here, the essential point with regard to the question of mechanism is that the f

luctuations should come from

qualitatively new kinds of factors existing in a new domain.
Within the new domain described above, we would naturally expect that new kinds
of laws would
operate, which may include new kinds of causal laws as well as new kinds of laws
of chance. Of course, if
one were now to make the assumption that these new laws would surely be nothing
more than purely causal
laws, one would then fall back into deterministic mechanism, while the similar a
ssumption that they were
surely nothing more than laws of probability would throw one back into indetermi
nistic mechanism. On-the
other hand, we have in the proposals made in this chapter avoided both these dog
matic and arbitrary
extremes, since we have considered, as the situation demanded, the possibility t
hat there are new features to
the causal laws (a quantum force not appearing at higher levels) as well as to the
laws of chance (random
fluctuations originating in the sub-quantum mechanical level).
Of course, as we have indicated in Section 5, we do not regard our earlier propo
sals as providing a
completely satisfactory and definitive interpretation of the laws of the quantum
domain. The basic reason is,
in a sense, that the fundamental concepts considered in the theory (waves and pa
rticles in interaction) are
still very probably too close to those applying in the classical domain to be ap
propriate to a completely new
domain such as that treated in the quantum theory. Indeed, the whole general eff
ort to understand the
quantum theory in terms of models so close to those of the classical domain has
often been criticized as
mechanistic. This criticism would in fact be correct if one s intention were to st
op at this point. On the other
hand, if one simply regards these theories as something definite from which it m
ay be helpful to start, then
it seems evident that such a criticism does not apply.
It is important to add here that there are good reasons why the provisional cons
ideration of mechanical
explanations of the quantum theory may be a good starting-point from which quali
tatively new
developments are likely to arise.
First of all, one must recall that mechanical theories often imply qualitatively
new properties. Thus, for
example, when a large number of simple mechanical elements is put into interacti
on one obtains
fundamentally new kinds of collective effects (e.g. the large-scale properties o
f an aggregate of atoms).
Thus, we may expect that the consideration of old mechanical concepts in new con
texts will perhaps already
lead to some qualitatively new results.
Secondly, a careful consideration of the contradictions and the weak points of a
given mechanical theory
often suggests new concepts that resolve these contradictions or eliminate the w
eak points. Thus, the careful
analysis of the mechanical theory of the electrons made by Lorentz was of great
help in suggesting the
theory of relativity, which gave a solution to many of the difficulties raised b
y the Lorentz theory. In
Section 6, we have described efforts to deal with some of the weak points of our

original interpretation,
which likewise suggest considerable changes relative to the original conception.
Thirdly, to insist that once we pass the classical domain, mechanical concepts w
ill surely have absolutely
no relevance whatever would be just as dogmatic as to insist that these concepts
must be adequate for every
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE QUANTUM THEORY 87
domain that will ever be investigated. A better procedure is to try every kind o
f concept that we can think of,
and to see which kind is best in each particular domain. The work described in t
his chapter then shows that
mechanical concepts can go further in the quantum domain than had hitherto been
thought possible.
Finally, it is important to stress the value of starting with some concrete theo
ry and working forwards
from there. Without such a concrete starting-point, criticism of the current the
ories is rather likely to
become sterile in the long run. For it is extremely difficult purely from genera
l considerations to be led to
qualitatively new ideas. Thus, in practice, such criticism, accompanied by no co
ncrete new suggestions, is
likely to leave one with no real alternative but to continue to work along the u
sual lines, in the hope that new
experimental developments or lucky and brilliant new theoretical insights will e
ventually lead to a new
theory. On the other hand, to leave future progress in this line solely to exper
iment or to the hope of chance
new insights means that one is renouncing one of the important functions of crit
icism, namely, to help
suggest definite alternative lines of research that are likely to lead to a corr
ect direction. And as we have
pointed out here, there is good reason to suppose that the specific proposals in
dicated in this chapter may be
helpful in achieving this purpose.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
List of References for Chapter IV
(1) R.Furth, Zeits. f. Phys., 81, 143 (1933).
(2) L.de Broglie, Compt. Rend., 183, 447 (1926); 185, 380 (1927).
(3) E.Madelung, Zeits. f. Phys., 40, 332 (1926).
(4) Reports on the Solvay Congress, Gauthier-Villars, Paris (1928), p. 280 .
(5) L.de Broglie, The Revolution in Physics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London (195
4).
(6) Uspekhi.fizich. Nauk, 45 (Oct. 1951); French translation in Questions Scient
ifiques, Vol. 1 (Editions de la
Nouvelle Critique, Paris (1952)). See also D.J.Blokhinzhev, Grundlagen der Quant
enmechanik, Deutscher
Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin (1953).
(7) D.Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 166 (1952).
(8) D.Bohm, Phys. Rev., 85, 180 (1952).
(9) Vigier s suggestions are discussed in L.de Broglie, La Physique Quantique Rest
era-t-elle Indeterministe,
Gauthier-Villars, Paris (1953).
(10) D.Bohm, Prog. Theor. Physics, 9, 273 (1953).
(11) D.Bohm and J.P.Vigier, Phys. Rev., 96, 208 (1954).
(12) D.Bohm, R.Schiller, and J.Tiomno, Supplemento al Nuovo Cimento, I, Serie X,
48 (1955)
(13) T.Takabayasi, Prog. Theor. Physics, 8, 143 (1952); 9, 187 (1953).
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(17) J.Schwinger, Phys. Rev., 74, 749 and 769 (1949); 80, 440 (1950).
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88 INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER FIVE
More General Concept of Natural Law