968
PROBATION LAW
PATERNO DE LOS SANTOS, JR.
DIVISION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 181306: March 21, 2011
FACTS:
Paterno de los Santos, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of
intentional abortion, and then he filed an application for probation. It was
ruled that he is ineligible to apply for probation, considering the fact that he
has waived his right to avail the benefits of probation law when he appealed
the judgment of conviction by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation,
considering that he had appealed his conviction, contrary to the provision of
Section 4, P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990.
HELD: Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a
penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and encourages an
otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the
State the time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the
trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial
court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioner's Application for
Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having
applied for probation only after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his
conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Furthermore, it was clear that when petitioner filed his appeal before
the appellate court, what he was questioning was the merit of the decision
convicting him and not the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court
for the purpose of correcting a wrong penalty to reduce it to within
probational range. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner, therefore, ipso
facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law.
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element
of speculation on the part of the accused to wager on the result of his
appeal that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment
of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now
applies for probation as an "escape hatch," thus, rendering nugatory the
appellate court's affirmance of his conviction. Consequently, probation
should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest spontaneity, contrition and
remorse.
Considering that the prevailing jurisprudence treats appeal and
probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner opted to appeal his
conviction, he, therefore, deemed to relinquish his right to the benefits of
probation.
ALEJANDRA PABLO vs. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, Presiding Judge,
Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Dagupan City
and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 12510: August 3, 2000
FACTS: Alejandra Pablo was convicted of a violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22. She applied for probation and was later denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the he should be denied probation on the
ground of disqualification from probation under Section 9 of P.D. 968.
HELD: The Court ruled that under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D.
968, the following offenders cannot avail of the benefits of probation:
a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than
six years;
b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or
the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or
fine of not less than two hundred pesos ;
d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this
Decree; and
e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive
provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof.
HELD: We recall that the law which governs all matters relating to
probation is Presidential Decree No. 968, commonly known as the Probation
Law, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1990. The provision of the law
that is pertinent to the current controversy reads:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.
Relying solely on the letter of the law, the filing of the application for
probation should be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. However, in the
case of Budlong v. Apalisok, we had occasion to rule that the above provision
of the Probation Law clearly provides only for the suspension of the sentence
imposed on the accused by virtue of his application for probation. It has
absolutely no bearing on civil liability.
This ruling was clarified in Salgado v. Court of Appeals, wherein we
ruled that, although the execution of sentence is suspended by the grant of
probation, it does not follow that the civil liability of the offender, if any, is
extinguished.
The Probation Law prohibits a judge from entertaining or granting an
application for probation if the defendant has perfected an appeal from
the judgment of conviction. The fact of conviction most certainly refers to
the criminal liability of the accused, as a result of a finding made by a judge
that he is guilty of the crime charged. However, the appeal in this case
involved only the civil aspect of the trial courts judgment. Hence, we see no
reason why, between the conjoined criminal and civil aspects of a felony, a
line cannot be drawn marking where the one springs from the other. Even if
by definition civil liability ex delicto arises from the criminal act, once its
existence is established, it should be treated separately from the criminal
liability. Indeed there is even categorical statutory basis to state that it
subsists despite the extinguishment of the criminal liability from which it
arose. This was the finding in Budlong v. Apalisok and Salgado v. Court of
Appeals.
Thus, we rule that, in an appeal from a judgment of conviction, the
criminal liability and the civil liability ex delicto should be considered
independently, each with its own corresponding effects. In the present case,
the law that bars an appeal of the judgment of conviction, as well as its
corresponding criminal liability, should not bar an appeal of the civil aspect
of the same judgment.
ARNEL COLINARES vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182748 : December 13, 2011
FACTS: Arnel Colinares was found guilty of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor,
as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the
law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand
of the case to the trial court given a finding that Arnel is entitled to
conviction for a lower offense and a reduced probationable penalty.
HELD: Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for
probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him
for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should
be lowered to imprisonment of four months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to
two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this
new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation
upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a
mere privilege granted by the state only to qualified convicted offenders.
Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: "That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction. Since Arnel appealed his conviction
for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from
applying
for
probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the
point is not that Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not
have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds
that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the
Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is
still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege
of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who
appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing
Arnel to now seek probation under this Court's greatly diminished penalty
will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will
appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation,
forfeit
their
right
to
apply
for
that
privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of
the penalty imposed on him. He claimed that the evidence at best
warranted his conviction only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide, which
crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought
from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law
would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court's finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction
that for the first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC
done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to
probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is
one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a
harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must
not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it
clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of
the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing
Arnel to apply for probation after he appealed from the trial court's judgment
of conviction would not be consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the
probation law should be interpreted to "provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from
a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct
judgment of conviction. Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong
crime, frustrated homicide that carried a penalty in excess of 6 years. How
can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court
now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with
its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation
under the reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and
upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an
appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may
deem best: Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment or
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with
the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. Such a
waiver amounts to a voluntary compliance with the decision and
writes finis to the jurisdiction of the trial court over the judgment. There is
no principle better settled, or of more universal application, than that no
court can reverse or annul, reconsider or amend, its own final decree or
judgment. Any attempt by the court to thereafter alter, amend or modify the
same, except in respect to correct clerical errors, would be unwarranted.
LOURDES A. SABLE vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON.
ENRIQUETA LOQUILLANO-BELARMINO, Presiding Judge, Branch 57,
RTC, Cebu City
G.R. No. 17796: April 7, 2009
FACTS: Petitioner convicted of the crime of Falsification of Public
Documents under Article 172(1) in relation to Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code on November 28, 2000 but acquitted Ildefonsa Anoba for finding
not guilty. However, the court finds that Lourdes Abellanosa Sable was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences her to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years ,2 months and one day to 6
years.
On August, 25, 2003 petitioner intimated her desire to apply for
probation instead of appealing the judgment of conviction which was denied.
ISSUE:
tenable.
HELD:
The court held that probation is a special privilege granted
by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals and
The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This outlaws the element
of speculation on the part of the accused -- to wager on the result of his
appeal -- that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment
of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now
applies for probation as an "escape hatch," thus rendering nugatory the
appellate courts affirmation of his conviction. Consequently, probation
should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest spontaneity, contrition and
remorse.
This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended, precisely to
put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if
the sentence is probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.
DANIEL G. FAJARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO P.
PEDRONIO; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and STATION COMMANDER
OF ILOILO CITY
G.R. No. 128508: February 1, 1999
FACTS: On May 26, 1988, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Iloilo City,
convicted petitioner of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, and sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of eight (8) months imprisonment and to pay the
costs, in Criminal Case No. 14196. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. By
decision promulgated on February 27, 1990, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction.
Upon the remand of the record to the lower court, on June 2, 1995,
petitioner filed a motion for probation contending that he was eligible for
probation because at the time he committed the offense in 1981, an accused
who had appealed his conviction was still qualified to apply for probation and
that the law that barred an application for probation of an accused who had
interposed an appeal was ex post facto in its application, and, hence, not
applicable to him.
On January 5, 1996, the trial court denied petitioner's motion for
probation.
On July 29, 1996, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari to annul the lower court's denial of his application for probation.
On November 12, 1996, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the
petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is qualify to apply for
probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 since he had appealed from his
conviction in 1988, after Presidential Decree No. 1990 amending Presidential
Decree No. 968, became effective in 1986, providing that "no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
HELD:
Presidential Decree No. 1990, enacted on October 5, 1985,
"was printed in Volume 81 of the Official Gazette dated December 30, 1985
but said issue was released for circulation only on July 1, 1986; hence, P D
1990 became effective after fifteen (15) days from July 1, 1986, in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, or on July 16, 1986."It is not ex
post facto in its application. The law applies only to accused convicted after
its effectivity.An ex post facto law is one that punishes an act as a crime
which was innocent at the time of its commission. Presidential Decree No.
1990, like the Probation Law that it amends, is not penal in character. It may
not be considered as an ex post facto law.
At the time of the commission of the offense chargedviolation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22in 1981, petitioner could have appealed if
convicted and still availed himself of probation. However, petitioner was
convicted on May 26, 1988, and he appealed. At that time, petitioner no
longer had the option to appeal and still apply for probation if unsuccessful in
the appeal. Presidential Decree No. 1990 was then in full effect. Hence, he
could no longer apply for probation since he had appealed.
On October 13, 1997, the Solicitor General submitted a manifestation
positing the view that petitioner's application for probation may still be
considered because when petitioner committed the offense in 1981, he could
avail himself of probation since the law as it stood at that time provided that
an accused convicted of a crime may apply for probation even if he had
appealed the conviction. We do not share his view. The case he cited is a
Court of Appeals decision, and, hence, not a precedent. What is more, it is
inapplicable because there, the accused's conviction became final on
October 14, 1985. Presidential Decree No. 1990 although enacted on October
5, 1985, was published in the Official Gazette on December 30, 1985,and,
hence, was not yet applicable at the time the accused was finally convicted.
Regrettably, the Solicitor General has cited a Court of Appeals decision that
is inapplicable to this case because the facts were not similar.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the other issues that petitioner has
raised questioning the constitutionality and wisdom of Presidential Decree
No. 1990, amending the probation law.