Religion and International Relations Theory: Towards A Mutual Understanding

EJIR
Article
Religion and International

Relations theory: Towards a
mutual understanding1
European Journal of
International Relations
17(1) 325
The Author(s) 2010
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DOI: 10.1177/1354066110364304
ejt.sagepub.com
Nukhet A. Sandal
Brown University, USA
Patrick James
University of Southern California, USA
Abstract
Until the end of the Cold War, it is not an exaggeration to say that only a few theorists of
International Relations (IR) or policy-makers engaged in either substantial investigation or
articulation of the links between cultural variables like religion and ethnicity on one hand
and international affairs on the other. In our article, we argue that this pattern does not do
justice to the nature of mainstream IR theories. Although studies are accumulating, how (or
whether) religion as a variable can be integrated into mainstream IR thinking still remains
in question. We look at three main traditions in IR theory classical realism, structural
realism and neoliberalism to see how religion can contribute to our understanding of
international affairs within those frameworks. We claim that, without stretching the limits
of theories or disturbing their intellectual coherence, possibilities for two-way interactions
between the frameworks and identity-related variables like religion can be identified.
Keywords
classical realism, neoliberalism, neorealism, religion
Introduction
Religion, like race, ethnicity and gender, stayed on the backburner in the study of
International Relations (IR) for a long time (Carment and James, 1997a, 1997b: 195
198). Even the English School, the most friendly theoretical strand, stayed away from
religion for several decades. This separation of religion and politics is usually traced
back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), regarded as the starting point of the contemporary state system. The idea of a secular world of politics took hold in the minds of many
in the West.2 Due to the World Wars and the Cold War, investigation of religion declined
Corresponding author:
Nukhet A. Sandal, Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, Providence, RI 02912 USA.
Email: ahusandal@gmail.com
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European Journal of International Relations 17(1)
significantly in the 20th century. These events shifted research on IR even further away
from non-material factors. The fading of the post-World War I liberal vision and an
increased focus on material capabilities during the Cold War came at the expense of any
burgeoning thought of ethics, morality or religion, broadly defined.
We argue that this pattern reflects preferences and hesitations of individual scholars
more than the nature of mainstream IR theories. Identity-related variables have been
mostly regarded as a component of reflectivist/hermeneutic traditions, especially during
and in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Scholars from positivist traditions,
therefore, have not been open to the incorporation of such variables into their explanations, even if these variables had potentially high explanatory power. This mindset can
be traced back to the great debate over traditional versus behavioral methods in the
1950s and 1960s: an unintended consequence of the debate was to remove religious
argument from the academic mainstream along with secular normative theory and diplomatic history, all equally out of place in a positive discipline (Jones, 2003: 371). Jones
notes in particular the disappearance of religion even from the English School a perspective not normally associated with behavioral methods as a by-product. In particular, Christian terminology slipped out of the vocabulary of debate, supplanted by
international society (Jones, 2003: 372). The legacy of Martin Wight, considered as a
founder of the English School, is instructive here. While Wights emphasis on international society remains central to the English School, all but forgotten is his willingness
to take religious doctrines, cultures and civilizations seriously (Thomas, 2001: 906).
Questions regarding war and religion, and the formation of religious traditions in international relations, are unfortunately ignored within the English Schools current research
programme (Thomas, 2001: 926).
Marginalization of religion, in sum, is due to reluctance of IR theory scholars rather
than the nature of IR per se. Religion can indeed be employed as a variable in explanatory IR theory as a part of ostensibly objective accounts of what is going on out there.
Even the most apparently distant and challenging strands of IR theory can accommodate
religion in one way or another. Such an accommodation, indeed, is necessary if we want
to make more sense of domestic and international politics as well as foreign policy decisions in a world that simply refuses to be purely secular.3
Thus we examine ways in which religion could be integrated into IR and how the
work on religion in international relations in general can be systematized into looking at
religion as a variable in classical realist, neorealist and neoliberal scholarship. Although
studies are accumulating, how (or whether) religion as a variable can be integrated (or,
has been integrated) into mainstream IR thinking still remains in question.4 This debate
is not limited to religion but encompasses identity-related variables in general. Therefore,
some aspects of this articles arguments about treatment of religion in IR theory may also
be valid for variables such as gender, race and ethnicity. We prefer, however, to leave the
discussion of such a possible overlap to others. Given the limits of space, we focus particularly on realism (classical and structural variants) and neoliberalism, namely, how do
these schools of thought potentially accommodate religion?
The study is divided into six main parts. The first shows how and why religion ended
up on the backburner of IR. Methodological preferences are identified in the second part to
help set the agenda. Third, we review classical realism briefly and ask whether (and how)
religion can be integrated into this theory. The fourth part is dedicated to structural realism
Sandal and James
and the fifth discusses neoliberalism in the same vein. If we want to capture religion fully
and integrate it into the scholarly investigation of international relations, we must answer
these questions: (a) does religion fit into a particular framework? And (b) what are the possible ways of integrating religion into our studies as they relate to widely used frameworks? The sixth and final part summarizes tentative answers to these questions.
Religion on the backburner

Abstention from theoretical and systematic study of the role of religion in politics originally stemmed from belief that the era of faith causing war had ended and deliberate
action would be needed to prevent a disaster of such scale from happening again
(Laustsen and Waever, 2008). Both scholars and politicians regarded the violence
unleashed during the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe as stemming from an irrational
obsession with religious ideals, which could be avoided by taking religion out of the
picture altogether. Since then, religion has been treated as a cause of violence and an
aberration in politics, not as a concept that deserves a systematic and in-depth investigation, despite the role it played in establishing the foundations of the contemporary international system (Philpott, 2000). The decision to confine religion to the domestic sphere
as embodied in the principle of cujus regio, ejus religio (literally meaning whose region,
his religion) left the decisions regarding religion to officials governing administrative
units. The process of privatizing religion took place incrementally after Westphalia and
with variation across states as a function of how each entity came into being. One example of this incrementalism is the shift from Westphalia to a confessional system as
opposed to immediate and all-out secularization (Casanova, 1994: 3539).
Secularization also brought with itself secularism (i.e. secularization is the process of
becoming secular whereas secularism means an emotional attachment to secular values).
As a result of these shifting allegiances, the state became the unit of investigation.
Alternative modes of social grouping, usually by virtue of constituting a threat to the
dominant unit, became restricted to the private sphere. After these grand changes in the
Western mode of living, religion looked to practitioners like a greatly diminished force in
international affairs and became de-emphasized in domestic politics in most parts of the
Western world. Although its potential power generally remained underestimated, religion
continued to influence decisions and actions in both the private and public spheres.5
Some understood this better than others. A case in point is Herbert Butterfield, a major
figure in the English School. Sharps exegesis of Butterfield is instructive. Butterfield
focused on how Christian ethics might inform diplomacy pursued out of self-interest,
wittily summed up as political realism with manners (Sharp, 2003). As Sharp points
out, there is more to Butterfields thinking than that. Emphasis on mutual restraint a
manifestation of the practice of Christian virtue constitutes strategic advice in pursuit
of the best possible outcome across the board (Sharp, 2003: 868). Expressed in secular
terms, Butterfields arguments on diplomacy sound like reciprocity, but his exposition
also has a Christian foundation, that is, the Golden Rule.
As the material concerns of the Cold War receded, religion as a distinct feature of
identity on levels ranging from individual to transnational (e.g. civilizational, as represented in Samuel Huntingtons [1993] much debated clash of civilizations thesis)
started to draw attention. Religion as (1) a force influencing peoples worldviews, (2) an
aspect of identity, (3) a source of legitimacy and (4) a system of values associated with
formal political and economic institutions has been taking its place in the political realm
whether the academic world acknowledged it or not (Fox and Sandler, 2004: 2).
Widespread unwillingness among academics to take issues of faith into account as an
important dimension due either to distaste regarding cultural variables or hesitation in
terms of technical issues like operationalization makes our academic accounts and
investigations incomplete and artificial. This, of course, is not to say that it is an academically healthy choice to tie every single political decision or action to religion.
Admittedly, and especially since September 11, there is a tendency to point either to
religion as a generic concept or to a particular faith to account for complex interactions
and events.6 This is accompanied by limited attempts to look at background conditions,
concomitant political waves and the sociological and philosophical history of religion. If
we want to employ religion as a variable in our investigations, we need to pay attention
to our usage of the word and how we operationalize it. The reason is clear: trying to use
religion in every account is no better than not using it at all.
Scholars also should pay utmost attention to how they define religion since there is
no single definition of the concept. The study of religion itself is seen as a scholarly
enterprise without an identity, one that lacks any widely shared understanding of its central topic, or of the methods appropriate to the study of this topic (Griffiths, 2000; also
see Asad, 1993). As Buzan and Little (2001) assert, IR thinking should shift from mutually exclusive interpretations to an interlinked set of perspectives that complement each
other. Religion indeed should be seen from such an inclusive perspective and the lack of
one single definition should not deter the IR scholar who is ready to define carefully the
aspect of religion used in an academic investigation.
Religious phenomena should be investigated as an independent (as a cause), intervening (as a link between the cause and the resulting observation) and dependent variable (as
the product of non-religious causes). It is essential to adapt frameworks of analysis
toward those ends. However, we also note that even when religion is captured as an independent variable, it is not assumed (again, at least within the limits of our knowledge of
the literature) to be the single cause of any event.
Although not an omnipotent variable, in short, religion needs to be brought back into
the study of international politics. IR as a field should not shy away from employing
religion as a causal factor. Some scholars even have expressed the need to establish a
subfield that focuses exclusively on the complex relationship between theology and politics (Kubalkova, 2000). This may seem to some like a far-fetched possibility, but it indicates how much attention religion now attracts and how it is re-emerging as vital to the
study of politics.
Methodological preferences
Investigating possible uses of religion in realist and neoliberal thinking and vice versa
(i.e. adoption of certain principles of these strands to understand religion and politics
better without paying too much attention to the coherence of the school of thought) is a
special priority. Whether one agrees with the substance of these theories or not, consensus exists on (a) the persistence of realism as a paradigm in IR theory and (b) its most
Sandal and James
prominent challenger being neoliberalism. Beyond question, realism is also the most
challenging school of thought in terms of accommodating non-material variables into its
explanations of international affairs. Hence, instead of focusing on schools of thought
that are more conducive to the study of identity gender, religion and ethnicity in international relations we prefer taking up a challenge and see how much of a moving
space we have in the most distant IR perspectives when it comes to religion.7
Some specific methodological preferences also are implicit in this project: first, the
focus is limited in terms of the number of IR theories here, so we do not claim to give a
full account of all possible strands of these schools of thought. Our categorization of
classical realism and neorealism may seem crude, especially to scholars who are well
versed in IR theory and the history of political realism. However, an attempt to include
all possible realisms neoclassical (Rose, 1998), postclassical (Brooks, 1997), offensive (Mearsheimer, 2001) and others as well as liberalisms commercial, democratic, regulatory and other variants (Keohane, 1986a; Richardson, 1997) along with
the possibilities of interaction in these accounts, would deflect attention away from religion via too much detail.
Second, some of the suggestions made in the article may remind the reader of constructivism. We try to stay in the main framework of the theories stated and confine our
suggestions and observations to the existing sphere of arguments in the literature. If there
are traces of constructivism in some lines of argument, this is because of an implicit
assumption that constructivism is a methodological approach rather than a school of
thought by itself. Thus it can be employed even in the midst of realist and neoliberal
paradigms toward their improvement. Klotz and Lynch (2007) acknowledge that the
term constructivism means different things to different scholars, but there is an agreement that the focus is on capturing processes of mutual constitution. Barkin (2003:
338) also argues that, unlike realism and liberalism, constructivism is about how to study
politics and it is, indeed, compatible (as are other sets of assumptions about how to
study politics, such as rationalism) with a variety of paradigms, including realism. In
line with these arguments, we recognize that constructivist epistemology is especially
valuable in any discussion of identity-related variables, which are constituted and influenced by social structures as well as contextual factors. However, portraying constructivism as a radical alternative to the existing paradigms instead of a complementary research
methodology would be unfair not only to realist and liberal IR theory, but also to those
who have developed and employed a constructivist research agenda.
Third, during the course of our discussion, we do not exclude the tools of foreign
policy analysis if they are relevant to and consistent with the theory treated. For example,
in our discussion of classical realism and religion, individual-level analytical tools, like
belief systems, are deemed especially relevant. Classical realism, after all, features an
intrinsic individual-level focus, be it in the form of variables or background conditions.
Classical realism and religion

Realism is not a monolithic school of thought; its various strands include their own
assumptions and causal explanations. However, if one needs to come up with a relatively
clear distinction in terms of categories, the realist literature can be divided into two main
schools: classical realism and neorealism. Both schools concur that states are the key
units of action for policy-making and analysis, they seek power and are rational, in the
sense that they have consistent, ordered preferences and they pick the utility-maximizing
choice. Although realism allows for a number of independent variables ranging from
human nature to distribution of capabilities, many scholars who have written on IR
theory have expressed their pessimism about the integration of culture and identity (see,
for example, Hobden, 2001: 4259; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Lapid and Kratochwil,
1996; Schweller, 1988: 20; Zakaria, 1999: 3235). This view can be attributed either to
a relatively restricted interpretation of realism or concerns about the intellectual coherence of this line of thought, especially as represented in its neorealist form.
Classical realism, in its 20th-century manifestation, is most clearly represented by the
works of scholars like John Herz, Hans J. Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr as a reaction to the utopianism that led to World War II.8 These realists reinvigorated the tradition
of power politics so that American policy-makers would avoid both passive unwillingness to use force and destructive and quixotic crusades (Keohane, 1986b: 8). The prevalent concern of the time was the exaggerated use of certain ideologies including
religious ones rather than a total ignorance of what is human. Classical realism, with
its willingness to attain a certain standard for reasoning and avoid ideological rhetoric,
had a normative dimension in this sense it stood against the neglect of interests and an
overemphasis on ideological justifications for inaction or overextension.
What made classical realism unique? The answer is its focus on human nature,
which can be interpreted as an independent variable or background condition depending on ones point of departure. Scholarly investigations that have human nature as an
independent variable or background condition can accommodate religion in line with
the classical realist tradition. Despite attempts to define politics as a science and subject of objective investigation, the dimensions of ethics and morality are taken into
account when assessing the challenges faced by states. The psychological emphasis on
human nature made it easier for classical realism to account for subsystem-level
changes. Since classical realists started with human nature and ended up at the system
level, any inter-level explanation (i.e. that links aspects of human nature to societylevel phenomena) also is possible a considerable advantage if one wants to work
with religion in this framework. It is possible to discern individual-levelstate-level
linkages in most of the works representative of the classical realist tradition. Morgenthau,
for example, asserted that politics is governed by objective laws which have roots in
human nature in his first principle of political realism and then takes nation-state as
the analytic level in his work. Similarly, Niebuhr, who introduced theoretical perspectives on politics based on an Augustinian understanding, employed first- and secondlevel explanations at the same time (1932: 14): Every group, as every individual, has
expansive desires which are rooted in the instinct of survival and soon extend beyond
it. The will-to-live becomes the will-to-power. Niebuhr saw society in a perpetual state
of war. Although he prescribed moral restraint and wrote on the guiding power of the
divine, he also recognized that society will never be sufficiently intelligent to bring all
power under its control and even the most religious men will be living their faith in
asocial, individualistic terms, therefore unable to translate the absolute will into
worldly affairs (Niebuhr, 1932: 46).
Sandal and James
More recently, Jervis (1998: 988) points to the fact that realism emphasizes the
reciprocal relationship between identities and conflict, and social psychologists have
long known that perceptions and misperceptions of what people have in common
often grow out of conflicts as internal unity is gained by seeing others as the Other (see
also Volf, 1996). Through this lens, religion as it plays out in ethnic conflicts, especially
as an independent variable (i.e. defining who we are and who the other is) and intervening variable (as a tool to bring people together who actually have other grievances), can
be situated in a classical realist explanation. Instrumentalism can incorporate religion as
an intervening variable but still preserve the assumption of rationality. Moreover, other
explanations that connect interests, human nature and conflict with each other can also
find a place for religion. The only concern here would be the unit of investigation.
Although classical realism is not as steadfast as neorealism when it comes to states as the
main actors, still, any account that treats religion without reference to states probably
would need to justify that departure. A shift to other mainstream frameworks such as
neoliberalism or the solidarist branch of the English School, the latter of which is not
included in this article (see Devlen et al., 2005) might therefore be considered as an
alternative to heavily state-centric paradigms by scholars who do not want to take the
state as a reference point.
Before any attempt at integration, one should look at the methodological preferences
of classical realism to identify the extent to which non-material variables can be employed
without disturbing the intellectual coherence of the theory. Morgenthau, considered by
many as the father of modern classical realism, joins the positivist school by asserting
that political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. However, Morgenthaus understanding
of science represented more of a desire to decrease the centrality of the normative dimension and perceived wishful thinking in policy-making as witnessed in the post-World
War I era than an attempt to exclude non-material variables altogether: the ultimate
decisions that confront the scientific mind are not intellectual but moral in nature
(Morgenthau, 1972: 9; see also Morgenthau, 1946). His understanding of the dynamics
of politics had an inextricably human dimension: modern man is suspended between his
aspirations, which he cannot fulfil, and his nature, which he cannot escape, [modern
man] experiences the contrast between the longings of his mind and his actual condition
as his personal, eminently human tragedy (Morgenthau, 1972: 10). Reinhold Niebuhr,
despite his faith in the overall trajectory of Christianity, linked the rationality and morality of human life by stating that all men cannot be expected to be spiritual anymore than
they can be expected to become rational (Niebuhr, 1932: 48).
Along with Reinhold Niebuhr, Morgenthau treated human nature as an independent
variable. In this light, religion, as part of the human imagination, can be treated as an
explanatory variable and an aspect of identity with repercussions for the decisions human
beings take and the strivings they experience. In his Moral Man and Immoral Society,
Niebuhr (1932: xx) asserted that the easy subservience of reasons to prejudice and passion, and the consequent persistence of irrational egoism, particularly in group behavior,
make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end. George
Kennan (1967: 319) also expressed his pessimism in equally religious terms: I wish I
could believe that the human impulses which give rise to the nightmares of totalitarianism
10
were ones which Providence had allocated only to other peoples and to which the
American people had graciously been left immune. Therefore, any variable stemming
from human nature and impulses capable of being translated into politics can be used to
explain decisions and political trends within the classical realist tradition. Niebuhr and
Kennan focused on the negative aspects of human nature disproportionately, such as its
passions, prejudices and weak disposition. These traits permit totalitarian control, where
the individual submits to higher ideological aspirations, like the political expressions of a
particular religion. Alternatively, one can be encouraged by the liberal use of emotional
and cognitive terminology in this line of thought. The whys and hows of the human
dimension, manifested in waves ranging from political Islam to evangelical Protestantism,
can be investigated within the boundaries of classical realism.
Use of cognitive variables as related to religion occurred most directly in the so-called
behavioral revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. During this period, an interest in political
psychology allowed for integration of religion as part of socialization and in relation to
its effect on the psychology of the decision-maker and decision itself. The difficulties associated with measurement as experienced with psychological variables in general and
the inappropriateness of inquiring about an individuals religious faith, marginalized
religion in the behavioral literature. Another factor in this avoidance was unwillingness
to tilt the Westphalian deferral (defined as an attempt to contain and manage difference
within the newly erected boundaries of states) in favor of overarching ideas that had the
potential to draw attention away from states and toward transnational movements
(Blaney and Inayatullah, 2000: 32). Neither policy-makers nor mainstream academics
stood ready to accept movement in that direction.
Such hostility towards any usage of religion in politics already had been expressed by
Morgenthau (1956: 234) when he elevated national interest over religious ideals: Little
do they know that they meet under an empty sky from which the gods have departed.
This statement targeted the futility of employing ambiguous ideals in a system in which
the key unit (i.e. state) existed independently of these belief systems. Since the state is
the central political actor in classical realism, policies cannot be justified on the basis of
pure ideology; a states interests override any moral or ideological framework. In a
Niebuhrian reasoning, despite the individual possibility of attaining the moral ideal, it
should not be expected that human collectivities can be close to this ideal. Individuals
have beliefs and ideals; states do not. Again, this is not an obstacle to employing religion
as a variable. However, in a state-level account in which religion or ideology is the only
variable, it becomes appropriate to shift to some alternative school of thought. Using
religion as a subunit variable with influence on state behavior is obviously different from
explaining state behavior (as a sum) exclusively by an ideology. To give an example,
within a classical realist framework, one cannot say that Iran committed an action
because it is an Islamic state, but the same framework would allow an explanation about
the influence of Ahmedinejads religious beliefs and/or pragmatic usage of religious discourse in determining the direction of Iranian policy.
Although classical realism emphasized power and interest, these concepts are used
flexibly enough to permit integration of the kind of cultural variables at issue here.
Realism, Morgenthau (1956: 5) argues, does not endow its key concept of interest
defined as power with a meaning that is fixed once and for all and the kind of interest
11
Sandal and James
determining political action in a particular period of history depends upon the political
and cultural context within which foreign policy is formulated. Morgenthaus interest
formation, which depended on a political and cultural context, sounds very much in line
with constructivism. Despite Morgenthaus cautions against the use of ideology at the
expense of prudence and self-restraint, if a state, as an institution, relies heavily on religion as an instrument of legitimacy in a period in which religion is influential in terms of
bringing people together, then religion may well be tied effectively to interests. Depending
on the context, moral arguments can override strategic speculation as Loriaux (1992)
states in his analysis of Augustinian realism; there is not only one human psychology, but
individual psychologies which collectively determine the meaning of interest and power
with a consideration of moral perspectives.
Obviously, the role of religion in a theocracy would be different from in a democracy
or a secular autocracy. But the flexibility of the concept of interest allows for usage of
constructs like ethnicity, race and religion as independent or intervening variables. The
same flexibility goes for power as well; its content and the manner of its use are determined by the political and cultural environment. Power may comprise anything that
establishes the power of man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which
serve that end, from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which
one mind controls another (Morgenthau, 1956: 8). Niebuhr (1996: 260) also argues that
man can create an endless variety of types and combinations of power, from that of pure
reason to that of pure physical force.
Within this framework, again, influence is particularly important. Employment of
religion as a source of legitimacy (which increases ones power by increasing ones
control on fellow citizens or even the citizens of another country) is not only permissible,
but also inevitable to make sense of things. Some even claim that the legitimacy of governments cannot be thought of independently of religion (see Geertz, 1977; Gill, 1998;
Kokoslakis, 1985). Niebuhr (1932: 36), while optimistic that high religions move toward
an interpretation of the divine as benevolent will, also reminds us about the possibility
of employing religion as a tool in which human vice and error may be clothed by religion in garments of divine magnificence. This suggests that the introduction of mechanisms of control over others (alternatively, a mechanism to get rid of control imposed by
others) and analyses of such mechanisms would contribute to both to the classical realist
framework and the literature on legitimacy.
A key methodological question needs to be answered before we can come up with a
convincing inter-level explanation: how can one translate individual-level needs and
insecurities (e.g. the need for affiliation and belonging, the need for consistency, etc.) to
state-level variables?9 Classical realism actually encourages the study of morality, ethics
and religion at the individual level or any subunit level for that matter. However, interest
formation at the state level is not that clear-cut. Any investigation that can contribute to
our understanding of such a mechanism would be a step forward for classical realism and
such a step would systematize this rich tradition without disturbing the core.
In short, Morgenthaus and Niebuhrs broad interpretations of power and interest as
well as a renewed focus on the Weberian legacy in classical realism is good news for
scholars who are interested in using cultural variables in the framework of realism.10
Since the Weberian tradition offers a solid framework when it comes to the belief
12
systemreligionsociety triangle (Hamilton, 1995), a line of thought whose intellectual

predecessors have been exposed to this tradition would welcome studies on religion and
decision-making. Morgenthaus understanding of politics as captured in classical realism
is a moral and political project in addition to an analytic device. Niebuhrs linkage of
human nature to state of conflict via will-to-power and the tendency of society to ignore
moral considerations also allows classical realist investigations of behavior as well as
issues of interpretation of the divine. Therefore, religion can be easily integrated into this
strand of realism both as an independent and an intervening variable. The classical realists certainly had a distaste for the use of ideology or religion by elites, but Niebuhrs
theorizing, for example, permits an account of ideology and politics if (a) the ideology in
focus is used as a tool of legitimacy; (b) the state is actually based on that ideology,
which in turn becomes an inherent aspect of the identity of individuals and vice versa;
and (c) if the key decision-makers worldview is particularly affected by a dimension of
their nature and upbringing, including religion.11
Niebuhr is back in business. One example is a lively debate about which components
of his theorizing would have held pride of place regarding the issue of the Iraq War.
Opponents of the war might point to the danger of unchecked power, while advocates
could call upon the need to act to prevent greater evil (Elie, 2007: 86, 8890, 94, 96).
Niebuhr explored at greater length would reveal considerable relevance to US foreign
policy, most notably as related to Iraq and the Middle East. Similarly, as Sharp points out,
Butterfields English School legacy could be applied to Iraq vis-a-vis the practice of selfrighteousness in statecraft identified as being particularly dangerous (Sharp, 2003: 875).
Neorealism and religion

Neorealism does not allow for an easy accommodation of religion. Classical realist
accounts are looked down upon as reductionist and state behavior is explained by looking at system-level variables like the distribution of material capabilities. According to
neorealists, states strive for survival in an anarchical system. Whatever happens inside
the units, it is the distribution of capabilities in the system that defines how a state would
behave in a given situation. States are self-interested and are concerned about relative (as
opposed to absolute) gains; they are interacting units that exhibit behavioral regularities
and form the system. They balance the capabilities of other state(s) by balancing externally (i.e. forming alliances) or internally (i.e. building up military capabilities) in a
search for security. Security is defined in strictly military terms, at least in the standard
Waltzian framework (Waltz, 1979: 80). Neorealism can be seen as a reaction to the
unscientific aspects of classical realism.12 Nye (1988: 241) asserts that the significance
of Waltzs work is not in elaborating a new line of theory, but in the systematization of
realism. Keohane (1986b: 164165) shares the same view and sees neorealism as a
progressive problem shift, but one that preserves the core assumptions of the theory
(see also James, 2002).
Without an explicit view of man, Shimko (1992: 299) observes, neorealism cannot
have any view of the human condition and therefore becomes philosophically antiseptic.
The aloofness of neorealism when it comes to human nature actually any variable that
is not related to the distribution of capabilities makes it difficult to see it as a
13
Sandal and James
welcoming host for investigation of transnational phenomena with a human focus. Brooks
(1997: 450) argues that neorealists implicitly replace the human aggression in classical
realism with fear (also see Waltz, 1959: 1642). However, despite the existence of fear in
neorealism as a key variable, it is not meant to be used on an individual level, which is not
highly respected in the Waltzian framework, no matter how generously it is interpreted.
This is one of the most criticized assumptions of neorealism; it blackboxes the state
much more than classical realism and how a state can have fear (and how its choices can
be explained without reference to its components) remains a question neorealism must
answer. Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 53) state that realism, especially its neorealist variant, suffers from a degeneration in which its conceptual foundations are being stretched
beyond all recognition or utility; it has become a generic commitment to the assumption
of rational state behavior. Taken in this sense, it becomes more difficult to place variables
like religion, even when they are investigated as a reflection of the exogenous distribution
and manipulation of interstate capabilities. This is due more to the intellectual narrowness
of minimal realism that is defined by anarchy and rationality only than the
authentic foundations of the paradigm (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 6).
Neorealism may not be fully welcoming to cultural variables but their accommodation as complementary accounts is not discouraged, even within the limits of minimal
realism. Even Waltz (1959: 238) does not dismiss the importance of the first and second
images: The third image described the framework of world politics, but without the first
and second images there can be no knowledge of forces that determine policy (also see
Goddard and Nexon, 2005). However, the emphasis on these images at least in the
absence of any material variable has been insignificant. Despite the influence of
Christianity and Islam in the Middle Ages and the variegated revolutionary ideas of the
French, Bolsheviks and Nazis in the modern era, these definitions of foreign policy
ends hardly meant something worthy of investigation for the neorealists (Smith, 2000).
Waltz (1997: 913), in response to Vasquezs prominent criticism, stated that old realists
see causes as running directly from states to the outcomes. New realists see states
forming a structure by their interactions and then being strongly affected by the structure
their interactions have formed.
Such a view, however, did not prevent scholars like Posen from using neorealist concepts like the security dilemma to account for ethnic conflict. According to Posen
(1993), security dilemmas within states are analogous to interstate ones and the collapse
of multi-ethnic states leads to an emerging anarchy. This anarchy forces different groups
in the state to provide their own security. Posens choice of terminology is ideal if one
wants to account for religious group dynamics and competition as well. In a similar vein,
Kaufman (1996) acknowledges the possibility of such anarchy under certain conditions,
such as the lack of effective control of the people by the government and the presence of
strong ethnic groups with enough of the attributes of sovereignty. In short, even if neorealism cannot accommodate ethnicity or religion in its core framework, concepts like
security dilemma, balancing and polarity can be employed to account for conflicts that
have an identity dimension. In the end, neorealism has a coherent literature and terminology and whether one agrees with the key assumptions or not, neorealist terms can be
adapted to account for intra-state or transnational identity conflicts in a relatively parsimonious way.
14
Although it does not seem possible to situate any subsystem variable into the Waltzian
framework,13 one can still find a place for religion in neorealism defined broadly to
include the scholars who regard themselves as neorealists.14 Buzans framework of
Classical Security Complex Theory (CSCT) is a variant of realism that is open to new
variables on different levels; its revised version, which focuses more evenly on military,
political, economic, societal and environmental sectors and brings non-state actors into
the security complexes, permits investigation of complex issues like terrorism. The
linkage of the societal level with others in this framework makes it a suitable theory for
scholars who want to focus on any identity variable, especially if it relates to a certain
region in which security concerns of the actors cannot be thought of independently from
each other. Admittedly, this is outside of the Waltzian framework and can only serve as a
complementary theory of unit behavior in Waltzs terms. How neorealist it is, or is not,
is again a debate that can be resolved within the neorealist tradition. In addition, CSCT is
not the ideal framework if one wants to look at mechanisms of global governance and
transnational ideas in general; the current structure of CSCT is most suitable when looking at how a specific factor (like religion, ethnicity or race) plays a role in a certain region.
There are other possibilities for accommodation. Walts balance of threat theory, due
to its implicitly constructivist terminology, can allow the introduction of religion even as
an independent variable. What a state sees as a threat in another state (Walt, as Buzan
does in his CSCT, treats states as units) may be defined by ideological as well as religious differences, which means that balancing behavior is the dependent variable. In the
neorealist framework broadly defined, Zakaria (1999) points out that states seek to maximize influence rather than power. This line of argument, similar to classical realisms
conceptualization of power, opens the way for inclusion of religion as an intervening (i.e.
source of legitimacy), if not independent, variable. In a similar vein, religion, like ethnicity, might have an influence on the alliance patterns that have direct implications for the
distribution of capabilities in the system (Davis et al., 1997).
Neorealism may be conducive to incorporation of moral considerations if these can be
linked to the main level and actors. For instance, Telhami (2002) claims that nothing in
neorealism precludes a theory linking moral factors and the external behavior of states;
if relative power is regarded as an instrument for implementing a states motives,
domestic politics and ideology can be treated again both as independent and intervening
variables depending on the expressed interests of a state. Governments engage in
conflict over any scarce and valuable good, including political and national ideology
and religious identity; the assumption of fixed and uniformly conflictual preferences is
more permissive in this sense than it seems (Legro and Moravcsik, 1999: 15). Regarding
the presumed realist position about the absence of morality in the realm of politics as a
mere theoretical preference that should be replaced in the light of emerging challenges,
Telhami takes another progressive step in realist thinking. Waltz states that systems
theories (which tell us about the forces the units [i.e. states] experience) explain why
different units behave similarly, and despite their variations, produce outcomes that fall
within expected ranges. By contrast, theories at the unit level tell us why different units
behave differently despite their similar placement in a system (Waltz, 1979: 72). Linking
Telhamis and Waltzs views on the issue, it is not impossible for scholars of IR to come
up with a theory of ideology that is acceptable within the limits of neorealism. Even Waltz
15
Sandal and James
himself acknowledges that system-level theory has to be accompanied by a unit-level

theory in order to get a full account of events (Waltz, 1979: 4849, 78, 87, 126). A unitlevel theory would inevitably take religion into account as part of the worldview of the
leader, political culture or bureaucratic system. Saudi Arabia and the United States might
assume a similar political position on an issue for very different reasons. A unit-level
theory that includes identity-related variables such as religion would provide the systemlevel theory with insights about the political causal mechanism and, consequently, with
the possibility of falsification and the prospect of better theoretical predictions.
Neoliberalism and religion

Neoliberalism constitutes the biggest mainstream challenge to neorealism. Neoliberals
accept the anarchy assumption of the neorealists but do not share its resulting pessimism.
They give considerable weight to non-state actors and their significant influence in the
political realm, especially thanks to the leverage of the latter in the economic sphere;
multinational firms, banks and other networks are important players and international
affairs is not just confined to the military sector in Buzans terminology. Keohane and
Nye (1987: 733) stated that, although states are still important actors, their autonomy is
being eroded by transnational forces, and cited interdependence as a relatively underdeveloped and undervalued concept with high potential. A set of rules and institutions
affects relations among states and pushes the international system toward pluralism and
diversity. Neoliberalism holds that transnational contacts and coalitions have transformed national interests and attitudes (Tarzi, 2004: 120). Contrary to neorealisms
emphasis on states, neoliberalism portrays an international system that also includes
competition and cooperation amongst national groups and transnational institutions
(Nye, 1988).15 With their emphasis on multiple channels of connection, absence of hierarchy among issues and the irrelevance of reliance on brute force, neoliberals diverge
significantly from neorealists.
Neoliberalism, by stating that transnational actors will pursue their own goals and
by acknowledging the importance of issue linkage, makes space for religious organizations and groups that would seem to exceed any strand of realism. Reflecting the
general view of neoliberalism, Nye (1988: 243) finds the systemunit-level differentiation odd; even if one can accept the unit-level character of a theory of foreign policy, it
is difficult to see how demographic trends, transnational flows, and military technology
that affect many states are assigned to the unit level. With its emphasis on international
institutions and norms, the liberal tradition is the most appealing framework for scholars
who investigate the transnational aspects and influence of religion. To put it more boldly,
any neoliberal theory of international relations that is devoid of moral sentiments will
not be able to account for crucial dynamics of political economy. Adam Smith linked
economics, conscience and morality as early as 1759. He concluded that political and
economic structures are outcomes of natural human action rather than conscious planning, the traditional focus for rational choice theorists. Religion, as a mental framework,
and usually coupled with political theologies (described below), has a determinative
effect on what is acceptable and what is not in human interaction, which has been the
basis of commerce and politics.
16
Political theologies, defined as the set of ideas that a religious body holds about
legitimate political authority, can also be investigated and employed within the neoliberal paradigm (Philpott, 2007). Due to the absence of a generic definition of religion,
how religious communities relate their beliefs to their public and political life gains special meaning when it comes to conflict and cooperation. According to Philpott, the difference in political theologies as well as the institutional relationship differentiation has
the potential to explain the political ambivalence of religion.
Axelrods (1984) evolution of cooperation, which draws attention to the development
of social conventions and effective rules in the expectation of repeated interaction, is also a
useful framework in which to investigate the possibilities of inter-faith dialogue and its
permissibility in the political theologies described above. Its emphasis on reciprocity leading to cooperation puts Axelrods intuitively plausible and prominent framework within the
mainstream of neoliberal concept formation. Works by Appleby (2000) and Gopin (2002),
which focus on the issue of religion and conflict resolution, fall under this rubric of the
evolution of cooperation. A states religion can potentially be a tool to legitimate, support or
destroy a regime, which is, again, a key variable in neoliberalism.16 Planned changes in
regimes require the destruction of existing institutions and the coordination of expectations
around new focal points (Young, 1982: 280). Viewed in that light, neoliberalism has the
potential to become a platform for the scholars whose area of interest is terrorist organizations that employ religious rhetoric.17 In that sense, religion can be accommodated both as
a dependent and an independent variable. This is not to say that political actors have unlimited power over the interpretation of religion or to deny that religious traditions have a life
of their own dependent on the audience in addition to political entrepreneurs.18 However, in
any given scholarly account, it is not quite possible to capture all dimensions of religion and
an attempt to achieve such a daunting task might distort the picture altogether. Therefore, it
is up to the individual scholar to distinguish the role(s) played by religion as an independent, dependent or intervening factor in a political event.
Along the same lines, the public choice literature as exemplified by the works of Arrow
(1970), Olson (1965) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962) should be considered seriously
since it has the potential to shed light on the role of religion in the relationship between
collective choices and institutional arrangements. Public choice assumes that individuals
are guided by their perceived self-interest; they make choices in light of these interests and
collective arrangements result from bargaining among actors including politicians
with diverse preferences. Public choice literature would be helpful in modeling and understanding the tension between the political theologies and political institutions among
many other issues. An example could be the preference for a secular public sphere over a
religious one (or vice versa) due to political power concerns of the governing elite more
than belief in the inherent value of the secular or religious order for everyone.
McCloskeys (2006) treatment of the intimate ties between political psychology in the
framework of virtues (prudence, justice, temperance, courage, love, faith and hope) and
economic structures also provides a basis for investigation of religion and modes of cooperation. Similarly, van Staveren (2001) develops an Aristotelian conception of economics
that requires a closer look at psychology. For a viable economic life, actors need to
develop certain capabilities (emotions, deliberation, commitment and human interaction)
within three main domains (freedom, justice and care). Van Staverens model allows for
17
Sandal and James
integration of a religion variable into neoliberal theory. Such an integration can account
for the patterns of distribution, conflict and cooperation that cannot be explained by models that employ a stricter rationality assumption inspired by neoclassical economics. For
those who prefer a two-way interaction model of religion and social structures, Jones
(2006) study provides a valuable point of departure. Jones states that culture defined
as patterns of beliefs, habits, values, ideals and preferences shared by groups of people is
slow to change but it is still fluid and responsive to economic, political and social forces.
It affects economics and politics but then is transformed itself in return.
Among the scholars who have investigated religion (especially as a dependent variable) using a similar kind of neoliberal line of argumentation is Iannaccone, who looks
at religion within a market approach. The combined actions of religious consumers and
religious producers are the part of a religious market that tends toward an equilibrium;
the free market has made religion more attractive to the consumers (Iannaccone,
1995; Warner, 1993). Modernity is not necessarily an engine for secularization but it
pluralizes beliefs and preferences by creating a market for religion. Religious institutions
become voluntary organizations that regulate social, political and economic behavior.
One can also take the actions of religious organizations as an attempt to correct political
market failures as Keohane (1984: 85) suggests in his explanation of regimes and as a
desire to become a status maximizer, competing with the alternatives in the international system in terms of political and economic status (Mishan, 1982).
Religions influence in both domestic and transnational politics also can be investigated by employing other concepts rooted in neoliberal tradition. Soft power, defined
as the ability to shape the preferences of others by non-military means, can be easily
adapted to non-state actors (Nye, 2004). Soft power of an entity entails three resources:
culture, political values and its policy resting on legitimacy and moral authority (Nye,
2004: 11). This concept, when systematically employed as a tool, can help to explain
why certain religious groups (including terrorist groups in any religion) have so much
influence on their adherents. By facilitating investigation of how groups interact with
institutions and what the effects are on foreign policy behavior, such a framework also
can accommodate the influence of religion in ethnic conflicts (see Fox, 1999, 2000;
Henderson, 1997). In a similar vein, with the changing scope of governance thanks to the
advance of technology, religious actors also take part in global civil society, transcending
the distinction between the domestic and the international (Bartelson, 2006). Individuals
who share the same religious conviction around the world come together to challenge the
premises of the traditional state structure. Religious institutions connect with each other
to realize their local and transnational objectives. Although it is too early to say that these
movements are mature enough to provide an alternative mode of governance, they are
too strong and widespread to exclude from theories of international relations.
Other culture- and norm-based explanations regarding religion also can be investigated by using the constructivist-oriented tools of liberalism. The concept of just war,
for example, is the result of an implicit cooperative agreement among states to maximize
their long-term absolute gains. This concept has its origins in theological justification for
war (Walzer, 1977). Investigation of such conceptual links, which can shed light on the
mechanisms of interest formation and behavioral change, would enrich both the neoliberal theory itself and the literature on identities, including religion.
18
Conclusion: Connecting IR theory with religion

Religion, a relatively new variable in the study of international relations, not only can be
integrated into IR theory, but even benefit from the insights of established traditions
when there is a need to explain complex interactions. We have argued that religion is a
part of the world out there and it should be treated accordingly. This is not to say that
religion can be added superficially to all accounts; scholars should pay utmost attention
to its definition and operationalization in their work, regardless of paradigm.
Due to limited space, we have looked at only three traditions to see how religion can
contribute to our understanding of international affairs within those frameworks. We
claim that, without stretching the limits of theories or disturbing their intellectual coherence, it is quite possible to see possibilities for two-way interactions between the frameworks and identity-related variables like religion. Obviously, for a concept like religion,
which has local, national and transnational dimensions at the same time, the distinction
among these dimensions may not always be very clear and such a distinction should not
be pre-imposed on a research agenda. The researcher should make choices in line with
the object of investigation, warning of any dimension that might have been underemphasized at the expense of other factors. Given the diverse interests of scholars of international relations, such choices and their integration into different IR theory strands should
be regarded as complementary, rather than essentially conflicting.
Classical realism is most suitable for sub-state accounts of religion. The focus on
human nature, the flexible definition of rationality, interest and power as well as the
widely used terminology of emotions and cognition allow for integration of studies of
belief systems and worldviews, over which religion has significant influence. The way
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) defined citizenship, national interest and foreign policy in India, relying on the concept of Hindutva, had significant local and international
consequences, including a change in alliance patterns. Evangelical Christianity, with its
emphasis on emotions and self-realization, has spread all over the world, influencing
political agendas and the official discourses of many countries, most notably the United
States. Another possible research avenue at the intersection of classical realism and
religion would be the analysis of politicians personalities and how they reflect their
perceptions in the public arena. Ian Paisley and the impact of the Free Presbyterian
Church on the politics of Northern Ireland can fruitfully be explored in the framework
of classical realism. Religion as a tool of legitimacy also can be studied under this
framework, given the definition of power with a focus on influence. The role of the
Dutch Reformed Church in the introduction and also the demise of apartheid in South
Africa testifies to the importance of religious institutions in (de)legitimizing political
systems. The only limitation in this school of thought is its final level. Accounts of
transnational phenomena would not fit neatly under this framework, which takes state
interactions as the focus.
Structural realism is unquestionably the most challenging framework within which to
work. There is always the possibility of coming up with a complementary model of
foreign policy that includes religion as a variable. Still, such a model would have to
accept its conceptual subordination to the system-level theory. In terms of interactions,
one can see that neorealist terminology is borrowed to explain sub- or trans-system
19
Sandal and James
entities and events, especially the conflicts. Admittedly, it is the identity-defining aspect
of religion that one can fit into the framework rather than legitimacy or worldview functions of it. Political leaders ranging from Mahmoud Ahmedinejad of Iran to Jiang Zemin
of China have employed religion as part of an official discourse when balancing with
other states. Analysis of the impact of such an identity creation and consolidation on
alliance patterns and balancing behavior could be conducted within the neorealist perspective. The relative inability of neorealism to accommodate religion may imply the
inadequacy of the tools in the strand that are needed to account for the phenomena we
are facing in politics today. Still, the bridging of religion with structural realism, even in
a relatively limited framework, has important research implications. SunniShia rivalry
in the Middle East, led by Iran and Saudi Arabia, can best be explained by balance of
threat and threat perceptions emanating from a religious source. The foreign policy and
balancing behavior of the state of Israel cannot be investigated without due reference to
its Jewish identity. The ethnic conflicts in the Balkans, Northern Ireland and South Asia,
with their strong religious overtones, are clear examples of the security dilemma and it
would be difficult to explain any ethno-religious conflict without borrowing from structural realist terminology.
If one wants to look at religious organizations/institutions and related transnational
phenomena, neoliberalism looks like the most suitable framework for such investigations in mainstream IR theory. With its emphasis on norms and regimes as well as its
focus on a plurality of issues and definitions of power, neoliberalism is conducive to
studies of legitimacy (which take religion as an intervening variable) and transnational
identity formation (taking religion both as a dependent and an independent variable).
Among the transnational religious organizations that impact upon local and international
politics are the Catholic Church, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, religious
NGOs that operate in parts of the developing world and the lobbies of ethno-religious
groups that operate in major powers in the system. At the other end of the scale, the ways
in which fundamentalist groups (including but not restricted to terrorist ones) such as
Al-Qaeda change the terms of politics can also be accommodated by a neoliberal framework. Such a linkage would facilitate the analytical investigations of many other violent
strands by emphasizing the competition and cooperation among the groups in terms of
catering to the physical and spiritual needs of individuals. With whom do these groups
cooperate? What do they deliver that the other groups in the market cannot? These
questions, asked within the framework of neoliberalism, have the potential to shed additional light on the dynamics of transnational power and relationships.
Admittedly, this review is quite limited both in terms of its coverage of IR theory
and its assessment of the religionpolitics literature. The aim of the article is to encourage thinking about religion without abandoning the widely used frameworks in IR
theory. What we have intended to show is that it is quite possible to link these areas of
literature to each other and that such a move would actually be enriching for both the
frameworks mentioned and for the study of religion in international affairs. If, as students of IR, we would hope to integrate nuanced variables such as religion into our
theorizing, a discussion of the extent to which theories in the field accommodate the
existing accounts and phenomena is a crucial exercise that needs to be extended to as
many strands of thought as possible.
20
Notes
1. An earlier draft of the article was presented at the 2009 Annual Convention of the International
Studies Association. The authors would like to thank Laurie Brand, Robert English, Jonathan
Fox, Deniz Kuru, Steven Lamy, Yosef Lapid, Neophytos Loizides and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions.
2. For an introduction to the near-hegemonic tradition of modernization and secularization in
sociological theory, see Wilson (1982) and Hamilton (2001); on secularisms long-standing
dominance in IR theory, consult Hurd (2004).
3. On the resurgence of religion in IR, see Thomas (2000) and Rubin (1994). For detailed
accounts of the intensity of religious beliefs and capacity for violence, see Appleby (2000),
Juergensmeyer (2003), Almond et al. (2003) and Carlson and Owens (2003). For treatments
of the more positive role religion may play in faith-based diplomacy, peacemaking and peacebuilding, see Cox and Philpott (2003), Johnston (2003), Sampson (1997) and Coward and
Smith (2004).
4. For substantive treatments of how religion can be integrated into the study of international
affairs on a number of different levels, see Fox and Sandler (2004), Petito and Hatzopoulos
(2003), Rubin (1994), Johnston (2003), Miles (2004), Juergensmeyer (2005) and James
(2010). Other works that deal with issues relevant to IR, but not strictly IR itself, include
Appleby (2000), Almond et al. (2003), Fox (2004) and Norris and Inglehart (2004).
5. For a detailed account of modernity and secularization, see Juergensmeyer (1993) and
Inglehart and Welzel (2005).
6. Religious identity manifested in particular faiths and inter-religious conflict needs to be differentiated from other factors of religion as causal variables. For example, whether one religion or another is inherently more violence-prone is beyond the scope of this exposition.
7. An impressive example in an area of IR theory more conducive to contact with religion,
namely, the English School, appears in Thomas (2005).
8. One can trace political realism back to ancient Greece, 16th-century Italian city-states or
17th-century England and this is indeed possible without disturbing the intellectual coherence
of realist thinking. See Thucydides (1972 [c. 400 BC]), Machiavelli (1985 [1513]) and
Hobbes (1988 [1651]). For a discussion of the contributions of Thucydides and Machiavelli
to classical realism literature, see Forde (1992).
9. See Lincoln (2003: 2, 57). While embarking on this journey, it is important to bear in mind
the evolution of concept formation about religion. As Lincoln demonstrates, it cannot be separated from culture, occupies multiple domains and must be addressed in a polytheic and
flexible manner.
10. For a broader treatment of realism and the Weberian tradition, see Williams (2005), Barkawi
(1998) and Pichler (1998).
11. However, this line of thought, despite its flexibility, is not the most suitable for a study of
transnational religious phenomena, networks (including terrorist groups) and governance systems due to its focus on states as the basic units of analysis.
12. For a broader treatment of the differences between classical realism and neorealism, see
Brooks (1997), Gilpin (1984) and Schweller and Priess (1997).
13. See Elman (1996) for an argument to the contrary.
14. See Buzan (1993) and Walt (1987).
21
Sandal and James
15. For a sociological treatment of the religious movements, see also Eisenstadt (2000). In this
work, Eisenstadt states that religiously inspired movements constitute another path of modernity; hence they can be situated in existing sociological frameworks that draw attention to
transnational aspects of ideologies.
16. For regime theory, see Young (1982), Krasner (1983), Ruggie (1983), Keohane (1984) and
Haggard and Simmons (1987).
17. Some prominent investigations of such terrorist organizations include Stern (2004), Almond
et al. (2003), Hoffman (1995) and Rapaport (1984).
18. Hasenclever and Rittberger (2000) differentiate among the primordialist, instrumentalist and
moderate constructivist accounts, claiming that only the moderate constructivist accounts
recognize the unique trajectory that religion follows.
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Biographical notes
Nukhet A. Sandal is a visiting fellow at the Watson Institute for International Studies
at Brown University. Her research interests include religion and international affairs,
politics of divided societies and international relations theory.
Patrick James works at the University of Southern California, USA and is the author or
editor of 17 books and over one hundred other academic publications. He served a fiveyear term as editor of International Studies Quarterly. James has been honored by the
International Studies Association as Distinguished Scholar in Foreign Policy Analysis
(200607) and Ethnicity, Nationalism and Migration (200910).

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University of Southern California, USA

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Religion on the backburner

European Journal of International Relations 17(1)

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Classical realism and religion

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European Journal of International Relations 17(1)

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systemreligionsociety triangle (Hamilton, 1995), a line of thought whose intellectual

Neorealism and religion

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himself acknowledges that system-level theory has to be accompanied by a unit-level

Neoliberalism and religion

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Conclusion: Connecting IR theory with religion

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Huntington SP (1993) The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72(3): 2249.

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