NTTP 3-07.2.

NAVY TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE
PROTECTION
NTTP 3-07.2.1
SEPTEMBER 2006

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

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THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
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THIS DETERMINATION WAS MADE 01 AUGUST 2006.
OTHER REQUESTS SHALL BE REFERRED TO
NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND,
686 CUSHING ROAD, NEWPORT RI 02841-1207.

URGENT CHANGE/ERRATUM RECORD

NUMBER

DATE

ENTERED BY

PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY:

COMMANDER, FLEET FORCES COMMAND

0411LP1056690

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September 2006
PUBLICATION NOTICE

ROUTING

1. NTTP 3-07.2.1, ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION, is available in the Navy

Warfare Library. It is effective upon receipt.
2. Summary. NTTP 3-07.2.1 supports the U.S. Navys increased emphasis on
antiterrorism/force protection. It consists of specific information on planning,
organization, command and control, preplanned responses, and tactics.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

CONTENTS
Page
No.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
1.1

PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................1-1

1.2

SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................1-1

1.3

CONCEPTS ................................................................................................................................1-1

1.4

FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS.....................................................................................1-2

1.5

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLANS...............................................................1-3

1.6

THREAT.....................................................................................................................................1-3

1.7

CONCLUSION ...........................................................................................................................1-3

CHAPTER 2 ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING

2.1

OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................2-1

2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.2.6

PLANNING PROCESS DEFINED ............................................................................................2-2

Mission Analysis.........................................................................................................................2-2
Course of Action Development...................................................................................................2-3
Course of Action War Gaming ...................................................................................................2-5
Course of Action Comparison and Selection ..............................................................................2-5
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Plan Development.....................................................................2-6
Transition ....................................................................................................................................2-6

2.3

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS.............................................................................................2-6

2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.4.5

APPLICATION OF THE AT/FP PLANNING PROCESS ........................................................2-8

Mission Analysis.........................................................................................................................2-8
Course of Action Development...................................................................................................2-9
Course of Action War Game.......................................................................................................2-9
Course of Action Comparison and Decision.............................................................................2-11
Orders Development and Transition .........................................................................................2-11

CHAPTER 3 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

3.1

OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................3-1

3.2

COMMANDER/COMMANDING OFFICER ...........................................................................3-1

3.3

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION BOARD..............................................................3-3

3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2

ANTITERRORISM OFFICER...................................................................................................3-4
Antiterrorism/Force Protection Training Supervisor ..................................................................3-4
Force Protection Training Team .................................................................................................3-4

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3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3

SECURITY OFFICER................................................................................................................3-5
Navy Security Force....................................................................................................................3-5
Auxiliary Security Force.............................................................................................................3-6
Reaction Force ............................................................................................................................3-6

CHAPTER 4 ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

4.1

OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................4-1

4.2

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL....................................................................................4-1

4.3

MILITARY WORKING DOG TEAM.......................................................................................4-1

4.4
4.4.1
4.4.2

NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE...............................................................................................4-2

Mobile Security Squadron and Detachment................................................................................4-2
Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron................................................................................................4-2

4.5

SUBMARINE FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT .........................................................4-3

4.6

NAVAL SECURITY FORCE UNIT..........................................................................................4-3

4.7

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS FLEET ANTITERRORISM

SECURITY TEAM COMPANY................................................................................................4-3

4.8
4.8.1
4.8.2

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESOURCES.................................................................4-4

Port Security Unit........................................................................................................................4-4
Maritime Safety and Security Team ...........................................................................................4-4

4.9
4.9.1
4.9.2
4.9.3
4.9.4

NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE .................................................................4-4

Multiple Threat Alert Center.......................................................................................................4-4
Support to Ashore Installations...................................................................................................4-5
Support to Afloat Commands......................................................................................................4-5
Support to Major Commands......................................................................................................4-5

4.10

HOST NATION SUPPORT .......................................................................................................4-5

CHAPTER 5 COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

5.1

OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................5-1

5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.2.3
5.2.4
5.2.5
5.2.6
5.2.7

AFLOAT AT/FP COMMAND AND CONTROL .....................................................................5-1

Command Duty Officer...............................................................................................................5-2
Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officer .........................................................................................5-2
Quarterdeck Watches ..................................................................................................................5-2
Chief of the Guard.......................................................................................................................5-3
Pier Sentry and Waterborne Patrol..............................................................................................5-3
Other Sentries..............................................................................................................................5-3
Reaction Forces...........................................................................................................................5-3

5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4

ASHORE AT/FP COMMAND AND CONTROL .....................................................................5-3

Command Duty Officer...............................................................................................................5-4
Security Officer...........................................................................................................................5-4
AT Tactical Watch Officer/Watch Commander .........................................................................5-4
Chief of the Guard/Waterfront Security Supervisor ...................................................................5-4

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5.3.5
5.3.6
5.3.7
5.3.8
5.3.9
5.3.10
5.3.11
5.3.12

Patrol Supervisor.........................................................................................................................5-5
Entry Control Point .....................................................................................................................5-5
Pier Sentry...................................................................................................................................5-6
Flightline Security.......................................................................................................................5-6
Mobile Patrol...............................................................................................................................5-6
Waterborne Patrol .......................................................................................................................5-7
Reaction Forces...........................................................................................................................5-7
Other Responders........................................................................................................................5-7

5.4

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION.........................................................................................5-7

5.5
5.5.1
5.5.2
5.5.3
5.5.4

ANTITERRORISM COMMUNICATIONS ..............................................................................5-8

Dispatch Center...........................................................................................................................5-8
Emergency Operations Center ....................................................................................................5-9
Radios..........................................................................................................................................5-9
Computer-Aided Dispatch System............................................................................................5-11

CHAPTER 6 PREPLANNED RESPONSES

6.1

OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................6-1

6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2

SURVEILLANCE ......................................................................................................................6-1
Surveillance Detection Principles ...............................................................................................6-2
Surveillance Detection Planning Considerations ........................................................................6-2

6.3
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3

SMALL BOAT THREAT...........................................................................................................6-4

Small Boat Detection Principles .................................................................................................6-4
Small Boat Detection Considerations .........................................................................................6-5
Small Boat Continuum of Force .................................................................................................6-7

6.4
6.4.1
6.4.2

DEEP DRAFT THREAT............................................................................................................6-8

Deep Draft Threat Principles ......................................................................................................6-9
Deep Draft Threat Considerations ..............................................................................................6-9

6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2

SUBSURFACE THREAT ..........................................................................................................6-9

Subsurface Threat Principles.......................................................................................................6-9
Subsurface Threat Considerations.............................................................................................6-10

6.6
6.6.1
6.6.2
6.6.3
6.6.4
6.6.5
6.6.6
6.6.7
6.6.8

ENTRY CONTROL POINT THREAT ....................................................................................6-13

Personnel and Vehicle Identification ........................................................................................6-16
Unauthorized Pedestrian or Vehicle..........................................................................................6-16
Protests and Rallies ...................................................................................................................6-17
Media Requests .........................................................................................................................6-18
Presence of IED ........................................................................................................................6-18
Unattended Package at or near the ECP....................................................................................6-18
Surveillance Detection ..............................................................................................................6-19
Medical Emergency ..................................................................................................................6-19

6.7
6.7.1
6.7.2

RAIL-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE THREAT ..........................................6-20

Rail-Borne IED Threat Principles.............................................................................................6-20
Rail-Borne IED Threat Considerations.....................................................................................6-20

6.8
6.8.1

AIRCRAFT THREAT ..............................................................................................................6-20

Aircraft Threat Principles..........................................................................................................6-21

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Aircraft Threat Considerations..................................................................................................6-21

6.9
6.9.1
6.9.2

STANDOFF ATTACK THREAT ............................................................................................6-22

Standoff Attack Threat Principles.............................................................................................6-22
Standoff Attack Threat Considerations.....................................................................................6-22

6.10
6.10.1
6.10.2

MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM THREAT........................................................6-23

MANPADS Threat Principles...................................................................................................6-23
MANPADS Threat Considerations...........................................................................................6-23

CHAPTER 7 TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

7.1

PURPOSE ...................................................................................................................................7-1

7.2
7.2.1
7.2.2

EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE .....................................................................................................7-1

Deadly Force Triangle.................................................................................................................7-2
Conditions for Employment of Force .........................................................................................7-3

7.3

RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES ...........................................................................7-6

7.4

INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION MEASURES.............................................................................7-8

7.5
7.5.1
7.5.2

GUARD MOUNT PROCEDURES..........................................................................................7-12

Brief and Inspection ..................................................................................................................7-12
Watch Turnover ........................................................................................................................7-13

7.6
7.6.1
7.6.2
7.6.3
7.6.4
7.6.5
7.6.6

SECURITY BOAT TACTICS..................................................................................................7-14

Assessment Zone.......................................................................................................................7-14
Warning Zone ...........................................................................................................................7-14
Threat Zone ...............................................................................................................................7-14
Single-Boat Defense .................................................................................................................7-14
Multiple-Boat Defense..............................................................................................................7-15
Intrusion Response....................................................................................................................7-17

7.7
7.7.1
7.7.2

WATERBORNE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES.....................................................................7-19

Waterborne Access ...................................................................................................................7-19
Waterborne Clearance...............................................................................................................7-20

7.8
7.8.1
7.8.2
7.8.3
7.8.4

ANTISUBSURFACE TACTICS..............................................................................................7-20
Detection and Deterrence of Swimmers ...................................................................................7-21
MK3A2 Concussion Grenades..................................................................................................7-21
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support......................................................................................7-26
Tactics against Mines................................................................................................................7-26

7.9
7.9.1
7.9.2
7.9.3
7.9.4
7.9.5
7.9.6
7.9.7
7.9.8

ENTRY CONTROL POINT PROCEDURES..........................................................................7-27

Assessment Zone.......................................................................................................................7-28
Warning Zone ...........................................................................................................................7-28
Threat Zone ...............................................................................................................................7-28
Personnel Entry Control Point ..................................................................................................7-28
Vehicle Entry Control Point......................................................................................................7-29
Commercial Vendor Access......................................................................................................7-31
Inspecting for Explosive Devices..............................................................................................7-31
Obstacles and Barriers ..............................................................................................................7-31

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7.10

CREW-SERVED WEAPONS ..................................................................................................7-33

7.11

ANTIAIRCRAFT TECHNIQUES ...........................................................................................7-35

7.12

DEFENDING A TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT ............................................................................7-35

CHAPTER 8 SECURITY REACTION FORCES

8.1

OVERVIEW ...............................................................................................................................8-1

8.2
8.2.1
8.2.2

REACTION FORCE SKILLS ....................................................................................................8-1

Security Reaction Force Operational Tasks ................................................................................8-1
Tactical Team Configuration ......................................................................................................8-1

8.3
8.3.1
8.3.2
8.3.3
8.3.4
8.3.5
8.3.6
8.3.7
8.3.8

REACTION FORCE FUNDAMENTALS .................................................................................8-3

Overview.....................................................................................................................................8-3
Mental Preparation......................................................................................................................8-3
Principles of Ashore and Afloat Close Quarter Battle ................................................................8-3
Basic Communications Procedures.............................................................................................8-5
Fundamentals of Room Clearing ................................................................................................8-7
Tactical Lighting Techniques......................................................................................................8-7
Adversaries and Hostage Handling.............................................................................................8-9
Team Casualty in Battle..............................................................................................................8-9

8.4
8.4.1
8.4.2
8.4.3
8.4.4
8.4.5
8.4.6
8.4.7
8.4.8
8.4.9
8.4.10
8.4.11
8.4.12
8.4.13
8.4.14
8.4.15
8.4.16
8.4.17
8.4.18
8.4.19

TACTICAL MOVEMENT PROCEDURES ............................................................................8-10

Close Quarter Battle Tactical Movements ................................................................................8-10
Movement Techniques..............................................................................................................8-10
Fields of Fire .............................................................................................................................8-11
Considerations For Tactical Movement ....................................................................................8-11
Team Formation........................................................................................................................8-12
Tactical Movement Techniques and Commands ......................................................................8-12
External and Open Space Movement ........................................................................................8-15
Passageway Movement .............................................................................................................8-20
Blow Through ...........................................................................................................................8-35
Ladders......................................................................................................................................8-36
Stairways...................................................................................................................................8-37
Room Entry Techniques............................................................................................................8-38
Breacher Movements ................................................................................................................8-48
Room Clearing Techniques.......................................................................................................8-48
Movement Within a Room........................................................................................................8-63
Limited Penetration...................................................................................................................8-69
Follow-on Rooms......................................................................................................................8-69
Deconfliction.............................................................................................................................8-71
Tactical Withdrawal ..................................................................................................................8-74

8.5
8.5.1
8.5.2

HOSTAGE SITUATION MANAGEMENT ............................................................................8-78

Hostage Site Management.........................................................................................................8-78
Hostage Information .................................................................................................................8-79

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8.5.3
8.5.4
8.5.5

Resolving Hostage Situations ...................................................................................................8-80

Stockholm Syndrome ................................................................................................................8-80
Surrender of Hostages and/or Hostage Taker ...........................................................................8-81

APPENDIX A ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLAN TEMPLATE

A.1

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... A-1

A.2

SAMPLE PLAN ........................................................................................................................ A-1

APPENDIX B INPORT SECURITY PLAN TEMPLATE

B.1

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... B-1

B.2

SAMPLE PLAN ........................................................................................................................ B-1

APPENDIX C RISK ASSESSMENTS

C.1

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... C-1

C.2

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT................................................................................ C-1

C.3

CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS ................................................... C-1

C.4

PLANNING AND RESPONSE ELEMENT ASSESSMENTS ................................................ C-2

C.5

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM....................................... C-4

APPENDIX D UNAMBIGUOUS WARNING DEVICE (AIRBURST WARNING MUNITION)

D.1

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... D-1

D.2
D.2.1
D.2.2
D.2.3
D.2.4

UNAMBIGUOUS WARNING DEVICE ................................................................................. D-1

Functional Description............................................................................................................... D-1
Purpose....................................................................................................................................... D-2
Projectile Range ......................................................................................................................... D-2
Unambiguous Warning Device Constraints............................................................................... D-2

D.3
D.3.1
D.3.2
D.3.3
D.3.4

SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS AND OPERATING PROCEDURES........................................... D-2

Loading/Unloading Procedures.................................................................................................. D-2
Safety Precautions...................................................................................................................... D-2
Operating Procedures ................................................................................................................. D-3
Unit Preplanned Response ......................................................................................................... D-4

D.4

TRAINING ................................................................................................................................ D-4

APPENDIX E WARNING SHOTS

E.1

PURPOSE .................................................................................................................................. E-1

E.2
E.2.1

TACTICS ................................................................................................................................... E-1

Authorization to Use Warning Shots ......................................................................................... E-1

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E.2.2
E.2.3
E.2.4

Authorized Weapons Systems.................................................................................................... E-1

Clear Field of Fire ...................................................................................................................... E-2
Appropriate Use of Warning Shots ............................................................................................ E-2

E.3
E.3.1
E.3.2

TECHNIQUES........................................................................................................................... E-2
Automatic Weapons................................................................................................................... E-2
Command and Control ............................................................................................................... E-2

E.4

PROCEDURES.......................................................................................................................... E-3

E.5

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................. E-3

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LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
Page
No.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Figure 1-1.

Terrorist Methods and Events ................................................................................................1-3

CHAPTER 2 ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING

Figure 2-1.
Figure 2-2.

Preplanned Responses for Small-Boat Threat......................................................................2-10

War Game against a Small-Boat Threat............................................................................... 2-12

CHAPTER 3 ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-2.

Afloat Antiterrorism/Force Protection Administrative Organization.....................................3-2

Ashore Antiterrorism/Force Protection Administrative Organization ...................................3-2

CHAPTER 5 COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS

Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-2.

Afloat AT/FP Watch Organization (Notional) .......................................................................5-2

Ashore AT/FP Watch Organization (Notional)......................................................................5-4

CHAPTER 6 PREPLANNED RESPONSES

Figure 6-1.
Figure 6-2.
Figure 6-3.

Small Boat Threat...................................................................................................................6-5

Swimmer Threat ...................................................................................................................6-12
Improvised Explosive Device Standoff Distances ...............................................................6-19

CHAPTER 7 TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES

Figure 7-1.
Figure 7-2.
Figure 7-3.
Figure 7-4.
Figure 7-5.
Figure 7-6.
Figure 7-7.
Figure 7-8.
Figure 7-9.
Figure 7-10.
Figure 7-11.
Figure 7-12.

Deadly Force Triangle............................................................................................................7-2

Opportunity, Capability, and Intent........................................................................................7-3
Random Antiterrorism Measures ...........................................................................................7-7
Single-Boat Patrol ................................................................................................................7-15
Multiple-Boat Patrol for a Pierside High Value Asset .........................................................7-16
High Value Asset Underway with Two Security Boats .......................................................7-16
High Value Asset Anchored with Two Security Boats ........................................................7-16
Response to Inbound Contact...............................................................................................7-19
Pull and Drop Release ..........................................................................................................7-24
Concussion Grenade Employment .......................................................................................7-25
Entry Control Point ..............................................................................................................7-27
Explosive Detection Optimization Chart..............................................................................7-32

CHAPTER 8 SECURITY REACTION FORCES

Figure 8-1.
Figure 8-2.
Figure 8-3.
Figure 8-4.

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Bump One (Step 1 of 2) .......................................................................................................8-13

Bump One (Step 2 of 2) .......................................................................................................8-14
Trailer ...................................................................................................................................8-15
Leapfrog Movement .............................................................................................................8-17

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Figure 8-5.
Figure 8-6.
Figure 8-7.
Figure 8-8.
Figure 8-9.
Figure 8-10.
Figure 8-11.
Figure 8-12.
Figure 8-13.
Figure 8-14.
Figure 8-15.
Figure 8-16.
Figure 8-17.
Figure 8-18.
Figure 8-19.
Figure 8-20.
Figure 8-21.
Figure 8-22.
Figure 8-23.
Figure 8-24.
Figure 8-25.
Figure 8-26.
Figure 8-27.
Figure 8-28.
Figure 8-29.
Figure 8-30.
Figure 8-31.
Figure 8-32.

Pier/Large Open Space Movement.......................................................................................8-18

L Shaped Passageway.......................................................................................................8-21
T Shaped Passageway.......................................................................................................8-21
Four-Way Shaped Passageway .........................................................................................8-21
Transiting L Shaped Passageways ....................................................................................8-22
Cross Over in L Shaped Passageways ..............................................................................8-24
Transiting T Shaped Passageways ....................................................................................8-26
Transiting Four-Way Shaped Passageways ......................................................................8-30
Blow Through.......................................................................................................................8-33
Stairways ..............................................................................................................................8-37
Cross Entry...........................................................................................................................8-41
Buttonhook Entry .................................................................................................................8-42
Inward Opening Door 2-Man Entry .....................................................................................8-43
Inward Opening Door 4-Man Entry .....................................................................................8-44
Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry...................................................................................8-46
Breacher Movements............................................................................................................8-49
Corner Clearing ....................................................................................................................8-52
Overlapping Fields of Fire ...................................................................................................8-52
Center Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry .................................................................................8-53
Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry .................................................................................8-56
Corner Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry.................................................................................8-60
Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry.................................................................................8-62
Two-Man Room Movement .................................................................................................8-66
Four-Man Room Movement.................................................................................................8-68
Follow-on Rooms 4-Man Entry ...........................................................................................8-70
Adjoining Parallel Doors......................................................................................................8-72
Nonadjoining Parallel Doors ................................................................................................8-74
Withdrawal Movement Techniques .....................................................................................8-76

APPENDIX C RISK ASSESSMENTS

Figure C-1.
Figure C-2.
Figure C-3.
Figure C-4.

Operational Risk Management Risk Matrix.......................................................................... C-2

Criticality/Vulnerability Value Numbering........................................................................... C-3
Criticality/Vulnerability of Assets and Areas........................................................................ C-3
Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Planning and Response Elements ........................................ C-4

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PREFACE
NTTP 3-07.2.1, Antiterrorism/Force Protection, provides tactics, techniques, and procedures to deter, detect,
defend against, and mitigate terrorist attacks against U.S. Navy forces. This publication should be used in
conjunction with NWP 3-07.2, Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.
Throughout this publication, references to other publications imply the effective edition.
Report any page shortage by letter to Commander, Navy Warfare Development Command.
ORDERING DATA
Order a new publication or change, as appropriate, through the Navy Supply System.
Changes to the distribution and allowances lists (to add or delete a command from the distribution list or to
modify the number of copies of a publication that you receive) must be made in accordance with NTTP 1-01.
RECOMMENDED CHANGES
Recommended changes to this publication may be submitted at any time using the accompanying format for
routine changes to:
COMMANDER FLEET FORCES COMMAND (N35)
U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET
1562 MITSCHER AVE STE 250
NORFOLK VA 23551-2487
In addition, forward two copies of all recommendations to:
COMMANDER
NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND
DOCTRINE DIRECTOR (N5)
686 CUSHING ROAD
NEWPORT RI 02841-1207
WEB-BASED CHANGE SUBMISSIONS
Recommended change submissions for this publication may be submitted to the Navy doctrine discussion group
site. This discussion group may be accessed through the Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC)
SIPRNET website at http://www.nwdc.navy.smil.mil/.
URGENT CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS
When items for changes are considered to be urgent (as defined in NTTP 1-01 and including matters of safety),
this information shall be sent by message (see accompanying sample message format) to PRA, with information
copies to Navy Warfare Development Command, and all other commands concerned, clearly explaining the
proposed change. Information addresses should comment as appropriate. See NTTP 1-01.

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FM ORIGINATOR
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CHANGE SYMBOLS
Revised text in changes is indicated by a black vertical line in the outside margin of the page, like the one printed
next to this paragraph. The change symbol indicates added or restated information. A change symbol in the
margin adjacent to the chapter number and title indicates a new or completely revised chapter.
WARNINGS, CAUTIONS, AND NOTES
The following definitions apply to WARNINGs, CAUTIONs, and Notes found throughout the manual.

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in injury or death

if not carefully observed or followed.

An operating procedure, practice, or condition that may result in damage to

equipment if not carefully observed or followed.
Note
An operating procedure, practice, or condition that is essential to emphasize.
WORDING
The concept of word usage and intended meaning that has been adhered to in preparing this publication is as
follows:
Shall has been used only when application of a procedure is mandatory.
Should has been used only when application of a procedure is recommended.
May and need not have been used only when application of a procedure is optional.
Will has been used only to indicate futurity, never to indicate any degree of requirement for application of a
procedure.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

CHAPTER 1

Introduction
1.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this Navy publication is to provide tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to deter, detect,
defend against, mitigate and recover from terrorist attacks.
1.2 SCOPE
This NTTP addresses compliance with antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) directives from the Department of
Defense (DOD), the Joint Staff, and the Department of the Navy. It augments other guidance with specific
procedures that a commander should take to implement AT/FP measures and should be used in conjunction with
Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-07.2, Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.
1.3 CONCEPTS
A successful AT/FP program is designed to:
1. Deter. Visible security measures to:
a. Create a hard target that is difficult to attack.
b. Disrupt the terrorist cycle of operations through the use of random antiterrorism (AT) measures.
2. Detect. Alert, well-trained, and well-equipped watchstanders armed with current intelligence to:
a. Recognize and report incidents of preoperational surveillance.
b. Identify and report terrorist attempts to test a commands security posture.
c. Inspect vehicles, personnel, vessels, and baggage to prevent introduction of improvised explosive
devices (IEDs).
d. Report and track the approach of unauthorized personnel, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft.
3. Defend. Measures and procedures, commensurate with the threat level and based on a recent vulnerability
assessment, that:
a. Protect critical assets, capabilities, infrastructure, and personnel.
b. Identify, classify, and neutralize threats through well-rehearsed preplanned responses.
4. Mitigate. Measures and procedures that minimize consequences of a terrorist attack and:
a. Establish passive measures, such as maximizing standoff from potential IEDs.

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b. Prevent further loss of life and minimize suffering through rapid response of emergency services.
c. Contain an incident, such as establishing a perimeter around a suspected chemical attack.
d. Thwart a secondary attack.
5. Recover. Measures that restore mission effectiveness and:
a. Return infrastructure to full operational status.
b. Protect critical infrastructure.
1.4 FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS
The force protection condition (FPCON) system describes the progressive level of protective measures
implemented by all DOD components in response to terrorist threats. The FPCON system is the principal means
through which a military commander or DOD civilian exercising equivalent authority applies an operational
decision on how to best guard against the threat. These guidelines will assist commanders in reducing the effect of
terrorist and other security threats to DOD units and activities.
A commands personnel awareness and alert posture is enhanced by creating additional duties and/or watches and
by heightening security. These measures display the commands resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist
threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the commands activities that it is prepared for an
undesirable target, and that the terrorists should look elsewhere for a vulnerable target.
There are five FPCONs. The circumstances under which they apply and the purpose of each protective measure
are as follows:
1. FPCON Normal applies when a general global threat of possible terrorist activity exists and warrants a
routine security posture.
2. FPCON Alpha applies when there is an increased general threat of possible terrorist activity against
personnel or facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable. Alpha measures must be capable
of being maintained indefinitely.
3. FPCON Bravo applies when an increased or more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Sustaining
Bravo measures for a prolonged period may affect operational capability and relations with local
authorities.
4. FPCON Charlie applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of
terrorist action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely. Prolonged implementation of Charlie
measures may create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its personnel.
5. FPCON Delta applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence is
received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is imminent. This FPCON is normally
declared as a localized condition. FPCON Delta measures are not intended to be sustained for substantial
periods.
Specific measures to be implemented at each FPCON can be found in DOD O-2000.12-H, of DOD Antiterrorism
Handbook.

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1.5

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLANS

Commanders will transform general measures and procedures, contained in each FPCON, into specific measures
and procedures to protect their critical assets, capabilities, infrastructure, and personnel. Chapter 2 outlines the
standard planning process to establish the right security posture, commensurate with the threat level. Chapters 6
and 7 provide detailed TTP to deter, detect against, and mitigate terrorist attacks. The classification of an AT/FP
plan is dependent upon its content, current policy, and the specifics of a units situation.
1.6 THREAT
Specific measures and procedures to deter, detect, defend against, mitigate, and recover from terrorist attacks will
be developed based on careful analysis of threat courses of action (see Figure 1-1 for a historical summary of
terrorist attack methods and events). This publication provides specific guidance on creating and implementing
tactics and techniques to achieve this goal.
1.7 CONCLUSION
AT/FP should be considered a Navy core competency and therefore a critical part of every mission area. Planning
for all operations should include considerations for AT/FP in order to maintain the readiness and effectiveness of
Navy forces. AT/FP efforts must not preclude unit mission. Commanders should tailor the TTP in this publication
to their specific mission requirements, threats, and resources.
Terrorist Device

Place(s) of Employment

Year of Event

Small boat IED

Marine Barracks, Beirut

World Trade Center, New York City
Federal Building, Oklahoma City
Khobar Towers, Saudi Arabia
U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
USS COLE

1983
1993
1995
1996
1998
2000

Pedestrian-carried IED

Israel, various sites

Remotely fired mortar

London

1991

Chemical agent in subway

Tokyo

1995

Biological agent (anthrax)

United States, various locations

2001

Remotely controlled device (toy car)

Spain

2001

Hijacked commercial aircraft

World Trade Center, Pentagon,

Pennsylvania
Four commuter trains, Madrid
Three underground trains, London

Truck IED

Coordinated Train IEDs

Note:

1993 present

2001
2004
2005

Other potential means of terrorist attack include nuclear weapons, swimmer IED, cyber
attacks, and dirty nuclear bombs.

Figure 1-1. Terrorist Methods and Events

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CHAPTER 2

Antiterrorism/Force Protection Planning

2.1 OVERVIEW
The planning process supports development of baseline and standing AT/FP plans as well as event-driven plans.
Baseline plans provide the guidance, policy, and detailed execution for sustained AT/FP operations. Each
installation and unit shall develop standing plans in sufficient detail to provide a baseline level of security and
procedures on how to increase security postures. Baseline planning includes incorporation of all critical
infrastructure, assets and areas, operational capabilities, and personnel.
Event-driven plans support special events and specific operations that do not fall into the context of baseline
planning, including:
1. Return of a strike group to homeport
2. Flag-level meetings
3. Aircraft detachments in support of airshows or deployed to a forward-operating base
4. Port visits to non-Navy ports
5. Transits through chokepoints
6. VIP visits
7. Significant changes in the threat.
Deliberative, outside-the-box thinking that transcends checklists that forces an understanding of the reasons
there are vulnerabilities will result in the creation of a robust AT/FP plan that, when executed, will protect
critical and vulnerable assets and areas to the level they need protection. Such expansive thinking will accomplish
another economy: by planning ahead, commanders can help eliminate the use of resources toward measures that
are accomplishing little or nothing.
The outcome of the planning process will be used in developing procedures and tools that will form the basis of
the AT plan. Standing and event-driven AT/FP plans should mirror an operations order five-paragraph format,
situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, and command and control (SMEAC), common to all
U.S. military services (standing and event-driven templates are provided in Appendixes A and B). A commands
antiterrorism officer is the primary developer of AT/FP plans.
Detailed discussion of the deliberate planning process can be found in NWP 5-01, Naval Operational Planning,
and in the Installation Antiterrorism Program and Planning Tool, Volumes I and II, published by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Deputy Directorate of Operations for Combating Terrorism (J-34).

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2.2 PLANNING PROCESS DEFINED
Organized into six logical steps or phases, the planning process provides a commander with a means to organize
planning and operational activities, and transmit those plans to subordinates and subordinate commands. Using
this common process, all levels of command can begin planning efforts with a shared understanding of the
mission and commanders guidance.
The six integrated steps of the planning process are:
1. Mission analysis
2. Course of action (COA) development
3. COA war gaming
4. COA comparison and selection
5. AT/FP plan development
6. Transition.
2.2.1 Mission Analysis
The purpose of performing mission analysis is to produce a clear mission statement after reviewing and analyzing
the situation(s), guidance from higher authority, and intelligence. The crux of the mission statement is a clear
delineation of what assets and areas are to be protected from specific threats and a prioritized order of assets
criticality to the mission. For example, the mission statement in an installations AT/FP plan might specify that
fuel storage tanks and ballistic missile submarine piers are the most critical assets to be protected. Base housing
and the commissary might be identified as critical, but secondary, assets. Appendix C provides details on specific
risk assessment tools.
Mission analysis also results in content for the situation and mission portions of the AT/FP plan. The core product
of mission analysis, the mission statement, is the product from which all other decisions are derived. The mission
statement provides focus for commanders throughout the entire planning process. Inputs to the mission analysis
step include:
1. Threat assessments (TAs)
2. Vulnerability assessments, e.g., Joint Staff integrated vulnerability assessment (JSIVA), Chief of Naval
Operations integrated vulnerability assessment (CNOIVA), port integrated vulnerability assessment
(PIVA), airfield integrated vulnerability assessment, naval facilities engineering commands risk and
vulnerability analysis and higher headquarter assessments
3. Assessment of off-base critical infrastructure
4. Commanders guidance
5. Analysis of critical assets, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and infrastructure
6. Specified, implied, and essential tasks
7. Constraints and limitations
8. Assumptions

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9. Available resources
10. Commanders critical information requirements.
Results of the mission analysis step will provide information for inclusion in paragraph 1 (situation) and
paragraph 2 (mission statement) of the basic AT/FP plan.
2.2.1.1 Defining the Purpose of the Operation
A clear understanding of the purpose of the operation is essential for maintaining tempo during both planning and
execution. The purpose of the operation is found in the commanders intent. If not specifically stated, the
operations purpose may be derived from the higher commanders intent or assigned missions or tasks. Once the
commander has determined the purpose, tasks specified, implied and essential must be identified to
determine their impact on the mission.
1. Specified tasks. Specified tasks are identified from the commanders intent, guidance, and supporting
documents such as Navy, fleet, or type commander (TYCOM) instructions. In AT/FP operations, specified
tasks are those tasks that higher echelons direct that must be accomplished. Tasks that pertain to any
element of the unit should be identified and recorded.
2. Implied tasks. Implied tasks are those not specifically stated in the order, but must be accomplished to
fulfill the mission or any part of it. Implied tasks emerge from analysis of higher echelons directives, the
threat, and the environment. Implied tasks help achieve a specified task. (Inherent, routine, or standard
operating procedure (SOP) tasks are not included in the list of implied tasks.) For AT/FP planning,
protecting a units personnel and critical assets is always an implied task.
3. Essential tasks. Essential tasks are those specified and implied tasks that define mission success and apply
to the entire unit. If a task must be successfully completed to accomplish the operations purpose, it is an
essential task. Essential tasks form the basis of the mission statement.
2.2.1.2 Commanders Planning Guidance
Once the commander approves the mission statement, guidance on how the mission should be executed is
provided. Commanders planning guidance should be specific enough to focus the planning effort, but not so
specific as to inhibit COA development defined in step two of the planning process.
Planning guidance should address the commanders concepts of shaping decisive actions to assist planners in
determining phasing of the operation, location of important events and other aspects of the operation the
commander deems pertinent. At this point the commander will provide guidance on an acceptable percentage of
protection for assets and areas.
2.2.2 Course of Action Development
During step two COA development planners use the mission statement (which includes upper echelon
tasking and intent, commanders intent, and commanders planning guidance) to develop several COAs. A COA
is a broadly stated potential solution to an assigned mission, such as a port visit or defining entry control points
(ECPs). Each prospective COA is examined to ensure that it is suitable, feasible, different, acceptable, and
complete with respect to the current and anticipated situation, mission, and the commanders intent. Planners
should strongly consider risk assessments that identify critical and vulnerable assets during COA development.
In accordance with the commanders guidance, approved COAs are further developed to a higher level of
specificity. It is during step two that planners also develop threat COAs (most probable and most dangerous),
using relevant intelligence assessment data, and determine how they are going to defend assets and areas against

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identified threats. The execution portion of the AT/FP plan is created from the commanders decisions and
information assembled during steps two, three, and four of the planning process.
Typically, the staff should develop two to three COAs for follow-on war gaming (step three of the planning
process) and comparison (step four of the planning process). The commander can limit the number of COAs if
operating under severe time constraints. It is important to remember that COA development does not involve
detailed planning. The COAs should provide just enough depth for the commander to make a decision about
which one to choose after the war gaming process (step three). Once a final COA is chosen in step four, the staff
produces a concept of operations (CONOPS), which leads to step five, AT/FP plan development.
Developed COAs, along with updated facts, assumptions, and risks, are briefed to the commander. Each
separately briefed COA should include the graphic and narrative and should be sufficiently realistic to withstand
the scrutiny of war gaming. Although the COA briefing is tailored to the needs of the commander and the time
available, standardized briefing formats provide focus and prevent omission of essential information.
Commanders should consider including the following items in the COA brief:
1. Updated intelligence estimate
2. Possible threat COAs (at a minimum the most probable and most dangerous)
3. Mission statement
4. Commanders intent
5. Commanders planning guidance
6. Friendly strengths and weaknesses
7. Rationale for each COA
8. Updated facts and assumptions
9. Recommendations for war gaming.
Following the COA brief, the commander may select or modify the COAs to be evaluated during COA war
gaming. Additionally, war gaming guidance and evaluation criteria may be provided and may include:
1. A list of friendly COAs to be war gamed against specific threat COAs
2. A timeline for the operation
3. A list of critical events (e.g., an unidentified vehicle running a checkpoint, people scaling a fence, an
unknown boat getting in the threat zone and a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yieldexplosive (CBRNE) event)
4. Go/no go criteria that would lead to the cancellation of an event, such as a port visit.
The commander establishes evaluation criteria based on judgment and personal experience. Evaluation criteria
focus the war gaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. Some commanders may be
concerned with risk while others may focus on the material/resource cost of a particular COA.

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2.2.3 Course of Action War Gaming
The third step in the planning process COA war gaming is the mechanism by which planners make a
detailed assessment of each COA (defined in step two) as it pertains to the threat and the environment (very
similar to operational risk management principles). During a COA war game, each friendly COA is examined
against selected threat COAs. Using COA war gaming, planners can identify strengths and weaknesses, associated
risks and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA by examining action-reaction-counteraction dynamics. If a certain
threat attacks or endangers the command, it is essential to know how the unit will react with preplanned
responses, and if those responses will be sufficient and timely. (See Chapter 6 for detailed guidance.) The war
gaming process should reveal friendly vulnerabilities that can be strengthened to minimize the risk and effects of
terrorist attacks. Drills and tabletop exercises are excellent ways to validate war gaming results.
COA war gaming also identifies preincident and postincident issues that may require additional planning. Short of
actually executing the COA, a COA war game provides the most reliable basis for understanding, calibrating, and
improving each COA.
2.2.4 Course Of Action Comparison and Selection
Step four in the planning process COA comparison and selection is the decision process that allows the
commander to verify results of the war game. The commander may also make modifications that significantly
improve a COA.
The central event of the comparison and selection process is a facilitated discussion (commanders war game)
guided by the commander or designated representative and supported by the planners and subordinate
commanders. Unlike the other steps, however, this step requires complete involvement (from start to finish) of the
commander and planners. The commander or chief of staff/executive officer facilitates the COA comparison and
selection process.
On the basis of the war game results, the commander identifies the COA that has the highest probability of
success and explains that decision to planners and subordinate commanders. The commander may also refine
intent and CONOPS and identify which portions of the chosen COA should receive further planning attention.
Each of the other COAs is then compared against the first COA identified by the commander.
The commander identifies the sequence in which COAs will be briefed, including any emphasis on certain
evaluation criteria results and whether or not any specific event or phase is to be discussed in detail. The
commander also specifies which personnel should provide estimates, including estimates of supportability.
2.2.4.1 Commanders Decision
After COAs and all criteria have been briefed and all evaluators have had an opportunity to comment, the
commander decides on a COA. Choosing from among several options, the commander can:
1. Select a COA without a modification.
2. Modify a COA to overcome noted disadvantages.
3. Adopt a new COA by combining favorable elements of multiple COAs.
4. Discard all COAs and resume mission analysis or COA development, as required.

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2.2.4.2 Preparing the Concept of Operations
Once a final COA is chosen, the staffs task is to develop a CONOPS, which will provide the detail that leads to
step five in the planning process, AT/FP plan development. With the creation of the CONOPS, the execution
portion of the five-paragraph plan (described in Appendixes A and B) can be finalized.
CONOPS should include a general description of necessary actions to be taken (how to complete the mission),
go/no go criteria (events that would lead to a change in protective measures), and a generic organization for
security operations. CONOPS includes a complete description with graphics and narrative.
2.2.5 Antiterrorism/Force Protection Plan Development
In step five of the AT/FP planning process, planners should be able to put the commanders intent, guidance, and
decisions into a clear, useful form that will be readily understood by subordinates who must execute the plan. This
step is when the AT/FP plan is fully developed and completed.
A plan is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinates tasks and activities
toward accomplishing the mission. The first three sections of the SMEAC-formatted plan (situation, mission, and
execution) have been prepared during the previous steps of the planning process. The last two sections,
administration and logistics and command and control, are built using a variety of command, TYCOM, and fleet
publications. Samples of afloat, ashore, and inport AT/FP plans can be found in Appendixes A and B.
The chief of staff/executive officer, as appropriate, directs AT plan development and may dictate the plans
format, set and enforce time limits, and determine which annexes, if any, are to be published and by whom. The
plan should contain only critical or new information, not routine matters normally found in standing operating
procedures.
Plans (produced in a variety of formats) can be detailed, written documents with many supporting annexes or they
can be simple verbal commands, depending on available time, complexity of operations, and levels of command
involved. Supporting portions of the plan or order, such as annexes and appendixes, are based on planners
estimates, subordinate commanders estimates of supportability, and other command-specific planning
documents. Whatever format is chosen, it is important that the plan be clear, concise, timely, and useful.
2.2.6 Transition
The transition step places the AT/FP plan into execution. In the majority of cases involving AT/FP planning, the
authors of the plan will supervise the execution of it. In large staffs, however, the planning staff hands the AT/FP
plan to the operations staff to execute.
2.3 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
In formulating AT/FP and inport security plans (ISPs), the following considerations should be reviewed and
incorporated as applicable:
Note
These considerations will not apply in all situations, nor are they all-inclusive.
1. Latest vulnerability assessments (e.g., JSIVA, CNOIVA, PIVA, port visit reports from the Navy lessons
learned system, and theater reporting provided by previous units)
2. Governing status-of-forces agreements and other host nation (HN) agreements, which provide information on:
a. Limitations on use of force

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b. Watch arming policy
c. Security boat employment and arming policy
d. Command and control (C2) relationships
e. Communications architecture
f. Special language requirements
g. Enforceable standoff zones.
3. Limitations on use of force
4. Memoranda of understanding/memoranda of agreement with state and local authorities
5. Rules of engagement (ROE)/rules for use of force (RUF)
6. Watchstander locations/watch organization:
a. Security patrols (fixed and mobile)
b. ECPs
c. Pier watchstanders
d. Security boats
e. Communications between security forces.
7. Physical/terrain considerations:
a. General layout of the installation/harbor/berthing areas
b. Areas surrounding installation/berth, including charted restricted zones and local marinas, and small
craft/swimmer launch points
c. Adequacy/enforceability of assessment, warning and threat zones.
8. Support infrastructure, e.g., husbanding, port and other services
9. Augmentation support, e.g., naval coastal warfare, USMC fleet antiterrorism security team (FAST)
10. Security training for boat officers and coxswains if liberty launches are used
11. Planned visits by VIPs or other dignitaries
12. Verification of completion of training and weapons qualifications for all AT watchstanders
13. Review of ships security plan for response procedures to specific threats
14. Execution of security drills for each duty section
15. Random AT measures

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16. Crew briefs on:
a. Area threat level and FPCON
b. Personal security precautions
c. Local safe havens (location, address, and contact numbers)
d. Contact numbers for the ship, local American or allied embassy/consulate.
17. Go/no go criteria that would lead to the cancellation of an event, such as a port visit
18. Postincident requirements, to include crisis management and recovery operations
19. CBRNE event posture, e.g., training, individual protection equipment (IPE), and coordination.
2.4 APPLICATION OF THE ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION PLANNING PROCESS
The following scenario illustrates the planning process for an event-driven plan:
The USS NORMANDY, steaming independently under Sixth Fleet operational control (OPCON) in the
Mediterranean Sea, needs to have one of its gas turbine engines replaced. The USS NORMANDY has been
directed to replace the gas turbine engine in the port of Limassol, Cyprus, from 1618 November.
2.4.1 Mission Analysis
Inputs to support mission analysis:
1. Message directing gas turbine engine replacement
2. Threat assessment (multiple threat alert center (MTAC)/Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS))
3. PIVA
4. Sixth Fleet orders/directives
5. LOGREQ/REPLY.
Outputs upon completion of mission analysis:
1. Specified task: Provide security for ship and crew:
a. While transiting
b. While pierside
c. While on liberty
d. While departing port.
2. Commanders estimate of the situation:
a. While transiting the greatest threat is a small boat attack.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
b. While pierside the greatest threat is a vehicle-borne IED and small boat attack.
c. While on liberty the greatest threat is a vehicle-borne IED directed against groups of 30 or more sailors.
2.4.2 Course of Action Development
Inputs from mission analysis:
1. Specified tasks
2. Threat assessment
3. Commanders estimate of the situation.
Outputs upon completion of COA development:
1. Sufficiently developed COAs for each specified task that provides security for the ship and crew during
various stages of the mission. For example, security measures for a COA against a small boat threat while
pierside would include:
a. Establish waterside assessment, warning, and threat zones using buoys.
b. Conduct security boat patrols with organic rigid hull inflatable boats (RHIB).
c. Establish a waterside ECP for authorized vessels.
d. Establish waterside barriers to block small boats and demarcate zones.
e. Establish three crew-served weapons positions in a 180 degree arc to cover waterside zones.
f. Rehearse reaction force procedures.
g. Establish topside sentry posts to observe and report waterside events.
h. Rehearse warning signal procedures (queries, flares, warning shots) to keep craft from entering the
warning and threat zones.
i. Modify engineering and damage control readiness based on threat level.
j. Identify available sensors for detection and tracking.
k. Establish waterside random antiterrorism measures (RAM).
l. Rehearse communications plan.
m. Rehearse signal plan.
2. Preplanned responses (PPRs). Figure 2-1 displays PPRs for a small boat threat.
2.4.3 Course of Action War Game
Inputs from COA development, which should be war gamed against threats, based on the commanders estimate
of the situation:

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Warning Zone

Assessment Zone

Establish detailed SOP for

small boat inspection/
clearance procedures

Clearing
Area

Continue tracking with available sensors

Suspicious

Broadcast warning for craft to change course

Use best available sensors for

detection/tracking

Employ ships whistle, alarms, flares,

searchlights
Pass range and bearing to weapons

Positive radio contact with

surface vessels approaching a
predesignated range, to
request ID, advise of security
zone

Update HN/local LE of potential threat

Have a weapons stations stand by to fire

Notify ATO/CDO, HN, and
local LE of suspect vessel
Ships/HN boat blocks, warns, shoulders
Notify designated sentry of
possible need for warning
signals

If vessel
continues
toward HVA

Engagement Zone

Post vigilant watchstanders

Broadcast a final warning to surface vessel
Utilize Big Eyes and NVGs

Notify weapons stations of

approaching vessels

Use ships/HN patrol boats to

aid in identification and
assessment

Pass range and bearing to weapons

Use ships boat to shoulder and ram

If no compliance, weapons free; ship/pier
weapons open fire when security boat clears
field of fire if time allows
Continue to engage until turned, stopped

If small boat complies, track

until past and clear

Figure 2-1. Preplanned Responses for Small-Boat Threat

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If vessel
turns
away

NTTP 3-07.2.1
In this scenario, COAs should be war gamed:
1. For a small boat threat while transiting, pierside, and departure
2. For a vehicle-borne IED threat pierside
3. For a vehicle-borne IED while on liberty.
Outputs: War gamed COAs. Figure 2-2 displays a war game example.
2.4.4 Course of Action Comparison and Decision
Inputs from war gamed COAs:
1. Results from COA war game, e.g., war gamed COAs
2. COA analyses from subject matter experts on the AT/FP Board
3. Recommendations of the best COAs from the AT/FP Board.
Outputs: COAs selected by the commander.
2.4.5 Orders Development and Transition
Inputs from COAs selected by the commander:
1. Results from COA comparison and decision, e.g., selected COA(s)
2. AT/FP plan, written by the antiterrorism officer (ATO) with selected members of the AT/FP Board, and in
accordance with commanders guidance.
Output: Written order ready for execution.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Small boat enters Assessment Zone (tracked with radar, HN boat, ships RHIB, pier watch)

HN boat or ship's RHIB intercepts small boat (continuous comms between HN boat/ships RHIB with ship)

Small boat leaves

Assessment Zone

Continue to track

Get accurate
description and
report to NCIS, HN,
ATO, and CDO

Small boat ignores warning

Small boat is authorized

to enter area, but not
near the ship

Small boat is authorized

to come alongside
the ship

Continue to track

Make report to ATO

and CDO

HN boat/RHIB continue
warnings (bull horn, tapes,
whistle, flare) and contact ship

Small boat
leaves area

Small boat
approaches
Warning Zone

Small boat
turns toward
ship

Ships second RHIB

intercepts small
boat and continues
warnings while
shouldering

Small boat
does what is
expected

Second RHIB
picks up Boarding
Officer and 4 VBSS
members

Continue to
track until it
leaves the area

Clear
Small boat
leaves the area

Small boat
continues
toward ship

Small boat crosses into

Threat Zone, 50 cal open
fire and eliminate threat

Tell small boat

to clear area

Small boat
continues toward
ship after VBSS
team debarks

Figure 2-2. War Game against a Small-Boat Threat

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2-12

Suspicious

Boarding Officer
rides small boat
to come alongside

RHIB clears
from 50 cal
field of fire

Small boat
leaves the area

VBSS search
small boat

Small boat
leaves the area

NTTP 3-07.2.1

CHAPTER 3

Organization and Responsibilities

3.1 OVERVIEW
Successful AT/FP programs, both afloat and ashore, share a common element: a streamlined, well-trained
organization. This chapter describes the roles of personnel who are tasked with AT/FP duties that include:
1.

Establishing policy

2.

Providing resources

3.

Developing AT/FP plans and SOPs

4.

Conducting self-assessments, training, and exercises

5.

Compiling intelligence and threat assessments.

Though very similar in composition, afloat and ashore AT/FP administrative organizations differ slightly. Figure
3-1 illustrates the organizational chain of command for afloat AT/FP units. Figure 3-2 shows the same chain of
command for ashore AT/FP units. The responsibilities of each AT/FP team member are discussed in the following
paragraphs.
3.2 COMMANDER/COMMANDING OFFICER
Commanders and commanding officers (COs) are responsible for protecting their personnel and assets from
terrorist attack. To successfully perform AT/FP duties commanders must:
1. Anticipate threats by ensuring intelligence and threat assessments are current.
2. Mitigate vulnerabilities by establishing procedural and physical protective measures.
3. Deter and detect threats through personnel awareness, surveillance detection, and random AT measures.
4. Prepare for incidents with preplanned and postincident responses, training, and exercises.
Each of the duties above are to be addressed in a comprehensive AT/FP program that commanders and COs shall
develop and implement to accomplish the standards set forth in SECNAVINST 3300.3 (series), Combating
Terrorism Program Standards.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Commanding
Officer
AT/FP
Board
Security
Officer

Antiterrorism
Officer

Antiterrorism
Training Officer

Navy
Security
Force

AT/FP Training
Supervisor

Force Protection
Training Team

Reaction
Force
Figure 3-1. Afloat Antiterrorism/Force Protection Administrative Organization

Installation
Commander
AT/FP
Board
Security
Officer

Antiterrorism
Officer

Antiterrorism
Training Officer

Navy
Security
Force

Auxiliary
Security
Force

AT/FP Training
Supervisor

Force Protection
Training Team

Reaction
Force

Figure 3-2. Ashore Antiterrorism/Force Protection Administrative Organization

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3-2

NTTP 3-07.2.1
Note
In some organizations, the person designated as ATO may be subordinate to the
Security Officer. In others, they may be the same individual. In any case, however, the
ATO must have direct access to the Commanding Officer/Installation Commander for
AT matters.
3.3

ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION BOARD

The AT/FP working group coordinates development and implementation of AT/FP plans under the direction of
the commander. In addition to assisting the ATO in creating and maintaining the standing AT/FP plan, the
working group also assists the ATO in drafting required additional plans (e.g., for a foreign port visit). The
working group, whose composition is determined by the commander, consists of personnel from a variety of
departments and activities. Typical members include:
1. Commander
2. ATO
3. Department heads
4. Intelligence officer
5. Security officer
6. Chaplain
7. Safety officer
8. Supply officer
9. Medical officer
10. Legal officer
11. Public affairs officer
12. Operations officer
13. Fire Chief
14. Comptroller/Budget Officer
15. Planning officer
16. Information services officer
17. Housing director
18. Supporting NCIS representative
19. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) representative
20. Maintenance/facilities representative

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
21. Emergency Management/Disaster preparation/Manager
22. Environmental protection officer
23. Tenant Command representative.
3.4 ANTITERRORISM OFFICER
The primary AT/FP adviser to the CO is the ATO, who shall be designated in writing. The ATO:
1. Shall be responsible to the CO for developing and managing the AT/FP program;
2. Prepares, updates, and implements AT/FP plans which are the heart of the program (see plan templates in
Appendixes A and B);
3. Manages resources that may include watchstander gear, security boats, nonlethal weapons, and inspection
equipment;
4. Oversees training as the head of the commands force protection training team (FPTT);
5. Shall be a qualified commissioned officer, noncommissioned officer or civilian (GS-11 or above) and be
of appropriate rank and position commensurate to the importance of AT/FP;
6. Shall be a graduate of a service-approved Level II AT training course prior to assignment; and
7. Serves on the commands AT/FP Board.
3.4.1 Antiterrorism/Force Protection Training Supervisor
The antiterrorism/force protection training supervisor (AT/FPTS) is typically a senior enlisted Master-at-Arms
who reports to the ATO and oversees daily unit AT/FP readiness. Additionally, the AT/FPTS:
1. Conducts initial and sustainment training for assigned AT/FP personnel;
2. Serves as the AT/FP TTP subject-matter expert; and
3. Assists the ATO in developing and executing AT/FP plans.
3.4.2 Force Protection Training Team
The FPTT, headed by the ATO, has three functions:
1. Conducts individual and team training for the commands security forces and unit personnel.
2. Plans and conducts command AT exercises to include the following functions:
a. Initiate scenarios and respond to watchstander actions.
b. Role play commands such as higher authorities or adjacent units.
c. Record and critique watchstander and team performances.
d. Ensure exercises are conducted safely.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
3. Continuously assesses the commands AT program, plans, and exercises by analyzing the following:
a. Terrorist options, e.g., TAs and intelligence support
b. Physical security, e.g., security posture, FPCON implementation, security forces,
operations/information security
c. Structural integrity, e.g., analysis of blast effects, countermeasures
d. Infrastructure, e.g., fire protection and prevention, utility services, and facility vulnerabilities to
weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
e. Operations readiness, e.g., emergency/WMD planning and response capabilities.
In addition to the ATO, composition of the FPTT should include representation from the following departments or
activities, as applicable:
1. Damage control/fire department
2. Medical
3. Engineering
4. Supply
5. Security
6. Reaction force
7. Visit, board, search, and seizure team (VBSS)
8. Weapons.
3.5 SECURITY OFFICER
The security officer manages, trains, and directs the commands security forces, which include the Navy security
force (NSF), auxiliary security force (ASF) (ashore only), and reaction force. (OPNAVINST 5530.14 (series),
Navy Physical Security, provides a detailed description of security officer and security force duties.) These
security and reaction forces employ armed personnel whose requirements are to protect personnel and assets,
putting them at the forefront of daily AT/FP operations. The security officer assists the ATO in developing AT/FP
plans, SOPs, instructions, and training plans.
Note
Security officer billets are only on larger ships. Security officer duties may be fulfilled
by the ATO on smaller ships.
3.5.1 Navy Security Force
The NSF, ashore and afloat, consists of all armed Navy personnel assigned to law enforcement and security duties
involving the use of deadly force to protect personnel and resources.

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SEP 2006

NTTP 3-07.2.1
3.5.2 Auxiliary Security Force
The ASF is an ashore armed force composed of local, nondeploying personnel derived from host and tenant
organizations, under the operational control of the host commands security department.
The ASF augments the installations permanent security force during increased FPCONs or when directed by the
host installation commander.
3.5.3 Reaction Force
The reaction force, ashore and afloat (formerly the ship self-defense force), is a task-organized force of armed
personnel designed to quickly respond to threats and incidents on installations and ships. Organized and trained
by the security officer, the reaction force augments the NSF, ASF, and on-watch personnel when responding to
events such as bomb threats, demonstrators, intruders, and small boat attacks. Chapter 8 provides detailed
guidance on skills and responsibilities of reaction forces.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

CHAPTER 4

Additional Resources
4.1 OVERVIEW
This chapter discusses nonorganic resources available to commanders to deter, detect, defend, and mitigate
against terrorist attacks. Additional resources to aid with postincident responses are discussed in NWP 3-07.2
Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.
Nonorganic support and services from the Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, government agencies, and HN
include:
1. Intelligence support
2. Threat analyses and assessments
3. Armed security boats
4. Pier, ECP, flightline, and topside AT/FP watchstanders
5. Airspace restrictions.
4.2 EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL
The U.S. Navys EOD organization detects, identifies, and disposes land and water explosive hazards, including
mines, ordnance, and IEDs. Specific examples of capabilities that directly support AT/FP responsibilities include:
1. Isolating and destroying a floating mine approaching a pierside ship.
2. Inspecting pier pilings with EOD divers and sweeping pier structures and equipment for IEDs prior to a
ships arrival.
3. Rendering safe and disposing a vehicle-borne IED discovered at an ECP.
EOD groups at Little Creek, VA and Coronado, CA provide oversight for EOD mobile units (EODMUs) and
shore detachments stationed worldwide. EODMUs support fleet operations with embarked detachments on
deploying aircraft carriers and amphibious warfare ships. Shore detachments, located at selected shore activities,
respond to EOD incidents in the local area in support of base and region commanders.
Local/HN police and divers can also execute pier/underwater inspections, allowing EOD to respond if an IED or
suspicious device is discovered.
4.3 MILITARY WORKING DOG TEAM
A military working dog (MWD) unit may be an integral part of any installation security department. Detector dog
teams significantly enhance the detection capabilities for both explosives and contraband. An MWD team consists
of one qualified handler and a certified dog. Although the use of an MWD is rarely considered deadly force, it is

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
considered dangerous force under certain conditions. MWD teams should be routinely assigned duties as
members of the security watch section.
4.4 NAVAL COASTAL WARFARE
The naval coastal warfare (NCW) mission is to protect strategic port and harbor facilities and provide point
defense for U.S., allied, and commercial ships, as assigned, operating within the littoral, at anchorages, and in
harbors. NCW forces are employed primarily for expeditionary operations such as port security in rear-area
defense operations and, if available, in support of homeland security operations.
Mobile security groups at Norfolk, VA and San Diego, CA provide oversight for active-duty mobile security
squadrons (MSRONs) and reserve naval coastal warfare squadrons (NCWRONs). For task-organized operations,
NCW forces can be augmented by U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) port security units (PSUs).
4.4.1 Mobile Security Squadron and Detachment
Four nondeployable MSRONs, based in Norfolk (2), San Diego, and Guam, provide training, administrative,
maintenance, and logistics support for 12 deployable mobile security divisions (MSDs). By 2005, all MSRONs
and MSDs will be available to support the worldwide needs of numbered fleet commanders.
MSDs provide lightweight, mobile, short-term point defense AT/FP for U.S. Navy ships and aircraft, other
Department of the Navy (DON) assets such as Military Sealift Command ships, and other DOD assets against
terrorist attacks in locations where the United States or HN security infrastructure is either inadequate or does not
exist. An MSD can provide the following:
1. Armed security boats limited to harbor operating areas
2. ECPs
3. Perimeter security around an aircraft or flightline
4. Perimeter security around a pier
5. Crew-served weapons for perimeter or topside defense
6. Teams to clear vessels before coming alongside a protected asset
7. Organic command, control, and communications (C3) assets.
MSDs, deployable within 72 hours of notification, are defensive units and are not trained to conduct offensive
maneuvers, urban operations, and visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS). They rely upon the supported asset for
limited intelligence support, messing, and berthing.
4.4.2 Naval Coastal Warfare Squadron
Deployable NCWRONs provide command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I), inshore
surveillance, waterborne security and vessel traffic control capabilities that significantly enhance force protection
(FP) and port security. Because they are manned largely by reservists, NCWRONs and subordinate units are
primarily employed for operation plan (OPLAN) engagement.
NCWRONs employ a mobile ashore support terminal (MAST), which contains extensive C4I equipment to
display a detailed near-real-time tactical picture of a port or the littoral for supported commanders. NCWRON
commanders are typically assigned OPCON of mobile inshore undersea warfare units (MIUWUs) and inshore
boat units (IBUs).

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
4.4.2.1 Mobile Inshore Undersea Warfare Unit
MIUWUs conduct port and littoral surface and subsurface surveillance and C4I operations in support of NCW
operations. MIUWUs employ a remote sensor surveillance center van to display data from a surface search radar,
acoustic sonobuoys, thermal imagers, and coastwatchers.
4.4.2.2 Inshore Boat Unit
Inshore boat units (IBUs) conduct waterborne surveillance, interdiction and high-value asset escort and defense in
support of NCW operations. Their primary assets are armed security boats, which are designed for harbor
operations but can conduct limited operations in the open ocean.
4.5 SUBMARINE FORCE PROTECTION DETACHMENT
Submarine force protection detachments are reserve units that provide security for nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarines in ports other than Naval Submarine Base, Bangor and Naval Submarine Base, Kings Bay,
and when transiting on the surface in restricted waterways. A secondary mission is to augment law enforcement
and physical security at Navy and submarine commands worldwide. There are four detachments, two on the East
Coast who report to Commander, Submarine Group 10, and two on the West Coast who report to Commander,
Submarine Group 9.
4.6 NAVAL SECURITY FORCE UNIT
Naval security force units are reserve units with the primary mission of augmenting installation security forces
and emergency operations centers (EOCs) during FPCONs Charlie and Delta. Unit personnel may also be used
for peacetime augmentation for special events such as air shows and Fleet Week. Naval security force units
support each continental United States (CONUS) installation and regional operations center.
4.7 UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS FLEET ANTITERRORISM SECURITY TEAM COMPANY
United States Marine Corps FAST companies provide a rapid and mobile short-term security augmentation for
installations, ships, and vital Navy and national security assets when terrorist threat conditions exceed the
capabilities of permanent security forces. FAST companies have forward-deployed platoons in the European,
Pacific, and Central Command areas. Those combatant commanders normally exercise OPCON through their
respective Navy component commander.
For supported commanders, FAST companies can:
1. Deter, detect, defend, and mitigate against terrorist attacks.
2. Conduct security for nuclear refueling and defueling operations.
3. Conduct limited platoon defensive operations to include hasty and deliberate defense, limited
counterattack/recapture, security patrolling, field fortifications, weapons emplacement, and supporting
arms direction.
4. Conduct rear area security operations.
5. Provide security for other short-term military and emergency operations such as the post-incident
protection of the USS COLE and Americans in Yemen.
6. Provide small arms and AT training to Navy security force personnel.
7. Conduct security assessments.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
4.8 UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RESOURCES
USCG PSUs and maritime safety and security teams (MSSTs) are potential resources available to the U.S. Navy
for AT/FP operations. PSUs and MSSTs are subordinate to USCG Atlantic and Pacific area commanders, but fall
under the OPCON of Navy commanders when assigned.
4.8.1 Port Security Unit
Deployable, reservist-manned PSUs provide waterborne and limited land-based security for ships and port
facilities. Similar to MSDs in capabilities, though larger, PSUs are typically assigned outside CONUS
(OCONUS) expeditionary missions alongside NCW forces in support of OPLAN engagement. Each PSU deploys
with six armed boats (limited to harbor operating areas) and a land-based security force that provides perimeter or
pier protection.
4.8.2 Maritime Safety and Security Team
Created after the events of 9/11/01, MSSTs provide security boats to enforce CONUS moving and fixed security
zones around Navy and commercial high-interest vessels and waterside critical infrastructure. MSST missions
include:
1. FP in U.S. ports and inland waters
2. Noncompliant boarding operations in support of homeland security
3. Specialized and surge operations, e.g., Fleet Week in New York City
4. Alien migrant interdiction operations.
4.9 NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
The NCIS provides AT/FP support and services to the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps from 140 worldwide field
locations. NCIS mission priorities are as follows:
1. Prevent terrorism and other hostile attacks against DON forces and installations
2. Protect against compromise of DON sensitive information and critical systems
3. Reduce criminal activities that impact DON operations.
The NCIS AT/FP program leverages investigations, collection, operations, analysis, law enforcement, and
physical security to inform and advise Navy and Marine Corps commanders concerning threats and vulnerabilities
at permanent/transient locations and transit chokepoints.
4.9.1 Multiple Threat Alert Center
The NCIS MTAC is a state-of-the-art analysis and production center for terrorist, criminal, counterintelligence,
and security information. Using data obtained from NCIS special agents worldwide and other government
agencies, the MTAC produces threat and trend analyses for afloat and ashore DON commands. These products
are available on the NCIS SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) home page
(www.ncis.navy.smil.mil) and include:
1. Blue Darts. Time-sensitive messages to warn units and installation commanders of a credible report of an
imminent terrorist attack against their unit or installation.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
2. Spot Reports. Time-sensitive messages in response to specific FP/terrorism threats that are tailored to
alert potentially affected DON assets.
3. Special Analytic Reports. Ad hoc reports that fuse criminal, cyber, counterintelligence, and AT
information from various organizations within NCIS. These reports are the main product of the MTAC.
4. Suspicious Incident Summaries. Daily reports listing suspicious incident reports to DOD personnel and
facilities CONUS and OCONUS.
5. Security Bulletins. Unclassified weekly reports of suspicious incidents and law enforcement information.
6. FP Summaries. Messages that provide Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) threat levels for countries
worldwide.
7. TAs. Tailored TAs for permanent and transient DON assets that cover terrorist, criminal, foreign
intelligence, and medical threats. TAs are typically produced within 30 days before a port visit in
coordination with NCIS field offices.
4.9.2 Support to Ashore Installations
NCIS maintains offices at all major Navy and Marine Corps installations. Ashore commanders have direct access
to NCIS AT/FP support and services through 13 field offices and 140 field elements worldwide. NCIS
participates in the JSIVA Program, the CNOIVA Program, and the PIVA Program.
4.9.3 Support to Afloat Commands
Through the NCIS Country Referent Program, agents conduct routine visits to expeditionary ports, airfields and
exercise areas to establish and maintain working relationships with U.S. and foreign law enforcement, military,
and intelligence counterparts so TAs can be prepared for transiting units. Collection efforts are conducted within
30 days for moderate-, significant-, and high-threat countries, and within 90 days for low-threat locations. TAs are
issued at least 10 days prior to the transiting units arrival. In many cases, NCIS special agents are available to
directly support transiting units.
Special Agents afloat are assigned to carrier strike groups and expeditionary strike groups for AT/FP support.
4.9.4 Support to Major Commands
Special agents, assigned to the staffs of fleet, component and unified commanders, serve as the commanders
direct connection to NCISs extensive AT/FP resources and capabilities. Additionally, special agents support
many type commanders and program managers by assisting in the protection of DON-sensitive information and
critical systems and liaising with local/HN authorities to arrange for vulnerability assessments.
4.10 HOST NATION SUPPORT
HN support, as defined by the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02), consists of civil or
military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises, emergencies,
or war and is based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.
Commanders must address HN support in AT/FP plans prior to port or airfield visits. Using the chain of
command, NCIS, theater commanders, and U.S. embassies, commanders should assemble relevant information on
the following AT/FP HN support issues:
1. Emergency services to include medical, fire, EOD, hazardous materials (HAZMAT), and WMD response

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
2. Military, Coast Guard, and law enforcement integration with organic security forces (e.g., HN personnel
on U.S. security boats, at an ECP, pier, or flightline)
3. C3 integration
4. Liberty party protection, including security of vehicles
5. Measures to prevent sabotage or tampering with supplies provided during the visit
6. Clearance responsibilities and procedures for boats and vehicles coming alongside the ship or aircraft
7. Port or airfield services.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

CHAPTER 5

Command, Control, and Communications

5.1 OVERVIEW
It is the commanders responsibility to create a functional, well-trained AT/FP organization, the core of which is a
flexible and responsive C3 structure.
According to JP 1-02, C2 is the exercise of authority and direction . . . over assigned and attached forces. . . . and
is . . . performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures. . . .
This chapter discusses C2 roles, afloat and ashore, and how forces communicate to deter, detect, defend, and
mitigate against terrorist attacks. Postincident C3, which involves local, state, federal and HN organizations, is
discussed in detail in NWP 3-07.2, Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.
5.2 AFLOAT ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION COMMAND AND CONTROL
Figure 5-1 depicts a notional afloat AT/FP watch organization. A units Standard Organization Regulations
Manual or other organizational manual should delineate specific C3 relationships, which will differ depending on
the commands size. For example, a frigate pierside in San Francisco may have all pier, topside, and waterborne
watchstanders report to the chief of the guard (COG), but an aircraft carrier pierside in the same port may have
waterborne personnel report to the antiterrorism tactical watch officer (ATTWO), while the COG controls pier
and topside watchstanders.
COs, ATOs, and security officers shall consider the following factors when creating specific C3 structures:
1. Location of unit (e.g., pierside, anchored, U.S. Navy installation, OCONUS)
2. Threat (e.g., heightened waterborne threat that could require dedicated water C3)
3. Commands AT/FP force and equipment (e.g., number of trained watchstanders, small boats, detection
equipment)
4. Nonorganic assets (e.g., presence of HN security forces that could require additional C2 watchstanders to
integrate AT/FP efforts).

Care must be taken to ensure adequate communications between shipboard, pier,

and waterborne personnel to reduce the possibility of a blue on blue or friendly
fire incident.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
Note
At U.S. Navy installations, the installation commander is responsible for pier sentries
and waterbourne security for ships in port. Accordingly, even if ships company
provides watchstanders, the pier watch organization reports to the installations
security organization.
5.2.1 Command Duty Officer
The command duty officer (CDO), as the COs representative, carries out the units routine in port and shall
ensure that a functional AT/FP watch team protects the command. The CDO typically executes the AT mission
through the ATTWO, if assigned.
5.2.2 Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officer
The ATTWO, who reports to the CDO, tactically employs command assets to defend the unit against terrorist
attack when in port, similar in function to the tactical action officer when underway. When in port at a U.S. Navy
installation, the ATTWO coordinates integration of waterborne and shoreside AT/FP assets into installation
security forces. The COG and other potential watchstanders, such as security boats, report to the ATTWO.
5.2.3 Quarterdeck Watches
The officer of the deck (OOD) in port, who reports to the ATTWO on security matters, is primarily responsible
for the safety, security, and proper operation of the command. ATTWO duties can be assigned to the OOD if one
is not in the watch organization. The petty officer of the watch and messenger of the watch assist the OOD in
controlling access to the ship and detecting unauthorized intrusions.
Commanding
Officer

Command Duty
Officer

AT Tactical
Watch Officer

Officer of
the Deck
Chief of the
Guard
Petty Officer
of the Watch
Messenger
of the Watch

Topside
Sentries

Pier
Sentries

External Roving
Sentries

Roving Pier
Sentries

Internal Roving
Sentries

Crew Served
Weapons

Waterborne
Security

Reaction
Force

Figure 5-1. Afloat Antiterrorism/Force Protection Watch Organization (Notional)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
5.2.4 Chief of the Guard
The COG, who reports to the ATTWO, is a senior enlisted security force member who supervises AT/FP
watchstanders. Specific responsibilities of the COG include:
1. Conducting guard mount and overseeing proper watch turnover
2. Roving around the pier, ensuring watchstanders are alert, informed, and properly equipped
3. Directing the employment of watchstanders and reaction forces in the event of an incident
4. Executing the orders of the ATTWO.
5.2.5 Pier Sentry and Waterborne Patrol
When moored at a U.S. Navy installation, ships pier and waterborne watchstanders will be under the tactical
control of the installations security force. At other locations, pier and waterborne personnel typically are under
the tactical control of the ships ATTWO, although both location and availability of other security forces will
influence the C3 structure. The ATTWO can delegate employment of these watchstanders to the COG.
5.2.6 Other Sentries
The ATTWO can post other sentries and patrols as the threat and situation dictates, including:
1. Gangway/brow sentry
2. Topside sentry
3. Forecastle sentry
4. Fantail sentry
5. Crew-served weapon sentries
6. Roving patrol.
5.2.7 Reaction Forces
In the event of an incident, such as a terrorist attack or indications of an imminent attack, reaction forces provide a
quick, responsive capability to bolster on-watch defensive efforts. Afloat reaction forces, formerly called the ship
self-defense force, usually consist of armed personnel who are not on watch, but who are specifically assigned to
respond if called.
Reaction forces are under the tactical control of the ATTWO, who can delegate their employment to the COG or
an on-scene commander, if assigned. Appendix D provides detailed guidance on skills and responsibilities of
reaction forces.
5.3 ASHORE ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION COMMAND AND CONTROL
In addition to the challenges faced by afloat commanders, commanders ashore must defend more areas and assets,
integrate tenant commands and ships waterborne and shoreside watchstanders into installation security forces,
and control civilian and military access. Figure 5-2 depicts a notional ashore AT/FP watch organization. A units
Standard Organization Regulations Manual or other organizational manual should delineate specific C3
relationships.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Commanding Officer

Security Officer

AT Tactical
Watch Officer/
Watch Commander

Command
Duty
Officer

Chief of the Guard/

Waterfront Security
Supervisor

Pier
Watchstanders

Waterborne

Figure 5-2.

Patrol Supervisor

Pier
ECP

Mobile

ECP

Flightline

Reaction Forces

Waterborne

Ashore Antiterrorism/Forceona)
Protection Watch Organization (Notional)

5.3.1 Command Duty Officer

The CDO, as the commanders representative, carries out the routine of the installation and shall ensure that a
functional AT/FP security force protects the installation and tenant commands. The CDO works closely with the
security officer or his representative, in response to a terrorist incident until such time as the installation
commander or other designated officer in the chain of command assumes control.
5.3.2 Security Officer
The security officer, through the watch commander, executes C2 of NSF responding to a terrorist incident. The
security officer further coordinates with other emergency responders and serves as a tactical advisor to the
installation commander.
5.3.3 Antiterrorism Tactical Watch Officer/Watch Commander
The watch commander serves as the security officers representative and as the ATTWO when employing
security forces tactically to defend the installation against attack. Assigned personnel from tenant commands and
ships supplement installation security forces and fall under the tactical control of the ATTWO. The
COG/waterfront security supervisor (WSS), patrol supervisor, and other watchstanders report to the ATTWO.
5.3.4 Chief of the Guard/Waterfront Security Supervisor
The COG/WSS, reporting to the ATTWO, is a senior security force member who supervises pier AT/FP
watchstanders. Specific responsibilities of the COG/WSS include:

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1. Conducting guard mount and overseeing proper watch turnover
2. Roving around the pier or assigned patrol area, ensuring watchstanders are alert, informed, and properly
equipped
3. Directing the employment of watchstanders and reaction forces in the event of an incident
4. Executing the orders of the ATTWO.
Large installations typically have more than one COG/WSS, each with separate areas of responsibility. A
COG/WSS can also assume duties as an interim on-scene commander during an incident.
5.3.5 Patrol Supervisor
The patrol supervisor, reporting to the ATTWO, is a senior security force member supervising AT/FP
watchstanders. Specific responsibilities of the patrol supervisor include:
1. Conducting guard mount and overseeing proper watch turnover
2. Patrolling the assigned area, ensuring watchstanders are alert, informed, and properly equipped
3. Directing the employment of watchstanders and reaction forces in the event of an incident
4. Executing the orders of the ATTWO.
Patrol supervisors are typically responsible for areas of the installation not covered by pier watchstanders, such as
base gates, airfields, buildings, facilities, and unmanned waterfront.
5.3.6 Entry Control Point
The ECP, as the point of first contact with security forces for those seeking access, is the most critical part in the
installations defense in depth. ECPs include access points to installations, piers, flightlines, and other restricted
areas. It is here that potential terrorists are detected and neutralized. An ECP can include the following
watchstanders:
1. Contact sentry
2. Cover sentry
3. Inspection team
4. Weapons team.
The senior member at the ECP serves as the supervisor and reports to the COG/WSS or patrol supervisor.
5.3.6.1 Contact Sentry
The contact sentry, as the ECPs first layer of defense, makes initial contact with individuals seeking entry onto
an installation or pier. Specific duties include:
1. Verifying individuals have valid photo identification (ID) and documentation (e.g., vehicle decal or pass)
2. Assessing personnel, vehicles, and their occupants for suspicious or anomalous behavior or appearance

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3. Performing package inspections at pier ECPs
4. Employing surveillance detection techniques against personnel outside of the ECP
5. Granting vehicle and pedestrian access to the installation or pier
6. Challenging and engaging as required.
5.3.6.2 Cover Sentry
The cover sentry, as the ECPs second layer of defense, is responsible for all personnel and weapons at an ECP.
Most importantly, the cover sentry covers and defends the contact sentry. Remaining at a distance from the
contact sentry, the cover sentry is positioned for effective response in case of attack.
5.3.6.3 Inspection Team
The inspection team conducts vehicle inspections, as assigned, based on FPCON and installation procedures, prior
to granting them access to the installation or pier. Inspection teams conduct vehicle inspections at primary ECPs
in accordance with the current FPCON, and man commercial vehicle inspection stations at all FPCONs. Random
vehicle inspection teams shall consist of at least one individual acting in concert with other watchstanders.
Commercial vehicle inspection teams shall consist of a minimum of three personnel: one supervisor and two
inspectors. The supervisor, who shall not participate in the inspection, observes and covers the inspectors and
vehicle occupants. If more than one inspection lane is used, the supervisor can observe up to two inspection lanes
provided the lanes are contiguous. A chase vehicle, operated by the supervisor, should be available to pursue
vehicle operators who fail to comply with inspection requirements.
5.3.6.4 Weapons Team
The weapons team position supports the cover and contact sentries and inspection team as the ECPs last layer of
defense. The weapons team should be positioned behind ballistic protection, which must be strategically placed to
bring effective fire upon intruders while minimizing collateral damage.
5.3.7 Pier Sentry
Based on commanders guidance, pier sentries may be assigned to fixed or mobile posts, and may be armed or
unarmed. Their purpose is to detect, deter, and defend against waterbourne and land-based terrorist attacks.
Armed sentries should have completed the appropriate Armed Sentries Course. In Navy ports, whether they are
provided by the installation or from ships force, pier sentries fall under the tactical control of installation security,
usually reporting to a COG/WSS.
5.3.8 Flightline Security
When posting flightline sentries or patrols, installation commanders must ensure close liaison between the
installations security forces and those of tenant aircraft squadrons and visiting aircraft.
5.3.9 Mobile Patrol
In assigned areas, mobile patrols in emergency vehicles rapidly respond to security incidents and provide visual
coverage of remote areas of installations, such as shorelines, where unauthorized access can occur.

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5.3.10 Waterborne Patrol
Waterborne patrols use boats and watchstanders from moored ships or the installation to detect, deter, and defend
against waterborne terrorist attacks. Regardless of their originating source, waterborne patrols fall under the
tactical control of installation security, typically reporting to a COG/WSS or patrol supervisor.
Security boats typically have three or four-person crews, with a senior petty officer or chief petty officer serving
as boat officer. Other crewmembers include a coxswain and one or two gunners.
5.3.11 Reaction Forces
Reaction forces are armed personnel quickly responding to threats and incidents, augmenting Navy security
forces, auxiliary security forces, and on-watch personnel. Initial reaction forces ashore are typically comprised of
on-duty and support personnel. During increased FPCONs, reaction forces are comprised of NSF personnel in a
dedicated standby on-duty/off-watch section. Reaction forces typically muster in a prearranged location, detailed
out as required. Reaction forces are under the tactical control of the ATTWO, who may delegate employment to
an on-scene commander. Skills and responsibilities of reaction forces are set forth in Appendix D.
5.3.12 Other Responders
The security officer, ATTWO/watch commander, COG/WSS, and patrol supervisor must coordinate C2 of other
installation incident responders and activities, including:
1. Fire department
2. HAZMAT response teams
3. Public works center
4. Emergency medical services
5. Medical department
6. EOD.
5.4 INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
Ashore commanders engage and plan with non-Navy agencies to ensure that there are integrated preplanned
responses in the event of a terrorist attack. Communication and coordination with the following agencies should
be part of AT/FP installation planning:
1. NCIS
2. USCG Group and Marine Safety Office
3. Joint Harbor Operations Center, if in operation
4. Local federal agencies, especially Department of Homeland Security agencies and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI)
5. Local emergency response agencies
6. Local DOD units.

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Afloat units at a non-Navy base or OCONUS must coordinate AT/FP efforts with local agencies, HN, and
Department of State (DOS), as applicable.
5.5 ANTITERRORISM COMMUNICATIONS
Antiterrorism C2 personnel need to quickly and effectively communicate up and down the hierarchy. AT/FP
communications requirements include capability to:
1. Collaborate
2. Request and share information and data
3. Share a common operational picture
4. Report incidents
5. Issue and receive orders
6. Deconflict with security forces to avoid friendly fire incidents
7. Rapidly allocate forces to defend and mitigate against attacks.
Commanders must ensure that communications networks, including physical C2 hubs, provide for unhindered,
effective communications between all elements of AT/FP forces. For afloat commands, C2 centers can be set up
on the quarterdeck, combat information center, or any other suitable location. Installation C2 hubs are described
below.
5.5.1 Dispatch Center
At shore installations, the dispatch center is a physical location, manned 24 hours per day, which serves as the C3
hub for public safety forces. At larger installations, the dispatch center can be in an EOC, with on-watch
personnel who can instantly react to a terrorist incident. At smaller installations without constantly manned
operations centers, the dispatch center is in the public safety building or other suitable location.
The duty dispatch agent makes routine reports to the CDO, but can come under the direction of the ATTWO/
watch commander during an incident or heightened threat condition. Dispatch communicates with most security
watchstanders, especially COGs, patrol supervisors, mobile personnel, and ECP personnel, providing direction
within a prescribed authority. Depending on the installations size and complexity, the dispatch agent may
additionally have tactical control over other services, including:
1. Emergency medical services
2. HAZMAT response teams
3. Fire department
4. Public works center
5. EOD.
Dispatch will normally be able to communicate and coordinate with local public safety and emergency response
agencies.

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In the event of a terrorist incident, dispatch can become communications-saturated. Response managers should
then consider standing up a separate EOC to take tactical control of responding units.
5.5.2 Emergency Operations Center
The EOC is a physical location where the installation commander, security officer, or ATTWO/watch commander
supervises operations during a terrorist threat, incident, or other incident that exceeds dispatchs capabilities and
authority. Larger installations may have a fully manned operations center; smaller installations might set up a
conference room or other suitable location that can quickly be brought on-line as an operations center. Prudent
planning will include the designation of an alternate operations center site should the primary operations center
not be available.
Operations center personnel collect, display, evaluate, and disseminate information, employing communications
that include:
1. Message traffic
2. E-mail (unclassified and secure)
3. Multimedia (commercial radio/TV)
4. Phones (unclassified and secure)
5. UHF/VHF radio
6. Fax (unclassified and secure).
From the operations center, C2 personnel direct Navy AT/FP resources and coordinate with non-Navy activities
and resource providers, including federal, state and local governments, coalition forces, and HNs. As required, C2
personnel can request additional incident support from civilian or military organizations/agencies.
Operations center personnel disseminate processed information including, but not limited to:
1. Tactical/common operational picture
2. Incident reports
3. Status reports
4. Mass alerts
5. Notification (up/down/across the chain of command).
5.5.3 Radios
Both ashore and afloat, security watchstanders communicate primarily via radios. Radios are normally either
conventional or part of a trunked system.
5.5.3.1 Conventional Radios
Conventional radios are either simplex or repeater-based. Normally for short-range communications, simplex uses
direct radio-to-radio communications on one frequency assignment. Simplex may also incorporate a higher-power
base station to provide greater range.

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A repeater is an intermediate radio that increases both sensitivity and range. Higher-power repeater-based systems
use separate frequencies for transmission and reception.
Conventional two-way radio systems usually have several channels, each with a dedicated frequency. For
example, a security department radio could have three channels. A channel or frequency used by personnel
performing a common function is often referred to as a net. Nets can be assigned by function, e.g., waterfront
on one channel, mobile patrols on a second, ECPs on a third channel.
Channels can also be assigned based on communication priority. Examples include:
1. Primary/Common Frequency. The frequency used for routine operations is referred to as the primary or
common frequency.
2. Secondary/Tactical Frequency. When required because of saturation or the need to communicate on a
matter that others on the primary frequency do not need to hear, some or all members can be directed to
switch to a secondary frequency, sometimes referred to as a tactical frequency. For example, responders
can be directed to switch to the secondary frequency to collaborate on incident response while others
remain on the primary frequency for routine operations.
3. Tertiary/Admin Common Frequency. When the secondary frequency becomes saturated with traffic,
there can be a designated tertiary frequency to which an on-scene commander and other talkgroup leaders
can switch to maintain command and control. A tertiary frequency can also be used as an admin common
channel for routine matters, such as reporting that an ECP light needs to be replaced.
5.5.3.2 Trunked Radios
Most government, public safety, business, and transportation communicators will employ trunked-radio systems
that consist of multiple (at least 5 and up to 30) frequencies. Because channel access is computer-allocated on an
as-needed basis and channels are available to all users, the system accommodates many users with a relatively
small number of frequencies. Each radio in the trunked system monitors the control channel to determine what
frequency is currently assigned as active. A trunked system with fewer than 10 frequencies will thus have many
more than 10 virtual channels available.
Trunked-system radios also include:
1. Easy reassignment of radios to subgroups or talkgroups
2. Selective disabling of radios that are lost or stolen
3. Ability to track which radio is transmitting
4. Private calls between two units
5. Emergency button
6. Patching between talkgroups and other systems.
5.5.3.3 Talkgroups
The unique identification of every radio in the trunked-radio system permits subgrouping of channels into
talkgroups. Guidelines for setting talkgroups include:
1. Radio activity levels. When normal operations keep routine radio activity levels high, it is advisable to
create additional talkgroups.

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2. Common functions. Talkgroups should be created along specific lines of responsibility such as a
talkgroup for security boats, one for ECPs, and another for mobile patrols.
3. Number of radio users. Talkgroups should be of manageable size to effect clear communications.
Additional talkgroups can be created as required.
5.5.3.4 Radio Communications Security
Radio communications are either unencrypted (in the clear) or encrypted. Transmitting in the clear means the
communications can be heard by anyone with a radio or scanner on the same frequency. Encrypted communications are scrambled so only those who have radios with appropriate decryption equipment understand the
transmission. Two primary types of encryption are digital encryption standard (DES), in use since 1974, and
advanced encryption standard (AES), developed by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology in
2000.
5.5.4 Computer-Aided Dispatch System
A computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system provides day-to-day C3 support for security, reaction, and firstresponse forces. A CAD system, available as commercial off-the-shelf, can include the following:
1. Interface and management of alarm and sensor (e.g., fire, intrusion, chemical/biological) systems
2. Integration with detection, data management, and assessment systems
3. Interface with higher-echelon C2 systems
4. Interface with radio and telephone systems
5. Management of major incidents
6. Creation of a common operational picture and timely situational awareness for on-scene commanders and
critical decision makers
7. Management and access of PPRs and checklists.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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CHAPTER 6

Preplanned Responses
6.1 OVERVIEW
Developed, exercised actions and measures that are implemented to identify, track, assess, and neutralize terrorist
attacks are called preplanned responses (PPRs). This chapter sets forth specific guidance for commanders and
planners to develop PPRs that will be effective mechanisms to counter terrorist threats. Likely threats against U.S.
Navy assets and installations include:
1. Small boats
2. Deep draft vessels
3. Swimmers and mines
4. Pedestrian-carried IEDs
5. Vehicle-borne IEDs
6. Rail-borne IEDs
7. Aircraft
8. Standoff attacks
9. Man-portable air defense system (MANPADS)
10. CBRNE attacks (covert or overt).
Note
Numeric listing of potential terrorist threats is for format purposes only. Numbers do
not indicate either the likelihood of occurrence or the degree of severity.
PPRs to thwart the threats listed above are discussed in the following sections. All PPRs are organized by
principles that will focus deliberate thinking, by planning considerations that will guide their effective
implementation, and by specific actions to take when interacting with or engaging potential threats. However, the
material in this chapter should not be considered the only available PPRs against terrorist threats. Commanders
must always look beyond checklists to think critically and dynamically about potential threats for each mission
and for each potential area of vulnerability.
6.2 SURVEILLANCE
Before terrorists initiate an attack, they typically conduct months or years of meticulous planning to maximize the
likelihood of success. The more sophisticated the operation, such as the attacks of 9/11/01, the more preparation is

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required. Much of the planning involves gathering exhaustive operational knowledge of a target through
surveillance.
Terrorists use surveillance to assess capabilities of security systems, judge effectiveness of security measures, and
identify security weaknesses. Terrorists closely examine all details of a target, including watch schedules, entry
control procedures, periodicity of roving patrols, and volume of traffic, citizenship of security guards, and the
presence of defensive weapons.
Reports of suspicious individuals conducting surveillance of military and civilian sites in the United States and
overseas have sharply risen in the past several years. This persistent stream of reports serves as warning that Navy
assets and areas are actively being considered as targets of opportunity.
6.2.1 Surveillance Detection Principles
The following principles will guide commanders as they develop PPRs to detect suspicious surveillance activities:
1. All personnel are potential observers of surveillance activities.
2. All personnel must have a heightened awareness of their surroundings.
3. Intelligence about potential local terrorist activity must be disseminated to all personnel.
4. Suspicious activity must be reported up the chain of command to law enforcement or security authorities.
6.2.2 Surveillance Detection Planning Considerations
Surveillance methods include both mobile and fixed personnel and devices. Mobile surveillance means following
targets to discern their patterns and routines. Multiple terrorist operatives can be employed to trail targets as they
move from place to place. Fixed surveillance occurs when both terrorist personnel and devices stay in one spot to
observe the target. A discreet observation point can be established in a house, office, commercial business, or
parked vehicle. Using both fixed and static surveillance, terrorists can observe buildings, facilities, ships, and
bases. Terrorists also use various modes of transportation such as buses, trains, or boats to approach and observe
entry control procedures and the reaction of security forces.
6.2.2.1 Detecting Surveillance Activity
Successful surveillance detection requires knowing what to look for and being able to distinguish the ordinary
from the extraordinary. In its most basic form, surveillance detection is watching for persons observing personnel,
ships, and installations. All personnel, especially sentries and watchstanders, must become familiar with their
surroundings and normal unit operating procedures, then, armed with heightened awareness, be able to detect the
slightest changes, any of which may be indicators of surveillance activity.
Terrorist surveillance activities can include:
1. Multiple sightings of the same suspicious person, vehicle or activity, separated by time, distance, or
direction.
2. Individuals who stay at bus/train stops for extended periods while buses/trains arrive and depart.
3. Individuals who engage in long conversations on pay or cellular telephones.
4. Individuals who order food at a restaurant and leave before the food arrives or who order without eating.
5. Joggers who stand and stretch for an inordinate amount of time.

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6. Individuals who sit in a parked car for an extended period of time.
7. Individuals wearing improper attire for the location (or season) who do not fit into the surrounding
environment.
8. Individuals who draw pictures/take notes or photographs in an area not normally of interest to a standard
tourist, show interest in security cameras, guard locations, or noticeably watch security reaction drills and
procedures.
9. Individuals who exhibit unusual behavior such as staring or quickly looking away from individuals or
vehicles as they enter or leave designated facilities or parking areas.
10. False phone threats, individuals who approach security checkpoints to ask for directions or innocently
attempt to smuggle nonlethal contraband through checkpoints in order to determine the effectiveness of
search procedures and to gauge the alertness and reaction of security personnel.
11. Vehicle breakdowns on or near the base or gates.
12. Vehicles with an excessive number of antennas (possibly indicating two-way radios).
13. Personnel or vehicles performing evasive movements.
14. A dirty vehicle with a clean license plate or vice versa, indicating a recent change.
6.2.2.2 Reporting Surveillance Activity
Any person who detects or suspects surveillance of assets or areas should immediately report it to the chain of
command so that civilian or military law enforcement authorities can take appropriate actions. Sentries or
watchstanders should have the ability to note descriptions and details of any suspected surveillance activity.
Note
Untrained personnel should avoid confrontation with suspicious individuals.
Surveillance detection techniques must be specific in order to be effective. Observers must note the following
information:
1. Detailed descriptions of suspicious personnel to include:
a. Gender/height/weight/hair color/build/race/identifying marks
b. Clothing
c. Equipment carried by suspicious personnel, such as a phone, camera, or notebook.
2. Time of day
3. Exact location of suspicious activity
4. Detailed description of vehicle.
By forwarding suspected surveillance reports up the chain of command, observers will assist law enforcement and
intelligence authorities in discerning surveillance frequency and patterns that point to threats against specific
assets and facilities. Depending on specific circumstances or trends, commanders and senior law enforcement

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officials, in coordination with intelligence experts, may determine the need for more specialized covert
countersurveillance measures to ensure installation or asset protection. Covert countersurveillance techniques are
beyond the scope of this publication.
6.2.2.3 Surveillance Detection Countermeasures
Preplanned surveillance detection countermeasures to deter terrorist activities can include installing mechanical
devices, varying modes of watchstander behavior, and employing physical barriers, among other things. Effective
surveillance detection countermeasures include:
1. Install and display visible security cameras and motion sensors.
2. Employ random AT measures such as:
a. Roving security patrols (varying size, timing, and routes)
b. Sentry watch rotations
c. Active searches (including x-ray machines and explosive detection devices) of vehicles and personnel at ECPs
d. MWD teams at ECPs.
3. Emplace barriers, roadblocks, and entry mazes.
4. Visibly display crew-served weapons and sentries.
5. Properly equip sentries with night vision devices (NVDs), binoculars, thermal imagers, and other gear to
enhance their abilities to detect surveillance.
6. Ensure sentries receive training in detecting surveillance activities.
7. Establish sentry posts so that all potential surveillance locations can be observed.
Although the above surveillance detection measures do not comprise an exhaustive list of preplanned employment
capabilities, they will assist personnel with consistently maintaining a vigilant stance. By proactively watching for
suspicious activity, observers have the highest chance of deterring terrorist attacks before they become a reality.
6.3 SMALL BOAT THREAT
As the bombing of the USS COLE in October 2000 clearly and unambiguously demonstrated, a small boat can be a
lethal weapon. In a matter of minutes, a small boat carrying approximately 500 pounds of explosives approached the
port side of the COLE, exploded, and left a gaping hole in the ship, causing the death of 17 sailors and many injuries.
6.3.1 Small Boat Detection Principles
The purpose for developing PPRs to counter small boat attacks is to prevent threats from gaining close proximity
to protected assets or areas. The following principles, illustrated in Figure 6-1, will guide the development of
PPRs to counter a small boat threat:
1. Detect and assess all vessels entering a predetermined assessment zone.
2. Establish positive ID and determine hostile intent of all vessels in the warning zone.
3. Prevent unauthorized vessels from entering the threat zone.

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Small Boat
Threat
Zone
Small Boat
Warning
Zone
Small Boat
Assessment
Zone

Figure 6-1. Small Boat Threat

6.3.2 Small Boat Detection Considerations
Small boat threats are one of the most lethal methods of terrorist attack. When developing PPRs, commanders
need to:
1. Obtain and analyze latest threat assessment.
2. Review vulnerability assessments and consider conducting an advance party survey.
3. Determine any constraints (what must be done)/restraints (what can not be done), as applicable.
4. Tactically analyze areas of restricted movement, chokepoints, harbors, and anchorages:
a. Identify likely small boat attack threat axes.
b. Identify possible launch points for small boats from surrounding areas, including local marinas.
5. Obtain pier construction and layout information.

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6. Request the most protected berth or restricted-access anchorage.
7. Identify local support services (e.g., HN patrol boats).
8. Determine integration procedures with HN waterborne assets.
9. Review all local notice to mariners for waterways, harbors, chokepoints, and anchorages.
10. Define waterside security perimeter and sizes of assessment, warning, and threat zones.
11. Identify use-of-force continuum procedures for unknown small boats (see paragraph 6.3.3).
12. Establish and practice warning procedures to keep craft from entering the warning zone.
13. Establish and brief clear procedures on what defines an authorized craft that can approach the high value
asset (HVA).
14. Review area of responsibility specific warning procedures.
15. Determine process for boat crews to identify zone boundaries (radar, range finders, visual markers).
16. Identify any nonlethal weapons to be used by waterborne or landbased security forces.
17. Determine placement of water barriers and warning signs.
18. Review ROE/RUF/SOPs and applicable instructions.
19. Modify engineering and damage control readiness based on threat level.
20. Coordinate with local emergency services to respond to threats and incidents.
21. Identify available sensors for detection and tracking.
22. Identify communications dead spots once security boats are deployed.
23. Ensure boat crews that man security boats are qualified.
24. Determine husbanding/port services and expected schedules.
25. Identify vessels requiring access to the asset or area (tugs, water taxis, barges) and generate access lists.
a. Distribute access list to watchstanders.
b. Identify escort required/no escort required vessels and generate list.
c. Determine which types of vessels will be inspected (tugs, water taxis, barges).
d. Identify location of vessel inspection area.
e. Identify and arrange for underwater hull inspection teams.
f. Identify vessel inspection area manning and equipment requirements:
(1) Inspectors

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(2) Cover sentries
(3) Cover positions
(4) Lighting placement around vessel inspection area
(5) Means to secure/block vessel inspection area.
Note
Security boat personnel should focus solely on protecting the asset or area and not be
involved in vessel inspection procedures. If possible, separate craft should direct vessels
to a pierside inspection area for clearance before proceeding to the asset or area.
26. Identify communications equipment and develop communications plan.
27. Determine placement of water barriers (such as barges, tugs, or large fenders) to block access to asset or
area.
28. Determine location of shore/ship crew-served weapons emplacements in defense of small boat threats.
29. Brief deconfliction procedures to all watchstanders to prevent friendly fire incidents against security boats.
30. Identify other ships in close proximity.
31. Determine position of observation and surveillance posts oriented toward potential waterborne threats.
32. Determine employment scheme and missions of security boats. Consider all possible missions, e.g.,
security patrol, escort, react, intercept, and waterborne static crew-served weapon position.
33. Consider not entering port if TAs/intelligence indicates a high probability of a small boat threat.
34. Consider getting underway if TAs/intelligence indicates a high probability of a small boat threat.
6.3.3 Small Boat Continuum of Force
Any craft has the potential to be terrorist-driven; security boats must use a preplanned continuum of force to
determine hostile intent and neutralize any threats, as follows:
1. Show a waterborne presence. Patrol randomly at various speeds throughout assigned sectors.
2. Detect and report contact. Detect by visual or radar means. Make contact reports to the security force chain
of command.
3. Intercept contact approaching the warning zone. Boat closest to contact intercepts contact at high speed at
the outer boundary of the warning zone.
4. Assume a blocking position between the contact and the HVA, thus reducing the contacts ability to attack
the HVA.
Note
It is not necessary to start at step 1 and proceed in a linear fashion. Personnel shall use
the appropriate level of force based on circumstances.

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5. Classify contact as unknown, friendly, or hostile. Commanders need to designate who will make this
determination (e.g., boat officer, COG).
6. Conduct radio hail. Warn to remain clear in the appropriate language (by HN liaison if onboard). For
example, Inbound vessel (identify by type, markings, name, position from navigation point), this is a U.S.
security boat (directly ahead, on your port/starboard bow/quarter). You are entering a restricted area, under
authority of ___. Stop your vessel (turn north, etc.) and clear the area immediately.
7. Sound the boats horn or siren or use visual devices (e.g., flares, spotlights, flashing law enforcement
lights) to gain crafts attention.
8. Conduct verbal hail. Warn to remain clear and display warning placard.
Note
Verbal warnings should be used in conjunction with radio warnings since many
smaller vessels do not have or monitor marine band radio frequencies.
9. Aggressively shoulder the contact out of the warning zone by physically bumping it forward of its pivot
point.
10. Train weapons on the contact.
11. Fire warning shots, if authorized.
12. Ram the contact to deflect it away from the HVA.
13. Warn the contact that it will be fired upon if it does not exit the area, if time permits.
14. As ROE/RUF permit and with proper authorization, fire on the contact.
15. If contact evades the security boat and continues toward the HVA, security boat will clear the fields of fire
of other security boats and crew-served weapons on the HVA.
The continuum of force is a dynamic set of measures to be employed as the situation dictates. The following
factors shape security force measures to determine hostile intent:
1. Contact actions (e.g., display weapons, aggressively avoid security boats, ignore warnings)
2. Operating area (e.g., small zones limit time and distance to interact with contact)
3. Security boat capabilities (e.g., underpowered boat cannot maneuver with contact)
4. Restrictive ROE/RUF (e.g., cannot use warning shots)
5. HN restrictions (e.g., only HN security forces can interact with civilian craft).
6.4 DEEP DRAFT THREAT
The potential for deep draft ships to inflict devastating damage is due to their large capacity to hold explosives,
and to the difficulty friendly forces will face trying to stop an underway vessel. Security forces and boats can stop
hostile small craft by shouldering, ramming or shooting them; while the same measures could be employed
against an approaching hostile ship, the likelihood of stopping it is minimal.

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6.4.1 Deep Draft Threat Principles
The following principles will guide commanders in forming PPRs to counter a deep draft threat:
1. Liaison with HN or USCG authorities to ensure all deep draft vessels in the area are tracked.
2. Detect, assess, and determine hostile intent as far away from the protected asset or area as possible so
security forces have time to react.
6.4.2 Deep Draft Threat Considerations
All planning considerations applicable to a small boat threat also apply to developing PPRs for deep draft threats.
Additional considerations include:
1. Coordinate with the HN/local port authority to receive the daily vessel movement schedule (to include
ferry schedules) for the port.
2. Coordinate with HN/USCG to increase the number of vessel boardings and emplacement of sea marshals.
3. Coordinate with HN/local port authority to identify prestaging/standoff area for high-interest vessels.
4. Coordinate air fire support assets.
6.5 SUBSURFACE THREAT
The third waterborne threat occurs at the subsurface level, carried out by either swimmers or mines, or a
combination of the two. Both threats were used successfully during the Vietnam War and remain attractive
options for terrorists because of their relatively low cost and simplicity. The most difficult aspect when planning
to defend against subsurface threats is employment of capability to detect them. Small boats and deep draft
vessels are clearly visible and thus provide at least some time to determine hostile intent; security forces may not
see a swimmer or mine until it is in the threat zone, if at all. While a mine is clearly a threat and should be acted
upon immediately, a swimmer or bubbles in the water are not necessarily indicative of a hostile threat.
6.5.1 Subsurface Threat Principles
The following principles will guide the development of PPRs to detect and deter subsurface threats:
1. Develop specific guidance for reacting to a surfaced swimmer or bubbles sighting. Such directives are
critical because of the likelihood that defenders will get only one look at the swimmer at the water surface.
Is any swimmer in the water within a certain distance from the protected asset or area assumed to be
hostile? Can concussion grenades automatically be used if a swimmer submerges or bubbles are seen?
PPRs to these questions will ensure security forces are armed with sufficient authority to counter this
elusive threat.
2. Install barriers at a distance from the protected asset or area if there is a likely threat of mines.
3. Use antiswimmer devices when possible. A variety of commercial antiswimmer products that either put
sound into the water to deter a swimmer, or detect a swimmer with a variant of sonar are increasingly
available to U.S. Navy assets.
4. Ships with sonar capabilities should be prepared to activate sonar systems as directed by senior officer
present afloat (SOPA) to assist in defense against subsurface threats. SOPA guidance should conform to
the Host Nation Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).

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6.5.2 Subsurface Threat Considerations
PPRs to defend against both swimmer and floating mine threats are primarily the same, though some differences
do exist. The following are actions to be taken for both threats:
1. Analyze the latest TA.
2. Review vulnerability assessments and consider conducting an advance party survey.
3. Determine any constraints (what must be done)/restraints (what cannot be done), as applicable.
4. Review all notice to mariners.
5. Prior to entering port, coordinate with HN to have EOD or another designated dive team conduct a pier
inspection.
6. Throughout a port visit, have EOD periodically and randomly inspect the pier and ships hull.
7. For a fixed asset such as piers at a base, have EOD conduct periodic and random pier inspections.
8. Analyze general layout of harbor/anchorage.
a. Identify possible launch points for swimmers, divers, and floating mines (marinas, storm drains, piers).
b. Ensure HN/installation security authorities are cognizant of these locations.
9. Define waterside security perimeter and assessment, warning and threat zones.
10. Identify HN/installation security support (security boats, landward security, marine mammals, fixed
sensors, EOD, fire, medical, communications).
11. Identify shipboard capabilities/limitations:
a. Sensors for detection and tracking
b. Security boats
c. Lighting around pier, ship, and underwater.
12. Ensure watchstanders are briefed on ROE/RUF continuum and tactics if a swimmer or a mine is detected.
13. Modify engineering and damage control readiness based on the threat level.
14. Ensure security boats/pier security have high-power handheld spotlights and NVDs.
15. Ensure security boat crews focus on the water, ships waterline, and piers instead of solely looking for
small boat threats.
6.5.2.1 Swimmer Considerations
Additional preplanned considerations to counter swimmers:
1. Create swimmer prediction tables based on tide and current information coupled with local knowledge of
the harbors currents.

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2. Define waterside security perimeter and assessment, warning and threat zones based on the likely axis of
approach (see Figure 6-2).
3. Analyze pier construction and layout.
4. Analyze general layout of harbor/anchorage to identify possible swimmer cover areas.
5. Construct and deploy warning bells (multiple treble hooks/chemical lights/bells on 15-foot light fishing
line at random intervals along the waterline), which are effective against swimmers but may be difficult to
maintain and redeploy.
6. Determine weapons/measures to be used against swimmers:
a. Security boat weapons
b. Concussion grenades
c. Diver recall devices
d. Sonar
e. Cycling of screws and rudders
f. Pierside security weapons.
7. Identify floating debris that could be used as camouflage.
8. Randomly conduct security boat patrols. Lookouts should be especially alert for telltale signs of
swimmers, such as air bubbles, snorkels, or piles of floating debris (to conceal a swimmer).
9. Turn screws, maintain sea suction, and shift rudders. An HVA can assist security forces by conducting
such actions at random intervals.
10. Activate sonar. Periodic pings from a ships active sonar may deter swimmers from approaching an HVA.
Note
Before activating sonar, ensure friendly divers are not in the water.
11. Rig shark nets and other underwater obstacles. An effective barrier can be constructed by hanging sections
of wire fence beneath floats, such as 55-gallon drums, logs, or telephone poles.
12. Deploy underwater lights. Positioned near piers and hulls, lights can aid lookouts in spotting swimmers.
13. Use draglines. Security boats can drag heavy lines with attached grappling or fishing hooks. Another
effective technique is to drag a length of concertina wire with a small weight attached to the free end
behind the boat. A tow boom should be constructed so the wire does not entangle the security boats
screws or rudders.

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Swimmer
Assessment
Zone
Swimmer
Warning
Zone
Swimmer
Threat
Zone

Current

Figure 6-2. Swimmer Threat

6.5.2.2 Floating Mine Considerations
If the threat of mines exists, the following additional preplanned measures should be taken:
1. Have EOD/HN periodically inspect the skin of the ship just below the waterline.
2. Have EOD/HN conduct predeparture hull and bottom search.
3. Establish security perimeter with booms to block mines, if available.
If a mine is spotted, the following actions should be taken:

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1. Notify the ship so it can set material condition Zebra.
2. Notify EOD.
3. Use firehoses to direct the mine away from the ship.
6.6 ENTRY CONTROL POINT THREAT
Any person or vehicle that needs to reach a critical asset or area should be required to pass through an ECP. At
naval installations and commands, ECPs are typically base gates, pier accesses, and ships quarterdecks. Such
defense-in-depth is designed to keep pedestrian-carried and vehicle-borne IEDs far enough from critical assets
and areas to inflict serious damage.
Note
Procedures for getting onto an installation may differ from those procedures required
to gain entry to a pier or ship.
Terrorists will likely be familiar with ECP procedures and will tailor their actions to appear inconspicuous.
(Unless suicidal, terrorists do not want to advertise their intentions.) The slightest oddity on an ID card or
mannerism may be all a terrorist reveals. When developing PPRs for establishing and maintaining an effective
ECP, it is important to:
1. Analyze the latest TA.
2. Conduct a prearrival pier sweep to establish a landward defensive zone.
3. Review HN limitations (e.g., number of U.S. sentries, types of weapons, HN versus U.S. responsibilities).
4. Ensure contact information for HN, EOD, police, and emergency personnel is current and available.
5. Identify likely avenues of approach for threats.
6. Provide multiple means of communication between the sentries and the protected asset.
7. Post signs to establish and define the security perimeter and ECP that are:
a. Visible from a maximum distance
b. Lighted at night
c. Written in the local language and English
d. Warnings to personnel to remain clear of the restricted area.
8. Identify ECP manning requirements, including:
a. Contact sentries
b. Inspectors
c. Cover sentries.
9. Identify cover positions for sentries.

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10. Identify positions for cover sentries and types of weapons.
11. Identify minimum evacuation distances if an IED is discovered.
12. Provide important phrases in the native tongue to the sentries.
13. Equip watchstanders with weapons, personal protective equipment, body armor, and protective masks.
14. Ensure communications, challenge procedures, and inspections procedures are well-rehearsed.
15. Coordinate warning procedures in preparation for an incident. Warning procedures can include:
a. Radio
b. Pyrotechnics
c. Hailers
d. Whistles
e. 1MC loudspeaker system
f. Mirror
g. Hand and arm signals.
16. Identify lighting placement around ECP (lighting plan).
17. Identify detection methods and measures to be used, including:
a. MWD teams
b. Explosive detection devices
c. Chemical agent detectors.
18. Determine who and what will be inspected and to what degree.
19. Ensure baggage and package inspectors are aware of the following suspicious indicators:
a. Weight:
(1) Unevenly distributed
(2) Heavier than usual for its size
(3) Heavier than usual for its postal class.
b. Stamps and postmark:
(1) More than enough postage
(2) Foreign city.

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c. Thickness:
(1) For medium-size envelopes, the thickness of a small book
(2) Not uniform or has bulges
(3) For large envelopes, an inch or more in thickness.
d. Writing:
(1) Foreign writing style
(2) Misspelled words
(3) Marked air mail, registered, certified, or special delivery.
e. Address:
(1) Marked personal, private, or eyes only
(2) No return address
(3) Poorly typed or handwritten address
(4) Hand printed
(5) Incorrect title for recipient
(6) Addressed to a high-ranking recipient by name, title, or department.
f. Envelope:
(1) Peculiar odor
(2) Oil stains
(3) Inner-sealed enclosure
(4) Excessive sealing material
(5) Wire, string, or foil sticking out
(6) Ink stains.
g. Rigidity:
(1) Springiness
(2) Greater than normal, particularly along the center length of the package/baggage.
20. Identify location for personnel and package inspection area.
21. Sandbag the inspection area to minimize blast damage.

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22. Request HN/base security inspect buildings and clear away abandoned vehicles surrounding an ECP on a
continuous and random basis to deter surveillance.
23. Establish a vendor access list with a schedule of all deliveries.
24. Rehearse crowd control procedures and coordinate these with HN or local authorities.
25. Deny access to obviously ill personnel and refer them to local health care providers.
26. Identify fields of fire for crew-served weapons and minimize potential collateral damage while maximizing
coverage of ECP.
27. Develop barrier plan to channelize threats.
28. Consider establishing additional or secondary ECPs closer to the protected asset.
29. Conduct guard mount and post sentries as required.
6.6.1 Personnel and Vehicle Identification
Before allowing personnel and vehicles to pass through an ECP, watchstanders should:
1. Check ID cards of all pedestrians and vehicle drivers. Check identification of vehicle passengers per
current policy.
2. Match picture on ID to bearer.
3. Ensure ID is authentic and has not expired.
4. Confiscate altered IDs, retain person, and turn over to COG/patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor.
5. Inspect personnel and hand-carried items per current policy.
6. Ensure bearer is authorized entry per current access policy or daily access list.
7. Detain unauthorized personnel attempting to gain access and notify the COG/patrol supervisor or ECP
supervisor.
8. Check vehicle ID papers.
9. Direct vehicles to inspection area and inspect per current policy.
10. Deny access to unauthorized vehicles.
6.6.2 Unauthorized Pedestrian or Vehicle
Whenever possible, use barriers to channel, slow, and physically stop the vehicle until it can be cleared to enter.
Each ECP must contain the specific, preplanned response that the sentry will execute.
The decision to authorize the use of deadly force will be influenced by:
1. The justifications for deadly force as detailed in the rules for the use of deadly force.
2. The conspicuousness of the warning to stop.

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3. The potential targets protected by the ECP, such as sensitivity, classification and operational importance of
the area, as well as the nature of the potential targets inside (e.g., VIPs and large occupancy buildings).
4. Latest threat warning and current FPCON.
5. The number of, and means by which the suspect negotiated the obstacles or barriers protecting the ECP.
6. Any indications that the vehicle poses a specific threat capability, e.g., visible explosives or symbols,
visible weapons, type of vehicle, and hazardous materials symbols.
7. Indications of intent, such as evident duress or nervousness of suspect(s), threatening statements, clothing
(e.g., hoods, masks, body armor, explosive vests).
No sentry (unless operating under the ROE/RUF that state otherwise) will engage a driver or vehicle with
weapons fire unless the sentry determines that conditions of extreme necessity exist and he is justified in using
deadly force as described in SECNAVINST 5500.29 (series), Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms
by Personnel of the Department of the Navy in Conjunction with Law Enforcement, Security Duties and Personal
Protection.
When the decision to use deadly force is made, direct fire at tires, engine, windshield, and driver.
When the PPR does not authorize deadly force, the entry control guard should:
1. Immediately notify a supervisor and provide the description of the vehicle and the direction in which the
vehicle was proceeding.
2. Immediately secure the ECP.
Note
If the ECP is at a pier, ships should sound inside alarms to alert reaction forces, and
outside alarms to alert those on the pier to take cover.
6.6.3 Protests and Rallies
If protestors approach an ECP, watchstanders should execute the following procedures:
1. Upon initial gathering or massing of personnel, notify COG/patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor.
2. Prepare to secure ECP by closing gates or activating barrier systems.
3. Maintain the flow of friendly personnel through the ECP.
4. Do not take actions that would escalate the situation.
5. Request reinforcements as required.
6. Verbally warn protestors to remain away from the post as directed by supervisors.
7. If protestors physically attack watchstander or attempt to forcefully gain access to the protected area:
a. Prevent access by using authorized force.
b. Apprehend aggressors and remove from immediate area.

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c. Secure ECP as directed to prevent unauthorized access.
d. Assist civilian authorities as required.
e. Maintain positive access control at all times.
6.6.4 Media Requests
Representatives of the media will not be allowed access to the protected area without proper authorization.
Additionally, watchstanders will:
1. Notify supervisor when media representatives identify themselves, attempt to gain access to the protected area,
or are visibly present near the ECP (displaying cameras, lighting or sound equipment, or marked vehicles).
2. Refer all media queries to proper military authority, normally the public affairs officer/command
spokesperson, command duty officer, executive officer, or commanding officer.
6.6.5 Presence of Improvised Explosive Device
If an IED is discovered at an ECP, watchstanders will take the following actions:
1. Communicate presence of suspect item to watch team present at location.
2. Alert COG/patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor using a preplanned procedure that does not involve using a
radio (radio signal could detonate explosive).
3. Verbally command the suspect to move away from the suspected item. If suspect is uncooperative,
physically take control of suspect and move away from the suspected item.
4. If the suspect is wearing the IED, attempt to control the suspect with verbal commands and have the
suspect move to a safe position that allows for standoff distances for bystanders and watchstanders. Do not
attempt to physically separate the suspect from the IED.
5. Once separated from the IED, restrain and search suspect.
6. Secure ECP by closing gates and activating barriers.
7. Direct all unarmed personnel to stand clear at specified distance (see Figure 6-3 for standoff distances).
8. All armed watchstanders fall back to the effective range of their small arms and wait for EOD.
6.6.6 Unattended Package at or Near the Entry Control Point
Watchstanders will take the following actions when an unattended package is noticed at or near the ECP:
1. Communicate presence of suspect item to watch team.
2. Alert COG/patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor using a preplanned procedure that does not involve using a
radio (radio signal could detonate explosive).
3. Secure ECP by closing gates and activating barriers.
4. Direct all personnel to stand clear of suspected IEDs or explosive material at specified distance (see Figure
6-3 for standoff distances).

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EXPLOSIVES
1
CAPACITY
(TNT Equivalent)

BUILDING
EVACUATION
2
DISTANCE

OUTDOOR
EVACUATION
3
DISTANCE

5 lbs/
2.3 kg

70 ft/
21 m

850 ft/
259 m

BRIEFCASE/
SUITCASE
BOMB

50 lbs/
23 kg

150 ft/
46 m

1,850 ft/
564 m

COMPACT
SEDAN

500 lbs/
227 kg

320 ft/
98 m

1,500 ft/
457 m

SEDAN

1,000 lbs/
454 kg

400 ft/
122 m

1,750 ft/
534 m

PASSENGER/
CARGO VAN

4,000 lbs
1,814 kg

640 ft/
195 m

2,750 ft/
838 m

SMALL MOVING
VAN/DELIVERY
TRUCK

10,000 lbs
4,536 kg

860 ft/
263 m

3,750 ft/
1,143 m

MOVING VAN/
WATER TRUCK

30,000 lbs
13,608 kg

1,240 ft/
375 m

6,500 ft/
1,982 m

SEMI-TRAILER

60,000 lbs/
27,216 kg

1,570 ft/
478 m

7,000 ft/
2,134 m

THREAT

PIPE BOMB

2
3

Based on maximum volume or weight of explosive (TNT equivalent) that could reasonably fit in a suitcase or
vehicle.
Governed by the ability of an unstrengthened building to withstand severe damage or collapse.
Governed by the greater of fragment throw distance or glass breakage/falling glass hazard distance. Note that
pipe and briefcase bombs assume cased charges that throw fragments farther than vehicle bombs.

Figure 6-3. Improvised Explosive Device Standoff Distances

6.6.7 Surveillance Detection
When there is suspicion or detection that the ECP or other asset is being observed, watchstanders will:
1. Note suspect(s) physical characteristics, vehicles (if present), methods of surveillance (cameras, video,
binoculars) and exact location.
2. Notify COG/patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor via means other than a radio so as not to alert observers
who might be monitoring radio frequencies.
3. Maintain visual contact and report any changes in location or suspect descriptions until arrival of
responding personnel.
6.6.8 Medical Emergency
If there is a medical emergency at or near the ECP, watchstanders will:

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1. Communicate situation to COG/patrol supervisor or ECP supervisor.
2. Determine whether victim requires first aid or emergency medical personnel.
Note
Determine if there is a legitimate medical emergency and not a pretense for terrorists
to drive an ambulance on an installation. Positively identify the emergency responders.
3. Maintain positive control of ECP at all times. Secure post only if necessary to provide first aid to victim.
4. Direct responders to victim.
6.7 RAIL-BORNE IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE THREAT
Rail-borne IEDs have not been used to inflict terrorist damage, though the potential exists. The reasons stated below are
pertinent; additionally, the trains size will permit loading very large IEDs, with less likelihood of early discovery.
Several reasons make a rail-borne IED an attractive form of attack for terrorists:
1. The IED is easily transportable.
2. The size of the IED can be quite large and is not limited to what a person can carry.
3. A rail car can be an inconspicuous delivery vehicle.
4. An IED can easily be hidden within the vehicle.
6.7.1 Rail-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Threat Principles
The following principles apply to preplanned responses to counter rail-borne IEDs:
1. Prevent the IED from reaching a critical asset or area.
2. Minimize loss of life and property, should an incident occur.
3. Limit the number of ECPs.
6.7.2 Rail-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Threat Considerations
Protecting against rail-borne IED threats requires developing additional PPRs:
1. Establish liaison with local rail authorities to coordinate train arrivals.
2. Establish and maintain communications with the train crew.
3. Create a diversion/derailment/interception plan for hostile threats and consider the use of air assets.
4. Maintain surveillance or control once the train has cleared the inspection area.
6.8 AIRCRAFT THREAT
The short reaction time associated with most terrorist attacks is further lessened when countering an aircraft
attack. With so much focus on waterborne and land threats, many aircraft can go unnoticed. If aircraft are deemed

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to be hostile and security forces open fire with weapons, there is the added concern of collateral damage from
expended rounds. While this risk exists when firing on waterborne and land threats, the potential for collateral
damage is greater when firing against an air threat. Ships located within the territorial waters of the United States
must comply with the provisions of CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for Use of
Force for U.S. Forces at all times.
6.8.1 Aircraft Threat Principles
As definitively shown on 11 September 2001, aircraft can be used as a weapon or to deliver another weapon such as a
bomb, missile or chemical/biological agent. Principles when developing PPRs to counter an aircraft threat are as follows:
1. Coordinate among all agencies dealing with control in the airspace around the protected asset or area so
early assessment of hostile intent can be made.
2. Visually assess all aircraft near protected assets or areas.
3. Consider firing arcs and select weapons to minimize collateral damage.
Responsible local air traffic control and U.S. units should warn suspected hostile aircraft. Noncompliance is not
necessarily a hostile act, but if the aircraft continues on a collision course, the decision to engage should be made
far enough out to be effective in stopping the potential attack.
The ideal weapons for defense against aircraft threats are surface-to-air missiles, such as the Stinger and crewserved weapons. Although difficult to initially detect, small general aviation aircraft are relatively easy to destroy
once hostile intent can be established.
6.8.2 Aircraft Threat Considerations
The following considerations should be part of PPR development to deter an aircraft attack:
1. Analyze the latest TA.
2. When intelligence anticipates a threat, consider the feasibility of getting underway, not pulling in or
anchoring out (thus reducing collateral damage if firing into the air).
3. Make a request to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or HN to create a temporary restricted area.
4. Review all notices to airmen.
5. Brief watchstanders on local flight routes.
6. Ensure watchstanders have flares and spotlights to warn off suspicious aircraft.
7. Train, direct, or rotate radars to warn off suspicious aircraft.
8. Evaluate the feasibility of using ships weapons systems (missiles/close in weapons system).
9. Determine antiair weapons, position them around the asset or area, and configure the mounts to enable
antiair firing.
10. Establish liaison with the local air traffic control authorities to have a short line of communication in case a
contact is identified as potentially hostile.
11. Monitor local air control frequencies and other appropriate international frequencies.

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12. Ensure identification friend or foe transponders are on at all times.
13. Coordinate security measures with local air stations and civil airports.
14. Post notices at local airports advising aircraft to stay away from assets or areas.
15. Modify engineering and damage control readiness based on threat level.
16. Ensure chemical, biological, and radiological detection and treatment measures are available.
17. Consider using tethered balloons to deter flights and provide some level of standoff.
18. Use deployable antiair radar (detects low and slow aircraft), if available.
19. Randomly patrol with military helicopters.
6.9 STANDOFF ATTACK THREAT
One of the most difficult threats to detect, deter, and defend against is a standoff attack, primarily because close
contact is never made between the attacker and security forces. Distance and the likelihood that the threat is in a
civilian or concealed area make eliminating the threat more hazardous. The most likely standoff threats are
snipers, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and man-portable air defense weapons (discussed in detail in
paragraph 6.10), such as a Stinger missile. Snipers use rifles as antipersonnel weapons, while mortars and RPGs
are used primarily as antiequipment weapons.
6.9.1 Standoff Attack Threat Principles
The best way to defeat a standoff threat is to keep it from happening. Close cooperation with civilian or HN
authorities to counter standoff attacks is essential. Principles that guide development of PPRs against a standoff
threat are:
1. Lessen the number of potential targets by reducing the visibility of critical assets and areas.
2. Extend watchstanders focus beyond the area immediately around the asset in order to assess potential
standoff threats.
3. Maintain a close liaison with civilian or HN authorities to quickly counter standoff threats.
6.9.2 Standoff Attack Threat Considerations
The following considerations should be part of planning when developing PPRs to counter a standoff attack:
1. Analyze the latest TA.
2. Consider anchoring out if the TA provides credible evidence that a standoff weapon attack is likely and the
threat cannot be mitigated.
3. Do not man the rails while pulling into or out of port.
4. Select a mooring location that provides the most cover from the threat sector.
5. Determine sniper, mortar, and RPG maximum ranges and the areas that are most likely to support an attack
with standoff weapons.

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6. Minimize the number of personnel topside.
7. Forbid salutes and military courtesies that indicate rank.
8. Reduce identification lighting.
9. Harden watchstander posts.
10. Provide watchstanders with binoculars and NVDs.
11. Use pier equipment (cranes and containers) to disrupt the line-of-fire from the most likely threat sector.
12. Do not draw attention to the arrival or presence of VIPs, such as the use of pennants on ships.
13. Arrange for civilian or HN authorities to patrol the most likely danger areas.
6.10 MAN-PORTABLE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM THREAT
Potential damage and loss of life resulting from the employment of a MANPADS is greater than from a sniper or
mortar threat. The November 2002 terrorist attack on an Israeli airliner in Kenya highlights the potential antiair
MANPADS threat to U.S. aviation assets. Since MANPADS threats will typically launch a single missile as
opposed to a recurring sniper or mortar threat, the key to countering the threat is to prevent its recurrence. Criteria
to identify possible terrorist MANPADS launch sites include:
1. Accessibility and concealment: A location chosen for ease of ingress/egress and concealed enough to
allow the hostile fire team to get into position, assemble the weapon, and fire it without being discovered
by security force personnel.
2. Line of sight: The need for a terrorist to have an unobstructed view of the target.
3. Exposure time: The amount of time the intended target is vulnerable from an operational attack.
4. Distance to target: The distance required by a terrorist to positively identify the intended target.
6.10.1 Man-Portable Air Defense System Threat Principles
Principles that apply when developing PPRs to thwart a MANPADS threat are:
1. Lessen the number of potential targets (both on the ground and in the air) by reducing the visibility of
critical assets.
2. Extend watchstanders focus beyond the area immediately around the asset in order to assess potential
MANPADS threats.
3. Maintain close liaison with civilian or HN authorities to prevent MANPADS threats.
6.10.2 Man-Portable Air Defense System Threat Considerations
Commanders should employ measures to counter the MANPADS threat at airfields/installations and to reduce
aircraft inflight susceptibility. PPR considerations for both areas include:
1. Conduct or assemble airfield security and local area assessments to identify areas of vulnerability (in terms
of possible launch sites), to include airfield arrival and departure corridors as well as potentially vulnerable
ground targets, such as parked aircraft or ground vehicle motor pools.

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2. Obtain latest intelligence about MANPADS threat. (One valuable resource is the Air Mobility Command
worldwide database, which offers briefs and information on airfields.)
3. Use Flight Path Threat Analysis Simulation software available from the Defense Intelligence Agency
Missile and Space Intelligence Centers SIPRNET website.
4. Analyze risks and alter, divert, or cancel air missions if the MANPADS threat is too great to mitigate.
6.10.2.1 Airfield/Installation Defense Considerations
The following considerations apply to airfield/installation defense and the MANPADS threat:
1. Isolate prime MANPADS launch sites and vulnerable areas by expanding the airfield area of control.
Measures that may require coordination with local/HN authorities include:
a. Increased physical presence at prime launch sites
b. Focused and random patrols of vulnerable areas
c. Electronic surveillance of vulnerable areas to include both launch sites and potential targets.
2. Ensure personnel understand the MANPADS threat (to include component recognition), areas of
vulnerability, and reaction plans.
3. Enforce airfield access control procedures.
4. Disperse parked aircraft to reduce damage from a MANPADS or rocket-propelled grenade attack.
5. Develop and exercise contingency plans for responding to a MANPADS attack.
6.10.2.2 Aircraft Inflight Susceptibility Considerations
Considerations to reduce aircraft inflight susceptibility to the MANPADS threat include the following actions:
1. Establish airfield-specific procedures for the use of aircrew tactical countermeasures and/or tactics.
Development and dissemination of procedures may require coordination with local/HN authorities.
2. Stagger arrival times of normally scheduled mission to make arrival, departure, and ground times harder to
predict for the terrorist.
3. Randomly change approach and departure routes in accordance with current Federal Aviation
Administration guidelines.
4. Limit or discontinue use of landing lights within identified threat zones to reduce heat-producing/targeting
options.
5. In high-threat areas or when intelligence has indicated a high-alert status, coordinate and develop plans for
engine-running offloads to minimize ground time.

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CHAPTER 7

Tactics and Techniques

7.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this chapter is to provide tactics and techniques, which are measures employed to achieve specific
goals, to deter, detect, defend against, and mitigate terrorist attacks. For example, a security boat uses the tactic of
a head-on intercept to prevent an unknown vessel from approaching a HVA.
Tactics and techniques are dynamic. What may be appropriate for a U.S. port may be forbidden in a foreign port.
Factors influencing which tactics and techniques a commander will employ are based on specific threat
conditions, geography, available forces, laws, and diplomatic considerations. This chapter is intended to serve as a
guide, not as an inflexible set of rules. Commanders should use this chapter as a foundation on which to build
additional tactics and techniques.
7.2 EMPLOYMENT OF FORCE
With the arming of security forces comes the responsibility to employ force, both nonlethal and lethal,
judiciously, inflicting harm on terrorists while protecting friendly forces. The minimum force necessary shall be
used by armed sentries to compel compliance and prevent further actions by an aggressor. If escalation of force is
necessary, the following six-step continuum can be used:
1. Professional Presence (body language, demeanor, and manner of approaching)
2. Verbalization (direction and commands)
3. Restraining and Detaining (laying hands on subject to gain control, use of temporary restraining devices
such as handcuffs and leg restraints)
4. Compliance Techniques (joint manipulation, pressure point applications, take-down type techniques, use
of intermediate weapons in control configurations)
5. Intermediate Force (chemical agents; use of impact weapons in an impact mode; use of hands, feet, elbows
and knees)
6. Lethal Force (use of a firearm or any force that has a reasonable likelihood of causing death or serious
bodily harm).

Additional information can be found in DOD Directive 5210.56, CJCSI 3121.01B and OPNAVINST
5530.14 (series).
Note
It is not necessary to start at step 1 and proceed in a linear fashion. Personnel shall use
the appropriate level of force based on circumstances. For example, a sentry at an ECP
would be justified in firing upon a person who suddenly displays a knife and lunges at
the sentry.
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Security forces are required to use deadly force to protect themselves or their shipmates when:
1. They believe that they, or fellow personnel, are in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
2. Lesser means are not appropriate or cannot be reasonably employed.
7.2.1 Deadly Force Triangle
For use of deadly force to be appropriate, three conditions must exist: opportunity, capability, and intent. Use of
deadly force is illustrated as a triangle in Figure 7-1 and in a situation in Figure 7-2.
1. Opportunity. Established when a weapon or explosive device is in effective range to cause death or
serious bodily harm to DOD personnel or designated assets. For example, a hostile craft can approach an
anchored ship, but a pedestrian would not have the opportunity to attack a parked aircraft surrounded at a
distance by an electrified fence.
2. Capability. The ability or means to inflict death or serious bodily harm, or the hands-on ability to place
or attach explosives on vital assets. Examples of capability include:
a. Visible weapons
b.

Suspicious looking package (e.g., wires protruding from a box)

c. Large amount of cargo on a small vessel

d.

Covered package or person (e.g., pedestrian wearing a heavy coat in warm weather, possibly
concealing an IED).

3. Intent. The willingness to cause death or serious bodily harm demonstrated through aggressive actions or
lack of compliance. A nervous truck driver at an ECP does not necessarily indicate intention to destroy a
building on base. On the other hand, a boat that ignores warnings and aggressively maneuvers past security
boats toward an HVA displays hostile intent.
While not necessarily conclusive, indicators that contribute to determining hostile intent include:
1. Intelligence reports

ity

Op
po
rtu

nit
y

bil
pa
Ca

Intent

Figure 7-1. Deadly Force Triangle

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Capability

Intent

Opportunity

Figure 7-2. Opportunity, Capability, and Intent

2. Failure to respond or react to hails and warnings
3. Evading security forces to gain access to a restricted area
4. Driving at high speed directly toward an HVA or ECP
5. Displaying weapons.
7.2.2 Conditions for Employment of Force
The most significant decision an armed watchstander will ever make is whether to use force and to what level.
Force should only be used against a threat. Determining if a person or vehicle is a threat, that is, determining
hostile intent, is a core duty of every AT/FP watchstander. In order to create an environment where use-of-force
decisions will be made promptly and correctly, commanders and planners must prepare the battlespace as outlined
in the following paragraphs.
7.2.2.1 Mindset of Watchstanders
The security of a unit rests largely upon the effectiveness of its watchstanders. Alert, well-trained security forces
will successfully deter, detect, defend against, and mitigate terrorist attacks. Specific guidance to ensure
watchstander success follows:
1. Watchstanders must be well-rested. Watchbills should be constructed so that watchstanders receive
adequate rest, especially if the mission lasts longer than two days. Off-watch duties should be kept to a
minimum.
2. Watchstanders must receive post-specific training and orders. All watchstanders must know how to
detect surveillance activity and receive specific instructions for their posts. The COG/patrol supervisor
shall accompany oncoming watchstanders to their posts and ensure specific knowledge. For example, a
pier sentry must know the area of responsibility (e.g., looking for air and subsurface threats in addition to

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waterborne and pier threats), how to communicate with the COG and other watchstanders, fields of fire,
and techniques to classify unknown contacts. A contact sentry at an ECP, for example, must be trained in
personal communication skills, must be able to recognize suspicious pedestrian and driver behavior, and
understand terrorist techniques to evade detection by security personnel.
3. Watchstanders must receive current intelligence. The oncoming watch should receive current threat
intelligence during guard mount (see paragraph 7.5 for procedures). When armed with the latest threat
analyses, attack means, capabilities and descriptions, watchstanders gain an edge in detecting and
classifying threats. Changes to FPCONs must be rapidly disseminated through predetermined means, such
as notification over the radio or delivered by the COG. Watch turnover must be standardized, thorough,
and observed for completeness by the COG.
4. Watchstanders must know preplanned responses. Security forces will be required to take the right
immediate actions when confronted with terrorists who can execute attacks in seconds rather than minutes.
If a sentry spots a swimmer submerging next to a ship, there must be no hesitation. Prebriefed responses
must be carried out immediately. For example, if a contact sentry at an ECP discovers an IED in a vehicle,
fellow watchstanders must be notified, personnel need to be moved away to a safe distance, and the driver
must be separated from the vehicle. Repetitive training on PPRs is necessary to ensure correct immediate
actions.
7.2.2.2 Clarity of Procedures
All aspects of AT/FP operations must be clearly delineated in SOPs. Watchstanders must receive frequent and
repetitive training to eliminate hesitation, confusion, and ambiguity. Topics to be addressed in SOPs include, but
are not limited to:
1. Clearing of weapons
2. C3
3. Use of personal and detection equipment
4. Detection and classification of unknown contacts
5. Tactics to neutralize threats
6. PPRs (see Chapter 6 for specific guidance)
7. Weapons release procedures.
Until procedures are clear and unambiguous, there is no basis for an effective training program. While generic
procedures exist for threats (e.g., always check an ID before letting a pedestrian pass through an ECP), unique
procedures should be implemented based on the situation and threat level (e.g., when there is an increased
likelihood of a pedestrian-carried IED, all personnel will pass through metal detectors at ECPs).
7.2.2.3 Organizing the Battlespace
To maximize the effectiveness of alert, well-trained watchstanders, commanders must intelligently construct the
physical defense of critical assets or areas against specific threats. The primary purpose in organizing the
battlespace is to allow watchstanders to determine hostile intent so appropriate force can be applied to neutralize
specific threats before an attack is executed. Additionally, a well-laid-out defense can remove one or more
elements of the deadly force triangle shown in Figure 7-1.
The principal method to organize the battlespace is to create a layered defense in depth, which:

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1. Ensures that there is no single point of failure. The threat must evade or penetrate several defenses
before getting access to a critical asset or area.
2. Sets conditions for the use of force. A layered defense allows watchstanders to detect, identify, classify
and neutralize threats, by employing PPRs and SOPs, so that hostile intent can be determined as far from
the protected asset or area as possible.
Three zones add structure to this defense in depth. They are:
1. Assessment zone: The outermost defense zone, which typically does not have boundaries, is the
assessment zone. Security forces detect and identify contacts (e.g., small boats, pedestrians, vehicles) as
they approach or pass near the protected asset or area. In some instances (e.g., areas outside an installation)
security forces may not typically patrol the assessment zone and may not control access or challenge
contacts. To simplify the ID process and reduce unnecessary use of force, watchstanders must be given
current access rosters for expected vessels or vehicles (e.g., vendors, fuel barges, pilot boats).
2. Warning zone: Security forces must classify contacts in the warning zone as either threats or nonthreats.
In this zone, security forces initially interact with contacts to determine hostile intent and to provide a
physical presence controlling access to a restricted area. Classification measures and warning zone
parameters are based on specific threats. At an ECP, for example, a heightened threat of pedestrian-carried
IEDs would result in more thorough screening of personnel, each of whom are separated from friendly
personnel until classified. SOPs must clearly define methods and steps that can be used to determine
hostile intent so watchstanders can avoid ambiguity and hesitation.
3. Threat zone: The threat zone is the innermost layer of defense in depth. All personnel, vehicles, and
vessels must be classified as either a threat or nonthreat before entering this zone. To neutralize threats, the
threat zone must be organized to bring maximum destructive fire, via crew-served or other weapons, to
bear on targets while minimizing the risk of fratricide and damage to assets.
Note
The threat zone is not a trigger line or kill zone where security forces can
automatically fire upon uncleared personnel, vehicles, or craft. Hostile intent must first
be determined.
Zone sizes and locations are dependent upon several factors:
1. HN restrictions. Political sensitivities, availability of HN security forces, and HN laws all restrict U.S.
actions when OCONUS. A HN, for example, might restrict a U.S. ship security boat to patrol only 200
meters around the anchored ship so as not to interfere with commercial vessel traffic lanes. Or a HN may
not even allow U.S. boats in the water, insisting that HN boats will provide security.
2. Geography. Channel width, port size, and pier dimensions are just several restrictions that can limit sizes
of defense zones. The ideal of establishing zones 500 yards in width to deter standoff RPG attacks is not
possible for a pierside ship in a 100-yard-wide river.
3. TAs. Location-specific TAs can shape the size of zones. For example, if there is a high threat of vehiclecarried IEDs, security forces should establish ECPs far from the protected asset, post additional vehicle
inspectors, and employ a variety of detection equipment. Zones that protect against a swimmer threat
would extend upstream of the current that flows past an HVA, while zones against a small boat threat
might extend in the other direction toward local marinas, which could serve as boat launch points.
4. Capabilities of U.S. security forces. The number and skills of AT/FP forces will affect zone size and
location. If four, vice two, security boats are available per watch, zone sizes could be extended so

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identification and classification of unknown vessels occurs farther from the HVA, providing more time
and distance to neutralize threats. Conversely, using nonorganic security forces, such as FAST or NCW,
would result in more robust coverage of ECPs, which could then be constructed closer to the HVA.
5. Proximity of targets. In a crowded port or urban installation, security forces may be limited in choice of
weapons employment. In such environments, zones could be extended, if permissible, to ascertain intent
further from the protected asset, better ensuring an ability to neutralize the threat with allowable weapons.
Note
When enough security forces are available, it may be advisable to divide zones into
sectors. For example, a waterborne warning zone could consist of two sectors, each
patrolled by a security boat.
7.2.2.4 Realistic Training
To complete the use-of-force conditions for well-trained watchstanders to man their posts in a properly prepared
battlespace, commanders must institute realistic, meaningful training. After the AT/FP organization has
completed appropriate courses and received individual and team instruction, they must be tested, specifically in
ways that incorporate lessons learned from previous training scenarios. Testing should, at a minimum, include:
1. Immediate action drills
2. Multiday exercises
3. Tabletop exercises
4. Multiunit exercises.
7.3 RANDOM ANTITERRORISM MEASURES
The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were carefully planned, and with a high degree of certainty,
commanders can conclude that terrorists will carefully plan future attacks. The purpose of RAM is to present a
robust security posture from which a terrorist cannot easily discern patterns and routines that are vulnerable to
attack. The goal of a RAM program is to deter, detect, and disrupt terrorist attacks. The effectiveness of a RAM
program will be measured by how formidable, unpredictable, and ambiguous the installation or ship can appear to
instill uncertainty of success in the minds of would-be terrorists.
An effectively planned RAM program will employ measures from a higher FPCON or use locally devised
measures that can be employed in a random manner to supplement basic FPCON measures already in place (see
Figure 7-3). Implementing RAM will yield other advantages:
1. Commanders can maintain and sustain a lower FPCON without compromising security effectiveness,
maximize scarce security resources, and minimize security force burnout, while reducing degradation in
command AT awareness.
2. When security routines are varied, it will be difficult for terrorists to target important assets, build detailed
descriptions of significant routines, or predict activities by a specific asset or within a targeted installation.
3. Unannounced, unpredictable and visible security measures will help mask available capabilities that can be
used to respond to, and defeat, terrorist attacks.

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day

Monday

Tuesday

Random
vehicle
inspections

ID
checks

Wednesday Thursday

Roll out
Reaction
Force

ID
checks

Friday

Close gate,
place
barriers

Saturday

Sun

Random
vehicle
inspections

Figure 7-3. Random Antiterrorism Measures

4. Personnel and family members will develop increased AT awareness.
5. By participating in changing routines, watchstanders will accrue broader training while honing skills in
increased alertness.
Commanders should keep in mind the following tenets when developing and executing RAMs:
1. The installation or ship ATO is in charge of the RAM program and should monitor, track, and analyze
RAM implementation efforts.
2. RAMs should be visible (to confuse surveillance attempts) and should involve not just security forces, but
also the command as a whole. All RAMs should be reviewed and approved by the Installation
Commander/Commanding Officer.
3. To be effective, tenant and transient units must be fully integrated into, and support the RAM program.
4. To confuse terrorist surveillance attempts, RAMs should be implemented in a strictly irregular fashion,
never using a set timeframe or location for a given measure.
5. Local RAM measures should:
a. Assess local threat capabilities and identify effective RAM countermeasures
b. Mitigate installation or unit vulnerabilities
c. Be deconflicted with ongoing approved surveillance detection measures
d. Not be limited to security force personnel only.
Examples of RAMs include:
1. Posting extra security watchstanders
2. Opening and closing base gates
3. Conducting vehicle inspections at base gates

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4. Conducting baggage inspections at pier ECPs
5. Increasing the use of MWD teams at installation gates and perimeters
6. Positioning portable lights at gates to increase visibility
7. Posting police vehicles with emergency lights flashing at installation gates
8. Deploying multiple security boats
9. Blocking streets in front of critical assets
10. Changing weapons posture, e.g., displaying additional small arms and crew-served weapons.
7.4 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION MEASURES
Military personnel and their families, as representatives of the United States, are attractive targets for terrorists.
Individual protection measures can reduce or mitigate the likelihood of becoming victims of criminal or terrorist
acts.
Commands must play an active role in enhancing personal AT awareness. Specific measures to be taken can
include:
1. Ensure all personnel and family members receive:
a. AT awareness briefings, focusing on local specific threats, during indoctrination training
b. Annual Level I AT training.
2. Conduct additional training when TAs or conditions change.
3. When required, develop and implement individual force protection plans (IFPPs) for personnel on travel,
both CONUS and OCONUS. Elements may include:
a. Name/rate/rank/social security number
b. Dates of travel
c. Details of itinerary
d. Estimate of situation
e. Reason for travel
f. Billeting locations
g. Forms of transportation
h. Areas of vulnerability
i. Emergency plan
j. Latest local vulnerability assessment from NCIS

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k. Pertinent local restrictions, laws, regulations, and customs
l. Confirmation that the traveler has received Level I AT training.
4. Verify travelers receive a location/area specific brief for the stated destination (and destinations en route if
other than for connecting transportation).
5. Traveler briefs should be based on the following sources for the stated destinations in the individuals
itinerary:
a. DIA foreign intelligence threat level (FITL)
b. DIA terrorism threat level (TTL)
c. DIA political violence threat level (PVTL)
d. DIA criminal threat level (CTL)
e. DOS travel warnings and public announcements
f. Center for Disease Control (CDC)/World Health Organization (WHO) risk announcements, blue sheet
listings, travel alerts and travel advisories
g. DOD foreign clearance guide (FCG) special area designations
h. NCIS TAs.
6. Each command should maintain a database to track individual and unit level travel from initial IFPP
approval up through the completion of travel. The tracking database should contain the following
information:
a. Individuals name, rank and contact information (preceding and during actual travel)
b. Individuals command
c. IFPP approval authority and contact information
d. Destination country
e. Destination country FPCON, TTL, PVTL, CTL
f. Dates of travel.
7. The level of IFPP approval authority should be based on the FPCON level at the stated destination:
a. FPCON Normal and Alpha approval authority is the first O5 in the chain of command.
b. FPCON Bravo, Charlie, and Delta approval authority is the first O6 in the chain of command.
c. Restricted Areas approval authority is the first Senior Executive Service/Flag/General Officer in the
chain of command.
8. Although the FPCON drives the level of IFPP approval, actual approval should be based on:

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a. DOS travel warnings and public announcements
b. DIA FITL, TTL, PVTL, CTL
c. CDC/WHO notices, alerts and announcements
d. NCIS TAs
e. DOD FCG special area designations
f. Combatant command travel restrictions.
9. IFPPs should be required for all instances of international travel, leave or TAD, for all military personnel
and for DOD civilians on all official travel.
The following measures, which should be addressed in AT/FP plans, raise personnel awareness of specific threats:
Note
Most measures below apply to foreign travel but also maintain some relevance in the
United States.
1. Be aware of surroundings.
2. Use common sense.
3. Use the buddy system whenever possible.
4. Dress and behave in public in a manner consistent with local customs.
5. Avoid wearing clothing that identifies one as an American.
6. Do not flash large sums of money, expensive jewelry, or luxury items.
7. Be alert for surveillance attempts and suspicious persons or activities.
8. Watch for unexplained absences of local citizens as an early warning of possible terrorism.
9. Avoid public disputes or confrontations.
10. Know how to use the local phone system; always carry change.
11. Know the locations of police, government agencies, U.S. Embassy and other safe locations.
12. Know certain key phrases in the local language.
13. Carry ID showing medical information.
14. Maintain vehicles in good condition:
a. Always have at least one-half tank of fuel.
b. Use locking gas caps on all vehicles.

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c. Walk around vehicle and look for suspicious items before entering.
15. Be aware that accidents and disabled vehicles can be staged.
16. Avoid areas that can be boxed in or channeled to chokepoints.
17. Be aware when using public transportation:
a. Avoid travel in high risk areas.
b. Purchase tickets in advance to avoid lines.
c. While in a baggage claim area, stand back and wait for luggage.
d. Avoid identifying bags with command stickers, flags, sports teams, or other American symbols.
18. Avoid uniform-type clothing such as flight or cruise jackets.
19. Do not carry ID card/travel orders/leave papers/club cards/passport in carry-on luggage. Maintain on
person or put in checked luggage.
20. Do not disclose military affiliation with strangers.
21. Use hotel precautions:
a. Stay in centrally located hotels when possible.
b. Avoid street level rooms.
c. Try to stay below the sixth floor.
d. Identify escape routes and fire exits.
e. Leave television or radio on while out of room.
22. Use precautions for liberty parties (a group of four or more individuals traveling to the same destination):
a. When possible, use U.S. government vehicles and drivers. Vehicles should not reflect the fact that they
are government vehicles and, when feasible, drivers should be in appropriate civilian attire.
b. Conduct route analysis.
c. Never overload the vehicle.
d. Ensure all personnel know muster locations, both primary and secondary, and times.
e. Consider maintaining a watch on the vehicle when parked.
23. Installation personnel:
a. Essential personnel should be equipped and trained for a CBRNE event.
b. Nonessential personnel should be familiar with evacuation, shelter-in-place, and protective equipment
procedures for their installation.

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7.5 GUARD MOUNT PROCEDURES
Guard mount procedures standardize watch turnover between oncoming and offgoing personnel. A thorough
guard mount is key to establishing the proper mindset in watchstanders. The supervisor must be completely
familiar with all matters directly related to the watch, and ensure all personnel are briefed and fully prepared to
assume duties. Command-specific guard mount procedures may amplify the specific procedures listed below.
Procedures that ensure an orderly turnover include the following:
1. Develop a ready-reference binder to contain:
a. General/special orders
b. Standard equipment checklist
c. Communication plan
d. Report formats
e. ROE/RUF
f. Intelligence information
g. Post-specific information.
2. Develop a guard mount logbook to record:
a. Changes to ROE
b. Watch events
c. Equipment turnover
d. Changes to information in the ready-reference binder.
7.5.1 Brief and Inspection
Prior to commencing watch turnover, oncoming watchstanders should attend a guard mount brief and inspection.
The COG, or designated supervisor, conducts the briefs and inspection. A standard brief should include:
1. ROE/RUF guidelines
2. Status-of-forces agreement
3. Intelligence update
4. Previous/upcoming watch events
5. Current FPCON
6. Post-specific orders
7. Chain of command
8. Communications procedures (callsigns, prowords, signal plan)

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9. Location of available resources, such as EOD, MWD, and reaction forces
10. Location of medical personnel
11. Location of key personnel
12. Location of HN and friendly forces
13. Weapon issue/return, armory, and clearing barrel procedures
14. Meal and water resupply.
After the guard mount brief, the supervisor should conduct an inspection of all oncoming watchstanders and:
1. Ensure proper gear has been issued and is functioning:
a. Personal gear can include body armor, gas mask, first aid gear, and flashlight.
b. Optics can include night vision devices, thermal imagers, and binoculars.
c. Communications equipment can include flares, radios, batteries, and whistles.
d. Law enforcement equipment can include flex cuffs, handcuffs, metal detectors, mirrors, vapor tracers,
and batons.
e. Weapons (both nonlethal and lethal).
f. Ammunition.
2. Resolve personnel issues and concerns.
3. Answer questions and clarify orders.
4. Quiz watchstanders to ensure competent level of guard knowledge and post-specific orders.
7.5.2 Watch Turnover
Upon completion of guard mount, the oncoming COG or supervisor should accompany every watchstander to the
post to ensure proper turnover, the core of which is a passdown of watch events to the oncoming watchstander.
Watch reliefs, both on land and underway, should be staggered so that all security forces are not focused
simultaneously on turning over, thus reducing the alertness of the force against terrorist activity. Once the watch
is turned over, watchstanders should conduct communications checks.
Note
As a random AT measure, guard mount and watch turnover times should vary.
The offgoing supervisor must debrief each offgoing watchstander and conduct a formal debrief of significant
watch events with the ATTWO or designated supervisor.

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7.6 SECURITY BOAT TACTICS
The principal task of security forces, with respect to waterborne vessels, is to determine hostile intent as far from
the HVA as possible. Using defense in depth, security boats, more than any other AT asset, can determine hostile
intent early because of their capability to interdict contacts at a distance from the HVA.
Waterborne defense in depth around an HVA is established by creating assessment, warning and threat zones.
Commanders should create zones large enough to determine hostile intent and, if necessary, engage a small boat
threat as far away as possible from the HVA. Ideally, zones that are 500 meters in width allow for effective small
boat engagement and prevention of standoff attacks from RPGs.
Zone size is also dependent upon the capability and number of friendly security boats, and the type and speed of
potential threats. For example, if four boats are patrolling, interdiction times should be shorter so zones could be
smaller. Or, if a threat analysis reveals the presence of high-speed craft in the area, zones should be widened to
allow for engagement farther from the HVA.
It will not always be practical to establish large defensive layers because of channel width, port size, and traffic
patterns, nearby friendly shore facilities, HN restrictions and other considerations. For example, a HN might
restrict a U.S. ships security boat to patrol only 200 meters around the anchored ship so as not to interfere with
commercial vessel traffic lanes. Or, a pierside ship in a river may be only 100 yards from the far side of the river.
7.6.1 Assessment Zone
The outermost defense zone is not typically patrolled, thus allowing security boats to remain close to the HVA in
case of an incident. Security forces first detect and identify contacts, notify craft that they are nearing a restricted
area (if they approach the warning zone), and create a visible deterrent presence in the assessment zone. Unlike
the warning zone, access to the assessment zone is not challenged.
7.6.2 Warning Zone
In the warning zone, access by unauthorized craft is challenged. While security boats passively observe craft in the
assessment zone, in the warning zone they actively interact with unknown craft for classification as either a threat or
nonthreat, to determine hostile intent and to ensure unauthorized vessels do not approach closer to the HVA (using a
continuum of force described in Chapter 6). The size of a warning zone is determined after consultation with local
civilian, military, or HN authorities since it requires security boats to interact with local craft. The warning zone is
typically divided into two or more sectors, based on the number of available security boats.
7.6.3 Threat Zone
The threat zone is the innermost layer around the HVA. No hostile craft should be permitted to enter this zone.
Hostile intent should have been determined in the warning zone after repeated attempts to deter the unknown craft
from approaching the protected asset or area. Predetermined ROE/RUF guidelines will specify what lethal actions
can be taken by security forces once hostile intent is determined.
7.6.4 Single-Boat Defense
When a single boat is on patrol, its crew will be required to exercise sharp judgment, because interdicting every
craft that comes into the warning zone will leave the HVA vulnerable to a diversionary attack. As a result, the
security boat should maintain a static position, close to the HVA, facing out toward potential waterborne threats
(see Figure 7-4). The boats task is to assess all craft near the HVA and only react to vessels that are deemed
potential threats (e.g., coming directly toward the HVA at a high rate of speed). Commanders can post additional
watchstanders high on the HVA to aid in contact assessments.

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Pier
High Value Asset
Security Boat

Figure 7-4. Single-Boat Patrol

When the HVA is underway or at anchor, the security boat should be positioned to face the most likely threat. For
example, while transiting a chokepoint where the area to the port side of the HVA is considered hostile, the
security boat would take position on the HVAs port quarter. From this position, the security boat can respond
quickly to inbound contacts. Communication between the security boat and the HVAs bridge, which can warn of
inbound contacts, is essential. A single boat cannot maintain full coverage for a ship underway or at anchor and
must, therefore, be responsive to perceived potential threats.
7.6.5 Multiple-Boat Defense
When two or more security boats are on patrol, as shown in Figure 7-5, sectors must be assigned. To protect
pierside, anchored, or underway HVAs, boats will randomly patrol near the outer edge of the warning zone
sectors and assess all vessels in their vicinity. Their physical presence should deter craft from approaching the
HVA. Since diversions are a standard tactic in the asymmetric environment, security boat personnel must be
aware of, but not distracted by, a contact in another sector.
When the HVA is at anchor or underway, security boats should position themselves to maintain 100 percent
visual coverage around the HVA. In Figure 7-6, boat A will focus ahead of and down the starboard side of the
HVA; boat B will focus up the port side and astern of the HVA. In Figure 7-7, boats around an anchored HVA
will actively patrol their sectors, synchronizing their movements to maintain full visual coverage around the
HVA. Three security boats would be positioned as follows: one ahead of the HVA and one on each quarter; with
four boats, one boat would be stationed on each bow and quarter of the HVA.

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Assessment
Zone

A
Warning
Zone

B
Threat
Zone

Warning Zone Boundary

Threat Zone Boundary

HVA

HVA High Value Asset

Sector Boundary
Security Boats

Figure 7-5. Multiple-Boat Patrol for a Pierside High Value Asset

B
High Value Asset

A
Figure 7-6. High Value Asset Underway with Two Security Boats

High Value Asset

Figure 7-7. High Value Asset Anchored with Two Security Boats

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
7.6.6 Intrusion Response
The physical presence of security boats will deter most vessels from approaching an HVA. Hostile craft, however,
can employ detection-avoidance measures, which can include:
1. Using a larger vessel as a radar screen by hiding in the ships visual and radar shadow.
2. Disguising a vessel as a legitimate commercial or pleasure craft.
3. Using radar reflective decoys to divert patrols from the area.
4. Using multiple boats as decoys to lure security boats from the area.
5. Using a larger vessel to transport small boats and personal watercraft.
7.6.6.1 Waterborne Techniques to Establish Hostile Intent
Any craft has the potential to be terrorist-driven; security boats provide a valuable tool to determine hostile intent
and neutralize waterborne threats. The following techniques aid watchstanders in determining hostile intent:
1. Show a waterborne presence and patrol at the outer edge of the warning zone. A physical presence will
deter most nonthreats, leaving subsequent techniques to warn off remaining nonthreats and identifying
threats.
2. Intercept contacts approaching the warning zone. Assume a blocking position between the contact and the
HVA, thus reducing the contacts ability to attack the HVA while sending a clear message that further
incursion is forbidden.
3. Conduct radio hail. Warn to remain clear in the appropriate language (by HN liaison if onboard). For
example, Inbound vessel (identify by type, markings, name, position from navigation point), this is a U.S.
security boat (directly ahead, on your port/starboard bow/quarter). You are entering a restricted area, under
authority of ___. Stop your vessel (turn north, proceed east) and clear the area immediately.
4. Sound the boats horn or siren or use visual devices (e.g., flares, spotlights, flashing law enforcement
lights) to gain crafts attention.
5. Conduct verbal hail. Warn to remain clear and display warning placard.
Note
Verbal warnings should be used in conjunction with radio warnings since many
smaller vessels do not have or monitor marine band radio frequencies.
6. Aggressively shoulder the contact out of the warning zone by physically bumping it forward of its pivot
point.
7. Train weapons on the contact.
8. Fire warning shots, if authorized.
9. Ram the contact to deflect it away from the HVA.
10. If time permits, warn the contact that it will be fired upon if it does not exit the area.

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The following factors shape which of the above techniques security forces use to determine hostile intent:
1. Contact actions (e.g., display weapons, aggressively avoid security boats, ignore warnings).
2. Operating area (e.g., small zones limit time and distance to interact with contact).
3. Security boat capabilities (e.g., underpowered boat cannot maneuver with contact).
4. Restrictive ROE/RUF (e.g., cannot use warning shots).
5. HN restrictions (e.g., only HN security forces can interact with civilian craft).
7.6.6.2 Intrusion Response Tactics
The following tactics should be employed when responding to contacts nearing the warning zone:
1. Intercept contact while maintaining full protective coverage. When there are multiple boats on patrol,
the nearest security boat should intercept the contact at high speed while the others take up position in the
threat zone to provide full coverage of the remaining area around the HVA (see Figure 7-8).
2. Tactically block the contact. The intercepting boat should approach head-on to the contact, presenting a
minimum target. (The speed of approach and distance could require an approach ahead of the contact to
intercept.) As the contact turns to avoid a collision, the security boat should turn in the same direction onto
a parallel course, maintaining a position between the contact and HVA on the contacts quarter. A position
on the quarter prevents the contact from slipping behind or surging past the security boat.
Note
Security forces need to maintain awareness of the contact crews actions; such
crews can be capable of heaving explosive devices into security boats.
3. Shadow contacts near the warning zone. To neutralize potential threats, security boats should maintain
the quarter position and either switch sectors or hand off the contact if it passes into another patrol sector.
4. Deconflict friendly fire. Security boats and crew-served weapons watchstanders on the HVA or pier need
to closely coordinate actions to prevent a friendly fire incident. If a contact evades an intercepting security
boat or displays hostile intent, the security boat should announce a preplanned proword over the radio and
rapidly clear the fields of fire of friendly weapons. At night, use of flashing or steady colored lights (e.g.,
blue one night, green the next, amber the next) on friendly boats is a method to discern friends from foes.
Note
A small boat is an inherently unsteady platform from which to fire automatic weapons
or a shoulder-fired RPG. An aggressor may slow or stop when preparing to open fire
on an HVA or defending boats.
5. Allow contacts to disengage and retreat. A security boat should not pursue an aggressive contact
that suddenly disengages and clears out of the warning zone. The contact could be a diversion
attempting to draw off security in preparation for an attack.
6. Shoot to stop forward motion. When engaging a hostile craft, fire should be directed at the engines,
not the coxswain. A boats forward motion can continue even if no one is at the helm, but a boat with
disabled engines will stop quickly.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
Assessment Zone
Contact
Warning Zone

Threat Zone

Sector
A

Sector
B

B2

B1
HVA

HVA

High Valve Asset

Sector boundary

1. B2 intercepts and interrogates

contact at Warning Zone
boundary.
2. B1 slides over and takes a
position between the HVA
and contact.

3. If the contact evades B2 and

continues toward the HVA,
B2 clears the field of fire for
B1 and crew-served weapons
on HVA.

Figure 7-8. Response to Inbound Contact

7.7 WATERBORNE INSPECTION TECHNIQUES
Ships, whether pierside, anchored or underway, require other vessels, such as tugs, pilot boats, garbage and oil
waste barges, to come alongside. Security forces must inspect and maintain positive control over all such vessels
before permitting access to a protected ship. Where possible, security boat crews, whose focus should remain on
waterborne protection, should not serve as vessel inspectors. Ideally, vessels should be directed to a pierside
inspection area, controlled by additional security personnel.
Further information can be found in the small watercraft inspection guide (SWIG) from the interagency technical
support working group (TSWG), which can be ordered at www.tswg.gov.
7.7.1 Waterborne Access
Close coordination among security boats, an HVA, HN authorities and vendors is critical to unhindered
waterborne access. Unnecessary tension and alarm will result if security forces are not notified of scheduled visits,
or if vendors approach an HVA without prior notification. To avoid such incidents, the following procedures
should be observed:
1. Coordinate with local/HN port authority/husbanding agent for expected vessel movements and visits.
2. Base/unit/HN notify contractors, vendors, guests of increased security.

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3. Coordinate communications connectivity between security boats and vessels authorized to come alongside.
4. Identify vessel inspection area (pierside, underway).
7.7.2 Waterborne Clearance
Before a vessel is authorized to go alongside an HVA, a detailed search must be conducted to ensure no IEDs or
hostile personnel are onboard. Procedures to clear personnel and vessels include the following:
1. Inform the vessels master of intention to board and inspect.
2. Ensure all crewmembers are brought to a visible area upon the craft.
3. Identify number of crewmembers and inspect IDs (retain IDs until inspection is complete).
4. Inform master to remove key or associated starting device and identify engine-starting system.
5. Place crewmembers in an area topside, away from inspecting spaces; ensure security is assigned to watch them.
6. Master or first mate will accompany inspection team and will open all compartments, containers, and boxes.
7. Walk completely around vessel, performing visual inspection, looking for anomalies (e.g., newly painted
areas).
8. Using the spiral search technique (one high/one low, clockwise and switch), inspect for:
a. False bulkheads
b. IEDs
c. Weapons
d. Triggering devices
e. Unusual wires, packages, out-of-place equipment.
9. Select a prearranged code to alert other team members if suspicious or dangerous items are found.
10. If a suspicious or dangerous item is found:
a. Alert team members
b. Ensure crewmembers are secured
c. Call EOD and HN authorities.
11. If the vessel is cleared, security personnel must stay with the vessel at all times while alongside the HVA
to prevent an incident.
7.8 ANTISUBSURFACE TACTICS
Mines and swimmers, armed with light automatic weapons or IEDs, represent viable threats to ships, waterfront
facilities, bridges and other assets. Both mines and swimmers are difficult to detect, yet have distinctly different
tactics associated with defending against them. Each is described below.

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7.8.1 Detection and Deterrence of Swimmers
Assessment, warning and threat zones for swimmers should be formed based on the location of likely swimmer
launch points and consideration of tides and currents around the protected asset. Unlike small boats, swimmers
are difficult to detect, with the likelihood that watchstanders will get one, or no, sightings before an attack. Just as
with the small boat threat, specific watchstander actions must be clearly outlined and briefed for each zone.
To avoid false alarms and friendly fire, it is important to make diver notification procedures clear; all
watchstanders should be alerted to the presence of friendly divers in the water.
The nominal speed for a swimmer, depending on distance and equipment carried, is approximately one knot.
However, the water current can strongly affect a swimmers speed. Security personnel should employ the
following techniques to deter and detect swimmers:
1. Post extra security at potential points of attack if there is an elevated swimmer threat.
2. Be aware of tides and currents in the operating area. A swimmer may take advantage of a flood current to
attack a target at slack water, so an escape can be made on the ebb current. Swimmer prediction tables,
based on tide and current information coupled with local knowledge of the harbors currents, must be
disseminated to applicable security forces.
3. Randomly conduct security boat patrols. Lookouts should be especially alert for telltale signs of
swimmers presence; some indicators are air bubbles, snorkels, or piles of floating debris (to conceal a
swimmer).
4. Turn screws, maintain sea suction and shift rudders. An HVA can assist security by conducting such
actions at random intervals.
5. Activate sonar. Periodic pings from a ships active sonar will deter swimmers from approaching an HVA.
Note
Before activating sonar, ensure friendly divers are not in the water.
6. Rig shark nets and other underwater obstacles. An effective barrier can be constructed by hanging sections
of wire fence beneath such floating devices as 55-gallon drums, logs, or telephone poles.
7. Deploy underwater lights, positioned near piers and hulls, to illuminate the area so swimmers are easier to
spot.
8. Use draglines with attached grappling or fishing hooks. Another effective technique is to drag a length of
concertina wire with a small weight attached to the free end behind the boat. When employing this
technique, a tow boom should be constructed so the wire does not entangle the security boats screws or
rudders.
7.8.2 MK3A2 Concussion Grenades
If authorized by applicable ROE/RUF, the most effective deterrent and defense against a hostile swimmer or diver
is the MK3A2 concussion grenade, commonly called the G911 grenade. The concussion grenade is designed to
produce a blast effect that incapacitates a swimmer or diver; this effect allows other watchstanders or security
personnel to further engage the threat.

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7.8.2.1 MK3A2 Description
1. The MK3A2 is black with yellow markings around its middle and consists of a half pound of TNT with a
cardboard wrapper and a 5-second fuse.
2. The grenades kill range on land is about 6 feet/2 meters, with an incapacitation range beyond 30 feet.
Secondary pieces (fuse bits) can project as far as 650 feet (198 meters) from detonation point on ground.
Though primarily considered an offensive weapon, the employment of the MK3A2 concussion grenade for
anti-swimmer operations is considered a defensive weapon and deterrent.
3. The MK3A2 produces a large shock wave when detonated on the ground and an even greater shock wave
is produced underwater. The shock wave in water travels at 4,192 feet per second. The shock wave travels
through open-air voids (ear drum, lungs, stomach, etc.) in a diver causing internal damage and bleeding. It
has a 50 ft. casualty radius in water and will cause ear injuries as far away as 150 feet.
4. When the grenade is released from the hand, the spring-loaded cocked striker ejects the spoon and rotates
on its axis to forcefully strike the percussion primer, igniting the 45 second black-powder delay element.
During this delay, the grenade will impact the water and begin to sink. The deeper the grenade sinks, the
more effective it will be against swimmers. The delay elements will then burn down to the detonator that
sets off the main charge of TNT.
5. Detailed information on the MK3A2 concussion grenade can be found in NTRP 3-07.2.2, Force Protection
Weapons Handling Standard Procedures and Guidelines.
7.8.2.2 MK3A2 General Safety Precautions

Never deploy a grenade unless you intend to destroy something or harm

someone.
Note
The MK3A2 offensive grenade has 2 safeties (the safety clip and the safety pin). Never
remove either safety feature until the decision to deploy the grenade has been made.
When employing the MK3A2, strict safety guidance listed below and in the NTRP 3-07.2.2 should be followed to
avoid injury to personnel. Always be aware of surroundings when handling weapons know who and what is
around at all times. The following are general safety precautions/guidelines:
1. Do not approach a grenade that has not detonated as designed (dud-fired). Contact EOD for any grenade
that has not detonated.
2. Dud-fired grenade may fire at any time:
a. Deterioration or dampness may prolong the burning time of pyrotechnic delay element.
b. A hung cocked striker can overcome a mechanical obstruction.
3. Do not attempt to replace safety pin in a dud-fired grenade.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
4. Do not drop or jar a grenade. This may arm or function the fuse.
5. Do not attempt to remove a fuse.
6. Do not pull grenade out of case by the fuse. This can cause the top half of grenade including detonator to
separate from bottom of grenade exposing TNT filler.
7. Ensure that the fuse body and base of practice hand grenades are pointed away from the body. Fuse
functioning could cause serious injury.
8. Ensure that there is a safety clip attached to the M206A1 or M206A2 fuse. Do not carry a MK3A2 hand
grenade without a safety clip in place.
9. Do not attach grenades by the pull ring or the safety lever to any equipment or person.
10. Under no circumstances will any hand grenade be carried in the uniform pocket.
11. Extra hand grenades should be carried inside a rucksack or a utility bag.
12. Take proper cover and observe proper safe distance before detonating a grenade.
13. Do not deploy grenades closer than 10 feet from ships hull and pier pilings, the shock waves can be heard
and felt by personnel in the ship below the waterline.
14. Recommend issue MK 3A2 in unopened, taped-up shipping canister. Watchstanders should only open the
canister when a clear and present threat warrants immediate use of the MK3A2.
15. Once removed from container, grenadier must keep a firm grip on the grenade.

If pressure on safety lever is relaxed after safety clip and pin have been removed;
it is possible that the striker can rotate and strike the primer while still holding
the grenade.
7.8.2.3 MK3A2 General Technique
Proper grip is important in properly arming grenade. Gripping procedures differ slightly for right and left hand
personnel.
The preferred method for engaging swimmers/divers from ships and piers is pull and drop. The pull and drop
release will also be utilized for small boat application but the six point kneeling position will be used vice the
standing position. The intent of any release is to place the concussion grenade into the water quickly so that it can
get as deep as possible before detonation in order to maximize its concussion effects. There should be a
downward force at release toward the water, while avoiding an arc trajectory (see Figure 7-9).

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Figure 7-9. Pull and Drop Release

1. Hold grenade in strong hand with safety lever placed between first & second joints of thumb.
2. Right-handed grip: hold grenade upright with pull ring away from palm. Pull ring can be removed by
index finger of free hand.
3. Left-handed grip: hold grenade inverted (upside down) with pull ring away from palm so pull ring can be
removed by index finger of free hand.
7.8.2.4 Small Boat Deployment

If an active grenade is dropped into boat, there will be no attempt to retrieve it. The command
Abandon Ship will be given immediately. All personnel will exit boat immediately.
Watchstanders/sentries should be looking for surface swimmers/divers or bubbles from divers. Upon sighting or
suspecting the presence of a swimmer/diver, security forces should drop grenades in parallel lines between the
sighting and the HVA, as well as around the HVA (see Figure 7-10). If there is ebb current, additional grenades
should be dropped in lines beyond the sighting in the direction of the ebbing flow. The following are general
procedures for deploying the grenade from a small boat:
1. When deploying the grenade, grenadier will assume the six point kneeling position. This is the only
position used for Anti-Swimmer grenade deployment aboard small boats.
2. Stance:
a. Body faces outward.
b. Toes and knees on deck.
c. Elbows and forearms on gunnels of boat.
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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Threat Zone

Swimmer sighting

Grenade pattern
High Value
Asset

Figure 7-10. Concussion Grenade Employment

d. Grenade case on starboard or port quarter of vessel.
3. No actions should be taken until the coxswain directs the action. The following are standard firing run
procedures/commands:
a. After the coxswain commences on course, he gives the command GRENADIER UP.
b. Grenadier secures his weapon, then places one case of grenades on starboard/port aft deck then replies
GRENADIER UP.
c. Coxswain gives command STAND-BY FOR A TWO (or more) GRENADE PATTERN.
d. Grenadier acknowledges amount of grenades to be dropped.
e. Coxswain will give command ASSUME POSITION.
f. Grenadier will get into position and reply IN POSITION.
g. Coxswain will issue command REMOVE SAFETY.
h. Grenadier will remove safety (with grenade held over the water) and reply SAFETY REMOVED.
i. Coxswain gives command PULL PIN.
j. Grenadier removes pin with a twist-pull-twist motion and replies PIN PULLED.
k. Coxswain gives command DEPLOY GRENADE.
l. Grenadier drops grenade in water and replies GRENADE AWAY (or, ONE AWAY) and then
retrieve another grenade and state IN POSITION.
m. Coxswain gives command DEPLOY GRENADE and process continues until proper amount of
grenades are deployed.

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7.8.2.4.1 Single-Boat Deployment
Grenades are deployed off of either port or starboard side of vessel (never both). Although not as effective as 2boat deployment, this Clears a narrow strip of water.
7.8.2.4.2 Two-Boat Deployment
Two-boat deployment can be utilized to clear a wider channel or security zone. In this case, boats line up 40 to
50 yards abreast, moving at same speed and on same course. The boats must maintain dress as grenades are
dropped on inboard side of vessels simultaneously.
7.8.2.5 Low Freeboard Ship Deployment
The pull and drop release found in NTRP 3-07.2.2 will be utilized. The trajectory shall be as direct to the water as
possible in order to allow time for grenade to sink to maximize its blast effects. Avoid an arc trajectory upon release.

Explosive safety experts recommend dropping the grenade no closer

than 10 feet to the hull of a ship. Shock waves can be heard and felt
by personnel in a ship below the waterline.

Concussion grenades should not be deployed from heights greater

than 35 feet.

7.8.2.6 Pier Deployment

The pull and drop release found in NTRP 3-07.2.2 will be utilized. The trajectory should be as direct to the water
as possible in order to allow time for grenade to sink to maximize its blast effects. Avoid an arc trajectory upon
release.
7.8.2.7 Training Grenades
The GG15 Inert Training grenade can be used to train on deployment procedures. However, it will only provide
muscle memory and is not intended to replace live training.
7.8.3 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Support
Regional and installation commanders will promulgate procedures on how to request EOD support. While waiting for
EOD to arrive, ships personnel should commence tagout procedures for diver operations. EOD should conduct both
hull and pier sweeps to ensure no explosives are attached when there is any suspected swimmer sighting.
7.8.4 Tactics against Mines
Floating mines are simple and effective threats that can be employed against ships and piers. The goal of any
tactics measure against a mine is to prevent it from contacting the intended target. To prevent contact, personnel
should direct the spray of a fire hose against the mine, and then call EOD or HN authorities. When specifically
authorized, personnel can shoot at the object from a safe distance, though this may only serve to submerge, not
detonate, the mine. Small boats can be used to tow the object with a hook or line only when there is no other
choice. Personnel must exercise extreme skill and care when towing mines.

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7.9 ENTRY CONTROL POINT PROCEDURES
An ECP is a key component of any installations defense in depth (see Figure 7-11). Active and passive security
measures at an ECP are integral to forming a hardened outer shell around bases and critical assets. The objective
is to process known, authorized personnel and vehicles as quickly as possible, focusing time and manpower on
screening unknown personnel and vehicles.
A well-created ECP is defined by defense in depth and alert, well-trained sentries. Defense in depth is
accomplished by employing assessment, warning, and threat zones, which force terrorists to penetrate several
defensive layers to gain access to a critical asset or area.

Cover
Sentry

Post-ECP
Zone

Ships Force
Entry

Inspection Area
Pre-ECP
Zone

Ships
Force

Contact
Sentry

Non-ships
Force

Inspection
Barrier

Sentry
Non-ships Force
Entry

Road

STOP
until called

Figure 7-11. Entry Control Point

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Effective sentries must be able to detect surveillance, as well as control vehicle and personnel access. Repetitive
and focused training will ensure sentries take proper immediate actions when confronted by potential threats. The
most important immediate action is the decision to use force and to what level. Sentries must receive a current,
detailed, local-threat briefing before assuming an ECP post.
7.9.1 Assessment Zone
The assessment zone around an ECP includes the visual range of the base gate guard, pier watch, or Quarterdeck
watch. It is within the assessment zone that active and passive security measures are employed to identify, detect,
classify, and assess possible threats. Watchstanders should routinely conduct long-range visual preassessments of
all approaching pedestrians and traffic.
Those seeking access should be required to slow, and then stop to allow for inspection of credentials while in the
assessment zone. Known and authorized personnel should be segregated, channelized separately, and then
allowed to proceed. Personnel who are unknown or unauthorized should be channeled into the warning zone so
further inspections can be conducted, while preventing their access to the critical asset.
7.9.2 Warning Zone
The warning zone at an ECP is a physically separated area closer to the critical asset than the assessment zone
where unknown and unauthorized personnel are inspected and identified. In this zone, IDs and access lists are
checked and the purpose of visits is confirmed. Commensurate with the current threat situation, personnel and
packages should be inspected using explosive detection devices (MWDs and vapor tracers), as available. The
warning zone contains a standoff zone past the ECP where the cover sentry can engage a person who has gained
unauthorized entry. The cover sentry typically mans a crew-served weapon from a covered position.
7.9.3 Threat Zone
The area past the post-ECP standoff zone to the protected asset or area is the threat zone. No unauthorized
personnel should be allowed in this area. All watchstanders should clearly understand authorized use of force in
the threat zone.
7.9.4 Personnel Entry Control Point
At the ECP, there should be a marked stopping point for approaching pedestrians, where security watchstanders
can assess each person.
7.9.4.1 Suicide Bomber Considerations
Suicide bombers have become more of an expected occurrence; it is therefore, imperative, that sentries be familiar
with, and alert to, suicide-bomb indicators, which include the following:
1. Surveillance, particularly focusing on the ECP
2. Rehearsals in or around the ECP
3. Information about purchases of, or illicit access to, facility blueprints
4. Unseasonable dress or conspicuous, bulky clothing
5. Obvious or awkward attempts to blend in to a crowd
6. Repeated and nervous handling of clothing items

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
7. Profuse sweating
8. Slow-paced walking while focusing on surrounding personnel
9. Attempts to stay away from security personnel
10. Hesitant, nervous muttering
11. Perfumed, recently shaven individuals.
7.9.4.2 Interview Techniques
ECP personnel shall develop interviewing techniques that can be used as a tool to determine hostile intent. Types
of questions to ask include:
1. Neutral questions that should not cause the subject any concern, designed to give some indication of the
individuals physiological norm:
a. What is your name?
b. Where do you live?
c. How long has your trip been?
2. Relaxing questions relating to direct involvement of the subject and designed to elicit a physiological
reaction from the guilty:
a. What is the purpose of your visit?
b. What are you carrying?
3. Control questions designed to evoke a known lie, a probable lie, or an emotional response are used as a
gauge to help determine the truthfulness of the interviewees answers to relevant questions:
a. Have you ever smuggled anything?
b. Have you ever had explosives or any other illegal devices in your possession?
4. Symptomatic questions, used to determine whether some outside influence is bothering the subject:
a. Is something wrong?
b. Are you nervous about something?
c. Are you worried that your body will be searched?
The interview does not need to be complicated. Interrogators should ask questions until satisfied of intent, make
an assessment, confer with the other inspectors, then hold or release the individual.
7.9.5 Vehicle Entry Control Point
There are four scenarios a sentry may encounter at a Vehicle Entry Control Point. They are summarized below
with the expected actions.

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7.9.5.1 Vehicle with Proper Identification
An individual/vehicle seeking access to a naval installation has proper identification and decal or pass: Admit
vehicle/individual to the installation.
7.9.5.2 Vehicle Lacking Proper Identification (No Suspicious/Threatening Activity)
Individual or vehicle lacks proper id or decal, but exhibits no suspicious/threatening activity:
1. Deny access into the installation.
2. Stop traffic at the ECP in the lanes(s) affected.
3. Position sentry to block entry into the installation.
4. Ensure the unauthorized individual/vehicle exits the area.
7.9.5.3 Vehicle Lacking Proper Identification (Suspicious/Threatening Activity)
The vehicle/individual attempting access causes the ECP sentry to have reasonable suspicion that there may be
a threat to the safety of the sentry or installation.
1. Advise the driver, occupants or individual that due to heightened security additional information is
required and request their cooperation. Inform the driver and individuals that they are required to provide
appropriate/additional identification.
2. The vehicle generally should not be moved until the investigation is completed. Traffic should be rerouted
as required.
3. Document all information, including individual identification, license plate, DOD decal, vehicle
registration, vehicle identification number, insurance documents, and description and ID of personnel and
vehicle. All individuals should be questioned, required to produce identification, and if in a vehicle,
personnel can be required to exit the vehicle.
4. Conduct a cursory search of the passenger compartments, trunk, engine compartment and undercarriage of
the vehicle to ensure there are no weapons, IEDs or other materials posing an imminent threat to the
security personnel conducting the stop.
5. If the ECP security/guard still has reasonable suspicion or believes that their investigatory stop has
produced additional information which would cause them to believe that a threat to the installation or
themselves still exists, the individuals who occupy the vehicle should be detained for questioning by NCIS
and/or appropriate civilian authorities. Retain possession of all identification, vehicle papers, or dangerous
items until NCIS/local law enforcement arrives. Items retained shall be turned over using chain of custody
documents.
6. If the stop does not disclose evidence suggesting a threat or other criminal misconduct they should be
thanked for their cooperation and permitted to enter or depart as appropriate.
7. Make a full report in accordance with local procedures to the Regional Security office and NCIS.
7.9.5.4 Vehicle Gains Unauthorized Access into Installation
A person or vehicle gains unauthorized access into an installation (passes through the ECP without permission),
security/guard force personnel shall:

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
1. Document all information possible, including license plate and description of the person/vehicle/
occupants. Pass information on the incident and description of the vehicle and individual(s) to the
Installation/Regional security office.
2. Commence an installation-wide search for the vehicle.
3. Immediately close the effected ECP to all traffic.
4. Supervisors should consider closing other ECPs.
5. Immediately initiate procedures at all ECP exits to ensure that the person/vehicle does not exit the
installation. Ensure other ECPs are alerted to the possibility of additional entry attempts.
6. Check all vehicle/occupant identification during exit from the installation. Continue until the
person/vehicle has been located.
7. Once located, terminate exit procedures at all ECPs.
8. Report if unable to locate the person/vehicle. The Installation Commander will determine when it is
appropriate to end the search and terminate exit procedures.
7.9.5.5 Reports
Make reports in accordance with OPNAVINST 3100.6(series) and higher guidance.
7.9.5.6 Additional Guidance
The following additional guidance is provided:
1. Reasonable suspicion requires specific articulate facts (facts which can be expressed clearly) which
taken together with rational inferences drawn from those facts justify a suspicion that warrants further
inquiry. While racial profiling is prohibited, an individuals race or ethnic origin, along with other specific
articulable facts, can be relevant as long as race is not the sole or principal factor used to justify suspicion.
If reasonable suspicion is present the sentry will take action to further investigate the circumstances to
ensure a threat does not exist.
2. Use of deadly force is not authorized solely to detain the vehicle or individual if the driver or individuals
attempt to or actually depart the installation unless they pose a threat to the installation or the ECP
personnel. NCIS/local law enforcement should be contacted immediately to effect a be on the lookout
(bolo) report. If, in the judgment of the sentry, the vehicle, driver or individuals pose a threat to the
installation or ECP personnel, use of force guidelines in DOD Directive 5210.56 apply.
3. At all times, security personnel should conduct themselves with the utmost courtesy and professionalism.
Most legitimate drivers will voluntarily comply with requests for identification and inspection of vehicles
if asked in a professional manner.
7.9.6 Commercial Vendor Access
Procedures for controlling access of commercial vendors are as follows:
1. Check access list for vendor.
2. Direct commercial vehicles to inspection area.

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3. Compare bill of lading with load and conduct inspection per current policy.
4. Contact the COG or ECP supervisor when a vendor is not on the daily vendor access list; vendors not on
the access list must be escorted to and from the delivery location by delivery recipient.
7.9.7 Inspecting for Explosive Devices
Procedures to detect explosive devices will vary based on available equipment. Under-vehicle inspection mirrors
and MWDs are used by most bases. Newer methods of explosive detection include undercarriage vehicle
surveillance systems (UVSS), vehicle and cargo x-ray and backscatter inspection systems, and hand-held
explosive detectors (both trace and vapor). Combining several of these methods has proven to be the most
effective way to optimize explosive detection. For example, as seen in Figure 7-12, inspection with an undervehicle inspection combined with MWD achieves an 81 percent detection rate (with a 10 percent false-positive
rate). Using this same approach and augmenting it with a hand-held explosive detector increases the detection rate
to 93 percent (with a 28 percent false-positive rate). Security forces should combine approaches wherever feasible
to maximize probabilities of explosives detection.
7.9.8 Obstacles and Barriers
Note
Shore commanders will determine barrier placement per DOD O-2000.12-H, DOD
Antiterrorism Handbook.
Obstacles (obstructions employed to disrupt, channel, turn or block the movement of personnel or vehicles) and
barriers (a coordinated series of obstacles) should be constructed using defense-in-depth principles.
TRADITONAL

100

EXPERIMENTAL CONOPS

90
traditional approach
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80
P
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60

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Figure 7-12. Explosive Detection Optimization Chart

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Detection
Frequency
(Fd)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
When establishing an ECP, personnel will:
1. Place barriers so they are sufficient to stop or slow most vehicles.
2. Locate barriers at a distance from the critical asset to minimize damage in the event of an incident.
3. Place serpentine obstacles inside the gate between the contact sentry and the cover sentry.
a. Obstacles in a serpentine should be placed in close enough proximity that they restrict vehicle speed to
under 15 mph while also requiring at least five seconds to negotiate.
b. The serpentine exit should lead the vehicle directly into the cover sentrys most advantageous field of
fire.
4. Establish separate personnel and vehicle inspection areas that:
a. Minimize disruption to routine traffic.
b. Allow the inspection stations to be observable from crew-served weapon positions.
5. Establish hardened positions for ECP watchstanders that:
a. Are readily accessible and capable of reinforcement.
b. Provide cover from effects of friendly crew-served weapons.
6. Ensure the cover sentrys position is, at a minimum:
a. Behind cover.
b. Capable of engaging a vehicle that has deliberately breached the gate.
c. Located in a position to afford the sentry time to alert other forces, ready ones weapon and provide a
field of fire that minimizes danger to other drivers or personnel in the vicinity of the ECP.
7. Establish primary and secondary forms of communication between the ECP and protected asset.
8. Conduct a test drill to determine how much time ECP sentries and the reaction force have to respond to
any ECP security breach.
7.10 CREW-SERVED WEAPONS
Crew-served weapons provide firepower that can be used to stop vehicles, small boats, and personnel who present
a threat to critical assets or areas. When establishing crew-served weapon positions, personnel will:
1. Identify maximum ranges.
2. Consider potential for fratricide and collateral damage.
3. Position each crew-served weapon, considering:
a. Primary, alternate, and supplementary positions.
b. Fields of fire (interlocking where possible).

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c. Cut-outs and dead space (areas that cannot be directly fired upon by the weapon).
d. Depression and elevation settings for waterborne or air threats.
4. Prepare traverse and elevation and range cards for each position; install pintle stops on tripods to ensure
traversing and elevating control.
5. Harden crew-served weapon emplacements (Kevlar/steel panels/sandbags).
6. Determine ammunition and staging requirements.
7. Identify optical equipment for best day/night visibility.
8. Ensure, at a minimum, two qualified personnel (gunner and assistant gunner) are at each crew-served weapon.
9. Determine and brief weapons conditions.
10. Ensure watchstanders are thoroughly briefed on ROE, conditions for RUF and battery release procedures.
11. Determine if warning shots are permissible.
12. Define target precedence for each crew-served weapon (e.g., for waterborne threats, target small boats
before targeting a swimmer).
13. Identify communication equipment and locations on the radio net, such as:
a. HN
b. Bridge
c. ECP
d. Security boats
e. Pier
f. Quarterdeck.
14. Establish an alternate/emergency communications plan if primary communication assets fail.
Alternate/emergency assets include:
a. Flares
b. Whistles
c. Hand and arm signals
d. Verbal warnings.
15. Determine C2 for the coordination of fires.
16. Ensure barrier and lighting plans are specific and well-designed for maximum impact.
17. Ensure crew-served weapons are inspected during each shift.

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7.11 ANTIAIRCRAFT TECHNIQUES
Commanders must promulgate specific use-of-force criteria for AT/FP watchstanders, specifically focusing on
identifying hostile intent and restrictions on the employment of weapons against aircraft threats.
When firing at an aircraft, point ahead of it along its flight path. If using a 25-mm machine gun system, which has
almost a minutes worth of bullets, fire it in automatic mode ahead of the flight path. The gunner should slowly
advance the stream of fire toward the aircraft, adjusting for deviations of the course to the left or right.
Once the stream of bullets reaches the midpoint of the target, the gunner should keep the stream on target. Since
the rate of fire is higher for a .50-caliber machine gun, single shots should be used with that weapon until the
target is close enough to have a reasonable assurance that the 14-second burst of automatic fire will hit the target.
7.12 DEFENDING A TRANSIENT AIRCRAFT
The extensive damage inflicted on a U.S. Navy aircraft by protestors in Shannon, Ireland in early 2003 highlights
the vulnerability of aircraft at nonmilitary bases. Upon arrival at all stops during a mission, aircraft commanders
should conduct a security assessment to determine if host-provided security (at all non-DOD/non-North Atlantic
Treaty Organization [NATO] airfields) is adequate.
Once the aircraft commander determines that security is adequate, personnel will then:
1. Coordinate additional physical security enhancements (lighting, ropes, stanchions and patrol
coverage/responses).
2. Coordinate weapons and ammunition storage with the nearest U.S. or NATO installation; if not available,
store weapons aboard the aircraft in a locked container.
3. Secure all doors and hatches to the aircraft.
If the aircraft commander determines security is not adequate, personnel will:
1. Coordinate additional physical security enhancements (lighting, ropes, stanchions and patrol
coverage/responses).
2. Post watchstanders as close-in sentries.
Note
U.S. Navy Raven teams, when assigned by OPNAV, fly with aircraft, and provide
ground security during mission stops.
3. Load weapons according to established directives.
4. Establish communications with the nearest U.S. or NATO installation, or with an English-speaking HN
facility on the airfield.
5. Ensure watchstanders possess crew contact information.
6. Establish a watch schedule and coordinate watch relief transportation to/from billeting locations.
7. Search aircraft interior and exterior, to determine if there are stowaways, explosives, or any evidence of
tampering.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

CHAPTER 8

Security Reaction Forces

8.1 OVERVIEW
Reaction forces, afloat and ashore, provide a response capability during a terrorist incident or threat and provide
the capability to immediately augment duty security forces or deck watchstanders armed, trained, and equipped
personnel in response to an incident or increased threat. Leaders and personnel must receive in-depth training to
effectively support AT/FP watchstanders and security personnel.
8.2 REACTION FORCE SKILLS
8.2.1 Security Reaction Force Operational Tasks
Security reaction forces reinforce fixed posts manned by armed sentries and respond to situations such as an
armed intruder or hostage situation beyond the capability of the armed sentry or past the point of perimeter
security. Associated operational tasks are:
1. Augment fixed post and/or cover the withdrawal of Entry Control Point (ECP) sentries.
2. Respond to ships/building penetration and/or hostage situation by isolating and containing the incident,
assessing the situation and making standard situation reports.
TYCOM, DOD C-5210.41M instructions and OPNAVINST 5530.14 (series) and TYCOM instructions provides
specific Reaction Force requirements.
8.2.2 Tactical Team Configuration
The general team configuration will depend on the situation and should be promulgated in a unit SOP. At a
minimum, always work in pairs. The following are team positions:
1. Point: Constantly maintains security, studies direction of the flow, stays in the center of the passageway
for reference, gives direction to team leader.
2. Team Leader Coordinates the movement of the train. With diversified ATFP trained personnel the
Team Leader must coordinate all facets of the movement ensuring he has direct communications with his
Point and Number 2 person.
3. Team Member 2 Coordinates the movement of the point man.
4. Team Members (Train) Conduct the entries, moves with the flow, listens for direction and requests
direction from team leader.
8.2.2.1 Reaction Force Team Leader
A reaction force team leader must be well trained and experienced in the following skills (in addition to the
individual skills listed in previous paragraphs):
1. Small unit tactics

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
2. Multiple team tactics
3. Deployment of weapons teams
4. Employment of weapons
5. C3 principles
6. Defense-in-depth concepts
7. Planning and execution of reaction force training
8. Knowledge of terrorist operations/asymmetrical threats.
8.2.2.2 Individual Basic Reaction Force Team Members
Individual basic reaction force members must be able to demonstrate the following skills:
1. Respond appropriately to a security alert/incident.
2. Augment fixed posts.
3. Cover ECP withdrawal.
4. Conduct tactical movement to critical spaces/areas under No Light, Low Light, and Bright Light
conditions.
5. Take immediate action while en route to an incident.
6. Shoot while moving.
7. Assess the tactical situation and make reports.
8. Control entry and enforce perimeters.
8.2.2.3 Individual Advanced Reaction Force Team Members
Shipboard/Installation reaction forces may require the ability to search and clear a space and neutralize a threat.
Accordingly, in addition to the basic reaction force skills listed above, advanced reaction team members must
demonstrate:
1. Search interior and exterior spaces.
2. Enter spaces/buildings using initiative based tactics as part of a 2, 4, or 6 person team.
3. Perform immediate action when confronted with an unauthorized person(s).
4. Regain control of a space and detain/remove unauthorized person(s).
5. Engage targets using TACLIGHTs.
6. Move to critical spaces under No Light, Low Light, and Bright Light conditions.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
8.3 REACTION FORCE FUNDAMENTALS
8.3.1 Overview
Close Quarter Battle (CQB) is a form of engagement that involves opposing forces at reduced range or in
confined space areas, in contrast to the often-longer ranges and open areas associated with other forms of small
unit engagement. CQB is not surgical in nature and requires frequent sustainment training to maintain capability.
In the unlikely event a situation arises that a CQB Team is required and the need for support from Naval Special
Warfare, U.S. Coast Guard, and Marine Fast Company is not available, this section provides basic fundamental
guidance for a well-trained Security Reaction Force to respond.
8.3.2 Mental Preparation
Reaction forces need to recognize the real dangers inherent with armed or physical confrontations and the
importance of a tactical mindset. Tactical is defined as: the science of maneuvering in combat and the skill of
using available means to reach an end. Training of mental preparation is the foundation for a successful outcome
in any conflict. Personnel should always plan for worst-case scenario.
The tactical (survival) mindset includes the following characteristics: alertness, decisiveness, aggressiveness,
speed, self-control, and determination.
1. Alertness is to remain alert to avoid surprise and being prepared for worst case. Always be aware of what
is behind you, what is out of place, and what is not normal. Always anticipate success and dont anticipate
losing.
2. Decisiveness implies that you have a course of action, and follow through. Never hesitate because of the
state of affairs or the abnormality of violent emergencies deadly force and ferocious fighting that needs
to occur. Act vigorously developing tactical decisiveness.
3. Aggressiveness is the means to implement violent action for intimidating and overwhelming the adversary.
Once the decision is made to assault, take the fight to the adversary with an incalculable advantage,
indignation, and with quiet controlled anger. The best defense is a good offense.
4. Speed of action should be deliberate, smooth, and fast. Be fast but not fair, end the action before the
adversary knows its over. Speed is the essence to act within a reaction time. SMOOTH is FAST.
5. Self Control is staying focused, having a mental presence of mind, and the ability to deal with one problem
at a time. If loss of control occurs, the potential for loss of life is great. Aggressive force does not mean
excessive force. Be calm, controlled and precise.
6. Determination is to take power and resources without reservation in order to stop the adversary. Actions
must be in accordance with the rules for the use of force. Dont be kind; be tough and determined.
8.3.3 Principles of Ashore and Afloat Close Quarter Battle
The principles of Close Quarter Battle include: detailed planning, speed, surprise, and aggressive action.
8.3.3.1. Detailed Planning
This includes developing standard operating procedures/preplanned responses (PPR), which delineate specific
actions to be taken and coordinate with all individuals/entities involved in reaction force operations. These should
include the situation, mission, and detailed execution of the specific PPR. The basic concept of operations should
address:

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
1. Commanders Intent
2. Scheme of Maneuver
a. Assembly Area
b. Insertion Point
c. Movement to Objective
d. Actions on the Objective
e. Extraction.
3. Specific Tasks: team and individual assignments of duties and responsibilities
4. Coordinating Instructions
a. Actions at Danger Areas
b. Actions on Contact
c. Actions at the objective
d. Security countermeasures
e. Evacuation Plan deliberate, hast deliberate, emergency
f. Use of Force/Deadly Force/Rules of Engagement as appropriate
g. Weapons conditions
h. Abort Criteria
i. Time line.
5. Administration and Logistics: This section of the plan should include weapons used and ammunition
allocation. The medical plan should cover the worst-case scenario and should include a MAN DOWN
section to deal with team casualties. An equipment checklist should be promulgated to the team, including
standardization of personnel load out and specialized gear needed for the specific mission.
6. Communication Plan: NTTP 3-07.2.1 (Command, Control, and Communications) should be referred to for
detailed communications flow for afloat and ashore. The tactical team response execution checklist should
include primary, secondary, and tertiary means of communication with appropriate operational checks and
training. A loss of communication plan should be implemented as well. Actions of the security elements
cannot be coordinated without information on the adversary and friendly forces. The communication plan
should include:
a. Primary, secondary, and tertiary communications.
b. If the team is using Encryption, have a solid plain language (clear voice) plan, in case the Crypto-fill is
dropped (or zeroized).
c. Create Prowords for Deviations or Emergencies.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
d. Detailed loss of communications plan. This should include verbal and nonverbal means.
7. Intelligence: Who, what, when, where, and how should be known. Generate Commanders Critical
Information Requirements to include Priority Information/Intelligence Requirements (PIRs), Friendly
Force Information Requirements (FFIRs), and Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFIs).
Subsequently, Requests for Information (RFIs) are submitted to Higher HQs (HHQs).
8. Command and Control: Identifies the organizational composition and coordination of the efforts of the
team and coordinating entities. Provides the chain of command and associated responsibilities.
9. Rehearse: The rehearsal of the plan is essential to work out flaws. Start with a diagram and chalk talk to
ensure everyone knows and understands the concept of operations. Walk through the plan to ensure the
actual motion is accommodating and smooth. Rehearsals need to have control before speed and can be
used for daily training for the teams.
10. Inspection: Upon completion of mission brief with an accepted course of action, conduct a personnel and
equipment check ensuring 100% accountability, with the standardized personnel load out.
8.3.3.2 Speed
Speed of movement for the team must be smooth and controlled. Obtain good entry door position with well-aimed
shots. You are as fast as your slowest person.
8.3.3.3 Surprise
Surprise is the key to success. The element of surprise ensures that the team has the advantage of vigilance prior
to room entry. Not only does this benefit the team, it traumatizes and throws the adversary off guard.
8.3.3.4 Aggressive Action
Gain physical and physiological control through violence of action, thereby dominating and eliminating the threat.
Three primary actions need to occur:
1. Clear Entry Point and immediate threats (i.e., doorway, entrance way into passageway, top and bottom of
ladders)
2. Clear Corners
3. Clear Areas of Responsibility.
8.3.4 Basic Communications Procedures
Effective reaction force communications is vital to the success of the response. The following are basic
communications procedures:
1. Monitor the radio at all times.
2. Use correct phonetic Alphabet and Numerals.
3. Use proper terms and Call signs.
a. Interrogative
b. Roger

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
c. Over
d. Out
e. Break
f. Standby
g. Say Again
h. Numbers to Follow.
4. Speak slowly and clearly.
5. Acknowledge and confirm all communications received.
6. Stay off the net unless passing vital information.
7. Feed all VITAL info to the team leader.
a. PASS any changes in location
b. Status of personnel
c. Any intelligence that is found
d. Significant actions of the ships crew, etc.
8. Reporting format Acronym HUTS will be utilized at the objective.
a. H = Hostages
b. U = Unknown
c. T = Tango (Adversary)
d. S = Shipmates (your reaction force team members).
9. Update position while moving to the area using SAALT.
a. S = Strength number of personnel encountered
b. A = Arms armed or unarmed
c. A = Action Hostile actions and your actions
d. L = Location Hostile location and your present locations
e. T = Time Approximate time you will need to contain the situation.
10. Establish procedures to be taken in the event an NSF member has been taken hostage and his captors are
now in possession of his hand-held radio, i.e., all NSF members would then be given a code word that
alerts/directs them to switch to a pre-designated frequency.

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8.3.5 Fundamentals of Room Clearing
Fundamental principles of room clearing include:
1. Dominate the room with aggressiveness
2. Eliminate threats as they appear while clearing your sector of fire
3. Control the Situation and the personnel, which may include utilizing detainee handling procedures of flexcuffing all personnel.
4. Search of the dead
5. Search of the room.
8.3.6 Tactical Lighting Techniques
It is important to light dark spaces in order to conduct a search.
1. Following are fundamental Tactical Lighting Techniques:
a. Where there is controllable lighting, move from dark areas into lighted ones, never the reverse.
b. If unable to turn the lights on prior to entry into a compartment, turn lights out in the compartment you
are departing in order to avoid silhouetting yourself or teammate.
c. The TACLIGHT is a very important tool and will probably be used more than any other piece of
equipment.
d. The primary method of lighting is the TACLIGHTs attached to applicable weapons, but each team
member will have a working flashlight, extra batteries and backup Chemlites.
2. Important considerations when using a handheld TACLIGHT:
a. TACLIGHT must have a bright light.
b. The light must have an impulse on/off switch for one-handed use.
c. The TACLIGHT must be small enough to be carried and used so as not to interfere with weapon
operation.
d. Always hold TACLIGHT in the weak, non-firing hand.
e. Hold TACLIGHT with overhand grip and thumb on impulse switch.
f. Hold strong hand near or on primary weapon.
3. Techniques to avoid:
a. Backlighting or silhouetting another team member from behind.
b. Keeping the TACLIGHT lit when not absolutely necessary.
4. The TACLIGHT can also be a disadvantage to the entry team because it can identify your position.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
5. Flashlight Carry Techniques:
a. Ayoob Technique
(1) This technique incorporates the two-handed isosceles or weaver position. This is a quick-reaction
technique for users of side-button (on/off) operated flashlights.
(2) Thrust both the light and the pistol out to approximate an isosceles position.
(3) Both the light and the pistol are parallel to one another in a side-by-side manner with both thumbs
touching. This technique will only work if the light is held with the thumb forward.
(4) If the beam of the light appears to point too high in relation to the target, rotate the knuckle of the
weak hand thumb below the knuckle of the strong hand thumb. This will keep the beam of the light
within a more useable range.
b. Rogers Technique
(1) This technique incorporates the two-handed isosceles position. The technique is designed for
(Surefire) flashlights that have a pushbutton (on/off) switch located on the rear of the flashlight.
These flashlights are compact and pocket-sized.
(2) The flashlight is held between the index and middle fingers of the non-firing hand (much like a
Cigar) with the lens pointed toward the target.
(3) The pushbutton switch is held against the palm of the non-firing hand, and is activated by applying
palm pressure to the pushbutton (on/off) switch.
(4) Simply thrust both the light and the pistol out to approximate a weaver or isosceles position.
(5) Both the light and the pistol should be almost parallel to one another in a side-by-side manner.
c. Harries Technique
(1) This technique incorporates the two-handed isosceles. The technique is for flashlights that have a
pushbutton (on/off) switch located on the rear of the flashlight. This technique is a more natural and
comfortable manner for grasping the flashlight than the Rogers/Surefire method.
(2) The technique enables the support hand to hold and operate the flashlight while simultaneously
providing isometric stability to the shooting hand. The flashlight is not only an illumination tool,
but also a great first response (reactive response) impact weapon.
(3) Simply thrust pistol forward in a weaver stance.
(4) Grip flashlight in non-firing hand in a clubbing grip, with lens at the bottom of the fist.
(5) The Thumb of the weak hand is toward the chest; which is the natural way to hold a light with a
button on the tail cap.
(6) The light is crossed under the strong hand arm and the wrist of the non-firing hand is hooked
around the firing hand, placing the backs of the hands against each other in a back-to-back
configuration. Back of support hand is pressed firmly against the back of the shooting hand.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
(7) This position not only allows similar weapon control to that of the standard weaver stance, but it
also maintains a rough coaxial between the pistol and the light before and during firing.
8.3.7 Adversaries and Hostage Handling
Prior to conducting tactical movements, information on the adversary and/or any hostages present needs to be gathered.
1. For the adversary, the following should be determined:
a. Total number
b. Location
c. Weapons and explosive types and amount
d. Personal protection (Gas Masks, Body Armor, etc.)
e. General Description of each adversary.
2. For the Hostages
a. Total number and gender
b. Description
c. Location
d. How they are being detained.
Upon entry into a space, hostages and adversaries are ordered down and any resistance will be dealt with
accordingly. Both hostages and the adversary are dealt with in the same manner of being secured and searched.
Hostages may become hysterical and possibly hostile, and immediate control of the situation is essential for the
safety of both the hostage(s) and team members.
8.3.8 Team Casualty in Battle
In the hostile environment of Close Quarter Battle (CQB), casualties will invariably occur. Should a casualty
occur, finish the fight and then take care of the downed teammate. Apply combat medical training as required.
1. For Non-Compliant/Hostile Situation
a. Suppress and eliminate enemy fire to allow for preparation and evacuation of man down.
b. Provide 360-degree security for casualty
c. Evaluate casualty and prepare to transport if necessary.
2. For Compliant/Non-hostile Situation
a. Evaluate casualty and prepare to transport if necessary
b. Provide security for casualty.
3. Team Leader will make decision to abort or continue mission IAW Go/No-Go criteria.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
8.4 TACTICAL MOVEMENT PROCEDURES
8.4.1 Close Quarter Battle Tactical Movements
Upon completion of all planning and rehearsals, actual team mission must be executed. In order to successfully
execute, tactical movement rehearsal and training will have to be successfully conducted. Combative techniques
should be used. These include advanced marksmanship, selected target engagement, dynamic movement
techniques, and specialized techniques and equipment.
Tactics are to be used and planned to the reaction forces advantage. Since there are many ways to move to and
through spaces, team members must be able to think quickly and adjust tactics if and as necessary.
Tactical team movement will have a variety of doors, passageways, and spaces to negotiate. With inherently
contrasting differences, the shipboard diversity of doors, passageways, and spaces will be more problematic for
movement and space entry. These areas are known as the fatal funnel since they contain confining areas which offer
little or no cover or concealment and which can limit the team members tactical options if they have to go to combat.
8.4.2 Movement Techniques
1. Movement techniques are influenced by several factors including building layouts and, afloat, differences
in classes of ships and their configurations (cover and concealment, lighting, and routes etc.). The purpose
of tactical movement is to place the team in a better position in relation to the adversary. This may mean
protection from the adversary or movement to neutralize the threat. Ensure that a move will actually
improve the ability to carry out your task and not make you and your buddy or team casualties. Following
are considerations for movement:
a. Team formation will be dictated by the structural characteristics, which will often determine the best
movement formation. The team leader must adjust to differences and implement changes by directing
necessary formation changes.
b. Inherent to shipboard movement, which deals with confined passageways, ladders, and weather decks,
particular care must be taken to avoid being surprised. A column taken under fire from forward or aft
while moving in a confined area has no room for dispersal and cannot bring its full firepower to bear on
the adversary.
c. When moving outside, care must be taken to check levels above and below on the pier, ship or building.
2. To reach the target area (designated confined space/room), movement from outside into the interior
requires certain considerations and movement techniques.
a. Cover Cover provides protection from small arms fire. Aboard ships, boats, and piers, cover is
available in many forms. The team members job is to recognize and use it. Any solid object that will
not explode or badly splinter in between a team member and a bullet is worthwhile. High probability of
ricochets will occur on harder and more rigid material such as concrete, metal decks, bulkheads, and
overhead.
b. Concealment Concealment allows team members to remain unseen by the threat. Frequently, an
object will provide both cover and concealment. When seeking concealment, choose a position that will
allow sighting the threat without being detected. Concealment can provide an advantage over the threat,
but cannot defeat the threat. Additionally, concealment should not prevent observing and, if
appropriate, engaging the threat.
c. Observation Accomplished through the use of the five senses: sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
(1) Sight The most important sense for detecting, identifying, and engaging adversaries. Tips for
making the most of this sense:
(a) To identify an object in low light conditions, look at it out of the corner of the eye about 6 to 10
degrees above and below object. Shift the eyes slightly from time to time or the object will
blend into the background.
(b) When moving from dark to lighted spaces and vice versa allow time for eyes to adjust.
(c) Make use of lighting tools (TACLIGHT with strap, chemical light, krill light etc.) to help detect
threats in reduced visibility.
(d) When using lighting tools, do not make yourself or teammate a target.
(2) Hearing Since the line of sight in many areas are limited, you may be able to hear adversaries
before you see them. Be patient when listening and try to separate unusual sounds from typical
sounds. Use ambient sounds to cover your own movement.
(3) Touch Allows team members to find their way and to operate weapons and equipment in low light to
dark areas. Accordingly, weapons and equipment familiarization need to be instinctive not reactive.
(4) Smell and Taste The sense of smell can alert to fire or help in determining whether a liquid is
water or petroleum. Along with the sense of smell, in a heavy humidified room, some petroleum,
chemicals, and other materials can be tasted as well.
8.4.3 Fields of Fire
A field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons can cover effectively with fire from a given position.
360 degrees overlapping fields of fire on the level the team is working, as well as above and below, is desired. A
good field of fire should permit engaging adversaries at the best range possible. It should also have a minimum of
dead spaces and/or areas into which weapons cannot be fired due to intervening obstacles or the nature of the
ships structure. The most important concept of a good field of fire is that the team member is muzzle aware and
never sweeps teammates.
8.4.4 Considerations For Tactical Movement
The purpose of tactical movement is to move in a coordinated manner and provide cover and readiness for any
eventuality. The following are considerations for tactical movement.
1. Identify and engage the first immediate threat (open door before closed door).
2. Use other activity around to reduce detection (ship noise, etc.).
3. When space is available move and set-up in a staggered formation.
4. Look before moving. Plan the route; look for cover and concealment while moving to and from the
objective.
5. Move by short bounds from one covered or concealed location to another.
6. Ensure all in your team or pair are aware of your movement.
7. Do not silhouette yourself by moving with bright light behind you. Silhouette the adversary when possible.
8. Avoid making unnecessary noise. Ensure each team member does not have loose material that may make noise.

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9. Stay within 12 to 18 inches of the wall during entry. Two steps in and two steps either left or right.
10. Minimize your time in the Fatal funnel. Never stand or stop in the Fatal funnel. Maximum two steps
forward and minimum two steps to the right or left.
11. Divide areas of observation and areas of fields of fire to ensure 360 degree of coverage of the observable
area including above and below.
12. Personnel movement should be heel to toe with knees bent to maintain balance. Provides a good Power Base.
13. One team member moves while another observes and covers.
14. Team member two and/or breach (if applicable) may open the door.
15. Number one person and trainee will always enter from doorknob side on an outward opening door if closed.
16. Number one person and trainee will always line up opposite the doorknob on an inward opening door
when closed.
17. Number one person will have weapon to bear on the opening.
18. Clear corners to the center of the room with slight overlap, one foot off teammates barrel.
19. Use easily understandable communications between team members.
20. Follow designated chain of command in the event casualties are encountered. Who is second, third, fourth,
etc. in charge?
21. Designate rally points in the event team members get separated. Units SOP, ATFP Plan, and Mission
planning will dictate these points (i.e., primary and secondary lockers).
22. Never assume the adversary is dead or alive and do not be lured into a false sense of security. Plan, Train,
and Adhere to worst-case situational events at all times. DO NOT TAKE SHORT CUTS.
23. When entering a space always remember to move in the opposite direction of the person in front of you
upon entry. If first person starts incorrectly . . . STAY INCORRECT, go with the flow of your teammate
and clear the fatal funnel. Never choreograph team movements.
24. Team should avoid entering any unnecessary spaces or gathering personnel unless a specific threat is
encountered.
8.4.5 Team Formation
Team formation will be dictated by the structural characteristics, which will often determine the best movement
formation. The Sweep team leader must adjust to differences and implement changes by directing necessary
formation changes. Inherent to shipboard movement, which deals with confined passageways, ladders, and
weather decks, particular care must be taken to avoid being surprised. A column taken under fire from forward or
aft while moving in a confined area has no room for dispersal and cannot bring its full firepower to bear on the
adversary. When moving outside, care must be taken to check levels above and below the teams location.
8.4.6 Tactical Movement Techniques and Commands
To successfully transit a building or vessel, its imperative that all team members following the Point (also called
the Train) fully understand all commands and the required movements associated during the course of tactical

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
and clearing entries. Commands should be loud, short and concise. Anybody can take charge of the room or hall;
however, if nobody takes charge, the number three man will. The team member in charge will determine status of
area, including:
1. Areas that are not clear (danger areas)
2. Status of tangos, hostages, unknowns, and other team members (HUTS reports):
a. H = Hostages
b. U = Unknown
c. T = Tango (Adversary)
d. S = Shipmates (your boarding team members)
3. Next threat or movement
4. If additional assistance is required.
8.4.6.1 Tactical Movement Commands
The following are standardized tactical movement commands.
1. Bump one Movement command (usually given by team member two) for the Point to move forward
passed the entry point to a space as the first room element lines up on the entry point. Once the point is set
in the new or bumped position, the room entry is then made. See Figures 8-1 and 8-2.

Bump One!

CLOSED

OPEN

Closed

Closed

Cleared
Room

Figure 8-1.

Bump One (Step 1 of 2)

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CLOSED

Closed

Closed

Figure 8-2. Bump One (Step 2 of 2)

2. Bump Two Movement command for the point to move forward as the next room element lines up on
the entry point preparing to enter. Element leader gives command. Room entry made. Point moves to next
immediate threat.
3. Coming out or Coming in Coming out is a command given to let existing team members in the
passageway identify the room-clearing element that is preparing to exit the cleared space and rejoin the
train. Coming in command is from a team member that has been requested to enter a room as a trailer
element. The term coming in identifies the trail element and alleviates team blue on blue incidents. Both
must be acknowledged with a response. Coming in/out is answered with Come out/in or Hold.
4. Okay Right/Left Clear or Clear Last Room Okay Left/Right is called when the left or right side
of the room or space has been cleared. This is verbalized by the team members on their side of the room or
space. Clear is called by the team member in charge of the space once the entire room has been swept
and secured. Clear Last Room is called if there are no follow-on spaces.
5. Search Once all team members in the space have given command of Clear, one team member takes
responsibility for calling out the command Search and commences to search the space while the rest of
the teammates cover his movement.
6. Trailer Call out Trailer (SHOUT!) when a team member requires assistance. This could be an
adversary, another room, room larger than expected, or anything else the team member in the room cannot
handle. Assistance will come from team members lined up in the passageway. If the command is given
before the Clear is given; the next two team members will enter as a number three and four man as if
performing a four-man room entry. If the room has already been called Clear, the team members
requested will come in at the low ready. When calling for Trailer, if there is no response from the hall,
team member one maintains cover on the space. Team member two calls exit command Coming out and
steps into the passageway to obtain status of trailer pair. See Figure 8-3.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Adversary
2

P/1
4

Figure 8-3. Trailer

7. Move Command given by one team member to another to move.
8. Moving Call made by a team member to inform other team members that he will be moving to an
unclear area, tango, middle of room, down the wall, etc.
9. Last Man/Set Used to maintain rear security. Lets the other team members know that the rear security
is in place and covering the rear threat area. Also used to let the rear security team member know that the
next person in the train has the rear security so it is safe for him to move (during a withdrawal, for
example.)
10. Snap Right/Left Utilized when dealing with the L, T, and Four-way passageways. Point will
indicated that he has a passageway on the left or right. The team leader (TL) of the train will give the
command to Bump and then will command Snap Right/Left. This will allow coverage down the
passageway while the Point moves forward to cover the next immediate threat area. Snap Right/Left is
covered more in the Passageway Movement section.
8.4.7 External and Open Space Movement
Once the team arrives at the location of the incident, it may be required to rapidly transit across an open area or
the exterior of the ship to penetrate inside. This type of maneuvering needs to allow the team to move effectively
in large open spaces, while maximizing cover for movement. The team needs to establish a base of fire covering
element and a maneuvering element, which also forces the adversary to deal with multiple targets.
Several important factors need to be considered when moving across an open area vessel.
1. Fields of Fire 360 degrees overlapping fields of fire on the level the team is working on as well as
above and below is desired. A field of fire is the area that a weapon or group of weapons can cover
effectively with fire from a given position. A good field of fire should permit the team member to engage
adversaries at the best range possible and should have a minimum of dead spaces and/or areas into which
the weapons cannot fire because of intervening obstacles or the nature of the buildings or ships structure.

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The most important concept of a good field of fire is that the team member is muzzle aware and never
sweeps other members of the team.
2. Fighting Positions Team members will be able to choose positions from which to defend against an
adversary or from which to neutralize them. The choice of such fighting positions depends on the
characteristics of the building, pier, or ship. All good fighting positions have certain characteristics in
common.
a. Cover must be considered at all times throughout movement, but must be maximized when halted.
Whatever cover is selected, observation and a clear field of fire must be available in order to provide
adequate security. Covering team members must be aware that they are exposed from every direction
and that selection of proper cover is relative to the direction of movement and/or the direction a
perceived threat can approach from.
b. Concealment if cover is not available, some form of concealment should be occupied. While on the
move concealment should be maximized in order to restrict hostile observation. Use the natural
shadows and attempt to stay out of the open. TACLIGHTs need to be used sparingly during external
movement because its signature will compromise the teams location.
Team members must remember that movement itself provides a level of security by not being in one place too
long either to be engaged or observed. These characteristics must be balanced against mission tasking. It serves no
purpose to occupy a good fighting position that is not located where it will permit the team to accomplish their
task. Additionally, the team must be prepared to move from one fighting position to another quickly and
efficiently.
8.4.7.1 Leap Frog Movement Technique
The leap frog maneuver is a bounding technique utilized when practical. Its use will be dictated by the speed of
the team and the threat level. This primarily applies to rear security and how they can move behind the team in
order to maintain proper security and also keep up with the rest of the team. The last two members of the team
may occupy multiple static security positions throughout movement in order to provide security to the team as
well as cover one another (Figure 8-4).
1. One team member will occupy a covered and/or concealed position, while the other member moves
forward to establish another security position
2. Once a team member sets security, he must communicate this fact and inform the other team member that
he can safely move to the next security position. The team must maintain visual contact with rest of the
team throughout this procedure as to not get separated.
3. In shipboard application, watertight exterior doors require the number two person to take hold of the lever,
open and control the door, while the number one person enters the space. Number two follows
immediately after. Lever or wheel opening mechanisms found on many exterior watertight doors usually
lead to passageways. Individual dogs found on exterior watertight doors usually lead to small spaces.
Unfastening dogs takes time and means a slow, noisy entry.
8.4.7.2 Pier/Large Open Space Movement
1. In a pier/large space tactical maneuver, expedite withdrawal and maximizing cover utilize the Fire/Cover
and Maneuver scheme.
a. Establish a base of fire cover element/position ONES BASE
b. Establish a maneuvering element TWOS MOVE.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Movement 1
Movement 3
Movement 2

Movement 4

Basic LEAPFROG Movement

Figure 8-4. Leapfrog Movement

2. Element movements will consist of the preparatory command to MOVE followed by MOVING. The
individuals of the first maneuvering element with stand up, turn outwards away from the base of fire/cover
element and move in a diagonally movement away from the base element creating dead space.
Maneuvering element never turns inward towards the base of fire/cover element. It is essential to establish
the dead space to allow effective and clear fields of fire/cover to be established. (See Figures 8-5 and 8-6.)
3. Communication between the two elements will consist of establishing the base and maneuver.
a. Initiation of the base is called out Ones Base Two Move.
b. In response Two Move with the movement command Twos Moving.
c. The second element moves back to a point while first element is covering.
d. The second element will drop and communicate Twos Set Ones Move.
e. In response Ones Move with the movement command Ones Moving.
4. Command and control of this type of maneuver scheme will be dictated by the senior person in charge of
each element. The element leader will work in conjunction with the other elements to effectively and
efficiently conduct the maneuver. Rehearsal and sustainment training are key to its success.

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Open Space
Fire/Cover and
Maneuver

Threat Area

Movement
Element

1s Move / Moving

1s

2s Base 1s
Move

2s
Base of Fire

Figure 8-5. Pier/Large Open Space Movement (Sheet 1 of 5)

Open Space
Fire/Cover and
Maneuver
1s MOVE /
MOVING

Threat Area

Movement
Element

2s BASE 1s
MOVE

Base of Fire

Figure 8-5. Pier/Large Open Space Movement (Sheet 2 of 5)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Open Space Fire

/Cover and
Maneuver

Threat Area

1s SET 2s MOVE

Base of Fire

2s MOVE / MOVING

Movement
Element

Figure 8-5. Pier/Large Open Space Movement (Sheet 3 of 5)

Open Space Fire

/Cover and
Maneuver

Threat Area

1s SET 2s MOVE

Base of Fire

2s MOVE / MOVING

Movement
Element

Figure 8-5. Pier/Large Open Space Movement (Sheet 4 of 5)

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Open Space Fire

/Cover and
Maneuver

Threat Area

1s MOVE / MOVING

Movement
Element

2s SET 1s MOVE

Base of Fire

Figure 8-5. Pier/Large Open Space Movement (Sheet 5 of 5)

8.4.8 Passageway Movement
Passageway movement and clearing operations take precision coordination and movement techniques requiring
extensive command and control. Passageways are usually long, narrow, restrictive, and may focus potential
adversaries attention directly towards the teams movement. Like doorways, portholes, stairways and ladders;
passageways may present unique and inherently dangerous challenges. Additional challenges may include
backlighting, dead ends, or rooms located adjacent to or at the end of the hallway.
8.4.8.1 Types of Passageways
There are basically types of passageways:
1. L Shaped (Figure 8-6)
2. T Shaped (Figure 8-7)
3. Four-way (Figure 8-8).

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Figure 8-6. L Shaped Passageway

Figure 8-7. T Shaped Passageway

Figure 8-8. Four-Way Shaped Passageway

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
8.4.8.2 Transiting L Shaped Passageways
When moving around a series of L shaped passageways, there are two options available to the team.
The first is the Snap Left/Right using High/Low coverage. The second is a variation of the Cross Cover allowing
both multiple teams to cover the hallway from opposite sides.
1. Snap Left/Right in an L Shaped Passageway:
a. The Point will tell the train that he has a hallway to the left or right. He can also step out and use body
language or hand signals to tell the train he has a threat to the right or left (Figure 8-9 (sheet 1)).
b. Point goes to one knee and buttonhooks around the corner. Team member two is physically against the
Points back with elbows above the head of team member one, pinning him in a kneeling position.
Service rifle of the team member two will be above the Points head as he also buttonhooks around the
corner (Figure 8-9 (sheet 2)).
c. The high team member (team member two) will give the low team member (Point) permission (verbal or
signal) to stand and continue movement. Train resumes movement around corner (Figure 8-9 (sheet 3)).

P/1

Figure 8-9. Transiting L Shaped Passageways (Sheet 1 of 3)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

P/1
2

Figure 8-9. Transiting L Shaped Passageways (Sheet 2 of 3)

P/1
2
3

Figure 8-9. Transiting L Shaped Passageways (Sheet 3 of 3)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
2. The procedures for cross cover in an L shaped passageway are:
a. When Point (team member 1) identifies a passageway, he calls out Hallway (Figure 8-10 (sheet 1)).
b. Point will HOLD on his threat area until team member two takes control. Team member 2 will give
direction to the Point (Figure 8-10 (sheet 2)).
c. Team member two squeezes the shoulder of the number one man as a signal to move. The use of the leg
bump to give the ready signal does not serve well in this situation because a push or bump from behind
the line can be mistaken for the signal. The thigh or shoulder squeeze is a positive sign and normally is
not mistaken.
d. At the same time that the signal is passed, both men move simultaneously.
e. Point remains close to his wall and buttonhooks around the corner and only penetrates slightly making
sure the train can at least see the back of his armor (Figure 8-10 (sheet 3)).
f. Team member two will move behind Point and take up position on the opposite side of the hallway. He
will make sure to be on line as best as possible and not cut down Points field of fire.
g. When they have cleared their sectors, Hallway clear is called.
h. The rest of the train will stand by to support in case assistance is needed.
i. The team then continues to move along the corridor.

CLOSED

OPEN

Point

TM2

HALLWAY!

Figure 8-10. Cross Over in L Shaped Passageways (Sheet 1 of 3)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

CLOSED

Point
OPEN

TM 2

Figure 8-10. Cross Over in L Shaped Passageways (Sheet 2 of 3)

Snap left / right T passageway

2
3

P/1

Figure 8-10. Cross Over in L Shaped Passageways (Sheet 3 of 3)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
8.4.8.3 Transiting T Shaped Passageways
When moving around a series of T shaped passageways and intersections, there are two options available to the
team; these depend on the direction the team is approaching the junction.
1. The first is the Snap Left/Right. This will cover a new passageway opening from the main passage the
team is transiting.
a. Point will indicate that he has a passageway on the left or right.
b. Team member two will give the command to BUMP and then Snap Right/Left. This will allow
coverage down the passageway (Figure 8-11 (sheet 1)).
c. Team member two will clear and hold the opening, verbally indicating Hallway Clear. (Figure 8-11 (sheet
2)).
d. The train transits past the opening with the last team member communicating to the cover team member
Last Man.
e. Team member two then becomes the last person in the train (Figure 8-11 (sheet 3)).
2. The second is a variation using the Cross Cover with Snap Left and Right. This allows coverage of two
directions at once when a passage dead-ends at an intersection.
a. Point will indicate that he has a passageway on the left and right.
b. The lead team member of the train will give the command to Bump. Point moves to the outboard side
of the passageway and team member two moves up to the inboard corner, both maintaining cross
coverage (Figure 8-11 (sheet 4)).

Snap left / right T passageway

2
3

P/1

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 1 of 7)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Snap left / right T passageway

P/1
3

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 2 of 7)

Snap left / right T passageway

P/1

2(4)

3(2)

4(3)

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 3 of 7)

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Snap left and right T passageway

4
3

P/1

Direction of Movement

P/ 1 Visual Angle

TM 2 Visual Angle

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 4 of 7)

Snap left and right T passageway

4
3

P/1

Direction of Movement

P/ 1 Visual Angle

TM 2 Visual Angle

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 5 of 7)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
c. Team member two will indicate the direction of travel prior to clearing the intersection. Verbally
communicating, Hold left; moving right.
d. The two team members will hold cross cover, until team member three squeezes team member two to
communicate the train is ready and Snap Right and Left (Figure 8-11 (sheet 5)).
e. The Point and team member two will communicate with a muzzle dip or nod then simultaneously
Snap in their respective directions (Figure 8-11 (sheet 6)).
f. Once the hallway has been called Clear, the train will stack in the direction of travel. Last man will
be verbalized and the team member covering the opposite direction of travel will assume the last
position in the stack (Figure 8-11 (sheets 6 and 7)).

S n a p le ft a n d rig h t T p a s s a g e w a y
4 (3 )

3 (2 )
2 (P )

P (4 )

D ire c tio n o f M o v e m en t

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 6 of 7)

S n a p le ft a n d rig h t T p a s s a g e w a y

D ir e c tio n o f M o v e m e n t

P /1
2

Figure 8-11. Transiting T Shaped Passageways (Sheet 7 of 7)

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8.4.8.4 Transiting Four Way Shaped Passageways
Four way intersections or passageways are a different tactical challenge.
1. A critical element to emphasis is the need to clear the blind areas down the connecting passageways. (See
Figure 8-12 (sheets 1 and 2)). As the team comes to and crosses the intersection, these blind areas will
need to be quickly cleared to allow a safe transition.
2. The technique for this is very similar to the Cross Cover with Snap Right and Left used in T shaped
passageways.
a. Team member two will step across the passageway opposite Point to cross cover the opposing
passageway. Team member three will step into the center of the passageway to cover the direction of
team transit (Figure 8-12 (sheet 3)).
b. When team member two is set, he will communicate with Point (with a rifle dip or nod) and both team
members will Snap in their respective directions at the same time (Figure 8-12 (sheet 4)).
c. Team members in each direction will clear and cover down their passageway. When the team members
call Clear, the train continues across the intersection (Figure 8-12 (sheet 5)).
d. The team leader could also call Hold right; move left or any combination, determined by the direction
to the objective.
e. The last team member in the train will communicate Last Man as he passes through the intersection.
The two team members covering the intersection will then rejoin the train.
f. Ensure Rear Security is maintained through the movement.
g. A modification of this maneuver is to have the train split up to support each side passage after Point and
team member two snap left and right (Figure 8-13).

F IE L D
O F V IE W

Figure 8-12. Transiting Four Way Shaped Passageways (Sheet 1 of 5)

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FIELD
OF VIEW

UNKNOWN DEAD SPACE

UNKNOWN DEAD SPACE

Figure 8-12. Transiting Four Way Shaped Passageways (Sheet 2 of 5)

P/1

TM2

TM33

Figure 8-12. Transiting Four Way Shaped Passageways (Sheet 3 of 5)

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Figure 8-12. Transiting Four Way Shaped Passageways (Sheet 4 of 5)

Figure 8-12. Transiting Four Way Shaped Passageways (Sheet 5 of 5)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Figure 8-13. Blow Through (Sheet 1 of 5)

Figure 8-13. Blow Through (Sheet 2 of 5)

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Figure 8-13. Blow Through (Sheet 3 of 5)

Hold Right, Move Left

Figure 8-13. Blow Through (Sheet 4 of 5)

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Figure 8-13. Blow Through (Sheet 5 of 5)

8.4.9 Blow Through
Note
In the diagrams, a dashed line represents a CLOSED door.
A Blow Through is a continuous movement en route to a specific location. It is used when the team needs to
move rapidly as a complete squad from one point to the next. While maintaining 360 degree coverage, the team
will move from one point to the objective without stopping to clear rooms, unless the space or unknown area must
be negotiated to arrive at their objective. The team should avoid entering any unnecessary spaces or gathering
personnel unless a specific threat is encountered.
1. The team members should move as one squad, element or team providing 360-degree security throughout
the rapid movement. The speed of the team provides a level of security. Team members should also ensure
they observe high and low during movement.
2. The following procedures should be used for a Blow Through maneuver:
a. The team leader will initiate the movement with the call Blow Through
b. Open doors are pinned and closed doors are passed off to the man behind. The Point should not enter
rooms but will do a brief pause to allow the team member behind him to cover BUT NOT ENTER the
door or room. This allows the train to expedite movement to their objective. If Point is forced to pin an
open door, then the next team member needs to take up the Point position and responsibilities.
c. Team members will pass on the security of closed spaces onto the next team member in the train until
the threat has been bypassed. It is the personal responsibility of each team member to pick up the

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security of a passed on space and to pass it onto the next team member. If you are part of the train and
are covering an open door, do not drop security until after another team member covers for you.
d. A team member will hold on to an open space until the train has bypassed that space. In a narrow
space, a team member may have to partially enter that space so the train can move by freely. The team
member should not penetrate the room so far as to where the other team members lose visual sight of
him.
e. As the last team member passes an open space, he must communicate that he is the Last Man. Once the
last man has passed, the team member can collapse security and fall back into the train as rear security.
f. The two-team members in the rear of the train should work together as a permanent rotating rear
security. These team members will move as a two-man team using the call Last Man. This will be
answered with Set once the other team member is in position to provide cover. This is called out to
allow a clear field of fire.
g. Figures 8-13 thru 8-32 shows an example of a Blow Through down a passageway, passing off doors
and openings while maintaining a rotating rear security.
8.4.10 Ladders
Ladders are used for movement between decks and can be difficult to negotiate, resulting in a very vulnerable
situation during team movement. Some ladders are vertical; while others are inclined similar to standard steps
found in buildings.
1. When approaching ladders in the interior of a vessel, the team members lower body is exposed to
potential gunshot wounds. Approach a ladder in a crouched position and pause approximately 1820 feet
before the ladderway or at a position where the team member can see up the ladder from a crouching
position. Once this observation is completed, Point should cover up or down the ladder.
2. To move up a ladder, team member two should bump Point to initiate Points movement up the ladder.
Team member two will then take responsibility for covering the ladder, ensuring not to sweep over Point
with his rifle (muzzle awareness). Generally one person will be on the ladder at a time. If the ladder is
wide enough to allow two-team members to climb shoulder to shoulder then use two-team members to
climb the ladder with each team member covering in opposite directions (one up and one down).
3. Team member three should provide cover down the passageway to the front of the base of the ladder.
4. Team member four should provide cover in the opposite direction of the number one person (i.e., down the
ladder if Point is moving up a ladder that goes through a hatch between the deck that the team is presently
standing on).
5. Team member five is providing rear security.
6. Team leader is directing the movement.
7. Team members must ensure 360-degree coverage at the top of the ladder after ascending. They are
responsible for maintaining a security bubble at the top of the ladder as the rest of the team follows.
8. When time permits, Point should utilize 360-degree quick peeks with the retractable baton and mirror
attachment. Once the level is cleared for movement, establish control of this level by prompt movement of
the team. Never commit until a cleared area is established.
9. Upward and descending movements on a ladder are mirror images of one another.

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8.4.11 Stairways
Negotiating stairways are very similar to ladders.
1. When approaching stairways, team member two will move beside Point. This will be referred to as the
inside and the outside team member positions (Figure 8-14 (sheet 1)).
2. The front two team members will cross cover the stairwell and move together up the stairs. Train will
follow and maintain rear security.
3. The inside team member (Point) will stop when he has a full view of the next landing. This will allow the
outside team member (team member two) and the train to move up the stairwell around him (Figure 8-14
(sheet 2)).

ROOM or UNKNOWN
SPACE
P

3
2

Stairwell

Figure 8-14. Stairways (Sheet 1 of 4)

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ROOM or UNKNOWN SPACE

4
P

3
2

Stairwell

Figure 8-14. Stairways (Sheet 2 of 4)

4. On the next set of risers, the outside team member (team member two) turns into the inside man. Last man,
will communicate with the inside team member, and continue up the stairwell. Inside team member (Point)
then assumes rear security (Figure 8-14 (sheet 3)).
5. At the top of the stairwell, if faced with a doorway, follow the procedures for room clearing. If the top of
the stairway goes into a hall, resume hallway movement. This is where the two forward team members
revert back to Point and team member two (Figure 8-14 (sheet 4)).
8.4.12 Room Entry Techniques
There are many factors to consider when conducting a room entry including whether the door is open or closed,
whether there are other doors in the proximity, whether the door is locked or not, and the possible configuration of
the room behind the door.
1. When approaching the door, the team should line up on the same side as the door and determine which
way the door opens, in or out, and if the door is locked. The initial positioning (or stacking) on any door
remains the same:
a. Team member one will assume a position on the door; eyes and weapon are attuned to that door and
down the passageway in front of him.

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ROOM or UNKNOWN SPACE

P
4
2

Stairwell

Figure 8-14. Stairways (Sheet 3 of 4)

ROOM or UNKNOWN SPACE

Cross Cover

3
4
P

Stairwell

Figure 8-14.

Stairways (Sheet 4 of 4)

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b. Team member two will line up behind the number one person orientating his/her weapon in a covering
position but not sweeping the number one person. MUZZLE AWARENESS.
c. If there are more than two team members making the entry, team member three will take the same
actions as the team member two.
d. Team member four person will take the same actions as team member three, with exception his/her
weapon will be directed towards the rear for REAR SECURITY.
e. As the line-up is occurring on the door, all individuals must constantly be watching all around them.
360-degree coverage (HEAD ON A SWIVEL) is critical in order to maintain tactical awareness.
2. When the team is in position and ready to conduct the door entry, the last person in the stack will initiate
the movement into the space by squeezing the back of the thigh of the person in front of them. These
squeezes will travel up the stack to team member one who is positioned on the door entranceway.
3. Everyone needs to be paying attention at this point because team member one has the go ahead to enter the
space and everyone must follow. Once the team member one receives the thigh squeeze (indicating that
everyone is ready to go), he or she will enter the room.
4. It is essential that all team members pass through the threshold of the door as quickly as possible. The
doorway is the focal point of attention for anyone inside the room. This is known as the fatal funnel.
Failure to clear the doorway quickly may result in team casualties. Slowing down will endanger the team
as a whole by blocking them in the doorway. It violates the principle of speed and the fundamental of
domination of the room.
5. These line-ups can be modified for any number of personnel. Terrain and situation will dictate. Techniques
to remember are to line up behind the individual in front of you going into a room and stagger the line up
moving through a passageway. Always maintain overlapping fields of fire/observation; never sweep the
person in front of you with your weapon.
6. As the team moves forward securing its position through the passageway, and when it is time to make a
room entry, no one will turn his or her back on the unsecured area (moving forward and making first room
entry to the right, what is ahead is unknown). A permanent point position needs to be established. This
person constantly maintains security, studies the direction of the flow and stays in the center of the
passageway for reference.
7. The first person is always correct in their movement when entering a space. The second person reacts to
the movement of the first person and moves accordingly. During entry into a space, if the first person
meets resistance at/on the door, the first person maintains control of the door, covering areas of
responsibility as previously discussed. The second person will key off the first persons
movement/direction and move in the opposite direction of the first person, covering areas of responsibility
as previously discussed.
8.4.12.1 Cross Pattern Entry
The cross pattern (see Figure 8-15) is the choice for forceful entry.
1. With the door closed, team member take up position on the same side of the door.
2. On signal, team member one opens the door and enters the compartment, assuming a position on the
opposite side of the doorway.
3. Once clear of the doorway, team member two enters to the opposite side of team member one.

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Cross Entry

Immediate Threat area

Inward

Figure 8-15. Cross Entry

4. When the doorway is too narrow to enter simultaneously, the cross is effective because, unlike the
buttonhook, it is possible to see the initial adversary/destination before moving there.
8.4.12.2 Buttonhook Entry
1. After visual inspection from outside the door, team members line up on opposite sides of the doorway.
2. Upon the signal, both quickly enter the compartment, hook away from the door and keep their backs to the
bulkhead (always maintain about twelve to eighteen inches from any bulkhead) while entering.
3. If the doorway is too narrow to enter together, decide by signal who will go first, and then quickly enter
one after the other. (See Figure 8-16.)
8.4.12.3 Open Door Technique
If the door is open, approach cautiously, staying back from doorjamb utilizing slicing the pie technique to
survey the space. Line up off the doorjamb. The team will line up with the team member one on the door and the
remaining teammates lining up behind. On the signal (nod and thigh squeeze technique by the team), team
member two will initiate team member one to enter the space. The initial pair will enter using the Cross Entry.
8.4.12.4 Closed Door Technique
Entry into a room or space through a closed door depends largely on the location of the door and the direction in
which it opens. The first thing a team must determine is which way the door opens (In or Out), test the doorknob
to determine if it is locked or unlocked.

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Buttonhook Entry

Immediate Threat area

Inward

Figure 8-16. Buttonhook Entry

8.4.12.4.1 Inward Opening Door
When entering using an inward opening door, always use the door as a shield during the initial 70 degree of arc if
it is available. To enter, the second team member in the stack is in charge of movement once lined up on the door.
This may become any team member at any time.
There are three options to enter an inward opening door. Options 1 and 2 start from the same setup and are shown
in Figure 8-17 (sheet 1). The procedures only differ slightly. Option 3 is shown in Figure 8-17 (sheet 2) and can
only be used if there is a Point covering them. The team members are required to face each other and are not
covering the space around them.
1. Option 1. Second team member reaches around the first team member and opens door. They enter using a
Cross Entry.
2. Option 2. First team member opens the door while maintaining security on door. They enter using a Cross
Entry.
3. Option 3. The second team member can bump the first team member across and do a split door entry. The
team member on the doorknob side opens the door and enters after the other team member. They will enter
using a Buttonhook Entry.

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2 Man Entry closed door

inward opening
Option 1 and 2

Door knob

Figure 8-17. Inward Opening Door 2-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 2)

2 Man Entry closed door

Inward Opening.
Option 3

Door knob

Figure 8-17. Inward Opening Door 2-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 2)

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8.4.12.4.2 Inward Opening Door 4-Man Entry
A 4-man entry is very similar to Option 3 of a 2-man entry.
1. The second team member bumps the first team member across the closed door while he holds security on
the door (Figure 8-18 (sheets 1 and 2)).

4 -M a n S ta c k , C lo s e d D o o r
In w a rd O p e n in g .
S et u p on closed d oor

D o or kno b

Figure 8-18. Inward Opening Door 4-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 4)

4 or m ore M an Stack, Closed

Door Inw ard Opening.
Set up on closed door

Door knob

Figure 8-18. Inward Opening Door 2-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 4)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1
2. The first team member checks to determine if the door is locked, then gives the second team member a head nod.
3. The second team member opens the door and makes entry AFTER the first team member crosses the
doorway (Figure 8-18 (sheet 3)).
4. Third and fourth team members enter last (Figure 8-18 (sheet 4)).

4 o r m o re M a n S ta c k , C lo s e d
D o o r In w a rd O p e n in g .
S et up o n clo sed do or

D o or k n o b

Figure 8-18. Inward Opening Door 2-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 4)

4 o r m o re M a n S ta c k, C lo s e d
D o o r In w ard O p e n in g .
S et u p o n clo sed do o r

D oo r kn o b

Figure 8-18. Inward Opening Door 2-Man Entry (Sheet 4 of 4)

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8.4.12.5 Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry

Procedures for entering an outward opening door are the same as for an inward opening door when a two-person
team is making the entry.
When a 4-man entry is being performed on an outward opening door, the procedure differs slightly.
1. The second team member will bump the last man in the stack to open and control the door (Figure 8-19
(sheet 2)).
2. The team member that opened the door will enter last as shown in (Figure 8-19 (sheets 4 and 5)).

4-Man Stack, Closed Door

Outward Opening.
Option 2

Door knob

Figure 8-19. Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 5)

4-Man Stack, Closed Door

Outward Opening.
Option 2

Door knob

Figure 8-19. Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 5)

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

4-Man Stack, Closed Door

Outward Opening.
Set up on closed door

Door knob

Figure 8-19. Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 5)

4-Man Stack, Closed Door

Outward Opening.
Set up on closed door

Figure 8-19. Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry (Sheet 4 of 5)

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4 -M a n S ta c k , C lo s e d D o o r
O u tw a r d O p e n in g .
S e t u p o n c lo se d d o o r

Figure 8-19. Outward Opening Door 4-Man Entry (Sheet 5 of 5)

8.4.13 Breacher Movements

If a door is checked and is unable to be opened by the team, a breacher will need to be called up to open the door
before an entry can be made.
1. Several signals can by used to communicate that the breacher is needed at the door.
a. Verbal: Breacher up (could also include holding up a piece of equipment that the breacher is not
currently carrying)
b. Non-verbal: Team member two will signal with a closed fist raised to the side of the head in a
sweeping motion, up and down.
2. The breacher is normally kept near the rear of the stack (4th or 5th member in a six-man squad). When the
breacher is needed, signal to the rear of the stack. Point should remain vigilant while covering the front
(Figure 8-20 (sheet 1)).
3. The remaining team members will maintain 360-degree security while the breacher performs his required
actions. External breaching normally requires more security due to the time it may take to utilize a torch
(or other equipment) (Figure 8-20 (sheet 2)).
4. At accomplishment of the breach, the breacher will call Open then will move out of the way of both the
door and the Stack (Figure 8-20 (sheet 3)).
5. Breaching team member will then resume his position within the stack (Figure 8-20 (sheet 4)).
8.4.14 Room Clearing Techniques

After the room entry has been conducted, there are certain important steps that must be quickly accomplished.
Speed is of the essence if the team members are to overcome a potential adversary that may be waiting in the
room or space theyve just entered.
1. After entry, the next action the team takes is to eliminate any immediate threat. Team members should
always expect to encounter immediate threat targets, but should not look for them. An immediate threat is:

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Figure 8-20. Breacher Movements (Sheet 1 of 4)

BREACHER UP!

Figure 8-20. Breacher Movements (Sheet 2 of 4)

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Open!

Figure 8-20. Breacher Movements (Sheet 3 of 4)

Figure 8-20. Breacher Movements (Sheet 4 of 4)

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a. Any hostile target that blocks the movement of a team member to his point of domination.
b. Any hostile target that is so close that a team member cannot ignore it.
Although these are vague criteria, the decision of what is too close is, in the final analysis, the decision of the
individual team member. The engagement of a perceived immediate threat must not slow down the team
members movement. If the team member has to slow down to engage the target, the target is too far away to pose
an immediate threat.
2. The next action to be taken is to clear the corners. It is essential that the boarding team clears the corners
and occupies them as points of domination.
a. The number one man and the number two man are initially responsible for the corners until the other
team members enter (if more than a 2-man room-clearing operation).
b. The room clearing technique will be from the outside shoulder, sweeping inward to the center of the room.
c. The second person will follow on the heels of first person entering the space.
d. The direction of flow will be opposite the first person, and the room clearing technique will be from the
outside shoulder sweeping inward to the center of the room (Figure 8-21).
3. Dominate the Room. Team members will next move to their points of domination. This movement is
smooth and deliberate. Domination of the room is critical.
4. Collapsing Fields of Fire. While moving to their individual points of domination, the team members will
collapse their sectors of fire while moving to their points of domination, and will keep their weapons and
their attention oriented on their areas of responsibilities (Figure 8-22).
a. During movement, a field of fire is the area in which a team member is expected to locate and neutralize
adversarial targets. Using overlapping fields of fire, team members can efficiently eliminate adversarial
targets in a given area with minimal risk of a target not being selected.
b. Always have overlapping fields of fire/observation. Never sweep the person in front of you with your
weapon. When collapsing the field of fire, maintain the muzzle of the weapon one foot in front of the
deepest persons muzzle in the room.
5. Points of domination. Points of domination in a room are dictated by the location of the entry point in relation to
the room itself. In the vast majority of rooms, doors can be grouped as either center doors or corner/offset doors.
6. Obstacles in the Room.
a. If there is furniture, machinery, or hard mounted electronic equipment along the walls near the
doorway, team members must quickly clear and negotiate around or over obstacles and move away
from the entrance.
b. Team members must avoid being forced into the middle of the room or against the wall. However, at no time
will personnel stay against the bulkhead. Remain twelve to eighteen inches away from bulkheads to avoid
ricochets. Generally two steps through opening and two steps left or right depending on your entry technique.
c. If machinery or other objects obstruct view of the entire room slowly move further into the room and
keep the back towards bulkhead, until the situation seems safe.

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Corner Clearing

TM 1 enters, engaging
immediate threat area, first
wall and first & second
corner . Outside shoulder
sweeping inward to the
center of the room. TM 2
same motion, opposite wall.

Figure 8-21. Corner Clearing

OVERLAPPING FIELDS OF FIRE TM 1 engages next

imm ediate threat area, back wall to the center of the room. TM 2
engages same threat area creating overlapping fields of fire.
Remaining one foot of fellow TMs weapon barrel.

Figure 8-22. Overlapping Field of Fire

d. Another technique is for one team member moving to clear the blind area, while the cover team
member moves slightly in the same direction ensuring they do not sweep the clearing team member.
e. In the event that there are unaccounted personnel in the space, keep them in the center of the room and
the team members along the walls. Maintain triangulation with your teammate. This maintains clear

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fields of fire in the event the situation turns hostile. The only space that is clear of a threat is the space
the team member is standing in.
f. If an area is left with no security it must be recleared.
7. A vast majority of room layouts contain center and corner doors as discussed below. However, if a room is
encountered that does not fall into these categories, it can still be effectively cleared by following the same
principles and fundamentals of room clearing and the specific actions upon entry that are described.
8.4.14.1 Center Fed Entranceway

A room or space with a center fed entrance is a standard room entry.

1. Approach the door with both team members on the same side of door.
2. Determine which way the door opens, to determine which type of entry will be used.
3. Test doorknob to determine if it is locked or unlocked.
4. Conduct room entry.
5. Okay Left/Right is called when the Left/Right side of the room or space has been cleared. This is usually
verbalized by the team member(s) on their side of the room or space.
6. Once both sides of the room are clear, the call Room clear is made. Figure 8-23 (sheets 1 thru 4)
illustrate a 2-man entry into a center fed room.

Center Fed Room Entry

Initial Entry

P/1

Figure 8-23. Center Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 4)

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Center Fed Room Entry

Corner Clearing

P/1

Figure 8-23. Center Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 4)

Center Fed Room Entry

Collapsing Fields of Fire

P/1

Figure 8-23. Center Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 4)

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Center Fed Room Entry

Overlapping Fields of Fire

P/1

Figure 8-23. Center Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 4 of 4)

8.4.14.1.1 Center Fed Entranceway (4-Person Entry)

Larger spaces may require a 4-man room entry. The procedure is very similar to a 2-man entry with the entry
team stacked outside the door. The exact order of entry will depend on the type of door entry being used, but it
will most often be as follows:
1. The last person who comes upon the stack will initiate the movement into the space by squeezing the back
of thigh (or the shoulder) of person in front to travel up the stack to the number one person who is stacked
on the door-entrance way. Everyone needs to be paying attention at this point because the number one
person has the go ahead to enter the space and everyone must follow. Once the number one person
receives the squeeze (indicates that everyone is ready to go) he will enter the room (Figure 8-24 (sheet 1)).
2. Team member one enters the room according to the path of least resistance. He will engage any immediate
threat if encountered, and clears the corner to his front (the near corner).
3. Team member two enters the room immediately behind team member one and moves in the opposite
direction. He also engages any immediate threat he may encounter. His responsibility is to clear the corner
to his front and collapse his sector of fire back towards team member one while moving to his point of
domination (usually the near corner of the room (Figure 8-24 (sheet 2)).

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Four-Person Entry

P/1

Figure 8-24. Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 6)

Four-Person Entry

P/1

Figure 8-24. Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 6)

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4. Team member three enters the room and moves in the opposite direction from team member 2. He will
enter the room while presenting his weapon approximately 10 percent left of room center as he moves to
the right. He simultaneously starts to collapse his field of fire in the direction of travel to 1 foot off of team
member ones muzzle. He then starts his secondary sweep back towards the center of the room to 1 foot
off of the team member fours muzzle (who is entering immediately behind him) (Figure 8-24 (sheet 3)).
5. Team member four enters the room and moves in the opposite direction from team member three while
presenting his weapon approximately 10 percent right of room center as he moves to the left. He moves to
the same side of the room as the team member two and collapses a sector of fire that begins slightly offcenter opposite the direction he intends to move. Simultaneously he starts to collapse his field of fire in the
direction of travel to 1 foot off of team member threes muzzle. The sector of fire for team members 3 and
4 should overlap thus no area of the room is neglected in the initial clearing. (Figure 8-24 (sheet 4))
6. The collapsing of sectors of fire, and the overlapping of areas of responsibility ensure a quick and thorough
operation. When the threat has been eliminated and control has been established, the team is ready for its
next action. The situation and the mission will dictate this action (Figure 8-24 (sheets 5 and 6)).

Four-Person Entry

P/1

2
3

Figure 8-24. Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 6)

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Four-Person Entry

P/1

3
4

Figure 8-24. Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 4 of 6)

Four-Person Entry

P/1

Figure 8-24. Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 5 of 6)

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Four-Person Entry

P/1

Figure 8-24. Center Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 6 of 6)

8.4.14.2 Corner Fed Entranceway

Many rooms have doors that are in a corner or at an offset, especially on a ship. Corner doors occupy less floor
space in a room than center or offset doors. When clearing a room with a corner door, each team member has his
individual responsibility just as in clearing a room with a center door. The main difference is, clearing a space
with a corner entranceway must been done lengthwise.
1. The room entry element stacks up on the door and checks if a breacher is required (Figure 8-25 (sheet 1)).
2. Team member 1 enters the room according to the path of least resistance and engages any immediate threat. He
clears the corner to his front, collapses his sector of fire while moving to his point of domination. In a corner fed
room, his point of domination is the corner in front of him (Figure 8-25 (sheet 2)).
3. Team member 2 enters immediately behind team member 1. His point of domination is the corner
opposing the one occupied by team member 1. He also engages any immediate threat he may encounter.
His responsibility is to clear the corner to his front and collapse his sector of fire back towards team
member 1 while moving to his point of domination (Figure 8-25 (sheet 3)).
4. Team member 1 collapses his final sector of fire to within 1 meter of team member two. He keys off of the
corner opposite the entry point as he collapses his sector of fire.

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Corner Fed Door

2
1

Figure 8-25. Corner Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 3)

Corner Fed Door

1
2

Figure 8-25. Corner Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 3)

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Corner Fed Door

1
2

Figure 8-25. Corner Fed Entranceway 2-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 3)

8.4.14.2.1 Corner Fed Entranceway (4-Man Entry)

Larger spaces may require a 4-man room entry and starts with the same procedure as using a 2-man element.
1. The last person who comes upon the stack will initiate the movement into the space by squeezing the back
of thigh (or the shoulder) of person in front to travel up the stack to the number one person who is stacked
on the door-entrance way. Everyone needs to be paying attention at this point because the number one
person has the go ahead to enter the space and everyone must follow. Team member 1 will enter the room
once he receives the squeeze (indicates that everyone is ready to go) (Figure 8-26 (sheet 1)).
2. Team member 1 enters the room according to the path of least resistance. He engages any immediate
threats encountered, and clears the corner to his front (Figure 8-26 (sheet 2)).
3. Team member 2 enters the room immediately behind team member 1 and moves in the opposite direction.
He also engages any immediate threat he may encounter. His responsibility is to clear the corner to his
front and collapse his sector of fire back towards the number one man while moving to his point of
domination (usually the near corner of the room) (Figure 8-26 (sheet 3)).
4. Team member 3 enters the room and moves in the opposite direction from team member 2 (following team
member 1). Team member 3 will enter the room while presenting his weapon approximately 10 percent
left of room center as he moves to the right. He simultaneously starts to collapse his field of fire in the
direction of travel to 1 foot off of the number 1 mans muzzle (Figure 8-26 (sheet 4)).

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3
2

4
HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 7)

1
P

4
HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 7)

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5. Team member 4 enters the room and moves in the opposite direction from team member 3 while
presenting his weapon approximately 10 percent right of room center as he moves to the left. He moves to
the same side of the room as team member 2 and collapses a sector of fire that begins slightly off-center
opposite the direction he intends to move. Simultaneously, he starts to collapse his field of fire in the
direction of travel to 1 foot off of team member threes muzzle (Figure 8-26 (sheet 5)).
6. All sectors of fire should overlap in the center of the space; thus no area of the room is neglected in the
initial clearing (Figure 8-26 (sheet 6 and 7)).
8.4.15 Movement Within a Room

Once a room entry has been made, immediate threats dealt with, the room entry element will often need to move
to get an unobstructed view of the space in order to declare it Clear. It is essential that the team members in the
room-clearing element communicate with each other while performing these maneuvers.

2
3
P

4
HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 7)

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1
3

HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry ( Sheet 4 of 7)

3
2
4
P

HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 5 of 7)

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1
3

HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 6 of 7)

3
2

HB/TL

Figure 8-26. Corner Fed Entranceway 4-Man Entry (Sheet 7 of 7)

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8.4.15.1 Two-Man Room Movement

1. Team member 2 needs to come off of his wall so he can clear an area in his field of fire. He will request
verbally Moving.
2. Team member 1 acknowledges verbally with Move.
3. Team member 2 starting cutting the pie as he moves to see around the obstruction (Figure 8-27 (sheet 1)).
4. Simultaneously team member 1 goes to alert to support team member 2. Team member 1 may need to
move in the direction of team member 2 and stacks on him in order to continue to provide support and
cover (Figure 8-27 (sheet 2)).
5. The only person clearing the blind area is team member 2. Team member ones responsibility is to cover
him and maintain situational awareness over the remainder of the space.

Two-Person Movement

Figure 8-27. Two-Man Room Movement (Sheet 1 of 2)

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Two-Person Movement

Figure 8-27. Two-Man Room Movement (Sheet 2 of 2)

8.4.15.2 Four-Man Room Movement

If a 4-man room-clearing element needs to move to clear around an obstruction in a room, it is similar to the
procedure followed for a 2-man element.
1. A single pair of team members will clear the area, while the other pair covers the remainder of the space.
Once again, communication is key to this maneuver. A pair must call Moving and wait for the
acknowledgement from the other pair (Figure 8-28 (sheet 1)).
2. Team member 2 is the only person clearing the blind area. Team member 4 will transit behind team
member 2 to provide cover and support (Figure 8-28 (sheet 2)).
3. For the opposite side of the room, team member 1 will move first and team member 3 will transit behind
and take up a support position (Figure 8-28 (sheet 3)).
4. Figure 8-27 (sheet 1) shows an example of why it is critical for only one pair of team members to be
moving at any one time. Additional movement will cause confusion and increase the chances of a blue on
blue injury.

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Four-Person Movement

Figure 8-28. Four-Man Room Movement (Sheet 1 of 3)

Four-Person Movement
2
4

Figure 8-28. Four-Man Room Movement (Sheet 2 of 3)

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Four-Person Movement
1

Figure 8-28. Four-Man Room Movement (Sheet 3 of 3)

8.4.16 Limited Penetration

When entering a known small space, the team member may enter using his primary or secondary weapon to clear the
room. After entering an unknown small space, the initial entering team member should verbalize Tight or Small
Space to prevent the remaining team members stacked behind him from attempting to make a room entry.
8.4.17 Follow-on Rooms

After the room has been cleared, any doors are the next threat.
1. The team member with the best angle on the door will say, Stack on me and becomes team member 1
for the next room entry.
2. The remaining team members will stack on the new team member 1 and on the door.
3. This configuration becomes a standard 4-man room entry.
4. Communicate with the thigh/shoulder squeeze to signal that the stack is ready and team member 1 will
enter the follow-on room, with the stack moving in behind him.
5. If the door to the follow-on room is open, do not cross in front of it. Team member 1 will determine which
side to stack on and the remaining team members will stack on him.
6. Figure 8-29 (sheets 1 thru 3) shows possible configurations for a stack about to enter a follow-on room.
Room obstacles, unknown personnel, and busy activity of the room will dictate team movement.

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Four-Person Entry

HB

Figure 8-29. Follow-on Rooms 4-Man Entry (Sheet 1 of 3)

P
HB

Four-Person Entry Follow on Room

Figure 8-29. Follow-on Rooms 4-Man Entry (Sheet 2 of 3)

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P
HB

Four-Person Entry Follow on Room

Figure 8-29. Follow-on Rooms 4-Man Entry (Sheet 3 of 3)

8.4.18 Deconfliction

When moving to follow-on rooms when multiple teams are involved in the same incident or operating in
adjoining rooms, deconfliction needs to occur in order to prevent blue-on-blue incidents. The most common
instance that this will occur is when encountering a situation when a door connects adjoining spaces (parallel
door situation). Deconfliction can be verbal (discussed below) or non-verbal (Blue Chemlites under the door or
challenge and reply with TACLIGHTs).
8.4.18.1 Verbal Deconfliction (Adjoining Parallel Doors)

Prior to verbally indicating Clear to the team, after a room entry, one team member will call Parallel Door.
1. One team member will maintain security on the follow-on door, while one other team member
communicates the situation to the train, and will remain in the room (Figure 8-30 (sheet 1)).
2. The team will proceed forward to the next door and will execute a two-man entry procedure (Figure 8-30
(sheet 2)).
3. Team member will come back to the door of the follow-on room and communicate with the previous 2team members that he will deconflict what appears to be a connecting door. The furthest forward team
member, in the direction of team travel, should deconflict back to the other team members (Figure 8-30
(sheet 3)).
4. The teams will communicate at this point through the closed or open door. If a proper response is not
received, the team will perform a two-man room entry procedure (Figure 8-30 (sheet 4)).
5. If a proper response is received, and room 1 has not been cleared yet, the team will finish clearing room 2. After
room 2 is clear, the team in room 2 will communicate with the team in room 1 they will take the door. The
team in room 2 will stack on the door and perform a two-man room entry to assist the team in room 1.

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Parallel Doors
Parallel refers to the direction of the trains movement

1
2

Figure 8-30. Adjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 1 of 4)

Parallel Doors
Parallel refers to the direction of the trains movement

4
1

Figure 8-30. Adjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 2 of 4)

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Parallel Doors
Parallel refers to the direction of the trains movement

4
2

Figure 8-30. Adjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 3 of 4)

Parallel Doors
Parallel refers to the direction of the trains movement

ROOM 2

ROOM 1

Figure 8-30. Adjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 4 of 4)

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8.4.18.2 Verbal Deconfliction (Non-Adjoining Parallel Doors)

1. Figure 8-31 (sheet 1) provides an example of non-adjoining parallel doors.

a. After room 2 is clear, the team in room 2 communicates with the team in room 1 to take the door.
b. The team in room 1 stacks on the door and performs a two-man room entry.
2. Another example of non-adjoining parallel doors is in Figure 8-31 (sheet 2).
a. Team member 1 will cover the door while team member 2 will coordinate with the train still moving in
the passage.
b. All team members should realize the potential Blue on Blue situation and be ready for deconfliction
using the challenge and reply or the blue Chemlites. ALL team members MUST read the room the
same to minimize a Blue on Blue situation (Figure 8-31 (sheet 3)).
8.4.19 Tactical Withdrawal

When the overwhelming resistance situation arises and the tactical team needs to tactically withdraw, they need to
have a plan and technique to ensure success.
8.4.19.1 Withdrawal Communication

1. When the situation starts, the team leader will call out a retreat code word and initiate the movement with a
call out to the designated BTM Name followed by Move.

Parallel Doors

ROOM 2

ROOM 1

3
4

Figure 8-31. Nonadjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 1 of 3)

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Figure 8-31. Nonadjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 2 of 3)

Figure 8-31. Nonadjoining Parallel Doors (Sheet 3 of 3)

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2. The team member that has been designated to move will respond with Name followed by Moving.
This will indicate to the team that the designated moving individual understands the command and that he
or she is moving.
3. When the designated individual reaches his or her next cover position and setups to cover the remaining
team members the designated moving team member will then respond Name and Set. This will
communicate to the team that the next person can move and cover is being provided.
4. Example: Team leader (TL) initiates BOB MOVE
Team Member BOB replies and moves BOB MOVING
Team Member BOB moves and takes up the next cover position BOB SET
TL initiates movement of next team member.
8.4.19.2 Withdrawal Movement Techniques

The most important factor in executing a tactical withdrawal is to keep a composed demeanor and maintain
command and control. Once the situation has been identified, the permanent point needs to communicate the
situation to the Team Leader/Hall Boss, who will then initiate the movement. Once the movement is initiated it
needs to happen rapidly.
1. TL initiates Name Move. This designated team member is generally the Point (Figure 8-32 (sheet 1)).
2. Designated team member replies Name Moving. He shall turn inboard towards wall with weapon
pointed at the deck and shall move down the center of the passageway. Muzzle awareness needs to be
adhered to and be situational aware of other team members locations (Figure 8-32 (sheet 1)).
3. Designated team member shall move through the team to the next cover position at the end (Figure 8-32 (sheet 2)).

T/L initiates BOB M ove

TM BO B replies and m oves BOB MO VING

BOB
MOVIN G
T L/HB

1
P

Figure 8-32. Withdrawal Movement Techniques (Sheet 1 of 4)

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TM BOB moves behind number 4 who now becomes the

point man. Everyone else takes up positions to cover
down on all threats setting a corridor.

BOB SET

TL/HB

PP

Figure 8-32. Withdrawal Movement Techniques (Sheet 2 of 4)

4. Once this security coverage is set, TL commands the next team member to Move (Figure 8-32 (sheet 3)).
5. Once the designated team member initiates his/her movement, the next team member behind them shall
take up the point security coverage forward toward the overwhelming resistance (Figure 8-32 (sheet 4)).

TM 2 or TL gives the command Mary Move. TM MARY

replies Mary MOVING. TM 2 will pick up Marys field of fire.
Mary will LOOK FIRST, THEN MOVE past TM 2 2 sayingLAST
MAN as she moves past, tapping him on his shoulder.

Mary Moving

3
1

P
TL/HB

Figure 8-32. Withdrawal Movement Techniques (Sheet 3 of 4)

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TM 3 then sets for TM 2 by picking up his field of fire and either

giving the command SET or MOVE. TM 2 LOOKS FIRST, THEN
MOVES to put himself in position to bring back the TM 3.

TL/HB

Figure 8-32. Withdrawal Movement Techniques (Sheet 4 of 4)

8.5 HOSTAGE SITUATION MANAGEMENT

When a Hostage Situation occurs some basic guidelines and courses of actions need to be implemented
immediately.
8.5.1 Hostage Site Management

1. Locate the hostage situation site and isolate the situation to the smallest possible area. Upon arrival at the
site, perimeters will be established.
a. The inner perimeter will consist of the area closet to the hostage and surrounding sites. Only the tactical
team and the negotiator/communicator are allowed in this inner area. Evacuate nonessential personnel
from the area (scene) and hold as potential witnesses. The tactical team itself should stay out of sight of
hostage takers so as not to aggravate the situation.
b. Outer perimeter is the buffer zone (s) and control point for entry/exit to the inner perimeter.
c. Command and Control area is designated as the staging area where assembly, briefing, and assignment
can take place away from the danger area.
2. Establish a log (written, audio, digital) to record all information. Highly recommend to video the scene and
surrounding areas as well as record in writing EVERYTHING.
3. Do not escalate the situation by displaying threatening force to the hostage takers. Keep the area nonthreatening and low key.
4. Keep calm and attempt to establish communications with the hostage takers.
5. The following are Initial Communication Skills:

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a. Do not preface a demand with the words I demand, I want, I need, get me, or any violent
threats need not preface a demand. You must listen to what is being said.
b. Assure the hostage takers that everything will be done that can be done at your level, but that you do
not have authority to meet their immediate demands.
c. Show concern for all, especially the hostage takers. Do not over value the hostages since this gives the
hostage taker power.
d. Once communications have been established, do not hang up or break off dialogue or leave or turn your
back on the hostage takers. Keep talking.
e. Do not make promises of any sort.
f. Do not use violent words. Utilize helpful words and phrases:
(1). First I would like to get to know you better.
(2). Could you tell me what is the issue?
(3). I want to hear your side.
g. Never give anything without receiving something in return. Set an early pattern or relationship boundary.
h. The initial negotiator/communicator should exhibit no emotion, give orders, not be excited, and use a calm voice.
i. ONLY one person will be the communicator.
j. Once the official negotiator arrives, complete a turn over of all previous initial communications up to that point.
6. Apply the reasonable man theory. Common sense should prevail no alcohol, drugs, weapons, and/or
transportation provided.
7. The rule for hostage negotiations is DYNAMIC INACTIVITY. Give the impression of activity without
taking any action.
8. Make the hostage takers believe you genuinely understand their plight. Show empathy for them and show
understanding for whatever is their cause, but do nothing.
9. Patience. The team will need to be very patient and try to keep the hostage takers talking whilst awaiting
the arrival of specialist hostage teams/negotiators.
10. Time is on your side. You can wait them out and that is probably what is going to happen.
The negotiating process is a long and tiring evolution and will require you to be very patient.
8.5.2 Hostage Information

Once the negotiator and specialist hostage rescue team arrives on scene, they will need the following information
immediately:
1. Who the hostage takers are? Name(s), number, personal characteristics, motivations if any, weapons
present, and any demands made.

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2. Who are the Hostages? How many, race or ethnic group, aggressiveness, are they wounded or ill.
3. Where is the hostage site?
a. Safe observation points need to be established and maintained
b. Safe approach positions
c. Possible escape routes
d. Presence of food and water
e. Any type of blueprints or in the case of the ship placards or design plates for above and below. (A 360degree view of the entire site.)
8.5.3 Resolving Hostage Situations

There are four basic courses of action for resolving a Hostage Situation:
1. Contain and negotiate. This is the preferred course of action, because the other options cant be reversed
once begun and often result in dead or injured hostages.
a. Tactical team members are not negotiators. They will only try to start the initial
dialogue/communication. If they should get too clever, the end result will be hostage casualties.
2. Use of chemical agents such as CS-strong tear gas with vomiting agent, CN-nerve gas, and finally RCM
tear gas. You will be limited what you have available.
3. Controlled sniper fire.
4. Last resort is an immediate assault. The most complicated and potentially dangerous stage in a hostage situation.
a. Direct everyone down to the deck/floor in a loud authoritative voice.
b. Upon entry in the space everyone will be considered a threat until you have sorted them out.
c. All parties in the space will be handcuffed and searched.
d. Be cautious of the Flight for Freedom from the hostages especially if they have been abused.
e. Be cautious of retaliation towards the hostage takers from the hostages, especially if they have been abused.
8.5.4 Stockholm Syndrome

The Stockholm syndrome describes the behavior of kidnap victims/hostages who, over time, become sympathetic
to their captors. The name derives from a 1973 hostage incident in Stockholm, Sweden. At the end of six days of
captivity in a bank, several kidnap victims actually resisted rescue attempts, and afterwards refused to testify
against their captors. In fact, they were grateful to them for giving back their lives. The original victims visited
their abductors and one became engaged to the leader.
1. Behavior: Hostages develop positive feelings toward their captors unless they have been mistreated or
isolated and can, conversely, develop negative feelings toward authorities.

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2. Positive Aspects: The stronger the development of the syndrome, the less likely it is that the hostage taker
will kill the hostages.
3. Negative aspects:
a. Information from hostages may become unreliable.
b. Hostages may become an advocate of the hostage taker.
c. Hostages may act counter to the commands of the tactical team during an assault.
8.5.5 Surrender of Hostages and/or Hostage Taker

The surrender of hostages and/or hostage taker may be the most complicated and potentially hazardous stage in a
hostage situation.
1. Give exact instructions on how and where hostages are to be released.
2. Treat released hostages as hostage takers until you have handcuffed, searched and questioned them and
have sorted out who is who.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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APPENDIX A

Antiterrorism/Force Protection Plan

Template
A.1 INTRODUCTION

The AT/FP plan template is similar to the five-paragraph format, SMEAC, common to all U.S. military services.
Ships should develop this standing plan and tailor it to specific threats. The sample includes information each
section should contain.
Note

Commanders decide the format of their AT/FP plan. The sample provided does not
have to be exactly copied.
A.2 SAMPLE PLAN

The following information represents a sample AT/FP plan.

1. Situation
a. Name/location. Enter specific unit, ship, or installation, and exact location (latitude/longitude coordinates).
b. Maps or charts. Enter a reference to all maps and charts that apply to this plan. Maps and charts will
be used during the planning process.
c. Time zone. Enter the time zone. Indicate the number of hours to calculate (plus/minus) Zulu time.
d. References. Enter either a compilation of DOD, joint, and service publications or the selected reference
list that the unit, ship, or installation develops, to include memoranda of agreement and status-of-forces
agreements, pertinent to this AT/FP plan.
e. General. Describe the political/military environment in sufficient detail for subordinates to understand
their roles in AT/FP operations.
f. Enemy forces. Insert the general threat of terrorism including the intentions and capabilities,
identification, composition, disposition, location, and estimated strengths of hostile forces. Also include
any negative weather and other effects impacting watchstanders and/or equipment.
g. Friendly forces. Insert the AT/FP posture and forces available, including the next higher headquarters and
adjacent units, ships, or installations. Include information on any units not under the command required to
assist in AT/FP planning and execution. These units may include HN, Federal, state and local law
enforcement agencies, U.S. military police forces, fire support, special operations forces, engineers,
chemical, biological and radiological decontamination units, and explosive ordnance disposal assets.

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h. Attachments and Detachments. Develop a process for identifying and tracking individuals and units.
Insert this process and identify the person(s), staff, or unit responsible. Also enter attached or detached
units. Incorporate any reserve units, that are mustering and/or training at the installation, or with the
unit or ship. Do not repeat information already listed under task organization.
i. Assumptions. Insert all critical assumptions used as a basis for this plan. Assumptions are those factors
that are unlikely to change during the implementation of the plan. They may range from personnel
strength on a base to the major political/social environment in the surrounding area for a ship in port.
Examples follow:
(1) The unit, ship or installation is vulnerable to theft, pilferage, sabotage, and other threats.
(2) The owner and/or principal user of a resource, personnel, or facility should develop AT/FP
procedures for both normal and contingency operations.
(3) Terrorist activity should be considered for contingency purposes. Although absolute protection
against terrorist activities is not possible, the AT/FP plan provides overarching guidance and
procedures that balance mission requirements, available manpower and fiscal resources, and the
degree of protection required based on the current threat.
(4) Security personnel, both military and civilian, may be insufficient to provide total protection of all
unit resources; therefore, the principal owner or user of a facility, resource, or personnel must
develop adequate unit awareness and safeguard measures.
(5) Local, nonmilitary response forces will arrive within a predetermined number of minutes after
notification.
j. Intelligence. Insert the person, staff, or unit responsible for intelligence collection and dissemination.
The commander must have a system in place to access current intelligence. National level agencies,
geographic combatant commanders and intelligence systems provide theater or country threat levels and
TAs. These assessments serve as a baseline so the commander can develop a TA tailored to the
installation, ship, or unit. The tailored TA should be continuously evaluated, updated and disseminated,
as appropriate, and as directed by the commander. The commander should determine the frequency and
the means of dissemination of the tailored AT/FP product.
Note

A commander in foreign territory can not change the threat level. A commander in
U.S. territory can obtain current intelligence and develop ones own threat level, using
TA methodology. The unit, ship, or installation can and should tailor the local TA.
2. Mission
Enter a clear, concise statement of the commands mission and the AT/FP purpose or goal statement
supporting the mission. The primary purpose of the AT/FP plan is to safeguard personnel, property and
resources during normal operations. It is also designed to deter a terrorist threat, to enhance security
awareness, and to assign AT/FP responsibilities for all personnel. In meeting this goal, the AT/FP plan
should meet the following four objectives:
a. Deter terrorist incidents. Commanders will dissuade terrorists from targeting, planning against, or
attacking U.S. assets by communicating U.S. intent and resolve to defeat terrorism.
b. Employ countermeasures. Commanders will employ the appropriate mix of countermeasures, both
active and passive, to prevent terrorists from attacking Navy assets.

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c. Mitigate the effects of a terrorist incident. Commanders will employ the full range of active and
passive measures to lessen the impact of terrorist attacks against Navy assets.
d. Recover from a terrorist incident. Commanders will design plans to recover from the effects of a
terrorist incident.
3. Execution
a. Commanders intent. Enter how the commander envisions the development and implementation of the
AT/FP plan and the establishment of overall command priorities.
b. Concept of operations (CONOPS). Enter how the overall AT/FP operation should progress. CONOPS
stress deterrence of terrorist incidents through preventive measures. During day-to-day operations, the unit,
ship, or installation should stress continuous AT/FP planning and passive, defensive operations. This
paragraph should provide subordinates sufficient guidance to act upon if contact or communications with the
chain of command is lost or disrupted. The commanders AT/FP CONOPs should be phased in relation to
PPRs and post-incident responses.
c. Task organization. Enter all organizations present for AT/FP defense here or, if lengthy, in an annex.
Include the AT/FP requirements of HN, U.S., and other civilian organizations. The commander should
consider each component units ability to assist in the AT plan.
d. Tasks and responsibilities of key elements. Enter the specific tasks for each subordinate unit or
element listed in the task organization paragraph. Key members of the unit, ship, or installation have
responsibilities that are AT/FP-specific. The commander should ensure that a specific individual/unit/
element is responsible for each action identified in this plan. Each individual/unit/element must know
what the AT/FP tasks and responsibilities entail and how they will be implemented.
e. Jurisdiction. Enter the jurisdictional limits of the command. Although the Department of Justice, through
the FBI, has primary law enforcement responsibility for terrorist incidents in the U.S., the commander is
responsible for maintaining law and order within the installation, ship, or unit. For non-U.S. territory
incidents, the commander must notify the HN and the theater commander who will then notify the DOS. The
commander should explain HN agreements to address the use of security forces, other military forces, and
HN resources that clearly delineate jurisdictional limits. There may be exceptions due to the wide dispersal
of work and housing areas, utilities, and other support mechanisms that may require the Navy asset to be
responsible for certain areas outside of the unit, ship, or installation perimeter.
f. Coordinating Instructions. This paragraph should include AT/FP-specific coordinating instructions and
subparagraphs, as the commander deems appropriate. In addition, this section of the AT/FP plan outlines
aspects of the AT/FP posture that require particular attention to guarantee the most effective and efficient
implementation of the plan. For the purposes of this plan, there are three types of coordinating instructions:
procedural implementation, responsibilities, and special areas. These sections are listed below and are
representative and may not be all-inclusive.
(1) Procedural
(a) Alert notification procedures: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for establishing the
proper notification systems and procedures. Enter a description of the alert notification
procedures here. Include alert rosters for all units/organizations on the installation or ship.
Note

Establish procedures for notifying not only the appropriate staff elements, the crisis
management team and responding forces, but also units, service personnel, and other
occupants of an impending or actual situation.
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(b) ROE/RUF for the application of force: Enter the standing operating procedures for use of
deadly force and the standing ROE. (This may include information on minimum standards for
weapons qualification prior to issue of a weapon.)
Note

Establish the procedures for use of force and educate all personnel, particularly
security forces, watchstanders, and reaction forces.
(c) AT/FP exercises: Enter the appropriate means and frequency to exercise this AT/FP plan.
(d) Incident response: Enter the several plans that will be activated upon initiation of the incident.
Establish mechanisms to respond to a variety of terrorist incidents and integrate them into the
AT/FP plan. Describe the interaction with local authorities under memoranda of understanding
and status-of-forces agreements.
(e) Post-incident response: Enter information on how the unit will handle the consequences of a
terrorist incident. This section should include coordination with the Public Affairs Office,
medical, and mortuary affairs. Describe the interaction with local or HN authorities.
(f) Executive or distinguished visitor protection procedures: Enter the person or staff with overall
responsibility for protection procedures. This person or staff will identify the forces available
for executive or distinguished visitor protection. This plan should facilitate the coordination
with the visitors security office or protective/security detail.
(2) Implementation Responsibilities
Implementation responsibilities encompass two areas: security posture and threat-specific. Security
posture responsibilities include the following:
(a) Operations security (OPSEC): Enter the person, staff element, or unit responsible for OPSEC.
That person, staff, or unit should produce the criticality and vulnerability reports. The
commander will use these reports to enhance the AT/FP posture, design countermeasures and
PPRs, and post incident planning.
(b) Access controls: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for pedestrian, vehicular and
package/mail access onto the ship or installation. Describe the access control system.
Note

A unit, ship, or installation access control system may include several discrete systems.
(c) Barriers: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for planning barriers for the AT/FP plan.
(d) Lighting: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for the lighting plan.
(e) On-site security elements: Enter the person or staff with overall responsibility for security. List
the military and civilian security force that is specifically organized, trained, and equipped to
provide the physical security and law enforcement for the command.
(f) Technology: Enter the person, staff, or unit to identify emerging technologies that could
enhance the overall protection of the unit, ship, or installation.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

(g) Training: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for the preparation and execution of
individual security training. Establish an effective security education/training program for the
entire unit, ship, or installation (that includes required actions to different threat alarms and
specific training for civilian personnel, contractors, family members, and tenant/subordinate
units).
(3) Threat-specific responsibilities include the following:
(a) Weapons of mass destruction (WMD): Enter a special task-organized staff or unit to plan for a
WMD attack or to distribute protective equipment or conduct training.
(b) Information operations: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for information operations.
Note

The responsible planner should first develop a plan for the safeguarding of
information, then integrate that plan into the overall AT/FP plan.
(4) Special areas
(a) Airfield security: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for airfield security. Enter the
airfield security plan here (or include as an annex) as part of the overall AT/FP plan.
(b) Port security: Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for port security. Describe the port
security plan here (or include as an annex) as part of the overall AT/FP plan.
(c) Buildings: Enter a person, staff, or unit to review each building in accordance with the
criticality/vulnerability assessments.
Note

The responsible person, staff, or unit should develop a plan, series of checklists, or
other tools to bring the unit to a level of AT/FP consistent with the FPCON level.
4. Logistics and administration
Enter the logistical and administrative requirements to support the AT/FP plan that should include enough
information to make clear the basic concept for planned logistics support. Specific logistical and
administrative requirements that will emerge throughout the planning process outlined in the CONOPS
(specifically when developing PPRs) should be incorporated into this paragraph.
Note

Each unit, ship, or installation will require a review of its mission and threat to provide
information in sufficient detail. When applicable, it should refer to appropriate annexes.
a. Material and services. Enter supply, maintenance, transportation, construction, and allocation of labor
that apply to AT/FP efforts prior to a terrorist incident.
Note

Significant actions and support must take place in the post-incident response phase.

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b. Weapons and ammunition. Enter weapons and basic ammunition allowances required to support
AT/FP-augmented security forces.
Note

Planners should determine the location, authority for issue, and basic level of issue.
Planners should identify whether a predetermined allocation of ammunition exists,
where the allocation of ammunition is stored, who has access to the ammunition, and
whether the AT/FP package contains explosives.
c. Medical services. Enter plans, policies, and local/HN agreements for AT/FP treatment, hospitalization,
and evacuation of personnel, both military and civilian.
Note

Planners should include aerial medical evacuation support, the nearest trauma center,
ability to set up a crisis center, and WMD response capability.
d. Personnel. Enter procedures for mustering personnel and other procedures pertinent to AT/FP. Enter
instructions for submitting status reports.
e. Public affairs. Enter the person, staff, or unit responsible for coordinating and interfacing with the local
population to provide assistance for civilian needs in the event of casualties.
f. Updates to AT/FP plan. Enter the appropriate person, staff, or unit responsible for developing a
process for updating the plan and for the distribution of those updates.
5. Command and Control (C2)
Enter instructions for command and operation of communications/electronics equipment. Highlight any
deviation from the chain of command that may occur as a result of a terrorist incident. Command includes
subordinate and higher unit command posts, EOC locations, and designated alternate command posts.
a. Command. Enter command relationships to include command succession. The commander must ensure
that key AT/FP staff members understand differences inherent in the incident response command
structure, with special consideration given to the location of the unit, ship, or installation (U.S./foreign
territory). Whether these operations occur in the U.S. or in non-U.S. territory, the relationships should
be represented in the plan to reflect the agreements between supporting government agencies or HNs.
These relationships may be presented in a chart or as an annex to the plan. This is an excellent tool to
formulate alert notification procedures (to be placed in the front of the AT/FP plan) and paragraph 3c,
Task Organization. Also, the C2 and reporting responsibilities for foreign terrorist attacks on Navy
property or personnel belong to the geographic combatant commander within whose area of
responsibility the attack has occurred. For assets under the control of a functional combatant
commander, the functional combatant commander will coordinate with the affected geographic
combatant commander for an appropriate division of responsibilities. The commander should ensure
proper reporting procedures are in place with higher headquarters. Also note the location and
composition of the terrorist incident command center.
b. Communications. Communications for AT/FP contingency operations will be normal communications
augmented by portable radio, landlines, courier, and runners and will be in accordance with OPSEC and
communications security requirements. Enter requirements for additional equipment (e.g., computers,
handheld radios), its type and dissemination, pertinent communications nets, operating frequencies,
codes and code words, recognition and identification procedures, type of alarms, required responses,
and electronic emission constraints.

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6. Appendixes
Appendixes should provide detailed information, guidance, TTP, and PPRs that will support the overall
unit/installation AT/FP effort. The following provides a representative list of areas that can be addressed
in individual appendixes:
a. Tasks and responsibilities
b. Risk assessment and management
(1) Threat types
(2) Risk mitigation process.
c. FPCONs
(1) Threat levels
(2) Unit specific FPCONs
(3) Random AT measures.
d. Alert and threat notification
e. Incident reaction planning, PPRs, and SOPs
(1) Crisis response plan
(2) Surveillance detection and reporting
(3) Small boat threat
(4) Deep draft vessel threat
(5) Subsurface threat (swimmer/mine)
(6) Pedestrian-carried IED
(7) Vehicle/rail-borne IED
(8) Aircraft threat
(9) Standoff attack threat
(10) MANPADS.
f. WMD
(1) Points of contact/phone numbers for WMD (e.g., installation, local and regional emergency
response numbers)
(2) Glossary
(3) Agents and decontamination procedures

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(4) Checklists
(a) Fire department
(b) Security department
(c) Operations department
(d) Watch officer
(e) Recovery operations.
g. Installation/unit security
(1) Unit/on-site security elements
(a) Security watch organization
(b) Auxiliary security force policy.
(2) ECP procedures
(3) Access controls
(4) Barriers
(5) Security standards
(a) Navy security force standards
(b) Post manning and equipment requirements.
(6) Pier security
(a) Pier watchstander turnover procedures
(b) Underwater hull search procedures.
h. AT/FP C2 architecture
(1) Watch organization
(2) Communications plan.
i. Consequence management
j. Training/exercises
k. High risk personnel protection
l. OPSEC
m. Buildings/facilities planning.

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APPENDIX B

Inport Security Plan Template

B.1 INTRODUCTION

Ships and aviation squadrons typically develop ISPs/force protection plans (FPPs) whenever entering a
port/airfield not located within a U.S. Navy installation. These plans supplement the standing AT/FP plans by
providing event-specific CONOPS and procedures. The format is similar to the five-paragraph SMEAC format
common to all U.S. military services.
B.2 SAMPLE PLAN

The following information represents a sample ISP/FPP:

1. Situation
a. Port/site. Insert items such as port/site name, latitude/longitude, charts used, country, pier number,
berth, anchorage, fleet landing sites.
b. Time period for port/airfield visit. Insert dates of stay.
c. Date of most recent NCIS TA. Insert date-time group (DTG) of message, or date and type of
document if other than message, and any updates received, including by telephone.
d. Date of latest on-site assessment. Insert date or DTG of the most recent PIVA, ships own advance
party on-site assessment, or other type of assessment and originator per numbered fleet or task force
commanders guidance.
e. Threat.
(1) Threat level. Insert NCIS TA.
(2) FPCON. Insert as set by the prescribing authority for the area of responsibility, country, or port.
(3) Terrorist action history for site. Derive this data from multiple sources to include NCIS TA, DIA,
DOS, geographic combatant commander, and regional intelligence sources.
(4) COs FPCON. Can be higher but not lower than that prescribed by higher authority.
f. Friendly.
(1) Organic security personnel/equipment available, and plan to arm/employ. Insert location, manning,
weapons condition, and planned employment in this section only, e.g., ECP manned with contact
sentry armed with a Condition 1 9mm pistol, cover sentry armed with a Condition 3 M-16 rifle, and
a four-person reaction force on five-minute alert armed with Condition 3 M-16 rifles. This
information can be portrayed as either a narrative or in table format.

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(2) HN or local authority restrictions or sensitivities that may limit FP options. For example, HN may
not permit armed sentries on the pier or boats in the water. Include local and environmental
restrictions, e.g., manatee breeding grounds preclude high-speed small boat operations.
(3) HN or local authority security/services to be requested by ship/unit. Request actual services via
appropriately classified logistic request, e.g., Jersey or similar style barriers for vehicle control, oil
booms or other flotation systems for marking ships threat zone, contract security boats and/or
guards, police support, and additional lighting. Also consider:
(a) Husbanding agent and contact information.
(b) Location and method of contacting, in English, nearest HN or local authority EOD unit, police,
security, and medical.
(c) Authorization for own force/HN diving in connection with hull security inspection. Permission
must be obtained from local authority to conduct diving operations in most ports. If applicable,
indicate who is conducting diving operations.
Note

Foreign divers are restricted from diving in the vicinity of nuclear-powered warships.
(d) Radio frequency authorization for pier security. Indicate frequency, if applicable. Indicate if
encrypted.
(e) Authority to periodically transmit sonar, if required.
(f) Around-the-clock HN or local authority picket boats to be requested.
(g) Blocking materials needed. Indicate if Jersey barriers, container vans, or other barriers are
required.
(h) Armed police presence on the pier/fleet landing and/or HN liaison for the ship. If required,
indicate arrangements.
g. Advance party findings. If advance party did not conduct site survey, identify significant concerns
from existing assessments and after-action reports. Insert sufficient detail to indicate what security
concerns exist, if any. Indicate if not satisfactory. Items that the advance party should investigate
include:
(1) Lighting
(2) Cargo loading/unloading points
(3) Visitor control points
(4) Vehicle control points
(5) Observation positions from which hostile surveillance can occur
(6) Hazardous materials (explosive/flammable) in vicinity
(7) Commercial, cruise ship, and private vessel transiting and berthing

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

(8) Process for vetting service craft such as ferries, garbage and fuel barges, and tugs.
2. Mission
Insert a clear, concise statement of commands mission and the AT/FP purpose or goal statement
supporting the mission.
3. Execution
a. FPCON measures. List FPCON measures currently directed by the immediate superior in command
(ISIC). Insert how measures are to be implemented. Insert necessary deviations, reasons, and
compensatory actions taken, if any, e.g., HN does not permit the ship to deploy RHIB; therefore the
ship will use an oil boom and additional around-the-clock waterside crew-served weapon positions in
lieu of an RHIB.
b. Operational risk management (ORM). Insert ORM results, if used, for deviations from prescribed
measures and most likely enemy COAs.
c. Pertinent senior officer present afloat instructions. Insert when applicable to AT/FP, e.g., for shared
AT/FP arrangements during multi-ship port visits. Report changes and updates via compliance
message.
d. Additional FP implementation. Security or actions, if any, beyond those outlined above. Address any
additional FP security recommendations derived from on-site assessments or PIVAs, such as the
following:
(1) Security posts.
(2) Liaison officers. Examples include port control, HN, ISIC, United States Defense Attach Office
(USDAO).
(3) Communications. An example is rented cell phones that are compatible with HN infrastructure.
(4) Arms. An example is crew-served weapons.
(5) Special Orders. These can be location-specific and precipitated by HN or local authority rules.
(6) Special Events. Insert if any special events or ceremonies will be conducted in connection with the
port visit, such as change of command, general public visits, bus tours, or VIP visits.
e. Specific security measures that will be coordinated by HN or local authority. If CONUS,
coordinate with applicable region and/or installation AT officer. If OCONUS, coordinate in accordance
with applicable numbered fleet or task force commanders directives.
4. Contingency Considerations
a. C2. Examples include succession of command, CO/ISIC/USDAO contact information.
b. Recall. Examples include notification procedures, primary, and alternate muster locations.
c. Safe sites. Insert locations, which are identified through detailed coordination with region, HN, and
DOS. Specific locations must be included in this paragraph.
d. Emergency action. Examples include COs criteria for increasing FPCON, sortie, general recall.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

e. Local medical/fire/police contacts. Insert current information, some of which can be found in PIVA
and NCIS reports.
5. Commanders Remarks. Optional.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

APPENDIX C

Risk Assessments
C.1 INTRODUCTION

The following methods of assessing risk can be beneficial when performing step one of the AT/FP planning
process mission analysis. Using any or all of these methods will assist planners when they are tasked to define
what needs to be protected and to what level. In an environment where limited resources dictate that all assets and
areas cannot be fully protected against terrorist attacks, it is imperative that commanders prioritize the use of their
resources.
C.2 OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT

ORM is a decision-making process that enhances operational capability by identifying hazards, assessing risks,
and implementing controls to reduce the risk associated with any operation. With respect to AT/FP planning,
commanders can use ORM to guide decisions on where to improve AT capabilities. The basic tenets of ORM
follow:
1. Accept risk when the benefits outweigh the cost.
2. Accept no unnecessary risk.
3. Anticipate and manage risk by planning.
4. Make risk decisions at the right level.
ORM principles applied to AT planning help commanders ascertain the probability of a terrorist incident or
attack, weighed against the severity of impact on critical and vulnerable assets (see Figure C-1). Further, ORM
principles help commanders decide what assets to protect and at what level to protect them. A more in-depth
discussion of ORM principles can be found in OPNAVINST 3500.39 (series), Operational Risk Management, and
at http://www.safetycenter.navy.mil/ORM, the Naval Safety Center Website.
C.3 CRITICALITY AND VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS

Criticality and vulnerability (C/V) assessments help planners determine which assets are critical to a units
mission and which are most vulnerable to attack. The results of these assessments also help commanders decide
which assets to protect and to what level.
The criticality of an asset or area is determined by assessing three components:
1. Importance to the mission
2. Effect (if crippled or lost)
3. Recoverability (how quickly the asset or area can be restored to operation if hit).

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Probability

S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y

II

III

IV

Probability
A - Likely to occur immediately
or within a short period of time.
B - Probably will occur in time.
C - May occur in time.
D - Unlikely to occur.

Severity
I - May cause death, loss of
facility/asset.
II - May cause severe injury,
illness, property damage.
III - May cause minor injury,
illness, property damage.
IV - Minimal threat.

Risk Assessment Code

1 = Critical
2 = Serious
3 = Moderate
4 = Minor
5 = Negligible

Figure C-1. Operational Risk Management Risk Matrix

The vulnerability of an asset or area is determined by assessing three components:
1. Construction (e.g., type, quality)
2. Accessibility
3. Recognizability (e.g., aircraft carrier at pierside as opposed to a small building that contains research
material).
For each asset and area, assign a number (see Figure C-2) for each component of C/V, based on how critical it is
to the command and how vulnerable it is to each of the attack means (see examples listed in Figure C-3). The sum
of all component values produces a total C/V number. The higher the number, the more critical and vulnerable the
asset is.
C.4 PLANNING AND RESPONSE ELEMENT ASSESSMENTS

Planning and response elements contribute to the installations ability to deter and employ countermeasures both
preincident and postincident. This planning tool uses 16 elements. The 16 major AT planning and response
elements that must be considered when developing an effective plan are:
1. Intelligence
2. Information and planning

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

Value

Numeric Rating

Major
Significant
Moderate
Minor
Negligible

910
78
56
34
12

Figure C-2. Criticality/Vulnerability Value Numbering

Asset Name ___________________

Criticality
Attack Means*

Importance

Effect

Vulnerability

Recoverability

Construction

Accessibility

Recognizability

Total
C/V

Improvised
Explosive Device
Rocket-Propelled
Grenade
Chemical
Nuclear
Biological

* The attack means will vary depending on the threat analysis and operating environment.
Figure C-3. Criticality/Vulnerability of Assets and Areas
3. Installation AT plan and programs
4. Installation perimeter access
5. Security system technology
6. Executive/personnel protection
7. Mail handling system
8. Communication
9. Incident response and recovery
10. Firefighting
11. Hazardous material
12. Health and medical services
13. Security
14. Resource support
15. Mass care
16. Public works.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

AT planning and response elements are assessed by how effectively they perform activities that minimize terrorist
threats. Effectiveness can be divided into four facets:
1. Manpower
2. Policy/procedures/plans
3. Equipment
4. Training.
Using the value numbering system in Figure C-2, assign a number to each planning and response element against
the threat in the matrix shown in Figure C-4. The higher the number, the more critical and vulnerable the element is.
C.5 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

The Joint Staff Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program (CVAMP) directly addresses the
requirement in DOD directives to manage identified vulnerabilities by providing a simple, web-based tool to
track, prioritize, and report vulnerabilities. CVAMP inputs come from the results of JSIVA, CNOIVA, HHQ, and
local assessments. Naval installations will use CVAMP to comply with DOD tracking and reporting requirements.
CVAMP has the following capabilities:
1. Provides a database to document both higher level and local vulnerability assessment findings.
2. Documents a commanders risk assessment decision for each vulnerability.
3. Informs decision makers of an installations ability to counter assessed threats.
4. Provides a vehicle to identify requirements to the chain of command.
5. Provides a means to prioritize command vulnerabilities.
CVAMP is a web-based program accessed through the SIPRNET; accordingly, data up to the SECRET level can be
entered into the database. CVAMP can generate output reports by numerous criteria, such as FPCON and threat level.
Once historical data is entered, trend charts based on vulnerability assessment guideline categories can be generated.

Planning and Response Element _______________

Threat

Manpower

Policy/Plans/Procedures

Equipment

Training

Improvised
Explosive Device
Chemical
Biological
Fire
Nuclear

Figure C-4. Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Planning and Response Elements

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C/V

NTTP 3-07.2.1

APPENDIX D

Unambiguous Warning Device

(Airburst Warning Munition)
Reference: (a) Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command ltr Ser N715/a-27-021/267 dtd 7 Mar 03 (Weapon
Systems Explosives Safety Review Board Safety Approval for Limited Release of 12-gauge AY-04 Cartridge for
Force Protection)
(b) Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (International and Operational Law Division) ltr Ser
103/GWR dtd 24 Mar 03 (Legal Review of Air Burst Munitions)
(c) Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General (International and Operational Law Division) ltr Ser
103/GWR dtd 4 Mar 03 (Legal Review of 12-gauge Flash Bang Cartridge (DODIC AY04)
(d) Navy Tactical Reference Publication (NTRP) 3-07.2.2 (Force Protection Weapons Handling
Standard Procedures and Guidelines)
(e) Naval Education and Training Command 43466 (0501-LP-481-0100) (Personnel Qualification
Standard for Small Arms)
D.1 INTRODUCTION

As identified by the fleet, an urgent need exists to provide a clear unambiguous nonlethal means to alert
approaching vessels and warn them of their imminent entry into a protected/restricted waterside area and
concurrently to try to determine if there is any hostile intent on the part of these approaching vessels.
Research has indicated that airburst munitions provide the best possible near-term solution to provide this
capability. The 12-gauge flash bang (DODIC AY-04) round was selected as the most appropriate near-term
option to address the established urgent need. Testing conducted indicates that, while not optimal in its current
configuration, the AY-04 round does provide an acceptable interim means to address the requirement.
D.2 UNAMBIGUOUS WARNING DEVICE

The purpose of an unambiguous warning device (UWD) is to produce obvious audible, concussive, and visual
effects. The UWD is intended to assist Navy shipboard watchstanders/waterside perimeter defense watchstanders
in ascertaining if any hostile intent exists on the part of any vessel intruding into warning zones or approaching
naval units.
D.2.1 Functional Description

The 12-gauge flash-bang cartridge consists of a standard 12-gauge case with a special pyrotechnic projectile. The
projectile has a fuse and pyrotechnic mixture contained in a paper tube. When a cartridge is fired, the burning
propellant ignites the fuse, which burns for approximately three seconds and then ignites the pyrotechnic mix. The
pyrotechnic mix functions with a loud report and explosive pyrotechnic flash.

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D.2.2 Purpose

The 12-gauge flash-bang cartridge is intended for warning purposes, and is not intended to be used as an antipersonnel munition.
D.2.3 Projectile Range

The range of the projectile is nominally 60 to 110 meters. However, the range is highly variable, and may
function as close as 30 meters. From an elevated ship deck, the range may increase to a maximum of 150 meters.
D.2.4 Unambiguous Warning Device Constraints

In accordance with reference (a), the Weapon Systems Explosives Safety Review Board concurred with the
release of AY-04 12-gauge flash-bang ammunition, with the following constraints:
1. The ammunition is to be employed as a warning device for the purpose of force protection.
2. Use of the ammunition is limited to the following standard Navy 12-gauge pump shotguns: Remington
Model 870 and Mossberg Models 500, 500A1, and 500A2.
3. The ammunition is not authorized for transport or storage aboard submarines. For submarine transport
authorization, contact NAVSEA PMS-395A211 at (202) 781-7335.
4. Rounds shall not be exposed to helicopter (300kV) Electro Static Discharge (ESD). If helicopter transport
is required, the cartridges must be packaged in a metal ammunition can or a MIL-B-131 aluminized barrier
bag.
5. The cartridges shall be packed in M2A1 ammunition cans or comparable metal containers for shipboard
transport and storage, and they shall be correctly marked with UN and POP markings.
6. A copy of the safety and operating instructions for use of rounds (contained in Annex 1) shall be packed in
each container.
In accordance with references (b) and (c), since these munitions will not be fired with the intent of striking or
injuring personnel or damage their vessels or other property, a legal review was not necessary.
D.3 SAFETY INSTRUCTIONS AND OPERATING PROCEDURES
D.3.1 Loading/Unloading Procedures

For loading and unloading procedures of the AY-04 flash-bang round, follow the steps outlined in reference (d).
This is a pyrotechnic round that can easily start a fire. Do not load or unload AY-04 rounds below deck or in a
confined space. AY-04 rounds should be loaded and unloaded while the shotgun is pointed out over the water in a
safe direction that is clear of all personnel, equipment, ships, or other obstructions.
D.3.2 Safety Precautions

The following safety precautions are associated with the AY-04 UWD:
1. Operators shall wear hearing protection (AY-04 bang is a minimum 130 db) and safety eyewear when
training on the AY-04 cartridges.

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NTTP 3-07.2.1

2. In-Bore Obstructions. The design of the AY-04 rounds necessitates a low muzzle velocity. As a result, the
over powder wad may become stuck in the shotgun barrel creating a hazardous in-bore obstruction. Inbore obstructions can be kept to a minimum by ensuring the shotgun barrel bore is clean.
3. After firing a cartridge, keep the bolt closed and the muzzle pointed downrange until the flash or bang is
observed. This protects the operator if the projectile malfunctions in the barrel. If the flash or bang is not
observed, keep the bolt closed and the muzzle pointed downrange for 30 seconds minimum before
inspecting the shotgun.
4. Duds. Up to 6 percent of projectiles are duds and do not flash or bang. If retrievable, pick up the dud with
a shovel and place it in a water-filled ammunition container for 24 hours prior to disposal, or dispose of in
accordance with munitions disposal policies and procedures developed and approved by local Navy
authority.
5. The dud rate can be kept to a minimum by storing cartridges in sealed M2A1 containers to protect the
cartridges from humidity.
6. The projectile may start a fire if functioned over dry grass, oil, fuel, or other flammable material. Operators
shall know local fire procedures and should avoid firing over flammable materials.
7. Firing into a strong headwind is not recommended because the lightweight projectile may be blown back
toward the operator. Use caution when firing into cross winds or gusting winds.
8. Bare rounds shall not be carried on helicopters. If helicopter carry is required, the cartridges must be
packaged in a metal ammunition can.
D.3.3 Operating Procedures

The following are the operating procedures for the AY-04 UWD:
1. Ensure the shotgun chamber and barrel bore are clean.
2. Load cartridges into the shotgun magazine, and chamber one round.
3. Raise the shotgun to the shoulder, and elevate the barrel.
a. For maximum range when there is little or no wind, barrel elevation should be approximately 45
degrees. The most effective range from the deck of a ship is approximately 20 degrees.
b. Avoid firing into strong head winds. For light to moderate head winds, lower the barrel elevation to
reduce the wind effects.
4. Aim the muzzle in the direction of the target, and fire the cartridge. Choose an aim point in order to
achieve an airburst directly over or in close proximity to the target. It will take practice with the AY-04
round to become proficient in sighting and leading intended targets.
5. The 12-gauge AY-04 is best employed in volley fire of two to five rounds, for both reliability (in the event
one of the munitions duds) and shock effect.
6. Keep the bolt closed and the muzzle pointed downrange until the flash/bang or water impact is observed.
Then operate the shotgun pump to eject the fired cartridge. If the flash/bang or water impact is not
observed, keep the bolt closed and the muzzle pointed downrange for a minimum of 30 seconds. Then
disassemble and inspect the shotgun as follows:

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a. Unload the shotgun by removing all cartridges first from the magazine and then the chamber.
b. Remove the barrel and visually inspect the bore for obstructions.
c. If an obstruction is observed, insert a cleaning rod into the muzzle of the barrel, hold the chamber end
over a water filled ammunition container, and push the obstruction into the water. If the obstruction is a
projectile dud, soak the dud for 24 hours prior to disposal.
d. Ensure the barrel is clean, reinstall barrel, reload cartridges, and continue operation.
7. When finished operations, unload the shotgun and return all unused cartridges to the M2A1 metal
container. Seal the container lid to protect the cartridges from humidity.
8. Night Operations: In order to prevent night blindness, it is recommended that a prebriefed signal (i.e.,
radio) be established to warn friendly forces of the imminent firing of flash-type munitions in order to
afford them an opportunity to take appropriate protective measures (in order to preserve night vision).
D.3.4 Unit Preplanned Response

The units preplanned response should clearly delineate actions by the watchstanders should the round not fire
properly and the actual number of rounds to be fired prior to using force.
For Further Information Contact:
Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division
Small Arms Ammunition Branch Code 4083
Crane, IN 47522
DSN 482-4159
D.4 TRAINING

1. Watchstanders who are designated to use the UWD shall be trained in the safety and operating instructions
prior to use.
2. All watchstanders shall qualify in the use of the AY-04 flash-bang rounds by conducting live fire
familiarization training, in accordance with the requirements contained in reference (e). Supervisors are
responsible for ensuring that all armed watchstanders are fully acquainted with the use and effects of the
flash-bang round.
3. Shotgun muzzle cannot be aimed directly at the target, but must be elevated requiring operator judgment
and practice. All Navy personnel that are required to qualify on the 12-gauge shotgun and who could be
assigned a shipboard, shore side, or pierside withstanding position should also qualify on the flash-bang
rounds. Shore based personnel should fire five flash-bang rounds on a semi-annual basis, and shipboard
personnel should fire five flash-bang rounds on an annual basis to ensure that personnel are familiar with
the round and that they can effectively place the round in close proximity to the intended target (within 20
meters in front of an approaching vessel, offset 10 meters to either the port or starboard side of the
approaching vessel, at an altitude of 515 meters).

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APPENDIX E

Warning Shots
E.1 PURPOSE

This appendix provides TTP and training requirements associated with the use of warning shots authorized in
secretary of defense memo (16 May 03), Authorization to Fire Warning Shots from Naval Vessels and Piers.
E.2 TACTICS

Warning shots can be used in a units PPRs to defend against a small boat attack and can be employed from naval
vessels (including security boats) and piers. Warning shots are a means of communication and provide an
additional tool to determine hostile intent. Warning shots are not deadly force themselves when correctly
employed and can be used in ambiguous situations to communicate and deter innocent or inadvertent approach.
Failure to heed warning shots can, when considered in the circumstances, provide an indication of hostile intent.
DOD Directive 5210.56 (series), Use of Deadly Force, continues to apply to uses of deadly force by DOD
personnel engaged in law enforcement and security duties.
E.2.1 Authorization to Use Warning Shots

Warning shots, though not deadly force, entail risk of death, injury, or damage to property if improperly used. The
following restrictions are designed to lessen those risks. Warning shots to protect Navy and naval service vessels
within territorial seas and internal waters of the United States are authorized when, in appropriate exercise of FP
of Navy and naval service vessels, they are only fired:
1. Over water to warn an approaching vessel
2. When a clear line of fire exists
3. From a crew-served weapon or rifle
4. By personnel certified under a training program developed by the AT/FP Warfare Development Center
5. Under tactical direction of competent authority
6. When there are no other means reasonably available to determine the intent of an approaching craft
without increasing the threat to Navy and naval vessels or personnel.
E.2.2 Authorized Weapons Systems

Weapons systems authorized to fire warning shots are:

1. M-14/M-16 rifles
2. M-60/MK 43/MK 46 medium machine guns

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3. M-240 medium machine gun

4. M2 50-caliber heavy machine gun.
E.2.3 Clear Field of Fire

A clear field of fire when employing warning shots means:

1. Clear within 50 yards to either side of the vessel being warned.
2. No uninvolved persons, vessels, or structures are in the direct line of fire to the maximum range of the
weapon.
E.2.4 Appropriate Use of Warning Shots

The use of warning shots is only appropriate when:

1. An unauthorized vessel has entered a naval vessel protective zone (NVPZ) or marked harbor security zone,
and continues to approach a Navy or naval service vessel.
2. An unauthorized vessel approaches an NVPZ or marked harbor security zone at a high rate of speed.
3. Other means within the continuum of action (e.g., signage, barriers, security boats, VHF radio calls,
loudhailers, flares, ships whistles, lights) can not be reasonably employed or have failed to determine the
intent of the approaching vessel without increasing the threat to the unit or personnel.
Use of deadly force to protect a ship and its crew against a small boat attack is not contingent on firing a warning
shot first. When time and circumstances permit, warning shots can help the person holding batteries release
authority and/or the armed watchstander or crew-served weapons gunner to make the decision to use deadly force.
E.3 TECHNIQUES

Warning shots will be offset from the suspected threat:

1. For threats coming directly toward a gun emplacement/weapons system, a line of bearing shot should be
taken. In this method, line up the selected weapon on the threat, offset and depress the angle of fire to half
the distance between the threat and the vessel.
2. For threats that are crossing targets (e.g., crossing the field of fire), lead the threat sufficiently to ensure
that the intended warning shot does not become destructive fire.
E.3.1 Automatic Weapons

For optimum visual effect to warn off approaching craft, automatic weapons should be loaded with tracer rounds
for at least the first 10 rounds. To achieve a splash effect to warn off approaching craft, automatic weapons should
be fired in short bursts (35 rounds).
E.3.2 Command and Control

Each commander shall establish effective C2 procedures for the employment of weapons, to include those that
may fire warning shots.
Where the reaction time precludes communications between the watchstander and supervisor, the individual
watchstander must be empowered to employ the continuum of action in order to deter or defeat a threat.

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Accordingly, watchstanders shall be thoroughly trained in all aspects of the continuum from the use of warning
shots to the use of deadly force.
E.4 PROCEDURES

Warning shots are authorized in accordance with established PPRs or when directed by the CO or other
designated tactical weapons release authority.
The PPR for a small boat attack will include:
1. Layout of the assessment, warning, and threat zones
2. Procedures to identify potential threats
3. Means to classify potential threats
4. Weapons and gun mounts/positions employed to engage the threat once the determination of hostile intent is made
5. Batteries release procedures.
The CO, giving consideration to avoiding fratricide and collateral damage, is responsible for designating which
gun mount or post is authorized to fire warning shots. Particular care must be taken when selecting crew-served
weapon posts since machine-gun rounds tend to ricochet upward upon impact with the water.
Note

When ships are pierside, COs will coordinate with host installation commanders to
ensure layered defense and deconfliction of fields of fire between shipboard and shore
weapons positions.
Prior to assuming a watch, applicable armed watchstanders and crew-served weapon gunners will be briefed in
detail on the PPR for a small boat attack. The brief provided by the CDO/COG shall include details on warning
shots. Each watchstander designated to fire warning shots shall have written orders that contain the small-boat
PPR and assigned sectors of fire.
E.5 TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

Personnel should be considered qualified to fire warning shots when they have demonstrated to their CO that they:
1. Are qualified in the weapons for armed sentries in accordance with OPNAVINST 3591.1 (series), Small
Arms Training and Qualification, and applicable personnel qualification standards.
2. Are trained in the use of those weapons to fire warning shots.
3. Understand the conditions under which a warning shot should be employed.
4. Are trained in the tactics for the specific post from which warning shots may be employed.
All watchstanders shall be trained on the continuum of action and applicable ROE/RUF.
Note

Within the territory of the United States, RUF apply. Outside of the United States,
standing ROE/RUF apply.

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REFERENCES
These publications were used as references during the production of this NTTP and the associated NWP 3-07.2
(Rev. A), Navy Doctrine for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.
DOD PUBLICATIONS

DOD O-2000.12-H, Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities against Acts of Terrorism and Political
Turbulence
DODD 2000.12 (series), DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Program
DODD 5200.8 (series), Security of Military Installations and Resources
DODD 5210.56 (series), Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in
Enforcement and Security Duties
DODI 2000.16 (series), DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards
DODI 5210.84 (series), Security of DOD Personnel at U.S. Missions Abroad
JOINT PUBLICATIONS

CJCSI 5261.01 (series), Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund

Joint Chiefs of Staff Deputy Directorate of Operations for Combating Terrorism (J-34) Installation Antiterrorism
Program and Planning Tool, Volumes I and II
JP 3-07 (series), Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War
JP 3-07.2 (series), Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP for Antiterrorism)
JP 3-10.1 (series), Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Operations
NAVY INSTRUCTIONS

NTTP 3-07.3.2 (series), Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Employment of Nonlethal
Weapons
NWP 5-01 (series), Naval Operational Planning
OPNAVINST 3300.53 (series), Navy Combating Terrorism Program
OPNAVINST 3300.54 (series), Protection of Naval Personnel and Activities against Acts of Terrorism and
Political Turbulence
OPNAVINST 3300.55 (series), Navy Combating Terrorism Program Standards
OPNAVINST 3500.39 (series), Operational Risk Management

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OPNAVINST 3591.1 (series), Small Arms Training and Qualification

OPNAVINST 5530.13 (series), Department of the Navy Physical Security Instruction for Conventional Arms,
Ammunition and Explosives
SECNAVINST 3300.3 (series), Combating Terrorism Program Standards
SECNAVINST 5500.29 (series), Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by Personnel of the
Department of the Navy in Conjunction with Law Enforcement, Security Duties, and Personal Protection
SECNAVINST 5510.36 (series), Department of the Navy Information Security Program Regulation
SECNAVINST 5520.3 (series), Criminal and Security Investigations and Related Activities within the
Department of the Navy

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GLOSSARY
A
antiterrorism (AT). Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist
acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. (JP 1-02) The antiterrorism program
is one of several security-related programs that fall under the overreaching Force Protection and Combating
Terrorism programs. An antiterrorism program is a collective effort that seeks to reduce the likelihood that
Department of Defense personnel, their families, facilities, and material will be subject to a terrorist attack,
and to prepare a response to the consequences of such attacks if they occur.
antiterrorism awareness. Fundamental knowledge of the terrorist threat and measures to reduce personal
vulnerability to terrorism. (JP 1-02)
antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) plan. A plan that documents the specific measures taken to
establish and maintain an antiterrorism/force protection program, ensuring readiness against terrorist attacks.
antiterrorism officer (ATO). The person directly responsible to the commanding officer for all matters
dealing with antiterrorism and force protection. Previously known as the force protection officer (FPO),
changed to ATO by DODINST 2000.16 revision of June 2001.
area of responsibility. 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a
combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02) 2. The specifically defined
geographic or moving area around a naval force within an area of interest over which the officer in tactical
command exercises all warfare responsibilities and controls tactical operations. The size and shape of the area
are dependent upon the nature of the threat and the assets, both organic to the force or in dedicated support,
available to counter that threat. (NWP 1-02)
B
blue dart message. A time-sensitive terrorist incident notification message. Initiated by the Multiple Alert
Threat Center to provide commands immediate indications and warning of the high potential for, and
imminent threat of, a terrorist incident.
C
combating terrorism (CBT). Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce
vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and to respond
to terrorism), terrorism consequence management (preparation for and response to the consequences of a
terrorist incident/event) and intelligence support (collection and dissemination of terrorism-related
information) taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum, to include terrorist use of
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear materials or high-yield explosive devices. (Modified from JP 102)
consequence management. Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate
problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Also
called CM. (JP 1-02)

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counterintelligence (CI). Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other
intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or
elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 1-02)
crisis management. Measures taken to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate,
prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act or terrorism. It is predominantly a law enforcement response, normally
executed under federal law. (DRAFT JP 3-26)
D
defense in depth. The sitting of mutually supporting defense positions designed to absorb and progressively
weaken attack, prevent initial observations of the whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to
maneuver the reserve. (JP 1-02)
deterrence. The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought
about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (JP 1-02)
E
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). The detection, identification, on-site evaluation, rendering safe,
recovery, and final disposal of unexploded explosive ordnance. It may also include explosive ordnance that
has become hazardous by damage or deterioration. (JP 1-02)
F
force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel
(to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the forces
fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and
synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while
degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or
protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)
force protection conditions. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program standardizing the
military services identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats and terrorist acts against
U.S. personnel and facilities. This program facilitates interservice coordination and support for AT activities.
H
host nation (HN). A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO
organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (JP 1-02)
host-nation support (HNS). Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its
territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between
nations. (JP 1-02)
I
improvised explosive device (IED). A device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating
destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass,
or distract. It may incorporate military stores but is normally devised from nonmilitary components. (JP 1-02)

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installation. A grouping of facilities, located in the same vicinity, that support particular functions. Installations
may be elements of a base. (JP 1-02)
installation commander. The individual responsible for all operations performed by an installation. (JP 1-02)
intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and
interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge
about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)
L
law enforcement agency (LEA). Any of a number of agencies (outside the Department of Defense),
chartered and empowered to enforce laws in the following jurisdictions: the United States, a state (or political
subdivision) of the United States, a territory or possession (or political subdivision) of the United States, or to
enforce U.S. laws within the borders of a host nation. (JP 1-02)
lead agency. Designated among U.S. Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the dayto-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established
to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion
among the agencies, and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02)
level I antiterrorism training. Awareness training provided to all DOD personnel accessions during initial
training to include: military, DOD civilians, their family members 14 years old and greater (when family
members are deploying or traveling on government orders), and DOD-employed contractors.
level II antiterrorism training. Provides training for officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian staff
personnel who are designated to serve as antiterrorism advisors to the commander.
M
memorandum of understanding (MOU). A document that specifies actions and responsibilities to be
performed by the provider and receiver but only in general terms. An MOU should be backed by an
interservice support agreement. (NDP-4)
N
naval vessel protective zone. A protective zone around U.S. naval vessels as stipulated by USCG regulation
that states: (a) all vessels within 500 yards of a U.S. naval vessel shall operate at the minimum speed necessary
to maintain a safe course and shall proceed as directed by the official patrol (senior naval or Coast Guard
officer present), (b) no vessel is allowed within 100 yards of a U.S. naval vessel, (c) vessels requesting to pass
within 100 yards of a U.S. naval vessel shall contact official patrol on VHF Channel 16 and follow their
direction, (d) commercial vessels at anchor may remain at anchor if a naval vessel passes them within 100
yards, and (e) violations of the Naval Vessel Protection Zone are felonies, punishable by up to six years in
prison and fines up to $250,000.
P
physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to
prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them
against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (JP 1-02)

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port security. The safeguarding of vessels, harbors, ports, waterfront facilities, and cargo from internal threats
such as destruction, loss, or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts; accidents; thefts; or other causes of
similar nature. (JP 1-02)
R
random antiterrorism measures (RAMs). Random, multiple security measures that when activated, serve
to disguise the actual security procedures in effect; RAMs deny the terrorist surveillance team the opportunity
to accurately predict security actions. RAMs strictly vary the time frame and/or location for a given measure.
risk assessment. The identification and assessments of hazards (first two steps of risk management process).
(JP 1-02)
risk management. The process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors
and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 1-02)
S
shouldering. Maneuvering a vessel in contact with an opposing vessel to cause the opposing vessel to turn
away. Shouldering is undertaken with the intent of minimizing damage to the opposing vessel. (JP 1-02)
status of forces agreement (SOFA). An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force
deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may
be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate
agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the
authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its
members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters
affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered
as civil affairs agreements. (JP 1-02)
T
terrorist threat level. An intelligence threat assessment of the level of terrorist threat faced by U.S. personnel
and interests in a foreign country. The assessment is based on a continuous intelligence analysis of a minimum
of five elements: terrorist group existence, capability, history, trends, and targeting. There are four threat
levels: Low, Moderate, Significant, and High. Threat levels should not be confused with force protection
conditions. Threat level assessments are provided to senior leaders to assist them in determining the
appropriate local force protection condition (The Department of State also makes threat assessments that may
differ from those determined by the Department of Defense).
threat assessment (TA). The continuous process of compiling and examining all available information
concerning potential terrorist activities by terrorist groups that could target a facility. A threat assessment will
review the factors of a terrorist groups existence, capability, intentions, history, and targeting, as well as the
security environment within which friendly forces operate. Threat assessment is an essential step in identifying
the probability of terrorist attack.
V
vulnerability assessment. A Department of Defense, command, or unit-level evaluation (assessment) to
determine the vulnerability of a terrorist attack against an installation, unit, exercise, port, ship, residence,
facility, or other site. Identifies areas of improvement to withstand, mitigate, or deter acts of violence or
terrorism. (JP 1-02)

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AES

advanced encryption standard

ASF

auxiliary security force

AT

antiterrorism (JP 1-02)

AT/FP

antiterrorism/force protection (JP 1-02)

AT/FPTS

antiterrorism/force protection training supervisor

ATO

antiterrorism officer

ATTWO

antiterrorism tactical watch officer

C2

command and control (JP 1-02)

C3

command, control, and communications (JP 1-02)

C4I

command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (JP 1-02)

CAD

computer-aided dispatch

CBRNE

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (JP 1-02)

CDC

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CDO

command duty officer (JP 1-02)

CNOIVA

Chief of Naval Operations integrated vulnerability assessment

CO

commanding officer (JP 1-02)

COA

course of action (JP 1-02)

COG

chief of the guard

CONOPS

concept of operations (JP 1-02)

CONUS

continental United States (JP 1-02)

CTL

criminal threat level

C/V

criticality and vulnerability

CVAMP

Core Vulnerability Assessment Management Program

DES

digital encryption standard

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DIA

Defense Intelligence Agency (JP 1-02)

DOD

Department of Defense (JP 1-02)

DON

Department of the Navy (JP 1-02)

DOS

Department of State (JP 1-02)

DTG

date-time group (JP 1-02)

ECP

entry control point

EOC

emergency operations center (JP 1-02)

EOD

explosive ordnance disposal (JP 1-02)

EODMU

explosive ordnance disposal mobile unit

ESD

electrostatic discharge

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration (JP 1-02)

FAST

fleet antiterrorism security team

FBI

Federal Bureau of Investigation (JP 1-02)

FCG

foreign clearance guide (JP 1-02)

FITL

foreign intelligence threat level

FP

force protection (JP 1-02)

FPCON

force protection condition

FPTT

force protection training team

HAZMAT

hazardous materials (JP 1-02)

HN

host nation (JP 1-02)

HVA

high-value asset

IBU

inshore boat unit

ID

identification (JP 1-02)

IED

improvised explosive device (JP 1-02)

IFPP

individual force protection plan

IPE

individual protection equipment

ISIC

immediate superior in command

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JSIVA

Joint Staff integrated vulnerability assessment

MANPADS

man-portable air defense system (JP 1-02)

MAST

mobile ashore support terminal (JP 1-02)

MIUWU

mobile inshore undersea warfare unit

MSD

mobile security division (JP 1-02)

MSRON

mobile security squadron

MSST

maritime safety and security team

MTAC

multiple threat alert center

MWD

military working dog (JP 1-02)

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (JP 1-02)

NCIS

Naval Criminal Investigative Service (JP 1-02)

NCW

naval coastal warfare (JP 1-02)

NCWRON

naval coastal warfare squadron

NSF

Navy security force

NTRP

Navy Tactical Reference Publication

NTTP

Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures

NVD

night vision device (JP 1-02)

NVPZ

naval vessel protective zone

NWDC

Navy Warfare Development Command (JP 1-02)

NWP

Navy Warfare Publication

OCONUS

outside the continental United States (JP 1-02)

OOD

officer of the deck (JP 1-02)

OPCON

operational control (JP 1-02)

OPLAN

operation plan (JP 1-02)

OPNAVINST

Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (JP 1-02)

OPSEC

operations security (JP 1-02)

ORM

operational risk management

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PIVA

port integrated vulnerability assessment

PPR

preplanned response

PSU

port security unit

PVTL

political violence threat level

RAM

random antiterrorism measure

RHIB

rigid hull inflatable boat (JP 1-02)

ROE

rules of engagement (JP 1-02)

RPG

rocket-propelled grenade

RUF

rules for use of force

SECNAVINST

Secretary of the Navy instruction (JP 1-02)

SIPRNET

SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (JP 1-02)

SMEAC

situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics, command and control

SOFA

status of force agreement

SOP

standard operating procedures (JP 1-02)

SOPA

senior officer present afloat

SORM

standard organization regulations manual

SWIG

small watercraft inspection guide

TA

threat assessment

TL

team leader

TSWG

technical support working group

TTL

terrorism threat level

TTP

tactics, techniques, and procedures (JP 1-02)

TYCOM

type commander (JP 1-02)

USCG

United States Coast Guard (JP 1-02)

USDAO

United States Defense Attach Office (JP 1-02)

UVSS

undercarriage vehicle surveillance systems

UWD

unambiguous warning device

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VAMP

vulnerability assessment management program

VBSS

visit, board, search, and seizure (JP 1-02)

WHO

World Health Organization (JP 1-02)

WMD

weapons of mass destruction (JP 1-02)

WSS

waterfront security supervisor

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