Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 37:1

0021–8308

Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a
Critical Realist Tradition
Tuukka
Original
Exploring
Kaidesoja
Article
the
of Social
Causal
Power in a Critical Realist
Tradition
Blackwell
Oxford,
Journal
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0021-8308
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The Executive
UK
for
Publishing
theConcept
Theory
Management
Ltd
of
Committee/Blackwell
Behaviour
Publishing
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TUUKKA KAIDESOJA

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INTRODUCTION

The historical origins of the philosophical concept of causal power are traceable
to everyday language concepts such as ability, capacity, and readiness. In the
Western philosophical tradition, one of the earliest systematic treatments of this
concept can be found in Aristotle’s philosophy; his concept of efficient cause can
be seen as an ancestor of the modern concept of causal power. “Efficient cause”
is, however, only one of the four types of causes (or causal explanations) in
Aristotle’s classification of them. The others are formal, material, and teleological
cause. From this perspective, it is rather surprising that many current advocates
of the concept of causal power tend to see the variable causal powers of things as
the only kind of causes there is. This assumption is also largely accepted in the
critical realist tradition based on Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of science. As is well
known, Bhaskar espoused the concept of causal power along with some other
ideas from Rom Harré, who was his teacher in philosophy. Therefore, the roots
of this concept in the critical realist tradition can be found in the early works of
Harré and his associates (e.g. E.H. Madden, P.F. Secord).
For the sake of clarity, it is useful to distinguish the ontological problem of
causality from the epistemological problem. The former problem concerns the
question: what is causation? A solution of this problem should specify, among
other things, the differentiating characteristics of causal relations from other kind
of relations. I agree with critical realists that the concept of causality cannot be
eliminated from any viable ontology and that the ontological problem of causality
is therefore a genuine one. The latter problem, by contrast, deals with the question:
how is it possible to acquire knowledge concerning causal relations? Here, we are
interested in the empirical identification of causal relations and empirical testing
of hypotheses and explanatory theories that putatively refer to causal relations and
causal mechanisms. Nevertheless, the ontological and the epistemological problems
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007. Published by Blackwell
Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

64

Tuukka Kaidesoja

of causality are not entirely independent, as our solution to one of them constrains the domain of possible solutions to the other.
The concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition is designed to address
the ontological problem of causality. Critical realists commonly believe that, in order
to develop adequate epistemological and methodological views, ontological questions must be answered first. Following this order of exposition, I herein analyse
and evaluate the uses of the concept of causal power in this tradition mainly from
the ontological point of view, although I also have occasionally something to say
about the epistemological and methodological implications of these uses as well.
I begin by investigating Harré and E.H. Madden’s Causal Powers (CP), in which
they present a detailed analysis of the concept of causal power. Then I examine
the doctrine of human powers that Harré and P.F. Secord put forward in their
book, The Explanation of Social Behaviour (ESB). There is, however, somewhat a
controversial issue as to whether these two books be classified as belonging to the
tradition of critical realism or not. Be this as it may, these books have certainly
been influential in the formation of Bhaskar’s early philosophy of science and the
critical realist concept of causal power. Indeed, I also attempt to show that some
of the problems that vitiate the applications of the concept of causal power in
Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works already appear in CP and ESB. Furthermore, I point out that there are also some interesting contrasts between the
concept of causal power found in Harré and his associates’ early works and the
concept of causal power that is developed in the works of Bhaskar and other
critical realists (e.g. lack of the concept of emergence in CP and ESB). Next, I
turn my attention to Bhaskar’s first book, A Realist Theory of Science (RTS). I argue
that his transcendental account of the concept of causal power is both ontologically
and methodologically problematic. I also show that his version of the concept of
emergent causal power is ambiguous. Finally, I examine how the concept of
causal power is used in the critical realist social ontology that was first articulated
in Bhaskar’s book, The Possibility of Naturalism (PN). In this context, I also briefly
address the criticism that Harré and Charles C. Varela (e.g. 1996) raise against
applying the concept of causal power to social structures in the critical realist
social ontology. Although I largely accept their criticism, I nevertheless argue that
the concept of emergent causal power might be applied in a certain way to the
system-level properties of certain kind of concrete social systems. I also try to show
that the relations between the structure of the concrete social system and its
component agents may be considered as causal on the condition that we give up the
idea that there is only one adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality.

HARRÉ AND MADDEN ON THE CONCEPT CAUSAL POWER

In recent discussions dealing with critical realism, it is sometimes forgotten that
Harré (e.g. 1970) already uses the concept of causal power in the late sixties and
© 2007 The Author
Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007

2007 .H. However. They contend that the world studied by natural sciences should not be understood as merely consisting of passive matter in motion. 5). They also believe that it is. ] are the ontological ‘ties that bind’ causes and effects together” (ibid. and biological organisms. Harré and Madden also argue that the relationship between the ensemble of causal powers of a powerful particular and that its essential nature is naturally necessary and. according to this view. 16–18. Harré and Madden (1975. Examples of such powerful particulars include fields of potentials. meanings. However. ibid. I will come back to this extension later. in certain conditions. 101–102) refer to the real essences of powerful particulars.g. the powers of a certain powerful particular manifest themselves in observable effects necessarily. or regularly conjoined atomistic events. the term “can” incorporated into the previous analysis is meant to secure the extension of this analysis to the ascription of causal powers to people (ibid. in the appropriate conditions. I think that the analysis presented in CP is compatible with Harré’s earlier accounts of this concept and for this reason I focus. These real essences are constitutions or structures of particular things in virtue of which they each posses a certain ensemble of causal powers. in this section. 11). the most detailed analysis of this concept in Harré’s works can be found in CP. The natural necessity that connects causes to their effects in causal relations is. An important feature of Harré and Madden’s account of causality is that they conceive the relationship between the occasion for the exercise of the certain power and the manifestations of that power in observable effects as naturally necessary (ibid. By the concept of intrinsic nature. Madden. 102). and social classes cannot possess causal powers.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 65 early seventies. possible to divide objects of natural scientific research into natural kinds according to their real essences (ibid.” In other words. They also maintain that. They argue that these powerful particulars generate the observable patterns of events and the nomic regularities. the concept of causal power adequately represents the metaphysics presupposed by modern natural sciences. a real feature of the world and not a feature that the mind has somehow projected onto reality. which he wrote jointly with E. which they possess in virtue of their natures. . chemical substances. but rather of causally interacting powerful particulars. on the analysis of the concept of causal power that was put forward in CP. moral values. According to Harré and Madden. in principle. One consequence of this analysis is that abstract entities such as numbers. Harré and Madden argue that powerful particulars possess essential natures in virtue of which they each necessarily possess a certain ensemble of powers. causal powers are properties of concrete powerful particulars. in virtue of its intrinsic nature’. ordinary material objects. Furthermore. they also contend that it is physically impossible for a powerful particular © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 87). therefore. Harré and Madden (e. “[t]he ineliminable but non-mysterious powers and abilities of particular things [ . 86) analyse the ascription of causal power to a thing as follows: “ ‘X has the power to A’ means ‘X (will)/(can) do A. . They state that.

organelles). For example. it may be asked: what is the intrinsic nature (or structure) of the eukaryotic cell in virtue of which it necessarily possesses a certain ensemble of causal powers? If the causal powers of this cell are ontologically dependent on the non-relational powers of its component organelles. for example. 19–21) distinguish the concept of natural necessity from the concepts of logical. 13–14). Be this as it may. Harré and Madden (ibid.g. 2007 . because the former are necessarily a posteriori and the latter a priori.66 Tuukka Kaidesoja to act or react incompatibly with its own nature (ibid. reduces causal relations to the constant conjunctions of observable events and denies the existence of the natural necessities. Now. which are also complex things that can be further broken down into parts (e. then the powers of the cell are not ontologically grounded in the nature of the cell. which can be decomposed into parts (e. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. we need to think of some complex material thing. H2O molecules interacting in certain ways). organic molecules) and so forth. however. then it implies. I propose that there is indeed some wavering in their use of this concept. say a eukaryote cell. They nevertheless maintain that the conceptual necessity embedded in our historically developed conceptual systems may reflect a natural necessity grounded in the essential natures of things when empirical knowledge.e. entirely clear whether Harré and Madden’s theory is in fact an adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality. transcendental. and conceptual necessity.g. Harré and Madden use these kinds of intuitions heavily when they try to establish the superiority of their position to that of Human regularity theory. We do believe. that it is. which. Harré and Madden’s notion of natural necessity is compatible with our common sense intuitions concerning causal relations. but I also contend (contra Woller) that its different uses are quite tightly related to the two main uses previously mentioned. as it is reasonable to assume. 16–18). Raymond Woller (1982) argues that this theory is problematic since Harré and Madden’s treatment of the concept of natural necessity is multifarious even though they use it as it were unified. according to their interpretation. 6–7. but rather in the natures of its component organelles due to the fact that the powers of the cell can be ontologically reduced to the powers of its component organelles (i. Furthermore. acquired via scientific research into these natures. If we assume for a moment that this view is correct.e. that it is somehow necessary that a sample of water boils in normal air pressure when heated to 100°C by virtue of its chemical structure (i. then it may be asked: are the powers possessed by the cell nothing but the ontological resultants (or mereological sums) of the non-relational powers of its component organelles? If this is the case. is used in real definitions of natural kinds (ibid. To picture this more clearly. 12–14. in the sense that the powers of the cell do not exist unless the powers of its organelles exists. It follows from this that the propositions describing natural necessities are different from the logically necessary propositions. It is not. methodologically. I also suggest that their analysis of the concept of causal power is problematic or is at least insufficient in other ways. in the last analysis they are nothing but the resultants of the powers of the organelles).

In either case. 5–6. They fail. a biological organism. to provide any sufficient clarification of this position or arguments for it and. Among others. however. does not explain this power away nor eliminate the description of it from our description of this thing (ibid. although this is not the right place develop such a concept. see also Harré 1986. I think that one possible way to clarify and defend this position is to introduce the notion of an emergent causal power that specifies the conditions in which complex material things possess emergent causal powers that are ontologically irreducible to the powers of their components. to explain the properties of the cell solely by investigating the non-relational causal powers of its component organelles without considering their specific and complex organisation (e. Nevertheless. 285–286). There are. 11. 104–105). it seems to me that Harré and Madden at least implicitly commit to such a non-reductionist ontological view. The same applies to the powers of the organic molecules.1 It seems to me that Harré and Madden are not ready to accept this ontologically reductionist analysis of the concept of causal power. although they admit that the powers of these kinds of complex things are ontologically dependent on the powers of their parts (e. then this ontological reduction can be repeated by reducing their causal powers in a similar way to the powers of their component organic molecules. are all merely the ontological resultants of the casual powers of their components. or a car is somehow relevant regarding the existence of the causal powers of this thing.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 67 in principle possible.2 © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2007 . many passages in CP where they suggest that the specific organisation of the parts (or structure) of a certain complex thing such as a water molecule. but. Bhaskar (1978) has developed a concept of emergent causal power. for example. If the causal powers of the organelles are also nothing but the resultants of the powers of their components. which can be again reduced ontologically to the powers of the atoms that constitute them. as I will later argue. in terms of its nature. ibid. If the causal powers of the eukaryote cell and its component organelles. complex.g. their alleged causal powers are always ontologically reducible to the causal powers of entities that are ontologically more fundamental. I believe that an adequate concept of emergent causal power might be incorporated to Harré and Madden’s analysis of the concept of causal power quite easily. and to provide empirical evidence for the existence of such emergent powers. according to this interpretation. As such. according to which the causal powers of complex things are not ontologically reducible to the powers of their components. their non-linear. then this regression may go on ad infinitum or it may stop to such ultimate entities that are plain powers which lack intrinsic natures or structures. which I find problematic. complex things such as an eukaryote cell are not able perform any real causal work because. and relatively permanent dynamic relationships).g. and the component molecules of these component organelles and so forth. consequently. do not succeed in justifying this position. it is ambiguous and does not meet the previously stated requirement. They also maintain that the explanation of a certain power of a certain thing.

causal powers should be conceived as causal potencies of things. “since the natures of ultimate entities are their powers. ultimate powers. passive powers or liabilities. the causal powers of a complex thing cannot be reduced ontologically to the powers of its components. if no interfering influences are present. This marks the distinction between Harré and Madden’s concept of causal power and reductive analyses of dispositional concepts by using the hypothetical or conditional statements presented by Gilbert Ryle and others. Harré and Madden (ibid. conceived in a spatial sense. 162). In fact.68 Tuukka Kaidesoja Harré and Madden (ibid. These include active powers. the question should be asked: do these various causal powers share a common core? It seems to me that the answer is negative due to the fact that Harré and Madden explicitly use at least two rather different conceptions of causal power (see Woller 1982. 87–88) distinguish enabling conditions from stimulus conditions for the exercise of a certain causal power of a powerful particular. that a certain causal power of the powerful particular (that is already in the state of readiness) is exercised. Therefore. according to their view.) distinguish many kinds of causal powers. this latter concept conflates the powers and natures of powerful particulars. Although it is not necessary to consider these conceptual distinctions in detail here. because the former may include some of the particulars relations to its external environment. rather than the empirical consequences of the exercise of these powers. and capacities. In other words. Satisfaction of the stimulus conditions means. abilities. Therefore. that. or can. 86–87) emphasise that the powers of a certain powerful particular do not cease to exist outside the conditions where they are exercised as long as the nature of the particular does not change. They apply the previously presented concept of causal power to complex things with intrinsic natures. the descriptions of enabling conditions refer to the intrinsic structure or constitution of the powerful particular. 2007 . it follows that the concept of causal power © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. The other concept of causal power appears in the context of a discussion on the nature of ultimate entities (see ibid. according to which. 88). satisfaction of the stimulus conditions will necessarily lead to the empirical manifestation of the power in question. no further characterisation of such particulars is possible. Satisfaction of the enabling conditions ensures that the powerful particular “is of the right nature and in the right state for the exercise of a certain power” (ibid. do in the appropriate conditions. 161–185). Harré and Madden also separate the intrinsic structure of a particular thing from its internal structure. the previous analysis of the concept of causal power does not apply to the powers of ultimate entities. They state. Harré and Madden (ibid. constant powers. 627–631). In other words. by contrast. Furthermore. which determine what the thing will. tendencies. Unlike the former. It is worth noting that this position is different from the position considered in the previous section. variable powers. because there is no independent question as to their natures” (ibid. Therefore. Harré and Madden maintain that the causal powers of things cannot be ontologically reduced to their non-dispositional categorical properties. for example.

Leaving aside deeply metaphysical questions concerning identity and change. atoms.e. 101–102). 150–57. human beings should be understood as active and knowledgeable agents who are capable of © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Andrew Sayer (1997) defends a similar position. Sober 1980). chemistry). elementary particle physics. I think that the concept of essential nature might have some legitimate uses in certain scientific contexts (e. within the social sciences. the uses of the concept of causal power in different sciences would be restricted remarkably. and molecules) that possess something akin to real essences in the sense that Harré and Madden’s describe. Harré and Madden’s account of the concept of causal power is also explicitly essentialist. Therefore.g. restrict their essentialism to the domain of powerful particulars. although their essentialism is rather sophisticated in the following respects. They also think that the essences of complex powerful particulars may change. It follows from this that the uses of the concept of causal power developed in CP should be either restricted to such fields where it can be plausibly applied or. otherwise. alternatively. elementary charges. Even though these and other examples suggest that global essentialism is clearly problematic. 2007 .e. In a similar manner. they do not claim that all entities possess essences but. instead. Sayer 1997). 16–18. Harré and Madden differentiate essential changes from the inessential changes of powerful particulars. although they believe that ultimate entities are unchanging powers (ibid. biological species do not form such natural kinds as those that can be separated from each other by referring to the common essential natures of the individuals belonging to a certain species (see e. usually unobservable intrinsic natures that generate their manifest properties) and restrict their concept of the essential nature to the real essences of things (ibid. For example. they move on to distinguish the nominal essences of things (i. Harré and Secord argue that.g. Furthermore. observable properties that are normally used in the classification of things) from their real essences (i. 161–163).g. HARRÉ AND SECORD ON HUMAN POWERS AND HUMAN NATURES In ESB. that this concept should be redefined without reference to the essential natures of powerful particulars.g. I prefer the latter option as. Following John Locke. it is reasonable to conclude that the question of whether a certain thing possesses an essential nature or not is an empirical one. the only changes in the real essence of a powerful particular are those changes in its essential nature (e. 150). there is controversy surrounding the existence or not of psychological and social kinds that might be identified by referring to their essential natures (see e. there might still be some local candidates (e. according to their view. but it is inappropriate in many others. Subsequently. which he labels as “moderate essentialism. Firstly.g.” but I think that “moderate anti-essentialism” is an equally good name for this view. ibid.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 69 developed in CP is not as unified as Harré and Madden sometimes seem to suggest.

also appear in ESB. the power to provide self-commentaries on actions (see ibid. they suggest. Familiar distinctions between enabling and stimulus conditions (or internal and external stimuli). 84). 245). social selves. Harré and Secord’s ethogenic methodology emphasises the relevance of an agent’s own accounts of their actions. ibid. elaborated by using the conceptual system of powers. it is not always entirely clear whether the possessors of certain kinds of powers are biological individuals. generic and specific powers. persons. negotiations with agents. 240). quite optimistically. the power to monitor the monitoring of action.” They also contend that the concept of power and concepts like it. Harré and Secord (e. are capable of providing a secure basis for conceptual integration in the human sciences (e. These distinctions are. These powers include the power to initiate change. They base this new methodology on their anthropomorphic model of man. This position is closely related to their previously described anthropomorphic model of man. The basic principle of the ethogenic methodology states that.70 Tuukka Kaidesoja initiating action. that the concepts of ordinary language.g. “[f]or scientific purposes. treat people as if they were human beings” (Harré & Secord 1972. Consequently. Harré and Secord (ibid. a distinction between general capacities and specific states of readiness. 2007 . which conceives human beings as possessors of certain general powers that are exercised in meaningful and rule-governed social action.and short-term powers.g. in certain respects. 82) write that. should be classified by using the concepts used in everyday language. long. subtle but rather underdeveloped classifications of human powers (e. 253) maintain that different kinds of behaviours and actions.g. the power to monitor action. permanent and transitional powers. differs from their use in CP and Harré’s earlier works. in which human powers are exercised. and. ESB also contains a thorough critique of the behaviouristic experimental social psychology and a sketch of an alternative ethogenic methodology for social psychology. and between intrinsic and extrinsic conditions. or social episodes. 84–100). “can provide a system capable of being used to bring a unity of an acceptable sort into the whole field of disparate kinds of knowledge of human beings” (ibid. ibid. In accordance with this principle. in ESB. Moving on. In addition. powers to act and powers to acquire powers) are presented in ESB. These disparate kinds of knowledge of human beings include the so-called folk psychology embedded in our ordinary language concepts. and the importance of rules for the explanation of social action. Harré and Secord (see e. It is also notable that Harré and © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd.g. however. ibid. and actions and neurophysiological knowledge concerning the human nervous system. In accordance with these views. the power to use language. “identification of powers and natures must form essential parts of the methodology of the social sciences just as they do in the natural sciences. elaborated in a way that. 248–251) assert that the logical structure of the ascription of human powers fits the general logical structure of the ascription of powers presented above. powers and liabilities. the episodic nature of social action. psychological explanations of human behaviours. finally.

The essentialist analysis of the concept of causal power presented in CP is also problematic in the context of the social sciences. 246–247. 277–278) note. an individualistic interpretation of human powers is presupposed in Harré and Secord’s (see e. ibid. In what follows. which consist of both psychic and physical (or physiological) aspects. although it may contain other problems. inherited from the seventeenth century and based upon the substance and quality. Nevertheless. the lack of the notion of emergent power is problematic in ESB because human beings are obviously such complex organisms. the metaphysical doctrine of dual-aspect materialism that they espouse seems to require that human powers are tightly connected to the physiological structures and processes of individual human beings (see ibid. that “[t]he processes that are productive of social behaviour occur in individual people. In addition. are also visible in the critical realist social ontology. as being analogous with them only in some respects. for example. my critical remarks concerning the analysis of the concept of causal power in CP are also. As far as I can see. remarkably. this individualistic interpretation of the concept of human power does not violate Harré and Madden’s (1975) account of the concept of causal power. I argue that Harré and Secord’s account of human powers and human natures contains two intersecting tensions: (1) between an individualistic and a collectivist ontology. 270– 271) view that human powers are tied to the currently unknown internal nature of human beings. 89. composed of complex parts and possessing powers ontologically irreducible to their parts. Instead of repeating these remarks here. explicitly treat social groups or collectives as if they were individuals or analogous with them. Furthermore. for example. They write. I will proceed as if they were genuine causal powers. in a large part. however. it is not entirely clear whether human powers should be conceived as genuine causal powers or. 133). I will focus on the previously mentioned tensions that can found in the concepts of human power and human nature used in ESB. 24). In some passages in ESB. rather.” Of course. For example. and it is individual people that they [social psychologists] must study” (ibid. that from a metaphysical point of view: “the whole enterprise of this book can be seen as the attempt to replace a conceptual system. the term “individual” refers here not only to individual human beings but also to powerful particulars studied in the natural sciences. applicable to the concept of human power and human nature developed in ESB. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd.g. Harré and Secord do not. with a system based upon of an individual with powers. as I will later argue. For this reason.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 71 Secord avoid using the concept of causality in their account of the concept of human power and. Similar tensions. Harré and Secord’s account of human powers oscillates between an individualist ontology and a collectivist ontology. 2007 . human powers are conceived in plainly individualistic terms. restrict its legitimate use in their ethogenic methodology. Harré and Secord (ibid. In addition. and (2) between an anti-naturalistic Kantian idea of autonomous person and a naturalistic conception of human beings as biological individuals.

ibid. they contend. 127. 147–204). They also suggest that these transitory human powers are highly dependent on the social episodes (e. and “meaning”. but. It seems to me that they. they separate the concept of human nature from the concept of biological individual and claim that a certain biological individual may possess many natures.g. at least implicitly. Harré and Secord maintain that certain kinds of human actions should be explained by using concepts such as “rule”. “[the institutional] environment is operative both in its effects upon the natures of people. conceive these concepts — especially the concept of rule—as referring to certain kinds of collective entities that enable and guide the actions of individuals. these social selves seem to be highly dependent on different kinds of social episodes. This idea was abandoned by behaviourist social psychologists who advocate a mechanistic conception of human beings. 2007 .g. and in providing opportunities and background for the display of those natures” (ibid. 258). Again.g. which. 276–288). 84– 100). from transitory human powers such as moods. it may be concluded from the previous points that Harré and Secord at least implicitly presuppose that some human powers are properties of collective entities. 153). rather. according to which. ibid.g. ibid. monitoring their action. and maintain that transitory powers are not tied to “the permanent features of human nature” but. such as the power to speak English. may be understood as her different social selves (e. that these general human powers are some kind of transcendental presuppositions that are the “necessary © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 275–271) distinguish permanent human powers. Furthermore. to the “transitory aspects of human nature” (ibid.72 Tuukka Kaidesoja Nevertheless. 92–95. Secondly. they write that. there are other places in ESB that differ from the purely individualistic account of human powers. Moreover. Harré and Secord (e. 143–145. Thirdly. 281). Another tension in Harré and Secord’s analysis of human powers and natures can be found between their application of the Kantian conception of person and the concept of biological individual. human being are autonomous agents that possess power to initiate action independently of any antecedent causes. One of the central motives behind their book seems to be the rehabilitation of an anti-naturalist Kantian idea. attitudes and characters. quarrel. that human beings should not be conceived as passive organisms who automatically react to environmental stimuli. they believe. 29–43. although they maintain that these powers manifest themselves only through the actions of individuals. “role”. a dinner party. for example. To begin with. although they admit that the effects of these entities are always mediated by the actions of self-monitoring individuals (see e. It seems to me that it is presupposed in these views that rules and institutions possess causal powers that are ontologically irreducible to those of individuals. This collectivist interpretation of human powers is incompatible with the individualistic interpretation of the concept of human power and I will return to this issue in the context of critical realist social ontology. Harré and Secord argue. or lecture) in which they occur (ibid. and monitoring their monitoring of this action (ibid. as persons capable of initiating action. Now. rather. directing their action. in a Kantian spirit.

171. Harré (1990.g. Nevertheless. BHASKAR ON CAUSAL POWERS IN “A REALIST THEORY OF SCIENCE” Bhaskar adopted the concept of causal power in his RTS from the philosophical works of his teacher Rom Harré. It seems to me that this also explains why a naturalistic perspective on the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of these human powers is missing in ESB. in which human powers are ontologically tied to the nature of individual biological organisms. 11–12. 2007 . he also complains about the confusion of causal necessity for moral obligation and suggests that the concept of causality does not have any applications in the social constructionist ontology and methodology of the social sciences (ibid. 159 –162). 84) and derive descriptions of these powers from a priori philosophical analysis of the concept of person (ibid. Next.” where both a reason/rule-following explanation and causal explanation might be applicable (e. the latter collective” (Harré 1990. 179–181). He writes.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 73 conditions for something to be a language user” (ibid. 341). for example. 162. which conceives human beings as autonomous agents. I will turn my attention to Bhaskar’s RTS. In his later works on social ontology. Harré (1990. see also Harré 1993). narrative. see also Harré & Gillett 1994) has gradually abandoned the concepts of human power and human nature in favour of concepts such as conversation. Despite their conceptual distinction between reasons and causes. Furthermore. they seem to be willing to remove reasons for action from the causal order of nature. which they call “enigmatic episodes. 1993. discourse. Therefore. 91–92). in which the ontology of human studies is grounded in human beings. it seems to be incompatible with the previously discussed more naturalistic interpretation of human powers. in their discussion of the nature of intentional action. “there are only two human realities: physiology and discourse (conversation)—the former an individual phenomenon. ibid. 345) and that “primary human reality is conversation” (ibid. it is not surprising that there are © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. the concept of autonomous agent is tied inseparably to the concept of moral responsibility. This kind of talk. Harré and Secord distinguish the concept of reason from the concept of cause and are rather critical regarding a causal explanation of intentional action (ibid. and moral order (see also Shotter 1990). they admit that there are intermediate cases of human action. it assumes that some kind of transcendental powers separate human beings from the causal order of nature.” whereas now he concedes that this approach was misplaced. 350–352. For this reason. Furthermore. also includes an irreducible moral component since. in the Western philosophical tradition. in a certain sense. 352) also contends that in ESB he and Secord were “still thinking in terms of traditional metaphysics. I will come back to Harré’s more recent position on social ontology when I deal with Harré and Varela’s critique concerning critical realist social ontology. 37–42. individualistic. and in our everyday discourse. grammar. that.3 Although this antinaturalist position is.

(p. are categorically distinct from the patterns of events that they generate (Bhaskar 1978. When compared to CP. for example. 168–178). and generative mechanism in a similar way as Harré and Madden. 174) These statements are almost identical to Harré and Madden’s analysis of the concept of causal power. In general.g. atomic constitutions and so on which constitute the real basis of their natural tendencies and causal powers. Bhaskar’s account of this concept in RTS is more superficial as it lacks. as I have previously stated. Bhaskar’s distinctions between the different kinds of causal powers are also more modest than those presented in CP. for example. in RTS and his other works. 2007 . 14) writes that. He also states that causal laws conceived as ways of acting of powerful things must be analysed as tendencies due to the fact that there are situations in which the exercised causal powers of things fail to generate manifest effects at the level of actual events (Bhaskar 1978. 51) To ascribe a power is to say that thing will do (or suffer) something. “tendencies may be regarded as powers or liabilities of a thing which may be exercised without being manifest in any particular © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 14. a few interesting differences in Bhaskar’s account of this concept in RTS.74 Tuukka Kaidesoja many similarities between Harré and Madden’s (1975) analysis of this concept and Bhaskar’s own characterisations. for example. 45–55). He argues in RTS. there are also two specific points in which Bhaskar’s account of causal powers differs from Harré and Madden’s. In addition to these differences concerning their general approach. when compared to Harré and Madden’s book-length exposition of the concept of causal power. 175) The real essences of things are their intrinsic structures. Bhaskar (1978) writes. natural kind. 318). (p. liabilities. there are. clear criteria that would enable powerful particulars to be identified (Varela & Harré 1996. that it is a necessary condition of the possibility of scientific experimentation that causal laws/mechanisms. in virtue of its nature. which are ontologically grounded in the causal powers of things. For this reason. he presents a sketch of the development of science by using the concept of causal power in very much the same way as Harré and Madden (see ibid. Bhaskar (ibid. that: Most things are complex objects in virtue of which they possess an ensemble of tendencies. under the appropriate conditions. Bhaskar also uses the related concepts of natural necessity. Furthermore. In RTS. and powers. Bhaskar also uses a transcendental method of argumentation in the justification of his “transcendental realist” ontological position. Firstly. Bhaskar argues that mechanisms ontologically grounded in the causal powers of things are categorically distinct from the actual events that they produce. Bhaskar advocates a more openly ontological (or metaphysical) realism than Harré and Madden in CP and Harré (see e. 50). 33–36. however. (p. Furthermore. Unlike Harré and Madden. I focus on these differences here. 1986) in his other works on philosophy of science.

which. the relationship between the causal powers of things and actual causation remains obscure in Bhaskar’s account (see e. although they admit that the causal powers of things exists as potentialities outside the circumstances in which they are exercised. may be possible objects of our knowledge. 318). lie beyond our unaided perceptual capacities and scientific observations. From this perspective. Therefore. and that. because it locates the causal powers of things in an ontological realm.4 Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power is problematic. made by using sense extending instruments (see e. although their actual effects may be observable in certain conditions. by contrast.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 75 outcome. in principle. according to this view. Consequently. which. at least three problematic methodological implications seem to follow from Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power.g. processes. It is worth noting that Bhaskar is not only stating that causal powers exist in the form of the potentialities of things outside the conditions of their exercise. it is clear that Bhaskar does not explicitly advocate this Kantian doctrine because he believes that the causal powers of things. 305). Nevertheless. 2007 . This problem seems to be analogous to the problem of the relationship between things-in-themselves and objects of our experience (appearances) in the so-called two-worlds interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. causal powers are understood in RTS as non-actual and. Elder-Vass. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. according to this. exercised causal powers also seem to lie beyond observable phenomena. but also certain causal powers at work can be directly perceived. causal powers are not transcendental features of reality by definition. rather he also suggests that exercised causal powers are categorically distinct from the actual effects that they produce. things and states of affairs)? It is not enough to assert that the exercised causal powers somehow produce the actual objects of observations. it becomes problematic to answer to the question: how are causal powers of things related to actual entities (e. it is not just the effects of the exercise of causal powers that are observable. 49–62) argue that. observable events. Therefore. in many cases. unlike Kant’s things-in-themselves.” Therefore. lies beyond the realm of actual entities (see also Gibson 1982. (2) the causal powers of things exist in a special ontological realm beyond the realm of the actual events and processes that constitute the possible objects of our experiences (see also Varela & Harré 1996.g. in principle. non-empirical features of reality. It is notable that. consequently. 49–50). (1) the existence of the causal powers of things belong to the necessary conditions of the possibility of successful scientific practices and. in certain conditions. the exercised causal powers that produce observable effects are currently unobservable features of reality. I refer to the aforementioned view as a transcendental account of the concept of causal power because.g. ibid. because the precise nature of this relation of production remains inevitably obscure since it is hard to see how something that is categorically distinct from actual entities could produce any actual spatio-temporal effects. according to their view. Harré and Madden (1975. 331–337). Furthermore.

277. In this respect. those that operate in these “open-systemic” conditions. Nevertheless. 113. In RTS.g. 1994) subsequent books do not offer much help in this matter (see also Elder-Vass 2005. Laboratory experiments in physics and chemistry provide. 124–125. This view is. this concept is left remarkably underanalysed in RTS and Bhaskar’s (e. Sawyer 2005. it is not entirely clear whether the rather sketchy epistemological and methodological views that Bhaskar presents in RTS are consistent with his transcendental account of the concept of causal power. The second feature that differentiates Bhaskar’s view from Harré and Madden’s. 1982. In his later works. although he is by no means the first one to use this concept since its historical roots go back to at least the nineteenth century (see e. outside laboratory conditions. 1992). the notion of emergent causal power is needed in order to avoid ontological reductionism regarding the causal powers of complex things.76 Tuukka Kaidesoja Firstly. then laboratory experiments also seem to be vulnerable to the previous methodological problems. 281– 284).g. it follows from the previous two methodological implications that it is difficult to empirically evaluate the competing hypotheses regarding the causal powers that putatively participate in the production of a certain actual phenomenon due to the fact that it is always possible to invent indefinitely many hypotheses that allegedly refer to transcendental causal powers of things that explain the phenomenon in question (see also Kourikoski & Ylikoski 2006). 2007 . The first two problematic implications concern the lack of empirical or methodological restrictions in terms of the possible uses of the concept of transcendental causal power. 1989. Bhaskar uses this concept (1) to describe the properties of the whole of a particular complex thing. Beckerman et al. non-actual properties of things. an efficient way of evaluating hypotheses concerning the causal powers of things because they enable scientists to study a certain generative mechanism in isolation from interfering influences. in principle.g. which is composed of parts related to each other (or organised) in specific ways. the situation seems to be even worse due to the fact that there seems to be few methodological tools available for testing empirically explanatory theories that allegedly refer to such transcendental causal powers of things. 1978. problematic because if we accept the notion that causal powers are. 191–194). 80–82). Furthermore. 1982. and (2) to describe relations between levels of reality without specifying clearly how these two uses are related (see e. 1979. is that he uses a concept of emergent causal power. Thirdly. it seems to be possible to invent indefinitely many hypothesis that refer to different kinds of transcendental causal powers that allegedly explain any actual phenomenon in which we are interested. As I have argued above. The third is a variation of the Duhem-Quine underdetermination (of theories by data) thesis. 1978. 1986. it seems to be possible to attribute indefinitely many hypothetical transcendental causal powers to a certain thing. Secondly. however. according to Bhaskar (see e. see also 1979. 163–170. this concept is also applied in several other contexts © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd.g. Bhaskar’s concept of emergent causal power is promising. Moreover.

CONCEPT OF CAUSAL POWER IN A CRITICAL REALIST SOCIAL ONTOLOGY In his book. 2007 . 1979. mental or social) emergent causal powers of complex things supervene5 on the physical properties of these things (cf. in principle.g. husband and wife” (Bhaskar 1979. According to Bhaskar (e. Nevertheless. instead. those such as.g. that it forms a part of the total causal structure of reality. Bhaskar 1994. Lawson 1997). Examples used by critical realists of internally related positions are. and following Elder-Vass (2005). hold that the specific methods of natural sciences are not directly applicable to the social sciences. The Possibility of Naturalism (PN). providing any clear analysis of it. but. I also believe that the concept of the ontological level of reality should be explicitly defined by referring to the emergent causal powers of complex things in order avoid postulating ontologically mysterious entities. Furthermore. Moreover. The concept of causal power is. critical realists commonly advocate a relationist conception of society in which social structures are understood as internal relations between social positions and positioned-practices (see e. therefore. Sayer 1992. 51–54. nor in his subsequent works. 36). Bhaskar does not specify in RTS. concept-dependence. Generally speaking. student and teacher. The © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. typically. so far as I can see. Bhaskar 1979. I think that Bhaskar’s transcendental interpretation of the concept of causal power also vitiates his account of the concept of emergent power because it becomes rather difficult to characterise the relationships between the emergent powers of a given complex thing and the causal powers of its constituent parts if both of these kinds of powers are conceived of as lying. whether all of the emergent properties of complex things are causal powers or only some subset of them. and time-space-dependence are such properties that differentiate social structures from natural structures. 67–88). MP and constituent.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 77 without.g. critical realists maintain that social life does not form its own reality. 48– 49). a central feature of the critical realist social ontology that is largely built on Bhaskar’s philosophical ideas. 81). Bhaskar develops a realist social ontology in which he largely employs his version of the transcendental realist ontology first presented in RTS. “capitalist and worker. consequently. totally distinct from the natural world governed by the causal laws of nature. nor the relations between its different uses (see e. see also Archer 1995. and that the concept of emergent power is explicitly defined as characterising the ‘parts-whole’ relation of the composition of complex things.g. I think that further development of the concept of emergent causal power requires that Bhaskar’s categorical distinction between the causal powers of things and the actual events is loosened. It also remains unclear whether non-physical (e. they commonly admit that there are certain specific ontological features that differentiate social entities from natural entities and. activity-dependence. beyond our observations. Sawyer 2005. For these reasons.

Furthermore. 103–106). Critical realists also emphasise the point that social reality is stratified in the sense that agents (or persons) and social structures are ontologically distinct entities in virtue of their sui generis emergent causal powers. Critical realists also admit that social structures have historically emerged from the social interaction of such agents.78 Tuukka Kaidesoja idea is that a certain social position. (2) the context of reasons. 103) writes that. and believe that some pre-existing social structures always enable and constrain current intentional human actions. For the sake of clarity. is nevertheless circumscribed. 2000). Bhaskar (ibid. In what follows. Bhaskar (1979. which may have already passed away. though real.). this view notably remains underdeveloped in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works. . “I intend to show that the capacities that constitute mind [ . 44. much like Harré and Secord (ibid. The most critical realists follow Bhaskar in believing that the existence of these rather antinaturalistically and individualistically interpreted general mental powers to be one of the ontological presuppositions of such social studies that take agency seriously. In PN. 104) maintains that these consciously mediated capacities of people (or agents) include the power to self-monitor ones own activity. Despite this ontological distinction. He also maintains. Archer 1988. I briefly evaluate the uses of this concept by focusing on one context at the time. ] are properly regarded as causal. power to monitor the monitoring of action. it is useful to differentiate three contexts in which critical realists have used the concept of causal power in their social ontology: (1) the context of general mental capacities. 1995. They have not provided sufficient answers to the following questions: what exactly are these general emergent powers that constitute mind? What is the exact relationship between mental powers and neurophysiological structures and processes? How does social context shape the development and the exercise of mental powers? How do © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. which individual agents occupy. and (3) the context of social structures. they nevertheless believe that structures are continuously reproduced and transformed via the intended and unintended consequences of agents’ intentional actions.” Following Harré and Secord (1972). and that possession of these powers is constitutive of both human mind and intentional agency (see Bhaskar 1979. they hold that structures are ontologically dependent on the activities of agents in the sense that structures cease to exist when they are no longer reproduced via the activities of individual agents. 2007 . whose autonomy.6 In addition to these two “basic levels” of social reality. Nevertheless. . namely agents and structures. I believe that these problems are at least partly due to critical realists’ transcendental interpretation of the concept of causal power and their ambiguous notion of emergent causal power. 44.g. I argue that all of these uses are beset by certain problems. some critical realists also distinguish several other levels (see e. and that mind is a sui generis real emergent power of matter. It is not prima facie implausible to state that the mind is constituted of an ensemble of emergent causal powers. is constituted by its internal relations to other social positions. and the power to manipulate symbols. that we can derive descriptions of these powers from a priori conceptual analysis.

“Reasons . . . He also states that. Now. Bhaskar’s reliance on an a priori philosophical argumentation. Although he contends that reasons are possessed in virtue of the exercise of certain general mental powers. Furthermore. it seems to be legitimate to ask here. If this is not the case. are their reasons for acting” (ibid. in the sense that it is not possible to answer them solely by using a priori philosophical analysis. He also states that. 124–125) rather sketchy doctrine of synchronic emergent powers materialism does not provide the required answers because it is. “I want to argue [ . As such. as well as that of causal efficacy.g. he explicitly criticises all kinds of materialistic views that conceive mental states as material properties of our neurophysiological systems. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Bhaskar (1979. as well as his transcendental account of the concept of causal power. This is where their views differ from those of Harré and Secord (1972). what is the intrinsic nature of reasons in virtue of which they possess causal powers? In PN. 117). Although Bhaskar does not use the term ‘supervenience’ in PN. . for example. should be understood. a necessary condition for their existence. 2007 . 106). . Bhaskar (1979.” is necessarily individualist and reductionist (ibid. Even though Bhaskar does not directly address the previous question. 123). the only plausible answer available to him seems to be the one in which reason is understood as a certain kind of mental property that supervenes from the neurophysiological properties of the brain. yet it remains unclear how the nature of desires and beliefs. ibid. He argues. in virtue of which they allegedly possess causal powers. which he refers to with the term “central state materialism. Critical realists also defend the view that an agent’s reasons should be conceived of as causes of her/his intentional action. among other things.g. see also 106). 115–123). 106. “agents are defined in terms of their tendencies and powers. he conceives the notion of intentional causality in terms of a theory of causal powers. argues that reasons can be interpreted as generative mechanisms that produce behaviour in a way analogous to the ways in which the generative mechanisms studied in the natural sciences produce observable effects. 118. it becomes impossible to explain how reasons could produce material effects. according to Bhaskar (ibid.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 79 mental powers develop ontologenetically. 124–137). open to many different interpretations and conceptually ambiguous. he nevertheless maintains that reasons are sui generis causes of intentional action (see e. 124). Bhaskar also states that. but does not develop this idea very far. as I have previously argued. 1979. Even though I think that the previous questions are not only extremely difficult but also largely empirical. which is. are beliefs rooted in the practical interests of life” (ibid. 120–123) provides quite a traditional analysis of the concept of reason by using the concepts of desire and belief. that this doctrine. Bhaskar’s (see e. I nevertheless believe that they are relevant in regards to the justification of the application of the concept of causal power to mind. ] that people possess properties irreducible to those of matter” (ibid. seem to prevent him for providing satisfactory answers to these questions. among which in the case of human agents. and how have they evolved phylogenetically? Unfortunately.

Finally. society. neurons and glias).g. According to this view. the demographic structure (Archer 1995). 68–69. it is possible to conceive human neurophysiological systems as “open systems” that are in continuous and complex interaction with their environments. Lawson 1997. that a non-reductionist materialist view. is some kind of transcendental entity that is. understood as a totality of social structures. In following this view. ibid. 165–194. I also believe that this view can be developed in such a way that would be compatible with the view that posits the physical and social environments. and the structure of an educational system (ibid. to a denial of the role that genetic factors play in the development of the neurophysiological system. is compatible with the emergent materialist doctrine. understood as states of neurophysiological systems. Bhaskar and other critical realists’ views of mental powers often seem to be much closer to the problematic Cartesian mind-body dualism than they are prepared to admit. Sayer 1992). however. that the points made above require further conceptual elaboration. commonly write about the enabling. chapter 3). Accordingly.). 163–170. possess system-level emergent powers that are ontologically irreducible to the powers of their components (e. “not given. in which human beings live (and have lived). Bhaskar (ibid. and perhaps most controversially. For critical realists. mental states could be conceived as a specific kind of non-physical. Sayer 1992. 2007 . critical realists have applied the concept of causal power to social structures. and motivating effects of social structures in relation to the actions of the agents that occupy the structural positions. Examples of such powerful social structures include the structure of a capitalistic economy (Bhaskar 1979. on the results of neuroscientific research. constraining. Searle 1992). as shaping (and having shaped) their plastic neurophysiological systems. experience” (Bhaskar 1979. Bhaskar and other critical realists contend that internal relations between social positions and positioned practices posses some kind of transcendental and emergent causal powers (e. which sees mental properties as the non-physical properties of the neurophysological systems that supervene from the physical properties of such systems. and that their validity depends. see also Archer 1995. 51–52. however. and yet material (in the broadest sense of the term). both ontogenetically and phylogenetically. mental properties. it requires a rebuttal of genetic determinism in regards to the properties of such a system. according to which. among other things. but.g.g. 65–67. This does not amount. rather. 51) also suggests that the © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. but presupposed by. To conclude: I hope to have shown that Bhaskar’s criticism of the doctrine of “central state materialism” is misplaced and that some kind of biologically informed non-reductionist materialist perspective on the mind is more plausible than that which is advocated by Bhaskar. I concede. 68). In other words. however. properties of the neurophysiological system (see e. for example. Nonetheless.80 Tuukka Kaidesoja I think. the problem of the causal efficacy of social structures seems to be the pressing question: how do the internal relations between social positions affect the actions of the agents that occupy these positions? Critical realists.

2002b. Varela 2001) are right to insist that. “function”.g. see also 2001. but does not present a precise analysis of the meaning these concepts . as Harré and Varela (1996. and “right”. To be convinced of this. Manicas 2006). 57. This statement seems to be incompatible with the view that social structures possess causal powers since.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 81 concept of social position may be further analysed by using concepts such as “place”. see also Harré 2001. 322. 2007 . 314. 2000a. “task”. then it is clear that social structures are not such things that may possess causal powers. 2002a. I assume that the differentiating feature of the critical realist social ontology is that it sees the powers of individual agents and the powers of social structures as ontologically distinct because I believe that this is the most common view among critical realists. Bhaskar (e. 2002) have criticised critical realists for their application of the concept of causal power to social structures. however. ambiguous. as I suggested in the beginning of this article. Harré and Varela (1996. in this respect. in some cases. I have earlier challenged this presupposition. working class) in their application of causal powers to social structures. I think that Harré and Varela are right to criticise the critical realist view that social structures possess relatively autonomous causal powers in relation to the agents that occupy the positions in these structures. using the Aristotelian distinction between efficient and material cause. that social structures should be understood as material causes of social activity. suggests. Although Bhaskar’s position is. not intended as a denial of the fact that there are some advocates of this tradition who do not accept this view (e. critical realists commit to the reification of the abstract macro-social concepts (e. 43–44. do not seem to meet this requirement.g. This statement is. in CP because it requires among other things that causal powers are illegitimately separated from powerful particulars. Varela (1996 see also Harré 2001. however. “duty”. I am not entirely convinced that it follows from this. it should be emphasised that it is certainly a minimum requirement for the legitimate application of any adequate concept of causal power to a certain entity that this entity be a concrete and organised material system that is capable of producing observable effect(s) in certain conditions and in a relatively autonomous way. 257–258. ibid. They argue that the attribution of causal powers to social structures violates the general logic of the concept of causal power as it is presented. 2002b. They also argue that if the concept of causal power is adequately understood. 2002b) seem to suggest. whereas people are the only efficient causes of social activity. that all kinds of social structures are © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Lewis 2000. It is notable that the arguments presented by Harré and Varela presuppose that the general logic of the concept of causal power has been already presented in an adequate way in Harré’s earlier works. Harré and Charles C. Manicas 2006. 72). the concept of causal power should be interpreted as an elaborated version of the Aristotelian concept of efficient cause (see also Harré & Madden 1975. 316. cf. However. “rule”.g. see also Harré 2001. Social structures. conceived as sets of abstract internal relations between social positions and positioned-practices. 30). Therefore. for example. Varela 2001. Nonetheless.

Harré 2001. it may be difficult to decide where the boundaries of the system lie. in many ways shape and modify their powers. It is surely one thing to say that the conversations. in which biological individuals engage in their lives.g.82 Tuukka Kaidesoja nothing but taxonomic categories. First of all. 2002b). 26. Manicas 2006. it is not clear whether Harré’s social constructionism is in fact compatible with the analysis of the concept of causal power presented in CP. hospitals. 2007 . other social systems. 98. 73). maintains. Sawyer 2005). It is also an exaggeration to claim that. 316.g. it is not at all clear to me how conversational constructs could satisfy the minimum requirement for the application of the concept of causal power. In other words. I find the first claim perfectly acceptable and compatible with causal powers theory and the other problematic. it is important to notice. Harré (see e. which do not refer to any extra-conversational entities (see also Manicas 2006. The environment of the system may. even if we deny that social structures. or ecosystems. there may still be some other way to apply the concept of causal power to concrete social systems.g. in turn. these kinds of concrete social systems might be modelled by using the theory of complex dynamic systems that radically differ from the traditional functionalism (e. although in some cases. then it may be said that the system as a whole possesses system-level emergent causal powers in relation to its environment because it fulfils the minimum requirement for the legitimate use of the concept of causal power. Now. or political parties). possess relatively autonomous powers in relation to the agents that occupy the structural positions.g. for example. and material artefacts. that it does not follow from Harré and Varela’s arguments against critical realist social ontology that Harré’s social constructionist ontology is the only viable social ontology compatible with the causal powers theory.g. material resources. Harré & Gillet 1994). By the term ‘concrete social system’. and another to claim that people are nothing but conversational constructs (see e. 43–52). In addition. It does not follow from the position outlined above that concrete social systems possess autonomous causal powers in relation to the agents that form their © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Moreover. families. 1993.7 If we think of any given concrete social system in this way (e. although they are not merely physical systems. business firms. these kinds of concrete social systems can be conceived as organised material systems. in their social ontology. factories. Archer 2000. understood as some kind of abstract internal relations between social positions and positioned-practices. see also Harré 2002b. Furthermore. in his later social ontology. because they also possess non-physical emergent causal powers. schools. I refer to the organised groups or collectives of individual agents who communicatively interact with each other in relatively stable ways by using symbols. that people are the only causally efficacious entities in social reality while simultaneously claiming that people are conversational constructs. Talcott Parsons) in sociology (see e. consist of individual agents that do not participate in this system. here. critical realists have tacitly committed to some kind of structural determinism that totally undermines human agency (see Harré & Varela 1996.

82) has also recently abandoned the presupposition that the causal powers theory provides an adequate analysis of all kinds of causal relations. enabling. because these system-level powers are not only ontologically dependent on the non-relational powers of the agents but also on the relatively stable dynamic relations between communicatively interacting agents (and the relations between them and material resources and artefacts). “communicative interaction”. Therefore. meant to deny the notion that these kinds of social systems may have been historically formed through the activities of different agents to those who currently act as their constituent components: nor does not follow from this that the system-level emergent powers of the social systems can be ontologically reduced to the powers of individual agents. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. capitalist economies. Although this move makes things conceptually messier. although his discussion of the causal powers of social structures is still quite problematic. I also admit that the concepts of “concrete social system”. In this sense the positions that agents occupy in this kind of social systems remain important. Furthermore. it is possible to say that the relational structure of the social system (i. constrains. although it is not possible to ontologically separate them from the ongoing interaction between agents. However.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 83 components because the emergent causal powers of the previously characterised social systems are always ontologically and causally dependent on the causal powers of the acting agents. and motivates the actions of the agents. 1986. any evaluation of these suggestions forms the topic of another article. and educational systems. adequately analysed by using the concept of causal power. due to the aforementioned reasons. and motivating structural relations may still be interpreted as causal by using some other analysis of the concept of “cause” than the causal powers theory. it seem to be more fruitful to try to specify different kinds of causal relations that are referred to by different kinds of causal concepts applied in different contexts (see Hitchcock 2003).e. I shall leave it open here as to whether the previous analysis can be extended to also cover macro-systems such as welfare states. and “emergent causal power” require further analysis than that which must be omitted here. Indeed. Lewis 2000. however. 132. Bhaskar (see e. Moreover the relation between the structure and agents in such systems cannot be. the set of relations between its components) also enables. Nevertheless. I nevertheless believe that it leads to a more fruitful interaction between philosophical analysis and empirical research. 1994.g. 2007 . see also Patomäki 1991). instead of searching for a single ontological analysis of the concept of causality.8 This is not. constraining. The previously stated argument demands that we give up the presupposition that there only exists a single adequate ontological analysis of the concept of causality. Some critical realists have already proceeded in this direction by presenting tentative analyses of structural social causation that employ a different kind of analysis of the concept of cause to that of the causal powers theory (see Groff 2004.

9 Tuukka Kaidesoja Department of the social sciences and philosophy PL 35 (MaB) 40014 University of Jyväskylä. The question of whether a certain entity possesses an essential nature or not is empirical in nature. • In the context of social ontology. Schaffer (ibid. but might succeed by using another kind of ontological analysis of the concept of causality.84 Tuukka Kaidesoja CONCLUSION Finally.) himself defends an agnostic position regarding the existence of a fundamental level (see also Bhaskar 1978. By contrast. • It is not possible to analyse the structural social causality by using the concept of causal power. and.jyu. Harré and Madden (1975. 2007 . He also argues that the idea of the infinite reduction of the properties of complex things to the properties of their constituents is internally coherent and cannot be rebutted by a priori arguments alone. it might be fruitful to give up the presupposition that there only exists one adequate way of analysing the concept of causality. 170 –171. For example. 182). I want to list briefly the major points that I presented in the previous discussion regarding the critical realist concept of causal power: • The concept of emergence. in both the natural and social sciences. the uses of the concept of causal power should be restricted to (1) human beings or people conceived as dynamic biological organisms that are naturally predisposed to. Therefore. • Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power advocated by most critical realists is problematic. is necessarily part of any notion of causal power that is employed outside elementary particle physics. social interaction. Finland e-mail: tukaides@cc. Schaffer (2001) has quite convincingly argued that there is no positive or negative empirical evidence available for the existence of the fundamental level of reality.fi NOTES 1 It should be noted that it is not necessarily problematic to assume that ultimate powers (or other kind of ultimate entities) do not exist. • The concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti-essentialist way. and whose powers are modified by. 161–185) suggest that physical fields of potentials are the ultimate powers that do not possess any © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (2) to such concretely structured groups and collectives (and perhaps combinations of these) that function as relatively enduring dynamic social systems. which refers to the relationship between the system-level properties of a complex system and the properties of its parts.

Elder-Vass 1999. mine. 5 In this context. Beckerman et al. structure or relationships and mechanism or the processes that makes it tick” (e. although I do admit that this notion cannot be analysed by using the concept of causal power.g. especially in the field of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science (see e. Bunge maintains that these kinds of social systems are always concrete material entities. it must have two different subsets of physical properties. Harré does not claim that all causal powers belong to “Realm 3”. That is all. for instance. this view is problematic since it denies that the causal powers of social structures are supervenient on the properties of the current agents and their activities. inspired by Giddens’ structuration theory. Bunge 1998. “in this universe. of course. at a given time (t). Beckerman et al. It should be also noted that the concept of emergent causal power has been the subject of vigorous debate. (iii) if. 144) has recently questioned the notion of emergent causal power by claiming that. Harré’s (1986. 1995.g. Elder-Vass 2005. although he does not use the concept of emergent causal power. Some of my interpretations and critical remarks have also been formed in numerous discussions with Mika Salo. 61). 2007 . Secord 1990). All responsibility for possible errors is. 1998) has defended a similar notion of a concrete social system from the point of view of the emergent materialist system-ontology. 1992. All other material efficacy is product. the causal powers of biological organisms. Sawyer 2005). which is only implicitly present in ESB. the concept of supervenience usually includes the following theses: (i) No two things can differ in their non-physical properties without differing in their physical properties. Kim 1996. environment or context. . the problem concerning the existence of ultimate powers or a fundamental level should be distinguished from the problem of the ontological reduction of the causal powers of complex things to their constituents. 4 In his Varieties of Realism. (ii) a single thing cannot change its non-physical properties without changing its physical properties. unlike him. 281–316) position concerning the interpretation of the causal powers that belong to the ontological “Realm 3” resembles Bhaskar’s transcendental account of the concept of causal power. rather. for example. and dualistic in the sense that it separates discursive reality from physical reality. Sawyer (2005. Schaffer 2001). 1990. Nevertheless. but. [ . 9 I would like to thank Kaj Ilmonen and Petri Ylikoski for their helpful comments on the earlier version of this article. 169) has argued that the emergent causal powers of social structures are not usually ontologically dependent on the activities of the current agents. 57–74) in the sense that his interpretation of the concept of social structure. Nevertheless. Possible solutions to these problems are not. 6 Archer (e.g.” It seems to me that he has committed here to a rather dubious ontology that is both ontologically reductionist regarding. © 2007 The Author Journal compilation © The Executive Management Committee/Blackwell Publishing Ltd. seems to require the existence of some kind of fundamental entities (see e. Sawyer 2005). totally independent since ontological reductionism (or reductive physicalism).g. for example. differs from mine and. Note also that my position differs from that defended by Manicas (2006. 2 Harré (2002b. . however. there are people performing discursive acts and there are material poles and charges. 1992. “a social system is analysable into its composition or membership. I am not ready to entirely give up the notion of structural social causality. Kim 1999. becomes more central in Harré’s (see e.g. According to his CESM view of a system. on “the activities of previous ‘generations’.g. 1993) later works on social ontology (see also Shotter 1990.” As. 1996.g. 7 Mario Bunge (e. ] Elementary charges are [causally] efficacious. a single thing has two different subsets of non-physical properties.Exploring the Concept of Causal Power in a Critical Realist Tradition 85 intrinsic natures or structures. 91–92) has argued. 3 This aspect of moral responsibility. 8 This problem is a specific instance of the more general problem concerning the conceptualisation of downward causation in complex systems that possess system-level emergent causal powers (see e.

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