CHOOSING TO LEAD

American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World

CHOOSING TO LEAD

American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORDI
Peter Wehner

PART I: INTRODUCTION

1 Rebuilding American Foreign Policy Eliot Cohen, Eric Edelman, Brian Hook

PART II: REBUILDING AMERICAS ALLIANCES

2 Americas Alliances for the 21st Century Eric Edelman

10

3 Europe A. Wess Mitchell

22

4 Western Hemisphere Daniel W. Fisk

29

5 Asia and the Pacific James Shinn

38

6 The Middle East Elliott Abrams

45

7 Africa J. Peter Pham

53

PART III: NATIONAL DEFENSE

62

8 Strategy for the Common Defense Eliot A. Cohen

63

9 Military Readiness and Defense Modernization Jim Talent & Lindsey Neas

73

PART IV: ADDRESSING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY

84

10 International Terrorism Gen. Michael Hayden & Jamil Jaffer

85

11 Iran Mike Singh

98

12 Afghanistan and Pakistan Paul Miller

107

13 Russia Paula J. Dobriansky & David J. Kramer

121

14 North Korea Dan Blumenthal

132

PART V: CHINA

141

15 U.S. Economic Policy Toward China Leland Miller

142

16 Military Competition with China Jacqueline Deal

152

17 An Integrated China Policy Aaron L. Friedberg

161

PART VI: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

170

18 Connecting Economics and Security Laurence Zuriff

171

19 The Trade Agenda Clay Lowery & John Herrmann

181

PART VII: FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES

189

20 A Strategy of Cyber Deterrence Michael Chertoff & Frank Cilluffo

190

21 Leading Intelligence Michael Allen & Bryan Smith

201

22 Countering Nuclear Threats Robert Joseph & Rebeccah Heinrichs

214

23 Energy Security Jeffrey Kupfer

228

24 International Organizations Kristen Silverberg & Brian Hook

237

25 Democracy and Human Rights Mark Green

246

26 Development Assistance Daniel Runde

256

PART VIII: ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS

267

27 Implementing an Effective Foreign Policy Peter Feaver & Will Inboden

268

FOREWORD

FOREWORD
Peter Wehner

About a quarter of a century ago the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union
collapsed. It was an epic moment that evoked understandable elation, and
in some quarters highly optimistic analysis. The political scientist Francis
Fukuyama wrote in an influential 1989 essay, The End of History?, that the
world had perhaps reached the end point of mankinds ideological evolution
and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of
human government.
Twenty-five years later, it is clear history is not over, even in the Hegelian
sense, and liberal democracy has not been universalized. Euphoria has
given way to anxiety. The world, if not necessarily more dangerous than it
was during the Cold War, is surely more chaotic and diffusely complex. The
scale of global disorder is staggering. In the Middle East alone we behold
the continuing threat from al-Qaeda and the rise of the Islamic State; the
dissolution of states such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen; the regional rise
of Iran as a nuclear-threshold state and, with it, the specter of nuclear weapons proliferating far and wide. Nor is the rest of the world any calmer, with
Russian aggression in Ukraine and Chinese expansionism in the maritime
domains of East Asia. Cyber threats have mushroomed and grown global in
scale, and, thanks to the current U.S. Administrations policies, the alliance
system designed to preserve order and peace has been weakened.
As one might expect, foreign policy is rising on the list of priorities and
concerns for the American people. A Pew Research Center poll from earlier
this year shows that, for the first time in five years, as many Americans cite
defending the United States against terrorism (76 percent) as a top policy priority as say that about strengthening the nations economy (75 percent). An
internal Republican survey in March found that security issues ranked first
on a list of top priorities for voters, ahead of economic growth, fiscal responsibility, and moral issues, among others. Foreign policy will almost certainly
be an important, perhaps even dominant, issue in the 2016 presidential race.
i

Those running for high public office are likely to find the American people
somewhat disoriented, feeling vulnerable, anxious, and unusually powerless
in the face of global affairs. There can be little wonder why. The United States
has waged war for nearly fifteen years and undertaken nation-building
operations that turned out to be more difficult and costly than we imagined.
If previous administrations overestimated Americas capacity to shape
events, the current Administration has made the United States a reluctant
and often passive world power, and the world is more turbulent and dangerous
because of it.
We are caught in a moment of confusion, then, that begs for clarity. This
is where Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World
comes in. Consisting of 27 chapters drafted by members of the John Hay Initiative, Choosing to Lead seeks to diagnose the problem and suggest remedies
going forward. It articulates both a conceptual approachthe principles and
ideals that ought to inform American foreign policyand concrete and comprehensive policies flowing therefrom. It covers the world, with chapters
addressing challenges and opportunities from Latin America, Europe, and
Asia to the Middle East and Africa. It includes chapters on defense modernization and readiness, trade and economics, intelligence and energy security,
democracy and human rights, cyber security and the United Nations, foreign
assistance and structuring the National Security Council. The tone of the
chapters is analytical, not polemical; we are interested more in solutions
than in recriminations or scoring debating points.
Most of the contributors writing here have served in government, so we bring
not just a theoretical understanding of the issues but real-world experience.
Informing these chapters is an appreciation of the sheer complexity of the
current strategic environment and the knowledge that adjustments and
recalibrations need to be made all along the way.
Choosing to Lead points the way forward for the next President, regardless
of party. Just as many of our foreign policy challenges transcend party politics,
so do their solutions. For a period of time from 1942 onwards, American
leaders of both parties came to a consensus about how our country should

ii

conduct itself internationally. That consensus has frayed badly, but it can be
rewoven into a common fabric of organizing principles and commitments.
This book is designed as a practical policy manual, one intended to address
real concerns. But the larger ambition of this book is to help Americans regain
their footing and confidence in American leadership in world affairs. It aims
to provide the American public, lawmakers, and even prospective Presidents
with insights into how to think about foreign policy in an age of upheaval.
No party has a monopoly on wisdom. Members of both major parties have
plenty of lessons to learn from the past fifteen years, from the difficult and
protracted nature of war and nation-building to the chaos and upheavals
that have followed in the wake of American weakness and retreat.
In an unusually polarized time the contributors to this book believe it is
important that we restore the bipartisan tradition of American leadership in
world affairs. We urge the careful balancing of American ideals and interests,
prize strength and prudence, and stress the need for a measured application
of a principled vision of foreign policy to shifting circumstances. A successful
foreign policy requires three things: a proper conceptual understanding; the
right policies; and individuals with the ability, wisdom, and discernment to
successfully implement them. The next President will need all three.
Change is a constant in world affairs, of course, but the present period is
unusually tumultuous. Tectonic plates have been quietly shifting, and we
are now witnessing some of the noisy effects. Maps are being redrawn; the
very units of the post-Westphalian order are under unprecedented stress;
jihadi statelets are rising suddenly from the rubble of failed and collapsing
states. If in the face of all this the United States withdraws within itself,
whether out of frustration, weariness, or a sense of impotence, the worlds
problems will only worsen, the disorder will accelerate, and malignant
regimes and organizations will gain strength and influence.
We are, nonetheless, sanguine about the future, both because we reject
historical determinism and because we know the United States has a unique
place and role to play among nations. Every author in this book accepts that

iii

there are limitations on American power. But we understand, too, that with
the right leadership and policies in place, the United States can once again
be a guarantor of global order and peace, a champion of human rights, and
a beacon of economic growth and human flourishing. There is no reason the
21st century cannot be the next American Century. We have our problems,
but our economic, social, and cultural assets far outstrip those of every
imaginable competitor. Choosing to Lead offers perspectives and recommendations on how to make that next American Century happen. In doing so, we
believe it will serve the world as well as the United States of America.

few final words about the plan of the book. It is divided into six sections and opens with a compelling and visionary chapter on rebuild-

ing American foreign policy. It then turns to a subject too often neglected
in recent years, Americas alliances. After discussing national defense and
international economic concerns it examines threats to American national

security by region. It then explores a number of global challenges and

opportunities. The book concludes with the question of organizing the central government, and above all the White House, for the effective conduct of
foreign and defense policy.


September 2, 2015

iv

Part 1

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: REBUILDING AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Eliot Cohen, Eric Edelman, and Brian Hook

U.S. foreign policy today is failing every test that a great powers foreign
policy can fail. Today, Americas enemies do not fear the United States, and
Americas friends doubt that they can trust it. Neither the American people
nor the world-at-large understands anymore either the purposes of American
power or even, in some respects, the principles that shape them. Indeed,
after a decade and a half of conflict in the Middle East and South Asia, some
Americans have concluded that the best thing to do is to pull back from the
world and its troubles. Some argue that Americas role as guarantor of global
order is no longer necessary, history having ended with the Cold War; there
are also those who think the United States is too clumsy and incompetent
to do much of anything right; and there are, finally, those who think that
nation-building at home is some kind of alternative to engagement abroad.
We disagree. We believe that a strong United States is essential to the
maintenance of the open global order under which this country and the rest
of the world have prospered since 1945; that the alternative is not a selfregulating machine of balancing states but a landscape marked by eruptions
of chaos and destruction. We recognize the failures as well as the successes
of past policies, because to govern is to choose, and to choose in the world
as it is, is necessarily to err. But while we believe that we must understand
those failures and learn from them, we also believe that American power and
influence has, on the whole, served our country and the world far better than
American weakness and introversion.
We also recognize that international circumstances have changed, and
that, while many of the fundamentals of American foreign policy remain,
our approaches must change accordingly. In Lincolns words, as our case is
new, so we must think anew, and act anew.
Today the United States faces a global system that is more complex and
more volatile, if not always more dangerous, than that of the 20th century.

In Asia we confront a rising China, whose growing economy may eventually

equal or even surpass ours in sheer size, whose governmental system still
rests on the foundation laid by one of the great totalitarian monsters of the
past century, and whose aspirations run counter to our interests. Beijing
seeks to dominate East Asia, to assert claims to international waters that are
unacceptable to us, and to replace the American-shaped order that enabled
Chinas peaceful rise with a system in which we are only one of multiple,
equal participants.
In Europe, rather than the continent whole, free, and at peace that many
anticipated at the end of the Cold War, we face a revived Russia whose
frail democratic institutions have been undermined, silenced, or destroyed.
The Putin regime has invaded two neighbors and annexed part of their
territory, while intimidating others. Moscow has refurbished and rebuilt
important elements of its armed forces and is willing to use them. At the
same time, our European allies are trapped in slow growth, inadequate
defense expenditure, and a crisis of confidence in the postwar institutions
that they have constructed.
The Middle East is aflame, as several of the states created in the aftermath
of the world wars have dissolved in sectarian and ethnic bloodshed and civil
war. The Syrian civil war, which has cost nearly a quarter million people
their lives, has created millions of refugees and emerged as a magnet for
jihadis from around the world, including Europe, who will eventually return,
hardened by experience, to their homelands. The Persian Gulf is menaced
by an Iran whose nuclear ambitions will not be blocked and, indeed, may
even be eased by the Obama Administrations misconceived deal with it.
Today, Tehran dominates four Arab capitals and wages covert warfare from
the Mediterranean coast to southern Yemen, attacking by indirect means
Americas allies from Israel to the Emirates.
The threats from hostile states include the persistence of a North Korea
that is expanding its stockpile of nuclear weapons and which, if unchecked,
will put them on missiles that can reach the United States. At the same time,
non-state actorsmost notably, jihadi movements of several stripesvie

with each other for primacy in waging holy war from Nigeria to Pakistan.
After a period in which American leaders boasted that they had put al-Qaeda
and analogous movements on the verge of strategic defeat, we now realize
that such groups will continue to threaten our homeland, our people, and
our interests abroad, and that they have the power to destabilize or even
overthrow allied governments throughout the Middle East.
These and other challenges (for example, Americas increasing estrangement from an authoritarian and illiberal Turkey, or the nascent competition
for control of resources in the High North) require a first-order rethinking
of American foreign policy. The threats will not be resolved by rousing
speeches and a substantial increase in defense spending alone, welcome and
necessary though both would be. Rather, they will require more resources
and creative statecraft. A new American administration will require patience
and perseverance in reversing the setbacks of recent years, and in refashioning a world order that the United States played the leading role in shaping
some seventy years ago.
The good news is that the American hand in international politics remains
not only strong, but considerably stronger than that of any potential rival or
collection of rivals, most emphatically to include China. The United States
has a modestly growing and relatively young population, unlike China, Russia,
Japan, and Europe. The depth of our financial markets and research establishment remains unmatched. As a result of the unconventional oil boom
the United States, in effect, is energy self-sufficient; it has, in addition,
abundant water, the worlds most productive agriculture, natural resources,
and clean air. The American military is the most experienced in the world,
and, while others can match individual aspects of its armed forces, none
has its full spectrum of abilities. The American system of government, with
all of its cacophony and division, is legitimate and functional; the states of
our federal system are laboratories for policy innovation, and a constantly
renewed source of fresh political elites. The United States has an alliance
system that, despite strains and change, remains unmatched. Indeed, one
of its great intangible sources of strength is its ability to build and operate
coalitions. And unlike its potential rivals, it shares borders with only two

nations, and those friendly.

What principles should inform the way the United States plays this hand?
The first is to reject the notion of foreign policy based exclusively either on
ideals or interests. The truth is that the United States has always, and must
by its nature, act on both. A country founded on the proposition that all
men are created equal, and whose President declared during its greatest
war that the issue at stake was whether any nation so constituted can long
endure, has universal claims and a universal outlook that it cannot and
must not renounce. John Quincy Adams may have declared that the United
States should not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy, but in the
same speech he insisted that the principles underlying the Declaration of
Independence were the only legitimate ones, destined to cover the globe.
At the same time, the United States has interests like all states; moreover,
a pursuit of its ideals without thought to cost or consequence would lead to
all manner of unacceptable dangers. Americans rightly allied with the Soviet
Union during World War II; it cooperated with unsavory regimes in the Cold
War; it reluctantly works with non-democratic regimes in the Middle East
that are better than the alternative.
The first principle of American foreign policy, therefore, should be prudence,
a cardinal conservative virtue, which does not mean forsaking ones values
but rather advancing them in the manner best adapted to their success. In the
increasingly complex international environment in which we operate, the
United States cannot afford to be doctrinaire, even as it would also be absurd
to aspire to act with the amoral practicality of an 18th-century monarchy.
Prudence will also mean picking our fights. In the aftermath of World War
II American GDP was nearly fifty percent of the global total; after falling to
something over a quarter of world GDP when Europe and Japan recovered
from World War II, it is declining further to something like a fifth of global
GDP. Our resources will be finite, and so will be the ability of our leaders to
focus on more than a few problems at a time.
At the heart of American foreign policy should be our conception of international order. That order is only partly about free trade, although it is
5

important to remind ourselves and others of just how important a world of

low tariffs and diminished barriers to commerce has been to the prosperity
that has brought hundreds of millions out of poverty since the World Wars.
That conception of order must include: the freedom of smaller states to live
without fear of invasion or military coercion; commitment to the rules that
govern the great commons of mankindincluding sea and spaceand rights
of free passage and peaceful use thereof. And it must include as well the
maintenance of a world that is friendly to the existence of free peoples and
limited government.
The United States does not seek to impose its form of government by conquest, but it should never stint in its defense of the basic ideas that have
defined us: limited government; freedom of speech, religion, and assembly;
protection of private property; and an independent judiciary. The United
States could not thrive in a world dominated by corrupt, authoritarian, or
totalitarian regimes, and history suggests that, although democracies have
waged war against each other in the past, by and large free states can and do
settle their differences amicably.
The United States cannot exert its influence by example alone. For more
than seventy years American military power underwrote the very existence
of the international system. American soft power, from Fulbright scholarships to U.S. Information Agency libraries, from Radio Free Europe to the
work of institutes sponsored by the two great parties in the United States,
were indispensable. The first call on the U.S. government must be the reconstruction of our defenses after years of war and, recently and worryingly, a
prolonged reduction in them below what is safe. The word reconstruction
is important here: An American military redesigned for the 21st century will
differ in material ways from that of the 20th.
In the same way, our instruments of soft power must be reconceived. Efforts
to wage a war of ideas against radical Islam have, on the whole, failed.
The U.S. government, working creatively with the private and nonprofit
sectors, must find approaches that make the case for free governments and
free societies, and that undermine or confront ideologies that oppose ours.

There is a political contest here that requires the same energy and enterprising spirit that imbued American efforts at political warfare during the
early Cold War.
A third effort must be directed at reshaping the American alliance system,
which was indispensable to our victory in the Cold War, but which now
requires remaking. Some old alliesthe United Kingdom, most notably
have faded and withdrawn, while others (Japan, Australia, and even Canada)
have grown in importance and self-confidence. We have new allies (the
United Arab Emirates, for example, or Colombia) whose potential remains
untapped. And we have partnersabove all, Indiawho may resist the name
ally but will act alongside us in important ways.
The NATO alliance will remain a bedrock of European security; indeed, its
protection and maintenance in the face of Russian aggression are imperatives.
But new alliance systems will emerge, in a variety of forms, including treaties,
informal agreements, and bilateral and multilateral arrangements. And it
is correct to say that, without slighting our European commitments, the
United States must shift some of its foreign policy energy to Asia from its
traditional focus on Europe and the Middle East.

ne hundred years ago, the United States hesitated on the verge of

entering the global war that was convulsing Europe. It eventually did

so, as an associated rather than an Allied power, and its ambivalence crippled its performance. President Wilsons attempt to reconstruct global order

was only partly successful and, regrettably, Americas leaders were unable to
agree on sustaining an American role in maintaining global order thereafter.
That hesitation and reluctance increased the price paid when, in the 1930s,
the dictators had their way in Europe and Asia.
We do not yet face a cataclysm like that of the late 1930s. But it is fair
to compare our era to that of the early 1930s, when the democratic powers
seemed to have lost much of their military edge and, equally important,
their self-confidence and will to use their power. At the same time, pitiless
dictators and virulent ideologies were making use of new technologies to
threaten, in ways previously inconceivable, the international order. In our
7

world, which could turn much darker with little notice, neither a minimalist
foreign policy that seeks to avoid conflict and maintain quiet nor one
thoughtlessly eager to remake the world, can succeed. Rather, America
needs a foreign policy based on strength, rooted in values and interests, and
conducted with wisdom. And to that end, this book.

Part II

REBUILDING AMERICAS
ALLIANCES

CHAPTER 2: AMERICAS ALLIANCES

FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
Eric Edelman

Since the end of World War II a major part of the international system
has been the globe-girdling system of alliances created by the United States
to maintain access to the global commons, facilitate international trade,
enable U.S. projection of military power for forward defense, prevent the
Soviet Union from dominating Eurasia, and preserve the norms-based world
order. That system of alliances has been remarkably successful. It has been
an enormous source of comparative strategic advantage for the United
States and has made a major contribution to the successful conclusion of
the Cold War.
Since the end of the Cold War, the far-flung U.S. network of alliances has
aggregated additional military capability, restrained allies from pursuing
disruptive policies, provided legitimacy for the use of force, given the U.S.
government and military access to vital geographic points, and prevented
important industrial capacity from falling into the hands of Americas
adversaries. The alliance system thus remains one of the key tools for U.S.
policymakers to manage a global order that is increasingly threatened by
revisionist authoritarian powers, emerging new nuclear powers, and nonstate actors including violent Islamic extremists, narco-terrorists, and
super-empowered cyber criminals.
Nonetheless, for Americans, alliances are a bit of an unnatural act. The
Founding Fathers established a long American tradition of avoiding what
George Washington called permanent alliances and what Thomas Jefferson
feared would be entangling alliances. The Founders views were rooted in
a vision of free trade as the dissolvent of the mercantilist war system and
the then-prevailing view that agriculture was the root of all wealth. Hence
Thomas Paines Common Sense (1776) argued that Americas plan is commerce, and that, well attended to, will secure us the peace and friendship of

10

all Europe to have America as a free port. Establishing a crude form of economic determinism that still influences many commentators on U.S. foreign
policy today, he noted that U.S. agricultural products were the necessaries of
life, and will always have a market while eating is the custom abroad. These
ideas engendered an enduring sense that Americas inherent economic
strengths could spare it the vicissitudes of international politics.1
These injunctions had profound consequences for American strategic
culture and created an inherent ambivalence about alliance relationships. As Henry Kissinger has noted, no country has been more reluctant
to engage itself abroad even while undertaking alliances and commitments of unprecedented reach and scope. Americas unique geographic
circumstance, notably its separation from the rest of the world thanks to
two large bodies of water, contributed to a culture of ambivalence with
regard to alliances. Hans Morgenthau saw it as the most durable element
of national power, and historian C. Vann Woodward saw it as the basis of
Americas free security. As he noted fifty years ago, throughout most of
its history the United States has enjoyed a remarkable degree of military
security, physical security from hostile attack and invasion. This security
was not only remarkably effective, but relatively free because natures
bounty had interposed itself between the United States and potential
adversaries in place of the elaborate and costly chains of fortifications
and even more expensive armies and navies that took a heavy toll on the
treasuries of less fortunate countries and placed severe tax burdens upon
the backs of their people.2
In truth, this free security before 1900 was something of a mirage
largely attributable to the British Navys role in providing the United States
with a shield behind which it was able to prosper. Although an era of free
security, if it ever existed, is long gone, the notion has left a deep imprint on

Thomas Paine quoted in Felix Gilbert, The Beginnings of American Foreign Policy (Harper and
Row, 1965) pp. 42-3, and Walter LaFeber, The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home
and Abroad since 1750 (W.W. Norton, 1989), p. 19.
2
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 18, Hans Morgenthau, Politics
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Alfred A. Knopf, 4th ed., 1967), p. 106; and C.
Vann Woodward, The Future of the Past (Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 76-7.

11

the American psyche and is no small part of the explanation for the traumatic
impact of the 9/11 attacks on the United States.
The prevailing American aversion to taking on political obligations and
alliance relationships underwent a paradigm shift in the 20th century.
During World War II, in the wake of the colossal, global wars that had wreaked
unprecedented carnage in both Europe and Asia, the bulk of the U.S. national
security elite abandoned the dominant view that the nation could rely on
a continentalist strategy of hemispheric defense in favor of globalism
a strategic posture that relied on alliances to aggregate military power and
provide for forward military presence, and on power projection, which would
allow the U.S. government to prevent a hostile power from dominating
either Europe or Asia.
Seventy years later, we still retain enormous comparative advantage
from our favorable geography, which allows us to remain aloof from the
many rivalries and clashes of interest that stimulate international conflict.
The oceans have shrunk thanks to technological progress, but, as Samuel
Huntington observed, American policymakers have used this advantage to
maintain an historically uniquely diversified network of alliances that has
preserved a balance of power in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, while
also providing for the aggregation of military capabilities. These alliance
relationships facilitated the creation of a free world bloc whose security
underpinned the economic recovery of Western Europe and Japan, denied
their territory or industrial potential to the Soviet Union, helped prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons by providing extended nuclear deterrence
to allies, assisted in attenuating the historical antagonisms that had divided
allies by promoting multilateral ties, and provided a legitimating function
for military operations. From the military perspective the U.S. organizing
role created a template for the formation of military coalitions and helped
inform military modernization efforts around the world by establishing
requirements for standards and interoperability.3
Despite legitimate and growing concerns that Americas traditional allies
3

Samuel Huntington, The U.S.Decline or Renewal? Foreign Affairs, 67:2, pp. 91, 45.

12

may be less able and willing to contribute to the common defense, they continue to provide the United States with vital geographical access to Eurasia.
In addition, because potential competitors and adversaries like China, North
Korea, and Iran have no natural allies, the access provided by U.S. alliances
(and the potential that, if well led, these alliances can help complicate the
defense requirements of putative rivals or challengers) is an enduring U.S.
comparative advantage. Furthermore, the U.S. geographic position and track
record as a security partner gives it an advantage in recruiting new allies and
partners to deal with regional competitors or aspiring hegemons.
As the National Defense Panel (on which I served) noted in 2014, the primary
mechanism by which the United States has promoted its security interests
and its leadership of the broader international order has been through the
formation and maintenance of a wide network of formal alliances, such as
NATO, treaties with countries like South Korea, Japan, Australia, Thailand,
and the Philippines, and more informal but still deep partnerships, as with
Israel and the Gulf states. The NDP finding highlights the fact that Americas alliance relationships have taken three distinct forms: a multilateral,
integrated defense alliance in Europe; a hub and spoke system of bilateral
treaties in Asia; and a series of special relationships with implied defense
commitments in the Middle East.4
NATO has been called the most successful military alliance in history,
which, as former Supreme Allied Commander George Joulwan has said,
helped bring about the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Berlin Wall
and the Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany, and the demise of communism in Europe. It was and is a classic defense alliance, with a causus
foederis enshrined in the obligation under Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty to treat an attack on one as an attack on all. Growing out of the
experience of World War II, it enshrined the strategic axiom of Europe
First that had animated President Roosevelts Grand Strategy. Although
some scholars and critics have accused the U.S. government of succumbing

4
William J. Perry and John P. Abizaid, co-chairs, Ensuring a Strong U.S. Defense for the Future:
The National Defense Panel Review of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (United States
Institute of Peace, 2014), p. 6.

13

to an imperial temptation in taking on this obligation, the reality is that

this was an empire by invitation, with the United Kingdom especially and
the other West European powers insisting that a U.S. defense commitment
was the key to their political security and economic recovery. The security
underpinning was the basis for the European miracle of the 1950s and the
re-emergence of Europe as one of the most prosperous regions of the world.5
The U.S. defense commitment in the late 1940s actually exceeded Americas
existing capabilities, but eventually the U.S. government adopted a strategy
of forward defensethe stationing of U.S. troops and the deployment of
nuclear weapons to Europe. From the beginning there were differences
among the NATO members and between the United States and its allies
about strategy, budgets, and policy. Nonetheless, as Henry Kissinger has
noted, through the mechanism of the alliance, America was tied to Europe
by permanent consultative institutions and an integrated military command
systema structure of scope and duration unique in the history of coalitions.
The alliance not only brought about the results outlined by General Joulwan
but also has adapted itself to the new, stabilizing the Balkans, orchestrating
the demise of Muammar Qaddafi, providing a hedge against emergent Russian
revanchism, and reassuring the new allies who were formerly part of the
Soviet bloc. If it did not exist, in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of
Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine,
we would have had to invent it anew.6

he U.S. alliance system in Asia evolved in a totally different way. As

former PACOM Commander Admiral Dennis Blair has noted:

The United States has approached security relations in Asia as

a hub-and-spoke arrangementwith the United States at the

5
General Joulwan quoted in NATO Enlargement: The American Viewpoint, U.S. Foreign
Policy Agenda: An Electronic Journal of the U.S. Information Agency, 2:4, p. 19; Geir Lundestad,
Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952, Journal of Peace
Research, 23:3, pp. 263-77. Over time this morphed into an effort to create an integrated
Europe in order to accomplish the double containment of Germany and the Soviet Union;
see Lundestad, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1947
(Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-4.
6
Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 818-21.

14

center of bilateral ties among nations that, in turn, have limited

bilateral, if any, military interactions and security arrangements
with each other. U.S. bilateral treaties and security partnerships,
backed by capable, forward-stationed and forward-deployed
armed forces, remain the indispensable framework for deterring
aggression and promoting peaceful development in the region.

Paradoxically, the system arose in the aftermath of the outbreak of the

Korean War, when the U.S. government was seeking to reassure its European
allies in the immediate aftermath of the North Atlantic Treaty ratification.
U.S. leaders also feared being entrapped by some of our Asian allies in a
larger war not of American making. In that sense, our security treaties with
Korea and Taiwan were as much pacts of restraint as they were defense treaties.
Japan was the linchpin of the entire system. The U.S.-Japanese security
alliance was predicated on a grand bargain in which Japan renounced its
past reliance on military force and acceded to an American defense protectorate based on the nuclear umbrella in exchange for generous access to
military bases in Japan and a low international profile. It was a strategy of
dual containment directed against both the spread of communist influence
in Asia and any atavistic instincts to remilitarize Japan.
Although the hub and spoke system lacked the multilateral integrated
military structure of NATO, it, too, rested on the notion of forward defense
and power projection to reassure allies of the credibility of U.S. commitments
and to deter aggression by the Soviet Union or the Peoples Republic of
China. Despite the passage of 65 years and the enormous economic transformation of Asia, including the rise of China, the original U.S. alliance system
remains largely intact and continues to underpin regional security.7

merican security relationships in the Middle East have followed an

altogether different pattern. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire

the dominant outside powers in the Middle East were Britain and France.
During World War II, Britain had the main responsibility for the Middle East
7

Dennis C. Blair and John T. Hanley, Jr., From Wheels to Webs: Reconstructing Asian-Pacific
Security Arrangements, Washington Quarterly, 24:1, pp. 7-17.

15

as a theater of operations, but the United States established positions in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran guaranteeing it would play some role
in the regions fortunes after the wars end. Initially in the postwar period,
the U.S. government was inclined to allow Britain to play the role of senior
partner in a region that appeared to be ripe for potential penetration by the
Soviet Union. Over time, as the sinews of British power weakened, the U.S.
government assumed a ever larger role in the regions security culminating
in the Britains abdication of defense responsibilities east of Suez in 1971
and the assumption by the United States of responsibilities for maintaining
regional security and guaranteeing international access to the regions
energy resources.
As the cooperative Anglo-American rivalry played out in the Middle East,
there were fitful attempts to create an alliance structure. One such effort
culminated in the Baghdad Pact, but none of them ever came close to bearing
the weight of NATO. As Henry Kissinger has observed,
in the end, America was drawn into the Middle East by the
containment theory, which required opposition to Soviet expansion in every region, and by the doctrine of collective security,
which encouraged the creation of NATO-like organizations to
resist actual or potential military threats. Yet, for the most part,
the nations of the Middle East did not share Americas strategic
views. They thought of Moscow primarily as a useful lever to
extract concessions from the West rather than as a threat to
their independence.8

U.S. efforts to establish alliance relationships foundered on the realities of

decolonization and the retrocession of Anglo-French power from the region,
as well as the establishment of Israel. Over time, the special relationships
with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran that were established in World
War II were complemented by a special relationship with Israel and Egypt
as part of a broader strategy to contain both radical Arab nationalism and
Soviet power. The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the resulting Shii theocracy bent on spreading its revolutionary doctrine throughout the region

Kissinger, Diplomacy, pp. 525, 527, 533.

16

created a major disruption and set in motion a new wave of religious-based

extremism in both Shia and Sunni variants. The other special relationships,
however, have survived the habitual turmoil of the most volatile region in
the world. Whether they will continue to survive an Iran nuclear agreement
remains to be seen.

estoring and managing Americas far-flung network of alliances will be

one of the main tasks of a new U.S. Administration in 2017. It will be

especially challenging because the Obama Administrations grand strategy

has systematically undermined Americas alliances. A brief examination of

the Administrations grand strategy will cast some light on the challenges
facing us in the areas of alliance management and coalition maintenance.
As Colin Dueck has argued in The Obama Doctrine, the President has
pursued a strategy of retrenchment and accommodation. He has sought to
reduce American military structure and commitments, particularly in areas
like the Middle East where he believes the United States is overinvested, and
he has reached out to Americas adversariesChina, Russia, and Iranin
order to conciliate their grievances and make them responsible regional
actors in the international system. He wants them to be, as people used to
say in the 1960s, part of the solution and not the problem. Unfortunately,
this prioritization of attending to adversary complaints over the needs of
allies has subjected Americas closest traditional alliance relationships to
enormous strain. That is so because the outreach to adversaries has not only
been unsuccessful but also appears to have encouraged more aggressive policies by Russia, China, and Iran.9
The most visible case of a damaged alliance is the contentious and dysfunctional relationship that has developed between the U.S. government and that
of Israel. But the same dynamic is at work with traditional U.S. Gulf allies and
Egypt, as well. It is also visible to a lesser degree in relations with our Asian
allies, who have expressed concern about the durability of U.S. commitments,
not to mention some of the newer post-Cold War members of NATO.

Colin Dueck, The Obama Doctrine (Oxford University Press, 2015).

17

In some neorealist academic circles there is a view, perhaps shared by

key officials in the Obama Administration, that alliance management does
not require enormous effort, since states tend to balance major powers in
the international system rather than bandwagon with them. Former Secretary of State Shultz has suggested that the practitioners view is somewhat
different. He has likened alliance management to gardening, noting that
state-to-state relationships are like tender flowers that need fairly constant time, attention, and watering. The work of alliance management can
be burdensome. It is time consuming, emotionally draining, and requires
frequent consultations by senior officials. As Lawrence Eagleburger once
wrote to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson from the U.S. Mission in
NATO, I always admired your vision in inventing NATO, but eight months
here have led to some second thoughts. Like sex, NATO is a good thing to be
knowledgeable about, and to experience on occasion. But it can become a
bit wearing.10
Repairing the damage done over the past eight years to Americas alliances
will require an enormous diplomatic effort that must be sustained for some
years and based on the notion that alliance management is one of our most
important strategic advantages. That advantage will need to be nurtured and
extended in a new and potentially more difficult environment.
One of the most problematic issues in alliance management over the
years has been burden sharing. The United States after World War II essentially established a defense protectorate guaranteeing the security of its
allies with its nuclear umbrella. The willingness of the U.S. government to
do so created a classic public goods problem. As economists Mancur Olson
and Richard Zeckhauser explained, the economic theory of alliances states
that there is a tendency for the larger membersthose that place a higher
absolute value on the public goodto bear a disproportionate share of the
burden. The issue of burden sharing has been a neuralgic point among the
allies since the early 1950s. It is likely to become an even more trying task as
10

George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (Charles Scribners Sons, 1993), pp. 128-9, Eagleburger to Acheson, May 7, 1970, Dean Acheson Papers, Yale University, Sterling Memorial Library,
Box 9. I am grateful to Professors Walter LaFeber and Frank Costigliola for drawing this letter
to my attention.

18

cultural shifts, demographic decline, and economic pressures diminish the

resource levels that allies are willing to devote to defense. 11
Left unattended, this situation will call into question the actual aggregation
of power that is one of the fundamental purposes of pursuing alliances.
Alliance managers will have to develop more creative approaches to recommending that allies spend their scarce euros, pounds, and yen on specific
military capabilities that complement U.S. forces rather than the full spectrum forces that they maintained during the Cold War. The U.S. government will also need to consider a more explicit division of labor with allies
by encouraging them to procure the means to impose costs on potential
adversaries as part of the first line of defense, enabling the United States to
reinforce collective defense with the capabilities that are a manifestation
of its unique global reach.
The U.S. government will also want to seek new partners to deal with the
growing range of threats to regional security. India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and
the UAE are all partners who have developed a closer range of defense relationships with the United States over the past decade. Although it is unlikely
that they will become treaty allies, these special relationships have much
potential for further development that will complicate the calculations of
China and Iran, for example, in seeking to pursue their ambitions to revise
the security order in their respective regions. The prospects for new partnerships, however, will depend heavily on the new partners perceptions of
Americas reliability and commitment to its existing allies. The U.S. government will also need to construct informal coalitions that build on our
relations both with treaty allies and other types of partnerships. The international landscape is shifting quite rapidly, and U.S. alliance policies will
need to become more agile to cope with the increasing pace of change.
As the United States continues its effort to manage global order in the
21st century it will undoubtedly rely on the main tool that it is has employed
for the past 70 years: its system of alliance relationships. But there will be

11

Mancur Olson Jr. & Richard Zeckhauser, An Economic Theory of Alliances, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 48:3, pp. 268, 270.

19

some differences to accommodate the vast changes that have accompanied

the transition to an information age. New alliance relationships are likely to
be more informal and flexible than the legally binding, treaty based alliance
vehicles of the past. The Europe-first approach will shift over time toward
a balance of effort more focused on Southwest and East Asia. The heavy
emphasis on forward defense and presence is likely to give way to a greater
emphasis on access to bases, persistent and habitual training relationships,
co-production and purchase of selected advanced weapons platforms, and
U.S. punitive strikes. U.S. Special Forces will be a ubiquitous presence among
our allies (both state and non-state). Flexible and informal coalitions like
the Proliferation Security Initiative are likely to be a tool of choice in the
volatile and uncertain international environment that is likely to face the
next President.
Moreover, the new U.S. Administration will have to take as its point of
departure the enormous damage that has been done to U.S. alliances by the
policies of the Obama Administration. A great deal of effort will be required
in this regard. First and foremost the new Administration will have to rebuild
our defenses and demonstrate quickly both the resolve and the capability
to defend our allies. Many of our treaty allies, as well as prospective partners,
believe the United States is losing its military dominance and lacks the will
to defend them. This will take enormous personal effort on the part of a new
U.S. President and other senior national security officials.
In particular, the role of U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, long the
underpinning of our treaty alliances, is likely to persist into the future, a
fact that will require modernizing all three legs of the U.S. nuclear triad,
but mustering the budget resources, while necessary, will not be sufficient
to rebuild the damaged credibility of our extended nuclear deterrence commitments. The failure to enforce the Syria redline, the serial retreat from
long-held positions on nonproliferation policy in the Iran nuclear negotiations, and the total failure of the Administration to stand by the assurances
to Ukraine contained in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 have severely
undermined the faith of our allies around the world in U.S. assurances and
commitments. Attention to this set of issues must be an early priority for

20

new American leadership.

The diplomacy of alliance management, a skill set that has atrophied
since the Cold War, must be reinvigorated. Alliance management for the
next President and senior U.S. officials will not only be something important
to know about but something to practice constantly, no matter how wearing
it might be on the participants.

21

CHAPTER 3: EUROPE
A. Wess Mitchell

More than any place on earth, Europe has symbolized Americas ability
to stabilize and transform troubled regions in the modern era. This success
has rested on two foundations: deterrence and integration. By extending
the U.S. nuclear and conventional security umbrella into the historic crush
zone between the Baltic and Black Seas, U.S. policy suppressed geopolitical
competition within Europe after a century of both hot and cold war. By
encouraging the spread of Western institutions through the enlargement of
the European Union and NATO, that same regional policy helped to create a
zone of peace that soothed national rivalries and provided a partner to the
United States in managing the global order. With the 20th centurys hotspot
thus all but eliminated as a zone of geostrategic concern, the United States
could turn its attention to the Middle East and Western Pacific.
Both deterrence and integration are now in jeopardy. The first faces the
challenge of a re-emergent and creatively predatory Russia; the second is
a victim of perennial squabbles and divergent strategic interests within
Europe. By degrees, Europe is turning from a centerpiece of global stability
to an engine of crisis. This is dangerous for the United States. Coming at a
moment when America faces increased competition from revisionist powers
elsewhere, Europes dual crisis threatens to unravel the peace of Europe,
undermining the Western democratic order and diminishing the value to
the United States of important allies. The conditions now exist for a military
confrontation in Europes East that, if fought tomorrow, NATO might lose.
The next Administration must re-stabilize Europe and rebuild U.S. alliances
there as one of its highest foreign policy priorities.

s in all regions, U.S. deterrence in Europe is based on two components:

the belief among friends and foes that America is able to defend its

allies against attack, and the belief that it is determined to do so. Both are

doubted in Europe today.

22

Doubts about American capabilities stem from two factors. First, unlike in
other allied regions, the United States has until recently maintained virtually
no military presence in frontline NATO states. It has also been cutting back
its presence elsewhere on the continent. Since the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. military presence in Europe has dropped from more than 300,000 troops
to about 60,000. The Obama Administration has accelerated this process,
removing 15 bases and the most combat-ready units, including two Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs), two air squadrons, and all remaining U.S. heavy armor.
Second, as U.S. capabilities have diminished, those of our rival are increasing.
Long discounted as backward, the Russian military under Vladimir Putin has
acquired new weapons, absorbed lessons from the Georgia War, and developed
hybrid warfighting techniques to effectively counter NATOs capabilities. The
Russian Army now outstrips in size and quality any force between itself and
Germany, outnumbering NATOs CEE militaries combined by 3:1 in men and
6:1 in planes. In the Baltic region, it has a 10:1 edge in troops and maintains
air dominance over NATOs northeastern corner. Backing its conventional
forces is a 27:1 advantage in tactical nuclear weapons, rooted in a doctrine
of limited strikes for strategic effect. Using these advantages, Putin has
boasted he could be in Riga, Vilnius, Tallinn, Warsaw, or Bucharest in two
days. A recent RAND war game concluded that he is correct.12
Deterrence is not just physical, but also political in character. While
NATOs eastern and northern members generally see Russia as a threat, its
western and southern members mostly do not. Many Polish and Baltic leaders assume that if they were to invoke Article 5 in a crisis, NATO would not
be able to summon the requisite consensus to act. A recent Pew Research
poll validated their fears, finding that a majority in many West European
countries opposes supporting a NATO ally if attacked.13 Russia understands
this disunity. It uses divisive diplomacy to exploit Europes cleavages and
has crafted limited-war techniques designed to grab land quickly without
triggering Article 5.
12

David Ochmanek, presentation of findings from the RAND Baltic Wargame, Center for a
New American Security, June 4, 2015.
13
NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian Crisis, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid,
Pew Research Center, June 10, 2015, p. 5.

23

The United States has contributed to the crisis of deterrence. Until recently,
the Obama Administration has pursued what many U.S. allies viewed as an
unbalanced courtship of Russia that advanced a narrow definition of Western
interests and prioritized diplomatic ties with Moscow over security links with
allies. As damaging as the substance of the U.S.-Russia reset was its style.
Against the backdrop of an early Obama Administration that questioned the
value of Cold War-era alliances and pursued personal diplomacy with the
Kremlin, the reset seemed both apologetic and freewheeling.14 The Administration has made headway against this perception. But a lasting impression of
the suddenness with which U.S. priorities can shift from one Administration
to the next remains, undermining the predictability that is the sine qua non of
effective deterrence for any great power.

ven as deterrence is eroding, the primary mechanism that U.S. policy

over the years has cultivated to reinforce itEuropean integrationis

stalling. The strategic value of integration to the United States was that it
stabilized Europe and offered to extend that stability into abutting regions.

It thus strengthened deterrence in two ways: by thickening the political

bonds of U.S. allies into a whole that was less susceptible to coercion or
invasion, and by promising to pacify Europes borderlands.
Integration today is doing neither. The European Union in its current
form is capable of performing hardly any of the functions of geopolitical
competition, and partly as a result Europe has ceased being a model for
other regions. Structurally, it possesses few tools of competition, notably a
functionally integrated security force. Politically, it is unwieldy and divisive.
Ideologically, it struggles to comprehend conflict and competition. Economically, it is as of late a huge mess, and these economic problems have been
the platform upon which all the latent tensions and contradictions of the
EU framework have been let loose. Even the less ambitious U.S. hope that
Europes members would at a minimum not actively undermine each other
is proving questionable. Increasingly, the EUs political crises are distracting

14

Note especially President Barack Obamas address to the United Nations General Assembly,
September 23, 2009, and David Nakamura and Debbi Wilgoren, Caught on open mike, Obama
tells Medvedev he needs space on missile defense, Washington Post, March 26, 2012.

24

attention away from its core value as an economic free trade area, spurring
close U.S. allies like Britain to reconsider their membership.
The European Union is also foundering in its effort to pacify Europes
borderlands. The value of EU eastern policies was that they quieted the zone
beyond NATOs walls with less risk of confrontation than NATO enlargement
would provoke. Like Romes emissaries to client tribes beyond the frontier in
antiquity, they offered to civilize what could not be conquered or otherwise
absorbed. By invading Ukraine, Vladimir Putin put a hard object in the EUs
pathmilitary powerthat it has neither the tools nor mindset to confront.
The war created a deterrent to reviving the eastern partnership while also
planting seeds of future disagreement among the EUs largest western and
eastern members, Germany and Poland, over how to manage growing Russian influence in the East.
Recent U.S. behavior has contributed to this negative dynamic. Where
U.S. diplomats played a leading role in the negotiations that ended Europes
past frontier wars, they have been conspicuously absent from diplomacy on
Ukraine. Americas hands-off approach effectively outsourced leadership to
the European Union, which in its current state meant outsourcing to Germany.
By failing to participate in the Minsk process, the Administration aided
Putins attempt to fashion a diplomatic templatethe Normandy format
that excludes the European Union and the United States and settles eastern
disagreements through Russo-German bargaining.
The Minsk process signifies a different order for the Lands Between
than either the old NATO enlargement model (extending deterrence) or
the EU enlargement model (extending integration). It revives the model of
great-power settlements that ignore the wishes of smaller actors. It weakens deterrence by signaling U.S. disengagement on what Americas core
role in Europe should be: dealing with a predator. It weakens integration
by allowing that predator to be handled, not by an entity representing all of
Europes interests, but by Germany, which does not always have the exposed
EU members interests at heart.

25

he erosion of deterrence and integration is generating two sets of problems for the United States. One is the vulnerability of frontline NATO

members to attack; the other is a perpetually unsettled frontier for which

the West has no obvious solution.

Both problems are grave, but the first is potentially existential. NATO
today is highly vulnerable to a sudden Russian military strike aimed at
achieving limited territorial gains. Unfavorable force ratios could allow
Putin to hold a swath of NATOs flank hostage to the threat of escalation.
Russias ability to re-escalate the Ukraine war or ignite other frontier conflicts enables it to dissuade a renewed EU push in the East. Europes disunity
aids these tactics, offering a mosaic of variously arming, accommodating, or
cowering states whose divisions are easy to stoke.
All of this represents a serious danger. Recurrent frontier crises deepen
Europes paralysis while draining American resources needed elsewhere on
the U.S. security perimeter. A deterrence failure in the Baltic that results in
an unrepelled attack or stealth land-grab would render NATO meaningless.
This would undermine the foundations of security upon which the wider
European political order rests and, perhaps worse, undermine the credibility
of U.S. deterrence in other rimland regions that share frontline NATOs vulnerability and proximity to predators.

merica will compete at a disadvantage in conditions of contested primacy

as long as Europe, the seat of Western strength, is insecure. Stabilizing

Europe and rebuilding U.S. alliances there should be a high priority for the
next Administration. Americas strategy should be to strengthen deterrence
against immediate threats while shoring up the foundations of the European

security order to handle renewed geopolitical competition. Four tasks are

especially important.
First, we must deter Russian aggression in the Baltic. The highest priority
must be to prevent a military attack against any and every NATO member.
The next Administration should expand the half-implemented European
Reassurance Initiative with an emphasis on increasing U.S. troops, heavy
weaponry, and air defenses in Poland and the Baltic States. It should

26

strengthen frontline efforts at conventional deterrence, including by equipping Poland, Romania, and Finland with offensive weapons such as the
AGM-158 JASSM and investing in efforts to combat Russian hybrid-warfare
and propaganda techniques. It should insist that West European allies contribute to this effort.
Second, we must refocus NATO on territorial defense. Europes frontline
will remain vulnerable as long as NATO is militarily unbalanced. The next
Administrations biggest goal in Europe should be permanent NATO basing
on exposed members territory. It should encourage the Alliance to jettison
its defense-in-depth posture and embrace a preclusive strategy that raises
the costs of aggression at the local level. It should encourage the trend
prompted by the Ukraine war toward greater defense spending among many
European states, while also giving up on promoting out-of-area capabilities
in all but the largest West European states. Territorial defense must return as
NATOs core mission. It should overhaul U.S. nuclear strategy, discontinuing
the force reductions of the 2010 nuclear review and focusing particular
attention to countering Russian advantages in tactical nuclear weapons.
Third, we must build sub-regional alliances. The next Administration
should take a realistic view of the European Union as a valuable institution
that deserves U.S. support but is not ready to be a recipient of U.S. security
outsourcing. While continuing to engage the European Union on areas of
common interestthe Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP), energy security, and above all the Eastern Partnership (EaP)it
should pursue closer cooperation with sub-regional alliances that possess the skills and common view to deal with Europes security crises. In
particular, it should promote a miniature military alliance among northeastern NATO states (the NBP9) and organize the Visegrad Four (V4) to
support Polish and Baltic requests for permanent basing. The U.S. role in
these groupings should go beyond the coalition-of-the-willing format and
be systematic, well resourced, and focused on problems in Europe rather
than other regions. The United States should form an annual NBP+U.S.
Ministerial in defense and an annual V4+U.S. Ministerial on regional diplomacy. It should organize routine military planning and spur collaboration
27

in strategic industries and R&D. The goal should be to foster a corridor of

well-armed, tightly knit states that radiate stability in their neighborhood.
This task should receive the level of priority that the United States devoted
to encouraging the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s and
NATO enlargement in 1990s.
Fourth, we must position ourselves for a long game on Ukraine. The next
Administrations goal in the East must be the survival of Ukraine. America should arm Ukraine. But it should also organize the West for the long
game in this contest, in much the same way that it did for Germany during
the Cold War. The immediate object is to make the Ukrainian rump state
an economically viable polity to avoid collapse or state capture. This will
require greater Western aid and a strategy for investment and infrastructure.
In these tasks the U.S. government should actively encourage EU strategic
unity and action. While supporting German leadership in key EU equations,
it should be wary of outsourcing eastern diplomacy to Berlin and should be
more vocal in pressing Germany to back a revitalized EaP and contribute to
NATOs eastern defenses.
In all of these areas, the measuring stick for future U.S. policy should be
deterrence first: to judge virtually every action by whether it is likely to
strengthen or weaken Americas credibility among allies and rivals. This
implies a greater seriousness about Europe than America is lately accustomed to. Unlike either of its past two predecessors, the next Administration
must view Europe as an active theater in its own right rather than an area
from which to retire or from which to recruit allies for other regions. While
accepting the urgency of ISIS and the threat of a rising China, the United
States can no longer afford to treat Europe as a post-strategic zone of stability. Rebuilding alliances and restoring American power globally begins
in Europe. Taking that task seriously is one of most important things U.S.
policymakers can do to put the United States on the right track for restoring
order to a disarranged new century.

28

CHAPTER 4: WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Daniel W. Fisk15

Latin America and the Caribbean have experienced a generally positive

twenty-year trajectory of internal reconciliation, interstate peace, growing
democratic institutions and processes, and economic growth with broadening middle classes. Unfortunately, this general record of progress is counterbalanced by several enduring or worsening problems: institutions lacking
accountability and weakened by corruption; continued monopolistic economic
practices; persistent income disparities; limited educational opportunities;
marginalized communities facing integration challenges; the continued
growth of well-armed and well-financed criminal organizations; and continuing migration from parts of the region to the United States.
One consequence of this dichotomy is the re-emergence of leaders who
have centralized authority and limited political space through electoral
manipulation, institutional subversion, and overt repressionall wrapped
in the rhetoric of a 21st-Century Socialism claiming to address social and
economic inequities. In response, U.S. policymakers have defined U.S. interests toward the region almost exclusively in terms of these internal dynamics.
Refocused and reinvigorated support for a democratic and prosperous
hemisphere should remain at the core of the next Presidents policy toward
the Western Hemisphere. The challenge for a new Administration will be
to understand and address the risks emanating from the region as well as
those sited locally but whose real sources are to be found in other parts of
the world.
China, Russia, and Iran have reached out to countries in the hemisphere,
seeking allies and markets. These interactions go beyond longstanding
relationships with the Cuban dictatorship. China has used financial gifts,
infrastructure projects, and commodity purchases as an entry point to the
15

The author wishes to acknowledge his JHI working group colleagues for their assistance with
this chapter: Kimberly Beier, Jose Cardenas, Richard Downie, Bonnie Glick, Frank Kelly, Rebecca
Ulrich, Ray Walser and Timothy Walton.

29

region. By 2012, regional trade with China had reached $270 billion, up from
$29 billion in 2003. Premier Li Keqiangs May 2015 visit reinforced Chinas
engagement, as well as indicating that China would specially reward those
countries willing to cooperate with it, intimating that others would be even
further excluded. Russia has re-announced its presence, too, sending into
the Caribbean bomber aircraft and a naval flotilla, as well as its Defense Minister to seek access to ports and airfields in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.
Meanwhile, Irans relationship with Venezuela has long been of concern to
outside observers, despite some uncertainty about the concrete objectives of
the relationship beyond a shared opposition to the United States.
This activity to our south reinforces the necessity of renewed U.S.
engagement with our neighbors. To the extent that interactions by these
extra-hemispheric actors remain transparent and benefit the people of the
region, as trade relations are likely to do, we should welcome them. It is all
too easy, however, to recognize interactions that do not fit that definition.
The next U.S. Administration should therefore focus initially on countries
that respect democratic rules and follow economic growth policies based on
market principles and an openness to global markets. These countries offer
a strong counterpoint to those who seek to impose a state-centered alternative or who welcome extra-hemispheric countries for all the wrong reasons.
The place to begin is to revive North Americas potential with our immediate neighborsCanada and Mexico. Building on Ronald Reagans summons to [stop] thinking of our nearest neighbors as foreigners, Presidents
George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton pursued approval of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This landmark agreement tied together the
economies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States within a framework
that respects sovereignty and the unique governmental and cultural characteristics of each member. President George W. Bush, with his Mexican and
Canadian counterparts, subsequently launched the Security and Prosperity
Partnership in 2005 to build on NAFTA.
In NAFTAs 20-year existence, North American trade has grown from $300
billion (1993) to more than $1.1 trillion today. NAFTA changed the nature

30

of intra-continental trade, making North America a production platform for

finished goods and services. This trade has benefitted all three countries,
with Mexicos transformation and its growing middle class being the most
visible signs.
The continents human and natural resources are significant, yet the full
potential of the North American partnership remains to be realized. The
energy revolution of the past decade is a case in point: The three countries
account for a quarter of the worlds oil and gas production. Mexico, already
the worlds tenth largest gas producer, is poised to see increased production
with implementation of its energy reforms.16 Regrettably, the Obama
Administration has frayed relations with Canada, pushing our largest trading
partner to look to Asia, especially China, for markets. After taking some initial
positive steps in supporting Mexicos efforts against transnational crime,
the Administration seemed to step back to a point where, in the words of one
observer, there is not much to talk about in terms of U.S. policy actions.17 The
July 2015 escape of Mexican drug lord Joaqun El Chapo Guzmn further
strained the relationship. The capture and prosecution of Guzmn had
been a top U.S. priority for several years, but after his capture, the Mexican
government resisted his extradition, assuring the U.S. that it could and
would handle incarcerating him for his crimes.
A new Presidents early and unwavering attention should reinforce the
mutual benefits of the continental partnership with Canada and Mexico.
Outreach should begin prior to the inauguration with an informal meeting
between the U.S. President-elect and the Mexican President (an established
tradition) to reaffirm the importance of the bilateral relationship. A primary
point of this meeting should be to ensure U.S. support for the Mexican governments economic reform agenda, as well as its confrontation of criminal
syndicates and the violence fueled by the narcotics trade. After the inauguration, the new Presidents first foreign trip should be to Canada, signaling a
16

See Council on Foreign Relations, North America: Time for a New Focus, Independent Task
Force Report No. 71, David H. Petraeus & Robert B. Zoellick, Chairs, 2014; and Bernard L.
Weinstein & Morgan Allen, North America: An Energy Colossus, George W. Bush Institute,
March 2014.
17
Richard Miles, The U.S. Is Not Being a Good Neighbor, Washington Post, April 23, 2015.

31

revival of that relationship. These steps will firmly establish that our North
American partners are no longer an afterthought.
To underscore the importance of North America, the new National Security
Council staff should be given authority to coordinate U.S. government policy,
delegating elements of implementation to the relevant Cabinet agencies.
These policymakers should recognize that todays driver of North American
economic integration is energy.18 Canadas shale-oil development, the
opening for foreign investment in Mexican oil production, and U.S. shale and
natural gas deposits can help ensure North Americas competitiveness and
energy self-sufficiency.
A significant impediment to progress is the legacy regulatory structure in
the areas of food and consumer safety, environmental protection, and labor
mobility (including immigration). The lack of regulatory alignment and the
persistence of duplicative structures have cost American consumers billions
of dollars. This must be addressed. A more efficient regulatory structure
would recognize and accept equally demanding standards of food and consumer product safety and environmental and labor protections. If combined
with an improved transportation infrastructure and updated, enforceable laws
governing labor mobility, it would increase the prosperity of all three countries.

s for the tone of the new Presidents engagement with Latin America
and the Caribbean, decisions on U.S. immigration policy will be critical.

Recognizing the dissatisfaction with the current situation and the con-

troversy surrounding the status of the more than 11 million illegals in the
United States, ending an immigration framework that encourages illegal
migration is essential to Americas societal and economic well being. While
waves of immigration have always caused discomfort, legal immigration is
essential to our definition of ourselves and to U.S. economic growth. Immigrants fill critical gaps in and rejuvenate our workforce, often coming to the
United States during their prime working years. Immigrants are major contributors to innovation, too, having shown themselves to be especially good
18

This goes well beyond the status of the Keystone XL pipeline. If the Keystone XL pipeline
application remains pending in January 2017, an early on-the-merits decision should be made;
if the application has been disapproved, a new application should be encouraged.

32

at starting small businesses. An undertaking as large and as controversial as

real immigration reform that fundamentally updates a 1960s-era structure
will require strong presidential leadership.
Another focus should be on the countries that have respected democratic
norms, pursued economic liberalization internally, and opened their economies globally. Colombia, which was declared a failed state 15 years ago, is
one such country and one of the hemispheres success stories. The 50-yearold struggle by the FARCnow primarily a drug-trafficking organization
rather than a political movementremains the primary obstacle to peace
and greater prosperity. The U.S. government, under Plan Colombia, has supported Colombias efforts to end the conflict; as long as the FARC retains
any organizational capacity, U.S. support should continue, ensuring that the
Colombian government is dealing with the FARC from a position of strength.
Colombia also could be a key ally for the new U.S. Administration as it re-engages the region.
Mexico and Colombia, along with Chile and Peru, formed the Pacific Alliance to enhance trade opportunities with Asia and to promote economic
integration. This effort demonstrates the evolution of these countries
vision beyond this hemisphere and merits U.S. encouragement.
The Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras
(known as the Northern Tier) are plagued by dramatic levels of criminal
violence, inequality, endemic corruption, and weak institutions that are
unresponsive to the majority of citizens needs. To its credit, the Obama
Administration has sought to assist these countries, although it took the
massive and embarrassing migration of unaccompanied minors from the
region to the United States to get it to act.
Achieving more effective governance at the local level must be a priority
for U.S. policy in these countries. Without confronting pervasive corruption,
any assistance will have little lasting impact. Strengthening civilian police
forces and independent justice systems is essential to stability and will
take time to build. In the near-term, we should fund the establishment of
an independent, investigative organization in each of the three countries
33

similar to the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala

(CICIG)to review professional competence, ensure accountability, uphold
the rule of law, implement anti-corruption measures, deliver judicial
reforms to address impunity, and participate in the preparation of legal
cases against corrupt actors. Funding through the central governments
should be restricted, however. We should also condition any such aid on the
willingness of each of the three Central American governments to publicize
their national budgets and match every U.S. dollar of assistance with revenues through the enactment and collection of a security tax.19 Regular
consultations with national and international civil society organizations,
including the private sector and labor organizations, about the development,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of the program also should be
an element of U.S. assistance.
Finally, the United States must insist on tangible results in partner countries efforts to end impunity, hold corrupt officials accountable, and prosecute human rights violations. The Executive Branch should be more active
in using existing authorities to combat corruption, including the use of
Treasury Department designations and the withdrawal of U.S. visas under
Proclamation 7750 (2004).
The island nations of the Caribbean all face continuing challenges of
governance and economic development to one extent or another. Some are
at risk of being overwhelmed by the money and violence of international
criminal organizations. Despite these threats, these countriesCuba still
exceptedhave remained true to their democratic processes and institutions.
Beyond Haiti, where U.S. assistance remains a priority, the other Caribbean
countries are often relegated to a lesser place on the U.S. policy agenda. The
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) is overdue for updating. The new President
should direct a comprehensive review of policies to engage and bolster the
well being of Caribbean nations, including in the areas of energy, economic
19

One of the principal reasons that Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative with Mexico have
been successful is the willingness of the governments and citizens to bear a larger degree of
financial responsibility through the payment of taxes. In the case of Colombia, a specific tax
was placed on the wealthiest, with their agreement, to help fund efforts against the guerrillas.
In Mexico, the government matched each U.S. dollar with $5-8 dollars in state funding.

34

development, and educational exchanges.

espectfully engaging Brazil, the worlds sixth largest economy, should

remain an objective of the new Administrations senior leadership,

including at the presidential level. Regardless of the countrys tumultuous

politics, Brazil envisions itself the leader of South America and has
expanded its diplomatic and economic presence in the hemisphere in recent
years. Its foreign policy bureaucracy is generally adversarial to the United
States, seeing the two countries in competition. Its business class, however,
remains strongly interested in building up the bilateral relationship. Brazil
should be a partner, as President George W. Bush demonstrated by pursuing
cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as in alternative fuels and
health initiatives in West Africa.
Brazil is important in its own right, but it is also critical in its role as an
enabler of rejectionist states such as Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador
occasionally joined by Nicaragua and Argentina. The internal maneuvering
and external conspiring of these states has preoccupied U.S. policymakers.
With leaderships hostile to the United States, these countries have
attempted to create an alternative inter-American system. Except for Cuba
and its longstanding one-party dictatorship, the others have manipulated
democratic mechanisms (for example, elections, constituent assemblies,
and referenda) to centralize power and subvert separate governmental
branches, while threatening independent political and civil society actors.
The next President must recognize these regimes for what they are and
approach policy toward each with a clear vision.

n the special case of Cuba, the Obama Administrations decision to resume

full diplomatic relations perversely reinforces the dictatorship. In the new

Administration, support for the Cuban people should be the U.S. priority, and
that focus should go well beyond the provision of information technology.
The U.S. diplomatic presence on the island and visiting U.S. officials
should engage all elements of Cuban society, including regular interaction
with independent Cuban actors, regardless of the regimes obstruction. At the
same time, the President should enforce existing statutory restrictions on

35

investment in Cuba with state entities or involving expropriated properties,

modifying policy only in response to genuine political and economic reforms.
The new President should direct increased public diplomacy to highlight
how U.S. policies seek to help average Cubans. This effort should include
outreach by the President and other senior U.S. officials with foreign counterparts, as well as engagements with the Cuban people directly, not simply
with the regime in Havana.
The Obama Administrations accommodation also extends to Venezuela,
including outreach to officials who are reportedly under Justice Department
investigation for complicity in narcotics trafficking. Experience over the past
eight years has disproved the belief that diplomatic engagement will moderate
the anti-democratic and anti-American philosophy of the Venezuelan leadership. Rather, the new U.S. President, using existing statutory authorities,
should increase pressure on Venezuelan government officials responsible
for human rights abuses. At the same time, the U.S. should enhance support
for the Venezuelan opposition, including through diplomatic outreach to
third countries to encourage support for civil society actors. The President
should direct the public release of information on Venezuelan corruption and
facilitation of narcotics trafficking, information that deserves to be widely
known. Venezuela can be expected to respond by saber-rattling against its
immediate neighbors; U.S. support to those countries should be visible and
robust. And the new Administration should develop a strategy to encourage
multilateral support for a political transition and economic recovery as the
Venezuelan regime faces a governmental legitimacy and economic meltdown.
As the authoritarian regimes in Havana and Caracas founder, the examples of
Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua will be less relevant, and the so-called Bolivarian model will be shown for what it is: a power grab in populist garb by a
few who empower and enrich themselves at the expense of the larger society.

resident Obama came into office with little in his background or experience to suggest an interest in this hemisphere. The importance of the

Western Hemisphere nevertheless bookends his eight years: Early on, his

Administration followed through on cooperation with Mexico, and his mes-

36

sage at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in 2009 offered expectations of

a new partnership and steps forward to advance prosperity, security, and
liberty. As the Administration concludes, what will stand out is the Executive Order on immigration, the outreach to anti-American governments
in Cuba and Venezuela, andgiven the regions rapturous love affair with
ftbol (soccer)the U.S. Justice Departments welcome investigation into
Fdration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) corruption.
Yet prosperity, security, and liberty are more at risk today than they
were on January 20, 2009. A peaceful, democratic, and prosperous Western
Hemisphere is in the interests of all the citizens of the Americas, and most
assuredly of the United States. Defending our interests and our values is not
imposing them; failing to defend them has made the United States neither
more secure nor more prosperous.

37

CHAPTER 5: ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

James Shinn

China and its allies will be the agents of their own containment, driving
their neighbors into the arms of an enhanced U.S. alliance system with each
major expansion of military capability and each threat to use military force.
Chinese expansion in both the East and South China Seas, Beijings border
disputes with India, combined with North Korean belligerence and Pakistani
duplicity, are the strongest long-term motivators for the rebuilding of the
American Asian alliance networkif we and our Asian allies have the will,
the means, and the patience to do so.
China and its Asian allies pose a major threat across the entire constellation
of conventional, nuclear, cyber, and asymmetric warfare, as catalogued in
Chapters 15, 16, and elsewhere in this volume. The conventional military
thrust of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) is steady and transparent: a shift
from near seas defense to a blue-water navy and power projection across
Chinas sea lines of communication, particularly to the Persian Gulf. Chinese
military growth has expressed itself in the move from exercises in the Pacific
of single ships and planes to multi-fleet, coordinated, unscripted training
exercises involving multiple surface ships, submarines, fixed-wing aircraft
and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). China continues to expand its nuclear
and missile forces in size and perhaps in use doctrine as well, while dramatically increasing the skill and sophistication of its cyber warfare capabilities.
Both Pakistan and North Korea continue to expand the size of their
nuclear arsenals and associated missile delivery systems. (The North Korean
threat is described in Chapter 14). Pakistan continues to support terrorism
as a tool of statecraft in both India and Afghanistan. This is the combination
of threats posed by China and it allies for which the American alliance in
Asia must be rebuilt in order to deter and counter.

efore turning to some key guidelines for rebuilding that alliance, tattered
as it is by the Obama Administrations disastrous handling of Iraq and

38

Afghanistan, its appeasement of Iran, and the loss of U.S. credibility in the
Middle East, three geopolitical factors unique to Asia need airing. One of
these is positive for the U.S. Asian alliance system, one is negative, and one
could go either way in the future.
The favorable factor resides in the fact that the U.S. alliance system in
Asia is designed to contain a single large and rising continental power, the
Peoples Republic of China, and its two relatively weak but still troublesome
adjacent allies, North Korea and Pakistan. In contrast, Americas allies are
more numerous and span a long, discontinuous arc from Northeast Asia,
Japan, and South Korea, moving through several ASEAN states and thence
westward to India and south to Australia; all but Afghanistan have maritime access.
The flip side of this arc is the tyranny of geographythe very long lines
of communication and supply between the United States and its Asian allies,
in contrast to the interior lines of communications and supply in maritime
and continental areas in close proximity to the PRC itself. This favorable
geographical position (for China) has enabled the PLAs development of doctrines such as Anti-Access/Area Denial, intended to keep the United States
and its allies from sending naval forces into Chinas near seas, including
those around Taiwan, thereby raising the stakes of doing so. The closer
operations are to the Chinese littoral, the more dangerous and expensive
Chinese efforts are trying to make them.
The third, more ambivalent factor is that the United States and its alliance
partners are essentially seeking to maintain the regional status quo. But Chinese military expansion into the second island chain of the eastern Pacific
and the South China Sea, and along the Himalayan border, threatens that
regional status quo.
Asias economic integration, combined with the sheer size of Chinas
economy, means that every member of the U.S. alliance system in Asia must
make its security choices under the shadow of Chinese trade and financial
and cultural influence, as described in Chapter 22. For the United States
and even more so for its Asian neighbors, the security threat from China is
39

intertwined with the economic benefits of trading and investing with China.
This complicates alliance-building and alliance-management processes in
subtle ways.
But interdependency cuts both ways. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Partys (CCP) monopoly on political power rests on nationalism and,
even more so, prosperity, yet this very prosperity has been achieved and is
maintained through Chinas integration in the global economy. (This is less
of a factor for Pakistan and virtually not a factor at all for North Korea, the
self-isolated hermit kingdom.) The destructive consequences to Chinas
economy, and thus to the power base of the CCP, of major violence in Asia
may be as great a deterrent to Chinese foreign policy adventurism as the U.S.
Asian alliance system. On the other hand, Beijing has revealed its skill at using
trade and financial leverage to pursue foreign policy goals in Asia.

he first guideline for rebuilding the U.S. Asian alliance system is a

whole of government approach: the United States and its allies can

exploit the power of compatible political, diplomatic, and military structures.

This approach is being implemented most deeply with Japan and Australia,
and to a lesser degree with the Republic of Korea, but can serve as a template
for other potential Asian allies such as the ASEAN states and India.
In contrast, China, North Korea, and Pakistan are arms-length allies, cooperating out of perceived self-interest, not shared values. The relationship
between the PRC patron and its two failed state clients is unbalanced, with
very limited integration on the military and intelligence side and virtually
none on the political side.
The U.S.-Japan relationship is explicitly a whole-of-government alliance
that includes increased coordination in intelligence, early warning, and
operational decision-making, as well as with largely compatible weapons
systems. As such it is a model for the rest of the U.S. alliance system in Asia.
Since it was sealed in 1952, the U.S.-Japan security treaty has lasted longer than
any other alliance between two great powers since the 1648 Peace of Westphalia.
For example, there is much to be gained in terms of intelligence collection

40

and analysis with allies throughout the region, including satellites, UAVs (such
as the RQ-4 Global Hawk), RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft, and submarine
signals intelligence. Integrated early warning systems can be extended,
including X-band radars and other anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.
There is much to be gained, too, from closer operational decision-making
albeit paced by the political appetite for closer relations and by legal constraints such as Article 9 of Japans constitution. Another step forward to
whole-of-government integration, and one to be emulated elsewhere with
allies in the region, is the U.S.-Japan Alliance Coordination Mechanism, a
shared set of procedures that enhance coordination between the U.S. military
and the Japanese Self Defense Forces.
The second guideline for rebuilding the U.S. Asian alliance system is
systematically strengthening interoperability of weapons, training, and
war-fighting doctrine across all four of the threats posed by the PRC and
its allies, including conventional warfare, nuclear, cyber, and small-unit
asymmetric warfare. The degree of military interoperability across these
four threat modes varies widely. It is most advanced with Japan, Australia,
and Korea, far less so with ASEAN (other than Singapore) and with India.
Major weapons platforms are long-lived investments; training and doctrine
integration take even longer to achieve. Investments in human capital of the
Asian alliance take time to forge but have very high returns over timean
important element of whole-of-government alliances.
The rollout of a set of whole-of-government alliances in Asia requires
a deliberate transition from the hub-and-spoke structure that has long
characterized these relationships to enhanced integration among the
allies themselves. This type of integration can be achieved fairly smoothly
between, for example, Japan and Australia. It is more troublesome when
applied to Japan and South Korea, whose nagging problems of history
periodically erupt. But even these problems are not insurmountable, with
careful and patient U.S. assistance in resolving them.
Viewed from the Pentagon, the roadmap of this full-spectrum military
integration should drive the forward deployment of U.S. military forces

41

in the Pacific and shape their force structure, base locations, and rotation
schedule. The Obama Administrations notion of a pivot was basically
sound, but the actual force-structure changes in the Pacific were relatively
modest, revealing the policy to be more rhetoric than strategy.
The long-term needs and capabilities of Americas Asian allies must figure
prominently in the design and procurement of major weapons platforms.
The U.S. defense industry is a major asset in this rebuilding: distributed
production, compatible maintenance procedures, and technology transfer
as part of exchanges between U.S. defense giants and Asian counterparties, particularly in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and India, should be encouraged.
For example, the cumbersome, time-consuming, and bureaucratic U.S.
approval system for sales to Asian allies should be dramatically simplified
and explicitly harnessed to the greater purpose of rebuilding the Asian alliance, through the mechanism of a single, streamlined licensing agency that
is explicitly linked to our regional strategy.
The credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent remains an important element of the alliance. India has its own nuclear deterrent, but the rest of the
American allies are threatened not just by the growing nuclear arsenal of the
PLA but also by those of Chinas two allies, North Korea and Pakistan, which
both have a track record of weapons of mass destruction proliferation. The
steady advances in fissile material stockpiles, weaponization, and missile
delivery systems by both North Korea and Pakistan make the U.S. homeland
increasingly vulnerable to threats by Pyongyang, raising questions about the
credibility of extended deterrence, as explained in Chapter 14 and elsewhere
in this volume.
The third guideline for rebuilding the alliance is tactical pragmatism.
Military-to-military engagements that increase the transparency of the
PLA and CCP leaders with regard to both capability and intent benefit the
U.S. Asian alliance system more than the Chinese alliance system. As the
PLA probes outward and the United States and its allies resist, there will
inevitably be EP-3 type accidents and collisions that involve loss of life and
pose a risk of sudden escalation. The risks of accidental collisions in cyber

42

space are even higher, given the scale and skill of Chinese cyber aggression
and the large-scale damages that cyber warfare can now inflict on an adversarys infrastructure, military and civilian alike. It is prudent to prepare for
such accidents in advance, in terms of response planning among the United
States and its Asian allies, a clear strategy for retaliation when appropriate,
and crisis-management procedures with the PLA and its political masters
in Beijing.
By the same token, U.S. policy should be pragmatic about compromises in
our values while engaging with Party autocrats in Vietnam and the junta in
Myanmar. These are both distasteful regimes, but their shared fear of Chinese hegemony can drive them, too, into the arms of the U.S.-led alliance
system, not as whole-of-government partners but in other functional areas
of resistance to the PRC. There are several opportunities to employ shrewd
diplomacy to mitigate the threats posed by China. Pakistan and Indian confidence building can weaken Pakistans ties to the PRC. Regime change or
regime collapse in North Korea could peel away yet another Chinese ally.

he fourth and final guideline is patience. Rebuilding the alliance system in

Asia will require patience and consistency of strategy over time, neither

of which are qualities that come naturally to liberal democracies.

The Chinese will attempt to maintain their alliance system and perhaps
add a member or two, while neutralizing potential U.S. allies (Myanmar,
Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam) and driving a wedge between other U.S. allies, especially Korea and Japan. China and its allies are a mixed bag of soft and hard
authoritarians, absorbed by elite in-fighting and periodic spasmodic transitions of power. Their leaders are essentially illegitimate with their own
citizens, reliant on massive internal security forces to suppress dissent, and
they deliberately foster xenophobic nationalism to deflect domestic unrest.
In contrast, the U.S. alliance system in Asia is reinforced by shared dem-

ocratic values. Liberal democracies alternate ruling parties, which inevitably entails shifts in defense priorities. This means that elected governments
amongst our Asian alliance partners will periodically backtrack on commitments or budget choices made in pursuit of a tighter alliance with the United
43

States, and otherwise periodically exhibit free-riding or ungrateful tendencies.

Examples of left-leaning shifts include many criticisms of the U.S. alliance
by South Koreas Roh Moo-hyun and his Uri Party during his five-year term
of office beginning in 2003, the nave attempt at triangulating with China
by Japans Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama in 2009, and reflexive anti-American policy steps and persistent non-aligned movement promotions by
Indias Congress Party. A contrasting example is the contests between the
KMT and the DPP in Taiwan, where the nominally conservative KMT is
relatively more accommodating to the PRC and the nominally left DPP is
more hostile to Beijing. These retrograde moments must be patiently anticipated and factored into the long-term ebb and flow of alliance politics.
Liberal democracies will tack left and right, but it is this very alternation of
power that buttresses their legitimacy, strengthens the long-term credibility
of commitment that characterizes alliances among democracies, and lends
them resiliency in the face of the threat posed by China and its allies in Asia.
As George Kennan wrote in the concluding line of his 1946 Long Telegram,
we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and
conceptions of human society.
When it comes to alliance management with democratic allies, in particular,
we know the practical meaning of Kennans observation: Its hard work. The
next President and key Cabinet officials will therefore need to allocate more
of their scarce travel time to tending and mending alliance fences in East and
South Asia than recent Administrations have done. Top leadership politics in
Asia can be surprisingly personal, but can pay big dividends in the long run.
The first order of business in the shorter run, however, is to show up.

44

CHAPTER 6: THE MIDDLE EAST

Elliott Abrams

The United States has never had an alliance system in the Middle East that
resembled NATO or SEATO. We have never had binding bilateral defense treaties with governments there. American policy fostered the fairly short-lived
1955 Baghdad Pact involving the United Kingdom and several American allies
in the region, but it did not include us. Only due to Turkeys membership in
NATO have we had a full treaty commitment to the security of any country
in the Middle East.
Yet the United States has repeatedly, under Presidents of both parties,
asserted a responsibility in the region. The Carter Doctrine of 1979
responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan by stating, An attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded
as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such
an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.
President George H.W. Bush sent a huge armed force to liberate Kuwait after
Saddam Husseins Iraq captured it in August 1990. President after President has asserted a security relationship with Jordan and Israel, with Saudi
Arabia, and, after 1979, with Egypt. Close relations buttressed by extensive
military supply arrangements eventually developed with the United Arab
Emirates, Oman, and Bahrain as well.
This combination of sub-treaty relationships has made the United States
the dominant power in the region since World War II weakened the United
Kingdom, and especially since President Eisenhower opposed Britain and
France over Suez in 1956 and the British withdrew from east of Suez by
1971. The Middle East has changed enormously in that period: from pan-Arab
anti-colonial agitation, the appearance and disappearance of Nasserism, the
dangers from several Arab wars against Israel, the rise and fall of the Soviet
threat, the Iranian revolution and the fall of the Shah, to todays new jihadi
threat, rising Iranian power, and state failures in Libya, Iraq, Yemen, and
Syria that have followed the Arab Spring. What had not changed until the
45

Obama Administration was the shared sense that the United States would act
to advance its interests, protect its friends, and either deter or, if necessary,
defeat its enemies.
If this was not an alliance system in the formal sense, it was a network
of friendships, economic and political interests, military bases, repeated
American statements of intent, and forceful U.S. action that functioned just
as well as a more formal alliance could have. It is this network that must
be rebuilt by the next President, for Arabs, Israelis, Iranians, and Turks all
doubt that it still exists. The reasons for their doubts are all too familiar. The
United States in the past seven years set and abandoned a red line against
chemical warfare in Syria, failed to back and build responsible Syrian rebel
forces, abandoned Iraq before security and political normalcy could be fully
established, abandoned its own demands that Iran bring its nuclear weapons
program to a halt, and turned a close alliance with Israel into a tense and
nasty series of confrontations.
This last matter is worth a moments pause. Sharing common enemies,
Israel and its Arab neighbors have obvious common security interests. They
face a dangerous enemy in Iran, newly enriched by the end of international
sanctions and the unfreezing of well over $100 billion in assets. They also
face a group of non-state and semi-state actors, the jihadis of al-Qaeda and
ISIS, and the powerful Iranian-backed Hizballah. Meanwhile, the prospect of
major conventional warfare between the Arab states and Israel is virtually
nil. What is so striking now is that, although the United States managed
to maintain balanced and friendly relations with Israel and the Arabs for
decades, even when they were nearly at war (and sometimes even when they
were at war), today we have poor relations with both sides just when their
own relations are the least belligerent in their history.
Why is this? On the Arab side, the regimes see an American Administration
that appears to view Iran as a potential partner. To them the nature of the
Iranian nuclear program is crystal clear: Its goal is a nuclear weapon. For
this reason they all supported previous U.S. demands that the program end:
no enrichment, no secret programs kept from the IAEA, no underground

46

sites. The UAE signed a nuclear energy agreement with the United States in
which we demanded that they do zero enrichment. They signed readily, as
other friends did, because this was an unwavering and universal American
demand. Yet now they see the United States agreeing to allow Iran to have a
vast nuclear infrastructure while effectively denying such rights to its own
allies. Worse yet, they see the search for nuclear weapons as only one part
of a broad Iranian effort throughout the region, including in several Arab
countries, to establish regional hegemony. But at precisely this moment
American officials appear smilingly on camera with Iranian diplomats, and
the sense is widespread that with Iran, as with Cuba, the Obama Administration wishes deliberately to abandon, without significant compensatory
conditions, a half-century of policy.
Just as Israel and the Arab states see their interests beginning to coincide,
our closest ally in the region, Israel, has been treated as an increasingly
heavy burden to the United States. From the very first days of the Obama
Administration, relations have been marked by tension. The Administration
adopted in early 2009 the goal of zero new construction in any settlement,
to include East Jerusalema goal to which no Israeli government could ever
accede, and a condition no Palestinian leader had ever demanded. And when
the Netanyahu government refused to accede, the Administration blamed
Israel for sabotaging progress toward peace. Meanwhile, by demanding zero
construction as a prerequisite for negotiations, the Obama policy backed the
Palestinians into a corner: How could they appear less demanding than the
Americans? So years went by without any negotiations at all. Secretary of
State John Kerrys intense efforts in 2013-14 to commence talks were finally
met by Israeli agreement and then rejected by PLO chairman Mahmoud
Abbasyet the Obama Administration has continued to speak and act as if
Israel alone were to blame for the lack of peace negotiations.
Error followed error in U.S. management of the relationship with Israel,
including personal attacks on its Prime Minister. But when Israeli voters went
to the polls in 2015, they did not punish the Prime Minister for mismanaging
relations with Washington, as might have been the result if there were bilateral
tensions ten or 20 years ago. They believed the problem lay at the American
47

end, with the President rather than the Prime Minister, and re-elected him.
Arab leaders watching these tensions emerge might themselves, ten or
twenty years ago, have been encouraged to see a wedge driven between
Washington and Jerusalembut not today. If this is how the Americans treat
an ally as close and as popular as Israel, what kind of treatment could they
themselves expect? Instead of gloating publicly they have winced in private,
for they find themselves in the same boat with Israel, now facing a mutually
goading combination of Sunni jihadi and Iranian threats. The state failures
in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and prospectively Lebanon, as well as in Yemen, have
allowed Iran to increase its role in the Arab Middle East, and allowed it to
move its forces closer to Israels border with Syria. The opposition to Iranian
power and proxies consists of Israel, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf
Arabs, who, needless to say, lack the cohesion that Irans leadership brings
to the Shia forces.

hose common, and commonly acknowledged, threats provide a basis

for rebuilding the American position in the region and regaining the

trust of its leaders. The first order of business should be ending the mistrust
and tension with our closest friend and most valuable military ally, Israel.

Consultations between its officials and our new Administration should

come quickly, and public displays of renewed confidence will be helpful
not only in Israel, but in showing the Arabs that something has changed and
in reminding Iran of the closeness of U.S.-Israel ties. Early discussions of the
bilateral military relationship are an obvious requirement, despite the Obama
Administrations claims that in this area relations are superb.
But the political side, not the military one, is where the real damage
has been done and needs to be repaired. Diplomatically, the United States
should reiterate that it will energeticallynot grudginglydefend Israel in
all international fora. This will head off the need for some U.S. vetoes in
the UN Security Council, because it will strengthen the American bargaining
position as resolutions are drafted. Wielding the veto on Israels behalf
should be viewed not as a failure of diplomacy but as a proud assertion of
American interests and principles. In public and in private, the U.S. govern-

48

ment should combat the BDS movement and similar actions meant to delegitimize Israel and harm its economyincluding by adoption of new laws that
deny access to the American market to those institutions and companies that
boycott Israel.
The obsession with construction in settlements and in East Jerusalem
should be replaced by the kind of quiet agreement reached by the Bush
Administration with the Sharon government in Israel: to limit settlement
growth and keep the peace map intact. Instead of a dramatic and unrealistic
search for instant, comprehensive peace agreements (that Israelis and
Palestinians alike see as improbable), the United States should focus initially
on improving Palestinian life and building Palestinian institutions. Greater
economic progress, more autonomy, improved security, deepened IsraeliPalestinian and Palestinian-Jordanian cooperation, and the strengthening
of Palestinian institutions will pave the way toward an eventual solution.
Those goals are not dramatic, but they are both necessary and realistic.
Similarly, the existence of common security interests between Israel and
key Arab states presents an opportunity. An America mistrusted by both
sides cannot take advantage of it, but in a moment of renewed alliances
there will be possibilities. Perhaps some of the secret discussions between
Israel and several Arab states could be made more public, or new track II
discussions energized. Perhaps the 2002 Arab Plan could be discussed in
official or semi-official gatherings, to see if there are any prospects for Arab
flexibility and Israeli responses. Perhaps Egypt and Jordan, whose peace
treaties and security ties with Israel are unique, can play a role. Such possibilities would need to be examined quietly, to see what the traffic will bear
and what it would take for the traffic to bear more. But these are all possible
fruits of a reassertion of American leadership in the region.
With the key Arab statesJordan, Egypt, and the GCC countriesa great
deal of confidence has been lost. In private, Arab diplomats are withering in
discussing the American negotiations with Iran and the apparent American
misunderstanding of the nature of the Islamic Republic. What they seek
from the United States cannot be satisfied by increased arms sales, nor even by

49

security umbrellas, for the real problem is not mechanical: It cannot be solved
by selling F-16s or even F-35s, much less by speeches about American resolve.
What these Arab allies really seek is a new American Middle East policy that
recognizes our common interestsand common Israeli and Arab interests
in defeating Irans regional ambitions. Such a policy would oppose the Iranian
and Iranian proxy (Shia militias and Hizballah) military presence in Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon. It would understand that the Assad regime is an Iranian
asset that is also a jihadi manufacturing engine, because the slaughter of
Sunnis in Syria has been and remains the best recruiter for the Islamic State.
It would drop fantasies that in some mysterious way the Islamic Republic
can ever be an American partnerand fantasies that moderates in Tehran
can gain power if only we give Iran sufficiently broad concessions. It would
return to the previous American policy that an Iranian nuclear weapons
program is unacceptable and will be opposed through wide sanctions and a
credible military threat.
There is no reason why, to enhance that threat and to make practical
preparations for a last resort that may yet come, the United States and
regional allies should not publicly announce and then seriously commence
talks about possible military options, likely Iranian responses (against
the United States, the GCC states, and Israel), and how to limit and cope
with them. There should be no taboo on discussion of ways to prevent the
advancement of an Iranian nuclear weapons program, and related matters.
If we are serious about preventing any Iranian nuclear weapon, as President
Obama has repeatedly claimed is the aim of U.S. policy, let us both speak
seriously and prepare seriously.
More broadly, we should reinvigorate the Gulf Security Dialogue that the
Bush Administration began, where conventional and nuclear threats to our
Gulf Arab partners can be discussed. The goal should be to build a forum
where we can coordinate with our partners on issues from the Iranian threat
to counterterrorism to border and maritime security, in diplomatic, military,
and intelligence channels.

50

he nature of U.S. alliances with the Arab states will never rival those
with Japan, Australia, Canada, and the democracies of Europe, and not

only because they are not formalized in a defense treaty. These relationships
were built initially because the Gulf Arab states were critical sources of oil
for the United States, but that is changing on both sides. Today we are moving to energy independence, while for the Gulf oil producers the Asian countries, not the United States and Europe, are now the key customers. Oil will
not be a strong cement for our future relations.
There is another factor newly in play, too: the internal situation in many

Arab nations. Most of the Arab countries (Tunisia is for now the only exception)
are not democracies, and some are organized in ways that offend Americans:
absolute monarchies in some cases, repressive dictatorships in others, with
social patterns that often enough include the systematic oppression of women
and minorities. A close partnership with them against common enemies
should not include, and indeed is undermined by, the argument that our
silence about fundamental American values is required for any alliance to
exist. It is not. Prudence and humility dictate that we speak carefully, but pride
and a deep belief in our own values demand that we speak about freedom,
justice, and equality.
So does pragmatism, for, as we learned in Mubaraks Egypt and Ben Alis
Tunisia, dictatorships that appear stable may be illegitimate in the eyes of
the peopleand may disappear overnight. In the Middle East as elsewhere,
governments need legitimacywhether its basis is traditional monarchy,
popular sovereignty and free elections, or efficient rule and real economic
progress. Some Arab governments have combined several of these positive
qualities; others none at all. Today Tunisia, a brave experiment with
Arab democracy, deserves full American support. Given the dangers now
unleashed in the Middle East, managing our relationships with regimes that
govern poorly presents great challenges: Do we downgrade ties and cut aid,
or maintain them and risk greater complicity with oppression, which can
bring long-term popular resentment? American policy must keep in mind
that Arab states are more than the regime officials with whom we deal, and
that behind that faade exist populations seeking better lives. There is no
51

magic formula for balancing security issues and support for freedom, but
our policy should always reflect the need to maintain a balancerather than
jettisoning our own principles as needless complications.
In fact, the United States has in past decades maintained close relationships with Arab regimes while speaking out about freedom, and kept close
alliances with Arabs and Israelis at the same time. Today we have managed
to weaken all of our formerly friendly bilateral relations in the Middle East
and our regional role, diminishing American prestige and emboldening foes.
American allies in the region, and pro-American forces there more generally
(from parties to movements to individual leaders), are on the defensive. Our
friends new and old await new policies that protect our interests and values.
They will look to a new President to reassert the American leadership that
marked U.S. foreign policy after 1945 under Presidents and congressional
majorities of both parties. We should not disappoint them.

52

CHAPTER 7: AFRICA
J. Peter Pham

Africa is destined to present the United States with both significant challenges and extraordinary opportunities in the coming years, far more than
has been the case in the recent past. It could hardly be otherwise thanks to
the complex reality Africa presents. Divergent political, security, and economic trends exist across 54 African countries, presenting U.S. policymakers
with a wide range of choices as they chart new partnerships in an increasingly
dynamic region. While the United States has no formal alliances in subSaharan Africa, or even in Arab North Africa for that matter, it does have a
bountiful variety of partnership relations, several of which contain a security
component. That bounty is bound to increase in the years ahead.
In one sense Africas rising prominence represents a restoration of its
place. Americas first established diplomatic relationship dates from 1777,
when Moroccos Sultan Mohammed III became the first foreign sovereign
to recognize American independence. The subsequent 1786 Treaty of Peace
and Friendship, Americas longest unbroken treaty relationship, is still in
force. In the post-independence period, no overseas challenge had a more
transformative impact on Americas political evolution than that posed by
the Barbary Pirates of the semi-autonomous Ottoman regencies of Tripoli,
Tunis, and Algiers. The first permanent overseas deployment of the U.S.
Navy was its West Africa Squadron, established by the Webster-Ashburton
Treaty of 1842 and operative until the Civil War, wherein the United States
committed to maintaining at least eighty guns off Africas Atlantic coast in
conjunction with the Royal Navys efforts to suppress the slave trade.
In the ensuing years Africa largely disappeared from the U.S. strategic calculus. During the Cold War episodic alarms over Soviet attempts to secure
footholds on the continent arose only to recede as quickly as they appeared.
The zeitgeist captured in Hans Morgenthaus 1955 diktat, that the United
States has in Africa no specific political or military interests, has long

53

assumed pride of place.20 Five decades later the Clinton Administrations

Pentagon strategy document declared that, Americas security interests
in Africa are very limited.21 Then-candidate George W. Bush asserted to
an interviewer that, while Africa may be important, it doesnt fit into the
national strategic interests as far as I can see them.22
Yet once in the White House, it was Bush who, in 2007, directed the
Defense Department to create a unified combatant command, the U.S. Africa
Command (AFRICOM), covering the entire continent (although primary
responsibility for military relations with Egypt remained with the Central
Command). And his successor, Barack Obama, convened in 2014 the U.S.-Africa
Leaders Summit, the largest gathering of African heads of state and government ever hosted by an American President. Why the relatively sudden shift?
At the end of the Cold War, all but a handful of the continents states were
ruled by one-partyif not one-manregimes. Until 1990, aside from the
internal whites-only politics of the South African apartheid regime, exactly
one African leaderSomalias Aden Abdulle Osman Daar, back in 1967had
ever left office through electoral defeat, and only threeLopold Sdar
Senghor of Senegal, Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, and Julius Nyerere of
Tanzaniahad retired voluntarily. In contrast, by the turn of this century,
virtually every African state had opened up at least some space for political competition and many have subsequently become electoral democracies
with regular peaceful transfers of power between governing parties and their
opposition. Some countries have experienced such transitions multiple
times in recent years. That said, the U.S. government has reduced its democracy support and promotion efforts in Africa in recent years. U.S. Agency
for International Development funding for democracy assistance in Africa
has declined nearly 40 percent since 2009, as noted in Chapter 25. Likewise
programs addressing corruption and poor governanceboth obstacles to
developmenthave seen their funding curtailed.
20
Hans J. Morgenthau, United States Policy Towards Africa, in Africa in the Modern World, ed.
Calvin W. Stillman (University of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 317.
21
U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, United States Strategy
for Sub-Saharan Africa, August 1, 1995.
22
George W. Bush, interview by Jim Lehrer, NewsHour, PBS, February 16, 2000.

54

Africas economic progress since the end of the Cold War has been even
more impressive than its political development. Today the continent is
home to seven of the ten fastest-growing economies in the world this
decade.23 Demand from abroad, especially emerging markets like China
and India, for its primary commodities had been partly responsible for the
uptick. Africa holds 95 percent of the worlds known reserves of platinum
group metals, 90 percent of its chromite ore reserves, and 80 percent of its
phosphate rock reserves, as well as more than half of its cobalt and a third
of its bauxite. Africas proven petroleum reserves have also increased by 40
percent in the decade in contrast to the downward trends observed almost
everywhere else. That increase has boosted prices and, in turn, motivated
new investment in exploration and extraction.
Moreover, African agricultures importance is also growing as demand for
food by the developing worlds rising and increasingly affluent populations
surges, even as local resources elsewhere diminish (Africa contains more
than half of the worlds unused arable land). While the starting baseline for
most African countries is relatively low and while, in some of them, much
of the boom has been driven by potentially fickle demand for commodities,
a significant proportion of the growth is due to deeper, long-term trends.
Demographics is one. By 2050, one in four workers in the world will be African. The worlds fastest-growing urbanization rates also mean lower basic
infrastructure costs and concentrated consumer markets. Africas communications infrastructure continues to grow at revolutionary rates: Mobile
telephony and internet usage has grown at five times global averages over
the past decade. Whereas African countries used to be written off as risky
bets by investors or thought of only as sources for raw natural resources,
robust GDP growth rates, coupled with improved regulatory and commercial
environments, have made the continent an increasingly attractive place to
do business.

23
The seven African countries are Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Congo, Ghana, Zambia,
and Nigeria; the other three top ten countries are China, India, and Vietnam. See Lois Ren
Berman & Sakina Balde, Business Challenges and Opportunities in Africa (Euromonitor International, 2013); also see Africas Impressive Growth, The Economist, January 6, 2011.

55

lthough the story of Africa is increasingly one of economic dynamism,

there are very real security, humanitarian, and developmental challenges

that remain to be confronted, and that the United States has a stake in helping
to tackle.
The potential for Africas poorly governed spaces to be exploited to provide

facilitating environments, recruits, and eventual targets for terrorists and

other non-state actors has long been recognized. As the 2002 National Security
Strategy of the United States of America noted, Weak states can pose as
great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not
make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks
and drug cartels within their borders.24 With the possible exception of the
wider Middle East (defined to include Afghanistan and Pakistan), nowhere
has this analysis seemed more applicable than Africa, where, as the document
went on to acknowledge, regional conflicts arising from a variety of causes,
including poor governance, external aggression, competing territorial and
resource claims, internal revolt, and ethnic and religious tensions all lead to
the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas
that can become safe havens for terrorists.
Al-Qaedas 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi
as well as the countless attacks that have followedfocused attention on
the deadly reality of the terrorist threat in Africa. This threat has come in
several varieties. The rebranding of the Algerian Islamist terrorist organization GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prdication et le Combat) as the
Organization for Jihad in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb (Al-Qaeda in
the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM) illustrates one variety. The attack on Algerias
In Amenas gas plant by one of the groups factions in January 2013 left at
least 39 foreign hostages dead and sent shivers through energy markets. The
ongoing activities of various militant Islamist movements in the territory
of the former Somali Democratic Republic illustrate another. Al-Shabaabs
attack on Nairobis Westgate Mall in September 2013 and on Garissa Uni24
The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 17,
2002.

56

versity College in April 2015 left more than 67 and 148 dead, respectively.
The fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya created a vacuum in which still other
jihadi terrorist groups have flourished, including several affiliated with the
so-called Islamic State. Given how many of these groups increasingly interact
with each other, terrorism will likely remain one of the top security challenges
in North Africa and the Sahel for the foreseeable future.
Nor is terrorism in Africa exclusively Islamist in character. The Lords
Resistance Army in Uganda spread terror and death for years. A U.S. military
training effort in-country helped bring it to heel. New violent cults could form
amid the wrenching creative destruction the continent is now experiencing.
Closely related to terrorism is the danger posed by a lack of effective sovereignty that bedevils some African governments. In Mali, ethnic Tuareg fighters
tried, on the heels of the Libyan war, to carve out a separate homeland in the
countrys north. That effort precipitated the overthrow of the constitutional
government and abetted the takeover of more than half of Malis national
territory by AQIM and aligned Islamist movements. (Both setbacks were
reversed following a French-led military intervention in 2013.) In Nigeria,
militants from the extremist Boko Haram sect, which recently aligned
itself at least symbolically with the Islamic State, have seized control
of a remote area along the countrys northeastern borders and used that
enclave to launch not only assaults against government forces in Nigeria but
also cross-border raids into Niger, Chad, and Cameroon.
In addition to insurgents seeking to overthrow established regimes or
carve out new polities, criminal syndicates also ravage Africa. Piracy and
other brigandage, as well as human and material trafficking, is rife. While
the Somali piracy threat has been heavily diminished due to the ramped-up
presence of armed guards on ships, international naval patrols, and U.S.backed efforts by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to reestablish a functional government in Mogadishu, attacks on commercial
shipping have been on the uptick in the Gulf of Guinea. Moreover, an explosion in drug trafficking has afflicted West Africa. It has increasingly become
a site for transshipments into Europe and other destinations, and local con-

57

sumption is rapidly growing. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan and

former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo recently teamed up to produce
a report that estimated the scale of the cocaine trade through West Africa
alone at more than $1.25 billion per annuma sum that dwarfs the combined
state budgets of several countries in the subregion.25
While these depredations are technically security challenges, they can
only be addressed effectively in an integrated fashion. Solutions must
embrace a broader notion of human security that encompasses social,
economic, and political developmentwhich, often enough, also must
transcend national and other artificial boundaries. Nevertheless, the core
security dimension remains and cannot be ignored. The 2010 version of
the National Security Strategy emphasized the need to embrace effective
partnerships in Africa, and indeed a growing number of African countries
Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Senegal, and Uganda stand outhave improved
the professionalism of their armed forces and subsequently have taken the
lead in regional peacekeeping and other security efforts. Since 2005, more
than 248,000 African troops have benefited from training provided through
various U.S. training and equipment programs.
That said, even as the United States has its expanded security engagements across the continent, Africas increasing strategic importance has also
attracted the attention of other global powers, including China. Aside from
vigorous efforts to lay claim to African commodities, China has significantly
ramped up its own military posture in Africa.26 In this sense, Chinas rising
international posture mirrors in Africa what has also become true for Latin
America, as well as the rest of Asia. Just as the Cold War ultimately knew no
strict boundaries in U.S.-Soviet competition, so Sino-American competition
in future will no doubt go on in Africa.

25
West Africa Commission on Drugs, Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West
Africa, June 2014.
26
See J. Peter Pham, Pirates and Dragon Boats: Assessing the Chinese Navys Recent East
African Deployments, Journal of the Middle East and Africa 4:1 (2013), pp. 87-108. Since January
2009, as part of the international response to Somali piracy, China has maintained a task force
consisting of at least three warships off the eastern littoral of Africa at all times, using the
deployment to hone the long-range expeditionary capacity of the Peoples Liberation Army
Navy.

58

mid the many challenges, however, the next Administration will find
abundant opportunitiesif it makes it a priority to move beyond the

current ad hoc arrangements and cultivate alliance relationships across Africa.

In confronting the range of security threats it encounters in Africa, the U.S.

government would be well served by the establishment of a regional military

structure with responsibility for the continent as a whole. But AFRICOM
itself remains severely under-resourced and, in any event, is unlikely to
acquire the fixed assets characteristic of other combatant commands in the
near future. Hence it is imperative that special relationships be developed
with key African partners as well as better coordination with treaty allies
like France and the United Kingdom, which have maintained security ties
with some of their former colonies. Currently, only three African countries
Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia (the latter added only in July 2015)enjoy the
status of major non-NATO ally. With reforms and increased capacity, there
is no reason why other African states such as Nigeria (especially in the wake
of the landmark democratic transition in mid-2015), Ethiopia, and Kenya
could not achieve some sort of advanced status, even if not necessarily at the
major non-NATO ally level. In the meantime, the U.S.-Morocco Framework
for Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014, illustrates, the considerable
potential in triangulation. That Framework is aimed at developing Moroccan training experts, as well as jointly training civilian security and counterterrorism forces with other partners in the Maghreb and Sahel regions. It is
a good model for other triangular relationships.
If the security architecture can come together, the allocation of geographical
responsibility is inconsistent across the U.S. government. The State Department,
the Pentagon, and various agencies adopt different administrative divisions
when it comes to Africa, some of which spectacularly fail to conform to political,
security, and economic realities.
Likewise, while the United States has responded generously and repeatedly
to the humanitarian crises, both man-made and natural, that afflict Africa
at a disproportionate rate, Americas foreign aid structures are at best inefficient as ways to advance U.S. foreign policy objectives, as Chapter 26 illus-

59

trates. For one thing, U.S. government efforts are rarely linked to trade and
private investment flows, which are changing the landscape of Africa. Even
some of the best-intentioned U.S. efforts, like the 2003 Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), are unsustainable over the long term
unless Africans themselves develop the capacities to take their own futures
into their hands. The same may be said for the Millennium Challenge Corporations system of funding based on positive performance. The MCC has
done much good, not least in shifting the concept of aid from one of charity
to one concerned with self-help. But the program has increasingly become
something of an entitlement.
Increasingly, trade and investment need to become the points of emphasis
in U.S. discussions of development partnerships in Africa. That would mesh
well with the entrepreneurial dynamism that characterizes much of African
business these days. U.S. policy can help change the optic from old images
of charitable handouts to new ones of mutual aid and investment. Since the
original passage in 2000 of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),
which substantially lowered commercial barriers with the United States and
allowed sub-Saharan African countries to qualify for various trade benefits,
bilateral trade has boomed. This has fostered African countries integration
into the world trading system, while creating more than one million African
jobs, as well as an estimated 120,000 export-related jobs in the United States.
Since 2009, China has overtaken America as Africas largest bilateral trading
partner. Several other countriesincluding India, Brazil, Russia, and Turkey
are emerging as important economic actors on the continent, too, alongside
its traditional European partners. Nevertheless, AGOA continues to generate
considerable goodwill for the United States. Congress recently reauthorized
the legislation for ten more years, but it will fall to the next Administration
to transform the program from what amounts to a unilateral concession that
primarily benefits the energy sector to a sustainable program that encourages
African integration, as well as laying the foundation for a future free-trade
agreement between the United States and Africa as a whole. As things stand
now, Morocco is the only African country with a free-trade agreement with
the United States; we can do better than that.

60

The June 2012 U.S. Africa strategy affirmed rightly that, Africa is more
important than ever to the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular. This is so not only because
U.S. citizens and businesses hope to join with their African counterparts
in grasping the continents burgeoning opportunities, but because it is in
Americas strategic interests. U.S. policymakers should cultivate key African allies and partner closely with them in managing the challenges and
overcoming the threats to security that may otherwise block the path to a
promising future.

61

Part III

NATIONAL DEFENSE

62

CHAPTER 8: STRATEGY FOR THE

COMMON DEFENSE
Eliot A. Cohen

Americas strategic challenges today are in some respects as dangerous

as they have ever been, and certainly they are more complex. On the eve of
World War II we faced two major opponents; during the Cold War one rival
and its clients. Today, the United States must deal with multiple challengers
of different types and motivation. As in the 1980s, a substantial increase in
defense spending is required. Unlike the 1980s, however, higher levels of
spending coupled with renewed resolve will be necessary but not sufficient
conditions to provide for the common defense. Of necessity, a new era of
American strategy is upon us.
American strategy has two purposes. The first is to defend the homeland,
American citizens, and U.S. interests abroad, and to protect allies with whom
we have treaties or similar bonds of obligation. The second is to preserve
the international order to which we helped give birth during and just after
World War II, an order characterized, at least so far as the Free World was
concerned, by free movement of information and goods, relative freedom
of the movement of individuals, and open access to the great commons of
mankindthe seas, space, and now cyber space.
In this sense, American strategy is conservative and defensive in character. American foreign policy may seek to transform repressive or dictatorial
governments and societies into ones that are open, ruled by law, and characterized by the essential freedoms of faith and opinion, and of political
rights. On the whole, however, the American military is not used directly
for this purpose, except under exceptional circumstances. Indirectly, of
course, the Department of Defense has an important role to play in furthering American values through military education, liaison relationships,
training foreign forces in both technique and civil-military relations, and
the like. But the use of American military power to further liberalization
and democratization is more often a byproduct or a secondary purpose than
63

the chief objective of our forces.

One source of complexity in the new strategic environment is the shifting
weight and pattern of the American alliance system. During the Cold War the
heart of that alliance system was NATO. Today, however, Europes economic,
political, and social difficulties have turned our allies inward. One result is
that for decades European defense spending has decreased both as a portion
of GDP and relative to that of the United States. Although in some sectors
the Europeans have improved their ability to deploy usable forces overseas,
their militaries are severely limited in size, capability, and in the willingness
of domestic populations to tolerate casualties and aggressive action. Today,
roughly 75 percent of NATOs defense spending comes from the United
States, as opposed to the roughly 50/50 split at the height of the Cold War.
The failure of NATOs intervention in Afghanistan has not helped. The use of
NATO in Afghanistan created a convoluted, ineffective command and control
system and inhibited more than helped the creation of effective Afghan
security forces. The 2011 Libya conflict was also revealing. The good news
is that Britain and France, assisted by several European allies, were willing
to use force in pursuit of political objectives. The bad news is that they were
unable to topple a deeply unpopular dictator with a third-rate military in
a campaign lasting six months without substantial American intelligence,
logistical support, and precision strikeall areas in which they were sorely
deficient. Their unwillingness (and that of the Obama Administration)
to devote military and other relevant resources to stabilize the country in
the aftermath of regime change has also given rise to multiple problems
emanating from Libya.
Japans economic stagnation has not caused the actual disarmament that
we have seen in Europe (particularly in our most important ally, Great Britain), but it sets a cap on the expansion of Japanese forces and their further
development. Tokyo, however, has increased its international defense cooperation linkages and begun transforming its armed forces to deal with the
Chinese military challenge. It will become increasingly important as the
largest friendly military power in Asia, together with India, a rising power

64

with close if informal security ties to the United States.

Other traditional allies have improved their capabilities as well, most
notably Australia, Canada, and Israel. Moreover, newer partners have
emerged who possess real military capacity in their respective regions, such
as Colombia, the United Arab Emirates, and Poland. Other states, particularly those threatened by China such as the Philippines and Vietnam, are
open to new or renewed defense relationships with the United States. Thus,
one of the first tasks of a new Administration in January 2017 will be the
restructuring and reshaping of U.S. strategic alliancesnot discarding old
friends, to be sure, but reassessing the weight and effort we put into a range
of relationships.

nd what of Americas opponents? There are two great power challengers

to the United States: China and Russia. China is the larger and more

important power, Russia the more virulently hostile one, whose revisionism

seems less constrained by institutionalized leadership. Although the two are

not in formal alliance against the United States, they share military technology and sometimes act in concert to oppose us (for example, in Syria). Both
identify us as their chief military rival and have threatened the use of force
against allies and associates of the United States.
China and Russia reject the current world order, which they see as dominated by the United States not for purposes of supplying global security
goods but for selfish reasons. Both wish sharply to reduce or to eliminate
American influence, allowing them to unravel some current international
arrangements and exercise greater control over slices of the global commons
(such as cyber space, particularly in the Chinese case). Moreover, each has
geopolitical objectives of a territorial nature: Chinas attempt to exert dominance over the South and East China Seas, in one instance, and Russias effort
to restore informal empire in its near abroad, in the other. Open hostilities
with either power, or with both in coalition, are unlikely but conceivable
though less probable if the United States retains its broad operational military
superiority. More likely, the United States faces a period of sustained peacetime competition, occasionally edging into potential violence, with both.

65

The international jihadi movement is at war with the United States.

Indeed, neither the current nor the next President have any excuse for failing
to understand, upon entering office, that they serve first and foremost as a
wartime Commander-in-Chief. The difficulty here is that the current Administration has misunderstood this problem as one associated solely with the
al-Qaeda organization as it existed before 9/11. Our current enemies are a
much broader, and in some cases looser organization, or loose confederation
of organizations, that has experienced setbacks in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border region and Saudi Arabia but has enjoyed continuing major successes
in Africa (Mali and Nigeria), parts of the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen), and the
Levant (most recently, Syria). Its most vibrant offshoot, the Islamic State, has
scored spectacular successes in Iraq and has also established at least symbolic
branches in Africa and elsewhere, to include Libya and Afghanistan. Members
of the Islamist movement have struck repeatedly, although on a small scale,
in the United States, often attacking military personnelat Fort Hood in 2009
and in Chattanooga in 2015, to take the two most noteworthy examples.

he United States does not have an overall strategic concept for its conflict
with jihadi movements. This is despite the fact that this conflict is likely

to last for decades, and will probably culminate not in a clear-cut victory,
but in the dissolution, fragmentation, and moderation of a movement that
remains extremely dangerous today, to some extent to the homeland but
much more so to our allies and interests abroad. This challenges requires,
in addition to current counterterrorist activity, a strategy for a war of ideas,

political warfare analogous to the one we used to combat communist ideology

during the early Cold War years. Even in this nonviolent realm, the Defense
Department will have a role to play.
Three nuclear-armed or aspirant states also pose threats to the United
States: North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. Each composes a different case, and
although there are clear lines of cooperation among themNorth Korea
has been a provider of nuclear technology to the other twoeach requires
a different approach. The common threats posed by the three include direct
attacks on Americans and American interests, goads to further nuclear proliferation, and indirect effects caused by the sense of empowerment that a

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nuclear arsenal can create (examples: Pakistans launching of the Kargil war
against India in 1999 and North Koreas sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010). Moreover, a proliferated world will create dangerous
nuclear standoffs (for example, Israel vs. Iran) that will weaken American
extended deterrence.
Active hostilities against these three regimes are, to varying degrees, conceivable, in conflicts that could expand to regional wars. Even short of war we
face a series of protracted peacetime competitions with North Korea and Iran.
The challenge posed by the latter has been worsened by the Obama Administrations July 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran, which has demoralized our
friends. The lifting of the sanctions that have inhibited Irans conventional
and unconventional reach, and the feeble constraints left on its nuclear program, may well lead to a nuclear-armed Iran within the next ten or 15 years,
and have doubtless boosted Irans regional hegemonic ambitions.
Ungoverned space is also a challenge that American armed forces may be
required to deal with, if indirectly, in order to cope with the problem of safe
haven for jihadi terrorist movements. Contested space, to include maritime
regions rich in hydrocarbons or minerals, may also become arenas for
international conflict. Examples include the South China Sea and the High
(Arctic) North. In addition to the maritime, space, and cyber domains, however, actual ungoverned spacechaotic lands in which government has collapsedwill serve as breeding grounds and refuges for the next iterations of
the anti-Western jihad and perhaps also other, non-Muslim, anti-modernist
substate movements.

he United States is in the midst of its own variant of the crisis engulfing
all advanced welfare states, which is characterized by budgets under

increasing pressure from population bulges and unaffordable government

obligations to their citizens. Because of its demographics and the underlying

dynamism of its economy and culture, the United States is better positioned
than most to overcome its challenges. But we have yet to resolve the fundamental problem of the entitlement state, which in a variety of ways puts
excessive pressure on the defense budget.

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Furthermore, after a decade of war the American people are wary of combat,
and skeptical of new military commitments, particularly those that involve
the dispatch of substantial conventional ground forces to largely Muslim
countries. Although a basic bipartisan national security consensus remains
intact, our fractious politics make it more problematic to use force than in
recent years. American political and opinion leaders, by and large, mistrust
intelligence reports that may conduce to the use of military force. This in
turn means that even when, in theory, a smaller challenge that could be
dealt with early and with limited force (the Syrian civil war is an example),
the chances are that suspicion of the grounds for the use of force will mean
that problems will fester.
Although the foregoing characterizes our strategic environment, it cannot be a comprehensive depiction of it. There is no accounting for black
swansunforeseeable events that might transform attitudes at home and
abroad. Examples include mass-casualty events involving the use of chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons; the collapse of a major state as a result of
internal revolt; a large-scale war (for example, a general Middle East conflict
growing out of the Syrian civil war).
In such a dangerous, unpredictable, and complex environment, four principles should animate American defense policy. First, we need forces capable
not only of winning todays wars but also of dealing with each of the different kinds of future threats highlighted above. Second, we require a defense
insurance policy to deal with unforeseen or unforeseeable threats, and to
provide for expansion in time of need. Third, we must invest in capabilities
and concepts that will maintain our qualitative superiority over all competitors. And fourth, we must reshape our alliance and partnership arrangements
to provide in the 21st century what NATO provided in the Cold War: the
coalition support that enabled the United States to sustain global order as
well as its own national security. None of this can be accomplished with a
defense budget that is stagnant. Spending on defense will need to rise from
about 3 percent of GDP or less to something approaching at least the 4 percent of recent times.

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Satisfactorily and simultaneously tackling all of the problems described

above is impossible. Thus, American defense policy must be more integrated
into American statecraft than ever before. In principle, for example, it should
be possible through shrewd policy to divide Russia and China, for they have
different interests and no shortage of mutual suspicions. This is more the
task of diplomacy than defense, but defense is ever present as the backdrop
and backbone of diplomacy with adversaries. The longer-term military threat
posed by China is altogether more severe. China has the capability to threaten
U.S. friends and allies, and increasingly to punish or even exclude American
naval forces from operating in its vicinity. It can be met only by a revitalized
Pacific coalition to balance and restrain it. Moreover, both Russia and China
continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, as do virtually every other
nuclear power except the United States and Great Britain.
Defense force structure must take into account the upward spending
trajectory of our potential opponents and the multiplying threats we face.
Defense increases, therefore, cannot simply be made, as in the past, across
the board. Although all of the services need additional spending and enlarged
force structure, including the Army, the United States must particularly
emphasize the development of naval and air forces that can dominate the
Western Pacific, as well as our cyber, space, and nuclear forces. At the same
time, we will need to deepen cooperation with regional allies and substantially
strengthen and extend our basing structure, to include their active defense,
particularly in East Asia. In the case of the Russian periphery, the United
States must ensure that even with a weakened NATO our East European
allies are protected from conventional or hybrid threats.
We should expect the counter-jihadi struggle to go on for decades, and
plan accordingly. As we have discovered in Iraq, threats can regrow in places
where we believed they had been uprooted, and they can take new forms. A
completely new assessment of the jihadi threat is required, and that includes
taking its ideology, and the social structure in which it inheres, seriously.
The challenge here is not so much expanding force structure as actually
conducting effective operations that involve psychological and information
aspects in addition to military operations. It requires consolidating and in
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some cases building a physical, training, intellectual, and legal infrastructure

for a multi-decade effort. The ungoverned space dimension of this problem
requires that we retain the capability to assist others in establishing effective
government control. In desperate cases, we may need our own capability to do
that for others. In any event, a new Administration should have as one of its
first tasks the development of a comprehensive and long-term strategyone
with a time horizon of at least a decadeto fragment and disable the jihadi
threat, even if it probably cannot be wholly eliminated.

f we ever confront states that use, or are prepared to use or merely to share
the nuclear weapons they have, our calculus of acceptable risk will change

dramatically. Indeed, this will occur even in the case of nuclear weapons use
against a third party. The United States therefore needs the ability to detect
and prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons, and in some cases to disable

states nuclear arsenals. We require, in short, the capability to successfully

conduct preemptive attacks on the small nuclear arsenals of particularly
dangerous countries like North Korea and Iran, whether at the cusp of
regional crises or, possibly, in other situations. We may also need to react to
the regional conflicts these states may spawn, so we must plan seriously for
how we will react to the use of nuclear weapons against a third party.
Given our financial constraints, and the attitudes of the American people,
it is inevitable that we will fall short in some areas. We face a wide variety
of opponents and an equally wide variety of possible conflict types, from
nuclear exchanges to terrorism and everything in between. It is therefore
necessary that the United States recover its traditional strategic concept of
mobilization, albeit in modern form. This should include thinking about the
ways in which civilians with unusual talents or expertise, to include cultural
familiarity, could be quickly brought into the DoD as civilians or in uniform,
and ways to either develop new weapons very quickly or mass produce weapons we currently produce in small quantities, and even to replace losses in
key air and naval platforms. In the event of large-scale cyber war, for example,
we should be able to mobilize from the private and non-profit sector the
civilian experts whose skills are equal or in many cases well beyond those
accessible to government.

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ur war plans do not, by and large, envision protracted conflict, but that has
generally been our actual experience. This, too, needs to be an element

of mobilization thinking. We may need to do more than surge; we may need

to sustain.
Furthermore, it is important that the next President and his cabinet
officers explain to the American people the insurance function of defense
spending. It will therefore be incumbent upon the next generation of American leaders to describe accurately and realistically the dangers of a world
that includes states and non-state actors deeply hostile to the United States.
Defense policy must address our allies strategically. Many of our programs

(military educational exchanges, for example) do not focus on cultivating

particular allies or developing special strengths in those that do. We tend to
manage our non-NATO alliances on a country-by-country basis rather than
holistically and comprehensively. We should think of defense partnerships
not only in terms of foreign requests and our considered responses, but
active efforts to shape or enhance the capabilities of key allies. This may have
implications for force structure, acquisition (stockpiles of munitions, more
extensive exports of our best arms, greater co-production of key platforms)
as well as training, military assistance, and so forth. Particular attention
should be paid to non-traditional allies and partners, such as India, who will
assume an increasingly important role in our overall strategic concept.
For the past decade the leaders of the Department of Defense have concentrated on managing two medium-sized wars (Iraq and Afghanistan) and
chronic global counterterrorism while maintaining the health of an overstrained active-duty force. They have made some effort to reorient to Asia,
but, given the constraints of time, attention, and above all resources, they
have done so with only limited success. The real peace dividendthe
large margin of global military superiority that the United States possessed
when the Soviet Union collapsed, and before China had risenhas been
spent, and overspent. It is time to rearm, but to rearm differently than we
have done before.
The coming era will pose large and in some respects unprecedented
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challenges. As has been the case for the past 15 years, the new Secretary of
Defense will have to be a Secretary of War as well as a deft and hard-nosed
administrator. At the same time, the Pentagons leadership must attend to
the reconstruction of our armed forces for an era that will be as different from
the post-9/11 decade as that period was from the Cold War that preceded
it. This includes rebuilding the intellectual infrastructure of defensethe
array of internal analytic organizations, military educational institutions,
and allied academic organizations outside DoD. Whereas in the past defense
leaders could either wage the current war or, in a breathing period, overhaul institutions to prepare for the next, the next President and Secretary
of Defense will have to do both. A new Administration should undertake its
duties not simply, however, in the spirit of remedying its predecessors omissions and failures, but with a mind to reshaping the military for a complicated
and, in many respects, perilous age. Alas, many types of military force will
have to be made ready, and some will certainly have to be used.

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CHAPTER 9: MILITARY READINESS AND DEFENSE

MODERNIZATION
Jim Talent & Lindsey Neas

Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright famously said last year

that, There are an awful lot of things going on that need understanding
and explaining. . . . But to put it mildly, the world is a mess. Unfortunately, a
year later, there is even more going on in even more places, and the world
is even messier than it was. There are many reasons for this state of affairs
among the affairs of states, but a common thread is the failure of the United
States to effectively manage the global security commons. That failure, too,
has many causes, but its common thread, in turn, is the Obama Administrations preference for leading from behind rather than anticipating and
defusing risks of instability and aggression at earlier stages.
The next Administration must once again lead globally and purposefully,
but that alone cannot restore a margin of safety for America. The right policy
is certainly necessary but it is not sufficient by itself; the United States must
also have the power to influence events, which is another way of restating the verity that Americas armed forces constitute the foundation of its
national security architecture.
To be sure, hard power should not be the primary instrument by which
the United States executes its foreign policy and, except under rare conditions of total war, it never has been. But military might is and remains
an indispensable attribute of a great power, and the instrument that makes
credible the other tools in its possession. Ever since World War II, the primary purpose of American military power has been not to win wars but to
prevent them, or at least to limit themto deter aggressors and create an
environment in which diplomacy, engagement, economic sanctions, and the
other instruments of national influence have time and space to work.
That foundation is cracking. For most of the Clinton and Bush Administrations, Americas armed forces, which had reached the apex of their strength
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in the late 1980s and early 1990s, were declining relative to the risks they
confronted. In the Obama Administration, a slow bleed has become a gaping
wound. Unless the next President makes it a paramount priority to engage
in a Reagan-era restoration of Americas armed forces, his or her foreign
policyno matter how thoughtful it otherwise may bewill fail for want of
persuasive credibility. As a result, our security, and that of our allies, will be
further compromised.

he end of the Cold War led almost immediately to calls for a peace dividend. Recognizing political reality, and hoping to preempt congressio-

nal pressure for even deeper cuts, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney and JCS

Chairman General Colin Powell announced in January 1990 what became

known as the Base Force, a plan to reduce the U.S. military by approximately
25 percent by 1997. In brief, the plan called for the active-duty Army to
downsize from 18 divisions and 760,000 soldiers to 12 divisions and 535,000
troops. The Marine Corps would retain its three-division structure, albeit
with end-strength reductions. The Navy would undertake the wholesale
retirement of older vessels, shrinking from 551 ships to 451. And the Air
Force would drop from 28 active and reserve component fighter wings to 20.
Yet the Cheney-Powell plan did not satisfy the demands for reductions.
The incoming Clinton Administration immediately undertook an assessment
in early 1993 called the Bottom-Up Review. Secretary Aspin decided on a
further 10 percent reduction, scaling the active Army to ten undermanned
divisions and 495,000 soldiers, which fell a further 10,000 troops over the
decade. The Navy was reduced to 346 ships, eventually dropping to 316 by
the end of the decade.
Moreover, as military readiness declined through underfunding, the
operational tempo of that smaller military dramatically increased. Even
during the relatively peaceful 1990s, units were deployed at rates never seen
during the Cold War (except during the Korean and Vietnam wars). Worse,
as deployment rates skyrocketed, each services modernization budget (the
accounts that fund the procurement of new equipment) was cut to the bone.
The procurement holiday, as it came to be known, reduced new equipment

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purchases to a tiny fraction of what they had been over the preceding 15
years. For example, the number of tanks, artillery, and other armored vehicles
procured each year during the 1990s averaged about 7 percent of what it
had been annually between 1975 and 1990. Battle force ship procurement
dropped to less than a third its previous numbers. Average annual fixed-wing
aircraft procurement dropped to about a fifth that of the previous 15 years.
This combination of a smaller force operating at historically high tempo
using aging equipment guaranteed a pronounced decline across the force.
In 1998, General Hugh Shelton, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, testified that military readiness was in a nose dive that might cause irreparable
damage to the great force we have created, a nose dive that will take years to
pull out of. The Bush Administration, recognizing these stresses, entered
office in January 2001 determined to recapitalize the military and to deepen
progress in what was known in defense circles as the revolution in military affairs. Those plans were quickly overtaken by events. Following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, combat operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq, higher maintenance costs, higher personnel costs, and the cost of
expanding the Army and Marine Corps to support the surge ate up an even
substantially larger defense budget. For the first time, a major buildup in
defense spending did not result in a substantial increase in actual capability;
the armed forces ended the decade at approximately the same size and using
much the same inventory of equipment with which they began.
The defense industrial base had declined as well during this period, having consolidated and downsized over the course of 13 successive annual
reductions in defense spending. Fewer competitors meant less competition,
which, along with chronic management issues, increased the unit and overall costs of acquisition.
The armed forces were thus already highly stressed when President
Obama took office. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates recognized
that war-level defense spending was unsustainable. Accordingly, he began
an extensive review of Pentagon spending, hoping as Cheney and Powell
did nearly two decades before, to forestall irresponsible cuts to the military

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budget. As he wrote in Duty, Gates undertook these efforts with the clear
understanding from the White House that savings and efficiencies would be
used to modernize the services. After nearly 20 years of underinvestment in
new equipment, 15 years of high-tempo deployments and years of combat
in two theaters, the services desperately needed to be recapitalized. Gates
identified $400 billion in cost reductions beginning in 2009 and, potentially,
an additional $78 billion beginning in fiscal year 2012.
Also in 2009, Congress created a National Defense Panel to assess the condition of the military and to review the plans of the Department of Defense.
Chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former National
Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, the bipartisan 20-member panel issued
a unanimous report in the spring of 2010 that recommended a substantial
increase in the annual defense budget, primarily to increase the size of the
Navy and to recapitalize the equipment inventories of all of the services.
In February 2011, Secretary Gates announced his ten-year budget proposal
with modest increases in the defense topline. While not as substantial as
the National Defense Panels recommendations, the Gates budget would
have supported increasing the size of the fleet and partially modernizing the
equipment inventories of the other services. Yet two months later, President
Obama scrapped his own Secretary of Defenses proposed budget, announcing
his intention to reduce the annual defense budget by approximately $40 billion per year. Several weeks later, in negotiations with the House and Senate
leadership, the White House proposed a further reduction in defense spending of approximately $500 billion over ten years. The Presidents proposed
spending reductions were codified in the August 2011 Budget Control Act.
Including the sequester, cuts to defense when compared with the proposed
plan offered by Secretary Gates totaled nearly $1 trillion over the prospective
ten-year period.
It is important to grasp the significance of these events. In only months,
the analytical process by which a highly respected Secretary of Defense
established funding priorities was tossed aside in favor of a budget-reduction process that was ad hoc in nature, politically driven, and conducted

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without regard for the impact on military capabilities or current and future
threat assessments.
The consequences of these cuts are increasingly apparent across the force.
Todays Navy is smaller than at any time since before World War I. It struggles
to maintain a fleet of 272 deployable battle force ships and is expected
under the current sequester baseline to shrink to between 240-260 ships. In
contrast, the Chinese PLA Navy is expected to increase by 2020 to between
325-350 ships, nearly all of them modern and multi-mission capable. At
todays deployment rates, U.S. Navy ships are not receiving the maintenance
required for long-term readiness.
The active-duty Army will shrink to a planned 420,000 soldiers in 2019, the
size of the service in mid-1941. Training for nearly two-thirds of the force is
being curtailed to squad and platoon-level training. A substantial number of
Army modernization programs have been cancelled or restructured due to
funding reductions.
The Air Force expects to lose almost half of its fighter, bomber, and surveillance platforms by the end of 2019. Its inventory of KC-135 tankers, the
fleet that makes possible the regional and global reach of our Air Force and
Navy aircraft, now averages over 50 years in service and is budgeted to fly
into the 2030s. The B-52 bomber fleet, now also over 50 years of age, is budgeted to fly at least into the late 2020s.
Todays active-duty Corps is made up of 184,000 marines. Of that number, approximately 30,000 are deployed. In order for those units to be fully
manned, trained, and equipped, more than half of the Corps non-deployed
units are reporting significant readiness shortfalls. In order to protect shortterm readiness, only 9 percent of the Corps budget can be allocated for
modernization. The Corps budget, in other words, places the service in an
unsustainable situation.
As the funding cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act were felt across
the services, Congress re-authorized the National Defense Panel, this time
co-chaired by former Secretary of Defense William Perry and General John

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Abizaid (U.S. Army, Ret.). The panels unanimous 2014 report stated that the
defense budget cuts mandated by the BCA constitute a serious strategic
misstep [by] the United States . . . prompting our current and potential allies
and adversaries to question our commitment and resolve. The Panel further found that the effectiveness of Americas . . . diplomacy and economic
engagement, are critically intertwined with and dependent upon the perceived strength, presence and commitment of U.S. armed forces.
If funding levels mandated by the Budget Control Act are maintained, the
long-term consequences are predictable. The Army, according to both Secretary John McHugh and General Ray Odierno, Army Chief of Staff, will no
longer be capable of executing the national military strategy. A Navy of 240
ships would no longer be a global fleet. Given its capacity, it would instead
be a regional navy, capable of maintaining a meaningful presence in only
two critical regions on a rotational basis. By the end of the decade, the Air
Force will field the smallest and oldest inventory in its history, without the
ability to operate in contested air space, within an enemys integrated air
defense capability, and to generate needed levels of combat power.
Similarly, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter recently observed that,
given current budgets, the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps will not achieve
acceptable levels of readiness until 2020, and the Air Force until 2023. And
even if some acceptable level of readiness is achieved, the force will be much
smaller, will field older equipment, and will have diminished or possibly no
technological advantage over would-be adversaries, especially the Chinese.
In other words, the longer-term impact of the spending reductions mandated by the Budget Control Act will result in a force that has to an appreciable extent forfeited the very attributes that have made U.S. armed forces so
effective in combat.

e agree with the recommendations of the 2014 National Defense

Panel. We urge an immediate rebasing of the defense budget as a

first step. We know that many will characterize this as a build-up, but it
is in fact only a restoration of defense spending levels necessary for the U.S.
military to do what it is already committed to do.

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First we must restore readiness, and this should be done as soon as possible. The price will not be small; it always costs more to restore rather than
maintain readiness, but the sooner it is accomplished, the less the ultimate
cost will be.
Second, it has been more than four years since the Department of Defense
has engaged in even the basics of security planning: assessing current and
probable future threats, identifying the capacities and capabilities necessary to meet those threats, and developing a budget designed to produce
those capabilities. So the Department should be tasked to develop such a
plan in the first year of the next Administration. The pacing threatthe
threat against which the Department must primarily planis China, which
has become a peer military competitor of the United States in the Western
Pacific. The plan should take into account all known and probable threats
and should aim, as the Reagan restoration did, to create a force that will, with
continual improvements, be the foundation of American national security for
the next several decades.
The plan should provide at minimum for several rectifications of the present situation. It must first and foremost increase the size and capabilities
of the U.S. Navy. The United States must maintain presence and deterrent
power in the Western Pacific while also being fully present, and able to
project power, in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean and Eastern Mediterranean. The burden will only grow if Iran, much less other countries in the
region, acquire nuclear weapons. The Navy should be sized, at a minimum,
at 325-346 ships, and will need to be bigger if, as is likely, China continues
its buildup. The Navys budget must include room for buying the necessary
naval aircraft, increasing the procurement of Virginia-class submarines,
fully replacing the Ohio-class SSBNs to maintain the nuclear triad, and
increasing the number of surface combatants.
Second, the plan must recapitalize the U.S. Air Force. The Air Force needs
several capabilities that are currently in danger: air superiority, ISR, longrange precision strike, and ground-combat support are noteworthy. Currently,
the average age of its inventory is over 25 years old; lowering it substantially

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will require a large and sustained period of procurement and development.

Third, Army personnel end strength must be sustained at no less than
the level thought necessary in the Clinton Administration: approximately
495,000 soldiers. Everyone should understand, further, that an objective
and unbiased planning process would almost certainly recommend a higher
number. In fact, in 1991, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recommended
going forward that the Army be sized at 535,000 men. Given the chaos in
the Middle East, the threat of aggression in Europe, and the instability and
unpredictability of the North Korean regimerisks that were not present 20
years agothe number thought necessary 20 years ago is not enough today.
Much of the Armys vehicle inventory must be modernized or replaced.
Fourth, the U.S. nuclear arsenal must be modernized, if not increased in
numbers. Consistent with the New START agreement, both the U.S. and Russian
governments are reducing launchers and operational warheads. But the
strategic nuclear equation is decidedly more complex than it was during the
Cold War. The entirety of the U.S. nuclear arsenalOhio-class SSBNs, B-52s,
and the Minuteman III inventorymust be replaced. Russia is adding new
ICBMs each year. Only recently, President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia
would produce fifty new Tu-160 Blackjack bombers.
Chinas nuclear arsenal is mostly a mystery. Beijing is deploying its
new Jin-class SSBNs, which are expected to begin operational patrols this
year, and is now developing its next-generation SSBN. We know little of its
land-based force. And then theres Iran and North Korea: Both countries
are developing increasingly more capable multi-stage ballistic missiles. Iran
may deploy a capable ICBM within a few years. Only the United States considers itself bound to comply with current strategic arms control agreements.
China is not a party to any, and what exists on paper between North Korea
and the United States and Iran and the United States has either already
been violated or is worth little. Russia has been caught in violation of the
INF agreement, which suggests that its fealty to the New START numbers
is weak. Taken together, this situation equates to increasing imbalance.
Americas space architecture is also growing old and is increasingly vul-

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nerable to Chinese anti-satellite capabilities. The Department of Defense

is only now beginning to study how to replace or harden the satellites on
which both military and civilian communication depends. A plan, with the
resources to match, should be developed and implemented as soon as possible.
This list is by no means exhaustive, but even these requirements are
impossible to fund under the sequester baseline, or anything close to it. The
minimum necessary is the Gates baseline, and more will probably be needed.
Secretary Gates proposed his budgets in 2011, when Iraq and the Middle East
were still relatively stable, ISIS did not exist, NATO was not threatened by
Russian arms moving west, and China had only begun its aggressive conduct
in its near seas. Moreover, though the armed forces were already highly
stressed at that time, they were in much better condition than they are now
by every significant measure.

he core defense budgetthe amount spent on sustaining the armed

forces exclusive of the cost of overseas operationsis currently slightly

less than 3 percent of GDP. Ramping up to the Gates baseline would move
that number to approximately 3.5 percent of GDP, a historically low figure
and an amount that no economist would say, in isolation, is unaffordable.
The reason for the fiscal constraints under which the Department of
Defense has been forced to operate is not that its own needs are too great,
but that the structural deficit in the entitlement programs is crowding

out the discretionary budget, including defense. In other words, the fiscal
challenge facing the U.S. Federal government is the large and growing gap
between what it is spending on entitlement programs and what it is collecting for those programs. Because that gap is squeezing out the rest of the
Federal budget, the sequester of defense funds, far from being a solution to
the governments fiscal challenge, is actually a symptom of it. Moreover, it
has made that challenge even worse, because the sequester has masked the
size of the short-term deficit, thereby reducing the political pressure to deal
with the underlying problem.
Providing for the common defense is the first constitutional priority of
the Federal government; it is therefore the first claimant on Federal funds.
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In addition, without adequate security for the American homeland, for the
right of Americans to trade and travel, and for the norm-based international
system under which America has prospered, the economy cannot grow to
the degree necessary to fund other priorities, including reducing the debt.
For all these reasons, a plan for restoring Americas military strength should
not be seen as the enemy of fiscal responsibility, but one of its preconditions.
Most of the threats facing America and its armed forces today did not
exist 20 years ago, certainly not in the form in which they are manifested
today. In the 1990s, there was no global terrorist threat, no ISIS, no nuclear
North Korea, no resurgent and aggressive China, and no unfriendly Russia
threatening Eastern Europe. Bill Clinton, certainly no defense hawk, was
President, yet the force that the Clinton Administration believed necessary
then, in relatively peaceful times, was substantially larger than the force of
today. It had much more modern equipment and much greater technological
superiority over potential aggressors than the force of today.
Americas defense policy over the past generation has been, in essence, to
live off the capital that the Reagan Administration accumulated in the 1980s.
That capital had been substantially reduced by the time Barack Obama took
office; after the past six fiscal years of accumulating cuts, sequesters, and
chaos in the Department of Defense, that capital is gone. The next President
must do what Ronald Reagan did: Restore American strength and, in the
process, determine the size, shape, and posture of Americas armed forces
for the next generation.
The restoration of Americas armed forces should be viewed not as a
burden but as an opportunity to resurrect Americas global credibility. In
a fundamental way, defense policy is foreign policy, not only because the
armed forces are an important tool of power, but because whether and how
America sustains its military will communicate to the world the state of
American leadership and commitment. Because our purposes as a nation are
forever bound to our power, if the next President doesnt rebuild Americas
armed forces, his or her foreign policy will fail. Contrarily, no action the next
Administration could take would do more to restore Americas global stand-

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ing, and recover its fortunes than a successful effort to rebuild and refashion
Americas armed forces.

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Part IV

ADDRESSING THREATS TO
NATIONAL SECURITY

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CHAPTER 10: INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

Gen. Michael V. Hayden & Jamil N. Jaffer

The threat posed by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other terrorist groups with existing
or potential global reach is a multi-generational problem for the United
States and its allies. It is a problem we have confronted since at least the late
1970s, as Iran sought to spread its Islamic revolution through Shia-based
terrorist groups like Hizballah and its support for certain Sunni terrorist
groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
At the time, we paid relatively less attention to the spread of a reactionary Sunni movement as it sought to challenge dominant power structures
in Muslim countries across the Middle East. In some cases, elites in Sunni
Arab states used such groups both to counter the spread of Shia revolution from Iran and expand their own influence. These Sunni groups gained
legitimacy, support, and valuable experience fighting the Soviet Union
in Afghanistan. Then, in 1998, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri
announced an alliance between the formers al-Qaeda and the latters
Egyptian Islamic Jihad. They declared war against crusaders and infidels
and formally gave birth to al-Qaeda, an organization with deep roots in radical Sunni Islamist thought. This is the group that attacked us on 9/11, was
driven out of Afghanistan shortly thereafter, and finally took up residence
in the tribal regions of Pakistan.
Over time, under heavy U.S. pressure, much of al-Qaedas core leadership
has been killed or forced to move from its long-time hideouts in Pakistan.
Recently, al-Qaeda moved cadre with an active desire to strike the American
homelandthe so-called Khorasan Groupto Syria to take advantage of the
chaos there. A range of other so-called franchises also evolved, the most
dangerous to the U.S. homeland being al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP), which continues to gain strength from the ongoing chaos in Yemen.
We also confront a growing threat from a former al-Qaeda franchise that
has reinvented itself as a rival to its parent. The Islamic State in Iraq and

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Greater Syria (ISIS) today arguably forms the single greatest threat to American national security in the region. By wiping out the border between Iraq
and Syria, ISIS has gained credibility and resources that have permitted it to
attract thousands of recruits to its cause. These recruits are drawn to ISIS for
a variety of reasons: religious ideology, dissatisfaction with Western materialism and secularism and with their lot in life generally, an opportunity to
belong to a tight-knit group with a cause to fight for, and sometimes just for
excitement and adventure. A constant stream of outreach and slick media
materials that rival high-quality Western products help fill the recruiting
pipeline. So does a large social media presence, including multiple active
feeds on Twitter and YouTube. More than 20,000 foreign fighters have
joined the jihad in Syria, including more than 3,000 Westerners and more
than 100 Americans.27
Though it has sustained some tactical battlefield setbacks, ISIS is hardly
on the run. It is a confident, expanding organization growing in territory,
manpower, and wealth. In the past year alone, ISIS has announced new outlying provinces in at least seven countries and has claimed responsibility
for attacks across the globe, including in Europe and the United States. And
while its main force resides in what used to be the states of Syria and Iraq,
ISIS represents a serious threat to the stability of Lebanon, Jordan, and prospectively the Arab Gulf states. No solution to the regions massive political
violenceitself driven by a range of factors, especially sectarian division
and power politicsis imaginable without decisively dealing with ISIS.
As a harbinger of things to come, the growth and expansion of ISIS and the
increasing influence of al-Qaeda affiliates in the Syrian conflict has emboldened Iran and its Shia proxies. In Syria, Hizballah has directly intervened to
support the regime, while in Iraq several Shia militias form the backbone
of the governments fight against ISIS, evolving from small commando-like
squads into much larger, better armed, and more capable forces. Even worse,
IRGC-Quds Force operatives roam Iraq at will, providing direct support to

27
See Prepared Statement of Nicholas J. Rassmussen, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
(February 12, 2015).

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Iraqi forces and advertising their presence openly on social media. Lest one
forget, Iranian Shia proxies have killed hundreds of Americans, from Hizballah in the 1980s to Khatib Hizballahs and Asaib al-Haqs use of Iranian-made
weaponry to kill American and allied soldiers in Iraq in the 2000s.

any today argue that the recent spread of terrorism across the Middle East has nothing to do with Islam. The truth, however, is that the

ideology that motivates and inspires al-Qaeda and ISIS has deep roots in
certain longstanding forms of radical Sunni Islamist theology going all the

way back to Ibn Taymiyyah in the 13th century. The ideology that underpins
the Iranian revolutionary state and its terrorist proxies likewise has roots in
radical Shia theology. At a minimum, these extremist interpretations create
a narrative for their adherents of unrelenting hostility between Islam and
the Judeo-Christian West.
This is not to say that the majority of the worlds Muslims support these
groups or follow these ideologies. They do not. Indeed, the vast majority rejects
their radical visions and abhors their tactics. Nonetheless, the theologies
that form their intellectual backbonewhether Wahhabism, Salafism,
Shia martyrdom narratives, or other similar constructsare long standing,
widely known, and avidly studied strains of radical Islamist thought. And
moderates in general, even when they form a large numerical majority, do
not fare well under the polarized conditions of civil war, including in the
ongoing sectarian version of civil war that currently spreads over increasingly
many (and ever more faint) territorial boundaries across the region.
Violence of the sort that such radical theology engenders is by no means
exclusive to Arabs or Muslims; historical examples can be drawn from every
region of the earth over many centuries. In the West, not until the 17th
century did Christendom begin to seriously cope with hundreds of years of
strife over religious doctrines. In many ways, Enlightenment-era theological
reform was a response to this long history of religious conflict, and the doctrine of separating the Church from the state was one tool by which reformers sought to limit the spread of doctrinal disputes into politics and war.
With Enlightenment-era reforms breaking the bond between the coercive

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power of the state and the religious and moral narrative of the Church, the
Churchs ability to drive world events was substantially limited.
Islam writ large has not achieved that separation. The theology that drives
both Shia and Sunni radical groups constructs an artificial conflict between
faith and modernity. It tells of a golden era when Islams influence and territory was dramatically expanding and constructs a narrative of a new, rising
era of Islam in the modern day. And with the majority of the worlds Muslims
living in countries that are impoverished, run by narrow elite groups, or
where their religious practice is viewed as a threat to the stability of the state,
this narrative can be extremely attractive to a tiny but hugely problematic
subset of the populationmostly disaffected young men. They grab on to
this narrativeand to its underlying religious ideologyoften in an effort to
give meaning to their lives. Troublingly, key parts of the religious ideology
that undergirds this narrative are actually supported by the very statesor
at least by elites within such statesthat are now threatened by this trend.
In another way, there are parallels to Americas urban gang infestation
in the 1970s and 1980s. The alienation felt by disenfranchised youth, and
the meaning, opportunity, and excitement they found in joining the Bloods,
Crips, and other violent street gangs, roughly parallels the path of thousands
of young people travelling to join the jihad under banners of al Qaeda and
ISIS. Just like joining a street gang, however, it matters which group you join.
Vastly more Muslims who find themselves disenfranchised or dissatisfied
choose a constructive path, seeking opportunities and achieving success in
business and politics, and adhering to more moderate and traditional forms
of faith. The problem today, of course, is the trendwithin the small group
of individuals who are attracted to radical ideologiestoward ever more
extreme forms of radicalism and, in turn, the violence they engender. And
while al-Qaeda was once the vanguard of this movementwith its promise
of opportunities to attack the Westtoday ISIS is the leading attraction for
the deeply disaffected, through its promises of land, wealth, and concubines
to its recruits.
One of the most challenging issues confronting the West is how to deal

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with this fight within Islam, a fight fundamentally over the nature and
future of the faith. It would be arrogant for us to assume that we can solve
this problem. We must accept that if Islam is to be rid of these extremist
trends, it must come to this realization itself. And while we have powerful
tools of statecraft at our disposal, the use of these tools can only inform, but
not determine, the outcome of this great debate. If Islam is even to come
close to the Wests Enlightenment answerseparating the sacred from the
secularwe must accept that this will be a multi-generational process and
that specifics of the Christian solution may not apply to this other great
monotheism. We must also be prepared to confront the support for these
destructive ideologies provided by some of our key allies and be prepared
to demonstrate, in concrete terms, the very real threat that these extreme
ideologies pose to their own stability.

n addressing the threat posed by these (and other) terrorist groups, we

begin with a basic first principle: The United States has an absolute right

(and responsibility) to defend itself against those who present a threat to its
people or its vital national security interests. We have the right to take direct
action to eliminate groups that present such threats, as well as to go after
state entities that permit them to operate. This does not mean, however,
that it is always wise to take direct action or to immediately remove regimes
in all countries where radical terrorist groups operate. We must have a prudent and pragmatic foreign policy, one that does what is necessary to keep

Americans safe and protect our core national security interests, while we
also work to support our allies and patiently empower moderates.
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush implemented a clear national policy on terrorist groups of global reach and the
regimes that harbored them. From Afghanistan and Pakistan to East Africa
and the Philippines, America took action to kill, capture, detain, and interrogate key terrorist suspects and to infiltrate their training, logistics, and
communications networks. We acted alongside partners where possible,
seeking to build on and leverage their capacity, but also took unilateral
action when necessary.

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These policies set the stage for more recent counterterrorism efforts,
including the continued expansion of direct counterterrorism actions.
Indeed, the most successful operations of this White House replicate, in
significant respects, the intelligence and military efforts begun in the Bush
Administration. Most importantly, the relative continuity across two administrations reflects a clear American policy consensus and affirmatively legitimizes the use of these tools going forward.
It is precisely because of the sustained pressure that these counterterrorism operations have brought to bear upon al-Qaeda and others that our
country is less vulnerable today that it was on September 10, 2001. And yet
this very success has allowed the 9/11 attacks to fade from consciousness,
particularly among Washington policymakers. As a result, in recent years,
U.S. counterterrorism policy has become significantly more constrained. For
example, the Obama Administration has exhibited little tolerance for collateral damage, requiring a near virtual certainty that non-combatants will
not be killed before we take direct action. Terrorists have learned this lesson
and now intentionally hide among civilians. Moreover, President Obama
has imposed limitations on when and where U.S. forces can strike and has
significantly raised the bar on the threat required before U.S. forces can act,
essentially taking a powerful capability off the table and easing the pressure
on the enemy. Rather than actively pursuing these groups at every turn, as
we once did, today we more often limit ourselves to acting only in rare circumstances on high value targets or in response to imminent threats.
Similarly, we have shifted (back) from a war footing toward a law enforcement posture. By taking long-term intelligence or military detentions off the
table, the Obama Administration effectively decided to capture terrorists
only when a Federal indictment is available. This has the perverse effect
of requiring us to either let key targets go, hand them over to other states,
or, more often than not, try to kill them. Of course, one cannot interrogate
dead people, and the sharp decline in interrogations, a product of our lack of
an appropriate capture-and-detention policy, has significantly limited our
collection of timely terrorism intelligence.

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This shift from intelligence-driven warfighting on the battlefield to evidence-based indictments in Federal court is likely to make it significantly
harder to successfully prosecute this conflict. In particular, the shift is almost
certain to result in lost intelligence and hence actionable opportunities.
Indeed, in many ways, it represents a return to the failed law-enforcement
strategy that our nation rejected in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. Likewise,
the decision by Congresswith explicit support from the White Houseto cut
back on intelligence collection authorities at a time when threats are rising
is shortsighted and creates increased risk for the nation.
From its public statements about the need to end wars, the possibility
of repealing the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF),
and the constant drumbeat about closing Guantnamo Bay to the tactical
constraints it has imposed upon itself, the Obama Administration has made
clear to the American public, the world, and, perhaps most troublingly, to
our enemies that it has tired of the fight.
The Obama Administration has likewise muddled our national thinking
because of its unwillingness to candidly discuss the threat we face from ISIS
and al-Qaeda. While the President deserves credit for describing our conflict
with al-Qaeda as a war, he does so while backing off from the full use of the
tools of a belligerent. He has suggested, unconvincingly, that the conflict may
be coming to an end. And the Administrations actions often seem driven
by a desire to be seen as doing something rather than by a determination to
achieve actual success. More often than not, recent Administration efforts
are trending toward minimizing American involvement while sticking to the
narrative of ending global conflicts. As a result, even when action is taken, it
tends to be hesitant and halting, and the size and durability of our commitments seem untethered from battlefield realities.
The fight with ISIS is indicative. The conflict began small in the summer of
2014, with the Administration repeatedly eschewing opportunities to stymie
ISISs rise as it rolled across the Syria-Iraq border despite appeals from
U.S. officials on the ground and U.S. partners in the region. When we did
act, we initially limited our efforts to a small number of locations in Iraq,

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with the Administrations own war powers notifications to Congress highlighting its preferred narrative of a short-term, highly limited engagement.
Despite the expansion of conflict, the Administration has failed to conduct
a robust campaign against ISIS, relying principally on a limited volley of
airstrikes. This failure could have catastrophic consequences. With ISISs
establishment of provinces around the world and the increase in attacks it
is inspiring in the West, we are seeing the development of a capacity for
global reach. When combined with its control over a significant swath of
land, including its strategic position sitting atop historic trade routes and
key natural resources, ISIS could become an even more serious threat to the
United States at home.
Moreover, the failure to act when moderates still had a chance to play a significant role in the Syrian opposition permitted better-funded, better-armed,
and better-trained forces, including Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, to dominate
recruiting. This, in turn, filled the Syrian rebel force with committed jihadis
from around the globe wholike the Afghan jihadis before themwill
return home to wreak havoc there also.
U.S. inaction has likewise permitted Iran to be more influential in Baghdad and Damascus than ever before. It has allowed a terrorist proto-state
to be established and flourish on the resource-rich lands between Iraq and
Syria, and it has led our allies to question U.S. commitments and long-term
resolve. The repeated lack of action by the U.S. government when allies are
threatened, when terrorists capture significant territory, and when publicly
declared redlines are crossed, has cost us dearly in credibility and, ultimately, constitutes a core failure of global leadership for our nation.
The current situation, and our current approach to it, is thus a recipe for
long-term disaster. The next Presidentof whatever political partymust
enter the White House prepared on day one to reinvigorate our longstanding
commitment to taking the fight to the enemy overseas, where they live and
plot against the West.

n the face of these threats, we must be prepared to defend ourselves with

all instruments of national power. We must combat this threat directly

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while also working to protect our key allies and interests around the world. A
revised counterterrorism policy that takes this approach has ten key elements.
First, recognize and deal with the changed political geography of the Middle
East. The states of Iraq and Syria are all but gone in their prior form. The
same is likely true of Libya and Yemen, which are on the verge of becoming
failed states. Likewise, Lebanon once again teeters, enflamed by renewed
sectarian strife threatening its very viability as a state. These states were
created with but modest attention to historical, tribal, commercial, ethnic,
or religious realities, and were historically sustained by raw power. While
the geopolitical contours of a future Middle East are difficult to discern
and beyond U.S. power to unilaterally determinewe should think long and
hard before adopting any policy designed to restore old lines that were
never more than frail symbols for these societies. A more realistic approach
would grant more freedom of action for us to deal with the Kurds, and to
address Baghdads Shia government, the remnants of Alawi power in
Syria, and Irans quest for regional hegemony, all the while frustrating the
demands of al-Qaeda and ISIS to return the region to a medieval caliphate.
Second, employ counterradicalization programs to reduce the attractiveness
of jihadism. Many of our key partners in the global fight against terrorism,
including the governments of Indonesia and Morocco, conduct significant
counterradicalization programs with some success. While these programs
are not without flawsincluding recent increases in recidivismthey offer
useful lessons in combating the attractiveness of jihadism. The longstanding idea that we can win the hearts and minds of the Muslim world through
a public relations campaign is absurd. A better approach is to demonstrate
to local populations the threat these groups pose to their own safety, security, and economic livelihoods. We can and should give locals the tools and
capabilities to address these problems themselves. Such tools need not
exclusively, or even primarily, be weapons. To the contrary, the best way to
limit the long-term attractiveness of jihadism is to give people a stake in
their own success and an investment in their own communities. Economic
progress in underprivileged societies, the ability to obtain an education
one not in a radical madrassaand the ability to establish and maintain
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strong family and personal ties, are all elements in a long-term strategy we
must adopt if we are to succeed in limiting the growth and attractiveness of
radical terrorist groups.
Third, keep up the pressure. A key to our relative safety since 9/11 has
been keeping key terrorist groups on the run, constantly searching for new
places to hide. Sustained counterterrorism pressure makes it hard to plot
large-scale attacks. We must not permit broad swaths of land in key regions
to remain ungoverned, or worse, be governed by groups like ISIS. This will
mean, in real terms, restoring more flexible authorities to both our military
and the intelligence community to identify, locate, and take action against
groups that mean us harm, as well as to treat the ongoing conflict like the
war it really is, not the smaller, more limited engagement some might wish
it were.
Fourth, take unilateral direct action when necessary. A key part of keeping terrorists on the run is our willingness to take direct action when circumstances
warrant it. Thus, in places like Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Pakistan, Mali, and
Somalia, we must be willing to act not only against key terrorist leadership
targets but also against the training sites and the support infrastructure of
planners, facilitators, and funders that support the global jihadi force. We
must double down on our willingness to use all direct action tools at our
disposal, and not shy away from any of the tools of war, including the use of
manned or unmanned aerial vehicles and deployed special operations forces,
to set the conditions for and take direct action when appropriate.
Fifth, step up direct commitments and support to partners. Beyond resources
and equipment, we must be willing to deploy U.S. forces as part of the fight
we ask our partners to undertake. In the Iraq-Syria theater, this means not
simply conducting a limited train-and-equip program that generates a
handful of moderately capable fighters. It means committing fully to both
our Iraqi and Kurdish partners (including direct shipment of equipment and
ammunition to the Kurds) and requires us to actively edge out Iranian forces
from their current lead role. It also requires us to be willing to deploy special
forces teams into the field in both countries alongside our partners, whether

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moderate Syrian rebel forces, Kurdish peshmerga, or Iraqi security forces.

Such deployments could provide a major morale boost to our allies and allow
us to be a force multiplier for our partners, directing the more effective use
of U.S. airpower (which must also be stepped up) and helping our partners
employ more effective fighting tactics. These much closer partner ties on
the ground must also be accompanied by much more robust intelligence
sharing agreements, drawing from the lessons learned in the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
Sixth, expand counterinsurgency efforts against key terrorist nodes worldwide.
While we view the fight against al-Qaeda today as primarily focused on the
Af-Pak border region and certain ungoverned parts of the Middle East and
Africa, we must not forget the longstanding alliances and operational capabilities that al-Qaeda has generated globally. And while we currently view the
ISIS fight to be localized to the Iraq-Syria border region, it is increasingly clear
that the ISIS ideology is spreading beyond these bounds. We must therefore
establish a U.S. presence alongside our partners in additional countries to take
the fight to al-Qaeda and ISIS not just where they control territory or operate
in ungoverned spaces, but also where they take root in local populations. In
doing so, we must take advantage of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan
for conducting long-term counterinsurgency operations.
Seventh, redouble efforts to obtain counterterrorism intelligence. The lesson
of 9/11 and our past fourteen years of war is that consistent, timely, and
solid intelligence collection and analysis, across all disciplines, remains
critically important to successfully combatting terrorist groups. At the
same time, incidents like the horrifically successful double-agent operation
al-Qaeda ran against the CIA in Khost, Afghanistan, in 2009 remind us that
al-Qaeda and ISIS are improving their own intelligence capabilities. As a
result, we must develop an even stronger collection posture against them,
and must dedicate the additional resources necessary to this effort. We must
also provide more flexible authorities and policy guidance to implement this
collection, and we must develop a realistic counterterrorism capture policy.
It is time to acknowledge that the current Administrations policy of only
capturing and detaining terrorists when we can bring Federal charges is seri95

ously deficient. We must maintain a capacityin addition to just a narrow law

enforcement contextto capture, detain, and interrogate terrorist targets for
sustained periods of time to obtain intelligence information.
Eighth, re-establish ties with longstanding partners while also addressing
issues with them. Longstanding U.S. partners in the Arab world today have
little faith in our commitment to them; they doubt our word, and their
confidence in our staying power suffers from our seeming indecision and
hesitancy. They see us as exhorting them to take on an increasing share
of the burdenas we are and they mustwhile providing little support to
help them actually do so. We must reorient this policy by actively supporting
efforts to re-establish the Yemeni government, by actively helping the Libyan
government (such as it is) to establish effective control over key areas, and
by supporting the Egyptian governments efforts to roll back the jihadi
infestation of the Sinai Peninsula. At the same time, we must acknowledge
that Sunni terrorist groups receive support from institutions and individuals
in allied states that too often turn a blind eye to such support and provide
haven to the radical clerics whose theology drives these groups. As a result,
while we must expand our ties and double down on our security commitments
to longstanding partners, the price of admission must be a major, sustained
change in internal policy with respect to their direct and indirect support to
terrorist groups and their networks.
Ninth, create a serious, near-term plan to defeat ISIS. While much effort since
9/11 has focused on addressing ungoverned spaces, today spaces actually
governed by terrorist groups and their sympathizers represent a serious,
growing problem. ISISs success in gaining power and land in the Levant was
aided by the premature withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq and the Obama
Administrations failure to support moderate forces in Syria. And while the
Administration is taking action against particular ISIS targets and is haltingly
working toward the creation of a small, moderate Syrian rebel force, this
simply is not enough. Success will almost certainly demand the deployment
of more U.S. forces to the region, even as we encourage an Arab ground force
to take the lead. And even after such a force comes into existence, it will need
extensive direct U.S. support in the form of command and control, intelligence,

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weaponry, logistics, and possibly manpower. While this is likely to spark

controversy, it is important to realize that not making such a commitment
now will almost certainly ensure that an even larger effort will be required
down the road.
Tenth, account for the threat of a resurgent Iran. We cannot allow the
expanding threat posed by al-Qaeda and ISISnor the desire to seal a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear programto distract from the fact that
the explosion of conflicts in the region is, in significant part, stoked by the
resurgent and growing destabilizing activities of the Iranian regime and its
proxies. It is Iranian support for the Assad regime that has allowed the Syrian
conflict to fester, creating the conditions for the rise of ISIS, and it is Iranian
support for the Houthi rebels that helped push the Yemeni government out
of power, increasing instability in a country that hosts the most dangerous
al-Qaeda affiliate. We must directly confront Irans destabilizing actions and
make clear to the regime in Tehran that we will not tolerate such activities.

n sum, we find ourselves in a challenging environment, one that our own

actionsor lack thereofhave helped create. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates,

particularly AQAP, pose a significant threat to the homeland today. ISIS has
established the beginnings of a terrorist superstate with control over significant territory and resources, and its message of jihad spreads worldwide.

Our traditional allies question our commitment to them and our willingness
to act. And our desire for a nuclear deal with Iran has led us to turn a relatively
blind eye to its destabilizing activities and to its growing, outsized influence
in places that matter.
Yet hope remains. Two U.S. Administrations into the global war on terrorism,
we have established our position that America can and will take action to
protect our nation at the times and places of our choosing. Our nation and
its peoplemost importantly, our men and women in the military and the
intelligence communityare prepared to do what it takes. What is now
required is strong and resolute leadership in the White House to renew our
longstanding commitment to countering these threats before they arrive on
our shores by taking the fight to the enemy overseas.

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CHAPTER 11: IRAN

Michael Singh

When the next President enters office, Iran will be a nuclear-weapons

threshold state operating more than 5,000 centrifuges, with more than
14,000 additional ones at hand but deactivatedassuming the July 14
accord is implemented and survives its infancy. It will be openly engaged in
research and development on advanced centrifuges. Its heavy water reactor
and its underground second enrichment facility will both be modified but
otherwise intact and in use. Iran will have successfully defied multiple UN
Security Council resolutions by refusing to suspend uranium enrichment, to
dismantle illicitly built nuclear infrastructure, and to make a full declaration
regarding its past clandestine nuclear activities or fully address IAEA inquiries
about them.
Iran will also possess a large, sophisticated ballistic missile arsenal, face
no ban on the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, and will
be relieved of sanctions against its missile efforts by 2023 regardless of
its actual missile activities. Its regional influence will have expanded, and
its support for terrorism will likely continue unabated, benefited by Irans
influx of financial resources and the prospective lifting of sanctions against
its export of conventional arms in 2020 and selective de-designations of the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force and its commanders.
Iran will not be free of all sanctions, but it will have shed the most significant and restrictive ones, allowing it to grow economically and expand
its influence diplomatically and militarily. A major divide will linger
between the United States and its closest regional allies over perceived U.S.
diffidence in the face of Iranian assertiveness, further eroding a U.S.-led
security architecture already reeling from the Iraq War, the Arab uprisings,
and subsequent American disengagement from an active role in Iraq, Syria,
and elsewhere.
It might be tempting to regard these developments as regrettable but

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peripheral to Americas global foreign policy agenda as Asia and Russia loom
larger as concerns. Some may regard it as an acceptable price for deferring
a long-running confrontation between Tehran and Washington over Irans
nuclear ambitions. But the truth is that Iran poses a challenge to vital U.S.
interests in the Middle East: nonproliferation, counterterrorism, the freedom
of navigation in key waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz, cyber security,
and others. Irans strategy for advancing its own objectives clashes with
Americas strategy for advancing its interests, which aims to ensure regional
stability, provide for the security of Israel and other allies, weaken violent
non-state actors, and prevent the rise of any hegemon from within the
region or without.
The next President will thus inherit not only a nuclear accord that was
opposed by majorities of Congress and the American public, but a broader policy
that he or she, regardless of party affiliation, will find insufficient to meet
the challenges the U.S. faces with respect to Iran and the Middle East. As
part of a broader comprehensive strategy to rebuild American alliances,
advance U.S. interests, and improve stability and security in the region, the
next Administration should devise an Iran policy focused on re-establishing
American deterrence, strengthening constraints on Tehrans nuclear program,
countering Iranian efforts to project power regionally, and increasing pressure on the regime. The next President will be doing so in a more difficult
international and regional environment and with fewer tools at the ready
compared to predecessors.

he Obama Administrations Iran policy has boiled down to a double

gamble: first, that striking an agreement with Tehran that relieved

sanctions while leaving it with an extensive nuclear weapons capability was

better than the available alternatives; and second, that U.S. overtures and
security assurances, together with the time bought by the agreement, could
see Iran transformed into a more benevolent regional power whose threat
to the United States and its allies is diminished. The challenge for the next
President is that he or she will not know upon assuming office, or perhaps
even over the full four to eight years of his or her tenure, whether President

Obamas gambles will ultimately pay off. Nor will the next Administration
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have the luxury of waiting to see the nuclear bargains impact on Irans
long-term internal dynamics, because it seems more likely that Iranian
behavior will worsen rather than improve in the short-to-medium term, and
that the regime will strengthen its hold on power.
Anti-Americanism is one of the founding pillars of Irans Islamic regime,
and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei may feel the need to
reassert his fidelity to it following his nuclear compromise with Washington.
He may also be wary that the agreement will disproportionately benefit
President Hassan Rouhani and his pragmatic faction and thus take steps to
strengthen Rouhanis hardline opponents to prevent the political balance
he assiduously seeks to maintain from being disturbed. As Secretary of State
John Kerry has noted, the deal was done over the objections of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Guards are unlikely to slip quietly
into the Iranian night.
Furthermore, Iranian regional behavior is not driven only by the policy
choices of the United States or by nuclear diplomacy but also by events in
the region. Irans security strategy hinges on projecting power well beyond
its borders while seeking to create an inhospitable security environment for
the United States and its allies. To advance this strategy, Iran has cultivated
impressive asymmetric capabilities to compensate for its conventional military weakness, primarily by building, training, arming, and funding proxies
and allies such as Hizballah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Shia militias in
Iraq and Syria. It has in a sense similarly instrumentalized the Syrian regime,
which is vital to Irans ability to project power in the Levant and coordinate
with its proxies there. Iran has thus invested significant effort and resources
in propping the Assad regime up. Tehran has also built a rudimentary but
nevertheless serious anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capability with sea
mines, fast boats, offensive cyber capabilities, and an extensive missile arsenal, among other things.
Because the regional situation is growing more chaotic and the chaos is
unlikely to soon abate, and since Iran shows no sign of reconsidering its
regional interests or strategy for advancing them, its destabilizing activities

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are likely to wax rather than wane. Irans activities in turn draw a response
from U.S. allies in the region, who are increasingly assertive as a result of
American disengagement. The consequent dynamic will likely feed a vicious
cycle of unresolved conflict spreading. That cycle may well include efforts
by U.S. regional allies to develop their own nuclear programs to match Irans
status as a nuclear weapons threshold state in order to ensure their ability
to respond in kind to any quick Iranian nuclear breakout.
Furthermore, Irans nuclear efforts should not be considered separate from
its regional strategy but part of it; if Irans strategy remains unchanged, its
nuclear weapons ambitions should also be expected to linger. Nuclear weapons would add a strategic element to Irans existing asymmetric deterrent,
bolster the regimes domestic security, and ensure that external adversaries
freedom to respond to Iranian and Iranian-sponsored attacks and subversion
is limited. Relative freedom from effective countermeasures, in turn, would
provide Iran an incentive to increase such activities.
Iran will not only have a strong incentive to develop nuclear weapons, but
the nuclear agreement will also leave it with the capability to do so. Indeed,
that capability will grow rather than diminish over the agreements duration
as the restrictions on Iranian nuclear activities phase out. Even assuming
Iran does not withdraw from the arrangement sooner, after 15 years Iran will
face no restrictions on enriching uranium above 3.67 percent (90 percent is
generally regarded as weapons-grade), and will begin deploying advanced
centrifuges that can enrich uranium many times as efficiently as its existing
machines after eight and a half years have passed. Iran will also have far
more resources to pursue these and other goals: Limits on its oil exports will
have been removed, international investment in expanding its hydrocarbon
production will be unfettered, and oil prices are likely to be above their
unusually low 2014-15 levels.
While Irans nuclear weapons capability will grow, the tools available to
the United States to counter and contain it will be diminished. Irans growing
nuclear activities and its remaining nuclear infrastructure will have been
granted legitimacy by the international community, its defensive and offensive

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military capabilities will be greater, and the United States will have agreed
not only to refrain from imposing additional sanctions on Iran for nuclear
advances, but will also have suspended its most significant sanctions. A
military strike, in addition to its other downsides, will be increasingly complicated due to international involvement in Iranian nuclear activities and
foreign investment in Irans key economic sectors, such as hydrocarbons.
To avoid the twin debilities of simple acquiescence to Iranian nuclear and
regional activities or increasing reliance on military or other direct action to
deter or reverse them, new strategies and tools will be needed.

hile much of the focus in advance of January 2017 will be on the

nuclear agreement, the next Administration will requireas a

result of the situation it will inheritan entirely new Iran strategy. Such

an approach will require a broad policy review that assesses the state of
Irans nuclear activities, its regional activities, the broad situation in the
Middle East, and the stances of key U.S. allies in the region and beyond. Such
a review should nest discrete questions such as how to handle the nuclear
issue and how to counter Iranian regional behavior into broader assessment
of the challenges Iran poses to U.S. interests and objectives. It should be
devised in partnership with Congress, taking into account the congressional
and public concerns expressed during the review of the JCPOA and any subsequent congressional actions. It should produce a strategy for countering
those challenges and improving U.S. tools for implementing itthis in the
context of a comprehensive Middle East strategy that takes into account
extant realities and broader U.S. foreign policy goals.
On the critical question of Iranian nuclear proliferation, the next President
should make clear that the aim of American policy is not only to prevent Iran
from possessing an actual nuclear weapon, but to prevent it from having
an exercisable nuclear weapon capability. The nuclear accord of July 14, 2015,
is insufficient to reliably prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon
covertly and expires entirely in a phased manner between 2020 and 2030,
giving rise to the possibility that Iran could break out quickly even at
declared sites (albeit in contravention of its international obligations).

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In light of these and other serious deficiencies, the next Administration

will undoubtedly look to strengthen nuclear constraints on Iran and will
wish to do so in partnership with key allies in Europe, Asia, the Middle East,
and elsewhere. Indeed, given the expiration of nuclear restrictions on Iran in
relatively short order, the U.S. debate will not be whether the strengthening
of these constraints is required, but how to accomplish it.
Strengthening the nuclear constraints on Iran will be complicated by the
Obama Administrations support for the 2015 accord and the subsequent UN
Security Council resolution enshrining it. These decisions are not binding
on the next President and in fact offer a mechanism to unwind the accord
and re-impose U.S. and international sanctions whenever the next President
desires to do so. However, President Obamas decisions will make it harder
for his successor to gain allied support for measures necessary to deter the
expansion of Irans nuclear program. Doing so will be easier if the next
Administration develops an early and specific concept of what additional
constraints it seeks; the Administration should therefore consider focusing
especially on the failure to address Irans past weaponization activities, the
weakness of the IAEA inspection regime for suspect sites, the automatic
sunset of its restrictions, and its lifting of non-nuclear sanctions without
imposing limitations in non-nuclear areas (such as ballistic missile development) on Iran.
Even as it seeks to strengthen the constraints on Irans nuclear program,
the next Administration must deter Iranian nuclear-related activity neglected
entirely or even facilitated under the accord, such as advanced ballistic missile
activities, and take steps to deter a covert Iranian breakout attempt. The
next President should consider a broader spectrum of options to deter Irans
development of nuclear-capable ICBMs and reentry vehicles and respond to
other egregious Iranian behavior, and make public its readiness to use force
if necessary.
With regard to Irans regional policy, U.S. allies in the Mideast are arguably
more concerned about Iranian destabilization and subversion of neighbors
than they are about its nuclear program. Here, the next Presidents room for

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maneuver will be greater, as neither Iran nor the United States made any
commitments in this area in the nuclear accord. The need for action will
also be great, given the Obama Administrations relative inaction and the
likelihood that Irans destabilizing activities will increase.
Two lines of action are required. First, the U.S. government and those of its
allies must impose costs on Iran for its destabilizing regional activities. This
should include blocking the flow of Iranian material and financial assistance
to proxies, actions against those proxies themselves (for example, designating
them under relevant sanctions laws where this has not already been done),
countering Iranian efforts to harass commercial shipping and naval vessels
in the Gulf, and responding to Iranian cyber threats and attacks. The U.S. will
also need to develop tools and strategies to counter Iranian A2/AD efforts,
which are likely to increase in the wake of the nuclear accord. To be credible,
this should be done in the context of an overall increase in defense spending.
In addition, nothing prevents the United States and its allies from ramping
up sanctions on Iran in response to its destabilizing regional activities.
Indeed, such actions could reinstate some of the pressure alleviated by the
lifting of nuclear sanctions. While U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere may
prove initially reluctant to support such steps, a strong case can be made
that their interests are undermined by Irans contribution to Middle East
instability, especially in Syria and Iraq. Such sanctions and designations
may also induce caution within the international business community
about reengaging in Iran, for the same reasons they withdrew during the
past decade: the reputational risk of doing business with entities engaged
in illicit activities.
Efforts to counter Iran would be immeasurably strengthened by changes
to U.S. strategy in Syria, by increasing pressure on the Assad regime and,
in Iraq, by sidelining Iranian proxies and IRGC forces and preventing Shia
militias from becoming institutionalized, as they have been in Lebanon and
in Iran itself. In contrast, U.S. strategy may be hampered by what are likely
to be growing relationships between Iran on the one hand and Russia and
China, among others, on the other. The next Administration should use the

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tools available to it to ensure that these relationships do not fuel additional

destabilizing Iranian policies.
Second, the U.S. government should strengthen its regional allies and
improve its coordination with them. This will mean strengthening the
bonds of the alliances themselves, as well as strengthening the capabilities of each of our allies to better counter Iranian mischief. One of Irans
chief advantages in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere is the simple fact that the
United States and its allies are not on the same page strategically and thus
do not coordinate effectively. At the same time, greater attention should be
paid to strengthening vulnerable governments, especially those of Lebanon
and Jordan.
Regardless of whether Iran is complying with the nuclear agreement or
expanding its destabilizing regional behavior, the next President should
also seek effective ways to support human rights in Iran, and to demonstrate American sympathy with political reformers. This will be most effective as an international rather than a unilateral effort and should encompass
the development of technological tools that could assist dissidents globally,
advance action on Iranian human rights abuse in international forums, and
demonstrate other forms of international support for activists. This should
be done in recognition that a true resolution of international concerns with
Iranian policy is likely only to follow a broader political shift within Iran
itself, albeit one that only Iranians can bring about.
A final question the next President will have to confront will be whether
to engage with Iran. Engagement is a tool, not a strategy. The U.S. government should continue to use engagement on a case-by-case basis, as it uses
any other tactic in its foreign policy toolkit, in coordination with allies, and
in support of the objectives described above. Engagement should be thought
of not as an Obama Administration policy, because in reality the U.S. government has selectively engaged with Iran for decades under Presidents
Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. Crucially, the U.S.
government should broaden its engagement beyond the handful of officials
dispatched by the Iranian regime to the nuclear negotiations to include

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other segments of Iranian society that may have a greater interest in better relations with the United States. Even as the United States and its allies
seek to counter destabilizing Iranian behavior, the door should be left open
should Iran choose finally to undertake a strategic shiftbut the shift must
be Tehrans, not Washingtons.

he next President is likely to inherit an Iran policy with which he or she

is dissatisfiednot only an overly generous nuclear accord, but also a

record of relative inaction against Irans expanding regional activities and on

questions of human rights. Countering Iran in the wake of the nuclear accord
will be a challenging and complicated task. International consensus may
prove elusive, and the U.S. government will have sacrificed many of its most
effective tools of pressure. But it is a task than cannot be shunted aside. It
should be pursued with an eye not only to thwarting the threats Iran poses to
U.S. interests, but also as part of the sort of comprehensive strategy toward
the Middle East that has been absent in recent yearsone that takes care to
not only preserve but to enhance American influence and leadership globally.

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CHAPTER 12: AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Paul D. Miller28

The categories we casually use to describe the habitable continents on our

planet can be notoriously arbitrary. This is true particularly for the Eurasian
landmass, and even truer for the territory that spreads from what is usually
called the Middle East through South Asia. Pakistan is usually grouped
into South Asia because of its close connections to India both historically
and geostrategically. Afghanistan has no permanent home: it is either at the
far left of maps of South Asia, at the far right of maps of the Middle East, or
all the way at the bottom of maps of Central Asia.
Since September 2001 Afghanistan has become far more central to Americans, and, as a consequence, policymakers have also awoken to Pakistans
perennial importance. Afghanistan under the Taliban government was the
headquarters for al-Qaeda and the place where the 9/11 terror attacks were
planned. Since then, the country has become the site of what is often called
the longest war in U.S. history. Thanks to their shared Islamic culture and
the presence of Pashtun communities on both sides of the Durand Line (the
still formally unrecognized border between Afghanistan and Pakistan), the
two states have been inseparable, politically and militarily, since the creation
of Pakistan in 1947. And the U.S. focus on the region since 9/11 has dragged
India westward, so to speak, shifting the focus of U.S.-India bilateral ties
toward terrorism and regional security, although Indias interest in Afghan
affairs long predates September 2001.
The State and Defense Departments have not seen eye to eye on where
Afghanistan and Pakistan belong, partly on account of differing policy priorities.
During the Cold War, Pakistan mattered to the U.S. government as an ally
counterbalancing a vaguely pro-Soviet India, then as an ally against the Soviet
puppet state in Afghanistan. Afterwards, the U.S. government was mainly

28
This essay is adapted from chapter seven of American Power and Liberal Order: Grand
Strategy in the 21st Century (Georgetown University Press, 2016) and is used with the permission
of the publisher.

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concerned about nuclear proliferation, a matter nowhere near the array

of issues relevant to Afghanistan. After 9/11, Afghanistan came to matter
more to U.S. policymakers than Pakistan, but it quickly became apparent
that U.S. objectives with regard to Afghanistan were unachievable without
cooperation from Pakistan. In 2009 the Obama Administration created the
State Departments Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan,
reflecting the inadequacy of the bureaucratic setup in the government to
handle it.
At the same time, Indias relationship with the United States came to
matter as much or more than the Afghanistan-Pakistan portfolio because of
Indias status as a rising democratic great power that shared U.S. concerns
over China. If we take South Asia as a whole, we find two nuclear-weapons
states and a third of the planets population. It is also home to a dense network of jihadi groups and is an epicenter of global terrorism rivaling that
found in the core of the Middle East. But it also encompasses the worlds
largest electoral democracy and one of the rising economic superpowers of
the century. U.S. objectives in South Asia are therefore very complex. The
most important goal is to strengthen ties with India, invest in its economy,
improve bilateral counterterrorism cooperation, and encourage it to become
a pillar of support for global liberal order.
The second-most important goal is to find a workable solution to the various intertwined problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan, including denying
safe haven to al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups; preventing the Taliban from
returning to power in Afghanistan; halting Pakistans support for some
jihadi groups while supporting Pakistans fight against others; helping
Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal; preventing the further proliferation
of nuclear technology; preventing war with India over Kashmir; achieving
a peace settlement in Afghanistan; and supporting nascent and fragile
democracies in both countries. This is a difficult and ambitious agenda,
especially since some of these goals work at cross-purposes with others.

hile the most obvious opportunities for the United States concern
India, the greatest threats emanate from Afghanistan and Pakistan.

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Indeed, Pakistan is arguably the hardest problem in U.S. foreign policy. It is

not (quite) the most importantsustaining NATO, managing Chinas voluble trajectory, and improving ties with India are more sobut the range of
problems surrounding Pakistan is more complex. Just consider: While the
biggest threats to U.S. interests in South Asia come from Pakistan, the officially designated U.S. ally in South Asia is Pakistan itself.
The United States can and does derive some strategic benefits from its
on-again, off-again alliance with Pakistan, but it also incurs steep costs. The
alliance is neither completely useless nor unproblematic, as its troubled
history shows.29 If the U.S. government sees opportunities to deepen the
positive aspects of its relationship with Pakistan it should certainly seize
them, but the next Administration should also lay contingency plans for a
strategic shift away from Pakistan altogether.
Pakistan has been an episodically useful ally against both the Soviet Union
and al-Qaeda. Pakistan was a formal treaty ally of the United States from
1954 to 1979, a signatory to two treatiesthe Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)that contained mutual defense guarantees. Pakistan withdrew from those treaties
in 1972 and 1979, respectively, and the United States does not have a formal
treaty obligation to Pakistan today, a point usually overlooked by Pakistani
officials. However, Pakistans cooperation was crucial in defeating the Soviet
Union in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and it has lent some assistance to U.S.
counterterrorism efforts since 2001. In 2004, hoping to increase Pakistans
value to the United States, President George W. Bush designated Pakistan a
Major Non-NATO Ally; this was almost certainly a mistake.
Washington and Islamabad have had a long intelligence liaison relationship that goes back to the early days of the Cold War. Pakistan allowed the
United States to use its territory for intelligence collection in the 1960s,
including an air base for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and
technical facilities to intercept communications. U.S.-Pakistani intelli29

Several recent books tell the tale well: Stephen P. Cohens The Idea of Pakistan; Daniel
Markeys No Exit From Pakistan; Bruce Riedels Deadly Embrace; and John R. Schmidts The
Unraveling.

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gence cooperation, like all aspects of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, cooled

following the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war but revived in the 1980s during the
Soviet-Afghan War. As is well known, the United States and Pakistan, among
others, cooperated closely to support the Afghan mujaheddin in their war
against the Soviet Union. Following the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and
the imposition of sanctions on Pakistan for its nuclear-weapons development, ties cooled again.
A similar arrangement recommenced after 2001. Pakistan has cooperated
with the United States against al-Qaeda and other militant groups, principally through its law enforcement forces and Directorate C of the ISI, its
counter-terrorism branch. Pakistan reportedly shares selected bits of intelligence it gleans about al-Qaeda with American military forces and intelligence agencies, and it likely has given private consent to the U.S. drone
campaign, possibly including use of air strips inside Pakistan for drone operations. Pakistan, in turn, is one of the largest recipients of U.S. military and
economic assistance in the worldassistance which has totaled more than
$8.3 billion since 2001.
But that is not the full story. For 60 years Pakistan has defined its national
interest as the ability to compete with India, retain its hold on part of Kashmir, and advance its standing in the Muslim world. To these ends it fought
four wars with India, sought hegemony over Afghanistan as strategic depth,
developed nuclear weapons, and supported a range of militants as proxies
against Afghanistan and India. It is increasingly clear, too, that, despite U.S.
pressure, Pakistan has not played a helpful role in the war in Afghanistan.
Elements within Pakistan continue to support militant and terrorist groups
there such as the Haqqani Network. As if the situation were unclear, Pakistani National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz publicly said in November 2014
that Pakistan should not target militants who do not attack Pakistan. Why
should Americas enemies become our enemies? When the United States
attacked Afghanistan, all those that were trained and armed were pushed
towards us. Some of them were dangerous for us and some are not. Why

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must we make enemies out of them all?30

At heart, what U.S. policy toward Pakistan should be depends on whether
Pakistan is genuinely interested in cooperating with the United States but
is held back by incapacity and weakness, or whether Pakistan is willfully
deceptive, only pretending to cooperate to the minimum extent necessary to
keep U.S. aid money flowing. If Pakistans problem is capacity, the U.S. government should give more aid. If Pakistans problem is one of calculated will,
the U.S. government should stop giving aid and start imposing sanctions.
Paradoxically, both explanations are true; there is no single Pakistani
policy. The government is schizophrenic, divided between illiberal civilian
oligarchs, some of whom genuinely desire to stop Pakistans support for
militants and develop closer ties with the United States, and military officerswho retain far more influence over Pakistans foreign and defense
policy than is usual for an electoral democracysome of whom have continued supporting selected jihadi groups. The Pakistani military continues
to believe that India is Pakistans greatest enemy, that Afghanistan is Pakistans defense-in-depth, and that supporting jihadi proxies against India
and Afghanistan is a legitimate strategy.
How can any U.S. Administration have a coherent policy toward an incoherent government? Probably the least bad approach would be to increase
both carrots and sticks simultaneously to strengthen the parts of government that favor ties with the United States while weakening the parts that
favor supporting militants. The main carrot the U.S. government can offer
is economic and governance assistance. Since 2001, the United States provided $7.4 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan, in large part under the
Kerry-Lugar bill of 2009.31 Continued investment in the infrastructure of
civilian governance and civil society would help strengthen and entrench
Pakistans transition to democracy. Because of the massive strategic implications of the success or failure of democracy in Pakistan, civilian aid to
30
Militants not dangerous to Pakistan should not be targeted: Sartaj, Dawn, November 18,
2014.
31
Congressional Research Service, Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military
Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-2016.

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Pakistanespecially aid directed to organizations that foster accountability

within government, like independent media, secular schools and universities,
the judiciary, and public prosecutorsshould be the top priority.
At the same time, the U.S. government has more leverage to compel Pakistan
to stop supporting militants than is widely appreciated, and it should not
hesitate to use it. There are at least four options: rescind Pakistans status
as a Major Non-NATO Ally; end intelligence cooperation; designate individuals, organizations, or the Pakistani state as sponsors of terrorism; and
initiate or expand unilateral U.S. operations in Pakistan.
How much cooperation could such steps, either singly or together, produce? To answer that question, the next Administration needs to be clear
about fundamental local strategic and political realities. Aside from its fixation on India, Pakistani military and intelligence elites believe that Pashtun
nationalism remains a threat to Pakistans territorial integrity. There are
more Pashtuns in Pakistan than in Afghanistan, but they make up a small
percentage of the Pakistani population while they constitute a dominant
plurality in Afghanistan. To reduce the threat of irredentism emanating
from Kabul into Pakistani territory, Pakistani governments have long sponsored a broadeningbut, alas, also radicalizingIslamic identity in Afghan
politics. This explains Pakistans sponsorship of the Taliban and why no
Pakistani government, whether proto-democratic or military, has ever been
willing to sever ties with potentially useful agents and groups across the
border, no matter how radical or murderous. To the extent that Pakistan has
failed to behave as a predictably useful ally in the war against the Afghan
Taliban or the Haqqani Network, this is the basic reason for it.
Pakistans approach has gotten out of hand in recent years, giving rise
to a level of armed radicalism within Pakistan that has taken a huge toll.
Before the blowback hit, it was hard to see how any U.S. policy could change
Islamabads calculations, given the depth of its interest in self-preservation.
Now Pakistani calculations have been somewhat destabilized, potentially
expanding U.S. leverage.
Thus, if the next Administration chooses the first option and formally dis-

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solves the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, rescinding its Major Non-NATO Ally status,
it is not a forgone conclusion that Pakistans level of counterterrorism cooperation with the United States would change much. Pakistans cooperation
against al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban is in its own interest now that
both groups have repeatedly targeted the Pakistani state. So long as Pakistan
prioritizes the Taliban over the United States, however, the U.S. government
has little reason to treat it as an ally.
As for the longstanding bilateral intelligence cooperation arrangement,
Pakistan benefits much from this relationship. The U.S. government gives
Pakistan a substantial amount of military assistance in the form of money,
equipment, and training, some of which probably extends to or includes
intelligence activities. The relationship has enabled U.S. forces to directly
targeted Pakistans enemies in the course of its drone campaign. Reducing or
eliminating intelligence cooperation with Pakistan would harm U.S. intelligence operations in the region as well as Pakistans, but none of the losses
would be irreplaceable. Alternative basing for key facilities and sharing
intelligence exists. Afghanistan, for example, would be just as good a location for basing assets to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance of militant
networks in South Asia, and a superior one for basing assets oriented toward
Russia and Iran.
Besides, Pakistani intelligence sharing has been decidedly selective, and
refocusing U.S. counterterrorism operations exclusively on groups that
target the United States, rather than those who are fighting Pakistan, may
constitute a more economical use of resources. Helping Pakistan fight the
Pakistani Taliban might be good diplomacy, but it has not helped to win the
war against the Afghan Talibanand it might have had the unintended consequence of breeding complacency in the Pakistani Army about the strength
and resilience of the countrys homegrown militants.
The next Administration could also designate Pakistan, or specific Pakistani
actors, as sponsors of terrorism. The Secretary of Treasury could designate
individual Pakistanis as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) for complicity
in terrorism or drug trafficking. Additionally, the next Secretary of State

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could designate Directorate S of Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence as a

Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Directorate S of the ISI, in charge of
external operations, plays a similar role as the IRGC-Quds Force plays in the
Iranian government.32 If the Haqqani Network is a veritable arm of the ISI,
as former JCS Chairman Admiral Michael Mullen claimed, Directorate S is
the shoulder. An FTO designation would make it a Federal crime to provide
material support to the group, bar members from entering or staying in the
United States, and obligate U.S. financial institutions to freeze any of the
groups funds it holds. Taking such a step would end any remaining U.S. ties
with Pakistani intelligence.
Designating Directorate S of the ISI as an FTO would only be possible if
the U.S. government could show that it was a rogue organization outside the
control of the Pakistani state. That may or may not be a plausible position to
take, but its truth is less relevant than its political implications. U.S. policymakers may feel compelled to argue (or pretend) that Directorate S is rogue
because if it is not, the necessary and logical next step is to designate Pakistan itself a state sponsor of terrorism. This final tier of terrorist designation
would end all forms of U.S. assistance to Pakistan and trigger a wide range
of sanctions and export controls. Pakistan would become a hostile power.
Finally, as a last resort, the U.S. government could initiate unilateral
operations in Pakistan, including drone strikes and Special Forces raids, and
including operations in Quetta. If the drone program is, as President Obama
claimed in 2012, a useful means of launching pinpoint strikes against Americas enemies while minimizing the violation of another countrys sovereignty, then the next Administration could expand the program. Specifically, the U.S. government might expand the geographic range of drone
strikes outside the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The Afghan Taliban
senior leadership is widely believed to be in Quetta, in Baluchistan Province,
beyond current U.S. counterterrorism operations capabilities. Those capabilities could be expanded or moved.

32
Steven Coll in Ghost Wars and Ahmed Rashid in Descent into Chaos both document these
and other charges in detail.

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A critic may answer that maintaining friendly ties with Islamabad is more
important than defeating jihadist groups. Cracking down on Pakistan for the
sake of defeating the Afghan Taliban may win the battle of Kabul but lose the
war for South Asia by driving Pakistan into open hostility. According to this
view, Pakistan is vastly more important than Afghanistan by dint of its sheer
size, nuclear weapons, role in the Muslim world, and much bigger and more
viable economy. The next Administration, according to this view, should
continue to engage Pakistan, give it more economic assistance, and encourage the growth of civilian ruleessentially the Obama Administrations
strategy. If the United States has to take a loss in Afghanistan to preserve
good ties with Pakistan, that is an acceptable price to pay.
The obvious rejoinder is: What good ties are left to preserve? During the
war in Afghanistan, the United States received few irreplaceable benefits
for its aid and alliance with Pakistan. Pakistan is indeed more important
and powerful than Afghanistan, but that means we need a coherent, credible
policy toward it, not a policy based on the principle that the U.S. government
should never offend it. Russia is also a powerful state, but that does not
mean the United States is obliged to pretend it is an ally or offer it billions
of dollars in aid. The United States has paid a steep cost for its strategy toward
Pakistan during both the Bush and Obama Administrations. Terrorists
planning attacks against the United States and its allies operate in Pakistan
almost unbothered by the Pakistani government. Pakistans rivalry with
India could trigger nuclear war with global radiological fallout, as it nearly
did in the winter of 2002-03. Pretending that Pakistan is an ally and giving it
money has prevented none of these developments.
Besides, what price would the United States pay for such a policy reorientation? The list of possible reprisalssponsorship of terrorism, proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, unhelpful meddling in Afghanistan, threats
to Indiadescribes the recent history of Pakistani foreign policy as it already
is. China might gain an opportunity to further deepen its relations with
Pakistan, but the Chinese government seems unlikely to welcome closer
ties to Islamabad than are necessary. Why would the Chinese government
allow itself to be chain-ganged into a nuclear war with India instigated by
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irresponsible Pakistani behavior? Moreover, the outcome of the conflict in

Afghanistan is not immaterial to U.S.-Pakistani relations; the United States
cannot simply walk away from Kabul as a gesture of goodwill to Islamabad.
Losing in Afghanistan would hurt U.S. interests in Pakistan, not help: Losing
there would mean civil war and a possible Taliban victory in Kabul, which
in turn would empower Pakistani militants, give them a safe haven, and put
more pressure on Islamabad to co-opt or appease them. Winning in Afghanistan, by contrast, would put further pressure on militants in Pakistan and
demonstrate the U.S. commitment to building lasting stability in South Asia.
Pakistan may be the horse drawing the Afghan cart, but one does not spend
time grooming the horse if the cart is on fire.
Future American policymakers need not and should not initiate every
one of these four policy options simultaneously, and hopefully they will not
need to impose most of them. Rather, the next Administration should start
by recognizing that current U.S. policy toward Pakistanfree cash, a formal
alliance, and a blind eye turned toward Islamabads failings and betrayals
has failed to secure vital American interests in the region. At the least, U.S.
policymakers need to start war-gaming alternatives to the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship with a mind to cultivating and strengthening ties with other
states in the region.

he United States must prevent any jihadi group from seizing power anywhere in the world. That is why the U.S. government should reverse

course and redeploy troops to Afghanistan, consistent with the 2012

Strategic Partnership Agreement, for the next decade or longer. Afghanistan is vital to American national security because it provides a platform
from which to directly target al-Qaeda and other militant groups in South
Asia. It is vital to prevent the Taliban from retaking power. A Taliban-controlled Afghanistan will almost certainly become safe haven once again for
al-Qaeda or other militant groups. Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their many
affiliates and allies in the region have not been defeated and, as illustrated
by recent developments in Iraq, are likely to grow stronger in a power vacuum
created by a full U.S. withdrawal.

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Additionally, success or failure in Afghanistan will affect Americas interests

across South Asia: Pakistans stability and the security of its nuclear weapons, NATOs credibility, relations with Iran and Russia, transnational
drug-trafficking networks, worldwide democracy promotion, and humanitarian considerations. These real and enduring interests require a substantial
and lasting commitment to the region, and they explain why the mission in
Afghanistan is not simply about denying safe haven to al-Qaeda but fostering
long-lasting stability in South Asia.
Iraq could hardly be a clearer cautionary tale: If the U.S. withdraws from
Afghanistan before Afghan security forces are able to lead the fight against
the Taliban and deny safe haven to al-Qaeda, militants are almost certain
to regain some degree of safe haven there, much as the Islamic State gained
ground since the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq in 2011especially
since the withdrawal of U.S. troops could mean the end of the drone program
in South Asia. Certain key parallels between Iraq and Afghanistan are striking. In Afghanistan, the insurgency gained ground from 2006 to 2009 and
threatened to balloon into full-scale civil war, as in Iraq in 2006-07. A surge
of U.S. troops in 2010-11 halted the insurgents momentum and, albeit less
dramatically than in Iraq, began to reverse their gains. U.S. policymakers took
advantage of their success to plan for transition to indigenous leadership.
This time, however, the agreements for a stay-behind force of U.S. troopsa
Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2012 and accompanying Bilateral
Security Agreement (BSA) signed in 2014were framed as a decade-long
arrangement, in contrast to the three-year duration of the abandoned Iraqi
Status of Forces Agreement. The longer time frame made sense. Afghan
security forces in 2014 did not have the logistics, air support, intelligence,
and transportation capabilities they needed to succeed. The pieces seemed
to be in place for an enduring U.S. presence and partnership with local
security forces.
President Obamas announcement of a complete pullout by the end of
2016 changed the outlook for Afghanistan dramatically, making it more
likely that something like a replay of events in Iraq will take place. If U.S.

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forces withdraw completely, as they are now scheduled to do by the end of

2016, Afghan forces are likely to show themselves to be as unprepared as
their Iraqi counterparts to face a renewed insurgent offensive alone. While
they are unlikely to collapse immediately, they may withdraw from some
districts and provinces in the south and east to minimize casualties and
focus on securing major cities and roadways. Such redeployments would
make military sense, but they would also amount to a de facto ceasefire with
local Taliban forces and enable the Taliban (and thus al-Qaeda) to control
some Afghan territoryas the Islamic State now does in Iraq and Syria.
The Taliban would then gain further strength and momentum through
their control of the drug trade, as the Islamic State benefits from the oil
industry. Their operational freedom would be further strengthened if the
alleged U.S. drone program in South Asiawhich requires at least some
personnel on the ground for airfield security, logistics, and maintenance
ended. Militants control of territory would lend them an air of legitimacy
and strength with locals and even win some degree of supportwhether
through loyalty or fearagain, just as in Iraq and Syria. Finally, if political
wrangling in the capital convinces Afghans that their government cannot
meet their needs or protect them, as Sunnis seem to have concluded about
Baghdad, they are likely to be more receptive to local solutions, even if they
come with the Talibans imprimatur.
The Obama Administration was compelled to re-engage with Iraq three
years after it left. There are high costs associated with the withdrawal and
reintroduction of U.S. forces abroad. The U.S. government can save those
gratuitous costs in Afghanistan by retaining a robust stay-behind force to
train Afghan security forces, conduct counterterrorism raids, and support
the Afghan forces rural counterinsurgency efforts. If U.S. efforts also succeed
in improving Afghan governance and democracy, it would foster an example
of democracy in the Muslim world and craft a long-term partnership with a
democratic state that borders both Iran and Pakistan. That scenario will be
difficult to achieve, to be sure, but it is not impossible.
The essential condition for victory is, and has always been, the construc-

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tion of a state capable of governing Afghanistan. This is the simple requirement of counter-insurgency, the primary objective of which is to foster
the development of effective governance by a legitimate government,
according to the U.S. Army counter-insurgency manual. Counter-insurgency is competitive state-building: Kabul must out-govern the Taliban
to demonstrate to the population why it deserves support. Only when the
international community can be confident that an effective government will
enforce its writ throughout Afghanistan can it safely withdraw the props of
support it has provided Kabul.
General David Petraeus told Congress in March 2011, when he was Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, that I am concerned
that funding for our State Department and USAID partners will not sufficiently enable them to build on the hard-fought security achievements of our
men and women in uniform. Inadequate resourcing of our civilian partners
could, in fact, jeopardize accomplishment of the overall mission.33 Petraeus
remarkable statementthat the United States could lose the war in Afghanistan without greater funding for civilian reconstruction and governance
assistancefell on deaf ears. Under the Obama Administration, U.S. aid for
governance and development declined by almost $1.5 billionone-third
of the totalfrom 2010 to 2011, and it has continued to decline every year
since.34 This is especially worrisome considering that the World Bank and
Afghan Central Bank recently judged that Afghanistan will require $4 billion
in assistance per year for ongoing reconstruction efforts.35
The next Administration can reverse this decline in a revenue-neutral
manner: The withdrawal of tens of thousands of U.S. combat forces has generated more than enough cost savings to pay for increased civilian aid. Even
sending more U.S. troops back to Afghanistan will still leave the U.S. presence
there far smaller and more affordable than it was at its peak in 2010-11. A
33
David Petraeus, Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army Commander, International Security Assistance Forces NATO, Before Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony
for the Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, March 15, 2011.
34
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Quarterly Report (July 30, 2015):
79.
35
Stephane Guimbert, Afghanistan--Aid Effectiveness, Fiscal Outlook Need Further
Attention, Discussion at World Bank Live, Washington, DC, January 31, 2006.

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surge of foreign aid to Afghanistan would not appreciably increase the financial burden on the U.S. Treasury, but it could change the trajectory of Afghan
governance and mean the difference between U.S. policy success and failure.

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CHAPTER 13: RUSSIA

Paula J. Dobriansky & David J. Kramer

Vladimir Putins Russia poses a major threat to American interests and

ranks near the top of the foreign policy/national security challenges facing
the United States. Not since World War II has Europe faced a graver crisis.
Should Russian aggression spread from Ukraine to a neighboring NATO
member state, the United States would be confronted for the first time with
Article 5 implications and the possibility of war with Russia. Moreover, the
ongoing crackdown inside Russia reflects a dangerous regime that is both
corrupt and authoritarian, while also paranoid and dysfunctional.
Putins regime poses a range of threats. It is, first and foremost, a threat
to its own citizens through its ugly crackdown on human rights. It threatens
its neighbors, as the invasions of Ukraine this past year and Georgia in 2008
illustrate. It has threatened Estonia through a cyber attack in 2007 and cutoffs of energy to and imports from Moldova, Georgia, Lithuania, and others.
It threatens the West through its attempts to corrupt our institutions by
using our financial system and buying up our assets while paying off influential voices. It threatens the United States in particular through its strident anti-Americanism, based not on ideology but on the cult of Putinism,
which has reached a level worse than that of the Cold War. It threatens an
already destabilized Middle East through its military and diplomatic support for Syrias Bashar al-Assad and the proposed delivery of sophisticated
S-300 missiles to Iran. And it threatens global stability through increasing
nuclear weapons saber-rattling in general. The world order itself is thus
under assault from the Putin regime.
Russias regime also challenges many of the principles for which we stand
and, left unchallenged, could pose an even greater threat in the future. And
yet the approach adopted by President Obama would never lead one to conclude that this threat is a top priority of his Administration, notwithstanding
the comments of the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who described
Russia as an existential threat. Essentially, the White House has contracted
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out responsibility for dealing with Putins Russia to the Europeans, and in
particular to German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This marks an abdication
of American leadership unprecedented since the end of World War II. It must
be reversed.

hen the Obama Administration entered office in January 2009, it

inherited a troubled relationship with Russia. In August 2008, six

months before, Russia had invaded Georgia, and relations between the

United States and Russia came to a virtual standstill. The Obama Administrations reset policy, one of its top foreign policy objectives when it came
into office in 2009, sought to repair the relations between Washington and
Moscow that had been damaged by the invasion of Georgia. And yet as the
Administration winds down, relations between Moscow and Washington
have plummeted to new lows following the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, levels
far lower than those it inherited.
Over the years, tensions in the relationship can be traced to differences
over, inter alia: Russias anti-terrorism campaign in Chechnya (which
included major human rights abuses); NATOs campaign against Serbias
Slobodan Milosevic and the subsequent recognition of Kosovo independence; the October 2003 arrest, on trumped-up charges, of Russias richest
oligarch, Mikhail Khodorkovsky; a broader deterioration in the human
rights situation inside Russia; the war in Iraq, which Russia vehemently
opposed; the U.S. decision to leave the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; NATO
enlargement; and Putins perception that the U.S. government was behind
the color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstanand that Russia
was next on our list. Putin has perpetuated the myth that the West, and the
United States in particular, represent an implaccable threat to Russia.
Seeking to put Russias invasion of Georgia in the past, the Obama Administrations reset with Russia was designed to pursue win-win approaches
to various global problems, including Iran, Afghanistan, non-proliferation,
arms control, and counter-terrorism. As part of its strategy, the Obama team
made clear that Russias disturbing human rights situation would not be

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linked to other parts of the relationship.36 In addition, the Administration

decided to center its policy on Russia at the expense of other countries in
the region, leaving Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other denizens of the
post-Soviet space to the European Union to handle. And in fall 2009, the
Obama Administration made adjustments to the missile defense system proposed by the Bush Administration, in part to curry favor, it hoped, with Moscow.
Obama attempted to work out a mutually satisfactory relationship with
then-President Dmitri Medvedev, believing that he was easier to deal with
than Putin. Days before traveling to Moscow for his first visit as President in
July 2009, Obama commented that then-Prime Minister Putin, by contrast,
had one foot in the old ways of doing business, suggesting the Cold War,
and one foot in the new, a comment that did not endear the American President to the Russian Premier. But Obama and his team believed that Medvedev
was the real thing and that their support for him might tip the balance in
Medvedevs favor against Putin. That calculation proved mistaken.
Other flaws in the reset policy included the public and repeated rejection
of linkage, which gave Putin a green light to crack down domestically without paying a price in his relationship with Washington. Since May 2012, with
Putins return, Russia has experienced the worst crackdown in human rights
in decades. The concept of win-win was alien to Putin, who sees the world
in zero-sum terms and perceived such an approach as indicating a lack of
resolve on the part of the U.S. government. On numerous occasions, such
as on the decision in September 2009 to revamp the Bush Administrations
plans for missile defense in Eastern Europe, the Obama Administration
created the impression that it wanted and needed better relations with
Moscow more than Moscow needed good relations with the United States.
The Obama White Houses neglect of Russias neighbors, reinforced by its
announced pivot to Asia that implied a distancing from Europe, gave Putin
the impression that he could lean on his neighbors without any consequence
from Washington.
36

Linkage refers to the concept that the internal situation inside another country, including
human rights abuses, can adversely affect the relationship with the United States in other areas
and limit the ability of the two countries to cooperate.

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Arms control has been a major focus with Russia, culminating in the New
Start Treaty concluded in 2010. The Administration also touted Russias
entry into the World Trade Organization, the Northern Distribution Network
for Afghanistan, and joint efforts on Iran, as accomplishments resulting
from the reset policy. The hope all this generated for follow-on arms control
agreements and a flourishing partnership proved unfounded, even before
Putins September 2011 announcement that he would return to the presidency the following spring. Bilateral relations had already lost their momentum, in part due to differences over Syria, reaction to the Arab revolutionary movements (especially the UN resolution on Libya, in which Putin felt
Russia had been duped into abstaining while the West used the resolution
passed in the Security Council to overthrow Muammar Qaddafi), missile
defense (Obamas concessions on that in September 2009 turned out only
to whet Putins appetite), and growing Russian pressure on its neighbors.
When Putin declared in September 2011 that he would swap places with
Medvedev, he all but ended Washingtons dwindling hopes for better bilateral relations.

egislation passed by the Russian parliament criminalizing homosexual

propaganda, the granting of asylum to Edward Snowden, and a broad

crackdown inside Russia led President Obama in the summer of 2013 to cancel
a summit with Putin ahead of the G-20 meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia.

Attention soon turned to developments in Ukraine, however, starting in late

2013, which presented the biggest challenges to the U.S.-Russian relationship since the collapse of the USSR.
Putins invasion of Ukraine, starting in February 2014 in Crimea, marks
the first annexation of one European countrys territory by another since
World War II and threatens the normative order and geostrategic stability
in Europe. In one stroke, Putin thumbed his nose at the Helsinki Accords
of 1975, the Paris Charter of 1990, the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, and
other agreements and commitments that had kept the peace in Europe for
decades. The postCold War order lay in shambles, and many worried that, if
Putins brazen act were left unchallenged, other authoritarian regimes would
think they, too, could aggress without consequence against their neighbors.

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If not stopped in Ukraine, too, Putin might move on to other neighbors.

The imposition of Western economic sanctions against the Putin regime
and key members of it in response to the invasion of Ukraine deserves modest praise; those sanctions, however, have been reactive and insufficient. At
the same time, Obamas unwillingness to provide Ukraine with the lethal
means to defend itself, despite overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress for doing so, has been a major source of disappointment. Concerns
that providing military assistance to Ukraine would lead to an escalation of
the conflict in which Russia would have an advantage are misplaced. Putin
is sensitive to the possibility of more casualties, evidenced by his decree
classifying all such information; his worst fear is the possibility of armed
conflict with the United States and thus he is much more likely to back down
if he sees the U.S. government stepping up and flexing some military muscle.
Instead, regrettably, the nave belief among a number of European leaders
that they can and should return to business as usual with Moscow is not
helped by a sense that President Obama is no longer paying much attention to the crisis, distracted by ISIS, negotiations with Iran, and domestic
concerns. While Putin may be operating from a weak base, he thinks that,
compared to leaders in the West, including the American President, he is
stronger and can outlast the sanctions.
More than 6,400 Ukrainians have lost their lives and more than 1.5 million have been displaced because of Russias invasion. Yet Secretary of State
John Kerry traveled to Sochi in May 2015 to meet with Putin, raising new
concerns that the Obama Administration may be seeking Russian help on
Syria and Iran at the expense of dealing with the Ukraine crisis. His travel
to Russia contradicts the isolation of Russia that President Obama bragged
about in his January State of the Union speech.37 After the visit, Russian
officials portrayed it as a signal that the United States has finally understood
that it had been on the wrong path.
37
In his State of the Union speech this past January, President Obama took credit for leading
the campaign to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. [I]t is America that stands strong
and united with our allies, while Russia is isolated with its economy in tatters. Thats how
America leadsnot with bluster, but with persistent, steady resolve.

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Putin had done nothing to merit a visit by a U.S. Secretary of State; after all,
he has continued supporting forces fighting in eastern Ukraine in violation
of the Minsk ceasefire agreement struck in February and has built up Russian
forces along the border with Ukraine in preparation for a possible full-scale
invasion. He and his Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, have offered no solutions and instead demand that the West, not Russia, change its policies and
lift sanctions. They have wooed certain European leaders, especially from
Greece, Hungary, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic, with the goal of buying
their resistance to extending EU sanctions on Russia. In his press conference
after meeting with Putin, Kerry never mentioned Crimea, implicitly criticized
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko in response to a journalists question,
and offered platitudes such as saying he was privileged to spend many hours
with Putin and Lavrov. His trip to Sochi made the Obama Administration look
weak and desperate and conveyed the impression that we need Russia more
than Russia needs us.
Since coming to office, the Obama Administration has failed to understand
the challenge it faces in Putin. Putins central objective is staying in power
no matter the cost, even at the risk of harming Russias interests and at the
expense of relations with the United States. His return to the presidency in
2012 turned on his lack of confidence in Medvedev to sustain the corrupt,
authoritarian regime Putin had built up over the previous eight years. Any
domestic liberalization or institutional reform, and any tolerance for Russias neighbors to pursue closer ties with the West, threatened the plutocratic
accumulation of wealth by Putin and his clique. Accordingly, he determined
that closer ties between Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova with Euro-Atlantic
institutions threatened his own interests at home. If those countries were
to become more integrated with the West, more democratic and successful
economically, they (in particular Ukraine) risked becoming alternatives to the
model Putin created in Russia. He also believed that the populations in those
countries were incapable on their own of wanting rule of law, an end to corruption, greater liberalization, and leadership that represented those desires.
Popular movements at home and in his neighboring states therefore had to be
the work of the West, in particular the United States.

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To justify his way of governing, Putin has needed to perpetuate the myth
that the West, and the United States in particular, represent threats to Russia.
As far back as his speech following the Beslan hostage crisis in 2004 and
continuing with his Munich speech in 2007, Putin has hyped the threat of
outside powers. Russias 2010 Military Doctrine cites NATO enlargement
as the greatest military danger, a theme repeated in the Military Doctrine
Putin approved in December 2014.
To be clear, neither NATO enlargement over the years, the European
Unions more recent outreach to its eastern neighbors, supposed American
hectoring of Russia on its human rights record (neither the Bush Administration nor the Obama Administration actually did much of this), nor the
U.S. treating Russia as a lesser power explains the current state of affairs.
The problem is Putin. But the reset policy of the Obama Administration has
not made matters better.

better way forward requires that we learn from our mistakes, especially those of the current Administration. For starters, we should stop

seeing Putin as anything other than a paranoid authoritarian leader who

oversees one of the most corrupt regimes in the world; he is not going to
change his stripes. The crackdown on human rights in Russia is the worst
since the Andropov days of the early 1980s. Most recently, the Russian parliament approved legislation banning undesirable organizations from the
country, without defining what that entails. This follows the foreign agent
law passed in 2012 that conjures up pejorative language from the Soviet era,
arrests and investigations of critics and opposition figures, including Alexei
Navalny, and the tragic assassination of opposition figure Boris Nemtsov on
February 27, 2015, just yards away from the Kremlin.
Beyond the abysmal domestic situation, Russias foreign policy under
Putin has posed major challenges to the West, as already enumerated above.
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Putin, despite high levels of popular
support, is invincible. He himself has placed his country in a precarious position by pursuing policies against Ukraine that have led to Russias isolation
as a pariah state; by failing to diversify Russias economy (a problem that

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mushroomed with the significant decline in the price of oil); and by insisting
on increases in defense spending at a time when the country cannot afford
them. Under Putins watch, Russias economy has fallen into crisis: By the
end of 2014, the value of the ruble had dropped by roughly half, capital flight
was more than twice that of 2013 (totaling $151 billion in 2014), inflation
and interest rates were up, and hard currency reserves had fallen below $400
billion (by mid-March 2015 they totaled roughly $350 billion). Even with the
ruble and the Russian stock market being decent performers in 2015, Russias
economy is not out of the woods by any means.
Because of Western sanctions, Russian companies are unable to refinance
the massive debt they owe to Western banksroughly $140 billion in 2015
alone. Russian banks are therefore turning to the government for bailouts,
further draining foreign currency reserves. The retaliatory sanctions Putin
put in placebanning food and agricultural imports from countries that
have imposed sanctions on Russiahave driven price increases for food and
staples significantly higher than the overall rate of inflation. The drop in the
price of oil contracts accounts for much of Russias current problems, but
Russias economic situation at the end of 2014 was far worse than it was at
the start of the year due mainly to Putins decisions (or lack thereof). Corruption drains anywhere from $300-$500 billion a year out of the economy.
Putins disappearance from the political scene for 11 days this past March
raised speculation of infighting within the Kremlin but also highlighted that,
for all the bravado Putin pours forth, he oversees a fragile system that may
soon fall to pieces.

ccordingly, we need to anticipate the impact of possible regime collapse

in Russia, Putins departure/removal from power, and/or a more aggres-

sive Russia that seeks to harm its neighbors. Planning for such scenarios is an
important basis for a new strategy.
If we accept the premise that the Putin regime is a threat to its neighbors,
to the West, and to its own people, we need to fashion a different approach
to Russia that involves several elements. First, we must contain Russias

opportunities for making mischief by ramping up sanctions to include

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Putin and his top circle on the visa ban and asset freeze lists. This might
require unilateral U.S. sanctions given reluctance among some Europeans
to toughen their measures. Financial sanctions against all Russian banks
and expulsion from the SWIFT system should be on the table unless Moscow
dramatically changes course in Ukraine. Such action worked at least to bring
Iran to a negotiating table and could have a similar effect on Russia. The
Obama Administration has confused tactics (maintaining unity with the
European Union) with objectives (getting Russia out of Ukraine and helping
Ukraine succeed); that confusion needs to be cleared up.
We must also support reform-minded forces inside Russia. Difficult as it
may be to provide support, there are still Russians who look to the United
States for help, financially and morally. We should not assume that the cause
inside the country is hopeless.
We should also bolster Russias neighbors and beef up the defense of NATO
allies along Russias borders. Supporting the neighboring states in their
efforts to liberalize and reform their economiesand thereby strengthening
their independence and viabilityis one of the best ways to respond to
Putins aggression. This should also include the prepositioning of equipment and the forward-deployment of U.S. forces, consistent with the Polish
Governments intention to put this on the agenda at the NATO Warsaw
Summit in 2016. Putin must know that aggression against other states in
the region will incur serious consequences, and that aggression against any
NATO member states will be met by NATO military forces consistent with
obligations under Article V.
We should also support Ukraine, in particular, in several specific ways:
by providing military aid to help it defend itself; by backing Ukraine in its
overall reform campaign and specifically in its debt restructuring efforts; by
leaning on private-sector lenders to show flexibility in debt repayment; by
refusing ever to recognize Russias annexation of Crimea; and by maintaining sanctions against the Putin regime as long as Russia occupies Ukrainian
territory, including Crimea.
We also need to stop telegraphing to Putin what we wont do, such as no
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military aid to Ukraine. It is wise to avoid gratuitous clarity in diplomacy, a

technique at which Putin himself is a master. We must also avoid importing corruption from Russia that infiltrates and infects our own systems. We
should therefore clean up our own systems by enforcing anti-corruption
measures and exposing those on the Kremlin payroll.
We should encourage the diversification of energy supplies in Europe and
unleash exports of American energy, notably crude oil, by amending the
atavistic 1975 ban. This would go far in dealing Putins energy-dependent
economic engine a major blow.
We must coordinate a coherent counter to the Russian propaganda campaign by funding fact-based journalism that is interesting and accessible to
audiences inside Russia and to populations along its borders. This will require
beefing up funding for broadcasting into Russia and neighboring states.
We would also be wise to accelerate development of a missile defense system,
especially in light of the Kremlins rhetoric on the use of nuclear weapons.
Such a system should not focus solely on rogue threats but should cover the
possibility of reckless action by Russia (as noted in Chapter 22.)
Cumulatively, these policy changes amount to a major effort that requires
coordination, phasing, and careful interagency and transatlantic cooperation.
Above all, it requires strong American leadership, steady engagement from
the President, and coordination with our allies. We do not advise total disengagement from officials in Moscow, but we need to be modest in our expectations, and we must avoid the appearance of chasing after Russian officials.
There remain areas where interests overlap, such as non-proliferation, the
Arctic, and counter-terrorism, but we must recognize that we do not share
many common interests nowadays. Indeed, our overtures toward Moscow
need be designed more to prevent harm than to advance the good. Putins
Russian regime views the United States, democracy, NATO, the European
Union, and the West more broadly as threats to its survival. As long as Putin
fabricates the line the West threatens Russian sovereignty, any significant
form of strategic partnership with the Putin regime is impossible.

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The truth, of course, is that the West had no interest in picking a fight with
Russia. It turned to sanctions over Ukraine reluctantly and in response to
clear Russian aggression. But our misreading of Russia made things worse; a
more candid assessment of reality must become the basis of a more coherent
and clearer strategy on how to deal with that reality. That is a development
that must start with a new Administration in January 2017.

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CHAPTER 14: NORTH KOREA

Dan Blumenthal

The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), as a nuclear weaponsarmed state, is a threat to U.S. forces in Asia and allies South Korea and
Japan, as well as a growing threat to the U.S. homeland. Its proliferation of
nuclear weapons technology to rogue regimes poses an even broader threat
to international security.
In October 2006, 12 years after President Bill Clinton signed a nuclear
freeze agreement with North Korea (the Agreed Framework), Pyongyang
conducted its first successful nuclear weapons test. Since then, the regime
has conducted two additional underground tests, in 2009 and 2013. The
expert consensus is that North Korea now possesses approximately six to
eight plutonium nuclear weapons and four to eight uranium nuclear weapons. It is on a pathway toward doubling, or even quadrupling, that number
by 2020. North Korea has improved its delivery systems as well. It is likely
capable of mounting its nuclear weapons onto missiles and is working on
miniaturization, as it aspires to place warheads on Nodong missiles (capable
of striking South Korea or Japan) and Taepodong intercontinental ballistic missiles (capable of striking the United States). The DPRK also seeks to
develop submarine-launched ballistic missiles to provide it with a survivable
nuclear deterrent.
The DPRK proliferates its nuclear technology as a means of generating
revenue for the Kim regime. Even as it engaged in multilateral diplomacy,
North Korea transferred nuclear technology to Syria, leading to an Israeli
airstrike on that countrys facility in September 2007. More recently, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated that North Korea and Iran could be
cooperating to develop a nuclear weapon.38 The two nations continue their
ballistic missile cooperation.

38
Paul K. Kerr, Steven A. Hildreth, and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, Iran-North Korea-Syria Ballistic
Missile and Nuclear Cooperation, Congressional Research Service, May 11, 2015.

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North Koreas million-man military poses a persistent threat to Seoul. Its

special forces can penetrate deep into the South Korean countryside and it
has stationed 70 percent of its ground forces and 50 percent of its air and
naval forces within 100 kilometers of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), ready
to inflict destruction upon the South Korean capital. As the regime of Kim
Jong-Un has built up its nuclear arsenal, it has grown bolder in using conventional military capabilities. In recent years, North Korea has killed South
Korean soldiers, sailors, and civilians. In March 2010, a North Korean submarine torpedoed a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. Then
in November 2010, North Korean artillery shelled the South Korean island
of Yeonpyeong, killing South Korean marines and civilians. The North Korean
threat ties South Korea down, draining its diplomatic energy and resources and
hindering its aspirations to become a truly regional security player.
With nuclear weapons and a Chinese patron all but held hostage by uncertainty, the North Korean regime seems to be less concerned about U.S. or
allied responses to its provocations. It poses a problem for which we do not
have a good solution. This reality demands first a review of how we got to
the current situation, and second a reassessment of the U.S. approach to
North Korea.

ince the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1993-94, every U.S. President has rejected strategies of both rollback and accommodation with

North Korea. Instead they have chosen a combination of engagement and

containment: The much-maligned term congagement is nevertheless the

workhorse of U.S. statecraft in Asia. In the North Korean case, it means that
successive Presidents have sought to contain the threat of a nuclear North
Korea by deterring it from attacking neighbors and by weakening it through
sanctions while, at the same time, they have tried to entice the regime to
give up its nuclear weapons program and join the international politicaleconomic system.
President Clinton signed the 1994 Agreed Framework in which Pyongyang pledged to dismantle its plutonium processing plant at Yongbyon in
exchange for up to $4.5 billion in aid, assistance in building two civilian

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nuclear reactors, and potential entry into the World Bank and IMF.39 North
Korea showed little intention to abide by the agreement and took advantage
of its many holes, including its failure to address ballistic missile production.
In May 1998, the DPRK publicly announced that it would abandon the agreement and soon thereafter launched a missile over Japan, forcing yet another
diplomatic process to deal with its missiles.
President Clinton also contained the threat by keeping a large forwarddeployed force in Korea and Japan despite post-Cold War calls to bring
troops home. He began upgrading the capabilities of the U.S.-ROK and
U.S.-Japan alliances. In 1997, the United States and Japan revised their
defense alliance, allowing Tokyo to conduct operations in surrounding
areas, including assistance to U.S. forces in South Korea during a crisis.
Between 1995 and 1998, the Clinton Administration sold $504 million of
defense hardware to the ROK.
President Clinton thus set the U.S. government on the path of congagement: direct talks with North Korea in the context of the Agreed Framework
and stronger defense arrangements with Japan and South Korea. But North
Korea had been cheating during that period by developing a highly enriched
uranium program (HEU). When this cheating was revealed by U.S. intelligence efforts, President Bush sent Assistant Secretary of State James Kelley
to Pyongyang in September 2002, with evidence in hand, to demand that the
DPRK account for all of its nuclear activities. When confronted with its violations of the Agreed Framework, the DPRK withdrew from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003 and reactivated the Yongbyon facility.
But the Bush Administration did not abandon the congagement framework; it only adjusted it with the goal of achieving a complete, verifiable,
and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of North Korean nuclear programs.
The Bush team instituted a tactical change in its engagement strategy: Bush
wanted China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia to be equally invested in the
negotiations with Pyongyang and thus convened the Six-Party Talks with
39
Taehyung Ahn, Patience or Lethargy?: U.S. Policy toward North Korea under the Obama
Administration, North Korean Review, 8:1 (Spring 2012), p. 74.

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those parties and the DPRK. By doing so, however, the U.S. government
allowed policy toward North Korea to be subsumed by a Sinocentric policy of
encouraging China to become a responsible stakeholder in international
affairs. The talks became as much about finding ways to cooperate with
China as about denuclearizing North Korea. Thus, China could set the pace
and adjust the goals of the negotiations, confident that Washington placed
a high priority on remaining in concert with Beijing.
The Bush Administration also bolstered containment by weakening and
isolating the Kim regime. Diplomatic innovations such as the Proliferation
Security Initiative and the Illicit Activities Initiative coerced and pressured
Kim, and cut off his personal wealth. The U.S. government sanctioned his
assets at the Banco Delta Asia in Macau, and rolled up the international
criminal networks upon which the regime relied for its survival. But at the
same time the Bush Administration reduced U.S. troop levels in Korea and
pulled back from the DMZ, partly to meet force requirements in the Middle
East and partly in response to ROK desires for more independence. Washington agreed to hand over operational control (OPCON) of ROK forces to
the Koreans. Yet Bush also strengthened deterrence through missile defense
cooperation with both the Japanese and the Koreans.
In 2003, the Pentagon released OPLAN 5027-04, a policy document that
established ground and sea-based missile defense systems as the centerpiece
of U.S. extended deterrence in northeast Asia. In May 2004, Japan purchased
ship-based missiles for its Aegis destroyers and new PAC-3 interceptors from
the U.S. Tokyo and Washington also integrated their missile defense programs.
As containment was bolstered, talks continued. In 2005, North Korea
promised to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and return to the NPT.
In exchange, the Six-Party members agreed to provide energy assistance and
respect North Koreas right to a civilian nuclear program. What North Korea
really wanted was to gain acceptance as a nuclear weapons state. In 2006,
after the energy assistance had been received, the regime test-launched a
Taepodong-2 ICBM and conducted a nuclear weapons test.
With this, the Bush Administration changed tack. But instead of strength135

ening its containment tools, Washington eased the pressure and emphasized
the engagement prong of its strategy. In February 2007, the Six-Party members reached an agreement whereby North Korea would freeze its nuclear
activities and disable all nuclear facilities. Even absent North Korean progress,
Washington lifted the Banco Delta Asia sanctions and removed the DPRK
from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Despite years of evidence to the
contrary, the Bush Administration believed that the right inducements could
still persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons.
President Obama came into office offering the DPRK an outstretched
hand, which the DPRK bit hard. It refused to continue the Six-Party Talks
and attacked the South Koreans. Obamas policy changed to strategic
patiencewhich amounts to a de facto containment-only strategy. As part
of that strategy, President Obama enacted unilateral sanctions targeting
North Korean entities. He also secured UN sanctions in 2009 (Security
Council Resolution 1874) and 2013 (Security Council Resolution 2094), in
response to North Koreas second and third nuclear tests.
Meanwhile, the Obama Administration, like its predecessors, has tried to
bolster U.S.-ROK deterrence. In May 2013, B-52 and B-2 bombers participated in joint training exercises with South Korea after a period of bellicose
rhetoric from the DPRK. The U.S. and South Korean governments have both
committed to improving their respective ballistic missile defense systems
and integrating them. The ROK has also agreed to purchase 40 F-35 fighters
and four RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drones.
While the congagement of North Korea has utterly failed to stop North
Korea from acquiring and testing its strategic forces or from proliferating,
it has managed to deter a nuclear attack and limit conventional attacks on
South Korea. The U.S. government has learned the humbling lesson that,
short of high-risk uses of force, there is little it can do to stop regimes hellbent on acquiring nuclear weapons. This suggests that, on balance, North
Koreas strategy in recent years has proven successful. In the words of Victor
Cha, three decades of U.S. negotiations . . . have provided the North with
$1.28 billion in benefits, and in return (the United States and allies) received

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two nuclear tests and thirty ballistic and cruise missile tests.40

iven the failure of U.S. strategy to date, the next President should conduct a senior-level policy reassessment as soon as its principals have

been selected, sworn in, and taken office. The first step in such a reassessment

must be the clear-eyed acceptance of the U.S. failure in strategic conception:

The Kim family cannot be persuaded or otherwise induced to abandon its
nuclear program. The regime views nuclear weapons as the key to its survival,
both as insurance against U.S.-led regime change and as a means to extort
resources for its failed economy.
Washington must also accept that, absent a change in its risk calculus, the
Peoples Republic of China will continue to support the Kim regime. Chinese
leaders seem still to prefer the trouble and expense caused by the current
North Korean regime to the uncertainties of its collapse, and especially the
possibility of a unified Korea under a democratic regime, with or without
nuclear weapons, and with or without a treaty arrangement with the United
States. Years of U.S. diplomatic efforts appear to have mellowed Chinese
thinking somewhat, but have changed its policy conclusions not at all.
So what is to be done? The truth is that a Presidents strategic options
against North Korea are limited to some mix of accommodation, engagement,
containment, or rollback. Accommodation, engagement, and containment
have all been attempted, while rollback has been rejected as too dangerous. In the short to medium term, containmentwith deterrence and the
weakening of the Kim regime as its essential elementsis probably the
only prudent course. Over the longer term, as South Korean leaders such
as President Park Geun-hye develop a concrete geopolitical program for a
unified, free Korea, U.S. statesmen may be in a position to explore rollback
through unification. Short-term containment and long-term unification are,
taken together, the best of a range of unsatisfying choices available to the
next President. This approach to North Korea should be complemented by a
renewed focus on human rights. That focus could achieve an improvement

40

Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea Past and Future (Ecco Press, 2012), p. 456.

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in the conditions under which North Koreans live, possibly provide some
with means of escape from Kims tyranny, as well as delegitimize Kims rule.
A new U.S. strategy of containment, with the long-term goal of unification,
should be guided by the following principles. First, Washingtons approach
to North Korea should fit into a larger strategy that maintains the United
States as the most powerful and influential geopolitical player in Asia,
enabling Washington to shape the region consistent with its interests
and principles. Second, the U.S. government should be open to diplomatic
engagement with North Korea if there is a true moderation in leadership
in Pyongyang that could lead to a dismantling of nuclear weapons, or at
least to prevent a crisis from escalating. Third, while the nuclear threat is
paramount, the U.S. government cannot abandon its commitment to the
betterment of the lives of North Koreans.
More specifically, that means that the U.S. government must lead an effort
to squeeze North Koreas misbegotten revenues and bring to bear the kind
of crippling sanctions inflicted on Iran. A key component of a robust containment policy is to weaken the Kim family, which relies upon a global network of
front companies to conduct its illicit business activities. A recent Financial
Times report underscored the nature of the Kim familys business syndicate,
and several North Korean state businesses remain for the U.S. government
to target.41
The next Administration should squeeze these networks wherever they may
lead, including China. Beijing continues to be North Koreas most important
ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and energy.
China accounts for about 80 percent of North Koreas imported consumer
goods and 45 percent of its food. In 2013, trade between the two countries
grew by more than 10 percent from 2012 levels to about $6.5 billion. China is
moving decisively to control North Korean mineral resources and companies.
41

Tom Burgis, North Korea: The secrets of Office 39, Financial Times, June 24, 2015.
According to the FT, the regimes illicit operations are directed by a secretive government
organization known as Office 39, which forms joint ventures with international business
conglomerates. The Hong Kong-based Queensway Group, with ties to Chinese intelligence, is
one of the regimes largest business partners. It is a global operation with identifiable leaders
and investments that the U.S. government can take down.

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As much as 41 percent of Chinese joint ventures in the DPRK are concerned

with extractive industries.
To be sure, China is irritated with Pyongyang. It responded to the DPRKs
nuclear provocation in 2006 by temporarily freezing development projects
in North Korea, delaying aid shipments, issuing a harsh statement of criticism, canceling a large-scale trade summit, and supporting the UN Security
Council resolutions. Every time the DPRK stimulates a crisis for purposes of
extortion, extra U.S. forces flow into the Western Pacific, something clearly
not appreciated in Beijing. But the economic numbers tell a fuller story and
underscore that Chinas overriding strategic concern is to prevent regime
collapse while also stabilizing the provincial economies of Jilin and Liaoning that lie adjacent to the Chinese-DPRK border, where some two million
ethnic Koreans live. For U.S. containment policy to work, Chinas central
Communist Party organs and government officials must see North Korea as
a liability rather than a boon to these provincial governments.
A renewed policy of crippling sanctions and tracking laundered DPRK
money wherever it may lead could pose serious risks to the Chinese banking
system, thus providing an incentive for China to pressure North Korea.
A more robust containment strategy also requires bolstering extended
deterrence over South Korea. After the Cheonan attack, the ROK released
Defense Reformation Plan 307 that outlined a new doctrine of Proactive
Deterrence, according to which the ROK will carry out proportional retaliation against North Koreas conventional attacks. The U.S. government
should continue its frequent military exercises with the ROK, which are
some of the largest that the U.S. military conducts worldwide. It should
not shy away from exercising in the Yellow Sea near the coast of China, to
remind China that North Korea is a net liability.
The U.S.-ROK Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC), which mirrors the formal structure for nuclear consultations within NATO, should consider the possibility of redeploying tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea
or developing a nuclear sharing program, like that of NATO. Enhanced
containment also requires a trilateral security arrangement among the ROK,
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Japan, and the United States that would make deterrence more credible.
Unfortunately, South Korean-Japanese relations require sustained mending
before that trilateral arrangement can take solid shape.
The bottom line for extended deterrence is to rebuild U.S. defenses and
nuclear infrastructure along the lines set forth in Chapters 9 and 22. The
sine qua non of deterrence is convincing Pyongyang that the United States
has overwhelming conventional and nuclear power and is willing to use it
to defend its interests. Its ability to provide a credible deterrent is waning
under current defense budget trends and the deterioration of the U.S.
nuclear infrastructure.
A stronger containment strategy should be complemented by a renewed
focus on human rights in North Korea. The Bush Administrations human
rights policy should be renewed and expanded: Bush pressured Beijing, Seoul,
and Tokyo into accepting North Korean refugees, expedited family reunifications, and found new avenues for international aid distribution in North Korea
and for providing North Koreans with access to basic news and information.
In this latter domain, technology has significantly advanced in recent years,
opening up new options that did not exist during the Bush Administration.
Ultimately, the optimal policy to both improve the lot of North Koreans
and rollback Kims nuclear weapons program is through unification under
ROK rule. President Park Geun-hye has moved preparation for reunification
to the center of her DPRK policy. The U.S. government should work with
the South Korean leadership on its plans, and coordinate planning among
interested parties, including Japan, as well as international humanitarian
and development organizations. The next Administration should engage
in private diplomacy with Beijing on unification to overcome the kind of
active resistance that could lead to great power conflict on the peninsula.
High-level diplomacy with Beijing should aim to persuade it that the U.S.
government and those of its allies are moving decisively toward long-term
unification, and to provide an opening for China to be at the table for discussions about Koreas future.

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Part V

CHINA

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CHAPTER 15: U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Leland R. Miller

American (and other) policymakers have for years debated whether the
United States and China are destined to cooperate, compete, or fall to conflict. But the question is unhelpful, because it invariably has two distinct
answers. In the economic sphere, strong U.S.-China relations will be critical
for both countries and the worldand remain, in the aggregate, mutually
beneficial. In the security realm, however, a China that continues to view the
status quo as a constraint to its rise poses a growing threat to U.S. interests
and those of its allies. So long as this endures, geopolitics will remain much
closer to a zero-sum game.
Any constructive framework for managing U.S.-China relations must recognize and incorporate the reality of these two conflicting dynamics. Otherwise,
with the strands in constant tension, U.S. policy toward China will continue
to be mired in confusion, alternating between shows of geopolitical weakness
and hardline economic postures that do us more harm than good.
The next Administrations China policy should therefore be grounded in
two key precepts: First, U.S.-China policy should be viewed through a wider
lens that better identifies and prioritizes core American interestsand is
more assertive in protecting themrather than wasting precious resources
fighting trivial policy battles simply to appear anti-China; and second, while
Washington should continue to integrate and coordinate its economic and
security policymaking, great care must be taken not to blindly merge their
execution. This will require a disciplined approach that combines tactical
assertiveness in each area with strategic ring-fencing, forcing policy to be
judged by its effectiveness rather than by its headline-grabbing power.
Getting U.S. China policy right is more than just an academic issue. The
current Administrations inability to pick its battles wisely (and both parties
confusion over how best to wage them) has led our Asian allies to question
U.S. leadership, as well as Americas long-term commitment to regional sta-

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bility. Too often, it has also let China off the hook for serious violations of
international norms. The next Administration will have a fresh opportunity
to right this shipbut only if it comes to terms with just how badly, and
unnecessarily, we have been causing it to founder.

he starting point for developing a sound U.S.-China policy is to recognize that policy priorities should be dictated by core U.S. interests, not

perceived Chinese misbehavior. The United States cant right every Chinese

wrong, and an inability to properly identify appropriate action areas has been
a shortcoming of U.S. policy for years. However, 2015 represents an extreme
case study in policy chaos. While the roots of the problem extend far beyond
any single issue, the failings of the Obama Administrations China strategy can best be understood through its disjointed approach to two aspiring
Asian institutions: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
The AIIB, founded by China during this past year, is a multilateral investment bank created ostensibly to fund infrastructure projects across the
Asian region. While its creation partly reflects Chinas frustration with its
relatively meager influence inside global institutions such as the IMF and
World Bank, its raison dtre is far more practical: Amid both slowing exports
and faltering demand at home, China sees the AIIB as a vehicle for recycling
its huge capital surpluses abroad via development loans, with the goal of
generating greater foreign demand for Chinese goods and services.
Countering the AIIB should never have been a first-tier policy issue for
the U.S. government. First, we have no significant interest in competing
for these infrastructure opportunities, which are not objectively attractive except to a Chinese economy increasingly desperate to subsidize new
sources of demand. Second, the amount of money at play is very modest;
China is contributing just over $29 billion of the initial $100 billion capital
base, an amount substantially less than it has provided Venezuela directly
since 2008. Lastly, but most telling, China already has a long (and disappointing) track record of conducting precisely these types of activities unilaterally through its state-run policy banks. The largest of these policy

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banks, China Development Bank, issued more than a half trillion dollars in
questionable loans and grants over the past decade alone. AIIB is not a dangerous new Chinese weapon, but rather the continuation of an immensely
inefficient state-run economic strategy scrambling for new sources of growth.
While policymakers should closely monitor the soft power implications of
AIIBs activities, remarkably little of the Administrations bandwidth should
have been required for that purpose. Yet that is not how things played out.
Devoid of a framework for assessing the banks relative importance within
the overall U.S.-China relationship, the Administration went on the attack,
lashing out at close allies such as Australia, South Korea, and Britain, first
in private and then (anonymously) in the Financial Times, accusing them of
constant accommodation of China. Missing was any coherent rationale for
taking this stand, or any serious argument as to why U.S. allies should gratuitously antagonize Beijing, beyond a hazy notion of sticking it to China.
Is the U.S. government really containing Chinese power by trying (and
failing) to undermine Beijing on a regional infrastructure bank? Is this truly
an issue where U.S. power and prestige should have been invested in the
outcome? Obama Administration policy constituted a foreign policy debacle
not just because it undercut U.S. credibility and damaged our relationships
with key allies, but also because it foolishly elevated a third-order issue like
AIIB into a major foreign policy coup for Beijing. We scored on our own goal.
An even more frustrating example of the Administrations approach to
China has been its long-term disinterest in a matter of far greater importance to U.S. leadership in Asia: the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Nearly a
decade in the making, TPP is a global free-trade pact led by the United States
and 11 other nations, including Japan, Vietnam, Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Australia. Encompassing roughly 40 percent of global
output, TPP will lower tariffs in previously impenetrable Asian markets such
as Japanese agriculture and Southeast Asian services, while also establishing
rules for trade dispute resolution and the protection of intellectual property.
Few platforms could better signal a sustained U.S. commitment to Asia: U.S.
standards are the bedrock of TPP, and U.S. political and economic leadership

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are its foundation. Moreover, the hope is that TPP will ultimately serve as the
precursor to a true (U.S.-led) pan-Asia free trade area.
TPP should have been the cornerstone of the Administrations Asia strategy from day one. In 2012, when President Obama announced his pivot to
Asia, he himself noted that there cannot be such a pivot without economic
and trade underpinnings, and TPP was nearly a ready-made solution. The
geopolitical implications of TPP are similarly compelling, as the pact would
in effect create a parallel economic alliance structure intended to cement
and deepen longstanding U.S. security and defense relationships.
Until just a few months ago, however, the TPP was nowhere on this
Administrations agenda. In order to pass TPP, the White House had to first
secure Trade Promotion Authority, known as fast track, a power sought by
every President since FDR that allows him to submit a negotiated treaty to
an up-or-down vote in Congress. The White House had six full years to push
for TPA, two of which featured Democratic control in Congress and the other
four when its partner was a GOP House eager to coordinate a TPA/TPP push.
Yet not until 2015 did the Administration expend even a modicum of effort
to push it forwarda sin of omission that very nearly led to its demise. TPA
legislation passed in June on its second try, by only the slimmest of margins,
and against the fierce opposition of the Presidents own party. TPP, meanwhile, is now foundering, the expected deal-cinching July negotiation
round ending in failure after signatory countries found themselves unable
to scramble together an agreement on the now-hurried timeline the White
House pushed forward.
Why would an Administration blow U.S. prestige on a third-order issue
like AIIB while risking the Presidents own legacy by ignoring TPP for
more than half a decade? Many pundits blame politics for the TPA debacle,
despite the fact that the White House dictated both the timing and the script
for eventual engagement. Many similarly blamed a lack of so-called China
experts in the Administration for the AIIB mess. But these were not merely
political missteps. They were either massive management fiascos or, just as
likely, strategic ones.

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Whatever the sources of the failures, Asia will not wait for America to
get its act together. In 2015 alone, China has signed free-trade agreements
with both Australia and South Korea, while it continues to push forward the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a China-led trade
bloc considered a rival to TPP because it includes seven Asian countries (five
in ASEAN) that are also TPP signatories. If America does not wish to lead in
Asia, China stands ready to fill the vacuum.

s Chapter 17 argues, China has become ever more open in challenging

key elements of the existing order in Asia. And this paths trajectory

looks even more troubling to U.S. interests on the horizon, as Beijing grows
closer to declaring an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the South

China Sea, Taiwan enters a presidential election year, and Chinese cyber
hacking of U.S. companies approaches a boiling point.
To confront these challenges the U.S. government needs a revamped
approach to U.S.-China policy, but not one that stresses greater reliance on
economic and trade policy as a means of retribution. This idea, which has
been making the rounds in Congress and elsewhere, implies that such a tactic
constitutes either a less costly or more effective way to address Chinas
aggressive behavior. Both are deeply flawed assumptions, however, and to
the extent they remain unchallenged, a new Administration may mistakenly
believe it wise to forgo conventional military deterrence and instead rely
primarily on its economic toolbox for solutions.
This notion, therefore, merits a more detailed critique. Acts of economic
warfarebe they raising tariffs on Chinese goods, threatening to fling currency manipulation labels about, or barring Chinas inclusion in global trade
pactstypically represent ineffective and counterproductive U.S. policy
responses. This is so for two key reasons. First, they will boomerang in
such a way as to harm American interests as much as or more than those
of Chinawhich is certain to escalate and in any case can better mitigate
short-term damage to its state-controlled economy than we can to our less
centralized one. Second, they will not disincentivize aggressive Chinese
behavior but will almost certainly have the opposite effect. In todays world

146

China holds a comparatively stronger hand in economic matters than it

does in the security realm; by relying on economic tools to guide outcomes,
Washington would effectively be ceding leverage to Beijing over how these
disagreements are settled.
With economic warfare largely off the table, then, what type of deterrence
is appropriate? The answer is that security threats merit traditional, securityrelated solutions. If China declares an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in
international waters, the U.S. Navy should sail through it, not raise tariffs
on Chinese ships. If Chinese naval actions threaten allies such as Taiwan or
the Philippines, the U.S. government should sell state-of-the-art weaponry,
not threaten to torpedo China from trade talks. As noted in Chapter 16, the
United States retains strong advantages in the security realm, and it should
not be eager to shift the policy battlefield when conventional deterrence
continues to offer the highest ground.
Beyond the general problemthe muddying use of economics-based tactics
for security-related issuesthe most widely discussed of these tactics merit
further analysis. The idea of raising tariffs on Chinese goods is a good place
to start.
In 2013, the Blair-Huntsman Commission proposed responding to Chinese
cyber intrusions with an across the board tariff on Chinese goods, an idea
that was surprisingly seconded by a recent Council on Foreign Relations
task force charged with re-assessing U.S. policy toward China. While these
groups should be lauded for articulating an actual program of deterrence,
raising tariffs on Chinese goodsor even threatening to do sohappens to
be a spectacularly poor idea, for three major reasons.
First, the obvious: China will inevitably respond to the raising of U.S. tariffs
with exclusionary efforts of its own, harming U.S. interests and threatening
escalation to a broader trade war.
Second, the proposal betrays a flawed understanding of trade economics,
under which imports are viewed merely as gifts bequeathed to foreign countries
for good behavior rather than critical inputs to a well-functioning American

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economy. Imports such as steel, auto parts, and textilesamong many other
key inputsallow U.S. firms to produce more competitively priced end products, while cheaper consumer goods improve the quality of life for American
families. Far from helping the average American, tariffs serve as a regressive
tax on consumers that ends up hurting the poor the most.
Third, and often overlooked, this approach may actually create a Chinese
incentive for escalation. Compared to the U.S. political system, where any
tariff-raising would certainly be subject to a fierce congressional tug of war,
Chinese leaders can opt to raise tariffs or bail out injured parties with the
mere stroke of a pen. This incongruity is not lost on Beijing, meaning the
chances of miscalculation will increase if Beijings game theorists believe
that a U.S. Administration cannot make good on its threatsor match any
ensuing escalation. (After the recent debacle over TPA passage, could anyone possibly blame them?)
What about accusations of currency manipulation? Many politicians in
both parties still believe that it serves U.S. interests to label China a currency
manipulator, an argument that has become more heated in the aftermath
of Chinas modest yuan devaluation in August. But it would not serve our
interests. To begin with, we face a practical problem: There is no agreedupon way to assess the true market value of the yuan short of liberalization.
According to the Congressional Research Service, from 2005 to 2013 the yuan
appreciated 34 percent against the dollar in nominal terms and 42 percent in
real terms. At what precise point does its value become fair? The IMF itself
declared the yuan fairly valued this past May.
Furthermore, the claims linking a cheaper yuan to U.S. unemployment
are specious. Before the 1994 yuan devaluation, the U.S. jobless rate was 6.5
percent; after the devaluation, it fell steadily to below 4 percent. In 2005,
China again began to strengthen its currency, and yet the U.S. economy
deteriorated. There is no historical link between the yuans value and U.S.
unemployment levels.

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Lastly on this point, it is curious to see this argument voiced in todays

economic climate, during a time when Chinas government may be the only
major one in the world actively resisting currency wars. In an apparent
break from reality, the U.S. Treasury Department left this Junes Strategic
& Economic Dialogue heralding a new pledge by Beijing not to intervene
except when necessitated by disorderly market conditionsignoring the
fact that Chinas central bank has kept the yuan strong over the past year
only by intervening to strengthen it, a dynamic made crystal clear when such
controls were loosened in August. So what is the verdict here? Should Congress censure Beijing, or send it a fruit basket?

.S. interests lie not in punishing China by economic means but rather
in incentivizing it to improve its game. Thus, for example, Chinas com-

mand economy is nowhere close to qualifying for membership in TPP due

to the agreements high standards, and under no circumstances should the

rules be loosened in order to facilitate its inclusion. But should China, at
some future date, conduct the necessary reforms to qualify, it is in Americas
interest to keep the door ajarand there is every reason to make that clear
to the Chinese leadership.
Trade agreements like TPP are built upon U.S. standards, with U.S. political and economic leadership as their foundation; any future China membership would solidify such power structures, not undercut them. Notably, TPP
will include limited, but valuable, disciplines on state-owned enterprises
(SOEs)for example, on transparency and non-discriminationthat are
directed specifically at economies like Chinas. Bringing Beijing inside the
tent of global best practices will help American firms compete.
Moreover, even skeptics should recognize that articulating an exclusionary policy toward China invariably does more harm than good. Welcoming Chinas future participation may or may not incentivize reform, but it
would undermine Beijings paranoid narrative that TPP is intended as an
anti-China alliance, helping ease the future accession of our allies in Korea,
Taiwan, and across Southeast Asia.
That said, while broad economic warfare rarely serves U.S. interests,
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targeted economic solutionssuch as tighter export controls on sensitive

technologies or sanctions on individual companies or persons that break
U.S. lawscan serve U.S. interests. The Blair-Huntsman report offers some
excellent proposals in this regard, particularly for combating the theft of
intellectual property (IP): denying products that contain stolen IP access
to the U.S. market; restricting use of the U.S. financial system to foreign
companies that repeatedly steal IP; and revising the approval guidelines
for approval by the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) and for foreign companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges.
The U.S. government should also consider more aggressive action on subsidies and IP at the World Trade Organization (WTO), where China has a
surprisingly strong record of complying with adverse decisions. Not doing
foolish things with our economic levers does not preclude doing appropriate
and even wise things with them.

he framework articulated here represents a rather dramatic rethinking of traditional U.S.-China policy doctrine, but its application is long

overdue. Experts have been too slow to recognize that the old rhetorical
divide between China hawks and doves no longer applies readily to a relationship where U.S. economic interests can suffer greatly from ill-advised
anti-China protectionism, but U.S. geopolitical interests can suffer even
more severely from security policies that signal a lack of resolve. We urgently
need an integrated approach that emphasizes tactical assertiveness in each

of these areas but that does not blur the categories to our own detriment
namely, strategic ring-fencing. The goal should be to optimize U.S.
leverage and outcomes while refusing to allow populist or simply foolish
impulses to dictate national strategy.
The next Administrations China policy must attack this challenge head on.
America should categorically identify its core interests and act steadfastly in
their defense, while avoiding wasting political and diplomatic capital chasing
down resolution on second- and third-tier issues. Once priorities are properly
identified, America must have the discipline to respond to any aggressive
Chinese actions using the appropriate leverswhich means treating security

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threats as security issues, enforced by the U.S. military, not problems that
can be wished away into the economic realm, where they nearly always do
Americans more harm than good.

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CHAPTER 16: MILITARY COMPETITION WITH CHINA

Jacqueline Deal

The Chinese Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), while taking care not to
cross the line into outright war, is on the march. During the Obama Administration the Chinese regime has deployed and tested impressive new
platforms and weapons, from an aircraft carrier to hypersonic boost glide
missiles; conducted exercises deep in the Pacific and Indian Oceans; and
engaged in alarming cyber attacks on U.S. national security targets, from
private defense firms to the Office of Personnel Management. Meanwhile,
to seize control of island territories claimed by Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Beijing has been moving into contested
waters with commercial or paramilitary ships, backed up by naval forces. In
the South China Sea, it has even dredged up tons of sand to construct 2,000
acres of artificial land around reefs occupied by China, to enable them to
host military facilities. When Japan and the Philippines, U.S. treaty allies,
have tried to resist Chinese pressure, Beijing has responded with economic
punishment such as the suspension of their critical exports from, or imports
to, the mainland.
Taken together, these actions show that, notwithstanding the cooperative
dimensions of U.S.-China relations, China has become a strategic rival of
the United States. It is regularly and systematically challenging American
influence, partners, and norms in the Asia-Pacific through its build-up of
military capabilities, among other tools.
Until now, U.S.-China military competition has centered on the maritime
zones surrounding the mainland, from the East China Sea and the Taiwan
Strait to the South China Sea, but the PLA has recently begun to pursue
power projection at greater distances, so the field of contestation is moving into the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Given the importance of
these waterways and the other countries that surround them for global commerce and security, the next Administration has a responsibility to ensure
that the United States prevails in the competition. At stake is nothing less

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than the future of free trade, freedom of navigation, and the policy autonomy
of American allies and friends in the worlds fastest-growing economic region.
Fortunately, in many respects, the easy part of Chinas road to military
influence lies behind it now, and the challenges ahead offer opportunities for
whoever wins the White House in November 2016 to develop competitive
strategies to counter the PLAs build-up, impose costs, and direct the competition into areas that favor the United States. Specifically, the next President
should invest more in U.S. penetrating strike assets, in naval and other forces
that strengthen American influence over critical sea lines of communication,
and in augmenting or supporting the capabilities of Chinas neighbors.

he geostrategic competition that has only recently become apparent

in Washington has already been underway for several decades from

Beijings point of view. The Chinese military owes its position today to
decisions made in the early 1980s, when Deng Xiaoping opted to reject the
destructive legacy of Mao Zedong and pursue instead reform and opening

to the West. Deng was no liberal; he viewed this policy purely as a means
to ensure the Chinese Communist Partys survival at a time when the old
Soviet model was troubled, domestic instability loomed in China, and U.S.
techno-military power posed a formidable challenge. The idea was that, by
allowing in foreign money and know-how, China would grow economically
and, eventually, be able to modernize militarily. A precondition was Dengs
diagnosis of a favorable external security environment. While the United
States was far ahead of China and a clear long-term threat, Deng saw that it
harbored no aggressive intentions in the near term.
In aiming to build the PLA into a force to rival the U.S. military, Deng and
his contemporaries were quite ambitious. The Chinese army was not even
mechanized in the 1980s; its strategy was to lure enemies deep into Chinese territory and then launch guerrilla attacks. The PLA Navy (PLAN) was
struggling with coastal defense. The Air Force had largely sat out the 1979
Chinese invasion of Vietnam, as its planes lacked the range to fly into Vietnamese airspace from their bases. Nonetheless, a leading Chinese admiral,
Liu Huaqing, already envisioned a Chinese navy that would control the areas

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within the first island chainfrom Japan and Taiwan to the Philippines
and Indonesiaby 2010, and the second island chain out to Guam by
2020. Meanwhile, to close the technological gap with American and other
advanced forces, planners in Beijing adopted in 1986 the High Technology
Research and Development Plan, better known as the 863 Program
(standing for 1986, March), which yielded the space weapons and high-powered lasers that the PLA has acquired over the past decade.
After the world condemned the CCP for its crackdown at Tiananmen
Square in 1989, Deng reiterated the need to be strategically patient, or, in
his words, to hide capabilities and bide time. This impulse was reinforced
by the relatively easy American victory over Iraq in 1990-91, and by the
U.S. campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, culminating in the bombing of the
Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999experiences that demonstrated the
potency of the American militarys penetrating, highly accurate weapons.
The threat was particularly apparent in 1996, when, in the wake of a series of
Chinese missile firings over the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. government deployed
two aircraft carrier battle groups to demonstrate its commitment to Taipei.
Chinese planners responded by accelerating work on an array of missiles
capable of striking U.S. bases and forces operating in the Asia-Pacific region,
with an eye toward challenging or even precluding such deployments in the
future. By 2000, Chinas GDP was already the fifth largest in the world, so
Beijing could afford to invest not just in the ballistic and cruise missiles
themselves, but also in the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) assets that facilitate locating and tracking targets, as well as guiding
weapons to hit them. The PLA thus acquired the means to hold at risk nearby
American infrastructure and platforms, the obvious aim being to force the
United States to think twice about intervening in a conflict between China
and Taiwan or one of its other neighbors.

oubt about the willingness of U.S. forces to operate in Chinas vicinity

within range of Chinese missileshas emboldened Chinese assertiveness.

American analysts have described the modernized PLA as an anti-access/

area denial (A2/AD) force charged with, first, preventing U.S. troops from

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reaching the theater (anti-access), and then, if they somehow manage

to penetrate, denying them freedom of maneuver around the mainland
(area denial). But this was not enough. Already in the early 2000s leading
Chinese strategists were advocating that the PLA push out of its A2/AD
umbrella as far as possible. For instance, Maj. Gen. Peng Guangqian wrote in
2001 that the Chinese term that most closely approximates A2/ADactive
strategic counter attacks on exterior lines (ASCEL)means:
Do notpassively waitin Chinas border regions, near seas,
coastal areas and associated airspace to meet the enemys strike,
but instead strive to strike the enemy at the greatest distance
possible after war breaks out. To the greatest extent possible,
the war should be brought to the enemys bases, war-fighting
platforms and the enemys war-fighting places of origin, actively
striking all the forces which make up the enemys war-fighting
system.42

In other words, more than a decade ago the PLA was contemplating not
just attacks on U.S. bases and forces in the Asia Pacific, consistent with the
A2/AD notion, but also strikes on critical ports and other targets extending
all the way back to the U.S. homeland. They were arguing for such strikes
purely on the basis of the logic of modern warfare, but over the next decade
Chinas overseas interests grew to the point where long-range capabilities
also began to seem necessary to protect Beijings far-flung economic interests.
Now fast forward to May 2015, when Beijing issued its first Chinese Military
Strategy white paper. The text states that China will revise its strategy
to emphasize preparation for maritime conflict and that the PLA has been
tasked with work[ing] harder to create a favorable strategic posture, with
more emphasis on the employment of military forces and means. The sea
trials of Chinas first aircraft carrier in 2011 were an early indicator, as was
Hu Jintaos calling China a maritime power in 2012, but now the PLANs
42

Peng Guangqian, The New Expansion of the Connotations of Active Defense Thought,
in Research on China Military Strategy Issues [in Chinese], (PLA Press, 2006), cited in Anton
Lee Wishik II, An Anti-Access Approximation: The PLAs Active Strategic Counterattacks on
Exterior Lines, China Security, Issue 19, pp. 37-48.

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evolution from its previous near seas or offshore defense roles to

blue-water status has been confirmed. The white paper is also notable for
its repeated emphasis on the PLAs requirement to protect Chinas sovereignty, security, and development interests. As China is today engaged in
trade globally, its development interests could reasonably be interpreted
to cover the map from Asia to Africa, the Americas, and Europe. In other
words, the PLA must strive to become a global force.
The rationale for this transition is laid out in another authoritative publication out of Beijing, the 2013 edition of the PLA Science of Military Strategy
(SMS) textbook, which is taught at Chinese military graduate schools to
mid-career officers.43 The SMS inventories Chinas considerable overseas
interests, most of which were acquired only in the past decade. More than
60 percent of Chinas GDP now comes from trade, and 90 percent of Chinas
imports and exports travel by sea, according to the text. International waterways and straits are thus lifelines of the mainlands development, and yet,
the SMS states, They are . . . not owned by us, nor are they controlled by us,
which means that in a war, our sea transport could be cut off. This means,
in turn, that China could be deprived of critical energy resources such as
uranium and iron ore, for which Chinas foreign dependence . . . exceeds 50
percent. To redress this vulnerability, in an apparent reversal of Beijings
longstanding stated opposition to overseas bases, the textbook emphasizes
the acquisition of overseas supply points, branch points, and bases
that will facilitate the deployment of Chinese forces to protect vital transportation routes.
Mainland-based A2/AD is thus not sufficient. Rather, the PLA must be able
to operate at extended distances from the mainland, and the SMS indicates
that the new global requirements are not derived simply from the need to
protect Chinas overseas interests. They also reflect the fact that Beijing is
not worried just about the United States. Other dangerous developments
highlighted by the SMS include the growing interest of Japan and India in
43

This and subsequent points about the SMS are drawn from Jacqueline Deal, PLA Strategy
and Doctrine: A Close Reading of the 2013 Science of Military Strategy, paper presented at the
National Bureau of Asia Research, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Army War College conference,
Carlisle, PA, March 2015.

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the South China Sea, the increasing cooperation of Japan and Australia in
the Western Pacific, and Russian transfers of weapons to Chinas traditional
rivals, Mongolia, India, and Vietnam. Beijing may therefore see a global
force as a way to outflank potential hostile coalitions on its periphery.
Finally, both the white paper and the SMS lay out concrete steps that the
Chinese military must take to become proficient in ocean-going maritime
and aerospace operations. Fulfilling this guidance will take years, considerable investment, and the development of a new set of skills. The strategy
in the white paper is therefore predicated on an assessment that in the
foreseeable future, a world war is unlikely and the international situation is
expected to remain generally peaceful.
The SMS clarifies the basis of this assessment when it describes the pattern
of U.S.-China interactions as a cycle of easeintensifyease, while struggles
of containment and counter-containment, extrusion and counter-extrusion
unfold. In other words, though tensions may flare at times, Beijing does not
need to worry about a major war with the United States. Chinese strategists
are therefore confident that the PLA will enjoy the time it needs to develop
the capabilities to address its new missions.

ith Beijing having ruled out major-power war, and with the Chinese
military currently unable to fulfill the missions with which it has

been tasked, the United States enjoys an opportunity to shape the military

competition in a favorable direction during peacetime. Specifically, the next

Administration should make defense investments and authorize U.S. operational behavior designed to exploit the PLAs acknowledged vulnerabilities
and weaknesses. The rationale for such a competitive strategies approach
is that, in the absence of it, Chinese strategists are likely to build on their
strengths and pursue capabilities they have decided are optimal for the competition with the United States. But by targeting Beijings sensitive points,
Washington may be able to channel Chinese investment in other directions,
so that the focus is on defensive capabilities that are relatively less threatening to the United States, or in areas where lots of Chinese spending is
unlikely to pay off anytime soon.

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To execute such an approach, the winner in November 2016 must devote

more attention to the competition with Beijing than has been allocated
over the past decade and a half. Whatever its initial impulses toward East
Asia, the George W. Bush Administration ended up focusing mostly on the
Middle East and Southwest Asia. That focus has lingered for most of the
past 14 years. Together with Chinas economic growth, the diversion of
U.S. resources to the Global War on Terror ensured that the CCP could
implement Dengs hide and bide mantra without much difficulty. Instead
of identifying Beijing as a determined rival, Washington credited it for
contributing constructively to the war on terror. The 2013 SMS notes with
approval that China has benefited from being perceived as cooperating with
the established major powers to address global challenges. Meanwhile, the
capabilities that the United States built up to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda
were not conceived with China in mind and are mostly irrelevant from a
competitive strategies perspective.
In recognition of the troubling trends with respect to the Asia-Pacific
balance of power, the Obama Administration in 2011 announced that the
United States would pivot to the region. This would have been a positive
development if the rollout had not been bungled, and if the Administration
had actually followed through on the idea. Instead, the choice of the term
pivot led many American friends and allies to wonder about our constancy,
and they were subsequently disappointed to observe very little in the way of
new U.S. forces deployed or other commitments to the region. More recently,
the Defense Department has talked about a Third Offset and a LongRange Research and Development Planning Program, but the language is
vague, and it is difficult to tell how seriously American strengths are being
pitted against Chinese weaknesses.
A credible effort to employ competitive strategies in the competition
with China would require a deeper understanding of these weaknesses or
sensitivities, and of Chinese decision-making in general, than seems to be
available in the U.S. government. As Andrew Marshall, who pioneered the
competitive strategies approach as part of his work on the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, has written:

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One is trying, in designing competitive strategies, to shape the

overall allocation of the opponents resources over the course
of the next decade or more, having him spend more than he
otherwise would in those areas where you would prefer to have
him spend. Easily stated, but complex as well as difficult to deal
with analytically.44

Acknowledging the difficulty and complexity of the task, in general, as

noted in Chapter 17 just below, the U.S. government should be looking
to induce Chinese defense planners to sub-optimize their allocation of
resources and to focus their investment in areas where the United States
enjoys a comparative advantage. It would be helpful to direct the military
competition into domains or balance areas where the PLA has to spend extra
to cover its shortcomings, or at least spend more than the United States
expends on countermeasures that neutralize Chinas investment.
Up to this point, Beijings investments have put the United States on the
wrong side of the cost-exchange ratio, as the PLAs A2/AD weapons have
generally been cheaper than the U.S. platforms and facilities they put at risk,
and the cost of defending against these weapons exceeds their production
costs. But the business of power projection into which the PLA is now entering is more expensive than the business of anti-access and area denial, and
it will now be Chinese platforms and systems that will be operating within
range of other countries A2/AD weapons. Moreover, China is entering a
period of slower economic growth, compounded by demographic trends that
will see it get old before it gets rich. Slower growth will eventually increase
Chinas military burdenthat is, the share of national resources going to
defensemeaning that Beijing will face more difficult tradeoffs about what
capabilities to pursue.
Meanwhile, Chinas behavior around territorial disputes has generated
substantial concern from Japan to Vietnam, the Philippines, and other South
China Sea states. These countries are eager to arm themselves better and to

44

Andrew W. Marshall, Competitive StrategiesHistory and Background, unpublished

lecture, 1988.

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work more closely with the United States. The next Administration should
embrace this opportunity more fully than has the Obama Administration.
While additional research into Chinese decision-making is required
before we can be confident in our efforts to shape future Chinese behavior,
some clues about where to begin in January 2017 already exist. Beijing has
already telegraphed its sensitivities around U.S. penetrating strike assets,
the security of its seaborne imports, and the rise of hostile coalitions on its
flank. If the next Administration wants to ensure that Asia remains friendly
to free trade, freedom of navigation, and states with policy autonomy, it
would be wise to develop capabilities aimed at reinforcing these circumstances and assets. Augmenting U.S. penetrating strike assets (for example,
long-range bombers), forces that contribute to U.S. influence over critical
sea routes (including sub-surface assets, air forces, and potentially expeditionary ground forces in addition to surface ships), and the capabilities of
allies and friends in the region would seem to be a good place to start.

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CHAPTER 17: A NEW CHINA STRATEGY

Aaron L. Friedberg

As in other parts of the world, President Obama has badly misplayed Americas
hand in Asia. Serious as they undoubtedly are, however, Washingtons
recent tactical missteps, inept messaging, and fluctuating attention are
only aspects of a larger problem. The fact is that the entire U.S. approach to
dealing with Asia and, in particular, with China, is outdated, dysfunctional,
and increasingly dangerous. If the next President does not re-examine the
assumptions on which present policies are based and initiate major course
corrections, he or she will face further erosion in American power and influence and a rising risk of confrontation and armed conflict.
The United States needs a new China strategy, one that is more forthright
in acknowledging the extent and severity of the challenge posed by Beijings
growing strength and broadening ambitions, more forceful and determined
in defending U.S. interests and values, and more skillful and farsighted in
integrating all of the instruments of American national power and working
with like-minded friends and allies.

ith occasional variations in tone and emphasis, successive U.S.

Administrations have pursued a broadly similar, two-part strategy

toward China for a least the past quarter century. First and most obviously,
the United States has engaged the Chinese government, and the Chinese

people, through a mix of summits and dialogues, trade and investment,

educational, scientific and cultural cooperation, and people-to-people
exchanges. The aims of this half of American strategy, in turn, have been
twofold. On the one hand, the United States has sought to encourage China
to become what the George W. Bush Administration referred to as a responsible stakeholder in the existing liberal international order, causing its
leaders to see their interests as lying in maintaining and strengthening that
order rather than seeking to fundamentally alter or overthrow it. On the
other hand, U.S. policymakers have also harbored the hope that, in time, by
promoting the growth of a new middle class, strengthening civil society, and
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spreading ideas about the virtues of accountable government, a freer press

and an independent judiciary, engagement would strengthen tendencies
toward political liberalization within China itself.
While engaging China across a variety of fronts, Washington over the past
two decades has also exerted increasing efforts to balance Beijings growing
power. This dimension of American strategy, too, has had several constituent
parts, including reinforcing U.S. forward-deployed forces, strengthening
relationships with traditional allies like Japan, Australia, and the Philippines,
and working to build new quasi-alliance ties to others in Asia (such as India
and Singapore) that share concerns about the possible implications of Chinas rapid rise for their security. The purpose of all these activities has been
to preserve stability, deter aggression, counter attempts at coercion, and
buy time for engagement to work its soothing and ultimately transformative
effects on Beijing.
In the past several years a number of troubling events and emerging trends
have combined to raise questions about the efficacy and continued viability
of both halves of American strategy. Thanks in no small measure to its ability
to access U.S. markets, capital, and technology, China has grown far richer
and stronger since the end of the Cold War. Instead of growing more liberal, however, its politics have become more repressive and more militantly
nationalistic. Following his elevation to the top leadership posts in late 2012,
Xi Jinping moved to strengthen the Party-states grip on society, cracking
down on dissent, further tightening controls on the internet and the activities of non-governmental organizations, and seeking to stem the spread of
subversive ideas in Chinas universities and culture. As part of this effort,
Xi has initiated an ideological campaign that emphasizes the importance of
standing up to foreign foes in order to reestablish Chinese greatness.
Even as it seeks to consolidate its power at home, the CCP regime has
become more open in challenging key elements of the existing order in Asia.
Chinas increasingly forceful attempts to assert its claims over most of the
waters and resources off its coasts are only the most visible manifestation
of this tendency. Beijing has also intensified its longstanding opposition to

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U.S. alliances, arguing that these are not simply archaic manifestations of an
outdated Cold War mentality but a dangerous, destabilizing influence. Xis
statements to the effect that Asias affairs should be left to the people of
Asia make clear his vision for a region in which Americas presence and influence have dramatically diminished and in which China will finally be able to
emerge as the preponderant power. Nor is this merely a matter of empty
talk and wishful thinking. In recent years Beijing has set out to build a set
of interlocking political institutions, trade agreements, banks, and massive
infrastructure development projects that would put it at the center of a new
Eurasian order, one dominated by Chinas influence, serving its interests,
and operating according to its rules.
Engagement has thus far failed to transform China into a status quo state,
still less a liberal democracy. Meanwhile, since the early 1990s, the dramatic
expansion of the nations military capabilities, fueled by its rapid economic
growth, has made balancing an ever more costly and challenging task. Chinas
nuclear force modernization programs have begun to raise questions about
the long-term viability of Washingtons extended deterrent guarantees. At
the same time, as discussed in Chapter 16, Beijings increasingly sophisticated and capable anti-access/area denial network of sensors and missiles
is raising doubts about the ability of the United States to defend its allies
by projecting conventional military power into the Western Pacific. At the
lower end of the spectrum of possible future conflicts, Chinas growing air,
naval, and maritime patrol forces are also giving it new options for enforcing its territorial claims by sustaining a military presence in the waters
and airspace off its coasts. Beijings interest in acquiring aircraft carriers
and its building of small forward bases on man-made islands offer further
evidence of its intentions in this regard.
Chinas leaders appear at this point to be motivated by a combustible mix
of arrogance and insecurity. Following the onset of the global financial crisis
in 2008, many Chinese observers concluded that, even as their own country
continued on its steep upward climb, the United States had entered into a
period of accelerated and likely irreversible relative decline. Some in the
leadership no doubt retain a healthy respect for American resilience, and
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Washingtons talk of a pivot to Asia in 2011 and 2012 may initially have
given them pause. But the fact that Beijing has become more rather than
less assertive in the past three years suggests that Xi Jinping and his colleagues are not impressed by the Obama Administrations proclamations
of resolve. At the same time, however, Xis crackdowns on dissent and corruption and his efforts to implement reforms aimed at sustaining economic
growth suggest he is well aware that the regime faces rising challenges to its
legitimacy and continued rule. This awareness has no doubt been heightened
by public unhappiness over the recent bursting of Chinas stock market bubble. A more aggressive external posture is a way of locking in gains against a
distracted and weakened opponent while at the same time rallying domestic
political support through the use of nationalist rhetoric and showy displays
of military prowess. Especially if Chinas growth slows sharply, such behavior is likely to become more common.
These worrisome tendencies have been visible for some time, but it is
only in the past two or three years that their importance has come to be
widely recognized. As a result, albeit somewhat belatedly, a debate over the
adequacy and future of U.S. China strategy has finally commenced. While a
complete analysis is beyond the scope of this essay, three positions in the
current debate warrant brief discussion.45
Some observers (and, in particular, many professional China hands
and former government officials) argue that there is no need for anything
more than minor, tactical adjustments in U.S. policy. In this view, reports
of increased Chinese assertiveness and an impending shift in the balance of
regional military power are greatly exaggerated. Moreover, even if it has not
yet produced desired changes in the character of Chinas domestic political
system, engagement has created a strong confluence of interest between
Washington and Beijing. Rather than threatening this convergence with talk
of possible conflict and needless efforts to further widen the already substantial gap in military power that separates China from the United States
and its allies, American policymakers should rededicate themselves to dia45
For more details, see Aaron L. Friedberg, The Debate Over U.S. China Strategy, Survival
57:3 (June-July 2015).

164

logue and the pursuit of mutually beneficial cooperation.46

Adherents of the enhanced engagement approach understate the severity
of the challenge posed by an increasingly capable and ambitious China. By
contrast, those who favor what can only be labeled a policy of appeasement
exaggerate the imminence and inevitability of Chinas gaining regional military superiority while at the same time underestimating the likely extent
of its aims should it succeed in doing so. In recent essays, several scholars
have suggested that the United States strike a grand bargain with China,
accommodating its growing power, granting it a sphere of influence, and
acceding to its wishes on at least some key issues, in particular the fate of
Taiwan.47 Putting aside the moral and political objections to such a policy,
this approach assumes that China will be able to sustain its present upward
trajectory, something that is by no means obvious. Nor is it evident why, if
Beijing believes its power will continue to grow, it should accept comparatively minor adjustments in the status quo that would still permit the United
States to retain its position as the dominant regional player.
Finally in this regard, some analysts make a case for a return to something
resembling a Cold War-style strategy of containment. If engagement has
empowered and emboldened Beijing without taming or transforming it, then
perhaps the United States should greatly constrict its economic dealings with
China and accelerate efforts to subvert the current regime through political
warfare, while pouring vastly increased resources into its own armed forces
and mobilizing its friends and allies to do the same.48
As with appeasement, although for different reasons, trying to shift to
a strategy of outright containment at this point would be premature and
self-defeating. Critics warn that an unremitting hardline approach risks creating a self-fulfilling prophecy, pushing Beijing to adopt a more openly hostile
46

See, for example, Jeffrey A. Bader, Changing China Policy: Are We In Search of Enemies?
Brookings China Strategy Paper no. 1 (June 2015).
47
See Charles L. Glaser, A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? International Security 39:4 (Spring
2015), pp. 49-90; Michael D. Swaine, Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific:
The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power, Carnegie Endowment, April 20, 2015.
48
Making the case for what he calls containment lite is Joseph A. Bosco, Americas Asia
Policy: The New Reality, The Diplomat, June 23, 2015.

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and aggressive posture more quickly than might otherwise have been the
case. Even if worsening relations and intensified competition are inevitable, many U.S. friends and allies (and significant portions of the American
public and the nations elites) are not yet convinced of it. For this reason,
and because of the vast economic interests at stake, political support for
containment is presently lacking, both at home and abroad.
If enhanced engagement, appeasement, and containment are all non-starters, the most plausible alternative is better balancing. Such an approach
follows from a recognition that, after more than two decades, current
policy has failed to achieve its objectives. Rather than making slow but steady
progress toward liberalization, Chinas domestic political system has mutated
into a new and, to date, evidently quite resilient form of authoritarianism,
one that combines the dynamism of the market, the repressive capacities
of a determined, brutal, and technologically sophisticated state, and the
mass mobilizing potential of nationalist propaganda. At the same time, far
from gradually accommodating itself to the rules and constraints of the
existing international system, Beijing now seeks to alter it in significant ways.
The character of Chinas domestic regime and the nature of its external
behavior are linked. Any rising power would seek a greater say in the affairs
of its region and the wider world, but an authoritarian China does so in ways
that reflect its domestic insecurity, contempt for liberal principles, and irreducible suspicion toward the country that Beijing regards (not without reason)
as the current systems primary architect and beneficiary.
This assessment has important implications for the ways in which U.S.
policymakers define American objectives. In the near term, they will have
little choice but to frame their goals in largely defensive terms, doing what is
necessary to protect an open regional order and strengthening the U.S. position on which it rests, even at the cost of heightened tensions with Beijing.
In the somewhat longer run, the evolution of Chinas domestic political
system cannot be a matter of indifference to American strategists. While
U.S. policymakers may have been overly optimistic in assessing Chinas
developmental trajectory, they were right to emphasize the importance of

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the character of its regime, and not only for the well-being of its people.
If China continues to grow richer and stronger but remains under oneparty authoritarian rule, the prospects for genuine accommodation with
the United States or other democratic powers will dwindle, while the challenges to U.S. interests and to regional stability will intensify. Instead of
downplaying the gap in values that separates the two regimes, Washington
needs to find effective ways to reintroduce the topics of human rights and
political liberty into its bilateral exchanges with Beijing, and to reinvigorate its efforts to encourage tendencies toward meaningful reform when
these reemerge, as they inevitably will.
With these ends in view, the most urgent task confronting the next
Administration will be to bolster the balancing side of the strategic portfolio: taking additional steps to deter aggression or attempts at coercion by
preventing further erosion in the regional balance of military power. This
requires, first and foremost, blunting and countering the PLAs A2/AD capabilities. Even in a severe crisis, Chinas leaders must never be deluded into
thinking that they have the option of launching a disarming conventional
first strike against U.S. and allied forces and bases in the Western Pacific. In
conjunction with friends and allies, Washington also needs to enhance its
capacity for countering Beijings territorial claims by conducting continuous
presence and freedom of navigation operations through contested waters
and airspace. The two Pacific powers are now engaged in a protracted military competition, one in which, for the moment, China has the initiative and
the United States is seeking cost-effective ways to respond. While bolstering
deterrence, American planners need to act so as to shift that rivalry away
from areas that play to Chinese strengths (such as mass producing conventional ballistic missiles) and back into those domains (such as undersea
warfare) where the United States and its allies are likely to have enduring
technical and operational advantages.
Intensified balancing must be accompanied by adjustments in engagement.
American policymakers should continue to seek cooperation with China in
those discrete areas where it may be possible, but they need to take a realistic,
transactional approach and not succumb to the pleasing illusion that more
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dialogue with the current regime, perhaps coupled with a few well-timed
concessions, will help build trust, create a common strategic narrative,
or construct a Pacific community of convergent interests.49
As regards the economic dimension of engagement (see Chapter 15), Washington must beware the temptation to use economic instruments to compensate for a lack of options in other domains (imposing trade sanctions in
retaliation for cyber espionage against government computer networks,
for example). At the same time, American policymakers must act to ensure
that economic policy serves the larger purposes of national strategy. China
is not just another trading partner; it is a geopolitical rival and potential
military opponent of the United States that has bent and often broken the
rules of the international trading system to achieve its own economic and
strategic ends by (among other measures) subsidizing exports, restricting
imports and stealing technology on a truly massive scale. Beijings burgeoning
network of free-trade agreements also threatens to divert trade at U.S. expense.
In addition to pursuing its own free-trade agreements with friends and
allies in Asia and Europe, the United States can narrow its overall trade deficit (and reduce its indebtedness to China) by taking full advantage of the
opportunities presented by the revolution in domestic energy production
to boost exports while adjusting its macroeconomic policies to reduce the
long-term imbalance between national savings and investment. But such
broad-gauge measures must be accompanied by more specifically targeted
policies designed to restrict Beijings access to strategically sensitive technologies and stem the hemorrhaging of intellectual property by imposing
costs on Chinese entities that have thus far paid no price for their activities.

espite its evident importance, Americas longstanding, mixed approach

to dealing with China was not the product of a coherent, comprehensive

strategic planning process, nor has it ever been the subject of a serious, presidential-level interagency review. Instead the various elements of U.S. strategy emerged separately and evolved largely independently over time. While

49
On the latter two concepts see Kevin Rudd, U.S.-China 21: The Future of U.S.-China Relations
Under Xi Jinping (John F. Kennedy School of Government, April 2015), p. 24; and Henry A.
Kissinger, Avoiding A U.S.-China Cold War, Washington Post, January 14, 2011.

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the resulting amalgam turned out to be tolerably coherent and was arguably
adequate for a time, this is clearly no longer the case.
The persistence of present policy owes more to inertia than to deliberate
choice. Whoever is elected President in November 2016 should therefore
begin with a frank assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the current
approach and conduct an open-minded examination of the potential costs,
benefits and risks of the available alternatives. This process could usefully
be modeled on the 1953 Solarium Project, in which the newly elected Eisenhower Administration organized teams of experts to explore the economic,
military, and diplomatic dimensions of three candidate strategies for the
conduct of relations with the Soviet Union.50 If history is any guide, the
opening months of a new presidency will offer the best opportunity for a
thorough, thoughtful strategic review. The alternative is to wait until a crisis
shatters prevailing assumptions, setting off a scramble for hastily contrived
and potentially ill-considered options.

50
Regarding Solarium, see Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: How
Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War Strategy (Oxford University Press, 1998) and William B.
Pickett, ed., George F. Kennan and the Origins of Eisenhowers New Look: An Oral History of Project
Solarium (Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, 2004).

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Part VI

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

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CHAPTER 18: CONNECTING ECONOMICS

AND SECURITY
Laurence Zuriff

The Cold Wars end during the 1989-91 period, whatever else it meant and
did, ignited a massive transformation of the global economy that, accompanied by dramatic if pent-up technological change, came to be known generically as globalization. Like all great changes, this one produced both discrete
events and shockwaves. Thus, by 1998 the Peoples Republic of China had
taken possession of Hong Kong, one of the worlds leading financial centers;
the Asian currency crisis, followed shortly by the Russian debt crises, had
roiled all major world capital markets. The latter toppled the government of
Boris Yeltsin, bringing Vladimir Putin to power. To capture the essence of the
still-swirling shift, one scholar coined the term geo-economics to suggest
that global economic relations would drive international politics in a way
that military power had done heretofore.
While the shift seemed to many to be historically singular, it was not so.
Here is how the dean of American grand strategy, Alfred Thayer Mahan,
described what he saw at the turn of the previous century:
The unmolested course of commerce, reacting upon itself,
has contributed also to its own rapid development, a result
furthered by the prevalence of pure economical conception of
national greatness .This, with the vast increase in rapidity of
communications, has multiplied and strengthened the bonds
knitting the interests of nations to one another, till the whole
now forms an articulated system, not only of prodigious size and
activity, but of an excessive sensitiveness, unequalled in former
agesThe preservation of commercial and financial interests
constitutes now a political consideration of the first importance,
making for peace and deterring from war.51
51
Alfred Mahan, Considerations Governing the Dispositions of Navies, in Retrospect and
Prospect: Studies in International Relations, Naval and Political (Little Brown & Company, 1902),
pp. 143-44.

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What was true by the end of 1991 is that a geopolitical landscape dominated by two competing economic systems had begun ineluctably to merge
into one system of competing economies, all depending on the architecture
devised and managed mainly by the United States during the Cold War.
No one should look nostalgically on the Cold War era, but the new dispensation has created a vastly more complicated set of policy challenges
concentrated at the intersection of economic and strategic domains. In
virtually every current national security challenge, international economic
considerations are playing critical and in some cases decisive roles. Despite
this profound shift, U.S. strategy continues to take an ad hoc approach to
applying economic power to national security interests. To leverage our
strengths and avoid undermining our long-term competitive position, the
next Administration needs to conduct a strategic assessment of the intersection of economics and national security policy and how best to reorganize the institutions tasked to advance American interests.

t the end of World War II, the United States made a concerted effort
to shape the postwar economic landscape. U.S. statesmen quickly

established the structure of monetary policy, finance, and trade that its
allies would employ to reconstruct thriving economies. Bretton Woods and
its institutions, the IMF and the International Bank of Reconstruction and

Development (eventually folded into the World Bank), established the U.S.
dollar as the free worlds reserve currency. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) usurped the UNs attempt at an International Trade
Organization to shape the rules of international commerce. These global
institutions became critical components in forming strong alliance bonds
that tolerated and encouraged the creation of highly competitive economies
that shared a common national security purpose.
The Soviets balked at the U.S. effort. Its representatives walked out of
Bretton Woods in 1945 and later refused participation in the Marshall Plan.
By the end of the 1940s, two independent economic systems were in place:
the Soviet command system and the free market U.S. system. The two systems did not directly compete economically but sought to exploit their ben-

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efits to compete politically and militarily with the other. The Soviet decision
to detach itself from the U.S.-led economic system greatly simplified both
the economic and the national security dimensions of U.S. containment
strategy. The West could compete in its own economic sphere among allies
without undermining a cohesive national security strategy against its common adversaries.
This separation allowed the U.S. government to construct the physical
infrastructure needed to support both its military strategy and the global free
market economic system that served to enhance the wealth and economic
capacity of the United States, its allies, and its friends. The U.S. Navy guaranteed safe conduct of international commerce. Allied governments helped
foster uniform trading policies that determined elements as mundane as the
size of shipping crates and protected Western technological advancements
through export control regimes such as CoCom. Led by the United States, the
West vastly expanded the deployment of undersea cable and satellites to
facilitate communication for both economic and military objectives. The U.S.
government developed global navigational tools such as Loran and later GPS,
and eventually standardized information-based communication through
the deployment of the Internet Protocol. With little financial or commercial
incentive to deviate from the free market economic system, the United States
and its allies could remain confident that any economic differences would
not undermine national security.
This bifurcation offered still other advantages to national security planning. Bureaucratic institutions could focus on either national security or
economic considerations. The U.S. commercial and military supply chains
remained mostly within the U.S. alliance system. Strict export control
regimes prevented the diffusion of sensitive technologies. The core value-added elements of Western economic might remained securely within
our national security sphere of influence. If we were protecting our allies, we
were also protecting our economic supply-lines. Although oil posed challenges, the dollar remained OPECs transaction currency, and petro-dollars
were invested largely in U.S. assets, benefiting American economic prosperity. The Soviets offered no viable alternative. They could not exert leverage
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over the conduct of economic affairs in the West.

By the 1980s, both the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China
were forced to recognize the futility of their economic model. In 1990, the
U.S. alliance system represented nearly 75 percent of total global GDP, a
percentage vastly larger than its respective share of global population.
More importantly, the pace of technological change in the West suggested
that, over time, the gap would grow even further. The long-term ability of
the Communist state-controlled economies to compete militarily, short of
nuclear war, would continue to atrophy without a radical economic adjustment. The only alternative available to the communist bloc was to join that
which they had rejected 45 years earlier.
Former U.S. adversaries quickly joined the economic architecture the
United States created. They accepted the U.S. dollar as the primary reserve
currency and the currency of global trade. They sought entry to the major
trade and economic institutions that helped manage international economic
activity, including the G7, GATT, WTO, IMF, and the World Bank. Our former
adversaries also adopted our information architecture to power their economies and compete with ours. The United States gained clear advantages from
this adoption, but it also created long-term economic and strategic challenges
that increasingly bleed into the conduct of U.S. national security policy.
Despite the shift in the economic balance toward former U.S. adversaries,
the United States remains in an enviable security and economic position.
The U.S. dollar dominates global trade and finance transactions. The size,
liquidity, and openness of U.S. capital markets are unparalleled. We have
the most favorable demographic trend in the developed world. Our natural resource position, especially when including access to food and water,
outpaces most of our major economic competitors. International economic
institutions that the U.S. government helped to create, such as the G-20,
World Bank, IMF, and WTO, continue to play central roles in preserving the
rules of conduct for international trade and finance. Our military is the only
power capable of protecting the architecture constructed to facilitate the
unencumbered flow of money, goods, services, and information globally.

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Most nations and economic actors are content to free-ride on the international economic system the United States constructed. But we should expect
current and future adversaries to challenge that system if they believe doing
so will serve their economic or national security position. We should pursue
a strategy that encourages the former and deters the latter.

o ensure that United States sustains its competitive advantage, the next

Administration needs to conduct a long-overdue strategic assessment of

the impact that economic and commercial activity now has on the conduct of

foreign policy. This assessment needs to certify that we are using effectively
the full panoply of tools available to us. It should start by recognizing four
key elements of U.S. international economic power and assessing the risk to
those assets to either external challenges or internal misuse or neglect.
The first of these is the dominance of the U.S. dollar in the conduct of
global trade and finance (roughly 80 percent of trade finance, 40 percent of
international payments, and 65 percent of foreign exchange reserves are
conducted or denominated in U.S. dollars). The second is the size, liquidity, and openness of our capital markets. The third is the key role international economic institutions such as the G-20, World Bank, the IMF, and
the WTO play in preserving the rules of conduct for international trade and
finance, as well as the vital role the United States plays in these institutions.
The fourth is the physical, financial, and information architecture that the
United States has constructed to facilitate the unencumbered flow of money,
goods, services, and information.
The next Administration should also conduct an assessment of the
strengths and weaknesses of our own economic position and those of our
potential adversaries. Many pundits have a tendency to overestimate our
weaknesses and the strengths of our competitors. For example, when the
Cold War ended, conventional wisdom held that Japan would prove a longterm economic juggernaut. In the end however, Japan Inc.s focus on strong
state-managed industrial policy and an export-focused economic strategy
created profound deficiencies masked by top-line economic data.
It is also critical to understand that nations have different perspectives on
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global economic competition and the risks and challenges such competition
creates. Chinas current economic model, which in many ways resembles
Japans, puts China in more direct competition with Asian neighbors such
as Vietnam and the Philippines than it does with the United States for share
of the worlds source of low-cost labor. If Chinas economic growth atrophies, as recent events seem to suggest it will, this decline may create more
tension with Chinas main economic competitors and geographic neighbors,
exacerbating regional security concerns.
The assessment must also identify the opportunities and risks associated
with conducting U.S. foreign policy in an integrated economic system. The
bifurcation of bureaucratic domains of expertise between economic and
national security priorities is no longer optimal. For instance, the use of
financial sanctions by the Treasury Departments Office of Terrorist Financing and Intelligence to isolate bad actors from the international system was
an ingenious bureaucratic innovation made possible by the dominant U.S.
position and the greater integration of the global economy.
The Treasury Department used authorizations enabled by Section 311
of the Patriot Act to coerce commercial and financing entities (foreign and
domestic) to comply with U.S. financial sanctions or risk losing access to the
largest and most liquid capital market in the world. The U.S. government
has applied these sanctions against myriad bad actors, including specific
individuals, companies, industries, and rogue states such as Iran and North
Korea. Originally developed by the Bush Administration, the tool eventually
became President Obamas favorite noncombatant command.52
The effectiveness of Section 311 sanctions depends on the dollars
remaining the worlds major reserve currency and the preferred currency
of international trade. This ensures that nearly all financial transactions
(including those in crypto currencies) ultimately dollar clear (convert into
dollars from a foreign currency). Dollar clearing assures that virtually all significant international transactions will hit a U.S.-regulated banking entity,

52
David E. Sanger, Global Crises Put Obamas Strategy of Caution to the Test, New York
Times, March 16, 2014.

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thus giving the United States unique insight on global economic activity.
The U.S. government, through the Treasury Department, uses this information in coordination with amenable governments to coerce economic actors
to abide by U.S. sanctions or lose access to its capital markets. As long as
sanctions are targeted at economic entities with a limited economic footprint and are perceived to be legitimate targets of concern, global financial
institutions can be easily persuaded. As targets move up the commercial
value chain, the effectiveness of economic coercion diminishes.53
The U.S. government is able to inflict costly economic damages on smaller
targets at very little cost (compliance costs fall on commercial not government entities). But as we have seen with Russia, economic reality often
intrudes on the viability of this weapon. U.S. and European exposure to Russian oil, gas, titanium, space lift, and financial holdings of Russian bonds
restrain the application of financial sanctions, limiting their impact and
potentially sending a signal of weakness. Furthermore, since these sanctions
rely on the acquiescence of non-U.S. entities, financial sanction regimes are
very difficult to snap-back. Critical economic entities can hide behind the
fig leaf of UN policy, arms control agreements, or domestic laws.
Overuse of these coercive measures also risks undermining financial sanctions effectiveness or perhaps even undermining long-term U.S.
national security interest. Maintaining the dominant role of the U.S. dollar and the global money networks benefits the United States economically
and also enables financial sanctions, but the application of this architecture to enforce sanctions discipline erodes confidence in those networks
and encourages efforts to circumvent them. Crypto currencies are one such
attempt, but so too are efforts by states such as China and Russia to develop
alternative money-exchange networks. We should also expect to see others
attempt to deploy this economic weapon against U.S. friends. Pro-Palestinian groups, for instance, petitioned SWIFT in 2014 to de-SWIFT Israel.
SWIFT refused, arguing that they had no such authority, but implied that
they would have to comply with EU law if so required. Still others may seek
53 For an in-depth analysis of Section 311, see Juan Zarate, Treasurys War: The Unleashing of
a New Era of Financial Warfare (PublicAffairs, 2013).

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to use alternative approaches to counter U.S. economic sanctions, such as

cyber attacks on U.S. economic interests (see Chapter 20).
The increase in cyber attacks is a costly problem for almost all businesses,
especially financial institutions. Given the asymmetric use of digital media
for conducting commercial and financial transactions in developed economies, the United States and its traditional allies are far more vulnerable to
economic cyber attacks. The government cannot solve this problem without
the support of commercial entities. The U.S. government, therefore, needs
to make fundamental adjustments to the way it views this challenge. For
instance, the Justice Departments focus on the criminal and litigious element of cyber attacks has stymied private-public cooperation, which in turn
has complicated identifying and undermining attacks. U.S. law needs to
establish effective safe-harbor provisions to ensure strong private-public
cooperation on cyber security.
The U.S. government should also evaluate the use of its Article I powers
under the Constitution to issue Letters of Marque and Reprisal. While allowing outright privateering is unwise, effectively deputizing, incentivizing,
and managing the private sector to hack back not only to block attacks but
to force individuals, groups, or states that condone hacking to pay a price
deserves consideration.
The next Administration should also evaluate rescinding the Obama
Administrations decision to endorse the Montevideo Statement on the
Future of Internet Cooperation in the wake of the Snowden debacle. Further
internationalization of internet governance does not serve U.S. national
security interests.
Financial sanctions and cyber concerns underscore the changing nature
of the private sector in the post-Cold War era. Private companies now have
extensive business ties with countries whose national security interests
differ materially from those of the United States. U.S. companies often see
greater growth opportunities outside traditional U.S. spheres of influence,
and many consider themselves post-national entities, not necessarily U.S.
corporations, thus undermining the symbiotic relationship between eco-

178

nomic and security institutions of the Cold War. The termination of many
CoCom restrictions allowed greater technology diffusion and manufacturing know-how. Large and critical portions of the U.S. commercial and
national security supply chain, including critical raw materials and finished
electronic goods such as semiconductors, are now located outside the traditional U.S. alliance network. This increasing globalization will likely create
opportunities as well as challenges to national security planning in times
of conflict and crisis. Understanding supply-chain vulnerabilities, the cash
cycle of global trade, and the nature of sovereign debt funding will become
increasingly important in determining when we or others are best advantaged or disadvantaged to exploit economic leverage to achieve national
security objectives.

unction and structure are co-dependent. Hence the roles, responsibilities, and domains of expertise of many government departments and

agencies must evolve to align themselves with a changing environment.

This evolution should occur from the top down with an evaluation of the
way the National Security Council integrates economic considerations. It
should start with the symbolic gesture of making the Treasury Secretary a
statutory member of the NSC. The President should also restore the Eisenhower-era National Security Planning Board that integrates input from a
broader set of departments, such as Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture,
into national security policy planning. This will likely prove more effective
than a dual-hatted NSC-NEC deputy at providing the President with the
necessary understanding of how economic and commercial considerations
affect national security policy and vice versa.
Given the evolution and integration of the global economic framework
over the past quarter century, the next U.S. Administration needs to lay out a
strategy for preserving U.S. economic preeminence. That strategy will need
to better coordinate our economic and national security objectives and
capabilities. The goal remains the same: secure the economic prosperity
of the United States through the benefits derived from free and open commerce. But the methods require adjustment. The United States has made
an exceptional investment over the past 70 years to ensure a dynamic and
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secure global economy. As Mahan observed 113 years ago, The preservation
of commercial and financial interests [is] now a political consideration of
the first importance. Conducting a realistic and open assessment of our
economic position will help the U.S. government construct a strategy to sustain the value of our investment and ensure that our policy is also deterring
from war.

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CHAPTER 19: THE TRADE AGENDA

Clay Lowery & John Herrmann

As demonstrated by Congress recent consideration of legislation to grant

the President Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), the Executive Branchs
negotiation of free trade agreements continues to be politically contentious.
In the end, however, an overwhelming majority of both House and Senate
Republicans supported the legislation to provide TPA to both President
Obama and his successor.
Congressional approval of the TPA legislation provides an opportunity
for the next Administration in January 2017, particularly if it is a Republican
one with support in Congress, to pursue a robust agenda of expanding trade
and investment opportunities for the United States that pursues three major
objectives. The first of these objectives is to promote economic growth and
American jobs (about 20 percent of American jobs are supported by trade,
and trade-related jobs pay on average 18 percent more than non-trade jobs).
The second is to level the playing field for American businesses, investors,
workers, and farmers, as the United States is already one of the most open
markets in the world. The third is to use trade and investment agreements as
tangible economic tools to advance foreign policy objectives by deepening
alliances, enabling the U.S. government to write the rules of the global economy and act as a counterbalance to other countries economic diplomacy.
These three objectives can be achieved by working with willing partners
to create enforceable rules to improve market access, protect investors, limit
market-distorting government subsidies, create more open government
procurement practices, improve food and product safety, and establish better standards for the treatment of workers, the environment, and intellectual property.

ecently enacted TPA legislation provides a six-year grant of authority.

The next President, therefore, will not have to spend significant politi-

cal capital upfront, but will instead be able to pursue an aggressive trade and

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investment liberalizing agenda starting on Inauguration Day. Some of that

agenda is already in train; others parts will need to be devised and launched.
But in addition to discrete initiatives, it is worth noting that the day-to-day
work of ensuring the proper implementation of such agreements and the
enforcement of existing rules must not be ignored if the next Administration has any chance of maintaining (and, hopefully, increasing) support for
a robust cross-border trade and investment agenda.
As noted, several negotiations are currently underway, and these provide a
foundation for an incoming Administration to build upon. Perhaps the most
significant of these is the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). First launched by
President George W. Bush in 2008, the TPP negotiations seek to conclude a
free trade agreement involving 11 countries in Asia and Latin America that
already serve as a destination for over 40 percent of total U.S. exports and
85 percent of U.S. agricultural exports.54 As described in Chapter 17, this
agreement also places the United States much closer to the center of Asian
economic issues and is a counter to Chinas growing economic presence.
The Obama Administration hopes to conclude the TPP negotiations within
the next few months, which seems probable, and to secure congressional
approval of implementing legislation by early 2016. It is possible, however,
that the TPP implementing legislation will not be approved by Congress
prior to the end of President Obamas term of office.55 In such a circumstance
(and assuming the next Administration agrees with the negotiated TPP text),
a top priority should be to work with Congress to implement the TPP.
Also going forward now are negotiations with the European Union (EU)
on a Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). EU member states represent the second largest export market for the United States,
one of the largest sources of direct investment into the United States, and
54
The eleven are Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru,
Singapore, and Vietnam.
55
The George W. Bush Administration concluded free trade agreements with Colombia, Korea,
and Panama, but was unable to secure Congressional approval of legislation to implement those
agreements prior to the conclusion of the Presidents term of office. The Obama Administration,
after making modest changes to the agreements, worked with Congress to pass implementing
legislation in 2011. Similarly, negotiations on NAFTA were concluded at the end of President
George H.W. Bushs Administration while congressional approval was secured during President
Clintons Administration.

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many of our most critical foreign policy allies in the worldfor example, the
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Poland. Tariffs on goods exported
between the United States and European Union are already very low, with
notable exceptions in agricultural products and some industrial sectors.
This means that the most significant benefits from this trade agreement
will be achieved through greater regulatory cooperation. Many economists
believe the quantitative impact of such an agreement would be substantial,
but negotiating such an agreement between two parties with highly sophisticated regulatory regimes will be extremely challenging. Despite a plethora of public statements pledging a desire to complete the TTIP negotiations during 2016, negotiations will almost certainly carry over to the next
Administration. This will provide it with an opportunity to have a substantive impact on the negotiations, including in areas such as investor protections, financial services, the internet, energy, and agriculture.56
Also ongoing are several negotiations underpinned by the rules and structure
of the multilateral system embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO).
The most aspirational of these agreements is reinvigorating and concluding
the Doha Development Round, which began in 2001 and has essentially been
dormant since 2008. While there appears to be little hope in the short term
for an ambitious conclusion of this negotiation, the U.S. government should
remain actively engaged at the WTO given its importance throughout the
entire global trading system.
Other plurilateral negotiations involving a subset of WTO member
countries that are like-minded in advancing a particular trade liberalization agenda appear to have greater prospects. One is the Trade in Services
Agreement (TISA). The TISA negotiations, launched in 2013, seek to eliminate barriers to trade in services. They involve 51 economies accounting for
approximately 70 percent of global trade in services. The negotiations provide an important opportunity to address changes in technology and business practices that have occurred since the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) was negotiated 20 years ago and in areas that play to Amer-

56

See Chapter 23 for a deeper discussion about energy exports.

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icas strengths: telecommunications, distribution and delivery services, and

cross-border data flows that facilitate the supply of services over the internet.
Roughly 80 percent of U.S. private-sector employment is in the services
sector, and more than 25 percent of U.S. employment is in business and
professional services, which are the services that are considered tradable
and now represent twice the percentage of manufacturing employment.
The national average barrier to services tradethe equivalent of tariffs on
goodsis much higher than merchandise trade as measured by the OECD
and others. Breaking down these barriers and expanding opportunities for
the U.S. service sector is clearly in our economic interest.
A second plurilateral negotiation concerns a potential Environmental
Goods Agreement (EGA). In 2007, as part of the Doha Round negotiations,
the United States and the European Union proposed to reduce and eliminate
barriers to trade in environmental goods and services, including technologies such as clean coal, wind energy, and solar cells. Total world trade in
environmental goods is estimated at nearly $1 trillion annually. In 2014, 17
WTO members began a negotiation to carry forward the proposal from 2007.
These 17 countries, accounting for over 85 percent of global trade in environmental goods, are seeking to eliminate tariffs on products in such areas
as renewable and clean energy generation, air pollution control, and wastewater treatment. The next Administration can help shape this negotiation
in a substantial manner starting in January 2017.
Yet another such ongoing negotiation concerns Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). In addition to bilateral trade agreements that include chapters to
protect investors, another key tool to promote U.S. investment around the
world and to attract foreign direct investment into the United States is a BIT.
The most developed BIT negotiation is with China, the third-largest market in the world for U.S. exports. According to the Rhodium Group, Chinese
direct investment supported 80,000 jobs in the United States in 2014.
Concluding a BIT with China would provide several benefits to U.S.
investors, including: non-discriminatory treatment compared to domestic
investors (national treatment) and to other foreign investors (most favored

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nation treatment); market access to sectors that are currently closed; the
right to fair compensation in the event of a regulatory taking or expropriation; the ability to transfer capital at a market exchange rate; and international arbitration to settle disputes. A BIT negotiation with China is likely
to be difficult and time consuming, which suggests that the next Administration could be handling the key concluding points with the second largest
economy in the world in its first few months in office.
In addition to leveraging TPA to take advantage of the ongoing negotiations just enumerated and driving them, where needed, in a more commercially advantageous way, the next Administration should explore new
opportunities to strengthen the U.S. economy, enhance U.S. commercial
interests, and advance U.S. foreign policy.
As to leveraging TPA, most of the existing negotiations mentioned above
will require congressional approval of implementing legislation, which
means that when the negotiations are concluded the new Administration should work with Congress through the mechanisms outlined by the
recently passed TPA.
In addition, the next Administration should bring other key countries
into existing negotiations that it considers in the U.S. national interest. For
example, Korea has expressed interest in joining TPP after the current negotiation is completed. Korea, the 13th-largest economy in the world and the
tenth-largest market for U.S. exports, is a country with which the United
States already has a free trade agreement. Bringing Korea into the TPP
should be considered immediately. The Philippines and Taiwan have strategic importance to the United States that could also be included.
The next Administration could also work with the European Union to
expand the scope of TTIP so that it includes Turkey and, potentially, Canada and Mexico as well. Turkey is the 18th-largest economy in the world,
it is in a Customs Union with the EU, has been one of the fastest-growing
major economies in the world for the past decade, and has historically been
one of the most important U.S. allies in the Near East. Nevertheless, while
the United States and Turkey have a BIT from 1990, trade and investment
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between the two countries is disproportionately low. An important side benefit is that such a project could provide an impetus for working together on a
positive agenda, thus helping to overcome the deterioration in U.S.-Turkish
relations over the past several years.
As far as entirely new trade initiatives are concerned, a worthy aspirational policy would be to try to improve U.S. standing in Latin America,
while also expanding opportunities there for American businesses. Beginning in 2011, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru formed a Pacific Alliance
to integrate their economies and facilitate trade and customs. The United
States has FTAs with all of these countries and could explore opportunities
to combine these agreements into a more comprehensive trade and investment agreement.
Another area that should not be ignored is the pathetic record of the
United States in considering bilateral trade and investment agreements
with African countries. The United States does not have a FTA with any
sub-Saharan African country and has concluded BITs that cover less than
7 percent of the regions GDP.57 Compare this to China, which has investment treaties covering almost 80 percent of the regions GDP. This places
U.S. investors at a competitive disadvantage and partially cedes the field to
geopolitical competitors. The next Administration should explore ways to
improve on this record, such as, for instance, the pursuit of BITs with any
African country that is receiving assistance from the Millennium Challenge
Corporation, a development finance program partially designed to attract
trade and investment flows.58
We might also consider new bilateral trade agreements. There are six substantial countries in terms of geographic size, population, economy, and
geopolitical importance with which the United States has little, if any, relationship in formal trade or investment protection: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Russia, and Turkey. Pursuing a free trade agreement, which typically
57
Ben Leo, Why cant America do investment promotion in Africa like China (or Canada)?
Center for Global Development, March 27, 2014.
58
See Chapter 7 for a further discussion about Africa and 26 for a further discussion about
Development Assistance.

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requires TPA, with any of these countries would be very difficult for many
reasons, including negotiating dynamics, economic diversity, and political
considerations both here and abroad. Neither is it necessarily the case that
there is no harm in trying; indeed, harm can be done by trying and failing.
But there can be some value in trying as well, so the next Administration
should conduct an appropriate interagency review of the prospects.
Specifically, the next Administration should work in a focused manner to
develop plans for establishing more formal trade and investment mechanisms with a number of these economies, and identify which of these countries are willing to begin genuine negotiations on what will most likely be
confidence building measures to establish the foundation for more robust
trade and/or investment agreements.
The United States only can negotiate trade and investment agreements
with a willing partner, meaning that Russia is not a candidate. As noted
above, the BIT negotiation process with China has made progress in the past
few years. While any BIT concluded with China would not be covered under
TPA (rather, the agreement must be ratified by the Senate), concluding and
securing ratification of a BIT with Chinaas well as any additional negotiationswill be a heavy political burden for the next Administration.
India, the worlds ninth-largest economy, is a democracy and has lately
become the fastest growing major economy in the world, surpassing China.
It is also a highly protectionist country that has played a negative role in
global trade negotiations, whether the Doha Round or the Trade Facilitation
Agreement. Indias new government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi,
is considered reformist and more business- and investor-friendly than previous Indian governments. So the United States has begun to explore negotiating a BIT with India, although it has made little progress. While such an
undertaking would be complex, the importance of deepening our alliance
with India may make it worthwhile.
Another problematic partner is Brazil. Brazil is the seventh-largest economy in the world and, until the past few years, had been growing at a moderate
pace for about a decade. Brazil is also highly protectionist, has a byzantine
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and regressive taxation system that harms its own poorer citizens and discourages foreign investment, and has been a very difficult negotiating partner
in global and regional trade arrangements. President Dilma Rouseffs government has been statist in its ideology but has become deeply unpopular
as the economy has stalled and productivity has flattened. This has led the
government to pursue much more orthodox economic policies, including
a change in sentiment toward the United States, accompanied by rhetoric
centered upon welcoming foreign investment.
A new Administration could try to seize on this potential opportunity to
work with the new Brazilian government on a bilateral tax treaty, a BIT, or
even working with other Latin American countries to build on the existing
Pacific Alliance.
Indonesia is the 16th-largest economy in the world and has been one of the
worlds fastest growing economies for the past decade. While less developed
than the other economies discussed here, its large size and future potential
make it an opportunity worth exploring. Indonesia is also a highly protectionist country with a strong tendency toward industrial policy, and it is somewhat arbitrary when it comes to both rule making and enforcement. Building
a deeper relationship with Indonesia, including working with Indonesians on
TPP accession, could be an important goal for a new Administration.

he Bush Administration pursued a robust trade and investment negotiating agenda that arguably focused more on foreign policy priorities and

less on the economically most important countries (Korea is an exception).

During its second term, the Obama Administration has also pursued a robust
agenda that has arguably been focused on the most significant economic
actors, but not as much on the most commercially important aspects of
trade and investment.
The best path for the next Administration is to devise and implement in
a balanced way a trade negotiations agenda that serves both economic and
political objectives. Existing negotiations and new ones, taken together,
have the potential to generate substantial positive economic returns in the
United States and advance U.S. national security interests at the same time.

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Part VII

FUNCTIONAL CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES

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CHAPTER 20: A STRATEGY OF CYBER DETERRENCE

Michael Chertoff & Frank J. Cilluffo59

The global cyber threat landscape is expanding exponentially; challenging

national security officials and corporate executives in the United States and
around the world to adapt to more sophisticated and diverse attack methods at the rapidly bending curve of technological change. Recently we have
witnessed an uptick in major cyber attacks against American interests both
public and private. Although this has led the current Administration to take
strides to improve our cyber security posture, much remains to be done in
terms of developing cyber policies that are bold and advanced enough to
reliably disarm and deter malicious actors. America does not enjoy the luxury
of time in confronting this issue. Instead, commitment and urgency are key
factors in the race to propel American cyber capabilities ahead of those of its
adversaries, and to assume a role of leadership and superiority in this new
realm of defense strategy.
While American cyber security is already benefitting from the strength of
government relationships with the private sector, focus on improving these
vital partnerships must remain a priority. Of course, in order for the United
States to become the most capable cyber power in the world, it is also necessary that it invest in the training of a skilled cyber workforce. Finally, it is
paramount for Americas leaders to use these emerging assets to create an
environment in which this nation and its interests are not only secure from
cyber attacks but can also benefit from a robust strategy of cyber deterrence.

he first step in addressing this countrys cyber security requirements

is to recognize that credible threats come from a wide variety of actors,

including states, criminal organizations, terrorist groups, and political

activists. These entities have different capacities to do significant harm, but

some of their goals are achievable with only moderate hacking skills or the

59
The authors thank Alec Nadeau, a Presidential Administrative Fellow at The George Washington University, for his contribution to this chapter.

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money to purchase hacking-as-a-service.60 Thus, while it is primarily only

states that can now execute significant espionage or military operations,
non-state actors frequently target U.S. interests for financial gain or to make
political statements that seek to undermine U.S. credibility.
When it comes to cyber attacks, the challenges surrounding attribution
are critical. The complexities of cyber space and the increasing proclivity of
states to use proxies in government-sponsored cyber missions mean that it
is often difficult to prove who is responsible for a particular attack. Therefore, the U.S. government must marshal and coordinate its intelligence and
technical capabilities to ascertain the identities of specific actors responsible for cyber attacks. In order to mount a credible deterrence, American
cyber capabilities must be capable of precise attribution to enable the most
appropriate and flexible response.
Today, the most advanced and persistent cyber threats to the United
States remain those directed by states and their proxies. China and Russia
pose the greatest threats, although the growing cyber capabilities of both
North Korea and Iran deserve careful attention as well. The most significant
danger that the United States faces from a national defense standpoint is
that these state actors are integrating cyber capabilities into their foreign
intelligence services along with their military doctrines and strategies.61
When assessing these threats, in addition to those that threaten the economic prosperity of the U.S., it is helpful to differentiate between Computer
Network Exploitation (CNE) and Computer Network Attacks (CNA). CNE
includes industrial espionage as well as intelligence preparation of the battlefield through mapping of a countrys digital and critical infrastructure. CNA
encompasses actions that disrupt or destroy targeted data or information.
While CNE may seem to be less threatening, its role as a necessary precursor
to attacks makes it vital for the U.S. government to articulate a cyber strategy
60

Tim G., Hacking as a Service: How Much Does it Cost to Hack an Account, The Underground
Economy Part Four, August 4, 2014. http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hacking-servicehow-much-does-it- cost-hack-account
61
Frank Cilluffo, A Global Perspective on Cyber Threats, Testimony before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation,
June 16, 2015.

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that deters all attempts to compromise the integrity of U.S. networks.

One of the major cyber threats facing the country today is that of espionage, a form of CNE and a tool that Americas adversaries are using in an
increasingly brazen manner. For example, the massive data breach of the
Office of Personnel Managements (OPM) records of approximately 20-25
million current and former Federal employees compromised a database of
personal, financial, and location information on military, diplomatic, and
intelligence officials with top security clearances. Additionally, more than
one million fingerprint records were stolen, potentially compromising the
identities and employment opportunities of numerous federal employees.
This breach, which was discovered in April and May 2015 after about a year
of exploitation, is, according to informed observers, most likely attributable
to China. While it may be impossible to keep malicious actors from penetrating government networks, the U.S. government must develop standard
practices to quickly identify, quarantine, and jettison intruders from these
critical systems.62
Additionally, organized crime syndicates and other actors have adapted
fraud schemes to the internet and scaled them to network level threats on
Americas financial institutions and economic prosperity. In 2013, hackers
began to implement a massive fraud scheme that utilized spear phishing
and a strain of malware called Carbanak to help criminals steal hundreds
of millions of dollars from dozens of banks in countries around the world,
including the United States. While the financial services sector is typically
regarded as one of the most security-proficient sectors in America, this type
of fraud against banks is not uncommon and must be addressed in a comprehensive cyber security strategy.
A third form of significant cyber aggression is the disruption of networks
or online services, frequently accomplished through Distributed Denial
of Service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks overpower internet services with
malicious traffic in order to block legitimate access to such services. DDoS
62
Paraphrased from statements of U.S. Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX) made during a House
Oversight and Government Reform Hearing on the OPM Data Breach. http://www.c-span.org/
video/?326593-1/hearing- office-personnel-management-data-breach

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attacks can be executed through the use of a malicious robotic network (botnet63) or through other manipulations of unsuspecting internet users. In
one recent example, Chinese-linked hackers redirected traffic to the popular
search engine, Baidu, to temporarily cripple the webpages of a U.S. coding
company that linked to a Chinese language version of the New York Times
and a website intended to help Chinese citizens circumvent government
censorship. DDoS has also been used by Iran to target the U.S. financial sector and, perhaps most infamously, by Russian actors to paralyze Estonian
networks in 2007. While DDoS attacks are used to disrupt service, they are
also often used as a diversionary tactic to distract a victims security team
from guarding against other coordinated attacks on valuable information
and systems.64
The final cyber threat that poses the most profound risk is an outright
destructive attack against critical infrastructure. Examples from at home
and abroad, including Iranian attacks against the Sands Casino and the
North Korean assault on Sony Pictures, indicate a growing capacity among
adversaries to carry out such attacks. However, it is not only the entertainment industry that is at risk. The threat to critical infrastructure was
demonstrated by a 2012 Iranian attack against Saudi Aramco that hampered
its operational capacity for two weeks by turning 30,000 of its computers
into bricks. American critical infrastructure must be secured against such
threats, and potential actors must be deterred by U.S. cyber capabilities.

longside this overview of the cyber threat landscape, the next step
toward understanding how the United States must build its cyber secu-

rity and cyber deterrence strategies is to examine the current responses and

vulnerabilities of U.S. policy. As the private sector owns and operates over 90
63
Symantecs researchers define a bot and a botnet as follows: A bot is a type of malware
that allows an attacker to take control over an affected computer. Also known as Web robots,
bots are usually part of a network of infected machines, known as a botnet, which is typically
made up of victim machines that stretch across the globe. http://us.norton.com/botnet/
64
Neustar and Symantec have independently reported on the increasing use of DDoS attacks as
smokescreens to hide more significant attacks like data theft and malware installation. Susan
Warner, Smokescreening: Data Theft Makes DDoS More Dangerous, April 22, 2014. https://
www.neustar.biz/blog/smokescreening-data-theft-makes-ddos-more-dangerous. Sam Shead,
Symantec: Data-stealing Hackers Use DDoS to Distract from Attacks, October 9, 2012. http://
www.zdnet.com/article/symantec-data-stealing-hackers-use-ddos-to-distract-from-attacks/

193

percent of this nations critical infrastructure, its role in promoting Americas

cyber security cannot be overstated. For years, industry has been on the
front lines of cyber attacks and, on a sectoral basis, many private businesses
have self-organized into Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs)
to share threat indicators and defensive cyber strategies.
Over the past few years, these ISACs and standalone companies have
increasingly coordinated with the Federal government to mitigate and
respond to cyber threats by sharing information on malware signatures, vulnerabilities, and other indicators of malicious activity. However, the private
sector is not only useful as a source of information for the government but
also as a resource to law enforcement in assisting with the takedown of cyber
criminal enterprises like botnets. Despite recent efforts to strengthen partnerships with the private sector, much industry potential remains untapped
when it comes to protecting critical infrastructure and taking a more active
role in defending American interests.65
The U.S. governments efforts to bolster the countrys cyber security posture have been partly realized through three Executive Orders signed by
President Obama. EO 13636 promoted a culture in which the government
shares threat information with private businesses and directed the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to develop a voluntary framework of cyber security best practices to reduce risk to critical infrastructure.
Although privacy remains a contentious issue surrounding the information
sharing debate, the NIST Framework is increasingly being adopted by private
businesses to eliminate cyber risks.
In 2015, President Obama signed two other Executive Orders dealing with
cyber security. EO 13691 attempts to increase information sharing within the
private sector by promoting the formation of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs), a categorization of information sharing entities
that would include ISACs in addition to non-sector specific organizations.
65
As an example of the private sectors potential to protect U.S. interests against cyber actors,
see Symantecs recent partnership with Europol that led to the takedown of the Ramnit botnet.
Nadia Kovacks. Symantec Partners With Europol In Ramnit Botnet Takedown, February 14,
2015 http:// community.norton.com/en/blogs/norton-protection-blog/symantec-partners-europol-ramnit-botnet- takedown-pif

194

Still, however, this policy of improved sharing of threat indicators fails to

fully leverage industrys potential to defend against and fight cyber threats.
The final cyber Executive Order allows the Secretary of the Treasury, in
conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice, to impose sanctions
on individuals or entities outside of the United States who are responsible for,
or complicit in, malicious cyber activities against American interests. While
recognition of the need to sharpen economic instruments and sanctions is
an important symbolic step, U.S. leaders must consider these tools to be only
one element of a comprehensive and coherent strategy of cyber deterrence.
In addition, the Department of Homeland Security has been at the forefront of the battle to protect U.S. networks and coordinate cyber security
incident response. Currently DHS employs its Einstein and Continuous
Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) programs to detect cyber intruders, halt
malicious traffic, and prioritize vulnerabilities in government networks.
However, these programs have not yet been fully implemented, would
greatly benefit from increased congressional funding, and sometimes are
hampered by legacy systems, harming the security of Federal information.
It must be a priority of government agencies to replace such legacy systems
and work more closely with DHS in the coming years.
DHSs National Cyber security and Communications Integration
Center (NCCIC) is the center for information sharing and incident response
coordination between government agencies and the private sector. As the
clearinghouse for troves of sensitive data, DHS also has established officers
to ensure the protection of citizens privacy and civil liberties. DHS and the
NCCIC, as civilian agencies, should continue to be the focal point of information sharing, and they should strive to earn and retain the trust of the
American people, which is necessary in securing their interests in cyber space.
Not to be overlooked in the Federal governments efforts to combat
threats to the nations cyber security is the Department of Defense (DoD).
DoD is currently preparing itself for the possibility that all conventional
conflicts may now involve a cyber component. Therefore, it has recently
released an updated Cyber Strategy, outlining three major goals to secure
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its networks and demonstrate to the world the precision and effectiveness
of Americas cyber operational capabilities.
The first goal of the cyber strategy is to move away from the model of
service-based networks towards one larger Joint Information Environment
(JIE). Currently in process, this shift will allow DoD to better defend its networks, systems, and sensitive information. The second and third goals of
this strategy focus on building broader partnerships with the private sector
and international allies to defend against disruptive or destructive cyber
attacks while maintaining viable cyber options to control conflict escalation
and deter threats at all stages of engagement. These goals represent a start
toward an effective strategy of cyber deterrence and should be cultivated
and given the utmost priority.
DoD currently retains the right to use cyber tools to disrupt an enemys
command of networks, military-related critical infrastructure, and weapons
capabilities, although it generally reserves these tactics as a last resort. U.S.
leaders must utilize these capabilities as a deterrent to Americas adversaries, but these tactics must also be tailored and precise to avoid disproportionate escalation.

espite the current initiatives and responses of the U.S. government

and its allies in the private sector and around the world, significant

vulnerabilities in American cyber security policies remain to be repaired.

The adoption of cyber security best practices, information sharing, and

threat prevention are extremely important, yet not good enough. The private sector is restrained in its cyber security practices due to outdated and
vague legal restrictions, and the government is still not fully utilizing this
sectors potential.
Furthermore, the consequences and penalties for committing malicious
cyber acts against the United States must be raised and perpetrators must know
that they cannot hide behind their keyboards if they attack American interests.66

66

Frank Cilluffo, Sharon Cardash, and George Salmoiraghi, A Blueprint for Cyber Deterrence:
Building Stability through Strength, Military and Strategic Affairs (December 2012).

196

The ability of the U.S. government to protect its own networks and infrastructure has been rightly questioned of late, and any doubts need to be laid
to rest through active demonstration of Americas cyber defense capabilities.
That demonstration has four key parts. First, in order to develop the
cyber capacities necessary for the United States to retain its position as the
responsible, undisputed leader and military power of the world, America
must invest in the cyber education of its workforce. Educational programs
sponsored by the DoD and the private sector should be promoted and financially supported by the government where feasible. Although it is difficult
for the public sector to compete with the salaries available to cyber professionals in the private sector, the prestige and significance of working to
better Americas cyber posture will be a valuable asset in recruiting a strong
and deep workforce.67 Given that the initiative remains with the cyber
attacker in the near term, the U.S. government must also invest in offensive
capabilities. In order to articulate a credible deterrence capability, America
must ensure the means to wield the best trained and equipped cyber arsenal.
Second, the Federal government must also take a lesson from the private sector, in which cyber security and information security are steadily
becoming issues that chief executives prioritize and for which they are held
accountable. The days in which the security of cyber networks were the sole
responsibility of CIOs are over.
In the wake of the massive breach of the Office of Personnel Management,
it became evident that agency leadership had failed to implement even
basic recommendations for enhancing cyber security; the resignation of
the agency director was a belated sign of accountability. But the failure to
implement cyber security best practices and to identify and segregate ones
most valuable information and systems is far more widespread. According
to a Government Accountability Office report, 19 of 24 major government
agencies report cyber security as a significant deficiency or material

67
Paraphrased from statements of Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for Cyber
security and Communications, Dr. Andy Ozment, before the American Bar Association, February
20, 2015. http://www.c- span.org/video/?324377-1/discussion-cybersecurity-law

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weakness.68 Our government leaders, just like CEOs, must be held responsible when extensive data breaches occur due to avoidable lapses in security.
Similarly, the President must drive government officials to enforce agencywide cyber hygiene practices and make the security of networks and data a
top priority.
Third, the framework for information sharing and the incentives for private sector investment in cyber security must be institutionalized. For years,
bipartisan efforts have been mounted in Congress to establish a legal safe
harbor for information sharing, but Executive Branch support to enact these
proposals into law has been lacking. It is urgent that Congress pass legislation to ensure confidentiality and liability protection for participation in the
exchange of threat information. Such legislation would allow the Administrations current Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAO)
proposal to be more effective.
Legislation is also needed to create a liability cap for companies that
adopt reasonable cyber security measures. A new law could be modeled in
part on the recent NIST standards or similar plans. Just as the Safety Act
promoted the development of counterterrorism technology, such a liability
cap would create a strong financial incentive to implement more robust security measures. Such a plan would also promote the development of a more
mature cyber insurance marketplace, thus providing another market driver
to provoke changes in behavior and the adoption of best practices.
Fourth, to articulate a convincing message of deterrence against cyber
actors, the U.S. government must fully develop a doctrine of response
against varying levels of cyber intrusions, up to and including principles for
when an attack would be treated as an act of war. While the Administration
has utilized law enforcement tactics against cyber criminals and even foreign agents engaged in cyber espionageincluding prosecution of illegal
dark web marketplacesand while in theory economic sanctions are now
68
Gregory Wilshusen, Cyber Threats and Data Breaches Illustrate Need for Stronger Controls
across Federal Agencies, Government Accountability Office. Testimony before U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Science, Space and Technology, Subcommittee on Research and
Technology and Oversight, July 8, 2015.

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available against cyber bad actors, there is no apparent, integrated overall

strategy for deploying all elements of national power against cyber attacks.
Although America will need a comprehensive strategy of cyber deterrence,
policymakers must develop specific strategies tailored to the unique qualities of the various actors likely to engage in cyber attacks. This is necessary
because actors, rather than the attacks they launch, are the targets of a successful cyber deterrence strategy. The strategy must be able to differentiate
between the motivations, methods, and vulnerabilities of such actors to be
fully effective.69
The next President needs to mandate a strategy that addresses the
following three key questions:
What structures are needed to further promote true international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting organized cyber fraud activity,
including action against financial and other online enablers of criminality?
How does the U.S. government deal with nations that provide safe haven for
criminal hackers?
In what circumstances will economic sanctions be imposed on individuals
or even nations engaged in cyber espionage? Where intellectual property is
stolen, how will the U.S. government use trade rules or even civil liability
rules against those who steal or benefit from the stolen property?
What is the threshold of destructive attacks beyond which the U.S. would
treat them as an act of war? Under what circumstances would the U.S. government use kinetic force against a destructive attacker? Under what circumstances and with what degree of supervision would the government
license private actors, extending 21st-century letters of marque, in essence
to engage in active defense against a cyber attacker?
Given that state-sponsored cyber attacks can be mounted from platforms
anywhere in the world, even locations within the United States, policymakers
need to revisit the legal architecture that currently constrains what military
69

Frank Cilluffo and Rhea Siers, Cyber Deterrence is a Strategic Imperative, April 28, 2015.
http:// blogs.wsj.com/cio/2015/04/28/cyber-deterrence-is-a-strategic-imperative/

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and intelligence authorities can do domestically (Titles 10 and 50). The traditional dividing line between domestic and foreign activities does not readily
apply when cyber weapons spring from and travel through an uncountable
number of geographic locations. The legal architecture surrounding these
authorities needs to be revised in light of these changed circumstances.

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CHAPTER 21: LEADING INTELLIGENCE

Michael Allen & Bryan Smith

U.S. intelligence is beset by serious problems these days. Edward Snowden,

a reduction in authorities, risk aversion, and budget cuts have all harmed
this essential function of U.S. national security policy. This is dangerous.
Intelligence is our first line of defense and is vital to making well-informed
decisions, avoiding surprise, and giving our warfighters the ability to succeed. Intelligence is ever more critical to imposing effective sanctions on
weapons proliferators, Kremlin cronies, and terrorist financiers. We rely on
intelligence to give the President objective information about the plans
and intentions of other actors. We also rely on it to bring the fight to the
enemy so as to keep it from our shores.
Due to the wide array of national security challenges, high-quality intelligence is in greater demand than ever. Intelligence also functions now as a
currency in international relations; we share capabilities and intelligence
packages to improve relationships in furtherance of our national security
objectives, like tailored intelligence to inform the Iraqi Security Forces
targeting decisions or imagery data to benefit the campaign against Boko
Haram in West Africa.
Given its importance, the degradation of intelligence capabilities is foolhardy in a world that is dramatically less stable today than it was even a
decade ago, a judgment validated in detail by several chapters in this book.
Policymakers will turn to the Intelligence Community (IC)all 17 elements
within itto determine if Iran is cheating on its nuclear obligations, to monitor Russias creeping domination of Ukraine, to understand the threat posed
by the Islamic State in and beyond Iraq and the Levant, and to assess the extent
of Chinese pilferage of U.S. intellectual property through cyber intrusions.
While the severity and diversity of security threats are up, funding is down.
Statutory constraints on the collection and use of telephone records have
increased, as congressional and public support for intelligence programs has

201

eroded. Friendly governments and U.S. corporate partners are increasingly

leery about intelligence cooperation with a government they fear cannot
keep secrets. Our long-held technological edge is narrowing, even as the
democratization of certain technologies, such as ubiquitous strong encryption, makes the collection of technical intelligence more difficult. If this were
not enough, the White House has imposed needless and harmful limits on
collection and covert operations, and fostered risk-aversion in headquarters
and field operations. These negative trends must be reversed.
Since September 11, 2001, the ICs activities have been extraordinary. As
the de facto combatant commander for the war on terrorism, the CIA has put
tremendous pressure on Americas enemies, reducing their freedom to plan,
communicate, and travel. A major positive trend in U.S. intelligence has
been the increased level of integration within and between the intelligence
agencies, and their ability to work in concert with military, law enforcement,
and diplomatic operations. The most celebrated example of integration success is, of course, the Osama bin Laden raid over four years ago.
But as we move further away from September 11, 2001, and face negative
trends and a deteriorating global picture, the U.S. government needs to
redouble its efforts by ensuring we have the right legal authorities, restoring
base funding to near its post-9/11 peak, in part to fund the wide array of IC
capabilities, human and technical, necessary to sustain our technological
superiority. But most of all we need presidential leadership to defend the
ICs missions and personnel and enable its activities in furtherance of U.S.
national security objectives.

ne of the key intelligence challenges identified by the 9/11 Commission

Report was the difficulty the NSA faced in tracing connections from

terrorist suspects overseas back to the homeland. For example, in the lead
up to the 9/11 attacks, the NSA was monitoring a safe house in Yemen. Had
the U.S. government been able to determine that someone in this safe house
had made calls to San Diego, the call records program would have provided
authorities the necessary tools to make connections between the San Diego

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number and other hijackers hiding in the United States.70

Although the phone records program is just one of the tools the NSA and
FBI use to track terrorists on American soil, it has proved useful in foiling a
number of attacks, including by identifying the co-conspirators of would-be
New York City subway bomber Najibullah Zazi. The new phone records program recently revised by the USA Freedom Act will make the NSAs job more
difficult. Because phone records will now remain with the phone companies,
the speed and agility needed to break fast-moving terrorist plots will suffer.
The limitations placed on the phone records program is just one example
of undue restrictions levied upon the NSA in the aftermath of the Snowden
affair. Despite the growing threats to the United States and its interests
around the worldand in particular the broadening conflict with ISIS and
ongoing threat to the homeland posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliatesPresident Obama has taken measures to limit signals intelligence collection on
foreign nationals overseas. Surely, this makes the United States the only
country in the world to extend privacy protections to non-citizens and
self-impose restrictions on foreign intelligence collection.
Moreover, while the President did not give in to the overweening pressures that arose in the aftermath of the Snowden affair, he did go so far as
to reassure certain foreign leaders that we will not target their communications for signals intelligence collection. At the same time, our allies in
the United Kingdom and France are moving in the opposite direction. Both
governments are working to expand their authorities to better enable their
intelligence services to prevent attacks by terrorists returning from abroad
and by homegrown violent extremists. In a rare turn of events, we ought to
take a page from the French playbook and better enable our IC to protect
against these threats.
In addition, all communications providers should be held to the same
requirement to provide lawful intercept capabilities. Under the current

70
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III., Testimony before U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Judiciary, 113th Congress, June 13, 2013.

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law known as the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act,

or CALEA, only telecommunication carriers and broadband providers are
required to have the ability to produce communications records for the U.S.
government in response to court orders. However, extremists and criminals
are using new forms of communications not covered by existing authority,
forcing the FBI to go dark. The next President should take the lead in
working with corporate stakeholders to find a sensible way forward that will
preserve a critical surveillance authority while protecting the freedom of the
internet, privacy, and civil liberties.

ntelligence can play an outsized role in influencing national security

outcomesfor good or ill. At its best, key intelligence can provide a

tremendous boost to national security outcomesin value far exceeding

intelligences cost to acquire. For instance, had the U.S. government been
able to piece together clues and foil the 9/11 attacks, it might have saved
nearly 3,000 lives and avoided hundreds of billions in economic damage.

Conversely, bad intelligence can greatly increase the probability of poor

national security outcomes. For instance, poor analytical tradecraft led to
an erroneous assessment of Iraqs weapons of mass destruction capabilities,
part of the rationale for a massive deployment of U.S. forces.
The 9/11 Commission Report documents that in the years following the fall
of the Iron Curtain, the U.S. government drastically cut its intelligence capability, claiming a peace dividend. Many CIA stations overseas were closed
and personnel fell dramatically, with only 25 new officers entering the CIAs
clandestine service in 1995. These cuts proved unwise and dangerous for the
new security threats that led to the 9/11 attacks, the deadliest such attacks
on our soil in modern history.
After the shock of 9/11, we recognized the fallacy of the peace dividend
construct and reversed course, ultimately doubling intelligence funding to
$80 billion in 2010.71 This funding was sufficient to reverse personnel cuts
made after the Cold War and permitted investments in game-changing tech-

71
CRS, Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress, September 8, 2013,
p. 3.

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nologies that enabled new and revolutionary collection capabilities. This

funding fueled the Golden Era of SIGINT which, married with persistent
imagery surveillance, had a revolutionary impact.
Unfortunately, recent budget cuts spurred by the Budget Control Act have
now left the IC with funding levels insufficient for its ever-growing national
security mission. From its peak in 2010, intelligence funding has been cut by
approximately $10 billion.72 Not every dollar of the rapid post-9/11 intelligence build-up was spent wisely, and some trimming was warranted. However, these cuts have now gone much too far. Indeed, DNI James Clapper
worries that the recent cuts will have a termite-like effect, silently and invisibly eating away at the foundation of IC craft and capabilities. Thus, after
three years of sequester-level funding (and the possibility of more this year),
we are in serious jeopardy of repeating the funding mistakes of the early
1990s at the time when we can least afford to do so.
Cutting intelligence as the global landscape deteriorates simply makes no
sense. At least in the 1990s, we could explain away our decisions based on a
flawed belief in the peace dividend and an unusually benign international
security environment. How will we explain our mistakes next time?
Just how much intelligence funding is enough to enable the IC to do what
the President needs from them? Unfortunately, no magic formula exists to
tell us. Clearly though, the default setting of apportioning a pro-rata fair
share of the defense budget to intelligence is not a useful guide. Given
intelligences leveraged value proposition, a strong argument can be made
for investing disproportionately in intelligence.
One thing is certain. The quality of intelligence that will be available to
policymakers and warfighters in the next decade depends critically upon
investments made today. These investments must include attack-resilient satellites and other collection sensors, high-tech agent spy gear, cyber
defense, and code-breaking tools. Just as important, the IC must recruit and

72
Office of the Director of National Defense News Releases No. 46, November 21, 2014 and No.
1, February 2, 2015; and Department of Defense News Releases No. NR-348-14, June 30,2014,
and No. NR-034-15, February 2, 2015.

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train top-flight talent, and modernize the IT systems that these professionals will use to better share information, while protecting that information
from insider threats.

overnments (including, perhaps especially, the U.S. government) have

lost their monopoly on authoritative information. In the wake of the

misunderstood and misleading disclosures by Edward Snowden in 2013, the

credibility of U.S. intelligence came under attack, and the IC is still reeling
from it. Sadly, the President offered belated, half-hearted support to the
patriotic men and women who work in the intelligence community. It took
President Obama seven months after the disclosures to publicly and comprehensively defend the NSA. As a result, public opinion foundered upon
widespread misunderstanding of complex programs.
President Obamas mixed reaction to public opinion has fostered risk
aversion in the IC. DNI Clapper has said that we are making conscious decisions to stop collecting on some specific targets.73 In addition, the Obama
Administrations 2009 decision to permit another criminal investigation of
activities under the rendition, detention, and interrogation program sent
an unfortunate signal to our intelligence professionals that the Commanderin-Chief was willing to risk their prosecution for intelligence activities
that had been duly authorized by the Department of Justice. Together these
events have fostered risk aversion in the IC just at a moment when we need
creative and daring responses to an array of novel national security threats.
The next President should not bow to political pressure and should defend
the IC as its detractors seek to limit its capabilities with sensational and
unfounded claims.
While recent negative trends are daunting, the problems of U.S. intelligence are not insurmountable. In some cases, the problem implies its own
solution (as with funding), while others (like the threat environment) cannot be so much solved as deftly managed. The key to tackling each will be
committed, sustained leadership, especially that undertaken by the Pres73
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/speeches-and-interviews/202-speeches-interviews-2014/1115-remarks-as-delivered-by-the-honorable-james-r-clapper-director-of-national-intelligence-afcea-insa-national-security-and-intelligence-summit

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ident himself, who is by far the single most important actor in the U.S. IC.
The next Administration will also be able to bring to intelligence leadership a new, full-throated support whose tone alone would be a great asset
in tackling these problems. Inspiration of public support through presidential leadership is a prerequisite to enacting a sound intelligence agenda. It
should not be acceptable to the President of the United States that his Director of National Intelligence says the IC will not pretend to do more with
less. . . .it will do less with less.
The next President, his DNI, and entire IC-related team must conduct
a well-conceived, proactive, and sustained public relations campaign to
regain the publics trust. Congress will need to be a partner in this campaign.
The fact that the heads of the major intelligence agencies testify in public annually on the threats facing the country is unique worldwide. The IC
and the beneficiaries of intelligencethe President, Congress, warfighters,
and the law enforcement communitiesshould seek out opportunities to
explain their work in order to gain the support of the American people. We
need to be more active in telling the good news resulting from IC actions,
while protecting sources and methods. When trust and confidence is fostered between the IC leadership and its dedicated personnel and the American people, it will be clear why some important aspects of the IC mission
must remain secret, while subjected to rigorous oversight by Congress.
Strong presidential leadership also includes building personal relationships with national security leadership within the Federal government. It
is vital that the next President develop a good working relationship with IC
heads and the congressional oversight committees. Personal relationships
foster more candid discussions and assessments that will lead to better, less
politicized policy decisions.

resident Obamas assertion in 2013 that the threat to the United States

closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/1174 reflects a

nave wishfulness that terrorism is on the decline and that the U.S. govern-

74
President Obama, Remarks by the President at the National Defense University, May 23,
2013.

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ment and its military can resume a pre-9/11 posture. The enduring capability of AQAP, the rise of ISIS and Islamic extremists in Libya and across the
Middle East, and the brutality of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, remind us of
the need to maintain an aggressive counterterrorism posture. Prior to 9/11,
terrorists enjoyed only one safe haven in the worldAfghanistan. Today,
terrorist groups control territory in several countries, including Yemen,
Somalia, Libya, Syria, Iraq, Pakistan, and, once again, parts of Afghanistan.
We have made but modest progress in addressing this threat; rather, the
number of extremists flocking to these areas continues to grow. In February 2015, the Director of the NCTC testified before Congress that more than
20,000 foreign fighters have traveled to Syria. Of the 20,000, at least 3,400
are from Western countries, many of whom may have passports that allow
travel across Europe and the United States. This poses a serious threat to
Western countries, as the extremists may return home with combat experience and training in weapons and explosives.
In addition, as the Iran nuclear deal permits domestic enrichment and
other nuclear R&D, U.S. policymakers will need increased intelligence collection to monitor the inevitable cascading effect. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey,
and others may move toward developing nuclear capabilities to match Irans.
The IC will also be called upon to help compensate for the glaring verification
shortcomings in the Iranian nuclear deal. A resurgent Russias reinvigoration
of its nuclear capability reminds us of the need to invest in capabilities to
monitor their actions, as well. A recent Defense Science Board study noted
that the pathways to proliferation are expanding, citing networks of cooperation like the A.Q. Khan network, the Syria-North Korea collaboration on
a nuclear reactor, and the Iran-North Korea missile relationship.75
In part because the indices of proliferation contain so few visible signatures, the ICs record on counter-proliferation is mixed. Former Secretary
of Defense Bob Gates called the Syrian construction of the al-Kibar reactor
an intelligence failure. This raises questions about ICs ability to monitor
and detect nuclear activity, given the sheer scale of the territory to be mon75

Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: Assessment of Nuclear
Monitoring and Verification Technologies, January 2014.

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itored and increasingly sophisticated denial and deception techniques. As

the Defense Science Board concluded, monitoring proliferation must be a
continuous process for which persistent surveillance tailored to the environment of concern is needed.
U.S. intelligence must expand its global coverage to keep up with these
threats and better anticipate destabilizing events, such as the Arab Spring
uprisings in 2011. Many of the unstable situations emanating from the Arab
Spring have not returned to normal, not that normal was so wonderful from
a U.S. national security perspective. While intelligence sharing relationships
with our friends and allies are growing in importance given the nature of
the transnational threats, it cannot replace our own recruiting and sourcing.
The U.S. government should revitalize covert action as a policy toolin
particular the ability to counter propaganda from Russia and ISIS. Regarding covert action more generally, one of the principal faults of the current
Administration is that there has been excessive, suffocating policy control
over the execution of CIAs operations. The next President should be encouraged to employ the CIA when appropriate and grant the professionals the
flexibility to achieve stated policy objectives. Further, covert action should
not be a leaked talking point used for political purposes, a device that the
current Administration has employed on several occasions; rather, it should
be a serious policy tool requiring tolerance for creativity and risk.
The CIAs expeditionary capabilities should also be expanded to fill the
gaps in hot spots until the military and policy catch up. We must safeguard
the Agencys inventiveness and agilitydemonstrated when it was the first
U.S. government component to enter Afghanistan after 9/11the strengths
that make it uniquely valuable. Moreover, while we increasingly rely on
signals intelligence as communications technology improves and spreads,
human intelligence still has unique utility because it can reveal more insight
into motivations and intent. We should increase funding and our tolerance
for failure, and free the CIA to do what it does best among IC agencies
collect human intelligence.
As ungoverned space expands amid more failed and fractured states, the
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CIAs unique ability to identify allies and develop their own capabilities
should grow. It is certainly true that the U.S. government cannot always
deploy boots on the ground, but we should build partnership capabilities to
prosecute the terrorist threat more vigorously together. For example, U.S.
efforts in Yemen to bring direct action to AQAP have achieved some success. In fact, President Obama cited it as a model for U.S. counterterrorism
effortsbefore the recent displacement of the Yemeni government by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels.

he IC, especially NSA and FBI, must continue to play an active role in
guarding against cyber attacks from overseas. The quick attribution to

the DPRK of the attack against Sony Pictures was an intelligence success and
may deter future attackers concerned about exposure. But legislation is necessary to allow greatly expanded cyber threat sharing among the IC, the law
enforcement community, and the private sector. Such legislation will better
enable the IC to help protect against cyber attacks on the United States. As
noted in Chapter 20, the sustained pilferage of our intellectual property and

personal information by China and the likelihood that terrorists and criminals will migrate to cyber space to carry out their agendas make it imperative that the IC uncover attack vectors and malware before they impact our
private or public networks. State actors attacking private sector networks
for economic gain poses a new challenge for the IC. Despite a longstanding
policy preventing the U.S. government from conducting offensive economic
espionage, we should better enable the IC to defend against foreign states,
particularly Chinas, economic espionage against U.S. businesses. State
actors are of course also aggressively attacking U.S. government networks.
The theft of thousands of security files from the Office of Personnel Management is a threat to our intelligence officers overseas.
The cyber issue is a signpost that the overwhelming technology edge
once enjoyed by U.S. intelligence in many areas, protected by extreme
secrecy, has largely vanished over time. Recognizing this, visionary leadership within the CIA created IN-Q-TEL (originally named Peleus) in 1999
to enable the government to take small equity stakes in cutting-edge startups. IN-Q-TEL has enabled U.S. intelligence to learn, influence, and adapt

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to relevant commercial technologies.

Fortunately, no other country combines, at scale, the potent U.S. mix of
technological virtuosity, intellectual freedom, venture capital, legal protections, and risk-promoting culture. And yet Silicon Valley and other U.S.
technology centers are by no means monopolies. The world is gaining on the
United States, as is clear from trends in advanced technology degrees, test
scores, patents, market shares, and R&D investments. An era of leveling or
democratization of technological capability is upon us.
Technological advancement across the globe, even by non-hostile countries, is challenging the U.S. advantage, as these commercial technologies
spread into the hands of those who wish us harm. The near ubiquity of
extremely strong commercial encryption is a prime example. The Snowden
disclosures have only accelerated a trend well underway. Likewise, the
expected advent of commercial satellite constellations composed of dozens
or hundreds of small satellites will add to the potential for adversaries to
gain a level of global situational awareness that has been the sole province
of the U.S. for decades. In the cyber domain, countries thought to be unsophisticated, such as North Korea, perhaps with assistance from China, have
overcome what appear to be low technological barriers of entry to engage
in offensive cyber intelligence operations. Futuristic but viable technology-based threats, such as from synthetic biology or malignant application of
artificial intelligence, further challenge U.S. technological dominance.

ow then can U.S. intelligence continue to enjoy a comparative advantage in the face of global technological democratization? It will not be

easy. We suggest several operating principles.

The U.S. government should increase and then protect research and technology spending within the intelligence budget. The IC should pursue all
means of leveraging commercial technologies for intelligence. This enables

the IC to benefit from massive commercial investments in non-recurring

engineering to satisfy its mission needs.
When it comes to existential technological mission needs, the IC must

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go big or go home. These needs include: countering strong, ubiquitous

encryption; detecting and defending against unprecedented Zero Day
cyber attacks; and ensuring that satellites can conduct their mission in the
face of potent and growing Russian and Chinese anti-satellite capabilities.
In areas of highly classified, government-directed R&D, the IC should pursue multiple, competing paths, and keep them open as long as there is no
clearly superior approach. While expensive in the near-term, this approach is
cost-effective over the long haul and constitutes yet another reason budgets
must grow.
We must make much more effective use of the advanced space technologies
we already have. The IC needs to unlock the full potential of its collection
satellites by radically improving the way it tasks and operates them on the
ground. These operations must be much more agile and dynamic and permit interaction across all types of satellites. A very promising experiment is
underway now to do this, drawing on advances in cognitive computing, processing, and big data analytics. However, scaling this capability and making it
operational will require the concerted attention of top leadership, especially
as it will encounter strong cultural resistance within various IC domains.
The IC must also broaden its approach to tap open sources of information
(such as social media and commercial satellite data) to task its spy satellites
and other collectors. Additionally, we must make much greater use of social
media for anticipatory intelligence.
We must fully explore and exploit both the offensive and defensive sides
of all technologies. For example, the emerging Internet of Things offers
great potential to expand our collection of novel, precise, and actionable
intelligence, but it also opens a Pandoras Box of counter-intelligence
concerns. Similarly, the same digital grid that offers the NSA and CIA such
lucrative collection opportunities also gives our operatives digital exhaust
trails that can potentially expose their actions. It thus becomes imperative
for intelligence professionals to widely share information between these
same two sidesour exploiters and our defenders. Where possible, we need
to involve the same experts and operators in both missions. CIAs newly

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created Directorate of Digital Innovation may prove to be a model worth

emulating in this regard across the IC.
When these principles are viewed together, it becomes clear that successful
implementation requires a deft integration of complex skills and disparate
technologies, approaches, and missions. Therefore, despite the greater
emphasis on commercial technologies, highly complex systems engineering skills will continue to be called upon to retain our technological edge
in intelligence. Ironically, these are the same skills possessed by the ICs
traditional government contractors. Finally therefore, we must maintain
this strong traditional supplier base, whose capacity for innovation is often
underestimated and whose continued health cannot simply be assumed.

e envision the next President as an advocate-leader of U.S. intelligence, not a distrustful overseer. He or she, along with the DNI, will

need to convince Congress to restore, modernize, and stabilize statutory

authorities and funding. That leadership should focus on building a partnership with Congress. So too, should the next Administration make it a
priority to enact new authorities to fully enable intelligence to help defend
the nation against cyber attack, and other 21st-century threats. Also, the next
President needs to incentivize legal, measured risk-taking by the Intelligence Community, not risk avoidance. Operational imagination and boldness
should be the watchwords. Finally, the White House must place operational
security ahead of public relationsno White House intelligence leaks.
At the same time, the next President must have realistic expectations for
intelligence; he or she must accept that it can never inoculate the Administration from Black Swans or our own bad judgment. The next President must
also understand that covert action cannot be a substitute for policy, but it
can be a very effective policy tool as long as it adheres strictly to the law.
So too must the next Administration understand that greater transparency,
while preserving what must be kept secret in certain intelligence endeavors, will help engender greater support without necessarily compromising
secrecy in other areas.

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CHAPTER 22: COUNTERING NUCLEAR THREATS

Robert Joseph & Rebeccah Heinrichs

More than a decade after al-Qaeda attacked the United States, national
leaders are again turning their attention to adversary states. The June 2015
National Military Strategy states:
For the past decade, our military campaigns primarily have
consisted of operations against violent extremist networks. But
today, and into the foreseeable future, we must pay greater
attention to challenges posed by state actors. They increasingly
have the capability to contest regional freedom of movement
and threaten our homeland. Of particular concern [is] the
proliferation of ballistic missiles, precision strike technologies,
unmanned systems, space and cyber capabilities, and weapons of
mass destruction (WMD)technologies designed to counter U.S.
military advantages and curtail access to the global commons.

Thus, while Americas leaders cannot neglect threats like the Islamic
State, they must think seriously about how to deter and dissuade adversarial
state actors.
Throughout the Cold War, deterrence was at the center of the national
strategy of containment across Democrat and Republican administrations
alike. It was the focus of much intellectual capital as reflected in the evolution
of doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response. Throughout, doctrine guided force development and deployments, most notably in fielding
the strategic Triad that provided for the escalation control and assured
retaliation that were essential to the success of deterrence. While President
Reagan oversaw one of the largest offensive modernization programs in U.S.
history, he rejected mutually assured destruction on both moral and security
grounds. Instead, he envisioned strategic defenses as key to maintaining
peace and protecting the United States from attack. But the Cold War ended
before missile defenses were integrated into the U.S. strategic posture.
The end of the Soviet Union brought a fundamental change in how Ameri-

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can leaders viewed nuclear weapons. Many now assumed them to be weapons
of little utility. For some, particularly on the Left, they were described as relics. Among senior military officers, with the exception of the concern with
loose nukes from Russia or Pakistan falling into the hands of terrorists,
nuclear weapons were perceived as irrelevant to the threats that confronted
the nation. Perhaps they had a role as instruments of last resort against an
undefined existential future threat, or perhaps to respond to an attack by
a rogue state with weapons of mass destruction, but these were abstract
notions that concerned events presumed to be of very low probability.
With the specter of nuclear annihilation seemingly removed, the U.S.
government eliminated thousands of theater weapons, including whole
classes of systems that had been considered essential to deter the Red Army.
Large numbers of strategic forces were also cut and investments in the
U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructurebroadly defined to include warheads,
delivery vehicles, and supporting command, control and intelligence functionswere downsized and delayed. Equally important, U.S. operational
competence declined as reflected in a number of public incidents of security
and leadership failures.
As the sole superpower, many in the United States believed it could rely on
its conventional superiority in any part of the globe to deter or prevail over
any threat. Each successive iteration of U.S. defense doctrine reduced further the role of nuclear weapons. Each successive budget ensured a further
decline in nuclear capabilities.
At the national policy level, every Administration from Bush 41 to the present has sought to reduce the number of weapons in the arsenal. But for the
Obama Administration, and for President Obama personally, seeking deep
reductions, as well as prohibiting the development of any new nuclear capabilities, became one of his highest foreign policy goals. Rather than seeing
U.S. nuclear weapons as necessary for deterring nuclear conflict and for discouraging nuclear proliferation, the President has seemed motivated by an
ideological opposition to nuclear weapons themselves. The Prague Agenda,
laid out by the President in April 2009, called for a step-by-step process

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to reduce and ultimately eliminate the worlds nuclear weapons.

For this cause, President Obama was prepared to lead by example. He
instituted a no new nuclear capabilities policy. He negotiated the 2010
New START agreement that compels U.S. cuts but allows Russia to build
up. Supported by prominent elder statesmen and well-funded anti-nuclear
organizations, the global zero movement came to characterize much of
the thinking about nuclear weapons, at least in the Westand this was a
trend the President clearly and vocally supported and even came to lead.
Many reasoned that if the U.S. government was prepared to show the way,
others would join the effort to diminish the numbers and strategic significance of nuclear weapons, ideally all the way down to abolition. Unfortunately,
no other state has followed.
While Americas adversaries cheered self-imposed constraints on U.S.
nuclear forces, they saw great utility in their own possession of nuclear
weapons. For some, like Russia, such weapons promised to neutralize or
overcome U.S. and NATO conventional military superiority, providing the
most important capability for deterrence and defense. For others, nuclear
weapons promised protection against external intervention, permitting
brutal regimes like that of the Kim dynasty in North Korea to survive and
to some extent prosper with income from missile and nuclear proliferation
sales. For all adversaries, nuclear weapons could serve as tools of intimidation and blackmail.
In recent months, Moscow and Pyongyang have both issued nuclear
threats against U.S. friends and allies, and against the United States itself.
In particular, with Russias aggression against Ukraine and the prospect that
President Putin may have additional expansionist designs, it is clear that
we must reexamine our assumptions about deterrence and devote serious
thought to how best to use our strategic forces to prevent war.
Three cases demonstrate the need to re-think deterrence in the contemporary security environment. The first is Russia. The second, and likely
more enduring, is China, a rising power that sees the United States as the
principal barrier to its aspiration of becoming the dominant force in Asia.

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The third case is the nuclear-armed rogue state, including North Korea and
Iran. The Bush 43 administration developed presidential guidance on this
emerging challenge that served as a foundation for policy decisions such
as withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and deploying
defenses against small-scale missile attacks from North Korea or Iran. However, much of that thinking has atrophied in the past six years as the focus
shifted to the Obama Administrations Prague Agenda.
At the same time, U.S. missile defense capabilities have atrophied alongside the U.S. nuclear posture. Once envisioned by President Reagan as a way
to protect the American population from the threat of nuclear attack, initial
deployment of strategic missile defense began in 2004 as a way to defend
against rogue-state threats to the homeland. But the Obama Administration reversed this initiative by reducing the number of interceptors and
cancelling all programs designed to stay ahead of qualitative threats. Those
programs include work on the multiple kill vehicle (MKV), the boost phase
kinetic energy interceptor (KEI), and the airborne laser (ABL) project. The
Administration also cancelled the deployment of ground-based interceptors to Europe for the sake of the ill-fated re-set with Russia. Its replacement met the same fate. The SM3 IIB, the only component of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach with the capability to engage Iranian ICBM-class
missiles, was eliminated. Many of the same people who advocate for less
reliance on nuclear deterrence also oppose missile defense, even though
missile defense has the same goal as deterrence by dint of other means:
namely, to minimize the prospect of nuclear weapons use so as to diminish
their significance as a political factor in strategic competitions.

ach of the three nuclear threats noted above deserves greater scrutiny.
Russia is the place to start. As the incoming chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff stated, Russia is now the paramount nuclear threat. In fact, most U.S.
political and military leaders now view Russia as a strategic threat. General Philip M. Breedlove, who serves as SACEUR and head of the European

Command, recently stated: Russia is blatantly attempting to change the

rules that have been the foundation of European security for decades. The
challenge posed by a resurgent Russia is global and enduring. What we see
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suggests growing Russian capabilities, significant military modernization,

and ambitious strategic intent.76
President Putins view of the United States and NATO as a threat to Russia is clear. His message has been consistent since 2007 when he denounced
the United States for seeking to undermine global security through the
illegitimate use of force. The latest Russian military doctrine explicitly
identifies NATO as the top threat to Russia. At the same time, Russia has
shown contempt for arms control agreements by violating the Budapest
Memorandum, which committed the signatories to respect the territorial
sovereignty of Ukraine, and by violating the Intermediate-range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF). In neither case has Russia faced any meaningful consequences for its violations.
Many claim we are witnessing the start of a new cold war, but such
terminology is misleading. Todays situation is different and presents new
challenges. There is no significant ideological competition in U.S.-Russian
enmity and there is no multi-million-man Red Army stationed in the heart
of Europe. A further difference with implications for the success or failure of
deterrence is the fact that Russia and the United States now have divergent
approaches toward nuclear weapons.
In the Cold War both sides were determined to maintain parity at a
minimum. But, to quote the National Intelligence Council, Nuclear
ambitions in the United States and Russia over the last twenty years
have evolved in opposite directions. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security strategy is a U.S. objective, while Russia is pursuing
new concepts and capabilities for expanding the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategy.77 The differences manifest themselves in an
array of areas. One side, Russia, is enlarging its nuclear arsenal while the
other side, the United States, is reducing its forces and is only haltingly
addressing its decaying infrastructure and the needed modernization
76
General Breedlove, Press Conference at the Pentagon, April 30, 2015 (accessed at http://
www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=5624).
77
Director of National Intelligence Global Trends 2030 Report, p. 69 (accessed at http://www.
dni.gov/files/documents/GlobalTrends_2030.pdf).

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of its delivery platforms. Further, the U.S. government today favors

ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fatally flawed
treaty that would undermine the prerogative of future American leaders to
resume the testing of nuclear weapons if deemed necessary to ensure their
effectiveness and therefore credibility.
For its part, Russia has moved beyond Cold War deterrence. Moscow has
thought strategically about the role of nuclear weapons in todays security
setting by considering anew the relationship between conventional and
nuclear forces. It has concluded that the role of nuclear weapons is greater
than in the past. Nuclear weapons are the self-declared first priority of the
defense of the Russian state, as repeatedly reaffirmed in military publications
and in exercises. In both, strategic nuclear weapons provide for deterrence
of nuclear or conventional attack on Russia. Theater weapons and limited
nuclear use against conventional military targets are seen as a means to
de-escalate a conventional conflict on favorable terms. Here Russias doctrine
assumes an asymmetry of interests and a lack of willingness on the part of
the enemy to risk nuclear war.
Russian thinking is backed by an expansion of nuclear capabilities across
the board: heavy and mobile ICBMs, new SSBNs and SLBMs, upgrading of
Bear H and Backfire bombers, and the maintenance of vastly superior theater
nuclear forces. Earlier this year, the chief of Russias armed forces, pointing
to a large-scale modernization plan through the next five years, said that a
strong nuclear arsenal will ensure military superiority over the West.78
President Putins thinking reflects a traditional view of power politics.
In his words: We should not tempt anyone by allowing ourselves to be
weak.79 If Russian weakness is seen as provocative, perhaps the reverse is
also thought to be true: The weakness of Russias enemies is an opportunity
to advance Russias interests. Contrast this with the view articulated in the
U.S. National Security Strategy published this past January. At a time when
78

Thomas Grover, Russia Says Nuclear Arms to Keep Edge Over NATO, United States,
Reuters, January 30, 2015.
79
Vladmir Putin, Being Strong: Why Russia Needs to Rebuild Its Military, Foreign Policy,
February 21, 2012.

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Ukraine was in crisis, the Middle East in turmoil, and negotiations with Iran
were leading knowingly to an acceptance of that country as a nuclear weapons threshold state, the Presidents introduction mentions aggression by
Russia giving rise to anxieties about global security, but it does so in the
same sentence that includes the challenges of climate change and infectious
diseases. The emphasis is on limitations of U.S. resources and embracing
constraints on our use of new technologies.
What stands out in President Obamas message is the reaffirmation of his
2009 Prague speech. In the same paragraph in which he falsely asserts that
Irans nuclear program has been halted, he doubles down on the need to take
steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. Both are dangerous illusions.
After six years of failed policies with Russia, Syria, Iran, and elsewhere, the
President holds to the fallacy of leading by example through what amounts
to unilateral disarmament.

ompared to the United States and Russia, China has a comparatively

small nuclear and missile force. Since first testing a nuclear weapon in

1964, China has held an official no first use policy, originally meaning that
Beijing would use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack. But
in recent years China has undergone a modernization program to qualitatively and quantitatively improve its strategic forces and has suggested that
its interpretation of no first use may have changed.
Additionally, Chinese rhetoric involving nuclear weapons has become
increasingly more provocative. In October 2013, Chinese government-run
media reports outlined various hypothetical plans regarding how China
would attack the United States with nuclear weapons. It is not a surprise that
China would be war-gaming scenarios, but what is worth noting is that the
government, normally very opaque about its strategic objectives, decided to
make such plans public and in such a provocative and detailed manner.
While the Pentagon has reported on Chinese advances in nuclear capabilities, little is known about them due to Beijings lack of transparency. Chinas Second Artillery has built more than 3,000 miles of tunnels referred to
as The Underground Great Wall. It is reasonable to deduce that elements

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of Chinas missile and nuclear programs may be concealed within those

tunnels. Another troubling advancement is the modernization of Chinese
ICBMs, capable of reaching the United States, to carry multiple nuclear warheads. The missile that has received the most press attention and has featured in congressional hearings, the DF-21 carrier killer, poses an acute
risk to U.S. aircraft carriers.
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), while placing a lesser emphasis
on the challenges of China compared to Russia, recognized the significant
uncertainty about Chinas long-term objectives and how nuclear weapons
might contribute to their achievement. In particular, Chinese military writings discuss the potential of limited nuclear use at the upper end of Chinas
asymmetric anti-access/area denial doctrine, which is a central component
of a broader strategy. Additionally, seeing an opportunity to gain leverage
over the United States in other domains, China has been actively improving
its sophisticated cyber, anti-space, and hypersonic capabilities.
Beijing has also been participating in the missile market. A 2010 Deputy
Director of National Intelligence report to Congress concluded, Chinese
entities continue to supply a variety of missile related items to multiple customers including Iran, Syria and Pakistan. Chinas well-documented cooperation on Pakistans nuclear program continues to be a serious problem
and raises questions regarding whether the Chinese government knew about
the A.Q. Kahn network, which sold uranium enrichment technology to Iran,
and Libya. In April 2012, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta confirmed
that China had provided some assistance to North Koreas ballistic missile
program, which is a violation of multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions.
China has also reacted to U.S. missile defense deployment in the Pacific
in ways similar to Russias reaction to missile defense deployments in
Europe. As the U.S. government works to support its allies Japan and South
Korea from the threat of missile attack from North Korea, China has been
adamantly opposed, seeing the defensive systems as undermining its deterrent. Unfortunately, rather than remaining committed to the security of
U.S. allies, the Obama Administration has offered to cancel elements of its

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regional missile defense plans if only Beijing would cooperate on pressuring

North Korea. This offer has only served to undermine U.S. credibility.

ince the 1994 Agreed Framework, North Korea has received numerous
concessions, most recently in the Six-Party talks with the United States,

Japan, South Korea, Russia, and China. As noted in Chapter 14, each time
Pyongyang has promised to denuclearize, it has failed to follow through.

The pattern is clear: When negotiations reach an impasse, the North takes a
provocative action that then leads to more concessions and to more negotiations marked by yet more unredeemable North Korean promises.
After violating multiple agreements to denuclearize, North Korea has (or
is on the brink of deploying) ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads.
It has conducted three nuclear tests based on reprocessed plutonium and on
a covert uranium enrichment program. It declared itself a nuclear weapons
state. North Korea may have a dozen weapons, and perhaps 20-40, by 2020.
Its missiles can already strike Japan and South Koreaand are believed to
have the ability to carry nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads; North
Korean ICBMs are designed to coerce the U.S. government by holding even
a few American cities hostage to blackmail. North Korea is also the worlds
number one proliferator, supplying missiles to Iran and any other states
with the means to pay. It was the principal source for the Syrian nuclear
reactor destroyed by Israel in 2007.
The Bush Administration applied tough financial sanctions on the DPRK
in 2005, but relaxed them in 2007 in a failed effort to get Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear program. The Obama Administration once promised
unconditional engagement with North Korea but has retreated to a passive
policy of strategic patience, which basically means it has done nothing
about this growing threat. Working with allies, the new U.S. administration
should institute new targeted sanctions and interdictions to undermine
North Koreas ability to transfer illicit funds, weapons, and fissile materials.
The U.S. government must also keep ahead of the threat with improved missile defenses, especially against long-range missiles.

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rans nuclear and ballistic missile programs have become strategic instruments intended to achieve strategic effects. Short- and medium-range

missiles, even if armed only with conventional warheads, are tools of intimi-

dation against neighbors and against U.S. forces in the region. Medium- and
long-range missiles, and particularly ICBM-class missiles under development,
could hold American and European cities hostage to nuclear attack, providing
a means of deterring U.S. assistance to regional allies. Longer-range missiles
may also provide a sense of protection against external intervention, permitting Iran to continue its support for terrorism, to backstop its quest for
regional hegemony, and to further repress its own people, the foremost threat
to the regimes survival. One must also consider the use of these missiles
against Israel. The mullahs often threaten Israel with destruction, and Israel
takes these threats seriously, as it must.
The stated goal of the P5+1 evolved from denying Iran a nuclear weapons capability by banning enrichment to the much more limited objective
of temporarily extending the breakout time to 12 months. This fundamental change in the U.S. negotiating position recognizes, and indeed both
accepts and legitimates, Iran as a nuclear weapons threshold state. Even in
the highly unlikely circumstance that all U.S. negotiating goals were to be
met, after the agreements restrictions either expire or are abandoned Iran
would be back to possessing the capacity to break out within a few months
or weeks.
The failure to constrain Irans missile build up in any way, too, magnifies
the flaws in the agreement. In an operational context, nuclear warheads are
the only feasible payload for Irans long-range missiles. As for weaponization, it remains unclear how much progress Iran has made. The November
2011 IAEA report identified 12 activities with potential military application,
some, including a missile warhead design, that are only associated with
nuclear weapons. In the intervening years, Iran has stonewalled the IAEA,
denying it access to facilities, documentation, and people to investigate
these past and perhaps still ongoing programs, all of which violate multiple
UN Security Council resolutions.

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Any agreement that allows Iran to continue to build its ballistic missile
force while simultaneously permitting Iran to maintain, if not expand, its
nuclear infrastructure will have severe national security consequences
for the United States and its friends and allies. Iran will almost certainly
become the dominant power in the Gulf. In the past decade, Irans malevolent presence has grown in Syria and Lebanon, and more recently in Iraq and
Yemen. Hence, with the lifting of all restrictions on its nuclear and missile
programs, as well as the end of the conventional weapons embargo, Irans
capabilities and appetite will certainly only grow.
Another consequence of a bad agreement is the increased prospect for
nuclear proliferation. One likely result of Irans greater capabilities and influence, reinforced by a growing skepticism among U.S. allies about our resolve
to defend their interests, will be decisions by other Gulf states to acquire a
nuclear capability similar to Irans. Saudi Arabia has already made clear that
it will want what Iran is permitted. And Turkey, Egypt, and perhaps others
will want to ensure that they are not too many, if any, steps behind Iran. An
agreement that effectively provides an international stamp of approval to
Irans ongoing nuclear activities will only encourage other proliferators.
Finally, because the United States and other P5+1 members have agreed
to exclude ballistic missiles in the negotiations, and indeed lift the restrictions on missiles in eight years or less from the time of the deals implementation, the message to other rogue states will be that we are not serious
about imposing costs for missile proliferation. This could further incentivize
states seeking weapons of mass destruction to acquire ballistic missiles as a
means of delivery. For Iran, it could encourage even closer cooperation with
North Korea on the transfer of missile technology and perhaps in the nuclear
weapons field. With hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief over
time, Irans military and its Revolutionary Guards will have access to more
resources for more missiles, for more weapons across the spectrum, and for
more terrorist activities.

f these are the principal threats, what must we do about them? The answer
depends on understanding that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is a key agent

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for peace and stability.

U.S. nuclear doctrine must once again resume a central role in the broader
national security strategy. That strategy should define national level goals
and outline the means to achieve them through the integration of all instruments of statecraft: diplomatic, economic, intelligence, strategic communications, and others. Above all, modernization is paramount. Specifically, we
must maintain the triad, which provides for optimal flexibility and resilience.
Each leg (bombers, submarines, and intercontinental ballistic missiles) has
unique characteristics that contribute to deterrence. We must also fully
modernize the nuclear force and infrastructure: warheads, delivery systems,
and nuclear labs alike require investment. We must also do what is necessary
to assure allies of the U.S. extended deterrent, which shields more than 30
countries. And we must not sign treaties like the CTBT that would compromise the U.S. ability to test if necessary to maintain the safety and reliability
of the stockpile. While the United States is taking some steps to modernize
its strategic platforms and address the deterioration of the nuclear weapons
infrastructure, it is proceeding in a slow, uncertain, and piecemeal fashion
and in the absence of a coherent strategic framework that is vital to guiding
planning and investments.
We must also accelerate the deployment of effective missile defenses. We
must develop the best missile defense system possible to protect our homeland, our forces, and our allies from attack from any source. We must reject
the current policy of trading away missile defense prospects in a futile effort
to appease regimes that object.
A major improvement to the current system would be the development of
a space layer. Space is the ultimate vantage point from which sensors can
improve the effectiveness of the present missile defense system, and also
from which interceptors could most effectively defeat missiles in their boost
phase of flight, which, because it comes before it can release decoys and
countermeasures, is the ideal stage to intercept a missile. There is currently
no treaty that prohibits using space for defensive purposes. Russia and China
have already militarized space and will likely continue to expand their

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activities in space to achieve strategic advantage over the United States.

The first steps to move toward incorporating a space-based interceptor
layer would include commissioning architectural studies, proof of concept
demonstrations, cost assessments, and acquisition planning.
We should fully fund the Missile Defense Agency and maintain a predictable and steady level of funding. We should support an aggressive testing
schedule without penalizing the MDA for missed intercepts. Rather than cancelling cutting-edge technologies as the Obama Administration did, we must
invest in advanced technologies, including directed energy technologies. We
must increase funding for homeland missile defenses, especially in view of
the emerging Iranian nuclear-armed ICBM threat. At a minimum, this should
include modernizing the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system and moving ahead with an interceptor site on the East Coast.
We must also support strengthening and expanding cooperation with
allies, including countries that feel threatened by states such as Russia, China,
Iran, and North Korea. The success of Israels Iron Dome missile defense
program is perhaps one of the best examples of what is possible when the
United States works to support an allys defense and when missile defense is
viewed primarily as a security requirement. In June 2014, when Hamas began
launching short-range rockets from Gaza into Israel, Iron Dome successfully
intercepted nearly 90 percent of the rockets it set out to intercept.
We have come a long way from the Star Wars controversy of the 1980s, a
time when the technological feasibility of effective missile defense could
provoke honest skepticism. With a range of relevant technologies today
that were unimaginable three decades ago, there is no doubt that we can do
this; we require only the intellectual wherewithal and the political will to
make it happen.
As to intellectual wherewithal, it is vital that we re-examine both deterrence and defense at the strategic level. This begins by appreciating the
reality that the best means to prevent war is when America has a capability
second-to-none and a perceived resolve that leaves no doubt that we will
protect our country, our forces deployed abroad, and our allies. We must

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return to President Reagans contention that allowing our nation to remain

vulnerable to nuclear threats is intolerable; if we can develop and deploy
systems to protect itand now we canwe must do so.

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CHAPTER 23: ENERGY SECURITY

Jeffrey Kupfer

A decade ago, the U.S. energy situation looked bleak. The gap between
domestic energy production and consumption was widening, and that trend
seemed likely to continue indefinitely. In 2005, the United States imported
30 percent of its total energy consumption (up from roughly 20 percent
during the 1990s), and in that years Annual Energy Report, the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) projected that net imports would rise to 38
percent in 2025. Today, ten years later, the situation is dramatically different.
Net U.S. imports of total energy consumption fell to 13 percent in 2013, and
analysts now project that domestic supply will continue to outpace domestic
consumption. In the reference case for its 2015 report, the EIA foresees
imports and exports coming into balance in 2028 (and, in some alternative
scenarios, that crossover happens as early as 2019).
Moreover, energy has been one of the few bright spots in an otherwise
tepid economic recovery. The consulting firm IHS CERA has estimated that
the countrys new oil and gas productiongenerally referred to as unconventional productionwas responsible for very nearly 40 percent of overall GDP growth from 2008 to 2013. Last year, the White House Council of
Economic Advisors reported that increased oil and natural gas production
alone contributed more than 0.2 percent to real GDP growth in both 2012
and 2013, a substantial component of the overall economic growth rate of
2.3 percent during those years. Furthermore, a recent study from the Harvard Business School and the Boston Consulting Group concluded that in
2014 this unconventional production supported about 2.7 million jobs. Even
more noteworthy is that those jobs paid, on average, nearly twice the average
national salary.
Yet while the countrys fortunes have changed for the better, the U.S. government still seems stuck in the past. Rather than embracing, encouraging,
and employing our newfound bounty, policymakers seem, at best, conflicted
and ineffective, and, at worst, hostile to developing and using our resources.

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We should be celebrating these achievements, developing and implementing

policies that reflect this new reality and encouraging more of the same. The
next Administration should approach energy policy with a mind to leading the United States into a new era in which we deploy Americas energy
resources to strengthen both our economy and our national security.
Energy policy contains many elements, including maintaining a stable and
predictable regulatory system, supporting basic research and development
of new energy technologies, accounting for the environmental and climate
implications of energy production and use, and recognizing the ultimate
market-driven realities at work. What is truly new and deserves the next
Administrations focus, however, is the growing capacity to translate the
revolution of U.S. energy production into significant domestic and foreign
policy benefits.

he changes in the U.S. energy landscape have been truly remarkable.

The first shot in the arm came in the natural gas sector. As of 2005,

the prevailing view was that U.S. supply could not keep up with domestic
consumption, and thus the country would need to rely more on imported

liquefied natural gas (LNG). In 2003, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified that in order to deal with higher and more volatile natural gas
prices the United States would need a major expansion of LNG terminal
import capacity.80 In 2005, the EIA projected that LNG imports would grow
from 0.4 trillion cubic feet in 2003 to 6.4 trillion cubic feet in 2025.
But the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturingand
the resulting shale galeturned all these predictions upside-down. Since
2005, U.S. natural gas production has risen every year, from 18.05 trillion
cubic feet in 2005 to 25.7 trillion cubic feet in 2014, more than a 40 percent
increase. Natural gas from shale, which was not even measured in 2005,
accounted for 11.4 trillion cubic feet in 2013. By 2010, discussion had shifted
to the viability of LNG exports from the United States; most analysts now
expect the United States to become a net natural gas exporter within the
next few years.
80

Testimony to the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Committee, June 2003.

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Meanwhile, entrepreneurs began applying the same techniques that had

been used for natural gas development to domestic oil fields. In 2005, the
United States produced an average of about 5.2 million barrels per day of
crude oil, an amount that had hovered near that level for years. But starting
in 2008, production rose steadily, reaching an average of 8.7 million barrels
for 2014. During the first six months of 2015, crude oil production averaged
9.5 million barrels per day.
Combined with greater efficiency in domestic oil use (another positive
trend), U.S. production increases have also reversed the oil import story. In
December 2005, the United States had net imports of about 12.5 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products, which was 60 percent of our
overall consumption of almost 21 million barrels per day. By June 2015, net
imports dropped to 5.1 million barrels per day, a little more than 25 percent
of consumption.
While most developed countries are slowing their consumption of petroleum liquids, the EIA sees continued growth (at about 2 percent per year)
for developing countries, with roughly two-thirds coming from China, India,
and other Asian countries. Energy needs around the world will grow, and the
United States stands in an excellent position to capitalize on that situation.
But the speed of the private sector in developing domestic resources has
not been matched by the U.S. government, which has seemed alternatively
indifferent or unwelcoming to the new reality and the resulting opportunities. We have seen this approach manifest itself in regulatory policy impacting production, infrastructure, and export markets.
Federal regulations for fossil fuel production in the United States have
been inconsistent and slow developing, and thus have caused much uncertainty for market participants. Regulations and permitting for infrastructure have suffered from the same problem. Regardless of what one thinks
of the merits of the Keystone XL Pipeline, the projects seven-year odyssey
has been a lesson in how not to handle an important decisionand at the
time of this writing, the issue still remains unresolved. The entire process
has created doubt, damaged our relationship with Canada, and crowded out

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more substantive energy discussions. During that same period, U.S. imports
of crude oil from Canadian oil sands have increased by nearly as much as the
projected capacity of the pipeline, but this oil has been transported by rail,
which is both less efficient and less safe.
As for export policy, Federal law requires government approval for gas
exports from the United States. If the U.S. government has a free trade
agreement in place with the recipient country, the Department of Energy
(DOE) will automatically deem the application to be consistent with the
public interest. However, when lacking a free trade agreementas is the
case with Japan (the worlds largest LNG market), China, and the European
UnionDOE will hold a hearing and study whether the application is in the
public interest.
The first LNG export applications were filed in 2010. It took more than
two years for the first non-FTA application to be fully approved, and even
now, only six have received DOEs final approval. During this period, billiondollar investment decisions remained in limbo, and U.S. allies around the
world wondered whether the U.S. government would let its companies provide
a needed resource. Even now, while the pace of approvals has picked up,
questions remain about the timing and criteria to be used to decide on
applications.
Meanwhile, there has been even more tentativeness infecting policymaking regarding crude oil exports. Forty years ago, reacting to the Arab
oil embargo and domestic price controls, Congress enacted a ban on U.S.
crude oil exports. The law provided the President with discretion to lift
the ban for certain countries, sellers, or classifications judged to be in the
national interest. President Reagan first used this waiver authority to allow
unlimited crude exports for internal use within Canada, and then Presidents
George H.W. Bush and Clinton used it for more narrowly tailored purposes.
With skyrocketing domestic oil production, there is an increasing mismatch
between the lighter types of oil produced in the United States and the heavier
crude that U.S. refineries are configured to process. As such, the price for
domestic oil has been consistently lower than the worldwide price, and, with231

out a worldwide outlet, analysts expect a reduction in the growth of domestic

production, with a corresponding impact on jobs and economic growth.
Nevertheless, there has been little movement within the Executive Branch
to allow crude oil exports, despite some recent pressure from Congress. After
a lengthy wait, the Commerce Department recently allowed some crude oil
swaps with Mexico. The Department has also issued a few discrete rulings
that allow exports of processed condensate (a very light hydrocarbon liquid),
but there is still uncertainty about how much processing is necessary to
get into the refined product category (which is exempt from the ban). The
Obama Administration has promised to study the overall issue, but no concrete activity is in evidence, and one cannot detect the slightest indication
that the President is considering using his authority to provide any broadbased exemptions.
There are several reasons why the U.S. government should be embracing
the development of domestic resources, and actively facilitating their entry
into world markets. First, it is good for our economy. The EIA estimates that
expanded LNG exports could increase GDP by 0.05 to 0.2 percent over the
2015-40 period. While some studies predict a slight rise in domestic natural
gas prices as a result of opening up the export market, any increase would be
more than offset by higher employment and investment in the sector.
As for crude oil, IHS estimates that lifting the ban would add $86 billion to
$170 billion annually to U.S. GDP between 2016 and 2030. Higher U.S. production would put more oil on the world markets, thereby lowering worldwide prices for both crude oil and refined products such as gasoline. It may
sound counterintuitive to non-expertsand this has been one of the political
problems with moving forward to void or adjust the 1975 export banbut
virtually every study shows that lifting the ban would lower consumer prices
at the pump by at least a few cents per gallon.
Second, the freer flow of oil and natural gas is consistent with a commitment to free trade, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. international
economic policy for decades. During the past few years, the reduction in
net crude imports has already improved our trade balance, and expand-

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ing exports of LNG and especially crude oil would bolster this trend. As we
push for additional free trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership in Asia and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership in
Europeor when we complain about other governments restricting imports
or exportsobsolete U.S. export policies undermine our own arguments.
Third, U.S. energy exports could greatly benefit U.S. allies, strengthening
existing relationships and building new ones. Over the next few decades,
much of the worldwide energy growth will take place in Asia, and those
countries are hungry for access to U.S. energy supplies. Japan and South
Korea are almost completely dependent on imports of liquefied natural gas.
As for oil, the top importing countries (besides the United States) are China,
Japan, South Korea, and India. Besides the prospect of lower global energy
prices, global markets will benefit from an increase in supply from a more
stable part of the world, and a diversity of transport routes that will help to
alleviate risk from current maritime bottlenecks. For European countries,
which receive about 30 percent of their oil and natural gas from Russia, the
availability of more U.S. energy supplies would allow them to diversify their
sources of supply and reduce Russian leverage on them.
Fourth, energy exports would help build U.S. diplomatic leverage (whether
we use that leverage effectively is a separate question). It is well understood
that lower worldwide oil prices have harmed the economies, and arguably
limited the influence, of countries such as Iran, Venezuela, and Russia. Less
well understood is that increased U.S. production has helped to facilitate the
imposition and severity of energy-related sanctions. It clearly would have
been much more difficult to convince oil-consuming countries to boycott
Iranian oiland potentially deal with higher oil prices as a resultif the
United States was not adding millions of barrels per day to the global market. The same dynamic occurred as the U.S. and its European allies debated
whether to impose sanctions on Russias energy sector. Looking forward, the
growth of U.S. energy production and its availability on the world market
should help the U.S. government to build international support for new or
broader energy sanctions, should they become necessary.

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t the same time that we extoll the benefits of increased energy production for our economic and national security, we must keep it all

in context.
First, we need be realistic about the volumes and timing. While increased
U.S. production and exports of oil and gas are having tangible impacts, they
cannot transform the energy situation overnight. The global gas market is
about 328 billion cubic feet (bcf) per day, with LNG accounting for about

31 bcf per day. As a point of comparison, the EIA predicts less than six bcf
per day of U.S. LNG exports by 2020. Meanwhile, the global oil market is
currently over 93 million barrels per day, and increased U.S. production will
range up to a few million barrels per day.
Second, while there is available regasification capacity (mainly in Europe),
maximizing the impact of these new supplies requires massive, global infrastructure investment that will take years, if not decades, to construct and
operationalize. For instance, many European countries that are most dependent on Russia for energy supplies cannot shift easily and quickly to other
sources, even if they become available on the open market.
Third, the energy industry in the United States is composed of hundreds of
players, all of whom study the market and make their own business decisions.
This is a good thing; the innovation and dynamism we have witnessed would
have been impossible without it. But the role of the private sector means
that the government cannot set the agenda based solely on national security
implications. Private companies will determine, for instance, how much to
produce and where to sell their products. They will not render OPEC or Saudi
Arabia irrelevant. While increased U.S. shale production certainly adds flexibility to the global system, it is not the same as having a few state-owned companies that can make a decision and influence the market almost immediately.
Fourth, increased domestic production does bring a set of environmental
issues, including ones related to climate change, that should not be ignored
or brushed aside. The next Administration can justifiably argue, however,
that the most effective way to deal with these issues is not to bottle up
domestic energy production or to impose limitations on the export of these

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resources. To the extent that these issues are localized, they can be (and
generally have been) handled by risk-based and cost-effective regulation.
To the extent that they are global, they can be addressed by realistic, equitable, and cost-effective actions. Besides, environmental considerations cut
both ways. In part because of increased natural gas usage displacing mainly
coal, U.S. carbon dioxide emissions are now about 10 percent lower than they
were in 2005, and in April 2015, monthly power sector carbon dioxide emissions hit a 27-year low.
Finally, we cannot let our success in the oil and gas sector blind us to the
continued challenges in the energy space. In the first place, no one knows
how long the shale gale will last. We would be foolish to allow our new
optimism to become as untethered from reality as was our former pessimism. Therefore, among other things, we need to continue supporting
research that could lead to technological breakthroughs and enable us to
further diversify and sustain our energy sources. We need to let innovation
flourish, let markets work, and eliminate special interest programs that are
not sustainable. We need to revitalize our domestic nuclear industry, as we
are becoming increasingly irrelevant while other countries look to develop
and build civilian nuclear power. And we need to modernize and protect our
countrys electricity system, making sure that we can deal with new sources
of supply as well as a stressed and vulnerable grid.
The goaland the accompanying rhetoric in the next Administration
should be about energy security, not energy independence. Regardless of
whether and when the United States achieves energy self-sufficiency, it is
unrealistic and counterproductive to think of ourselves as an energy island
that is immune to events in the rest of the world. Gasoline prices in the
United States will continue to be determined in large part by the global price
of crude oil. That is already evident in Canada and Norway, for instance,
both of which are energy independent or self-sufficient in oil, but their
pump prices ride the global roller coaster just like everyone elses (markets
for natural gas are different).
But at the same time, there are clearly benefits to having a larger percent-

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age of U.S. energy consumption come from domestic sources. According to

a recent CEA analysis, the less money that the U.S. economy has to dole out
on net petroleum imports, the smaller the impact a supply disruption would
have on it. Moreover, a stable and reliable resource base, with a short and
consistent transportation system, certainly enhances our energy security.
This is why we should be focusing even more attention on greater cooperation with Canada and Mexico to form a North American energy powerhouse.
Canada is among the worlds top producers of oil and natural gas, and Mexico recently enacted a series of energy sector reforms that are designed to
reverse the countrys production declines. While there is already significant
cross-border infrastructure and trade, especially between the United States
and Canada, opportunities for more collaboration and heightened benefits
for all abound.
Yet even with the focus on North American resources, the United States
will continue to have a vital interest in the stability of global energy supplies
and infrastructure. This principle applies to many areas around the world,
but especially to the Middle East. During the past few years, the Middle East
has produced about 30 percent of the worlds crude oil supply, but its share
is projected to rise to 35 percent by 2040. And so the idea that the U.S. government can disengage from that region without any ill effects is misguided.
The past decade has transformed the U.S. energy situation from one of
relative scarcity to one of abundance. Policymakers have been slow to adjust,
failing to embrace and exploit these resources to improve our economic
and national security interests. Starting in January 2017, the next President,
working with Congress and the private sector, can change all that. The benefits of doing so are much too great to waste.

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CHAPTER 24: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Kristen Silverberg & Brian Hook

In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. government built a liberal international order resting upon U.S. economic power, military superiority, and
nascent international institutions. A new constellation of international
organizations was meant to tie the postwar world to rules and standards
around trade and security. As foreign policy conservatives, we tend to focus
our efforts on threats to U.S. economic and military predominance but
devote comparatively little energy to decay or dysfunction in international
institutions. Yet international organizations require attention along with
elements of national power.
While the U.S. government should preserve diplomatic flexibility by working outside the current institutional framework when necessary, U.S. leadership at international organizations can reinforce support for open markets,
the rule of law, international security, and effective humanitarian aid. Moreover, the negative outcomes that would result from our absence should be
neither overlooked nor underestimated. In many cases, the absence of U.S.
leadership enables our competitors to use international organizations to
frustrate critical U.S. interests.
International organizations, particularly those clustered in and around
the United Nations, encompass a vast range of institutions, each of which
poses its own set of challenges. As an example, the on-going crisis in Syria
highlights both the best and the worst of the UN. On the one hand, the
Security Councils atrocious failure to take action in Syria helped enable a
humanitarian catastrophe, while the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and UNICEF provided critical humanitarian relief. At the risk of
overgeneralizing, we propose a set of principles the next Administration can
use to maximize its effectiveness at multilateral organizations, and thereby
avoid some of the major failings of its predecessor.

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resident Obama campaigned on a commitment to personally lead a

new chapter of American engagement with international institutions,

favoring work through formal institutions rather than the coalitions of the

willing sometimes favored by the Bush Administration.81 Indeed, the President won the Nobel Prize in part based on the Committees view that multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the
role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play.82
In fact, the Obama Administration will leave office with an uninspiring
record with regard to international institutions. In addition to the Security
Councils bleak record on Syria, which enabled a devastating death toll and
the worst refugee crisis in recent history, the Councils sanctions process
on Iran collapsed after 2010, leaving both the Administration and Iran to
conclude that sanctions were running out of steam. The Administration lost
key votes on Palestinian membership in UNESCO. It acquiesced to Venezuelas election to the Security Council. The World Food Program cut back on
rations because of a lack of adequate aid.
Faced with this inheritance, the next President may be reluctant to invest
energy wading into the multilateral morass, which can wear down even the
most persistent policymaker. But with some stronger leadership, international organizations can be a valuable tool for advancing American interests.
As a first step, we must reorient U.S. priorities.
The State Department too often prioritizes what international organizations say over what they do, playing into the hands of those countries who
prefer multilateral talk shopsforums for diplomats to endlessly debate
issues with no expectation of effectively addressing them. The State Department, for example, devotes significant effort working on political statements
by the UN. In 2009, President Obama took the unprecedented step of chairing
a UN Security Council session and used the opportunity to pass a non-binding
thematic resolution on nuclear abolition (leaving French President Sarkozy to
point out that the session could have been used to do something about actual

81
82

Speech at Depaul University, October 2, 2007.

http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html

238

cases of nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran).

Generally, the State Department defaults to political statements from the
UN because they are easier and more straightforward than the painstaking
work of overseeing the operational and technical side of UN programs. In
addition, for some Administrations, particularly on the Left, UN political
statements can serve a strategic purpose by building a case for a customary international law standard that does not enjoy support domestically.
Political statements from the UN can serve a legitimate purposefor
example, by calling attention to human rights abusesand we do not
suggest abandoning them altogether. But the core value of international
organizations to the U.S. government typically lies in their ability to take
concrete action. That is why despite the telegenic qualities of the General
Assembly and the Security Council, what goes on (or fails to go on) in the
World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Program, UNICEF, and
the many other functional organizations in the UN orbit can be far more
important to U.S. interests. To take obvious examples, the IAEAs capacity
to monitor suspect Iranian nuclear sites or UNHCRs capacity to aid Syrian
refugees will be more important than any statement the General Assembly
has made in recent years.
The absence of attention to operational issues, meanwhile, creates an
opportunity for catastrophic failure. Theres no better example than the aforementioned World Health Organization, whose lackluster response to the Ebola
crisis revealed an international health system lacking plans and capabilities
to fight global pandemics. The crisis exposed a range of issues: a WHO director-general with insufficient authority and power, failures in the management
of the WHOs Africa regional office; and an array of disparate programs within
the WHO diverting time and attention away from epidemic diseases.
As one of us proposed in a Wall Street Journal column, it is time to consider a new organization with a narrower mission and a clearer chain of
command that integrates NGOs, foundations, and the private sector into

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emergency operations.83 These are the players who increasingly answer the
call and lead transformations in global health, eclipsing the WHO and its
model of statist solutions. The next President should lead efforts to create a
new international medical organization outside of the UN system to control
the spread of deadly viruses in developing areas before they reach major
population centers. Whatever the fix, it will require hands-on attention to
organizational issues.
There is no reason to limit the conception of new, trans-UN functional
organizations to medical issues. Many sub-optimally performing UN organizations could use either the prospect or the reality of competition to impel
them to up their game. The U.S. government should take functional transgovernmental needs seriously in the 21st century, so if the UN system cannot
meet the challenges, we owe it to ourselves and others to devise alternatives
that can.

art of effective leadership on these issues by the U.S. government

requires personnel appointments with expertise and focus on the details

of UN organization and management. A cabinet-level UN Perm Rep who

spends his or her time on the Sunday shows may not be the best person to
manage a serious approach to the United Nations. We prefer a sub-cabinet
official who focuses on the mechanics of negotiating Security Council resolutions, reviewing UN budgets, pressing the UN on operations and mandates,
and demanding transparent and ethical administration of programs.
As a corollary to pivoting State Department attention toward operational
issues, the next Administration must also turn the UNs attention away from
developments in New York and toward the field. Personnel now accounts
for 70 percent of UN spending, and there is a major expansion project under
way to make room for new staff in New York. This is wrongheaded; there
are more than enough international sinecures at Turtle Bay already. The
U.S. government should instead reinvigorate efforts to move UN functions,
especially those related to peacekeeping, from New York to Africa, where

83

Brian Hook, The U.N. Agency That Bungled Ebola, Wall Street Journal, October 21, 2014.

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most operational activities take place.

Although our affirmative agenda at the UN should focus more attention
on operational issues, it will, of course, be important to continue to work to
defeat irresponsible political statements by UN bodies, including by more
effectively discouraging reckless voting by U.S. partners and allies. From a
country like Venezuela or Iranin other words, one whose current regime
actively opposes U.S. interests and valuesirresponsible voting behavior is
unsurprising. But as often as not, putative partners or even formal allies
oppose the U.S. agenda at the United Nations. For more than two decades,
the U.S. government faced an annual General Assembly resolution condemning the Cuba embargo; we were frequently joined only by Israel in
opposition. Last year, Jordan, a close ally, forced a diplomatically awkward
U.S. veto of a Security Council resolution on Israeli-Palestinian issues. As
of 2013, the only major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance that consistently
voted with the United States in the UN General Assembly was Israel; each of
the other top ten recipients aligned with the U.S. position less than half of
the time. Egypt votes with the United States just one out of every four votes;
Haiti votes with us only 14 percent of the time.
Indeed, some countries use opposition to U.S. policy in New York or
Geneva to preserve street cred in their region, even as they work more
actively to build closer bilateral ties. There is a school of thought at the
State Department that we can forgive a certain amount of hypocrisy with
a wink and nod. This is generally speaking not a good idea. Bad statements can condone or even lead to bad behavior, and U.S. officials should
not act as diplomatic sadists when it comes to their own countrys principles
and interests.
One obvious response is to make a countrys behavior at international
organizations a more significant factor in our bilateral relationship. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick floated a proposal many years ago to formally tie
foreign aid to UN voting patterns, but even short of that step, we could
hold states accountable by making clear that the bilateral relationship will
depend in part on responsible voting at international organizations.

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As part of this effort, the next Administration will also need to tackle the
role of regional groups at the UN, which work to undermine the influence
of the U.S. delegation through control of the distribution of UN leadership
positions. Regional groups frequently dole out positions by nominating a
single candidate based on a rotation system, which means that states have a
strong interest in keeping members of the region happy, but that guarantees
that seats will be filled frequently by some of the worlds worst actors. As
part of an effort to address the influence of regional groups, the U.S. government in the next Administration should consistently resist efforts to nominate unqualified countries as consensus candidates, including by recruiting
countries to compete for election.

ike its predecessors, the next Administration will face growing demands
from rising powers for a larger voice in international institutions, par-

ticularly with respect to global economic governance. While the U.S. government has agreed to accommodate changes in key institutionsthe G-20

for exampleCongress, led by Republicans, has so far opposed IMF quota

reform. We support modest quota reform to shift voting power by 6 percentage points from developed and overrepresented oil producers to emerging
economies. The change would not increase total U.S. financial commitments
to the IMF and would reserve the U.S. veto over major policy decisions.
Although the U.S. position is frequently at odds with the major emerging
economies at the IMF, we have an interest in keeping them at the table,
rather than fueling support for more aggressive revisionist approaches to
economic governance.
Security Council reform, however, is a different issue with different policy
requirements. Any U.S. President, including the staunchest UN critic, will
find himself turning to the Security Council in cases of crisis, as the active
agenda of the George W. Bush Administration in the Council illustrates. A
UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) facilitates participation by allies
and can help diplomatically isolate U.S. opponents. For Europe, especially, a
UNSCR provides legal and political cover. In 2010, relatively bland language
in a UNSCR on Iran was interpreted by the European Union as laying the
groundwork for far-reaching oil and gas-related sanctions, with dramatic

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consequences for the Iranian budget and economy. It is vitally important for
the next President to make clear that, although he will not allow the Council
to hold U.S. security concerns hostage, he will engage it seriously.
There, too large an expansion, and especially one that includes spoilers, could render the Council even less likely to take concrete and effective
action. The U.S. government has previously endorsed both Japan and India
for membership, and we recommend maintaining support for both, but the
next President should make clear that any expansion will have to be small to
avoid undermining the ability of the Council to act, and that new permanent
members should not have the veto. The U.S. position should also emphasize
that additional candidates for permanent membership will be considered on
the basis of specific criteria, rather than on any notion of regional distribution. Principles could include a commitment to human rights and the rule of
law as enshrined in the UNs own principles, a demonstrated willingness to
abide by international obligations, and a record of shouldering responsibility for international peace and security, including through UN contributions
and peacekeeping missions. In particular, any permanent members (including existing members) should be prepared to contribute at least 5 percent of
the UN peacekeeping budget.

peaking of money, one persistent problem in some international organizations is the role of free rider states that benefit from the organi-

zations work but without investing in its success. This is part of the reason

why organizations with less inclusive membershipwhere countries earn

the right to jointend to be stronger than universal bodies. It is also why
organizations funded by voluntary assessments are, as a general matter,
better run than organizations funded by mandatory assessment. Competition makes voluntarily-funded organizations more responsive and effective.
Moreover, the states controlling the governing board of a voluntarily funded
organization are the ones who have a stake in its success. No investment,
no sense of ownership or responsibility; whoever first observed that no one
ever washes a rental car got the essence of the point just right.
Theres no better example of the free rider problem than the UN Gen-

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eral Assembly budget. The General Assembly operates by one country, one
vote, though dues are assessed according to a formula based in part on gross
national income. As a result, the 176 member states who contribute less than
20 percent of the budget can easily pass a decision over the objections of the
seventeen member states who contribute 80 percent. Moreover, in 1998, the
minimum assessment for countries was reduced from 0.01 percent of the regular budget to 0.001, meaning that this year 20 of the poorest countries will
be assessed only $37,000, giving them little incentive to scrutinize the UN
budget. The result is, not surprisingly, that UN members easily pass new mandates, so that the budget has almost doubled over the past dozen years. We
support proposals by Brett Schafer of the Heritage Foundation to revisit the
UN scale of assessments, including by adopting a super majority requirement
for budgetary decisions and by imposing a minimum assessment for permanent
and non-permanent Security Council members.84

hatever success the next Administration has in advancing a well-run

and transparent United Nations, the U.S.-UN relationship will never

succeed so long as one of our closest allies, Israel, is the frequent target

of UN animus. Every U.S. Perm Rep has been engaged in working to defeat
anti-Israel initiatives, though the U.S. government has lost moral clarity on
the issue since Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan stood before the General Assembly to declare the Zionism is Racism resolution a political lie
of a variety well known to the 20th century and scarcely exceeded in all that
annal of untruth and outrage.85 Indeed, current tensions between the U.S.
and Israel may invite a climate in New York and Geneva that is even more
hostile to Israel.
For one, the Obama Administration failed to engage to prevent the
election of the Palestinian Territories to UNESCO, forcing a U.S. decision
to withhold dues. As disturbingly, the Administration has threatened to
engage on a French proposal to table a Security Council resolution on a twostate solution. At the time of writing, the exact French proposal is unclear,
84
Brett Schafer, The U.S. Should Push for Fundamental Changes to the United Nations Scale
of Assessments, Heritage Foundation (June 11, 2015).
85
Speech to the United Nations General Assembly by U.S. Ambassador Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, November 10, 1975.

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but the French are likely to revive elements of a failed 2014 resolution that
called for the completion of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within a year,
and for Israeli withdrawal from (undefined) Palestinian territories by 2017.
The resolution endorsed Jerusalem as the capital of both states, thus prejudging that sensitive issue and perhaps ruling out more workable solutions.
If this proposal is still alive, the incoming Administration should make
clear that any initiative along these lines would draw a U.S. veto, consistent
with decades of policy under Republican and Democratic Administrations,
which has maintained that resolution to the conflict should come about
through negotiations between the parties themselves.
In addition, the new Administration should consider whether to withdraw
from the UN Human Rights Council (HRC). We should consult the Israelis
on this, but our sense is that formal participation in the HRC legitimizes a
deeply problematic organization without sufficient benefit to the cause of
advancing human rights. We would favor the next Administration withdrawing until the body adopts reforms, including: stronger criteria for membership (or perhaps a commitment by regions to have competitive races for each
seat); credible action on pressing human rights issues; and evenhandedness
on Israel.
Finally, as part of signaling its intention to adopt a different approach than
the Obama Administration, the next President should put serious diplomatic
support behind, and ask the Europeans to support, Israels candidacy for a
2018 non-permanent Security Council seat.

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CHAPTER 25: DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Mark Green

Americas most effective foreign policy is one that taps into all the sources
of our strength and mobilizes all our tools of leadership. Military might is
irreplaceable; economic vitality makes so much possible. But our core
national valuessuch as human liberty and democracyand our willingness
to foster and encourage them in other societies, also constitute crucial tools.
With authoritarianism rising in many parts of the world and democracy in
clear distress, we need to sharpen those tools once again. The next Administration must reclaim the democracy momentum lost these past several years
by restoring resources to crucial democracy programs, pushing back against
authoritarian attacks on civil society and emphasizing human libertyespecially freedom of conscienceas a pillar of our nations foreign policy.

he Left likes to caricature conservative foreign policy as dangerously

hawkish and quick-to-the-trigger. However, an honest reading of

history shows that our best known conservative leaders have also been the

strongest proponents of fostering democracy as a way of strengthening our

alliances and advancing our interests without resort to military force.
Winston Churchills historic Iron Curtain speech called not for military arms, but ideological ones. The answer to the growing Soviet menace,
he said, was the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy
as rapidly as possible in all countries. President Reagans 1982 address to
the British Parliament boldly predicted that communism would be left on
the ash-heap of history, but he urged the West not so much to mobilize
its military, but instead to mobilize democracy: The objective I propose
is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy. And in
1989, when President George H.W. Bush traveled to Mainz, West Germany,
to deliver his Europe Whole and Free speech, he spoke not just of our
mutual defense, but of our shared values. The momentum for freedom, he
proclaimed, comes from a single powerful idea: democracy.

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But how does promoting democracy and human liberty advance U.S.
interests? Democratic states are usually more prosperous, stable, and reliable partners. They are better economic partners because they possess the
characteristics and conditions that experience shows are vital for economic
vibrancy and sustainable growth. Because of the relationship between
democracy and long-term, sustainable economic growth, the Millennium
Challenge Corporation has wisely instituted a democracy hard hurdle that
countries must pass in order to be compact eligible. Democratic states are
also better strategic partners because they are citizen-centered, making
them less likely to produce terrorists, proliferate weapons of mass destruction, or engage in armed aggression.
Conversely, most authoritarian regimes are, at best, unreliable partners
and, at worst, pose significant risks to peace and stability. Authoritarian
regimes often give rise to refugee populations, burdening and potentially
destabilizing their neighbors. In order to maintain their hold on power, such
regimes repress their people in part by isolating their citizens from outside
ideas and influences. They often attackdirectly or indirectly, physically or
digitallythose outside their borders who represent the freedom they fear.
Finally, because over the long run authoritarians are incapable of meeting
the aspirations of their citizens, they are prone to sudden instability and are
more likely to propagate extremism.

n his speech before Parliament, when President Reagan called for a

campaign to assist democracy, he was not seeking merely another gov-

ernment bureaucracy or traditional development program. He sought to

mobilize democracy itself. Congress responded by launching the National

Endowment for Democracy (NED) and, soon, the four nonprofit core institutes that work with the NED (the Solidarity Center, the Center for International Private Enterprise, the National Democratic Institute or NDI, and
the International Republican Institute or IRI, representing the sectors of
political life fundamental to any strong democracy).
Three guiding principles shaped each institute. First, those nations that
have already won their democracy should not seek to impose democracy on

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those who have not. However, where local leaders and activists (also known
collectively as civil society) reach out for assistance in pursuing democracy,
the democratic community of nations should respond with tools, ideas, and
resources. Second, not every democracy will look the same, nor do they
need to. Democracy must be adaptable to a nations circumstances and traditions. Third, democracy promotion is most effective when it is accompanied by an honest assessment of our own democratic experience, including
its shortcomings.
Since the 1980s, President Reagans campaign to assist democracy has
produced results in many parts of the world. Nowhere have they been more
important or transformative than in Europe and Eurasia, but NED programs
have also made much headway in a variety of bad neighborhoods. The
recent experience of Mongolia and Tunisia are just two examples showing
that democracy is not only a universal value and aspiration, but that it is
attainable even in societies with scant institutional experience with democracy compared to Western ones.
Mongolias only two bordering neighbors are Russia and China, and just a
few decades ago, the Mongolian Peoples Republic was a firmly entrenched
Soviet satellite. But as communism began to collapse, Mongolian leaders
abandoned the one-party state system and pledged to pursue multi-party
democracy. In 1992, IRI began working in-country to both strengthen the
national parliament and foster the development of issue-based political
parties. In 2015, Mongolia is marking the 25th anniversary of its democratic
revolution. Eager to share its story and spread the blessings of democracy,
the government has set up a special bureau to support other Asian countries
pursuing a democratic future.
Tunisia is another emerging success story. In December 2010, throngs of
angry Tunisian youth were flocking to the streets, demanding the ouster
of authoritarian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Economic malaise and
deeply imbedded corruption stalked nearly every aspect of society. Weeks
later, Ben Ali was gone, leaving behind a power vacuumand a tempting
target for extremists. In the face of these challenges, courageous Tunisians

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commenced crafting a new democracy.

They faced two daunting tasks: first, replacing a constitution that had
enabled Ben Alis repressive, corrupt rule and, second, swiftly assembling
the necessary institutions for holding credible elections that could give new
leaders a genuine mandate for reform. In both tasks, Tunisias democratic
friends stepped forward. IRI, NDI, and others staged public forums around
the country that enabled Tunisians to discuss important reform topics such
as devolution of power, freedoms of speech and religion, transitional justice,
and womens rights. This helped Tunisia eventually to enact the Arab worlds
most progressive constitution. To assist in constructing the necessary institutions for credible elections, IRI, NDI, the International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, and others staged both long- and short-term observation
missions, and trained thousands of local observers.

ne of the most important developments in the democracy movement

occurred not in any one country or region but all across the globe: the

long overdue emergence of women in political life and leadership. Obviously,

no democracy is representative if it excludes the votes and voices of half
its population. Moreover, given the wide array of complex challenges facing
the modern world, how can any country hope to succeed if it does not tap
into all of its citizens for the leadership it needs? Even though the reasons for
making sure women are heard in the democratic process should be self-evident, in too many countries, women are relegated to minor roles. To address
this, each of the NED institutes has developed initiatives specifically aimed
at bolstering the participation of women in democracy and governing. IRIs

Womens Democracy Network, for example, has 15 formal country chapters

and 2,700 members in 61 countries.
President Reagan understood that democracy is about more than mere
voting, whether it is men or women casting ballots. His remarks to Parliament referred to the broad infrastructure of democracy, the system of a
free press, unions, political parties, universities. . . that empowers people
to shape their own future. He also understood that democracy is an empty
promise unless joined with human libertylimitations on government

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authority aimed at protecting individual freedoms and preventing democrats

from morphing into despots, whether benign or otherwise. For the American democracy movement, freedom of conscience, the right to choose your
beliefs and to pursue your faith, have always been of special importance.
After all, it was the yearning for that very freedomreligious freedomthat
first brought so many Europeans to these shores.
In more practical terms for the democracy movement, studies have
shown that, where religious persecution is a contributing cause in a conflict,
and where war is being fought along religious lines, casualties are higher
and conflicts last longer. On the other hand, where religious freedom exists
and communities are allowed to peacefully pursue and express their religious beliefsand where religious institutions as such have been cut off
from access to political powersocieties tend to be more open, pluralistic,
and stable.86
Throughout the Cold War, America stood with people of many faiths as
they opposed Communist oppression. In the years since, Americans have
advocated for persecuted Christians in North Korea, China, and Vietnam;
Muslims in Burma; and various religious communities in conflict zones
like Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and the Balkans. American support for persecuted faith communities has spanned the globe and the spectrum of religious groups. To strengthen this work, in 1998 Congress passed
the International Religious Freedom Act, which requires the President to
take religious freedom into account in developing our foreign policy. It
also established the bipartisan U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom (USCIRF), an Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom, and a Special Advisor on International Religious Freedom at the
National Security Council.
Despite these and other efforts, freedom of conscience generally and
religious freedom in particular are under renewed attack. Signs of pressure
range from violent attacks on religious minorities and their places of worship
86
See Monica Duffy Toft, Daniel Philpott, and Timothy Shah, Gods Century: Resurgent
Religion and Global Politics (W.W. Norton, 2011), and Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind
of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, 3rd Edition (University of California Press, 2003).

250

to broad government hostility toward religious practices falling outside of

government-sanctioned religious institutions. The result has been a sharp
rise in political violence and refugee crises. USCIRFs 2015 Report points to
attacks in places like Nigeria, Central African Republic, Iraq, and Syria, and
concludes that a horrified world has watched the results of what some have
aptly called violence masquerading as religious devotion.

ust as human liberty has suffered many setbacks in recent years, the
democracy movement itself now faces new challenges. Over the past

four decades, the ranks of the worlds democracies have grown threefold.
However, over the past several years, the trend has reversed. Several factors,
including instability caused by Islamic extremists, are contributing to this
shift. None, however, is more dangerous than aggressive authoritarianism,
particularly in Asia and Eurasia. New authoritarian regimes are not only
dismantling democracy in their own lands but are working to export their
ideology to neighbors.
Recent years have seen an increase in the scope and sophistication of
authoritarian attacks on civil society. Civil societys strengthening was a
major influence in democracys rapid growth. As authoritarian leaders have
recognized this, they have responded with sweeping efforts to undermine
civil society activities.
Direct attacks on civil society are nothing new. In the days of the Soviet

Gulag, Moscow often dealt with activists through brutal violence, torture,
and imprisonment. These days, many authoritarians are adding more
nuanced approaches that range from heavy-handed legal restrictions aimed
at closing down civil society activities to intimidating those who participate
in them and cutting off sources of support. Regimes have begun striking
at such groups by attacking international organizations like IRI, NDI, and
Freedom House. New restrictions prevent international groups from entering
a country, publicly expressing points of view, communicating with citizens
and domestic groups, or sharing financial resources. Unsurprisingly, Russia
and China have created two of the most restrictive anti-civil society schemes.
In 2012, Russia enacted laws requiring international democracy groups to
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register as foreign agents (which, of course, has espionage connotations).

In 2015, it went even further, giving the government nearly unlimited discretion to shut down international NGOs deemed undesirable. In July 2015,
Russias Federation Council officially called on the government to consider
adding a dozen international NGOsincluding IRI, NDI, Freedom House
and the NEDto its list of undesirable organizations.
Chinas newly proposed Foreign NGO Management Law would require
that all international NGOs secure Chinese agency sponsorship and then
register with the State Councils Public Security Department. It authorizes the Department to investigate NGO offices or activities, freeze bank
accounts, and confiscate property on a whim. It also requires NGOs to submit
annual plans for approval and provides that half of an NGOs staff must be
Chinese nationals responsible to local foreign affairs service units.
Russian and Chinese government actions seem to be inspiring other leaders and regimes in their own efforts to weaken civil society. Since 2012, more
than 90 major laws have been proposed or enacted around the world aimed
at restricting civil society and international NGO activities.
Legal schemes arent the only tool in sophisticated new attacks on
democracy. Authoritarian leadersmost notably Putins Russiaare resorting to new technology-enhanced propaganda campaigns that both justify
their own repressive actions and seek to discredit democratic leaders and
systems. In scale, these campaigns resemble 1970s-era propaganda in the
former Soviet-bloc. In method, because of social media, satellite television,
and other technological advances, modern propaganda has a vastly greater
reach. One example is the Putin-linked Sputnik media group, which aims to
have operations in nearly three dozen countries and in thirty languages. Its
programming offers a steady drumbeat of ideology-driven stories portraying
Ukrainian leaders, for example, as fascists bent on punishing Russian speakers at every turn. Russia is far from the only country running high-profile
propaganda efforts. China, Venezuela, and Iran are also significant players. For example, Irans PressTV is its international effort, broadcasting 24
hours per day in English extensively networked with bureaus located in the

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worlds most strategic cities.87

A good portion of these propaganda efforts are aimed less at discrediting
outside interests and more at polishing the image of authoritarian regimes
themselves. In some cases, authoritarian leaders try to defuse domestic
democratic movements by claiming that their country already has democracy, albeit a version different than the liberal democracy practiced in
America and the West. In his day, Reagan pushed back against these efforts
to redefine democracy with his trademark humor and wit: The other day
someone told me the difference between a democracy and a peoples democracy. Its the difference between a jacket and a straitjacket.
While not propaganda in the strictest sense, some authoritarian regimes
also funnel of resources to foreign political parties and campaigns that they
believe will support their interests. Once again, Russia is the best known
practitioner of this approach. Russian funding of far-right political parties
across Europe is one widely reported example. The European Parliament has
recognized this threat, and in June 2015 a member of that legislative body
issued a formal call for the European Union to ban such funding.

erhaps the most disappointing factor in democracys declining fortunes is occurring right here in the United States: a sharp decline in

support for democracy programs and the nonprofits established to implement them. Since the early days of the Reagan Administration, democracy
programs have always enjoyed bipartisan support. However, since 2009,
USAID support has dropped nearly 40 percent. In the most recent fiscal year
alone, funding for democracy programs in Africa, where corruption and
poor governance remain significant barriers to the continents development,
has dropped approximately 38 percent. In other words, at the very moment

when the enemies of democracy are significantly ramping up their efforts,

we appear to be ramping down.
In the area of human liberty, Americas leadership in recent years has also
been uneven. At times, America has been a vocal advocate for the release of
87

Resurgentdictatorship.org/rethinking-authoritarian-soft-power; see also, PressTV.com.

253

imprisoned religious leadership in a number of countries. On the other hand,

for example, the position of Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious
Freedom has been vacant for four of the six years of the Obama Administration.
As President Reagan told his British audience three decades ago, democracy is not a fragile flower; still it needs cultivating. Unfortunately, these
past several years show just how much ground can be lost without determined
cultivating. The next Administration should move swiftly to restore democracy and human liberty promotion as a foreign policy priority. Early on, this
means appointing a national security team that understands how to foster
liberty and why it matters. It also means using the first budget to increase
the resources available for democracy, human rights, and governance programs. Because optics and symbolism matter in politics and diplomacy, the
President should include democracy points in early foreign policy speeches
and prioritize the nomination of a globally recognizable, politically savvy
Ambassador for International Religious Freedom.
As the next term develops, the President should seize the irreplaceable
opportunity of presidential travel to advance the democracy mission. When
meeting with allies who share our democratic values, he or she should enlist
their support for a multilateral campaign to patiently and persistently
advance the cause around the world. When meeting with leaders who
oppose or are indifferent to democracy, the President should still raise the
subject and be willing to point out our disagreementeven as other priorities
are discussed. Importantly, the President should not allow human rights or
democracy to be relegated to other officials or side meetings. Doing so
sends a signal that these subjects are merely diplomatic small talk. When
traveling to countries with authoritarian leadership, the President should
push to meet with civil society representatives, both as a way of demonstrating solidarity and in order to learn firsthand about conditions. The President
should also be ready to hear such civil society voices when they visit us here
in America.
The next President should condition part of our foreign assistance upon
how a country treats civil society, including democracy and human rights

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organizations, as well as international NGOs. In egregious cases, the next

Administration should consider targeted sanctions, visa restrictions, and
other measures to signal the importance we place on how governments treat
dissenting voices.
Finally, the next President must develop an in-depth strategy for dealing with the sweeping propaganda operations being conducted by several
authoritarian regimes. He or she should overhaul the current Broadcasting
Board of Governors and reinvigorate Americas international communications efforts. In particular, America needs to better incorporate rapidly
evolving social media tools since those tools are being used to significant
effect by extremist elements and authoritarian regimes.

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CHAPTER 26: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Dan Runde

The coming years will produce a series of challenges and opportunities

that will require U.S. leadership to use international assistance as a foreign
policy tool. This has been so since foreign assistance programs began more
than fifty years ago, but the future will be different in many ways. First, we
will likely confront many more failed and failing states that enable terrorist
groups like ISIS or compound the management of global pandemics. Second,
international assistance will need to be folded into an integrated strategy of
dealing with a rising China, a very different proposition from the Cold War
problem posed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet economic model and record
was not particularly attractive to states that understood the role of markets
in development; the Chinese model and record is. But the West can offer a
far more attractive partnership to developing nations, including access to
our innovation, technology, our higher education system, our growth-driving
entrepreneurship, and the empowerment of people.
Looking to the near future, dozens of developing countries are projected to
make breathtaking economic and related social progress, and it is in our clear
interest to help them. There are growing demands for governments that are
accountable to their people as an increasingly urbanized global middle class
develops consumer tastes and both political preferences and expectations
similar to those in the West. U.S. international assistance programs can help
ensure that these rising societies participate in the rule-based system set
up by the United States after World War II, the system that has enabled the
greatest prosperity and human freedom humanity has ever known.
These and other changes in the environment are rendering the old model
for managing and funding assistance obsolete. For the U.S. government
to remain relevant, it must make hard choices on how we allocate limited
resources, reorganize our institutions to fit the challenges, and simplify how
we deliver our assistance. But in this we have one huge advantage: Nations
that have pursued growth and freedom together tend to be dramatically

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richer, freer, and healthier. They therefore have greater capacity to solve
their own problems than was the case 30 years ago. The aid endeavor in the
past often looked like Sisyphus struggling with the rock; in many cases that
metaphor, thankfully, does not apply going forward.
International assistance does not equal development. The word development denotes domestically driven economic and social progress encompassing economic growth, political freedom, improvements in health,
literacy, education, and other quality-of-life measures. Each society is
responsible for its own development, more or less by definition. Development assistance, on the other hand, describes a facet of American foreign
policy and that of other wealthier countries. But it is not the only related
facet of U.S. policy. Some U.S. government assistance provides emergency
humanitarian relief in the face of short-term crises, most often of natural
origin (floods, earthquakes, and the like). The U.S. government and associated institutions like the International Red Cross are well regarded and
admired for their capabilities as humanitarian aid providers. Longer-term
development assistance often takes many years to affect systemic problems,
if it can do so at all. It overlaps with the U.S. capacity to undertake humanitarian crisis triage, but it has different methods and aims. For reasons already
noted, the next Administrations opportunity for policy innovation will fall
mainly in this latter domain.
The U.S. government remains the worlds largest provider of bilateral
assistance, often called Official Development Aid (ODA)about $26.5 billion annually out of a global total of about $150 billion. Aid from private
American groups adds significantly to that total. But aid resources, public
and private, are tiny in the context of trillions of dollars in resources from
global and local capital markets, global trade flows, taxes collected by poor
countries, foreign direct investment, and remittances. To meet global development challenges, the U.S. government will need to leverage all these
resources. The United States and other wealthy societies play a small but
critical role in organizing these resources through their ability to share
expertise via international knowledge networks. The member states of the
OECD can not only provide financial resources to poorer countries but can
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also fund solutions to broader governance challenges that others will not or
cannot confront on their own.
Beginning with the Marshall Plan, international assistance has been a
significant form of American power. While not every initiative succeeded,
19 of the 20 largest U.S. trading partners are current or former recipients
of U.S. development assistance, including Germany, South Korea, Taiwan,
and Japan. As was the case in these countries, economic growth is the best
remedy for ending poverty and underdevelopment. As we have witnessed,
especially since the end of the Cold War, trade, sound macroeconomic and
fiscal policies, good governance in general, and advancing institutional
maturity are all more important factors in conquering poverty than ODA.
Nevertheless, U.S. international assistance, delivered both bilaterally and
through multilateral institutions, are central forms of American soft power.
Our international assistance should buttress and support other critical foreign policy and national security objectives.

e need to be decisive and nimble to be effective in a rapidly changing

world. Twelve relevant global trends should influence how and where

we put our limited development resources. If we do not understand the environment within which policy must function, we will not be able either to do

good for others or to do well for ourselves.

The key trend, first, is that global economic growth over recent decades has
resulted in a number of countries transitioning to middle income status. As
these countries become wealthier, freer politically, and more capable of managing their own affairs, the U.S. government should be ready to shift from an
engagement based on assistance to one based on a broader partnership.
Second, for the first time in history more than half the worlds population
resides in cities. The worlds urban population now stands at 3.9 billion and
is expected to nearly double by 2050. The trend toward urbanization is particularly strong in the developing world; some 96 percent of all additional
urbanization by 2030 will occur there. If cities are equipped with the right
leaders, strategies, and infrastructures, then cities can be powerful engines
of growth. That is because population density has been historically the best

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indicator of the pace of economic transactions. But if cities have dysfunctional or corrupt governments, they can be breeding grounds for violence,
disease, and state decay.
Third, the global middle class includes approximately two billion people,
and will more than double to nearly five billion by 2030. As people get richer,
they demand higher quality food and better functioning governments.
Fourth, the global youth bulge will be a major threat or a major source of
talent. Providing youth with the skills and tools necessary for inclusion in
the global economy is both an economic and security necessity.
Fifth, there will likely be an increased frequency of global pandemics. Air
travel, urbanization, and diets with increased protein (meat and dairy) also
raise the risk of more widespread zoonotic diseases (from animals to people).
Sixth, as countries continue to develop around the world and populations
continue to grow, energy demand will also continue to rise. World energy
consumption has nearly doubled since 1973. The International Energy Association estimates that investments totaling $16.4 trillion are required for
the power sector by 2035 to meet global demand.
Seventh, communication is being revolutionized in developing countries,
and it is bound to have a major impact on economic life. In 2014, 1.8 billion
people used mobile devices in the developing world; there will be 2.9 billion
in 2020. Africa alone is expected to reach one billion mobile phone users,
with most accessing mobile banking and other services.
Eighth, increased access to primary and secondary education is growing
around the world, but there is a mismatch between formal education and
workplace demands. Workforce development should be the priority.
Ninth, investments of the order of $57 trillion in global infrastructure are
required over the next 15 years. The majority will be in the developing world.
Infrastructure activities need to simultaneously leverage the private sector
and address the challenge of providing public goods.
Tenth, with increased national income and wealth in developing coun259

tries, domestic tax bases and government revenues have grown. Developing
countries that harness domestic resource mobilization (for example, local
capital markets, local savings, and taxes and fees collected) can finance their
own public goods and need outside assistance less than ever. In 2012, developing and emerging economies mobilized $7.7 trillion in domestic resources,
orders of magnitude beyond what is available in ODA (about $150 billion a year).
Eleventh, corruption remains an endemic issue and is a tax on the private
sector, undermining economic growth and threatening the achievement of
government fiscal targets. An estimated $1 trillion dollars is lost annually
to corruption according to World Bank data. While corruption is a culturally variable concept, there can be no doubt that kleptocratic elites in the
developing world, enabled by a system of global finance centered in the
West, drain many state treasuries of money that belongs to the people. For
every dollar of ODA that comes in the front door of many developing countries, between eight and ten dollars go quietly out the back door into some
offshore shell account.
Twelfth and finally, a series of regional security threats endanger stability
and safety. Gangs and criminal networks in Central America, radical Islamist
groups in the Middle East and Africa, and low-level civil conflict in Africa
require a variety of responses. This includes assistance, but assistance must
be integrated into much broader policies to be effective.
Given these 12 major trends, all use of U.S. bilateral and multilateral assistance should be viewed through a series of strategic lenses. These lenses compose the set of priorities that should shape the use of development assistance.
We should emphasize and catalyze private sector-led economic growth
and improve the quality of governance. In most, but not all cases, that corresponds to democratic governance.
We should respond to the China challenge and to an assertive Russia,
meaning that, all else equal, aid that is relevant to theaters of competition
where those states are engaged should have priority over theaters in which
they are not engaged.

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We should combat violent extremism. Clearly, without basic security,

no development is going to happen, and no development assistance can
be effective. To that same end, we must reverse or mitigate the extent and
impact of failed and failing states.
And we must repel other transnational threats, including global pandemics, illicit drug networks, and human trafficking. From an economic point of
view, all of these problems are major externalities, and succeeding in these
daunting challenges will have a far greater positive impact on development
that any imaginable amount of ODA can have.

an the U.S. government effectively do any of these things, as far as development assistance is concerned? The question raises the prospect that

in some respects we are our own worst enemy. The development portfolio
in the U.S. government is splintered into more than 20 agencies with some

sort of responsibility for international assistance. To this feudal structure

one must add the counter bureaucracy of burdensome Inspector Generals,
regulations, and laws that have only expanded (to thousands of pages in the
Foreign Assistance Act) since 1961.
Given the limited U.S. domestic political constituency for development
assistance, the next President will have to invest political capital to shift
resource priorities, foster needed policy reforms, and make structural/organizational changes. One need only look at the major changes made under
the George W. Bush Administrationthe creation of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the AIDS in Africa initiative, the addition of a Director of
Foreign Assistance (a Deputy Secretary of State equivalent), for example
and the counter example of President Obama who, while launching several
Executive Order initiatives, has not engaged the Congress and has few institutionalized accomplishments in the development assistance area.
The U.S. government is also the largest, or one of the largest, shareholders of a set of critical multilateral organizations including the World Bank,
the Asian Development Bank, the EBRD (former Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe), the International Monetary Fund and others. The U.S. government
will need to lead shareholders in making significant changes in approach,
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priorities, and staffing to remain relevant. What structural changes are

needed to meet this changed world?
We are not properly organized to meet the challenges of the next 20 years.
One agency should coordinate all U.S. development spending, similar to the
period from 1961 to the mid-1970s, when all foreign assistance spending
was coordinated through USAID. A strengthened USAID should clear all
development-related spending by HHS, CDC, Justice, EPA, USDA, and others.
The next President should issue an Executive Order to achieve just that.
The personnel system needs strengthening and change. A separate personnel system should be instituted for the U.S. assistance system, for it
requires a skill set that does not align well with that of either the civil service
or the foreign service. That could reduce turnover: Over 60 percent of the
USAID workforce has less than five years of service, with no consistent
training. We should reinstitute a one-year training program for all incoming
staff. Overseas development programs should have the option of being
seven to ten years in length, and one person should be responsible for the
success or failure of a program.
We also need an expeditionary assistance workforce and career track
ready to work in failed and failing states for their entire career. The multilateral development banks should create a similar cadre of specialized
professionals, systems, and instruments to confront the chronic challenges
of failed and failing states. These professionals ought to be rewarded and
promoted at an accelerated rate given the increased risks they would take.
This new expeditionary workforce would be prepared to live in very difficult
places, equipped with military training and U.S. Army Ranger school type
survival training. They would not be armed but they would be familiar with
military skill sets and discipline.
Additionally, our assistance workforce should be separated into four
streams: a failed and failing states business model (the expeditionary workforce described above); a long-term development workforce focused on agriculture, democracy and governance, health systems, and such; an agency
or bureau focused on building multisector partnerships with the private

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sector; and the Millennium Challenge Corporation as a stand-alone agency

focused primarily on infrastructure.
The U.S. government should also make greater use of the instruments
housed within OPIC, the Trade and Development Agency, and the Development Credit Authority at USAID. It should increase its leadership of the Multilateral Development Banks and the IMF. It should pass IMF quota reform,
name all U.S. Executive Directors concurrently as U.S. Ambassadors, as we
do at the Asian Development Bank, to ensure greater connectivity with the
State Department. The U.S. government should be actively involved in making personnel decisions as management contracts end at the World Bank,
the IMF, and other MDBs.
Further, the U.S. government should review and ultimately remove
all bilateral and multilateral regulations preventing the United States
and MDBs from financing oil, gas, hydro, and coal projects, including the
carbon cap at OPIC.

he next Administration should develop key initiatives to jump-start

development efforts where they matter most. Above all, the U.S. gov-

ernment should re-engage in the fight against grand corruption at elite levels. It should reclaim leadership on ending corruption through reforms of

police and security sectors, support for independent media, and effective
justice systems and support for various industry initiatives, including the
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
It is also critical that U.S. policy do what it can to enable and equip global
entrepreneurs. Job growth depends on entrepreneurs. The U.S. government
should support improvements in the business climate as measured by the
World Banks Doing Business Indicators, provide basic business training,
and ensure linkages to micro, small, and medium sized enterprise finance
for partner countries.
Development assistance can also provide workforce/vocational training.
Integrating young people into the formal economy could undermine incentives for terrorism and unplanned mass migration. Fortuitously, industries

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such as tourism/hospitality, construction, and ICT will need hundreds of

millions of skilled workers. The U.S. government should lead a major public-private partnership with companies, civil society, educational institutions, and governments to provide workforce training to tens of millions.
The next Administration can also catalyze global infrastructure in
response to the China challenge and the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank. The U.S. government should identify an additional $100 million a year
for global infrastructure project preparation as well as specific reforms to
OPIC, USAID, and TDA. The U.S. and Japanese governments should seek a
special capital increase of the Asian Development Bank.
Another development target should be to empower women through
increased secondary school graduation rates. The empirical evidence on
changing the status of women turns on three things: urbanization; economic
growth with high rates of industrialization; and girls finishing high school.
U.S. government development assistance spending and technical assistance
should be shaped to ensure that girls stay in school as long as possible.
We should also prepare better for global pandemics. The recent Ebola
outbreak demonstrates that the world is not prepared for global pandemics.
The U.S. government should complete the rollout of a new global pandemic
surveillance network and re-establish a bioterrorism czar in the NSC. We
need also to finish the job of eradicating polio. Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Nigeria are the three remaining countries with active cases of the disease, so
eradication should be a priority for U.S. assistance in those countries. Giving
up on eradicating polio means it will spread again, and billions will have
been wasted.
The U.S. government is also in a singular position to lead the world in
expanding agricultural production. With a future global population exceeding
nine billion by 2050, there is an urgent need to address global agriculture. Current U.S. efforts fall short. Expertise in agriculture, including the creation and
dissemination of GMO technologies, makes the United States a natural leader.
U.S. policies should support all sizes of farms, provide assistance for sanitary
and phytosanitary standards, and support open trade policies and farm-to-

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market infrastructure investments.

The next Administration must also emphasize the need to Deliver on
Democracy. The Western commitment to democracy rests within deep
principle, but in most countries democracy must deliver effective positive
change, or a reversion to authoritarianism is likely. The U.S. government
should support transparent and effective government, including public
financial management, effective and non-politicized tax systems, and competent administration. We should also help strengthen property rights and
the rule of law.
Another promising priority looks to the growth of the number of foreign
graduate students studying science, math, engineering, city planning, public
administration, and agriculture in U.S. institutions of higher learning. We
influenced two generations of elites in developing countries who spoke
English, admired America, and looked to us instead of the Soviet Union. We
should help find public and private resources to dramatically increase the
number of graduate students from regions and countries such as Brazil, Africa,
the Middle East, and non-China Asia to study non-glamorous but needed
skills. The challenge is to make sure most of them return home. One way to
fund this would be to set aside 10 percent of sector earmarks from Congress
for water, health, and other directives for scholarships in those sectors.
Finally, we should encourage English language training in critical countries.
The United States and its Anglophone partners should work together, in
conjunction with the private sector, to spread English to countries such
as Brazil or Ukraine where, broadly speaking, the average English spoken
is poor or non-existent. We should be utilizing online courses with existing
curriculum and leveraging existing spaces in businesses, embassies, and
American centers. This is not merely a matter of self-interest. English is the
language of global business, and a competent English-speaking core is a
prerequisite for many countries getting in on the action.

he next Administration must review from top to bottom how we allocate the roughly $30 billion foreign assistance budget. We will need

to make hard choices. We should place the intersecting torque points that
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marry economic growth to good governance at the center of U.S. development policy. We should ensure that development resources and instruments
work closely in partnership with the private sector. We need to link our
assistance resources to our trade policy.
International assistance is a significant form of American soft power and
should support broader U.S. foreign policy and national security goals. The
consequences of inaction on reform and restructuring will directly affect the
growth of markets for our goods and services, our claim to global leadership,
and ultimately our national security.

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Part VIII

ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESS

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CHAPTER 27: IMPLEMENTING AN

EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY
Peter Feaver & William Inboden

The foregoing analyses and advice have focused on what the next President should do in the foreign policy and national security arena. But how
the next President should do it is no less important. History has shown that
the organization and process of foreign policymaking is critical to achieving
desired and desirable outcomes.
Almost all Presidents experience some form of the paradox of presidential power: the most powerful man in the world often feels powerless to
get his government to do what he wants. Part of this is by design, of course,
as the Constitution provides numerous checks and balances on executive
power and limits the authority of the presidential office. But the phenomenon
of presidential powerlessness also stems from the sheer complexity of the
modern Executive Branch, particularly the permanent bureaucracy of the
cabinet agencies and the regulatory state. From afar the millions of Federal employees and thousands of departments, agencies, and offices that all
ostensibly fall under the authority of the chief executive might appear to be
sources of enhanced power. It seems logical that the more employees you
have reporting to you, the more power accrues to you. Yet often the opposite happens as this sprawling bureaucracy leeches away presidential power.
Each office and each employee frequently has a mind and political will of
their own and just enough distance or autonomy from the President to pursue
an independent course. This can even be the case with White House staff. As
that staff has grown larger, so also has the number of influential people with
their own preferences and opinions about what policy should be and how it
should be conducted.
This challenge bedevils American Presidents in numerous ways. Their
requests for genuine policy options are shirked by staff who present faux
infeasible options that constrain the President to select the one subor-

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dinate-approved choice. Other times Presidents are not informed about

important policies being developed and carried out in their name. When
presidential decisions are made, they are either ignored or imperfectly
implemented. When the implementation of policies begins to fail, the President is kept in the dark. In short, there are impediments to the exercise of
Executive authority at every stage in the policy consideration, deliberation,
decision, and implementation process.
The solutions to the paradox of presidential power are not to be found
merely in crafting smarter policies, though that of course helps. The solutions
lay in crafting a better national security policymaking process. Every new
Administration reconfigures itself to suit the governing style of the incoming President, and the foreign policymaking apparatus is no exception. This
fact reflects a deeper truth about American foreign policy, which is that it is
the most President-centric aspect of American politics. To be sure the other
branches of government have important roles to play, and the vast Executive Branch establishment known as the permanent government creates a
powerful inertia that imposes limits on even determined Presidents. Yet in
foreign policy and national security, the President enjoys more leeway than
he enjoys on almost any other issue, and that leeway is particularly wide in
how the President chooses to structure the policymaking apparatus. The
Presidents several roles as Commander-in-Chief, Diplomat-in-Chief, Chief
Law Enforcement Officer, and Chief Executive all in whole or in part fall
under national security policy.
It is possible to assess the best practices in this area drawn from the past
several Administrations, clustering them in sections organized around concentric circles away from the Oval Office at the epicenter. The bottom line
of this analysis is simple: While the President has a great deal of leeway to
tweak the system in ways that suit his or her tastes, painful experience has
shown that some ways are better than others. What the President needs is an
organizational process that both fits his governing style and also mitigates
the inevitable downsides of that style. Presidents should get the system they
need, which is partly but sometimes not entirely the system they want.

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he most important institution is an informal one: the small circle of

advisers who enjoy particularly close relations with the President and,

because of this, enjoy de facto power and influence much greater than their

formal title or role might imply.

In the foreign policy space, this circle often includes the National Security
Advisorthe one formally assigned to be in this circlebut it need not. In
the Obama Administration, two of his advisers have probably enjoyed that
status (Tom Donilon and Susan Rice) but one clearly did not (Jim Jones).
Both National Security Advisors in the Bush 43 Administration did (Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Hadley) as did the one in Bush 41 (Brent Scowcroft).
In the Clinton Administration, arguably one did (Sandy Berger) and one
often did not (Anthony Lake).
Any President will find an inner circle helpful because it includes the people
who understand and share the Presidents vision most fully and who have
the most independent stature (at least with respect to the President) to
speak hard truths without fear of retribution. When the inner circle includes
people who themselves enjoy a deep understanding of foreign policy and
national security, this informal advising function can be quite constructive.
But in some cases the President may include people in the inner circle who
do not have such experience and wisdom. They may have keen political
instincts or deep personal knowledge of the Presidents views, but they are
shakier on the national security policy issues.
Bush 41s inner circle was especially strong on foreign policy and national
security, reflecting the long career of the President in this area. By contrast,
Obamas inner circle has been probably the weakest on foreign policy of any
post-Cold War President, and the individual closest to the President, Valerie
Jarrett, vividly illustrated the problem. Whatever her merits as a counselor
to the President on other issues, she has simply lacked the knowledge and
experience to contribute well in the foreign policy arena. Yet her closeness
to the President has put her at an extreme advantage over more knowledgeable but less powerful players in the system.
To compound matters, President Obama kept an especially closed inner

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circle dominated by the political people who had been with him since his
campaign for the White House and sometimes even his Senate days. The
results have been pernicious for the good functioning of foreign policy. Consequently, Obama often got the policies he wanted, but in a fashion that
was chaotic and contributed to a high degree of mutual distrust with the
other players in the system. Moreover, while these policy choices reflected
Obamas preferences, the cramped and insular policy process arguably
deprived him of exposure to alternative viewpoints on policy options and
the downsides of his policy preferences.
The next President must take care to include in his or her inner circle
someone with deep foreign policy and national security expertise, preferably
also assigned to the role of National Security Advisor. A White House Chief
of Staff with some foreign policy expertise is also preferable. Members of
the inner circle with fewer foreign policy and national security credentials
should accept self-imposed limits on their own action.

he President will also be served by a larger but still limited number of

senior staff at the Principal, Deputy, and near-Deputy level, all working

as part of the White House staff. In most Administrations, this groups func-

tions very differently on domestic policy than it does on foreign policy. Some
stovepiping is inevitable because of certain exigencies: the classification system and its implications for Information Technology systems (NSC staff have
separate computers for classified material that even many very senior White
House staff do not possess); many senior White House positions are filled
with campaign people who do not come from the national security community; policymaking in the national security space gives very senior non-political people from outside the White House, such as senior military and
intelligence officials, higher level access to the President (and other senior
decision-makers) on foreign policy than their civil service counterparts enjoy
on domestic policy; and so on. Thus, it is inevitable that Administrations will
look for ways to bridge across these stovepipes.
The Bush 43 Administration addressed this issue by emphasizing collegial
relations at all levels, but still keeping the silos rather separate. The Obama

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Administration went much further in merging the silos, placing and greatly
empowering political (as opposed to policy) people in senior NSC staff slots
and opening up NSC meetings to the senior White House political advisers. The upside of the Obama approach is that it kept the Obama national
security team very tightly integrated with the Presidents larger partisan
political agenda. This aided Obama in running for re-election and ensured
that considerations of his political legacy were uppermost in all national
security decisions. The downside was that when broader national security
interests were not in sync with the Presidents partisan agenda, there was
little institutional protection against politicization. President Obama has
presided over the most politicized national security policymaking process
in recent times, invoking unfavorable comparisons to Richard Nixon even
from sympathetic observers.
The next President should be willing to swing the pendulum away from
the appearance (or reality) of the politicization of national security. It
is probably a mistake to have the formal political advisers sit in on most
national security meetings, though of course they should feel free to advise
the President (privately) on the political implications of any policy. Likewise,
while senior NSC positions will of necessity be political appointees who the
President can trust and who share his vision for American foreign policy, it
is preferable if those people have stature and experience in the policy world.
It would be a mistake, however, to swing the pendulum all the way back
to a situation of impermeable stovepipes. At the end of the day, the White
House must function as a team, and all decisions have political implications.
It is understandable that a President wants to go to great lengths to ensure
that his decision calculus is not letting partisan considerations trump the
national interest and policy considerations. But once decided, the White
House must be able to sell and sustain that policy in a hyper-partisan environment. There is a legitimate role for political advisers, and just because
the Obama Administration granted too large a role to partisan calculations
does not mean that the next President should over-correct.

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he National Security Council staff exists to keep the NSC and associated
interagency process functioning smoothly. The NSC is a Cabinet-level

committee established in law and designed to be a formal mechanism that

enables the President to wield his authority and impose his will on his own government. This is as it should be, seeing that the President and the Vice-President are the only two elected members of the Executive Branch of government.
The next President will make two very consequential decisions during the

transition: the size and composition of the National Security Council staff.
Here again, the next President must guard against over-correcting for the
obvious shortcomings of the Obama Administration.
In terms of size, the next President will almost certainly opt for a smaller,
more elite staff than the one that has ballooned in the Obama years. It is an
almost universal critique on both sides of the partisan aisle: The NSC staff
has gotten too large (reaching 400 or higher by some estimates) and, as with
other forms of inflation, this growth has debased the currency of the positions.88
But it is a mistake to hold up the very small size of the staff from alleged
golden erasfor instance, the roughly fifty staff professionals serving under
Bush 41 and Brent Scowcroft. The demands for Presidential-level involvement
in national security policy development, implementation, articulation, and
promotion are greater today than they were in previous decades. Moreover,
9/11 was a game-changer, involving the creation of Homeland Security staff
functions to complement National Security staff. Some, but by no means all,
of the growth of staff reflects this broader ambit.
People often forget that President Clinton came in promising to cut the
White House staff from the allegedly bloated level it had reached at the
end of the Bush 41 presidency. Trying to keep that campaign promise produced havoc for early Clinton White House operations. A smaller NSC staff
is advisable; a small staff is probably not.
In terms of composition, the next President must make two decisions:
88
Several observers have made this point. See, for example, Karen de Young, White House
tries for a leaner National Security Council, Washington Post, June 22, 2015, and de Young,
How the White House runs foreign policy, Washington Post, August 5, 2015.

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what is the appropriate political vs. career mix among the professional
staff; and how to allocate the issues to directorates to reflect the Presidents
vision of the geopolitical landscape.
In terms of the staff profile, some mix of political and career officers is
appropriate. All-political would not work well; it would cost too much for
the relatively small White House budget (career detailees usually count
against their home department budgets), and it would be perceived as too
political by the rest of the interagency and lose the coordination advantages that come from bringing detailees to the White House. NSC staff tours
are also an important part of the professional development of departments
and agencies. However, all-career detailees would not work well either. That
approach would exclude the combination of informed experience and fresh
thinking that political appointees can bring; a great advantage of the U.S.
system over that of other advanced democracies is its relative permeability.
Political appointments on the White House staff, including the NSC staff,
constitute an important avenue for exploiting that advantage. Some posts
may be better suited to political appointees, such as Strategic Planning, and
others may be better suited to career appointments, such as Intelligence.
And the ratio of political to career staff should be higher among the more
senior positions than the more junior ones.
In terms of issue allocation, the directorates are organized regionally and
functionally; how they are divided reflects the prioritization schema the
President wants to impose on the system. Clinton elevated economic issues
into a separate National Economic Council and, within the NSC, created a
Non-Proliferation Directorate to reflect the higher priority given to those
concerns relative to previous Administrations. President Bush elevated terrorism issues into a separate Homeland Security Council and added an Iraq
and Afghanistan directorate to enhance oversight of the wars in that arena.
He also added a Strategic Planning office in the second term, underscoring
the importance he placed on longer-range integrative policymaking. President Obama added Cyber security and also merged the Homeland Security
staff back into the NSC staff.

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The exact configuration depends on the specific interests of the next President, but the following lessons learned over the past several Administrations are worth embracing. If the staff is sufficiently streamlined, the precise
allocations of the regional bureaus do not matter so much (for example, the
hoary question of whether India belongs in the directorate addressing Pakistan issues or in the directorate addressing China issues, or if both should be
combined). However, if U.S. forces are active in a persistent shooting war in
the country, that country likely merits its own Directorate. Functional concerns that are sufficiently high priority also merit their own Directorates:
Intelligence, Terrorism, Non-Proliferation, Defense Policy, Cyber, Democracy
and Development, and so on. But where possible, functions should be clustered, so Space can be subsumed under Defense; Nuclear, Bio, and Chemical
WMD proliferation can be clustered together; and so on. Given the tyranny
of the White House inbox, a separate and sufficiently empowered office for
Strategic Planning is vital; to make the office more effective, it should handle
the formal NSC role in the DoD and State budget processes, augmented by
the relevant policy directorates (Defense and Development).
A smaller staff would allow for some streamlining and reduction of rank
inflation. The growth in Deputies and their equivalents and Senior Directors and their equivalents is near inexorable, but some reduction from the
Obama high-water mark is appropriate. Fewer Deputies, with more senior/
qualified Senior Directors, would not necessarily result in a weaker NSC staff.
On the contrary, the flat structure has traditionally been key to the success of
the NSC staff compared to their much larger but more hierarchical counterparts in the interagency. Creating fewer layers will give Directors and Senior
Directors more coin of the realmaccess to their principalsallowing for
the de jure interagency rank equivalence (Director~Deputy Assistant Secretary; Senior Director~Assistant Secretary; and so forth) to be observed de
facto. It may be preferable to reserve the Deputy level for the functions that
integrate across a mix of functional and regional directorates, rather than
for Deputies to aggregate several functional Directorates, and Deputies to
aggregate several regional Directorates. For example, a Deputy for Planning,
which cuts across many different directorates, probably makes more sense

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than a Deputy for Regional Affairs, which would combine various European
and Western Hemisphere offices.
Some have called for a return to something like the Eisenhower-era
National Security Planning Board, particularly as a way to better integrate
across economic affairs and foreign affairs. If properly empowered, this
would have more capacity and clout than the current system of dual-hatting
a Deputy on the NSC and the NEC to provide the linkage.
The next President should also resist the temptation to cut the NSC staff
down to size in another area: travel. Under Condoleezza Rice, the NSC staff
faced quite severe travel restrictions. Those restrictions were eased under
Stephen Hadley, and, to the best of our knowledge, lifted still further during
Obamas tenure. To be sure, the NSC staff should not travel as much as their
interagency counterparts, and when they do travel it should be under conditions that make it clear they are not usurping the diplomatic function properly resident in departments. But the restrictions of the Rice years were too
limiting. Travel is an important opportunity for forging better interagency
cooperation, and in many cases NSC presence in key foreign settingsfor
example, delicate diplomatic negotiations on the Presidents highest priority
issuescan be an essential ingredient for success.
That said, complaints about an overactive, even overweening, NSC staff
during the Obama tenure are so widespread and so bipartisan that some
correction is appropriate. The NSC staff contributes best when it is powerful
but focused. It should play both an honest-broker and an entrepreneurial
role that respects the prerogatives of line departments and agencies while
also ensuring that the Presidents options are not limited to the few favored
by the interagency.
The NSC staff can also play a vital role during the implementation phase:
holding the line departments and agencies accountable for delivering on
what the President has decided. This role can produce controversy and even
conflict. In his memoirs, Secretary Robert Gates reports chaffing at the way
the Obama NSC sought to monitor the implementation of Iraq and Afghanistan policies. While mindful that it would be inappropriate for the NSC staff

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to subvert the chain of command, Secretary Gates did not identify many
concrete examples where that was actually happening. The specific complaints seemed to concern activities like direct communication exchanges
between the White House and the field, something that is essential for holding the interagency accountable for deliverables.

or the NSC to function effectively, its staff must strike two tacit bargains with the relevant Cabinet departments and agencies involved in

national security policy. The first bargain might be called the balance of

power and responsibility, and goes something like this: The NSC staff will
ensure that interagency perspectives are included in the policy development
process, and the departments and agencies in turn will faithfully implement
policies once decided. The second bargain might be called the balance of
time and resources, and goes something like this: The NSC staff will ensure
that deputies and principals committee meetings do not consume too much
interagency time, and the departments and agencies in turn will send appropriately senior representatives to participate in those NSC meetings.
Both tacit bargains have come under severe strain in recent years. Policy
development has become so centralized in the White House that the interagency often feels marginalized and irrelevant to the policy process. NSC
meetings have become so frequent and consume so much time that deputies
and principals have little bandwidth left to actually implement policies and
manage their departments and agencies. Even worse, the frequency of NSC
meetings has increased in inverse proportion to the involvement of departments like State and Defense in the actual development of policy. Secretaries, Deputy Secretaries, and Under Secretaries from State, Defense, and
Treasury have had the perverse experience of seeing their schedules being
consumed by mushrooming NSC meetings even as they and their departments have diminishing influence over policydecisions.
Improving the functioning of the National Security Council system must
start with restoring these tacit bargains. Simply put, the NSC needs to listen
more and meet less. Doing so will substantially improve the development
and implementation of presidential policy priorities. Inviting more involve-

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ment from State, Defense, Treasury, and other relevant departments and
agencies in the development of policy decisions does not mean diminishing
presidential prerogative; the President will remain Commander-in-Chief,
Diplomat-in-Chief, and Chief Executive. Yes, it puts more of a burden on
the Presidential Personnel Office to ensure that the Presidents appointees
at each department and agency are well chosen and loyal to his agenda, and
also able to represent presidential authority to their respective career staffs.
There are positive examples of these principles from recent history. The
George H. W. Bush NSC led by Brent Scowcroft upheld both tacit bargains,
and is deservedly remembered as a very well-functioning NSC system,
which, not coincidentally, led to effective policies. The Scowcroft NSC did
meet frequently, but all involved happily participated because they knew
their voices were being heard in the policy process, and they were thus more
willing to implement presidential directives once decided. As President Reagans second Secretary of State, George Shultz stands as an exemplar of a
loyal Cabinet official who was devoted to the Presidents policies but who
also managed the career staff in his department exceptionally well. Shultz
simultaneously controlled and empowered the Foreign Service bureaucracy,
and successfully enlisted it in service of the Reagan agenda. Or for a case
study in the effective functioning of the NSC and interagency process, take
President George W. Bushs deliberative process on the Iraq surge. APNSA
Stephen Hadley led a rigorous interagency review process, which, while
hardly perfect, nevertheless ensured that all concerned parties participated
and had their voices heardincluding State, Defense policy officials and the
Joint Chiefs, the intelligence community, and relevant NSC staff members.
Once the President made his decision for the new counter-insurgency strategy, all parties saluted and executed the new policy.
There is yet one more driver of interagency churn ripe for reform: the
cacophony of strategy reports, many of which are congressionally mandated. This alphabet soupthe NSS, NDS, NMS, QDR, QDDR, and so onis
intended to serve the noble purpose of forcing the Executive Branch to think
strategically. The work that goes in to preparing them does accomplish that
in part, but at great cost in staff time and senior leader focus. The same

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benefit could probably be achieved with a more modest set of public white
papers and classified annexes. The next President should work with the relevant committees in Congress to develop a more sensible set of mandates.
A better functioning NSC, coupled with the reforms of the NSC and White
House staff outlined above, would greatly contribute to improved civil-military relationsanother area that has suffered greatly in recent years. Differences of opinion between civilian and military leaders are normal and not
signs of civil-military crisis. Indeed, the United States rightly boasts in an
unbroken record of civilian control and military professionalism that makes
us the envy of other advanced democracies (let alone coup-prone developing countries). Yet in recent years this natural policy tension has been exacerbated by deep and mutual distrust, with civilians convinced that military
brass are gaming the system to constrain presidential options and the military convinced that civilians are denying them their rightful advisory role
and distorting military operations through indecision, micromanagement,
and basic ignorance of the military tools of statecraft.
This distrust is especially toxic because the professional military enjoys
much greater respect among the general public than do their superiors,
the civilian political leaders. Civilians are understandably wary about
how politically savvy military officers might wield that respect in ways to
impose their preferred policies on the process. The best tonic for distrust
is a healthy advisory process, one where the military voice is heard even if
it is not always heeded, and where military advice is accurately described
even, or perhaps especially, when civilian leaders invoke their constitutional
prerogative to choose a different option than the one the military prefers.
Better-designed processes, managed by more alert civilians attentive to
the civil-military equation, will quickly restore higher quality civil-military
relations in the next Administration.

ust as interagency relations function best through the honoring of its

tacit bargains, so also do Congress-Executive relations. The acute Con-

gress-Executive tensions of recent years are partly the consequence of insidious partisanship, partly from Constitutional ambiguity on the precise roles

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of Congress and the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign and defense
policy, and partly from the erosion of the tacit bargain that undergirds
healthy Congress-Executive relations. That tacit bargain goes something like
this: The Executive Branch will consult with Congress and invite congressional input on policy development, and in turn Congress will provide resources,
support, and latitude for Executive leadership and implementation of policy.
When trust erodes and this tacit bargain breaks down, Congress often
reacts by stymying Executive capabilities, whether through restrictive legislation, critical oversight hearings, budget cuts and limitations, or refusing to
confirm presidential appointees. While any President will have very limited
control over the composition of Congress, he does have substantial control
over his posture toward Congress. Whether Congress is controlled by the
Presidents party, or the opposition party, or a bicameral split, the next President will be wise to engage in more active outreach to Congress than has
been the case in recent years. Every President soon learns that Congress
can be a partner or an obstacle to national security policy but cannot be
ignored. Whenever possible, partnership is always to be preferred. This not
only ensures smoother functioning on foreign and defense policy but also
helps ensure the staying power of presidential policies.
It should also be remembered that, Executive Branch chauvinism notwithstanding, Congress occasionally originates good policy ideas. The many
examples of astute congressional initiatives that were initially opposed by
the Executive Branch include the Jackson-Vanik Amendment in support of
Russian Jewry, which helped undermine the Soviet Union; the GoldwaterNichols legislation, which profoundly and effectively reorganized the
Defense Department; the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program,
which helped secure and dispose of substantial amounts of nuclear material
in the former Soviet Union; and the ratcheting up of economic pressure on
Iran in recent years. In a similar vein, some of the most successful presidential initiatives depended on enlisting the support of a leading congressional
member of the opposite party. Think of Republican Senator Arthur Vandenbergs indispensable backing for President Trumans signature Cold War
initiatives such as the Truman Doctrines aid to Greece and Turkey and the

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Marshall Plan, or of Democratic Senator Sam Nunns fervent commitment to

the Reagan Administrations Cold War defense build-up.

hile the supposed halcyon years of bipartisan consensus supporting

American foreign policy are more the stuff of nostalgic myth than

historical reality, bipartisan cooperation remains both a worthy aspiration

and an important pillar of American national security. Even more than

domestic policy, foreign policy remains largely an elite realm. Creating
bipartisan buttresses for foreign and defense policy begins with restoring a
bipartisan elite.
There are both formal and informal channels for doing this. Formal channels include the advisory institutions that have designated slots for representatives from both parties: the Defense Policy Board, the Presidents
Intelligence Advisory Board, the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom, and the like. The next President should restore customs from
earlier eras that have waned in recent years, in particular the custom that
these formal advisory institutions will always have strong representation
from both partiesand not just nominal bipartisanship, where the out-party
is represented by disaffected members of that party, but real bipartisanship
involving the current and future thought-leaders of the out-party.
Informal channels such as private consultations and conversations may be
less visible but are often just as meaningful, if not more so, and are excellent
opportunities to engage the most capable members of the opposing partys
bench. Activities such as presidential meetings with former cabinet secretaries from the other party, NSC staff briefings with leading thinkers from the
loyal opposition, and regular consultations with congressional leaders of the
other party form the vital sinews of bipartisanship. Such channels rarely produce unanimity on policy, of course. But they do help ensure that a range of
perspectives is heard, can help dampen partisan fervor and public criticism,
and sometimes equip members of the other party to help explain American
policies to their own constituents as well as overseas audiences.
Most Administrations learn the value of these formal and informal channels through painful experience, sometimes not until their second term;
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some never learn it and leave a bitter legacy of partisanship for the next
Administration to fix. The next President should commit to a better start,
implementing these reforms from the outset rather than waiting for policy
failure and gridlock to force the Administrations hand.

he challenges that American national security policy has encountered in

recent years have also revealed some significant gaps in our foreign and

defense policy toolkits. When confronted with a new crisis, the hackneyed
binary between full-scale military intervention and complete isolation

is almost always a false dichotomyand its articulation is often a sign of

antecedent error. More often, the best and most realistic policy options
are those that involve a calibrated, circumscribed, and properly resourced
American involvement. There are many other options for creatively projecting American power while minimizing risk. But to realize these will mean
expanding or even developing other instruments of national power. Three
particularly acute needs are improving our Military Assistance Programs for
training and equipping foreign fighters; developing a permanent stabilityoperations capacity that harnesses civilian and military power for failing
states and post-conflict situations; and building an institutional ability to
wage ideological warfare, especially the battles of ideas against jihadism
and the propaganda of expansionist authoritarian regimes such as Russia
and China.
Again, while our current national security institutions are deficient for
each of these needed capabilities, there are ample precedents in the past for
the successful wielding of these tools. Military Assistance Programs offer
deft instruments for projecting power while managing costs and risks and
have been instrumental in many policy successes. Just a few examples from a
manifest catalogue include the provision of arms to the Afghan mujaheddin
in the 1980s in their insurgency against the Soviet Union, Plan Colombia
support for Bogotas fight against the FARC narco-guerillas, and Americas
decades-long military assistance to Israel, which has protected the security
of our most important Middle East ally.
In the realm of stability operations, the recent mixed legacies of Iraq,

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Afghanistan, and Libya may highlight our current deficiencies, but Americas leadership in the post-conflict reconstruction of nations such as Japan,
Germany, South Korea, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo serve as reminders
that we have been able to get the task done before.
The Cold War stands as the high-water mark of American engagement in
the contest of ideas, with dedicated institutions such as the United States
Information Agency, numerous broadcasting entities, and active participation by the intelligence community in covert information warfareall of
which contributed to countering communist ideology and enhancing Americas reputational power. Countering our various ideological adversaries
today may not entail replicating the USIA, but it should entail building new
institutions and capabilities (including reforming or scrapping the feckless
Broadcasting Board of Governors) adapted to the challenges of 21st-century
information warfare.

he next President faces a daunting task restoring Americas global

position after the erosion of the past several years. But undoing recent

mistakes may not prove to be the hardest challenge facing the next President.

Instead, it is the crises and surprises we cannot fully anticipate that may end
up being the more daunting test.
While he (or she) will be better prepared to meet those new challenges if
the President puts in place the policy reforms discussed in previous chapters,
in the end success will hinge as well on the performance of the Presidents
national security and foreign policy teamthe institutions, capacities, and
peoplethat must adapt and innovate in real time. In other words, getting
the organizational process right might be a necessary condition for the next
President to get the new policies right.

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JOHN HAY INITIATIVE

The John Hay Initiative is a volunteer network of foreign policy, defense, and
intelligence experts who support and advise elected officials and national
leaders. Through regular meetings, our 21 working groups help political
leaders understand, formulate, and implement national security and foreign
policy from a conservative internationalist tradition. JHI was founded in
2013 by Eliot Cohen, Eric Edelman, and Brian Hook.

Choosing to Lead: American Foreign Policy for a Disordered World

2015 A project of The John Hay Initiative