
bya publicauthority
of thepublicandto preventthe invasionof theirrights[as cited
in MIB 1997].
Thejudgmentorderedthe centralgovernmentto "takeimmediatestepsto establishanautonomouspublicauthorityto control
andregulatetheuseof theairwaves".Theministryof information
andbroadcastingset aboutdraftingbroadcastinglegislationthat
wouldestablisha broadcastauthorityandopen up the airwaves
to privateparties,individuals,andpublicbodieswishingto enter
the field of broadcastingand telecasting.
Whilethisexerciseto placetheroleof BroadcastingAuthority
of Indiain the contextof a comprehensiveBroadcastLaw was
still beingcarriedout,a parliamentary
subcommitteeformulated
a workingpaperon nationalmediapolicy in March1996. The
objectivesof this draftmediapolicy includedseveralof those
thathave been assertedin earlierlaws andreports[MIB 1996].
The newer concerns mentionedrelated to those that warned
againstpermittinggrowthof monopolyin any media,and expressedthemselvesin favourof restrictingcross-mediaownership. The workingpapertook a standagainstpermittingdirect
or indirectforeignequity participationin privatebroadcasting
companies[Ninan 1998]. The subcommitteelaid emphasison
the settingup of non-commercialbroadcastingstationsto be run
by universities,educationalinstitutions,panchayats,localbodies,
state governments,etc. It was in favourof allowing state and
local governmentsandNGOs to enterthe field of broadcasting.
It was only in 1997 that some urgencywas expressedfor a
broadcastinglaw for India,"in view of the impendingstartof
the muchmorepowerfuldigitalDirectto Home(DTH)services
anytimeby the nextyear"[MIB1997].In May 1997, the Broadcast Bill for settingup a BroadcastingAuthorityof Indiawas
introducedin parliament.It corroborated
the fundamentalprinciplesof all theearliereffortsto repositionBroadcastingin India.
The BroadcastingBill 1997 may in fact be seen as a confluence
of the majorimperativesderived from constitutionalclauses,
committeereports,judgments,andpolicystatementsconcerning
in India.But,thegovernmentfell againandthedraft
broadcasting
BroadcastingBill alongwiththe workingpaperon mediapolicy
remainsa majorpiece of unfinishedbusiness till today.
On theradiofront,in July 1999, it was announcedthatprivate
companiesregisteredin Indiawould be allowed to set up 101
independentFM stationsin 40 cities. Of the 148 frequencies
identifiedfor 40 centres,40 have been reservedfor educational
channelsto be operatedby the humanresourcedevelopment
ministrywithoutpaymentof any licence fee [MIB 2002]. The
auctionof FM frequenciesin favourof the open-marketlobby
is apervertedinterpretation
of theSupremeCourtjudgment.
None
of the recommendations
favouringalternativemediapractices
in the countryseem to be materialisingin the nearfuture,as the
governmenthas now decidedto tacklethe issue of convergence
of telecommunications,
informationtechnologyand electronic
mediabeforeannouncinga comprehensivepolicy thatwill cover
the entirecommunicationssector.

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The Draft Convergence Bill proposes the setting up of a


CommunicationsCommission of India on the lines of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in the US to manage, plan
and monitor spectrum for non-strategic and commercial usage
of communication infrastructure. The commission would also
grant licences while exercising some (among several other) of
the following principles:
- that communicationservices are made available at affordable
cost to all uncoveredareas including the rural,remote, hilly and
tribal areas;
- that there is increasing access to informationfor greaterempowermentof citizens and towards economic development;
- that quality, plurality, diversity and choice of services are
promoted.
[MIB 2000b: Clause 19]
As the country still awaits a comprehensive media policy and
a broadcast law to enable democratisation of media, efforts are
on for carving out an alternative media sector in India, which
would neither be state-run nor market-driven. The groups advocating community radio as part of the movement for an alternative public realm can only hope that the permission to use
radio for development goals at the community level and to
representthe priorities of the vulnerable would be granted soon.

Conclusion

conglomerates,furtherdiminishingthe freedomanddiversityof
information.As culturalhomogenisationbecametheorderof the
day, the uniformityof the content renderedmeaninglessthe
increasein the numberof informationsources [Pavaralaand
Kumar2001b]. As a result,the shrinkingof democraticspaces
has weakenedcivil society, allowing the state and the market
to have unfetteredcontrolover the minds of the people.
These concernshave been articulatedin several reportsof
committeesset up to examinethe statusof broadcastingin India
andalsoin numerouspolicydocuments.In spiteof plainlystated
toproduce
objectives,littlehasbeendoneto re-orientbroadcasting
meaningfulcontentthat dovetailsratherthanemulatescurrent
practicesof commercialradio,andaddressesthe developmental,
social, cultural,communaland democraticimperativesof the
country.No efforthas been madeto ensurethatthe weakestand
the vulnerableare empoweredthroughaccess and control of
media-technologies.
For instance,All IndiaRadio's 76 local radiostations(LRS)
were mandatedto producefield-basedprogrammeswith accent
on local problems, news and views, and local talent. The
organisation'sannualreportstates:
Whatdistinguishesthe localradiofrom.theregionalnetworkis
its downto earth,intimateapproach.
Theprogrammes
of thelocal
radioareareaspecific.Theyareflexibleandspontaneous
enough
to enablethe stationto functionas the mouthpieceof the local
community[PrasarBharati2002].
In reality, however, owing to inherent deficiencies of a
bureaucraticsystem these stations only replicatethe style of
workingandeventheprogramming
patternsof a regionalstation.
Their staff is ill equippedto run them in a mannerthat is
democraticand participatory.
Even as the well-intentionedstate broadcasteris frozeninto
inaction,commercialbroadcastinghas revived a plummeting
medium.But the latter'sagendato accumulateprofitsrenders
it incapableof exploitingthe potentialof the mediumfor development.Radio,designatedby severalas a mediumof thepoor,
seems to have been hijackedby the elites, propellinga number
of civil societyorganisationsto articulatetheneedforalternatives
in the formof popularand community-basedmedia.The communityradioinitiativesby severalgroupsacrossIndiafora share
of the airwaves,whichare 'publicproperty',areone significant
indicationof this popularresistance.
Themajorbarrierin usheringa vibrantcommunityradiosector
in Indiaappearsto be the perceptionthatit poses a threatto the
powerstructure.This perceptionis basedon whatWhite(1994)
callsa zero-sumnotionof 'distributive'power.If, as shesuggests,
poweris understoodas 'generative',whereby differentgroups
cangeneratetheirown sourcesof powernecessaryto accomplish
social, culturaland communityobjectives,this fear aboutloss
of controlcould be seen as misplaced.Radio must, therefore,
be lookedat as a tool for empowerment,an appropriate
technology to conscientise and build capacities of communitiesto
become active participantsin development.t17

Radio broadcasting in free India endeavoured to shape up in


the mould of public service broadcasting. According to communication scholar Dennis McQuail (1994:126) the idea of 'public
service' broadcasting encompasses eight principles:
Geographicaluniversalityof provision and reception;the aim of
providingforall tastesandinterests;cateringforminorities;having
a concern for national identity and community; keeping broadcastingindependentfromgovernmentandvested interests;having
some elementof directfundingfromthe public(thusnot only from
advertisers);encouragingcompetitionin programmesandnotjust
for audiences; and encouraging the freedom of broadcasters.
However, the state-controlled broadcasting in India ended up
following what Herman and Chomsky (1988) sketch out as 'the
propagandamodel' where media serve "to mobilise support for
the special interests that dominate the state and private activity",
becoming a propagandatool for government policies and actions.
In countries where the levers of power are in the hands of a state
bureaucracy,the monopolistic control over media, often supplemented by official censorship, makes it clear that the media serve
the ends of a dominant elite [Herman and Chomsky, 1988:1].
With liberalisation of the economy in India, broadcasting
witnessed backdoor and reluctant privatisation, but eventually,
as Kiran Karik, CEO, Discovery Channel, opines, forces of
commercialisation prevailed, leading to a shift towards empty
entertainment [Sen 2000]. As Stephen Barnard points out,
The classical argumentagainst commercialisationof mass communicationmedia is that pursuitof advertisingrevenues encourages programmingassumed to appeal to the greatest number,
therebymarginalisingless populartastes and interests.It creates Addressfor correspondence:
@rediffmail.com
anenvironmentmostconduciveto receptionof advertisingmessage, kanchankumar7
leading to programmingthat is undemanding,unchallengingand
Notes
pacifying [Barnard2000: 51].
Technology-led globalisation of media did not do anything to [I gratefullyacknowledgethe intellectualadvice and
supportI have received

changetheorderof thingsfor broadcastingin India.It led to the


concentrationof ownershipin a handfulof transnational
media

for writingthis article from Vinod Pavarala,Universityof Hyderabad.This


is a partof my doctoralresearchwork on the perspectivesand prospects of

Economicand PoliticalWeekly May 31, 2003

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2181

communityradioin India.I wish to thankthe DDG (A), the director,Audience


Research Unit and director, Policy of AIR; and the librarian,Research,
ReferenceandTrainingDivision, MIB who helped me in accessing relevant
documents for this paper.]
1 Accordingto the AkashBharatireport,the inaugurationof IBC's Bombay
station was reportedin the Timesof India in a bannerheadline, reading
'Viceroy Inauguratesa Wireless Era for India'.
2 According to H R Luthra,-Nhru, in 1948, had advocated in favour of
a set up approximatingthe BBC public corporationmodel. Letters of
appointmentof Akashvanistaff have always includedthe stipulationthat
they are liable to transfer at any time to the service under a public
corporation.
3 An expression borrowedfrom the Chanda Committee report.
4 According to H R Luthraand the Akash Bharati Report, on the same
day, theprogrammejournalIndianRadioTimewas redesignedandnamed
The IndianListener.It remainedunchangedfor the next 22 years, when
it became Akashvani.
5 The storyof how the name 'All IndiaRadio' came to be coined is related
by Fielden in his autobiography,The Natural Bent [Fielden 1960].
6 With A S Bokhari's brotherZ A Bokharibecoming the station director,
critics could not resist labelling AIR the BokhariBrothersCorporation
(BBC) [Luthra1986].
7 External Services broadcasts started at this time, the first broadcast
commencing on October 1, 1939.
8 Accordingto the ChandaCommitteereport,the numberof radiolicences
had doubled from 2,75,955 in 1947 to 5, 46,319 in 1950.
9 These include, Broadcasting in India by G C Awasthy, All about AIR
and Broadcastingand the People by Mehra Masani, Tangled Tapes by
K S Mullick,Radio ProgrammesofAll India Radioby PamelaPhilipose,
WhatAils Indian Broadcasting by K S Duggal.
10 ChandaCommittee reportpoints out that many countriesincluding the
UK and Canadahave found it necessary to instituteperiodic reviews of
theirbroadcastingsystems by independentcommitteesbutit has not been
so in India. H R Luthracites it as a case in point that the BBC during
its 40 yearshadbeenreporteduponby fourexpertcommissions:Crawford
Committee(1925), Ullswater Committee (1935), Beveridge Committee
(1950) and Pilkington Committee.
11 In his book, My Reminiscencesof Sardar Patel, V Shanker,his private
secretary,mentions that one of the first steps taken by SardarPatel to
'clean up' radio was to prohibit musicians 'whose private lives were a
publicscandal'.Some regardedthis as a measuredirectedagainstMuslim
women artists.
12 These included the Shillong, Baroda, Amritsar,and Mysore stations.
13 He observes that, in both the first and the second FYP, allocation to
broadcastingwas about one-tenth of one percent of the total resources
while it was reducedto one-eighth of the total resourcesin the thirdplan.
14 Also see Sanjay (1991), for an account of the problems that arose for
rurallistenersas manufactureof receptionsets was left entirelyto market
forces.
15 Keskaris said to have explained that Akashvani was a kind of an allIndia name and trademarkfor All India Radio and the word had been
takenfrom Kannadawhere it was originally used for the Mysore Station
during the British days.
16 Also see David Lelyveld (1996) on how under Patel and even more so
underKeskar,measureswere takento assurethatthe 'Hindu' side would
prevail in music on AIR.
17 Cited in Thomas, 1990: 4.
18 As stated in the Extractsof IndiraGandhi's address to the Conference
of AIR Station Directors on September9, 1975. See Appendix 6, Page
13 in MIB, 1977.
19 The report attributesthis expression to Yashpal (1983).
20 B G Verghese in an interview with the author.
21 Ibid.
22 Ministryof informationandbroadcasting,governmentof Indiaconstituted
a committee on November 22, 1999 comprising N R Narayanamurthy,
chairmanandchief executive, Infosys; KiranKarnik,managingdirector,
Discovery CommunicationsIndia;Shunu,chairmanand chief executive,
Quadra Advisory, marketing consultant; R C Mishra, jt secretary
(Broadcasting,ministry of I&B); Rajeeva Ratna Shah, chief executive,
PrasarBharati,special Invitee; to carry out a comprehensivereview of
PrasarBharati.

2182

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