Isocrates in Platos Phaedrus

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A tincture of philosophy, a tincture of hope: The

portrayal of Isocrates in Plato's phaedrus
a
Maureen Daly Goggin & Elenore Long
PhD candidate in the Rhetoric program , Carnegie Mellon University ,

Published online: 21 May 2009.
To cite this article: Maureen Daly Goggin & Elenore Long (1993) A tincture of philosophy, a tincture of hope: The portrayal of
Isocrates in Plato's phaedrus , Rhetoric Review, 11:2, 301-324, DOI: 10.1080/07350199309389008
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A Tincture of Philosophy, A Tincture of Hope:

The Portrayal of Isocrates in Plato's Phaedrus1
Over the last century, a range of contradictory representations of Isocrates
have emerged through critical scholarship. At one end of the spectrum, he has been
contemptuously characterized as a naive and ineffectual politician (Bonner 194),
as an intellectual wimp (DeVries, "Isocrates" 389), and as a conceited windbag
(Howland 152; Thompson 182). At the other end, he has been regarded as the hood
ornament on the newest model of rhetorical chic, as a strong proponent of democracy (Jaeger 3:66), as a pedagogical genius (Benoit 109; Forster 15), and as a
prophetic visionary for rhetoric across time (Cahn 134-44). Of all the polarized
debates pertaining to Isocrates, one of the longest standing concerns Plato's
depiction of him in the Phaedrus. The debate generally hinges on the question:
Does Isocrates represent the central cancer in a malignant rhetoric, or does he
symbolize the potential for a reformed rhetoric?
In addressing this Isocratean question, many scholars point to the following
passage from the end of the Phaedrus:
It seems to me that his [Isocrates'] natural powers give him a superiority over anything Lysias has achieved in literature, and also that in
point of character he is of a nobler composition; hence it would not
surprise me if with advancing years he made all his literary predecessors look like very small fry; that is, supposing him to persist in the
actual type of writing in which he engages at present; still more so, if
he should become dissatisfied with such work, and a sublimer impulse
lead him to do greater things. For that mind of his, Phaedrus, contains
an innate tincture of philosophy. (279A)
A corpus of literary criticism interprets these lines as underhanded and sarcastic
(Cope 31ff; Howland 159; Hudson-Williams; Robin 173). This pejorative interpretation is largely inherited from W. H. Thompson's 1868 critical edition of the
Phaedrus, the first and indeed only English commentary on the dialogue until R.
Hackforth published an edition nearly a century later in 1951 (cf. Hackforth ix).
In his edition Thompson claims that Plato's prophecy for Isocrates is a backhanded
compliment "passed upon him [Isocrates] at the conclusion of the Phaedrus [sic]
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. . . as but poor amends for the stinging sarcasm showered so profusely on his art
. . . in other parts of the dialogue" (173).2
For many scholars an assessment of Plato's regard for Isocrates hinges on yet
another, and larger, concern: Plato's regard for a true art of rhetoric as posited in
the Phaedrus. Numerous critics argue that Plato is deeply skeptical of the possibility that a true art of rhetoric can ever be achieved.3 For instance, Everett Lee
Hunt contends that just as Plato's Republic can never be realized, neither can true
rhetoric (46-47). Similarly, Oscar Brownstein suggests an ironic spin to Plato's
treatment of the topic: "this ideal rhetoric is the Platonic counterpart of Aristophanes' Cloud-Cuckoo Land" (398). Peter Schakel (131), William Kelley (78), and
Thomas Conley (12) agree, contending that, according to the Platonic Socrates in
the Phaedrus, true rhetoric is clearly outside the reach of mortals; all that is within
their grasp is a perversion of such rhetoric, equally corrupt as a lover who cares
nothing for the well-being of his partner but only for his own physical pleasure.
We contend, however, that scholars who claim that Plato spumed rhetoric and
who, as result, view Isocrates as the target of the Phaedrus have done so largely
because they have read the Phaedrus in terms of strict dichotomies: rational/irrational, philosophy/rhetoric, Truth/Falsehood. Such readings miss the nuances and
complexities of Plato's dynamic view of rhetoric in this dialogue. By contrast, our
reading of the Phaedrus finds a spectrum along which both rhetors and rhetoric
can be located, a spectrum that recognizes the dynamism of discursive practices.
This spectral vision opens up a space for locating Isocrates and his rhetoric.4
Both Plato and Isocrates were confronted with a moral/epistemic dilemma:
Faced with the inaccessibility of certain knowledge, how is one to take moral
action? Our essay argues that it is at this point of tension between morality and
epistemology that Plato's and Isocrates' views of a dynamic rhetoric converge. We
begin with a reading of the Phaedrus, focusing the explication on the Myth of the
Soul. Then we turn to two other constructs from the dialogue that resonate with
the myth: the three mythical pairs of lovers and the three love speeches. These
turns permit an extensive analysis of the moral/epistemic dilemma and the vital
role of rhetoric in coping with it. Finally, we demonstrate a convergence of Plato's
and Isocrates' ideas on rhetoric to argue that this intersection permits a view of
Isocrates and Isocratean rhetoric as the tincture of hope for a reformed philosophical rhetoric.
The Phaedrus is comprised of three speeches on love, one ostensibly
composed by Lysias and the other two by Plato's Socrates. The first is a
deceptive, dispassionate, and selfish discourse that argues for taking a nonlover
as paramour. The second is also a deceptive discourse, but one that is passionate
and well-intentioned, purporting to argue for taking a nonlover as paramour in
an effort to protect the beloved. The third is a well-reasoned and passionate
argument that demonstrates why lovers and beloveds should be paired. Taken
together, these three speeches reverberate on complex levels. This dynamism
A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope
303
has provided material for rich debates concerning, for instance, the subjects and
purposes of the Phaedrus (Hackforth 8; Stewart 116-17). While it is not our
intention to score the notes and chords that play throughout the dialogue, we will
focus on that which resonates most clearly with Isocrates: the topic of rhetoric as
conceptualized in the work. Because the Myth of the Soul most vividly portrays
Plato's vision for a reformed philosophical rhetoric designed to grapple with the
moral/epistemic dilemma, we begin with a close reading of this myth.5
The Myth of the Soul

The Myth of the Soul brings into focus three images that converge to intersect
with Isocrates' view of rhetoric, thus distinguishing him as a potential reformer of
rhetoric.6 First, the myth introduces the tripartite soul that illuminates the responsibility of reformed rhetoric to harness, not banish, emotional forces to complement rational ones.7 Second, the portrayal of the variegated souls teaches that true
rhetors need to leam how to control the dual reins of passion and rationality, not
only within themselves but also within the diverse personalities of their interlocutors. Third, in delineating various personality types on earth, the myth sketches a
dualistic controlling force, partly innate, partly self-governing. The latter force
makes possible the reform of rhetoric. The myth clearly distinguishes between
those orators with a depraved nature who were flagrantly practicing rhetoric in
Plato's day and those with a nature touched by philosophical inspiration. More than
merely locating these orators along a hierarchy, some innately better than others,
the notion of variegated personalities stresses that all orators have the ability and
the responsibility to move consciously toward higher Platonic goals.
Tripartite Soul
A central image in the Myth of the Soul is that of the charioteer and his two
steeds, a metaphor for the tripartite soul. Socrates likens the soul's nature to the
physical synthesis of the "powers in a team of winged steeds and their winged
charioteer" (246A). The charioteer controls two horses: one "noble and good . . .
a lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty: one that consorts with genuine
renown, and needs no whip, being driven by the word of command alone" (246B,
253D). The other is of "opposite character . . . hot-blooded, consorting with
wantonness and vainglory; shaggy of ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and
goad" (246B, 253E). It is important to note here that the good horse, the one
representing the intellect or rationality, is controlled by "the word" whereas the
bad horse, the one representing emotions or irrationality, is "shaggy of ear, [and]
deaf." The seat of reason resides in the former, which thus responds to language,
whereas the seat of passion resides in the latter, which, deaf to language, responds
only to sensual stimulus.
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Plato's imagery here compels us to see the equestrian metaphor as representing the differences between the ends of philosophy and sophistic rhetoric.8
Philosophy, like the noble steed, strives for absolute knowledge and aims at what
is best for man; conversely, sophistic rhetoric, like the ignoble steed, cares nothing
for truth but only strives for its appearance in order to fulfill what is pleasurable
to man. The true rhetorician of Plato's Phaedrus, then, must be like the charioteer
who, understanding the light and dark powers of these two forces, maneuvers them
toward a high moral purpose. A superficial reading of this myth may lead one to
see a simple dichotomy between the two horses, between philosophy and rhetoricthe former as noble, the latter as ignoble. However, such a reading would miss
the richness and complexity of Plato's proposed reform. In the myth the goal of
the charioteer is not simply to beat the bad horse into submission, letting the good
horse take control; rather the goal is to orchestrate the vital forces in both horses
so that they work in concert with one another. Since every mortal is guided by both
the rational and the emotive, both horses are essential. What separates the reformed
rhetor from the sophistic rhetor is this ability to do more than just harness the
influencing forces. The reformed rhetor has the ability to maneuver the forces so
that they work with one another toward a more virtuous goal (260D).
Personalities of Variegated Souls
The task of balancing rational and emotional forces is arduous for the rhetor.
Not only does he need to know his own soul, but in the paideiac race of life the
charioteer of rhetoric must know the nature of the other charioteers and their
steeds. Not all souls are alike; there is a range of variegated souls on earth at any
given time. Knowing the various natures allows the rhetor to make wise choices
in selecting and constructing the appropriate kind of speech to address "a variegated soul in a variegated style that ranges over the whole gamut of tones, and a
simple soul in a simple style" (277C). Hence, the challenge for the ideal rhetor is
to cultivate his innate skills for maneuvering his own reins and those of others.
The first principle in Plato's explanation of the variegated personalities is that
the soul, eternal and indestructible, continually perpetuates its own motion (245C).
The next principle is that all souls strive to discern absolute knowledge of the
Forms, or most generally, Being (248C). However, only the gods are able to take
in the fullest views of Being because Beingabsolute or perfect knowledgecan
only be apprehended by pure reason. Since the soul destined to become mortal is
ruled both by reason and emotion, it can attain only a partial vision of Being.
When "burdened with a load of forgetfulness and wrongdoing," souls lose
their wings, fall to earth, and take on bodily forms (248C). That which has seen
the least of Being is destined to land at the bottom of Plato's nine-runged ladder
of humanity to become a tyrant, striving for power and pleasure instead of wisdom.
Only one step above him is the sophist whom Plato conjoins with the demagogue.
A full seven rungs higher, at the top of the hierarchy, sits the philosopher, "a seeker
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after wisdom and beauty, a follower of the muses and a lover" (248D). The amount
of Being a soul manages to glimpse is the consequence of two interacting factors:
which of the 12 gods it follows and how well it controls the reins of its steeds. The
followers of Zeus, for example, are "by nature disposed to the love of wisdom and
the leading of men" (252E) whereas followers of Hera, queen of heaven, have a
royal nature (253B). Since Zeus leads the parade of gods (246E), souls following
in his tracks have the greatest opportunity to gaze upon the most of Being. On earth
these souls are more apt than others to become philosophers, perched on the top
rung and lovers of wisdom.
Regenerative Cycles
According to the myth, once on earth, the eternal soul strives to regain its
wings so once again it may follow in the train of its god. It takes several lifecycles
before the soul can rejoin its deity, each cycle testing the soul's propensity to strive
after goodness. Those who succeed in achieving the best within their mortal limits
continue to pass through the lifecycles and are eventually rewarded with new
wings. Those who fail "are taken to be punished in places of chastisement beneath
the earth" (249A). Socrates tells us that the diligent and successful philosopher
need pass through only three lifecycles while the lax and unsuccessful philosopher
is destined to travel through ten such cycles with all the other mortals (248E,
249A).
Plato's Socrates illustrates this ongoing moral process through his description
of three mythical pairs of lovers (253E-57A). The first pair illustrates the union of
two philosophical souls striving for that which is best: each fostering the highest
potential in himself as well as in his beloved. Through their mastery at the reins,
they are able to harness both passion and intellect in pursuit of this noble goal,
thereby winning "self-mastery and inward peace" (256B). As a result, not only are
their days on earth "blessed with happiness and concord," but "when life is over,
with burden shed and wings recovered, they stand victorious in the first of the three
rounds in that truly Olympic struggle" (256B). By contrast, the second philosophical pair has the best of intentions, but they let their guard down and their reins go
slack "in a careless hour, or when the wine is flowing" (256C). It is at this point
that "the wanton horses . . . choosfe] that part which the multitude account blissful
[and] achieve their full desire" (256C). On a continuum of kinds of lovers, this pair
is neither so dear and celestial as the first nor as self-serving and earthly as the
third. The third and last pair "engenders] an ignoble quality extolled by the
multitude as virtue" (256E, 257A). Thus, this last pair is condemned to float for
nine lifecycles, "bereft of understanding" (257A) that they could have acquired
during their lives had they chosen to work more closely with their steeds.
Socrates' descriptions of the three mythical pairs of lovers resonate with the
three speeches on love comprising the Phaedrus. Like the ignoble pair of lovers,
Lysias's speech is calculating and self-serving, and designed to appeal to the
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multitude's sense of plausibility. By contrast, Socrates' first speech, reminiscent of

the well-meaning pair of lovers, has honorable intentions insofar as it works to
protect a beloved. However, just as the well-meaning lovers are momentarily
inattentive to their wanton horses, the speech, for all its good intentions, rests on
a misconception of true love. In its ignorance of the truth, the speech offends Eros.
Socrates, therefore, refuses to leave until he has "made atonement for some offence
to heaven" (242C). His last speech, then, is a palinode, recanting the earlier
misrepresentation of Eros. In it Socrates advocates a true and pure sense of love
which glorifies Eros and which, like the diligent pair of lovers, enhances the lives
of both the lover and the beloved.9
Implications for Isocrates' Role in a Reformed Rhetoric

What implications do these resonating constructsthe Myth of the Soul, the
three mythical pairs of lovers, and the three love speecheshold both for a
philosophical rhetoric and for Isocrates as the figure of hope of such rhetoric? The
Myth of the Soul makes apparent that not all gods are equal in their proximity to
Being; nor are all charioteers equally adept at maneuvering their reins, either while
in heaven so as to maximize what they can see of Being, or while on earth so as
to realize their full innate potential. Plato's elaborate mythical scheme is a metaphor that seeks to explain, on the one hand, a hierarchy of innate abilitiesa
consequence of the god one followsand, on the other, the development of those
abilitiesa consequence of how well the charioteer controls the reins. The complexity of the soul results from its attempt to orchestrate the myriad of impulses
within itself. Plato's conception of rivaling forces of the soul makes room for a
reformed rhetoric. It demands a form of discourse that strives to orchestrate the
pleasure-seeking part of the soulthat which finds delight in verbal fluency,
crafted forcefulness, and graceful rums of phraseswith the disciplined partthat
which seeks restraint and truthfulness. In other words, philosophical rhetoric
requires eloquence and wisdom.
These three constructs converge as a bipartite metaphor for kinds of rhetors
and rhetorics. Socrates sets up polar ends of a rhetor/rhetorical continuum in his
prayer that Phaedrus will turn "towards the love of wisdom . . . [and] no longer
halt between two opinions," that is, between sophistic and philosophical rhetoric
(257B). Rather than invoking a simple dichotomy, the constructs of the Myth of
the Soul, the pairs of lovers, the three love speeches converge to let us see a
rhetor/rhetorical continuum along which we can locate Lysias/sophistic rhetoric,
Isocrates/potentially philosophical rhetoric, and Plato/philosophical rhetoric.
The significance of the philosophical rhetor's special status ought not be
overlooked. Because the philosopher is born with a greater potential to strive
toward goodness, he should be diligent in assuming a greater moral responsibility
to do so. What is important to recognize is that, for Plato, an inequality exists
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among humans not merely because of differing inborn talents but also because
individuals make different uses of their talents. It follows from the myth that
rhetors are not merely bom; they must leam how to hone their talent to craft
appropriate discourse, and they must persistently practice their craft. Thus the
myth provides an explanation as to why Lysias's speech is criticized; it is both
poorly crafted, or ineloquent, and impudent, that is, lacking in wisdom. Hence,
unlike philosophical rhetoric, it can only pretend to harness the tripartite souls of
those who hear it.
The sketch of the tripartite soul and the description of the three pairs of
mythical lovers, as well as the speeches they echo, further suggest that philosophical rhetors have a moral responsibility not only to themselves but also to those who
hear their discourses. Ultimately, these rhetors must be held responsible for
composing as accurate an account of truth as their current stage of development
permits. Misconceptions of Truth arise from human limitations and human frailties. On the one hand, humans are limited in their ability to access Truth, but with
practice and time they can grow in their ability to approximate Truth. On the other
hand, like the lovers who turn their attention away from goodness momentarily,
philosophical rhetors may occasionally go astray. The Myth makes clear, however,
that these rhetors have the potential within themselves to return to a path of wisdom
and imbue their discourses with their best approximation of truth. In either case,
misconceptions, whether the result of youthful blindness or momentary weaknesses, once recognized must be rectified, for it is one's moral obligation, says
Plato's Socrates, to represent as accurately as possible that which falls within the
parameters of one's present vision.
Within Plato's view recantation, then, is not only possible but morally mandated. Scholars such as Martha Nussbaum suggest that the Phaedrus may be read
in its entirety as a palinode to Plato's earlier views on rhetoric (202). Socrates'
playful jibe that he has heard "certain arguments advancing" the point that rhetoric
"is no art, but a knack that has nothing to do with art" (260E) clearly echoes the
very words he used in the Gorgias to claim that rhetoric is not an art (462B, C).
This notion of recantation makes the mythical pair of well-meaning lovers especially worthy of our attention. Metaphorically, they represent the regenerative
potential for rhetors to redeem themselves and work toward the reform of rhetoric.
What is there so far in our consideration of the Phaedrus that would lead us
to accept the notion that Isocrates, far from representing a corrupt rhetoric,
represents hopealbeit perhaps a tincture, or trace, of hopefor the reform of
rhetoric? First, Isocrates is described as having natural powers superior to Lysias's
and a nobler character. In short, Isocrates has "an innate tincture of philosophy"
(279A). In light of the vertical positioning of souls described in Socrates' myth,
this touch of philosophy is a mark of distinctive talent that sets him apart from most
others who engage in rhetorical activities. Second, Socrates argues that lovers
ought to pair up with like soulsphilosophers with philosophers, athletes with
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athletes, artisans with artisans (252C, D). Socrates, a follower of Zeus and a "lover
of wisdom," calls Isocrates his "beloved" (279B) at the end of the dialogue. This
nomenclature suggests that Platoor at least the Platonic Socratessaw in Isocrates a like-minded soul, the highest kind of soul with a potential for the best kind
of rhetoric.
Plato indicates that with this potential comes great responsibility for Isocrates.
What the Platonic Socrates apparently hopes for Isocrates is a recantation of sorts.
Just as a sublime impulse prompted Socrates to rectify his offense to Eros, so, too,
Socrates prays that "a sublimer impulse" will prompt Isocrates to "become dissatisfied with... the actual type of writing in which he engages in at present... [and]
lead him to do greater things" (279A). Whether this portrayal of Isocrates indicates
his youthful blindness or a momentary moral lapse in his rhetoric, it points most
importantly to the fact that Plato sees within Isocrates the potential to participate
in the highest of philosophical discursive activity. As Socrates tells the young
Phaedrus, what marks the philosophical rhetor is that he "has done his work with
a knowledge of the truth, can defend his statements when challenged, and can
demonstrate the inferiority of his writing out of his own mouth" (278C). A
palinode, such as the one which Socrates delivers, is but one way to "demonstrate
the inferiority of [one's] writing" (278C). The morally responsible rhetor is able
to recognize those occasions when a recantation is necessary. In this light, the
well-meaning lovers, in their pursuit to love one another purely while striving after
Being, represent the dynamic tension for the rhetor between the desire for moral
action and the inaccessibility of certain knowledge.
Morality and Epistemology: Convergences between Plato and Isocrates
Thus far we have worked to pinpoint the tension between morality and
epistemology as it emerges through the Myth of the Soul. This tension we will
argue is one that pervades Isocrates' work as well. Both Isocrates and Plato sought
to reform rhetoric. Not only was such reform one of Plato's purposes of the
Phaedrus (Hackforth 9), but the reform of rhetoric was also "an integral part of
the great program of moral reform undertaken by Plato" throughout his life (North
11). However, while Isocrates wanted to reform rhetoric for the very practical goal
of the political and social revitalization of the Hellenic states, Plato wanted to
reform rhetoric for spiritual and individual ends. Clearly, then, Plato and Isocrates
dealt with the tension between moral action and epistemic limitations in different
ways and consequently developed markedly different theories of rhetoric and
pedagogy.10 However, the moral/epistemological tension running throughout their
works permits us to locate intersections in their rhetorical theories. We argue that
it is at this point of convergence that Plato may have seen in Isocrates hope for
rhetorical reform.
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Moral Development
The story line of the Phaedrus may be said to concern itself with the moral
development of the young man for whom the dialogue is named. When we first
meet Phaedrus, he is mesmerized by Lysias's speech and considers the deceptive,
tedious discourse to be "extraordinarily fine" (234C), in fact, exemplary of
Greece's best rhetoric (234E). Warning against the oratorical practices of Lysias,
the subsequent speeches and Socrates' commentary on them serve to instruct the
young man regarding the proper purpose of public discourse. The overriding
objective of such oratory should not be to sway the multitudes according to what
is only probable or to serve as an eristic wrangling match; rather, its purpose should
be to instruct with clarity, completeness, and seriousness "those lessons on justice
and honour and goodness" (278A). Phaedrus marks his own conversion to philosophy when he states, "My own wishes and prayers are most certainly to that effect,"
after Socrates prays that he and Phaedrus may follow the example of the philosophical rhetor (278B).
On the one hand, Socrates' moral concern for Phaedrus is on the level of the
personal and spiritual. Against the backdrop of the Myth of the Soul, Socrates'
prayer, for instance, that Phaedrus might "live for Love in singleness of purpose"
(257B), functions as a blessing on the young man's own spiritual journey toward
Being. On the other hand, as Nussbaum points out in her description of fifth-century Athens, young Phaedrus was coming of age in a society where to be an adult
citizen meant devoting oneself "to the city's political and cultural life" (207). For
Plato at the time of writing the Phaedrus, a commitment to philosophy was not
restricted to a solitary life of contemplation. Quite the contrary: as stipulated in the
description of the mythical pair of diligent lovers, to be "Zeus-like in soul" is to
be "disposed to the love of wisdom and the leading of men" (252E, emphasis
added). This contention of Plato's Socrates that philosophy intersects with the
leading of menthat is, with civic activitystipulates that rhetoric should have a
strong moral dimension. In that rhetoric is used to guide men, Socrates' lesson for
Phaedrus is that philosophical rhetoric is discourse that influences men rightly, that
is, along the paths that are just, honorable, and good (278A).
The moral realm of public discourse in Plato's theory of rhetoric is one vector
that can be said to intersect with a similar line of argument in Isocrates' work.
While Isocrates dismissed the contention that the Platonic philosophical enterprise
was some cure for social ills and rejected dialecticism as a pedantic method for
splitting hairs, he was "profoundly affected by the moral reformation initiated by
Socrates" (Jaeger 3:50) and strove to transfer key philosophical tenets into the
realm of politics. Indeed, Isocrates even referred to his own rhetorical system as
philosophical in its own right.11 Not unlike the mentoring stance that Socrates took
toward Phaedrus, Isocrates assumed the stance of teacher and moral safeguard in
several of his works. Yet, while Plato's Socrates aimed his sights on Phaedrus, a
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kind of Philosophical Everyman, Isocrates' apparent strategy was to step in and

advise especially rich and influential young men, namely Nicocles and Demonicus, shortly after they had lost their fathers. In To Nicocles, Nicocles or the
Cyprians, and To Demonicus, Isocrates explicitly articulates his version of a
practical morality. As in the Phaedrus, in these horatorical texts we see a society
in which adulthood is equated with citizenship. Isocrates positions morality within
the affairs of the city-state and portrays these affairs as a dynamic course of activity
that achieves its moral equilibrium through the careful discernment of its members,
each according to his position.
Within the horatorical texts, the basis of Isocratean morality is made clear in
the arguments Isocrates develops to advocate the superiority of monarchical rule.12
What is important here is not the truth value of Isocrates' position, that is, whether
monarchical rule really was or is the best form of government. Rather, the point is
that he stood on moral groundsalbeit grounds that in some ways are out of sync
with current prevailing sociopolitical viewsto argue in favor of the monarchy as
the superior form of government. This is not to say, however, that Isocrates argued
that any monarchy was necessarily a moral one. Rather, he attested that the
monarchy, by the nature of its design, had the greatest potential to serve the genuine
interests of the public, interests served when a government was involved in
decisions "to relieve the state when it is in distress, to maintain it in prosperity, and
to make it great when it is small" {To Nicocles 9). For reign to be a moral one, the
reigning king must be a moral man, of superior intelligence and of nobler soul than
all those he rules (To Nicocles 10, 14). Thus it is to cultivate such virtue in the
young prince as he succeeds his father to the throne that Isocrates writes To
Nicocles.
There are multiple arguments, Isocrates wrote, that "prove" monarchical rule
to be the most fair and the least oppressive (Nicocles or 17). Among his arguments, two are central. Together they epitomize Isocratean morality. The first is
that only the position of monarch permits a government official to care genuinely
for the needs of his people. As caretaker of his people and lover of his country (To
Nicocles 16), the monarch "[d]eliver[s]... citizens from their many fears" and
assures his citizens that no ill will come to those who do no wrong (To Nicocles
23). Contrariwise, the genuine interest of the public is not served in democracies
or oligarchies because there self-aggressive men skilled in haranguing the public
are those that succeed. In such cases, "[m]en . . . are led by their mutual rivalries
to injure the commonwealth" (Nicocles or 18). They quarrel rather than deliberate
with one another, each working to secure what is most within his own private
interest (Nicocles or 20). The king alone, "not having anyone to envy" and having
inherited the throne for life, can avoid rivalries and bickering, focusing instead on
discerning the best course in daily decisions (Nicocles or 18).
The second key argument which Isocrates used to advocate monarchical rule
is that only within a monarchy is virtue encouraged and rewarded among the
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multitude (Nicocles or 15). According to Isocrates, that "the best among [the
multitude] shall have the honours, while the rest shall suffer no impairment of their
rights" is a moral precept, one obvious to common sense yet violated in other forms
of government (To Nicocles 16). In distributing their goods and services, oligarchies and democracies do not discriminate among the more and less virtuous, "a
principle," he explains, "which works in the interest of the worthless" (Nicocles
or 15). Since in such governments the virtuous get lost in the "hurly burly of the
mob" (Nicocles or 16), character that is noble and actions that are right are
overlooked. Neither rewarded nor nurtured, moral conduct disappears, and the
moral conditions of the state gravitate toward mediocrity in the best cases and to
corruption in the worst.
In order for a monarch to care genuinely for the needs of its people and to
reward consistently the most virtuous, the king must develop a keen sense of
discernment (To Nicocles 33). In some situations the king must be able to strike
a balance been two good courses of action, between, for example, actions that are
courteous and those that preserve his dignity, between those that directly secure
his own personal security and those that more immediately preserve the security
of the state (To Nicocles 34, 36). In each of these pairs, Isocrates explained, both
actions are necessary. What is required of an honorable king is to discern a balance
so that actions in favor of the one do not interfere with actions favoring the other.
So it is with matters of legislation, management, finances, and religion (To Nicocles 17, 19, 20). In striking a balance in such daily affairs, the king on a more
general level, maintains a state of equilibrium. His governance enhances the
people's emotional well-being, financial prosperity and political stature while at
the same time it secures his own position as a respected leader, free from the fears
of popular unrest and insurrection (To Nicocles 9).
But the king must also be able to discern situations where the choice is not
between two good actions but rather between what appears to be good and what
truly is. He must detect, for instance, true wisdom, or speaking "well on great
issues," from the appearance of wisdom, "disputing subtly about trilling matters"
(To Nicocles 39). And he must seek council only from those whose wisdom is
authentic. Likewise, he must be able to discern true authority, that is, the respect
subjects grant a ruler whose judgments they believe to be better than their own,
from the appearance of authority: harshness and severity in punishment (To
Nicocles 24). And he must take that course of action that buttresses his true
authority over the people. In pairs of alternatives such as these, in each case, on
the side of appearance is that which is base; on the side of the real stands the
virtuous. Baseness is linked with what is most horrid in governmental control:
greed, corruption, danger, and oppression that lead the people to feel fear, dread,
and hatred. In cases of such alternatives, it is through discerning the moral path as
each choice arises that the king is able to take steps to maintain a moral reign.
One may ask how Isocrates could have expected a king to possess such powers
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of moral discernment. In his words to Nicocles, Isocrates stressed that a king's

innate ability is a class above other mortals. As he inherits a noble heritage and a
superior intelligence, a king also inherits the responsibility to cultivate the powers
of his mind and the depth of his soul with education and discipline (To Nicocles
28, 10,11,50). For Isocrates it was only reasonable that less should be expected
of those under a king's rule. Isocrates' advice to Demonicus, a high-ranking
Cyprian citizen, for example, advocates wisdom, too (Demonicus 5), but a brand
that is more shrewd than sagacious. As a statement of practical ethics, To Demonicus concedes that the subjects of a monarchy must sometimes cultivate appearances that gain popular favor. He sets before Demonicus a set of "moral precepts,"
"practices" by which Demonicus "can make the most progress toward virtue and
win the highest repute in the eyes of all other men" (12). Consider, for instance,
Isocrates' advice to the young man regarding his religious practices: "Do honour
to the divine power at all times, but especially on occasions of public worship; for
thus you will have the reputation both of sacrificing to the gods and of abiding by
the laws" (13).
For the multitude of Cyprians, Isocrates' goals are even less complicated,
urging a morality that is equated with simple obedience and cooperation: "Do not
belittle nor despise . . . your assigned tasks," he writes, "but, knowing that the
whole depends on its success or failure on each of the parts, be careful in
everything" (Nicocles or 48). According to Isocrates' model of a moral city-state,
the king's virtue is of tantamount importance. If all others cooperate, playing by
rules that temper self-interest with well-rewarded virtue, the king can achieve a
moral equilibrium to secure what is genuinely in the state's best interest (To
Demonicus 11; Nicocles or 49).13
For Isocrates, governing as one should included harnessing rhetoric for the
best ends of the state. Within Isocrates' texts runs an overriding concern for the
well-being of Athens, a concern which serves to underscore the need for a
civic-minded rhetoric dedicated to the Greek city-states' best interest. During the
era in which Isocrates taught and wrote, the Peloponnesian War threatened the
dissolution of Greece. Endless battles between Athens and Sparta, for example, not
only proved economically devastating but also posed the very real threat of
unraveling the social fabric of Hellenic culture. Isocrates contended that the only
way to stop Greece from destroying itself was to distribute power equally across
all city-states, amove which would work to ensure Athens a position of leadership
in a unified nation. This pan-Hellenic ideal of a unified Greece, purged of its deeply
entrenched corruptions and bloody rivalries, became Isocrates' goal toward which
he worked to spread throughout the entire Greek world. Crucial to our argument
here is the fact that he considered public speaking to be a primary medium for
realizing this vision of political change.
As we have seen, Plato, too, demanded that the rhetor and his rhetoric serve
high moral ends. The dialogue makes clear that if Phaedrus had remained a devoted
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disciple to the clever but vapid Lysias, Phaedrus's soul would have become as dull.
Just as Plato criticized the hollowness of both eristic wrangling (26ID, E) and
sophistic discourse (262C), Isocrates also criticized empty orations. In Helen,
Isocrates contends that "to praise bumble-bees and salt" is not appropriate (12) nor
is subtly arguing both sides of what Isocrates considered to be a purely theoretical
issue (1). Neither type of verbal display benefits the individual or society. For
Isocrates, as for Plato, the trouble with the sophists was that they did not strive
after wisdom. Isocrates counters this deficit by challenging the sophists to entertain
"the highest kind of oratory that which deals with the greatest affairs" of the state
(Panegyricus 4). For Isocrates, prescribing appropriate subject matter was an
effort to move rhetoric beyond the grasp of the sophists (John Poulakos).
With a moral commitment to wise and just reasoning, Isocrates made appeals
for rigorous rhetorical activity that addressed pertinent social issues with careful
attention to the facts at hand. For instance, Isocrates reprimands Polycrates for
misrepresenting in a display the central character as a contemporary of Aeolus and
Orpheus, who according to public knowledge lived far earlier. But what apparently
concerns Isocrates even more than this careless attention to factual details is
Polycrates' failure to make his delivery relevant to current political or moral issues
facing the state. Consequently, in Isocrates' revision of the text, he provides an
extended discourse on the institution of Egypt. (See Busiris 11-29.) Likewise, he
incorporates commentary concerning Theseus' reform efforts into Helen, a text
similar in purpose and structure to Busiris. (See Helen 21-37.) Concerning Polycrates' choice of subject matter, Isocrates urges: "you will preferably not deal in the
future with such base subjects, but if that cannot be, you will seek to speak of such
things as will neither injure your own reputation, nor corrupt your imitators, nor
bring the teaching of rhetoric into disrepute" (Busiris 49-50). Securing the reputation of rhetoric from the critique of eristic wrangling is also Isocrates' apparent
purpose when in Helen he argues that improvements must surely be made to counter
the current sophistic practice of "wast[ing] their time in captious disputations that
are not only entirely useless, but are sure to make trouble for their disciples" as well
(1). In failing to employ their intellects, the sophistics' rhetoric was doomed to be
inconsequential. In the face of impending social collapse, Isocrates considered
inconsequential oratory to be not merely fanciful but downright immoral.
The Nature of Knowledge

A fundamental epistemological tenet for Plato in the Phaedrus is that mortals
are limited in their access to knowledge. This limitation has significant implications for rhetoric, an activity which should be grounded in knowledge of the Forms,
such as Justice (247D), Temperance (247D), and Beauty (250C). This concession
to the inaccessibility of certitude is made clear in Socrates' opening words to the
Myth of the Soul:
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As to soul's immortality then we have said enough, but as to its nature

there is this that must be said: what manner of thing it is would be a
long tale to tell, and most assuredly a god alone could tell it; but what
it resembles, that a man might tell in briefer compass: let this therefore
be our manner of discourse. (246A)
Similarly, a little later in the dialogue, Socrates admits that "whether I am right or
wrong in doing so [using dialectic], God alone knows" (266B). In both instances
Socrates seems to be suggesting that although we may strive for absolute knowledge it is not within the boundaries of man's ability to reach it or to say what it is.
Mortalswith their "dull... organs" (250B), their "inadequate reasoning powers"
(Hackforth 95)must settle on what something "resembles."
Isocrates also recognized the impossibility of accessing certain knowledge, a
concession which the sophists of his day were typically unwilling to make. In
Against the Sophists, he criticizes those who promise to teach certitude. Specifically, he rails against those sophists who "have gone so far in their lack of scruple
that they attempt to persuade our young men that if they will only study under them
they will know what to do in life and through this knowledge will become happy
and prosperous" (3). Such promises are false and criminal. Absolute knowledge,
for instance, knowledge of how to find true happiness, cannot be bought, taught,
or sold. Indeed, Isocrates goes so far as to suggest that "those who follow their
judgements are more consistent and more successful than those who profess to
have exact knowledge" (8). In other words, even just following one's hunches is
a better route than pretending one can achieve certitude.
Similarly, Isocrates takes to task those who "undertake to transmit the science
of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet, not having
taken trouble to examine into the nature of each kind of knowledge" (Against
9-10). According to Isocrates, the problem with this group of teachers is that they
conflate several kinds of knowledge. For Isocrates, the art of rhetoric depends on
a rich constellation of technical or practical knowledge, contingent knowledge, and
phronesis (understanding). Like the physical trainer who instructs athletes in the
kinds of positions required for various athletic events, "the teachers of philosophy
impart all the forms of discourse in which the mind expresses itself (Antidosis
184). This technical knowledge can be taught; it forms a common method which
marks those who have received such training (Antidosis 206). However, the other
kinds of knowledgewhich Isocrates terms "'theories,' for no system of knowledge can possibly cover these occasions, since in all cases they elude our science"depend on talent and experience (184). That is, since the rhetorical
situation is never the same on any two occasions for any two speakers or interlocutors, there is no way to systematize how the rhetor is to construct an appropriate
speech for every occasion. As Takis Poulakos points out, Isocrates distinguished
between the acquisition of knowledge and the application of knowledge. For
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Isocrates, "to bring doxa to krisis cannot be taught" ("Isocratean Rhetoric").

Training can polish a talent for discerning the best course of action, but diligent
practice is also necessary.
For Isocrates, unlike Plato, doxa did not mean irresponsible opinion but "a
working theory based on practical experiencejudgment or insight in dealing with
the uncertain contingencies of any human situation which presents itself (Noriin
290-91). For example, Isocrates tells Polycrates that his own revision of Busiris is
superior not only in that it judiciously treats rudimentary facts but also because the
argument has greater intrinsic probability. Arguing for the superiority of his
argument, Isocrates explains that it is only through the power of conjecture that a
case can be decided: "[S]ince the question [of Busiris's guilt or innocence] is open
to the judgment of a l l . . . one must resort to conjecture ... reasoning from what
is probable" (35, emphasis added). Doing so is not merely effective; the serious
rhetor argues from the basis of well-considered opinions because knowledge
concerning important political and moral issues is never known for certain. Isocrates elaborated this position most fully in the Antidosis:
For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the
possession of which we can know positively what we should do or
what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who
is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best
course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself
with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of
insight. (271)
Although this work was written approximately sixteen years after the Phaedrus, it
is clear from Isocrates' earlier works that his position on conjecture and inaccessibility of certain knowledge had already been clearly articulated. Most relevant
in the above passage are the echoes of Plato's Socrates in the Phaedrus. Specifically, not only does this passage echo Plato's view on human epistemic limitations,
but it also reverberates with Plato's concern that knowledge, however imperfect,
requires a persistent and diligent effort, a strong theme in much of Isocrates' work.
Such dedication to practice and training is important for cultivating moral
men. As Isocrates explains in the Antidosis, "I consider that the kind of art which
can implant honesty and justice in depraved natures has never existed.... But I
do hold that people can become better and worthier if they conceive an ambition
to speak well" (274-75). Isocrates, then, connects prudential conduct with systematic training in rhetoric and with persistence in its application. Indeed, he goes
so far as to blame the neglect of systematic training for the corrupt youth who wile
away the hours drinking and gallivanting (Antidosis 286-88).
Debates regarding the merits and shortcomings of Isocrates' own intellectual
prowess are endless.14 What is clear, however, is that, regardless of any limitation
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in Isocrates' own mental ability, he stressed the importance of disciplined intelligence. In the Busiris, for example, Isocrates depicts early Egyptian society as an
exemplary civilization. In the scenario young men devote themselves to training
their intellects and to acquiring knowledge. Abstaining from all pleasures, the
young men turn, instead, "to the study of the stars, to arithmetic, and to geometry"
(22). Over time, the studious young men in the Egyptian scenario become elders
who "have charge of the most important matters" of the state (22). For Isocrates,
the trained intellect serves as a tool for influencing the state's affairs by providing
the basis for constructing and delivering wise discourse (To Nicocles 39). Isocrates asserts that with properly schooled intelligence comes the ability to make
wise judgments.
According to Isocrates, what distinguishes his rhetorical theory from the
sophists' attempts at rhetorical practice is, in large part, this emphasis on mental
discipline. Isocrates repeatedly stresses that it is from mental toil that all benefits
spring, both for the individual and for society: "let a single man attain to wisdom,
and all men will reap the benefit who are willing to share his insight" (Panegyricus
2). But what further distinguishes him from other Jeachers, and to some degree
from Plato, was his richly complex notions about the various kinds of knowledge
necessary for effective oratory.,
Rhetorical Dynamism
In the Phaedrus, the road to knowledge is portrayed as a long and formidable
one, filled with twists and turns and occasions for palinodes. While everyone is
limited to feeding "upon the food of semblance" (248B), mortals, as we have seen
from the Myth of the Soul, vary in their abilities to approximate the truth, some
because of innate limitations and others because of failing to hone the talents they
possess.
Plato proposes the dialectic as a systematic way for negotiating the rhetor's
dilemma between moral obligations and epistemic limitations. The dialectic is
presented not as an exercise for discovering ultimate Truth but as a flexible
rhetorical tool for maximizing that which is discernable to mortals. As Curran
explains, the dialectical method provides a "safeguard" against avoidable errors in
reasoning about the subject at hand (67). This technique is for Plato a matter of
defining one's terms and setting them in a cogent order, a process that results from
Collection and Division. The former involves bringing "a dispersed plurality under
a single form, seeing it all together" while the latter requires one "to divide into
forms" (265D and E). That is to say, the dialectic is a method for analyzing how
things resemble one another. In the Phaedrus, how one collects and divides things
depends on the relations one discovers in other parts of the known world, not on
isolating absolute parameters of autonomous, self-confined Forms as some critics
have contended (e.g., Brownstein 394-95; Kinneavy 71).
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Plato introduces the dialectic as an artful tool of rhetoric. It is used to assess

and clarify what one can know in relation to the particular rhetorical constraints
of the "occasions for speaking," "the type of speech appropriate to each nature,
and order," and "what... can be relied on to create belief given the range of souls
in which one attempts "to implant conviction" (272A, 277C, 27IB, 271 A). By
situating the dialectic within the rhetorical situation, Plato moves it beyond a
barren mind-game, devoid of moral, spiritual, and social purpose. Instead, the
dialectic, generating pertinent contextual knowledge, is a dynamic tool that works
to mediate the tension between the moral goal of influencing soulsthe appropriate object of rhetoric and barriers to certain knowledge (270E).
When Phaedrus complains that dialecticism "seem[s] a considerable business," Socrates makes it clear that there are no short cuts in mastering the art of
rhetoric (272B ff). The rhetor's task is an ongoing and taxing one. Perhaps it is
because Plato conceived of knowledge in active terms that he found so ludicrous
not only the sophists' claims to hand over knowledge but also their notion that
techne contains wisdom. The absurdity of viewing the static pages of a book as a
locus of knowledge is highlighted in Plato's Myth of the Invention of Writing.
When the inventor of writing, Theuth, tells the king, Thamus, that the art of writing
'"provides a recipe for memory and wisdom'" (274 E), Thamus rejects this
judgment. On the second count, Thamus argues: '"[I]t is no true wisdom that you
offer your disciples, but only its semblance; for by telling them of many things
without teaching them you will make them seem to know much, while for the most
part they know nothing'" (275A, B). What is important to note here is that Plato
is not rejecting the art of writing but rather the claim that writing can contain
wisdom. Plato's Socrates underscores the moral responsibility of those who engage
in written or spoken discourse in saying: "there is nothing shameful in the mere
writing of speeches
But in speaking and writing shamefully and badly, instead
of as one should" (258D). What is shameful is claiming more for writing than can
be rightly claimed. Wisdom, the synthesis of both moral commitment and disciplined intellect was not, for Plato, a static commodity but an act of engagement.
Because writing freezes the dynamism required of the search for knowledge, it
should not be regarded "as containing important truth of permanent validity"
(277D). We might speculate that this is precisely the reason that Plato never wrote
a techne. Serious rhetorical endeavors must remain open to revision, testing, and
refining in the face of changing contextual demands.15
Like Plato, Isocrates never penned a manual on rhetoric.16 We'd like to
suggest that this parallel is more than a coincidence and possibly further evidence
of the two men holding complementary views toward rhetoric, views that held
dynamism to be a central consequence of mortals' pull toward moral action in the
face of the inaccessibility of certitude. Consider that the sophists, trusting techne
to stipulate static formulas for constructing and delivering discourse, reigned
throughout the rhetorical streets of Athens. The sense of rhetorical dynamism
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pulsing within Plato's Phaedrus and much of Isocrates' work was not commonly
held. For this reason, Plato may have considered Isocrates a soulmate committed
to a precious vision of a moral, intellectually rigorous rhetoric.
According to Isocrates, rhetoric's dynamism begins with the rhetor's power,
of conjecture to determine the best course of action (Against 8). In extending
discourse, either oral or written, the rhetoric must advocate this course of action
in a manner that is original in treatment, fit for the occasion, propitious in style,
and suited to the natures of those who hear him (Against 12; Nicocles or 16).
Proper government, Isocrates suggests in Nicocles or The Cyprians, is best considered rhetorical activity on a grand scale, for the superior government is that
which is best suited to fulfilling the demands of rhetoric, that is, to appraising and
responding to the natures and actions of men. For Isocrates, this power to orchestrate constraints so as to persuade one another is what has permitted civilization
itself: "Because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other
and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the
life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws
and invented arts" (Nicocles or 5).
In the Phaedrus what makes rhetorical activity alive is the rhetor's obligation
to write or to say that which is best, or the most moral, in the face of uncertainty.
Even philosophical rhetors, who according to Plato's scheme have the most innate
ability to recognize the right course, are still bounded by their humanness, by their
inability to say what only a god can say for sure. Yet rhetors according to Plato
must act, that is, they must write or speak when the appropriate occasion arises,
and they must do so in ways that strive after goodness, justice, and honor (272A,
278A). Plato makes clear that this activity is not only for the rhetor's own moral
development but also for the development of those with whom he engages in
discourse (255E). Viewing rhetoric, morality, and knowledge from such a perspective, Plato may have found Isocrates' work appealing on two different counts. First,
Isocrates was committed to cultivating in his students of rhetoric their powers to
determine the most moral course of action when faced with several competing
options. Second, Isocrates' treatises such as Panegyricus worked to bring about
pan-Hellenism, thereby realizing in concrete terms Plato's demand that rhetoric be
put to a rigorous moral test.
Conclusion
Those scholars who read the Phaedrus as Plato's rejection of rhetoric and who
subsequently view Isocrates as the target of this dialogue have tried to see this
dialogue in terms of a static extension of his earlier views on rhetoric (e.g.,
Brownstein 397; Kelley 78; Robin 173; Schakel 131). The tendency here has been
to misconstrue dialecticism as a formula for determining a stable truth. Such
readings miss Plato's reconceptualization of the relationship between mortals and
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knowledge as an ever-changing, dynamic one that is pivotal for a serious art of

rhetoric. We are suggesting that with Plato's increasingly complex formulation of
a rhetoric comes his willingness to entertain the notion that rhetoric may be
reformed and, consequently, be worthy of the status and title of a "true art," an art
on which much of his hopes for moral reform hinge. To overlook this point is to
miss the vigorous interplay between moral obligations and epistemic limitations
that gives rise to Plato's new vision of rhetoric. We have been arguing that it is at
this intersection of inaccessibility of knowledge and moral responsibility that
Plato's and Isocrates' theories of rhetoric converge, and Isocrates emerges as a
potential ambassador of Plato's reformed rhetoric.
To see Isocrates as the target of the Phaedrus is to erroneously associate him
with the sophists and demagogues whom Plato condemns to the penultimate rung
of the hierarchy of souls, just above the tyrant. These specious orators conjure up
discourse that is barren of inspiration that strives for truth. Such rhetoricjust as
demagogueryis founded upon and exploits the emotions and prejudices of the
populace. However, this reading mistakenly confuses Isocrates' practices with
those of orators who were insensitive to the dangerously manipulative potential of
rhetoric and who were ready to build arguments for argument's sake, oblivious to
whether their speeches offend the divine or social order. As we have argued,
Isocrates was acutely aware of the moral responsibilities of rhetors and teachers
of rhetoric, devoting a good deal of space to this very issue in his treatises.
The explicit target of Socrates' criticisms against rhetoric in the Phaedrus is
Lysias's speech which demonstrates sophistic tendencies: a misplaced focus on
arrangement and style, the absolute ignorance of the systematic principles behind
rhetorical practices, and the utter disregard for the truth-value of what is said.
Lysias's speech is formulaic, repetitive, lacking in substantial content, and most
importantly, an affront to the god of love, Eros (shortcomings for which Isocrates
may well have criticized the speech). Hence, it is Lysias, as a sophist, who belongs
near the bottom on the hierarchy of souls and for whom Socrates prays in vain to
"turn... towards the love of wisdom" (257B). In direct contrast, Isocrates already
possesses "an innate tincture of philosophy" (279A).
It is this notion of an "innate tincture of philosophy" that leads Plato's Socrates
to prophesy "greater things" for Isocrates (279A). Even those critics who read the
prophecy as a compliment to Isocrates typically suggest that Isocrates failed to
fulfill the prediction (cf. Hackforth 12; Jebb 2:4). Perhaps these critics reach such
a conclusion because they leave Isocrates little alternative but to become an
intellectual theorist to satisfy Plato. We would argue, however, that this conclusion
is premature, if not misleading. The tendency in much scholarship has been to
conflate the dramatic date with the date the dialogue was written and thus fail to
recognize the significance of the prophecy as a literary tool. The dramatic date,
410 BCE, corresponds to the period during which Isocrates wrote law speeches, a
period so dark in Isocrates' life that he later denies it (Jebb 2:7). Yet the Socrates
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of the Phaedrus sees potential in this young logographer even if Isocrates should
"persist in the actual type of writing in which he engages at present" (279A).17
However, when Plato was actually writing the dialogueconstructing the fictive
prophecyIsocrates had long turned his back on writing for the law courts and
had become a most-respected teacher of rhetoric and a rhetorician. Certainly, we
would argue, Plato would have applauded this shift in Isocrates' career and would
have viewed the shift as evidence of "a sublimer impulse lead[ing] him to greater
things" (279A). Consequently, we cannot agree with scholars who argue that
Isocrates failed to live up to Plato's expectations.18
But this is not to say that Plato commended Isocrates on all of his methods
and ideas, for Isocrates was not a dialectician and he rejected the notion of
universal truthsboth fundamental principles of Plato's philosophy. Yet, as Hackforth underscores, Isocrates' school had "stood over against the Academy" for
several decades (11). Clearly, Plato's Academy with its interests in mathematics
and philosophy had proven unable either to extirpate all of rhetoric or to transform
sophistic practices into the art of true rhetoric. Worse yet, Plato seems to have
feared the practice of sophistic rhetoric if left in the lands of the unenlightened
sophists would continue to corrupt the state and exploit the populace. Only
Isocrates with his large following and political commitments could possibly
redeem rhetorical practices.
Isocrates held that with the trained power of conjecture one can "without
claiming absolute knowledge . . . still choose the right means to the right end"
(Jaeger 3:64). For Isocrates, the rhetor's proper role was to work within the
political arena to provide the leadership necessary to unite the Greek city-states.
Had Isocrates positioned his ideal in direct contrast to Plato and Socrates, he could
have certainly led Plato to use the Phaedrus to spurn him. Rather, however,
Isocrates strove to integrate Plato's primary criticisms against sophistic rhetoric
those aimed at moral indifferencewith the particulars of active, timely politics.
It is Isocrates' attempt to integrate moral responsibility into rhetorical practices
while conceding epistemic limitations that we are suggesting led the Platonic
Socrates to deem Isocrates touched with a tincture of philosophyand that led
Plato to have hope, if only a trace of hope, in a rhetorical reformation.
Notes
1 We would like to acknowledge Richard L. Enos for his careful readings of initial drafts and for his
thoughtful suggestions along the way. We would also like to thank James Murphy for his useful
comments regarding our manuscript. Finally, we are especially grateful to Takis Poulakos not only for
his scholarship that works to open up a space for Isocrates but even more so for his insightful readings
and challenging comments that indicated a tincture of hope in earlier drafts of our paper.
2
Hackforth (9-12) and R. C. Jebb (2:4) are among the few scholars who have contended that passage
279A is a vote of confidence in Isocrates.
3
By contrast, we follow scholars such as Glenn Morrow (237), Edwin Black (361), David Kaufer
(63), and Jane Curran (67) who argue that Plato stipulates in the Phaedrus those practical principles
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through which it is possible for rhetoric to gain the "status of a bonafide and philosophically significant
art" (Murray 279).
4
Regarding the Phaedrus, we are following the dramatic date and the date of composition which
Hackforth recommends (8,7): the dramatic date of approximately 410 BCE establishes Isocrates as a
young man; however, Phaedrus was actually written about 40 years later, in approximately 370 BCE,
when Isocrates was close to 54 years old and nearing the apex of his immensely successful career as a
teacher of rhetoric. (See G. J. DeVries, who provides a summary of various theories concerning the dating
of the Phaedrus [Commmentary 7-11).] According to the approximate dates and organizational categories
that Jebb assigns to Isocrates' texts, the extant works which Isocrates would have written by 370 BCE
are the three hortatory letters or essays titled To Nicocles (c. 374 BCE), Nicocles or the Cyprians (c. 372
BCE), and To Demonicus (c. 372 BCE); the two displays titled Busiris (c. 390-1 BCE) and The Encomium
on Helen (c. 370 BCE); the essay on education titled Against the Sophists (c. 391 BCE); and the political
treatise entitled Panegyricus (c. 390 BCE) (2: 80-260). The above list does not include the six forensic
speeches that Isocrates wrote between 403 BCE and 393 BCE for, as Jebb states, "In his later writings
Isokrates nowhere recognizes this phase of his own activity" (2:7). Acknowledging, as Hackforth makes
clear, the precarious business of dating texts such as these (3), it is important, nevertheless, to note that
Plato wrote his most damning dialogues concerning the practice of rhetoric, the Protagoras and the
Gorgias, before Isocrates had even begun his career as a theorist and teacher (Jaeger 3:112), and we
contend that Isocrates' general view of rhetoric would have been firmly established by the time Plato
wrote the Phaedrus (cf. Jebb 2:53).
5
The epistemological function of Platonic myth is well documented (Stewart 260ff; Zaslavsky 14-5),
as is the epistemological function of the Myth of the Soul per se (Mueller 140-43). According to Robert
Stewart, myths provide Plato with ways of getting the listener "to begin thinking in much more complex
ways" (267). As Kelley underscores, that which is conceptualphilosophical or spiritualis especially
difficult to teach. Because the characteristics of myth, as a specific genre of discourse, require that it
employs physical images to describe that which is conceptual, the myth is a far better tool than literal
discourse for Plato to use to teach philosophical ideas (69). Hence, a careful explication of Plato's Myth
of the Soul is central to understanding the Phaedrus.
6
While the Myth of the Soul has been explicated according to themes of truth (Kelley 73-78), the
conflicting forces comprising the soul (Kaufer 72-75), the audience's susceptibility to logical, pathetic,
and ethical proofs (Golden 23), and as an allegory depicting the virtuous rhetor's soul (Weaver 61), to
our knowledge the Myth of the Soul has not been previously treated, as it is here, as an allegory for the
overriding tension Plato identified between philosophy and sophistic rhetoric.
7
That Plato's view of the soul evolved over time must not be overlooked (cf. Dodds 212; Grube
113; Welch 48). Particularly relevant to our discussion is the change occurring from the time when Plato
wrote the Gorgias, in which he damned all rhetorical practice, to the time he wrote the Phaedrus, in
which he stipulates principles for a true art of rhetoric. At the time when Plato composed the Gorgias,
he apparently conceived of a soul that was unifiedcomprised of a single life-giving, truth-seeking
force. Approximately 17 years later, however, when Plato wrote the Phaedrus, he had dismissed the
notion of the unified soul and held in its place what Kaufer terms a conflict model (65). Perhaps the
failure to recognize Plato's evolving conception of the soul coupled with a Victorian sensibility is
responsible for the privileging of rationality and temperance over irrationality and wantonness that
appears, for example, in Kelley (78) and Brownstein (393). However, as James Golden argues, by the
time he wrote the Phaedrus, Plato recognized that "not only is man a cognitive being concerned with
rationality but also a person motivated by emotions or passions that sometimes cause irrational
behavior" (24). We argue that it is Plato's conception of rivaling forces of the soul that, in part, makes
room for a true rhetoric.
8 See Edward Schiappa for a cogent discussion on the contemporary problems with using and
defining the slippery terms sophists and sophistic rhetoric. We are using sophistic rhetoric here and
throughout the rest of our argument in a sense consistent with how the term appears in translations of
322
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Plato's and Isocrates' works.

9 Certainly, on another level, Socrates and Phaedrus represent a diligent pair, both of whom are
enriched by Socrates' palinode.
10
For sketches of the fundamental differences between Plato's and Isocrates' educational theories,
see D. L. Clark (58), Hackforth (143-44), and James Kinneavy (73-75).
11
For an extended discussion of how Plato and Isocrates each defined the term philosophy to suit what
each valued most, see Werner Jaeger (50, 89-91, 182-96), Jebb (2: 37, 49), and Kathleen Welch (119).
12
One may ask whether the preference Isocrates voices for monarchical government in To Nicocles
and Nicocles or the Cyprians is genuine or merely assumed in order to write to and please the young
king. Takis Poulakos joins Jaeger in reading these horatorical texts as Isocrates' attempt "to legitimize
the constitution of tyranny by tempering its excesses" ("Narrative" 325). A survey of Isocrates' works
provides corroborating evidence indicating that his position in these horatorical texts was more than a
rhetorical convenience. In his later writings, Isocrates repeatedly voiced disenchantment with democracy (Archidamus, Areopagiticus, On the Peace) and looked with moral indignation at the oppressive
tyranny that emerged from Spartan barbarism (Panegyricus). Also, in idealizing the strengths of two
democracies, Solon and Cleisthene, he portrays the governments in aristocratic terms better suited to
monarchical than democratic rule (Areopagiticus).
13
In his later writings, Isocrates continues to explore the potential for moral government. A few years
after Plato wrote the Phaedrus, Isocrates penned Evagoras in which he exhorts Nicocles to bridle his own
desires in order to serve best the needs of his subjects. (See Takis Poulakos, "Narrative" 325.) Isocrates
employs a similar principle in On the Peace to urge Athenians to evaluate the injustices of their aggressive
political policy that violates self-government, a principle which Isocrates refers to as an inalienable right.
14
Thompson outlines divided opinions concerning the assessment of Isocrates' intellectopinions
which fueled a debate that began in Greek and Roman antiquity, was sustained throughout the European
Renaissance, and was very much alive in the Germany and England of his own day (170-71).
15
See Hackforth (163) who points out that Plato in the Epistle VII stipulates that the serious
philosopher doesn't commit his most profound ideas to writing (344C). This reinforces that writing
itself is not corrupt but the notion that it can contain wisdom is.
16
See Michael Cahn who highly commends Isocrates for never having written a techne (144).
17 While some may argue that Plato would never have said a kind word about logographers, Plato
himself contends that any rhetor, including the poet, the political composer, and the logographer, who
strives in serious pursuit of truth and eloquence is a '"lover of wisdom,'" that is, is touched with
philosophy (278C, D).
18
It is interesting to note that Lysias, who we are contending is actually the target in the dialogue,
followed a career path that was the mirror image of that followed by Isocrates. That is, Lysias abandoned
his career as a teacher of rhetoric to become a logographer. We can only wonder to what extent these
mirrored paths were on Plato's mind when he selected these figures for the Phaedrus. This is not to
disparage logographers altogether, however. See Enos who calls attention to the important function
logographers fulfilled in ancient Athenian society. Despite Isocrates' and Plato's written objections to
logography, it apparently served to buttress democracy in Greece at this time (9).
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Maureen Daly Goggin is currently a PhD candidate in the Rhetoric program at Carnegie Mellon
University. She has published on the role of history in studies of rhetoric and on disciplinary rhetoric.
She has a chapter coauthored with Richard Young in Defining the New Rhetorics: Essays on TwentiethCentury Rhetoric (Sage, 1992). Currently, she is interested in disciplinary historiography and is
researching the emergence of the field of composition and rhetoric.
Elenore Long is currently a PhD candidate in the Rhetoric program at Carnegie Mellon University.
She has published on community rhetoric, addressing sociopolitical and theological themes and has a
chapter forthcoming in Making Thinking Visible: A Collaborative Look at Collaborative Planning.
Currently, she is exploring interdisciplinary issues in literacy and is researching the dynamic role of
rhetoric in community advocacy.

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A tincture of philosophy, a tincture of hope: The

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MAUREEN DALY GOGGIN AND ELENORE LONG

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A Tincture of Philosophy, A Tincture of Hope:

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

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The Myth of the Soul

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

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multitude's sense of plausibility. By contrast, Socrates' first speech, reminiscent of

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Implications for Isocrates' Role in a Reformed Rhetoric

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

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kind of Philosophical Everyman, Isocrates' apparent strategy was to step in and

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

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of moral discernment. In his words to Nicocles, Isocrates stressed that a king's

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

The Nature of Knowledge

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As to soul's immortality then we have said enough, but as to its nature

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

Isocrates, "to bring doxa to krisis cannot be taught" ("Isocratean Rhetoric").

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

Plato introduces the dialectic as an artful tool of rhetoric. It is used to assess

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

knowledge as an ever-changing, dynamic one that is pivotal for a serious art of

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

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Plato's and Isocrates' works.

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A Tincture of Philosophy, a Tincture of Hope

Clark, D. L. Rhetoric in Greco-Roman Education. New York: Columbia UP, 1957.

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