Int J Philos Relig (2011) 69:155171

DOI 10.1007/s11153-010-9238-5

The concept of the highest good in Kierkegaard

and Kant
Roe Fremstedal

Received: 21 September 2009 / Accepted: 19 January 2010 / Published online: 7 April 2010
Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010

Abstract This article tries to make sense of the concept of the highest good (eternal bliss) in Sren Kierkegaard by comparing it to the analysis of the highest good
found in Immanuel Kant. The comparison with Kants more systematic analysis helps
us clarify the meaning and importance of the concept in Kierkegaard as well as to
shed new light on the conceptual relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. The article
argues that the concept of the highest good is of systematic importance in Kierkegaard,
although previous research has tended to overlook this, no doubt due to Kierkegaards
cryptic use of the concept. It is argued that Kierkegaards concept of the highest good
is much closer to Kants than what previous research has indicated. In particular, Kant
and Kierkegaard see the highest good not only as comprising of virtue and happiness
(bliss), but also as being the Kingdom of God.
Keywords Immanuel Kant Sren Kierkegaard Happiness Virtue
Kingdom of God The highest good Eternal bliss Religion
Introductory remarks
The highest good (det hieste Gode) was a concept that Danish (and German) thinkers
often relied on, not the least Danish thinkers influenced by Kant.1 Rather than com1 Cf. Koch (2003, 96) and Thuborg (1951, 57, 119). In the context of nineteenth and twentieth century

Protestant thought, G.E. Michalson writes: Whenever theologians spoke hopefully about a kingdom
of heaven on earth, Kantian influence was not far removed (Michalson 1999, 4). Regarding the key
role that the highest good plays in Kants critical philosophy more generally, see Rossi (2005, esp.
4366).
R. Fremstedal (B)
Department of Philosophy, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), 7491,
Trondheim, Norway
e-mail: roe.fremstedal@ntnu.no

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paring Kierkegaard to Danish thinkers of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, this
article compares Kierkegaard to Kant, possibly the single most important thinker of the
entire period. The article focuses on the highest good, a key concept in Kants philosophy of religion with which Kierkegaard clearly was familiar (SKS 19:141143; Not
4:12; JP 4722 ).3 However, rather than focusing on how Kant influenced Kierkegaard,
this article tries to provide a thematic comparison of Kant and Kierkegaard.4
Although the concept of the highest good is used and hinted at in many different
places in Kierkegaards authorship, it appears to be dealt with most explicitly in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The pseudonymous author of Postscript, Climacus,
identifies the highest good with eternal bliss (Salighed) and suggests that the highest
good is the absolute telos and that it is internally connected to an ethico-religious mode
of existing (SKS 7:354359, 388; CUP 389394, 426f). What appears to correspond
to this in Kant is his claim that the highest good is our final purpose (Endzweck) and
something that must be conditioned and limited by the Moral Law. In order to try to
make sense of the highest good in Climacus and Kierkegaard, I will start by presenting
Kants view.
Pre-moral happiness or happiness as a concept of nature
For his own happiness, writes Kant, is an end that every human being has (by virtue
of the impulses of his nature) (MM 6:386; cf. R 6:6n).5 We can assume with certainty
2 Abbreviations Kierkegaard: CA = Concept of Anxiety. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1980.
CD = Christian Discourses. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997. CUP = Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1982, vol. 1. EO1 = Either/Or, Part I. Princeton:
Princeton University Press 1987. EO2 = Either/Or, Part II. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1987.
EUD = Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990. JP = Sren Kierkegaards Journals and Papers. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 19671978, vol. 16. M = The
Moment and Late Writings. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998. Not = Journal(s) NB (in SKS). PC =
Practice in Christianity. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991. SD = Sickness unto Death. Princeton:
Princeton University Press 1980. SV = Samlede vrker. Copenhagen: Gyldendal 1994 [19621964]. SKS
= Sren Kierkegaards Skrifter. Copenhagen: Gad 1997ff. UD = Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1993.
3 As Kant does in the second Critique and in Lectures on Ethics, Kierkegaard uses the concept when

discussing the Stoics. At this point Kierkegaard relies on a history of philosophy by the Kantian W. G.
Tennemann (SKS 19:397f; Not 13:29). Regarding Tenneman, see Green (1992, 115f).
4 Unfortunately, the most thorough study of Kants influence on Kierkegaard, Green 1992, does not offer
an analysis of the concept of the highest good in Kierkegaard. Also, the most thorough thematic study of
Kant and Kierkegaard, Knappe 2004, does not focus on the highest good in Kant or in Kierkegaard.
5 All references to Kant are to the pagination in the Akademieausgabe: I. Kant, Gesammelten Schriften.
Berlin 1902ff. I have used the translations in the Cambridge Editions of the Works of Immanuel Kant in
Translation. Cambridge 1997ff. The reader is referred to the following texts: CF = The Conflict of the
Faculties in Religion and Rational Theology. CPR = Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy.
G = Groundwork of The metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy. A/B = Critique of Pure Reason.
MM = The Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy. LE = Lectures on Ethics. LPDR = Lectures on
the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion in Religion and Rational Theology. LP = Lectures on pedagogy in
Anthropology, History and Education. PP = Towards Perpetual Peace in Practical Philosophy. R = Religion
within the Boundaries of Bare Reason in Religion and Rational Theology. RA = Reflections on Anthropology. TP = On the Common Saying: This may be true in theory but it is of no use in practice in Practical
Philosophy.

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that all rational dependent beings have by natural necessity their own happiness as an
end (G 4:415). J.E. Hare comments:
Happiness is, in Kants technical sense, an idea, not the sort of thing of which
we can have experience. This is because, although the elements which belong to
the concept of happiness (like friendship) can be experienced, happiness itself
has to encompass the whole of experience. For the idea of happiness an absolute of whole, a maximum, of well-being is needed in my present and in every
future condition. [] [G 4:418; cf. LPDR 28:1080] It is lives as wholes that
are happy or unhappy, on this view [] Kant wants to insist, on the other hand,
that the elements which belong in the concept of happiness can be experienced.
[] Happiness, then, for Kant, is the maximum satisfaction as a whole of our
needs and desires as rational but finite agents, creatures of need and not merely
rational or moral agents. [] For Kant, happiness is an idea of the imagination
according to which everything goes according to my wish and will [cf. CPR
5:124]. (Hare 2002, 71f)
That everything goes according to wish and will, can be interpreted as the ability
to bring about what one wants (through intelligible causality). What corresponds in
Kierkegaard to happiness as the idea that I get my will is the following statement
made by the reflected aesthete A:
Real enjoyment [Den egentlige nydelse] consists not in what one enjoys [nyder]
but in the idea [Forestillingen]. If I had in my service a submissive jinni who,
when I asked for a glass of water, would bring me the worlds most expensive
wines, deliciously blended, in a goblet, I would dismiss him until he learned that
the pleasure [Nydelsen] consists not in what I enjoy [nyder] but in getting my
own way [faae min Villie]. (SKS 2:40; EO1:31)
The Danish term nydelse used here can mean both enjoyment and pleasure. The
aesthete claims that real enjoyment (egentlig nydelse) consists in the idea of always
getting ones will rather than enjoyment or pleasure (nydelse) as such. Rather than
consisting in a first-order desires (e.g. a given desire to enjoy wine or water), happiness as real enjoyment consists in the second-order desire to get ones way. This is
second-order desire since it is a desire about desires, namely the desire that I should
get my will independently of what it consists in (be it a desire for water or wine).6
While Kant understands happiness as the idea that everything goes according to
wish and will, A understands real enjoyment as the idea (Forestilling) of getting ones
will. As concept of real enjoyment is somewhat narrower than Kants concept of happiness since it focuses exclusively on ones will (rather than wish and will as Kant
does). Also, it involves the idea of getting ones will (simpliciter) rather than the idea
of everything goes according to will. Still, As real enjoyment is a sub-type of Kants
concept of happinesssomething that appears to have gone wholly unnoticed in the
Kierkegaard literature.
6 Allen Wood makes a similar claim about Kant. Wood (2001, 11, 20).

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Getting my will appears to involve that what I want (e.g. water) is brought about
or that I bring it about myself. Since what I want can be interpreted as an end, happiness can be taken to consists in (being successful in) reaching my end (e.g. getting
water). Happiness (Lykke or Glck) in this minimal sense means to succeed (lykkes or
gelingen) in getting my will by reaching my end. And since an end must be something
I have freely posited rather than that is something that is forced upon me (e.g. by
jinni who serves wine), happiness consists in reaching an end I have adopted myself.
However, positing an end involves being obligated to try to bring it about by applying
the necessary means (actions). So by positing an end I am thereby obliged to try to
get my will by reaching it. Thus, it appears that the quest for happiness as the idea of
getting my will follows from positing ends or from being directed towards ends. If this
brief reconstruction is sound, there is a much closer connection between happiness,
volition and agency than is known in the literature on Kierkegaard and Kant.
Clearly, this does not preclude there being other ways to conceive of happiness.
One way to conceive of happiness is to see it as consisting of pleasure and enjoyment
or as satisfying inclinations. This is a conception we also find both in Kant7 and Kierkegaard.8 However, this type of happiness can be seen as a special case of getting
ones will according to which ones will (maxim) consists of satisfying inclinations,
seeking pleasure or enjoyment.
However, it should be mentioned that if we follow our inclinations, this can be
considered to be a choice: Kants view is that rather than simply being ruled by
inclinations, we incorporate them into our maxim and thereby let them rule us.9 Kierkegaards notion of human nature as a synthesis of finitude and infinitude, necessity
and freedom (cf. Theunissen 1982, 21ff), implies not just being ruled by something
given, e.g. an inclination or a first-order desire. Rather, positing the synthesis involves
actively relating to the given (e.g. an inclination or a first-order desire) by receiving
it and endorsing it, alternatively by modifying it and changing it. This means that
although we have inclinations, it is not necessary to have a general rule (maxim) that
one should follow them.
Although As concept of happiness or enjoyment does not preclude hedonism, it
does necessarily involve it either. Rather than necessarily being a hedonist, the aesthete A relies on a Kantian understanding of happiness that is pre-moral. (Also, other
aesthetes such as Faust are said to seek distraction (adspredelse) rather than pleasure
(nydelse) (SKS 2:201; EO1 206)). However, the ethicist mistakes A for a hedonist
(SKS 3:32, 175; EO2 24, 179f), and we often find the same tendency in commentaries
and the secondary literature (e.g. SKS K4:371).
7 Kant occasionally understands happiness as (the idea of a sum, maximum or totality of) physical wellbeing (A806/B834; LPDR 28:1089, 1080; G 4:399, 418f), pleasure (cf. CPR 5:22f), or contentment with
ones state (MM 6:387; G 4:393). Cf. Byrne (2007, 102) and Wood (2001). See also the Hare passage quoted
above.
8 Notably, the ethicist attributes this hedonistic view to A (SKS 3:32, 175; EO2 24, 179f).
9 In what Henry Allison has dubbed the incorporation thesis, Kant states that [F]reedom of the power

of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any
incentive except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (R 6:23f). J.J. Davenport
has argued convincingly that Kierkegaards conception of volitional conditions for moral responsibility has
its origin in Kants incorporation thesis (Davenport 2001, 8385).

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The ethicist criticises the aesthete for relying on external factors that he cannot
control (SKS 3:175; EO2 180). Happiness understood as getting ones will as well as
happiness understood as enjoyment and pleasure are all vulnerable to this type of criticism, since there is no guarantee that things go according to will or that one achieves
pleasure or the satisfaction of inclinations. Even the aesthete A seems to acknowledge
this when he says that the door of happiness (Lykkens Dr) opens outward, not inward
(SKS 2:32; EO1 23), suggesting that there is nothing that one can do about it.
The highest good as the synthesis of happiness and virtue
Although Kant and Kierkegaard disagree about the source of our obligations,10 they
basically agree about the existence of unconditional ethical obligations (cf. Knappe
2004, ch. 3; Green 1997, 70f; 1992, 150; 1989, 395). In Kant, virtue is defined by the
Moral Law or the Categorical Imperative. While the Moral Law demands lawlikeness,
the material content (the purposes) comes from usfrom our subjective principles or
inclinations. Because it is given a priori, the Moral Law in itself is a formal principle
that is empty insofar as it does not set any purposes or ends. While subjective purposes are first-order principles, the Categorical Imperative (the Moral Law) works as
a second-order principle that chooses or selects among the maxims of the agent. Thus,
seeking happiness is not in itself something moral; it first becomes moral when it is
conditioned by the Moral Law and is thereby transformed to a quest for the highest
good. J. Marina explains:
[A]ll our ends are in some way or another related to our final end, namely happiness. This end is final insofar as it is not willed for the sake of anything else.
Insofar as this end is conditioned and limited by the formal principle of the moral
law, it is the highest good.11
Kant says that happiness is a natural end, an unavoidable determinant of the will
of a finite rational being, that gains admission into the highest good by being morally
constrained and universalized (CPR 5:25). Kant is reported to have explained the
relation between the good will and the highest good as follows:
[A] good will is simply good without restriction, for itself alone, in every respect
and under all circumstances. It is the only thing that is good without other conditions, but it is also not completely good. A thing can be unconditioned, and
yet not complete. It does not yet comprise the whole of goodness. The highest
good is unconditionally good, and also comprises the whole of goodness. (LE
29:599; cf. CPR 5:110)
It should be noted that there is also another way of understanding the content of the
highest good. Happiness can be understood as an end that itself follows from virtue
10 Dealing with this issue is completely outside the scope of this paper. However, I deal with this issue in
another paper that is in progress.
11 Marina (2000, 344; cf. 343345). Amongst others, Marina draws upon H.J. Paton, The Categorical

Imperative. In Kant, cf. LP 9:492.

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and whose promotion, like that of virtue, helps realize rational nature (Denis 2005,
35; cf. Guyer 2000, 339345, 386388). In this account, happiness concerns the very
ability to realise morals in nature. When he defines Glckseligkeit,12 Kant says:
Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose
existence everything goes according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on
the harmony of nature with his whole end as well as the essential determining
ground of his will. (CPR 5:124)
Here Kant is referring to a harmony between the intentions of a virtuous (rational)
agent and the actual consequences in the world. Happiness appears to be understood
as the result of satisfying ends that are morally required and not merely permissible. According to this ethical conception of happiness, happiness simply consists in
succeeding to realise ethics in the world. Happiness (Glckseligkeit or lyksalighed)
means that the virtuous gets his will since he succeeds (gelingt or lykkes) in realising
morals. Since this type of happiness (Glckseligkeit) is a concept of freedom that is
realised in nature, it provides a bridge between freedom and nature.
Kant is reported to have distinguished between happiness (Glck) as a concept of
nature, bliss (Seligkeit) as a concept of freedom and Glckseligkeit as a bridge between
nature and freedom (LE 27:644). Although Kant did not always use the terms consistently, the basic distinction seems clear enough. In this context, this distinction can be
given the following interpretation: In contradistinction to mere Glck (as a pre-moral
type of happiness), Seligkeit and Glckseligkeit are happiness conditioned and limited
by the moral. What sets Glckseligkeit apart from Seligkeit is that it is realised in
nature, in this life.
Happiness as a concept of nature (Glck) is the previously mentioned idea of
everything going according to wish and will. Happiness as a concept of freedom
(Glckseligkeit and Seligkeit) is something we are worthy of if and only if we have
been virtuous (cf. CPR 5:130). Happiness as a concept of freedom suggests that
virtue necessarily leads to (or even causes) happiness (cf. CPR 5:113115). In this
account, happiness as a concept of freedom is identical to the concept of the highest
good.
One example of happiness as a concept of freedom is Kants concept of moral happiness [Glckseligkeit] (MM 6:386388). However, Kant says that moral happiness
involves a contradiction and that the concept entails having already fully perfected oneself. If we cannot become fully virtuous in this life, moral happiness cannot be fully
realised in this world. Also, Kant thinks that if virtue generally leads to happiness in
this world, we would be motivated by the hope of reward and fear of punishment rather
than doing good for its own sake (cf. CPR 5:146f; LPDR 28:1083f). Kants view is
that we can only act morally if we have not reached the highest good. Hence, there
must be a disparity between virtue and happiness in this world. This would explain
why Kant holds that moral happiness involves a contradiction. We will see later that
this means that we cannot fully reach the highest good in this world.

12 The next paragraph is indebted to Kleingeld (1995, 107).

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I believe Kierkegaard agrees on this point. For instance, he (Haufniensis13 ) says

that if everything follows its regular course (gaaer sin regelmssig Gang) and good is
rewarded, then it is easy to merely strive for a finite goal (SKS 4:459; CA 160). Implicit
here is a distinction between a finite goal and the highest good. The upshot is that we
can only strive for the highest good in an imperfect world. While it is commonly held
that the existence of evil and suffering undermines belief in an almighty and good
God, Kierkegaard (Climacus) suggests that religion presupposes an imperfect world:
Whoever believes that there is a God and also a providence has an easier time
(in preserving the faith), an easier time in definitely gaining the faith (and not an
illusion) in an imperfect world, where passion is kept vigilant, than in an absolutely perfect world. In such a world, faith is indeed inconceivable. Therefore it
is also taught that faith is abolished in eternity. (CUP 29f; SKS 7:36; cf. 5:263f;
EUD 268)
In Kierkegaard we can distinguish between authentic and inauthentic happiness,
in a way that parallels Kants distinction between happiness as a concept of freedom (Seligkeit) and of nature (Glck), respectively. This distinction is implicit when
Kierkegaard (Anti-Climacus14 ) talks about someone who lives in sensate categories
(the pleasant and unpleasant, etc.) and imagines himself to be happy (indbilder sig at
vre lykkelig) although he in reality is unhappy (SKS 11:158; SUD 43). Interestingly,
the concept of the highest good is used explicitly in this passage. It appears to be
identified with truth and spirit (Aand; cf. Geist), or possibly with what I have called
authentic happiness. Kierkegaards distinction between categories of spirit and nature
corresponds to Kants distinction between concepts of freedom and nature (cf. SKS
23:103f; NB 16:13; JP 1520). In Kierkegaard categories of spirit appear to refer to
what we or God (freely chose to) do whereas categories of nature seem to refer to
laws, processes and facts of nature.
Throughout his authorship, and notably in the somewhat Kantian text Purity of
Heart (cf. Hannay 1993, 225227) Kierkegaard argues that we should seek virtue for
13 Kierkegaard originally planned for Concept of Anxiety to appear under his own name and only at the
last minute removed his name and added Haufniensis as the author. However, while making these changes,
Kierkegaard forgot that a footnote refers to his stay in Berlin in 18411842, a stay well-known in
Copenhagen. As Jon Stewart has pointed out: This only makes sense as an allusion to Kierkegaards
own biography and not to that of the pseudonymous author (Stewart 2003, 41). Cf. CA, 59f note, 21f; SKS
4:364ff, 328f note, K4:307339. Stewart goes on to argue that the example of Concept of Anxiety is far
from being anomalous in Kierkegaards works, pointing to Philosophical Fragments as another example.
Referring to philological research (SKS K4:171196, esp. 192f), Stewart says that only at last minute did
Kierkegaard relegate himself to the role of editor and present Climacus as the author. Stewart concludes
that there can be no talk of Kierkegaard consciously constructing a characteristic voice or position for the
pseudonym Vigil Haufniensis or Johannes Climacus [] Indeed, everything points to the fact that both of
these pseudonyms are completely ad hoc inventions (Stewart 2003, 41).
14 Attributing the views of Anti-Climacus to Kierkegaard is less controversial than in the case of the other

pseudonyms, since Kierkegaard himself says he invented Anti-Climacus in order to avoid getting criticised
for not living as he preached. This indicates that Kierkegaard shared Anti-Climacuss views and ideals
although he did not claim to live up to them. Thus, Theunissen states: Kierkegaard only meant to suggest
that he had not personally attained the level of belief by which Anti-Climacus measures human life. As for
its content, Kierkegaards identification with his treatise [Sickness unto Death] is unqualified (Theunissen
2005, 122 note 1; cf. Theunissen 1993, 13 note; NB 11:209; SKS 22:130; JP 6433).

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its own sake and not because it leads to happiness or a reward. In Postscript, Climacus clearly suggests that the individuals relation to eternal bliss or the highest good
is internally related to his moral duty (SKS 7:354359, 388; CUP 389394, 426f).
As C.S. Evans puts it: He [Climacus] defines (or redefines) happiness [Salighed] in
terms of virtue. Happiness is the intrinsically satisfied state of the person who fulfils
his moral duty (Evans 1999, 147, cf. 142147). Although C.S. Evans does not specifically say so, this sounds very Kantian since it involves the idea that virtue leads
to happiness (or rather bliss).15 However, we will see later that under Kierkegaards
framework, the whole is more complicated.

This-worldly and transcendent

Kierkegaards (Climacuss) identification of the highest good with eternal bliss means
that the highest good must be something that transcends the bliss or happiness we can
experience in this world (SKS 7:354ff, 368, 560; CUP 389ff, 405 617). Kierkegaard
himself appears to agree with Climacus on this point since he identifies the highest good with eternal bliss and immortality (SKS 10:230235, cf. 219; CD 222228,
cf. 211). Also, in this context both Climacus and Kierkegaard approve of Pauls saying
that he who only hopes for this life is the most miserable of all (UD 228; CUP 389
note; SKS 8:329, 7:355 note).
Rather than conceiving of the highest good as something this-worldly, Kierkegaard
conceives of it as something that can only be realised in the afterlife. The background
for this is that virtue does not (generally) lead to bliss or happiness in this world. In
Fear and Trembling and Postscript the relation between virtue and happiness in this
world is described as arbitrary (SKS 4:123, 156; 7:125ff, 129ff, 144, 270f note; FT
27, 63; CUP 134ff, 138ff, 155, 296f note). Kierkegaards later works, on the other
hand, tend to claim that virtue leads to unhappiness in this world (SKS 12:158; PC
154; SV 19:240; M 251; SKS 25:370ff, NB 29:107; JP 2908). Whereas the earlier
(18431846) approach depicts the world as essentially amoral, the later (post-1847)
approach tends to view it as evil. Perhaps as a result of the latter approach, there is a
tendency in the later Kierkegaard to portray the highest good in other-worldly terms
and see it in opposition to the goals of temporality.16
15 Although it appears to have gone unnoticed, the highest good coincides with repetition taken in strict
sense. More generally, the concept of repetition denotes that ideality is realised in reality, that universal
(ethical) principles, concepts, or ideas, are realised in a reality (cf. Stewart 2003, 274, 285, 296; Johansen
1988, 2, 6f, 9ff, 34f, 46, 66ff). In the strict sense, repetition means that ideality is fully realised in reality,
that morals are fully realised in the world. This is the idea of a moral world, a world where virtue leads to
happiness. In Fear and Trembling this world is called the world of the spirit and an eternal divine order
(SKS 4:123f; FT 27).
16 One of Kierkegaards points of departure here is the proverb Modgang er Medgang, that bad luck
is good luck or that downs are ups (cf. SKS 5:116ff; EUD 110ff). According to the later Kierkegaard,
modgang refers to what hinders one in reaching the goals of temporality, while medgang refers to what
contributes towards realising the absolute telos, the highest good or the Kingdom of God (SKS 10:159f,
163, 230235; CD 222-8, 151f, 155). Modgang seems to include the idea that our actions do not lead to
the consequences we intend (mishaps, etc.). Thus, modgang makes it easier to resign (resignere paa) what
Kierkegaard calls poorer [ringere] goods (cf. SKS 10:230235; CD 222228).

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As we will see, Kant would concede that the highest good can never be fully realised
in this life. However, Kant does not view the highest good in opposition to temporal
goals, as Kierkegaard does. Quite the opposite: In Kants account, the realisation of
eternal peace and international law (Vlkerrecht) not only contributes to the highest
good but also makes up political and juridical conditions for it. I do not think we find
anything that corresponds to Kants political and juridical conditions in Kierkegaard.
More generally, Kant seems to be much more optimistic regarding approaching the
highest good in this world than Kierkegaard is. The descriptions of this world as amoral
or evil found in Kierkegaards authorship are clearly at odds with the Kantian conception of happiness as successfully realising morals in the world. However, we will see
that even Kierkegaard allows for some this-worldly anticipation and approximation
of the highest good, at least in the case of Christian religiousness.
C.S. Evans has contrasted Climacuss conception of bliss (Salighed) with Kants
distinction between virtue and happiness in the following manner:
[V]irtue and happiness are always distinct for him [Kant], since happiness is
conceived as the sum total of the natural goods it is possible to realize. From
Climacus point of view Kant is still employing an aesthetic concept of happiness. [] Climacus does not merely link happiness with virtue in a synthetic
concept, as Kant did. (Evans 1999, 146f)17
In the second Critique, the highest good is conceived as a synthetic notion since
it consists of two heterogeneous concepts, virtue as a concept of freedom and happiness a concept of nature. Thus conceived, happiness is (the idea of) this-worldly or
empirical happiness. Evans is right in pointing out that this type of happiness is very
different from the concept of bliss (as a category of spirit) we find in Climacus and
Kierkegaard since the virtue and bliss (Salighed) that make up the highest good should
both be understood as categories of spirit (concepts of freedom).
Although what Evans says is in line with the analysis of virtue and happiness found
in the second Critique, he fails to take note of Kants notion of happiness as a concept of freedom (or happiness as something that itself follows from virtue), thereby
exaggerating the differences between Climacus and Kant. Insofar as the highest good
is transcendent it can refer to (the idea of) bliss rather than this-worldly happiness,
to freedom rather than nature. As Jacqueline Marina has showed, Kant can be interpreted as taking both virtue and happiness to be concepts of freedom that transcend
the world of sense, the result being that the highest good itself is something essentially
transcendent. In this account, the highest good involves complete virtue (sacredness)
and blessedness (not empirical happiness) (cf. Marina 2000, 330333, 337, 339341).
At best, this is something that we can approximate in this world. Moreover, we can
only make sense of the highest good as this-worldly if we refer to the highest good as
transcendent, as an absolute telos outside the world of experience, meaning that the

17 Climacus appears to be more in line with J.H. Abicht, a Jena theologian influenced by Kant who was
vehemently opposed to Kants distinction between virtue and happiness [in the second Critique]. He considers the two as naturally connected (di Giovanni 2005, 314 n 77). Di Giovanni refers to Abichts Kritische
Briefe (Nrnberg: Felsecker, 1793), 307.

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latter represents the highest good in an absolute sense (and the former in a qualified
sense).18 Marina writes:
The final end of the human being, the highest good, cannot be thought of as an
event subject to the same conditions as all other experiences in the spatio-temporal continuum. Achievement of both its formal and material elements (i.e.,
virtue and happiness in the supreme degree, or holiness and bliss) consists of
complete contentment with our condition. Once such a state is reached, a change
in condition is undesirable. Achievement of such a state would make time, as the
condition of change, unnecessary, since no other goal towards which the human
being is teleologically ordered can be thought. Thus achievement of the highest
good (holiness and bliss) must indeed constitute the end of the world as we know
it, i.e. the world of appearances subject to change. (Marina 2000, 338)
If the highest good is transcendent, this means that the gap between freedom and
nature cannot be fully bridged in this world (cf. Marina 2000, 350f; Michalson 1999,
175 note 70 (quoting Susan Neiman)). Nevertheless, it is possible to reconcile with this
world by hoping that we will make progress towards the highest good. Paradoxically,
Kant and Kierkegaards views suggest that it is only possible to endure existence and to
be a moral agent if one hopes for and strives towards a transcendent goal. Kierkegaard
suggests that if we could reach our final goal in this life, we would lack a task and our
existence would be hopeless (cf. SKS 8:372f; UD 276f).
Climacus is highly critical of those who act as spectators and want an objective and
detached (a-moral) description of bliss. Clearly, Kierkegaards (Climacuss) primary
concern is not to give a description of the afterlife but to delineate our (this-worldly)
concept of the highest good and how it makes it possible to orient oneself in this
world. This is consistent with the account in Fear and Trembling that stresses that
(Abrahamic) religious faith concerns the relation to this life (SKS 4:116, 131; FT 20,
36). However, in Kierkegaards account, Judaism involves believing that it is possible
to realise true happiness in this world since an ordeal is something that passes. Fear
and Trembling therefore says that Abraham believes he can become happy (lyksalig)
here (SKS 4:131, 115f; FT 56, 19f). Christianity, on the other hand, sees our whole
existence as an ordeal or an examination (cf. SKS 12:183; 20:392; NB 5:48; PC 183;
JP 481).
The absolute telos
Kant describes the highest good as our final end (Endzweck) (cf. R 6:5f; LE 27:470f),
whereas Kierkegaard (Climacus) describes it as our absolute telos (cf. SKS 7:524,
353f; CUP 502, 387f).19 This appears to be a difference in terminology rather than
18 Regarding Kant: Marina (2000, esp. 331 (with note), 332f, 335 (with note), 338, 340). Regarding

Climacus: Green (1997, 258f).

19 Like Climacus, de silentio identifies the absolute telos with eternal bliss (Evig Salighed) (SKS 4:148;

FT 54). Kierkegaard himself describes eternal bliss as det ene forndnethe one thing necessary (SKS
5:255; EUD 258f).

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substance. Both Kant and Kierkegaard claim that there is an ultimate end and that this
end consists in the realisation of virtue and happiness.
For Kant, the highest good is a necessary end. He claims that [E]very species of
rational being [jede Gattung vernftiger Wesen] is objectively, in the idea of reason,
destined [bestimmt] to a common end, namely the promotion of the highest good
as a good common to all (R 6:97; cf. LE 27:470f). This provides the background
for Kants claim that our vocation (Bestimmung) lies in realising the highest good
(cf. Zammito 2002, 164170; di Giovanni 2005, 710, 30f).
Although Kierkegaard occasionally talks about the vocation (Bestemmelse) of man
(cf. SKS 5:91, 19:255; Not 9:1; EUD 84; JP 5514), he is not so explicit about what it
consists of and does not offer a systematic analysis like Kant. However, in one passage,
the ethicist speaks about our vocation while endorsing the argument for the immortality of the soul as developed by Kant in the second Critique (SKS 3:265; EO2 279;
CPR 5:132, 128; Green 1992, 20). At least this passage suggests that mans vocation
lies in realising the highest good.
Elsewhere, Climacus and de silentio20 appear to view the absolute telos as a necessary purpose. Unfortunately, it is not perfectly clear whether this is a necessary end
for religiousness, moral agency or human existence more generally.21 What is clear,
however, is that it is not merely supposed to be a necessary end for Christians since the
relation to eternal bliss is said to belong to immanent religiousness and not merely to
Christianity (SKS 7:522, 529; CUP 574, 581; Kosch 2006, 167; Hannay 1993, 212).22
Climacus says that we have an interest in eternal bliss at the pre-Christian level, and
Christianity contracts to give one [betinger En] this good (SKS 7:560, cf. 25; CUP
617, cf. 15f). Christianity presupposes an infinite interest in eternal bliss as the sine
qua non (SKS 7:25; CUP 16; cf. Glenn 1997, 254).
Climacus claims that everybody expects eternal bliss, (SKS 7:355n; CUP 389f
note) suggesting that bliss is an absolute purpose (telos) that all other purposes must
presuppose. Indeed, Climacus says that the concern for the highest good cannot be
relinquished (SKS 7:524; CUP 577). This is not a psychological thesis or the empirical
observation that everybody is conscious of expecting eternal bliss since Climacus talks
20 The name of the pseudonym is consistently spelled Johannes de silentio (cf. SKS 4:104, 324n; 7:569).
However, the secondary literature has tended to change the spelling to Johannes de Silentio, presumably
because it is taken to be some kind of family name or a place name. Indeed the name means Johannes from
silence or Johannes of silence. I have followed the original spelling, although the reason for Kierkegaards
unconventional spelling is not clear.
21 Hannay (1993, 211, 213) says that even if a concern with this particular form of satisfaction [eternal

blessedness] may be natural to man, that there actually is a creator who can bestow this blessedness, and
who has implanted a concern for it in all human beings, it is not something anyone can either know or
find any reason to believe. [] Climacuss own idea of a highest good, of some benefit which Christian
belief or practice will bring him, is to say the least somewhat vague. Hannay then goes on to compare
Kierkegaard to Kant, adding the following proviso: Our comparisons with Kant are necessarily rough.
A more detailed assessment might well indicate less disparity between Kants and Kierkegaards views
(Hannay 1993, 213). Indeed, I believe this paper shows not only that Climacuss view are less vague than
Hannay claims but also that they overlap more with Kant that Hannays analysis shows.
22 Khan, however, holds that a proper relation to Salighed presupposes a relation to Christ, the paradox
(Khan 1985, esp. 53, 32f, 92109). This interpretation gives meaning if the point is that Christianity offers
bliss (Salighed) although the interest in bliss is found already at the pre-Christian level of existence.

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about a person who has lost a sense [tapt Sandsen] of eternal bliss, saying that it
is presumably (vel23 ) impossible for such a person to become eternally blessed (SKS
7:25; CUP 16). Rather than making an empirical or a psychological claim, Climacus
is making a conceptual (or possibly a transcendental) claim about existence or agency
presupposing some absolute end.
Unless we can make sense of Climacuss claim that everybody expects eternal bliss,
it is hard to make sense of Postscript more generally, since much of Climacuss analysis
rests on the assumption that we want the highest good and then goes on to discuss how
we can receive this good. Unfortunately, he is not explicit about why we would want
the highest good in the first place. Today, many would simply dismiss Climacuss view
as implausible, and hence view Climacuss argument and large portions of Postscript
as a non-starter. If we are to understand why Climacus held this view, it needs to be
reconstructed. One possibility here is a rational reconstruction along Kantian lines.
If the highest good is an end that itself follows from virtue, this suggests that the
necessity of the highest good can be justified on moral grounds alone. However, if
the highest good does not follow from virtue alone then a separate justification is
needed for happiness. I have tried to sketch such a justification briefly, although my
reconstruction only deals with happiness as the idea of getting my will. Although we
clearly find this conception of happiness in Kant and the aesthete A, it is less clear
that Kierkegaard or Climacus subscribes to this conception, since either one could
possibly rely on a conception of happiness (or bliss) that is different from the one we
find in Kant and aesthete A. Even if we cannot preclude this possibility, the available evidence makes it very hard to determine what such an alternative conception
of happiness or bliss would amount to and what implications it would have for the
highest good. Compared to the existing literature on the highest good and eternal bliss
(Salighed) in Kierkegaard (e.g. Khan 1985; Evans 1999; Hannay 1993), the somewhat
Kantian sketch given here seems so far the most promising.
Christianity and philosophy in Kierkegaard
The highest good is the single most important concept in Kants philosophy of religion. Kants claim that the highest good is a necessary end provides the background
for the postulates of the existence of God and immortality in his philosophy of religion. Although Kierkegaard does not accept Kants postulates, he appears to agree
with Kant that the highest good is a necessary purpose for us, something which leads
to the following problems. (A) Man is not completely virtuous. Given the so-called
ethical rigorism,24 this means that man is evil. Interpreted from a philosophical perspective, or the perspective of immanent (natural) religiousness, this means that man is
(infinitely) guilty; interpreted from the Christian perspective, the perspective of transcendent (revealed) religiousness, it means that man is infinitely sinful. In addition to
this problem, we have two other problems: (B) Even if I am virtuous I could still end
23 CUP 16 translates vel as certainly, but it can also mean presumably.
24 Regarding Kant, see (R 6:2225; cf. LE 27:302). Regarding Kierkegaard, see (Green 1997, 6387, 70f;

Green 1989, 395; NB 24:112; SKS 24:390; 7:383; JP 998; CUP 420f).

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up being unhappy and (C) that since the highest good take the form of a kingdom or
society, it cannot be realised by the individual on his own.
Instead of appealing to postulates of practical reason like Kant does, Kierkegaard
wants to overcome these problems by relying on revealed faith. This means that there
is an important sense in which Christianity is an answer to a philosophical problem
for Kierkegaard. However, it is crucial that Christianity is not merely that for Kierkegaard. The distinction between guilt and sin provides a case in point: Although man
is capable of seeing that he is guilty, he is incapable of realising that he is a sinner. In
contradistinction to guilt-consciousness (which belongs to immanent religiousness),
sin-consciousness has to be revealed by God.25
In Christianity, our salvation is based on our relation to the incarnation. So within
religiousness B our relation to eternal bliss is supposed to be based on a historical phenomenon or occurrence. Although this may separate Kierkegaard from Kant, this is not
perfectly clear since Kant scholars (e.g. Green 1992; Marina 1997; Michalson 1999)
disagree fundamentally about whether the realisation of the highest good depends on
revelation or an historic event. Since it lies outside the scope of this article to solve
this controversial issue, the present article remains agnostic when it comes to whether
there is a role for historical faith in Kant.
We have seen that happiness (Salighet) can be defined in terms of virtue. However, neither Climacus nor Kierkegaard believes it to be possible to deserve happiness
or bliss (CUP 404; EUD 268; SKS 7:368; 5:264). Ultimately, both Kierkegaard and
Climacus hold that we are neither capable of realising virtue nor the highest good; we
only choose whether or not to accept divine grace (cf. SKS 7:390f; 5:267f; 10:228;
CUP 429f; EUD 272f; CD 220f).26 Hence, for Kierkegaard and Climacus, bliss (Salighed) is ultimately defined in terms of grace rather than in terms of virtue. Bliss is
the state of the person who has received Gods saving grace. Nevertheless, ethics has
a crucial role to play in Kierkegaard since having an anguished conscience, being
aware of not meeting the ethical requirement, is a prior condition for anyone confronting the Christian offer of salvation (SKS 20:69; NB 79; JP 2461). Instead of endorsing
faith without virtue, Kierkegaard insists that we cannot become virtuous through our
own power and that therefore we cannot deserve happiness or bliss.
This means that we can only take part in the highest good by accepting divine grace
(EUD 268; SKS 5:264).27 Already by early 1843, Kierkegaard had aligned the highest
good with (Christian) faith (SKS 5:1921, 24f; EUD 911, 14f). Later he says that the
highest good is to love God (SKS 10:209; CD 200). I take this to mean that Christian
belief and love of God involve accepting grace and represent this-worldly anticipations and approximations of the highest good. Presumably, faith or ethico-religious

25 I deal with the relation between Christianity and philosophy in Kierkegaard in more deal in Fremstedal,
The double movement of faith in Kierkegaard compared to Kants moral faith (in progress).
26 For an attempt to compare this to Kant, see Fremstedal The double movement of faith in Kierkegaard
compared to Kants moral faith.
27 Khan shows that the etymology of Salig gives us the meanings weak, helpless, simple (and perhaps simplemindedness), and touched (by God, arguably). Khan says that faith in Salighed presupposes reflection,
that one veier (weights and balances, for instance temporal sufferings against eternal bliss) and overveier
(reflect or deliberate). Khan (1985, 90f, 8588).

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existence represents this-worldly aspects of the highest good, whereas eternal bliss,
as something transcendent, represents the highest good in an absolute sense. Insofar
as faith involves good works in Kierkegaard, his view appears to overlap with Kant.
Rather than saying that good works must precede grace, Kant says that for practical
purposes we should start doing our duty to the uttermost of our capability (cf. R 6:109),
adding that God will complete what we are unable to do (cf. R 6:67f, 117f, 139f, 144f,
201f). By doing this, Kant does not need to exclude the possibility of divine grace (cf.
Marina 1997, 399).
The Kingdom of God
Rather than merely consisting of happiness and virtue, the highest good is a moral
world where the virtuous are happy. Accordingly, Kant explicitly identifies the highest good with the Kingdom of God, the ethical commonwealth and the church (CPR
5:127ff; R 6:97ff, 139). At this point Kant is clearly giving a philosophical reinterpretation of biblical and ecclesiological concepts, concepts with which Kierkegaard
was familiar. Kant depicts the highest good as a necessary union of the virtuous in
an ethical community, including as political and juridical conditions the realisation of
eternal peace and international law (Vlkerrecht) (cf. R 6:123, 354f; TP 8:312f, PP
8:362; RA 15:647f; #1468). The latter two represent this-worldly anticipations and
approximations of the highest good in an absolute sense in Kant.28
Also, Kant understands the visible church as something that can contribute towards
the realisation of the highest good. Kant believes that the different churches work
towards the realisation of the ethical commonwealth as a regulative idea. J.E. Hare
takes Kant to be saying that
the victory of the good over the evil principle requires a visible representation
of an invisible kingdom of God on earth [] His argument is that we will have
ends which require the help of others if we are going to reach them [] We are
linked together by our needs and abilities into a single unit, or kingdom, which
we must be prepared to will into existence as a whole. It contains our need (for
even in the true church we will be creatures of need), and it contains other people
with the developed abilities to meet our needs; but it also contains the needs of
others, and our developed abilities to meet their needs. (Hare 2002, 264f)
Kant depicts the ethical commonwealth as a universal and invisible church (CF
7:59; cf. R 6:122; A808/B836; cf. Rossi 1995, 679, 681).29 The church consists of
virtuous individuals, but we cannot identify them, since knowing someones disposition (Gesinnung) would require supernatural (bersinnlich) knowledge or intellectual
intuition. We cannot know who belongs to the Kingdom of God, although God can,
since he can know hearts and reins (cf. MM 6:438f).
28 Kant can be taken to point out the need for political stability as a precondition of moral stabilitythat
is, for a political community prior to a moral commonwealth (Frierson 2003, 55).
29 Notwithstanding, in one passage Kant makes a puzzling remark to the effect that the visible church is

the true church (R 6:101). I take this to refer to immortality or the millennium rather than this world.

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Although Kierkegaard does not rely on Kants technical terms (e.g. intellectual
intuition, Gesinnung, etc), he uses the same biblical terms as Kant, saying that only
God can know heart and reins (Nyrer) (cf. SKS 20:325; NB 4:78; JP 6112). For Kierkegaard, as for Kant, this means that we are unable to say who belongs to the true
church and that in this world, the true church is the invisible church.
Kierkegaard is less explicit than Kant when it comes to interpreting the highest
good as the Kingdom of God. Some readers have even taken Kierkegaard to dismiss
the traditional Christian notion of the Kingdom of God.30 However, I believe that
Kierkegaard was far from dismissing this notion.31 Indeed, my view is that Kierkegaard interprets the highest good as the Kingdom of God and that this important point
has been overlooked by previous scholarship. One notable exception is Glenn (1997,
260f). Glenn suggests that what Climacus says about eternal happiness seems to be
based on the term Kingdom of God in the New Testament. Unfortunately, the only
textual evidence Glenn offers for this claim is a passage where Kierkegaard says that
the highest good and the greatest blessedness (strste Salighed) is truly to love, and
next, truly to be loved (SKS 9:240, cf. 240f; WL 239, cf. 239f; Glenn 1997, 261). In
my view, this passage can be taken to say that universal neighbour love is the highest
good. Arguably, this is what constitutes the Kingdom of God. Put in Kantian terms:
the realisation of the highest good involves universal respect or practical love.
I believe important textual evidence has been overlooked that supports Glenns thesis about the highest good being the Kingdom of God, particularly one passage where
Kierkegaard explicitly says that the Kingdom of God is the name of bliss (Saligheden)
(SKS 8:303f; UD 208f). And in two other passages Kierkegaard seems to identify or
at least align eternal bliss with the Kingdom of God (SKS 5:255; 10:65; EUD 258f;
CD 56). By doing this, Kierkegaard follows orthodox Christian views on the one hand
and Kant on the other.
In Expectancy of eternal bliss, Kierkegaard writes:
[T]he expectancy of an eternal salvation [Salighed32 ] is able (which otherwise
seems impossible) to be in two places at the same time: it works in heaven and
it works on earth; it seeks Gods kingdom and his righteousness and gives the
rest as an over-measure (Matthew 6:33) (SKS 5:255; EUD 259)
Here, the Kingdom of God is clearly aligned with eternal bliss. In Kierkegaard,
the highest good is the only thing that is unconditionally good and therefore deserves
infinite interest. Other goods, elsewhere described as poorer (ringere) goods (cf. SKS
10:230235; CD 222228) or finite goals (cf. SKS 4:459; CA 160), must therefore be
renounced insofar as they collide with the highest good or insofar as they depend on
some contingent state of affairs that we cannot control. In Kierkegaard, this provides
the background for understanding his repeated claim that we should first seek the
Kingdom of God and therefore renounce (forsage) everything else (SKS 20:376; NB
30 E.A.F. Jessem wrote: Martensens Wahlspruch heit: Reich Gottes und der Einzelne. S Kierkegaards:
Nur der Einzelne (Schulz 2009, 320).
31 This is suggested by a search for hieste gode in the electronic edition (SKS-E) at http://www.sks.dk/

zoom/search.asp.
32 Salighed means bliss or blessedness rather than salvation.

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5:12; cf. 8:303306 UD 208212). However, the passage quoted above suggests that
by expecting eternal bliss we are capable of seeking the Kingdom of God, resigning
(resignere paa) the rest and receiving the rest as a gift.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this article has been to clarify the meaning and importance of
the concept of the highest good in Kierkegaard as well as shedding new light on the
conceptual relation between Kant and Kierkegaard. It is argued that Kierkegaards
concept of the highest good is much closer to Kant than previous research (e.g. Evans
1999; Hannay 1993; Khan 1985) has indicated. I have pointed out considerable overlap between the concept of the highest good in Kant and Kierkegaard; in particular
that the highest good involves the following three elements: (A) virtue, (B) happiness
or bliss, and (C) a society or kingdom.
My view is that Kierkegaards concept of the highest good (and As concept of happiness) converges with Kant rather than necessarily being influenced by him. Thus, it is
internally (conceptually) related although it may not be historically related. Although
Kierkegaard was familiar with the concept of the highest good in Kant, Kierkegaard
often drew upon other sources than Kant, in particular various theological sources
(e.g. SKS K17:104).
After having examined several pseudonymous texts as well as writings Kierkegaard
penned under his own name, I have not found any clear evidence that Kierkegaard disagreed with Climacus or de silentio as regards the highest good. However, piecing
together their different remarks makes it easier to make sense of the highest good in
Kierkegaards authorship and to compare it to Kant. Since the pseudonyms and Kierkegaard appear to agree fully when it comes to the highest good, I have difficulty in
seeing why it would be wrong to attribute the views of the highest good found in Climacus and de silentio to Kierkegaard himself.33 Indeed, even the aesthete As Kantian
understanding of happiness appears to be consistent with the views of Kierkegaard,
Climacus and de silentio.34
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