Philippine Blooming Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine Blooming Mills Co.

FACTS:
March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a valid exercise of their
constitutional right of freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition
for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief
Executive, alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality of Pasig at Malacaang on
March 4, 1969 to be participated in by the workers in the first, second and third shifts (6am-2pm,
7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm respectively)
March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 meetings in the morning and afternoon where
PBMEO confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do with the Company because the
union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon,
Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of
the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for
that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to report for
work the following morning shall be dismissed for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike
March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company:
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION
MARCH 4, 1969
The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO answered that there is no violation since
they gave prior notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for strike against the
company.
Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers
directly responsible for unfair labor practice losing their status as employees
September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for reconsideration dismissed since 2 days late
ISSUE: Whether or not to regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is an
inhibition of the rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
HELD: YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of the Court of First Instance and reinstate
the petitioners as employees.
In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human
personality is the central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The

inviolable character of man as an individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in
his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the
assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small
encroachments, and the scorn and derision of those who have no patience with general
principles.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among
the immunities reserved by the sovereign people
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic
establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public
affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these rights
so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and
protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized.
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent
Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being
broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The
wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
Injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of
its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights.
There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against

the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
The most that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from
work on the day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially
if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that
their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police abuses. But management
was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free speech, free
assembly and the right to petition for redress.
The dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the promotion of
social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that
"the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of
Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to selforganization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social
and economic well-being."
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in
relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert
activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
Violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction
secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus
proceedings even long after the finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the exercise of
the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be
invoked and exercised when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified,
abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill
of Rights would be vitiated by rule of procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle
then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and its
laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best a dedicated counsel who
can defend his interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent legal services
Enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on
such human rights. It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to

"suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes
of justice require."

Pacita Habana v. Felicidad Robles

FACTS:
Pacita Habana et al., are authors and copyright owners of duly issued of the book, College
English For Today (CET).
Respondent Felicidad Robles was the author of the book Developing English Proficiency (DEP).
Petitioners found that several pages of the respondent's book are similar, if not all together a
copy of petitioners' book.
Habana et al. filed an action for damages and injunction, alleging respondents infringement of
copyrights, in violation of P.D. 49.
They allege respondent Felicidad C. Robles being substantially familiar with the contents of
petitioners' works, and without securing their permission, lifted, copied, plagiarized and/or
transposed certain portions of their book CET.
On the other hand, Robles contends that the book DEP is the product of her own intellectual
creation, and was not a copy of any existing valid copyrighted book and that the similarities may
be due to the authors' exercise of the "right to fair use of copyrighted materials, as guides."
The trial court ruled in favor of the respondents, absolving them of any liability. Later, the Court
of Appeals rendered judgment in favor of respondents Robles and Goodwill Trading Co., Inc. In
this appeal, petitioners submit that the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision.
ISSUE:
(1) whether or not, despite the apparent textual, thematic and sequential similarity between DEP
and CET, respondents committed no copyright infringement
(2) whether or not there was animus furandi on the part of respondent when they refused to
withdraw the copies of CET from the market despite notice to withdraw the same
(3) whether or not respondent Robles abused a writers right to fair use, in violation of Section 11
of Presidential Decree No. 49
HELD:
Complaint for copyright infringement was filed at the time PD 49 was in force, at present laws
dealing with protection of IP have been consolidated and governed by RA 8293. Same
principles are reiterated under Section 177 of RA 8293

A perusal of the records yields several pages of the book DEP that are similar if not identical
with the text of CET.
The court finds that respondent Robles' act of lifting from the book of petitioners substantial
portions of discussions and examples, and her failure to acknowledge the same in her book is
an infringement of petitioners' copyrights.
In determining the question of infringement, the amount of matter copied from the copyrighted
work is an important consideration. To constitute infringement, it is not necessary that the whole
or even a large portion of the work shall have been copied. If so much is taken that the value of
the original is sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author are substantially and to an
injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient in point of law to constitute piracy.
The essence of intellectual piracy should be essayed in conceptual terms in order to underscore
its gravity by an appropriate understanding thereof. Infringement of a copyright is a trespass on
a private domain owned and occupied by the owner of the copyright, and, therefore, protected
by law, and infringement of copyright, or piracy, which is a synonymous term in this connection,
consists in the doing by any person, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, of
anything the sole right to do which is conferred by statute on the owner of the copyright.
In cases of infringement, copying alone is not what is prohibited. The copying must produce an
injurious effect. Here, the injury consists in that respondent Robles lifted from petitioners book
materials that were the result of the latters research work and compilation and misrepresented
them as her own. She circulated the book DEP for commercial use and did not acknowledge
petitioners as her source.
In the case at bar, the least that respondent Robles could have done was to acknowledge
petitioners Habana et. al. as the source of the portions of DEP. The final product of an author's
toil is her book. To allow another to copy the book without appropriate acknowledgment is injury
enough.

Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union

Brief Fact Summary. Two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) that
criminalized providing obscene materials to minors by on the internet were held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a content-based blanket restriction on speech is overly broad
by prohibiting protected speech as well as unprotected speech, such restriction is
unconstitutional.
Facts. At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from
indecent and patently offensive communications on the Internet. The District Court made
extensive findings of fact about the Internet and the CDA. It held that the statute abridges the
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
(Constitution).
Issue. Whether the two CDA statutory provisions at issue are constitutional?
Held:
The CDA's "indecent transmission" and "patently offensive display" provisions abridge "the
freedom of speech" protected by the First Amendment. Pp. 17-40.
(a) Although the CDA's vagueness is relevant to the First Amendment overbreadth inquiry, the
judgment should be affirmed without reaching the Fifth Amendment issue. P. 17.
(b) A close look at the precedents relied on by the Government-Ginsberg v.New York, 390 U. S.
629; FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726; and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.
S. 41-raises, rather than relieves, doubts about the CDA's constitutionality. The CDA differs from
the various laws and orders upheld in those cases in many ways, including that it does not allow
parents to consent to their children's use of restricted materials; is not limited to commercial
transactions; fails to provide any definition of "indecent" and omits any requirement that
"patently offensive" material lack socially redeeming value; neither limits its broad categorical
prohibitions to particular times nor bases them on an evaluation by an agency familiar with the
medium's unique characteristics; is punitive; applies to a medium that, unlike radio, receives full
First Amendment protection; and cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and
manner regulation because it is a content-based blanket restriction on speech. These

precedents, then, do not require the Court to uphold the CDA and are fully consistent with the
application of the most stringent review of its provisions. Pp. 17-21.
(c) The special factors recognized in some of the Court's cases as justifying regulation of the
broadcast media-the history of extensive government regulation of broadcasting, see, e.g., Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S. 367, 399-400; the scarcity of available frequencies at
its inception, see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 637-638; and
its "invasive" nature, see Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U. S. 115, 128-are not
present in cyberspace. Thus, these cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First
Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to the Internet. Pp. 22-24.
(d) Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth Amendment, the many
ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it problematic for First Amendment
purposes. For instance, its use of the undefined terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" will
provoke uncertainty among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and just
what they mean. The vagueness of such a content-based regulation, see, e.g., Gentile v. State
Bar of Nev., 501 U. S. 1030, coupled with its increased deterrent effect as a criminal statute,
see, e.g.,Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U. S. 479, raise special First Amendment concerns
because of its obvious chilling effect on free speech. Contrary to the Government's argument,
the CDA is not saved from vagueness by the fact that its "patently offensive" standard repeats
the second part of the three-prong obscenity test set forth in Miller v. California, 413 U. S. 15,
24. The second Miller prong reduces the inherent vagueness of its own "patently offensive" term
by requiring that the proscribed material be "specifically defined by the applicable state law." In
addition, the CDA applies only to "sexual conduct," whereas, the CDA prohibition extends also
to "excretory activities" and "organs" of both a sexual and excretory nature. Each of Miller's
other two prongs also critically limits the uncertain sweep of the obscenity definition. Just
because a definition including three limitations is not vague, it does not follow that one of those
limitations, standing alone, is not vague. The CDA's vagueness undermines the likelihood that it
has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from potentially
harmful materials. Pp. 24-28.
(e) The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the
content of speech. Although the Government has an interest in protecting children from

potentially harmful materials, see, e.g., Ginsberg, 390 U. S., at 639, the CDA pursues that
interest by suppressing a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to send
and receive, see, e.g., Sable, supra, at 126. Its breadth is wholly unprecedented. The CDA's
burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as
effective in achieving the Act's legitimate purposes. See, e.g., Sable, 492 U. S., at 126. The
Government has not proved otherwise. On the other hand, the District Court found that currently
available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method by which parents
can prevent their children from accessing material which the parents believe is inappropriate will
soon be widely available. Moreover, the arguments in this Court referred to possible alternatives
such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" to facilitate parental control, making
exceptions for messages with artistic or educational value, providing some tolerance for
parental choice, and regulating some portions of the Internet differently than others. Particularly
in the light of the absence of any detailed congressional findings, or even hearings addressing
the CDA's special problems, the Court is persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored. Pp.
28-33.
(f) The Government's three additional arguments for sustaining the CDA's affirmative
prohibitions are rejected. First, the contention that the Act is constitutional because it leaves
open ample "alternative channels" of communication is unpersuasive because the CDA
regulates speech on the basis of its content, so that a "time, place, and manner" analysis is
inapplicable. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.
S. 530, 536. Second, the assertion that the CDA's "knowledge" and "specific person"
requirements significantly restrict its permissible application to communications to persons the
sender knows to be under 18 is untenable, given that most Internet forums are open to all
comers and that even the strongest reading of the "specific person" requirement would confer
broad powers of censorship, in the form of a "heckler's veto," upon any opponent of indecent
speech. Finally, there is no textual support for the submission that material having scientific,
educational, or other redeeming social value will necessarily fall outside the CDA's prohibitions.
Pp. 33-35.
(g) The 223(e)(5) defenses do not constitute the sort of "narrow tailoring" that would save the
CDA. The Government's argument that transmitters may take protective "good faith actio[n]" by
"tagging" their indecent communications in a way that would indicate their contents, thus

permitting recipients to block their reception with appropriate software, is illusory, given the
requirement that such action be "effective": The proposed screening software does not currently
exist, but, even if it did, there would be no way of knowing whether a potential recipient would
actually block the encoded material. The Government also failed to prove that 223(b)(5)'s
verification defense would significantly reduce the CDA's heavy burden on adult speech.
Although such verification is actually being used by some commercial providers of sexually
explicit material, the District Court's findings indicate that it is not economically feasible for most
noncommercial speakers. Pp. 35-37.
(h) The Government's argument that this Court should preserve the CDA's constitutionality by
honoring its severability clause, 608, and by construing nonseverable terms narrowly, is
acceptable in only one respect. Because obscene speech may be banned totally, see Miller,
supra, at 18, and 223(a)'s restriction of "obscene" material enjoys a textual manifestation
separate from that for "indecent" material, the Court can sever the term "or indecent" from the
statute, leaving the rest of 223(a) standing. Pp. 37-39.
(i) The Government's argument that its "significant" interest in fostering the Internet's growth
provides an independent basis for upholding the CDA's constitutionality is singularly
unpersuasive. The dramatic expansion of this new forum contradicts the factual basis
underlying this contention: that the unregulated availability of "indecent" and "patently offensive"
material is driving people away from the Internet. P. 40.

David v. Macapagal-Arroyo - temporary. teh sadz

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National
Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also
issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and
prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the
following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now
in alliance threatening to bring down the President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing
clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021. It must be noted that before the said
proclamations, the following course of events ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled Oplan Hackle I detailing the
plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio
City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks
containing information that Magdalos D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th
Anniversary of Edsa I.
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF
were planning to defect. Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin
were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo
administration. The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga. However, statements
were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo
groups within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the
20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal
of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and
various documents

Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant
from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been
violated, thus the case at hand.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners contention that
the said proclamation has none of it;
Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the
right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless
arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.
HELD:
The court held that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
moot and academic. During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers
committed illegal acts implementing it. There is no question that the issues being raised affect
the publics interest involving as they do the peoples basic rights to freedom of expression, of
assembly and of the press. An otherwise moot case may still be decided provided that the
party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court may inquire into the Presidents exercise of
power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the Presidents decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court
cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was
something that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining acts of terrorism, it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5
who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.
Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the
Constitution. Thus, the acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional. The plain
import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are
normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall
only be done if the offense is committed in ones presence or it has just been committed based
on personal knowledge both of which are not present in Davids warrantless arrest. This being
done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right
of the people to peaceably assemble. The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State
has a right to prevent. Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and

hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of
government officials to media are plain censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more. When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police
committed acts which violate the citizens rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare
such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Philippine Press Institute v. COMELEC

FACTS:
COMELEC issued resolution 2772 directing newspapers to provide provide free print space of
not less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper,
magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications,
their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press
Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the
Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against
the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not
impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers. It
merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec
space. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise
of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation
of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises
during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD:
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22
March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media enterprises to "donate" free print
space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from a fatal constitutional vice and must be set
aside and nullified.
The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent
domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to taking of
private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation.
The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis
temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the
compulsory donation, measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity
for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes.

Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the
problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of just compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of
paying compensation for Comelec space is precisely what is sought to be avoided by
respondent Commission.

TELEBAP and GMA Network v. COMELEC

Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is
an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as
citizens, taxpayers and registered voters. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in
this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Other petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., appears to
have the requisite standing to bring this constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Sec. 92 of B.P Blg. 881 requiring radio and television broadcast companies to
provide free air time to the COMELEC for the use of candidates for campaign and other political
purposes.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Sec. 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due
process of law and without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the
COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of communication or information
during the period of election.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC
Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it
stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of airtime to
advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air
time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view
of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for COMELEC
Time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies
the equal protection of the laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process
of law and without just compensation.
HELD:
Petitioners argument is without merit.
All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave
frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there
are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given

franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast
signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such
exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of
some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and
supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing
and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air
time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the
print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken
by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC. The use of property bears a
social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the common good. Broadcast
media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they may
render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed.

US v. Bustos
Facts:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, then
prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, and five individuals signed affidavits,
charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with
malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The complainants charged that the justice of
the peace solicited bribe money in consideration of favorable decisions. The Executive
Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance of the district. The judge of first
instance, after investigation, recommended to the Governor-General that the justice of the
peace be removed from office. After filing a motion for new trial, the judge of first instance
ordered the suppression of the charges and acquitted the justice of the peace of the same.
Criminal action was then begun against the petitioners, now become the defendants, charging
that portions of the petition presented to the Executive Secretary were libelous. The trial court
found thirty-two of the defendants guilty and sentenced each of them to pay a nominal fine. The
case was elevated to the Supreme Court for review of the evidence.
Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free
speech and free press.
Held:
Defendants are acquitted. Express malice was not proved by the prosecution. Good faith
surrounded the action of the petitioners. Their ends and motives were justifiable. The charges
and the petition were transmitted through reputable attorneys to the proper functionary. The
defendants are not guilty and instead of punishing them for an honest endeavor to improve the
public service, they should rather be commended for their good citizenship.
History of freedom of speech in the Philippines. Freedom of speech as cherished in democratic
countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before 1900. A prime cause for revolt was
consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues de Cien Anos" (The Philippines a
Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms sine quibus non," which the Filipinos
insist upon, said: "The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by
declaring the press in the Philippines free and by instituting Filipino delegates." The Malolos
Constitution, the work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded
freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition.
Liberty to comment on the conduct of public men in free speech. The interest of society and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp
incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear

conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his
official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course,
criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State,
so must expected criticism be born for the common good. Rising superior to any official, or set
of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary -- to any or all the
agencies of Government -- public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy. (See the cases of Wason vs. Walter, 4 L.R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3
F. & F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Garden, 5 Q. B. D., 1.)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or
badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a
justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled.
Right to assemble and petition. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary
consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the right of free speech.
Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to
public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of
penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The
persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges
made.
Privileged communication. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of
government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable
result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. "The doctrine of
privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free and unfettered
administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some instances afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.'" (Abbott vs. National Bank of
Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privileged communication; qualified. Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With
the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie
privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. In the usual case malice can be presumed from
defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on
the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true
motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of
malice. But a privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which
the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.

Babst v. National Intelligence Board

Facts: Arlene Babst, Odette Alcantara, Ceres P. Doyo, Jo-Ann Q. Maglipon, Domini TorrevillasSuarez, Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, Cielo Buenaventura, Sylvia Mayuga, Sheila S. Coronel, et al. are
columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications.
At different dates since July 1980, some of them have allegedly been summoned by military
authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their
works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives.
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio
Tadiar, Jr. on 9 February 1983 with the Office of the City Fiscal, Manila, against Domini
Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by
Doyo and published in the 28 March 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been
interrogated by Brig. Gen. Wilfredo Estrada (Ret.), Col. Renato Ecarma, NBI Asst. Director
Ponciano Fernando, Col. Balbino Diego, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Eustaquio Peralta, et. al.
The complaint included an staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel
has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region against Suarez
and Doyo.)
On 3 March 1983, Babst, et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction, which
was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation
to Babst, et. al. and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been
the subject of inquiry by the National Intelligence Board (NIB).
Issue: Whether the issuance by the NIB of letters of invitation to Babst, et.al., their subsequent
interrogation, and the filing of libel suits against Suarez and Dayo, are illegal and
unconstitutional as they are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression since
they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media.
Held:
The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the
issuance of letters of invitation petition and subsequent interrogations) have therefore been
abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or
constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can
easily assume a different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group
composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just

emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same
can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant
case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to appear . . . shall be considered
as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law."
Fortunately, the NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the
proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against
two of the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending
before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other
respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with
freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum, i.e., before the
court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to
the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an
inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have been
illegally obtained.
Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the
aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials has the authority to restrain any of
his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig.
Gen. Tadiar has filed the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity.
Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does not appear to have
anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.

Reyes v. Bagatsing
Facts:
Retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition, sought a permit from the
City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on 26 October 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 p.m.,
starting from the Luneta, a public park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two
blocks away. Once there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be
held. After the planned delivery of two brief speeches, a petition based on the resolution
adopted on the last day by the International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace
and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a
representative of the Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be
delivered to the United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and
foreign participants of such conference. An assurance was made to observe all the necessary
steps "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." Since Reyes had not been informed of any action
taken on his request on behalf of the organization to hold a rally, on 20 October 1983, he filed a
suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. The oral
argument was heard on 25 October 1983, the very same day the answer was filed. The Court
then deliberated on the matter. That same afternoon, a minute resolution was issued by the
Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the ground that there was no showing of
the existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a
permit. The last sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This resolution is without prejudice
to a more extended opinion." Hence the detailed exposition of the Court's stand on the matter.
Issue: Whether Reyes, et. al. can exercise their freedom of speech, press, or to assemble in
front of the US Embassy.
Held:
The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for
redress of grievances." Free speech, like free press, may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. There is
to be then no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there
be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent."
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and
respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with
freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a
right to prevent.

The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent,
of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public
interest. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US
Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. The novel aspect of the case is that
there would be a short program upon reaching the public space between the two gates of the
United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard.
Related to this, the second paragraph of its Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (to which the Philippines is a signatory) reads: "2. The receiving State is under a
special duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any
intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment
of its dignity." That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any intrusion or
damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its dignity, there would be
a justification for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal point would be the Embassy.
Moreover, Ordinance 7295 of the City of Manila prohibits the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for other
purposes. Even then, if the ordinance is nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a
defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the primacy accorded the constitutional
rights of free speech and peaceable assembly. There was no showing, however, that the
distance between the chancery and the embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be
shown that such a condition is satisfied, it does not follow that the Mayor could legally act the
way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be
argued that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right
of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the distance is
less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated. The high estate accorded the
rights to free speech and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.

Newsweek v. Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:
"An Island of Fear" was published by Newsweek in its Feb 23, 1981. It allegedly portrayed the
island province of Negros Occidental as a place dominated by big landowners or sugarcane
planters who not only exploited the impoverished workers, but also brutalized and killed them
with impunity.
Newsweek filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the printed article sued upon is not
actionable in fact and in law, the complaint is bereft of allegations that state, much less support
a cause of action.
Trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Complaint on its face states a valid cause of action;
and the question as to whether the printed article sued upon its actionable or not is a matter of
evidence.
Issue:
(1) whether or not the private respondents' complaint failed to state a cause of action
(2) whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action
Held:
Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is reversed and the complaint in Civil Case No.
15812 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental is dismissed
The court agreed with the petitioner's argument that private respondents' complaint failed to
state a cause of action because the complaint made no allegation that anything contained in the
article complained of regarding sugarcane planters referred specifically to any one of the private
respondents; that libel can be committed only against individual reputation; and that in cases
where libel is claimed to have been directed at a group, there is actionable defamation only if
the libel can be said to reach beyond the mere collectivity to do damage to a specific, individual
group member's reputation.
In the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr. (16 SCRA 807) this Court ruled that "in order to
maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable (People vs. Monton, L-16772,
November 30, 1962), although it is not necessary that he be named (19 A.L.R. 116)." In an
earlier case, this Court declared that" ... defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of
the person upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it be shown

that the readers of the libel could have Identified the personality of the individual defamed."
(Kunkle vs. Cablenews-American and Lyons 42 Phil. 760).
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially where a group or class
of persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been defamed, for it is evident that the larger the
collectivity, the more difficult it is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks
apply to him. (Cf. 70 ALR 2d. 1384).
In the case of Uy Tioco vs. Yang Shu Wen , 32 Phil. 624, this Court held as follows:
Defamatory remarks directed at a class or group of persons in general language only, are not
actionable by individuals composing the class or group unless the statements are sweeping;
and it is very probable that even then no action would lie where the body is composed of so
large a number of persons that common sense would tell those to whom the publication was
made that there was room for persons connected with the body to pursue an upright and law
abiding course and that it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn all because of the
actions of a part. (supra p. 628).
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at
a group or class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to
apply to every individual in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in
the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that
he can bring the action separately, if need be.
We note that private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500 sugarcane
planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues that the absence of any
actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit on behalf of the
aforesaid sugar planters.
We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
The case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of
all (Mathay vs. Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make
each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a
case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They
do not have a common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which was claimed to be
libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter. The news report merely stated that
the victim had been arrested by members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo
Sola, the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act
performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and protected by the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.

The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police unit were arrested.
The Court takes judicial notice of this fact. (People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393.)
The second issue to be resolved here is whether or not the special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition is available to petitioner whose motion to dismiss the complaint and subsequent
motion for reconsideration were denied.
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be
subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is
adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an
order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and
no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss
or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
then certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
adequate. The following are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus vs. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the City Court of Manila and directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez vs. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of
jurisdiction over the offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the
respondent court from further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez vs. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
improper venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent
judge from taking cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo vs. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by
prior judgment, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco vs. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on
the Statute of Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended
complaint.

In Tacas vs. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion
to quash based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist
from further action in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People vs. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on
prescription was set aside on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.
Respondent Court correctly stated the general rule and its exceptions. However, it ruled that
none of the exceptions is present in the case at bar and that the case appears complex and
complicated, necessitating a full-blown trial to get to the bottom of the controversy.
Petitioner's motion to dismiss is based on the ground that the complaint states no cause of
action against it by pointing out the non-libelous nature of the article sued upon. There is no
need of a trial in view of the conclusion of this Court that the article in question is not libelous.
The specific allegation in the complaint, to the effect that the article attributed to the sugarcane
planters the deaths and brutalization of sugarcane workers, is not borne out by a perusal of the
actual text.
The complaint contains a recital of the favorable working conditions of the agricultural workers in
the sugar industry and the various foundations and programs supported by planters'
associations for the benefit of their workers. Undoubtedly, the statements in the article in
question are sweeping and exaggerated; but, paraphrasing the ruling in the Uy Tioco case
above quoted, it would be unreasonable and absurd to condemn the majority of the sugarcane
planters, who have at heart the welfare of their workers, because of the actions of a part.
Nonetheless, articles such as the one in question may also serve to prick the consciences of
those who have but are not doing anything or enough for those who do not have.
On the other hand, petitioner would do well to heed the admonition of the President to media
that they should check the sources of their information to ensure the publication of the truth.
Freedom of the press, like all freedoms, should be exercised with responsibility.

Lopez v. Court of Appeals

Facts: In the early part of January 1956, there appeared on the front page of The Manila
Chronicle, of which Eugenio Lopez was the publisher, as well as on other dailies, a news story
of a sanitary inspector assigned to the Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz by name, sending a distress
signal to a passing United States Air Force plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila.
He was not ignored, an American Army plane dropping on the beach of an island an
emergency-sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. He utilized it to
inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due to a series of
killings committed since Christmas of 1995. Losing no time, the Philippines defense
establishment rushed to the island a platoon of scout rangers led by Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the reported killer menaced Babuyan Claro, however, Major
Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, a man, the same Fidel Cruz, who
merely wanted transportation home to Manila. In view of this finding, Major Wilfredo
Encarnacion branded as a "hoax," to use his own descriptive word, the report of Fidel Cruz.
That was the term employed by the other newspapers when referring to the incident. This Week
Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article
to it in its issue of 15 January 1956. Mention was made that while Fidel Cruz story turned out to
he false, if brought to light the misery of the people living in that place, with almost everybody
sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing being scarce. Then in the 29
January 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January News Quiz" included an item on the
central figure in what was known as the Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good
turn by calling the government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic.
Earlier in its Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of 18 January 1956, reference was
made to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up a story
about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be ferried back to
civilization. He was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year." The magazine on both occasions
carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that
were published on both occasions were that of Fidel G. Cruz, a businessman-contractor from
Santa Maria, Bulacan. It turned out that the photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary
inspector, were on file, in the library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard
procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news quiz format was prepared,
the two photographs were inadvertently switched. As soon, however, as the inadvertent error
was brought to the attention of Lopez and Gatbonton, the following correction was immediately
published in This Week Magazine on January 27, 1957: "While we were rushing to meet the
deadline for January 13th issue of This Week, we inadvertently published the picture of former
Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and contractor, in 'Our Own Who's
Who feature in the Year End Quiz' of This Week in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who
was connected with a story about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island. We here
express our profound regrets that; such an error occurred." Together with the foregoing
correction, Lopez and Gatbonton published the picture of Fidel Cruz; the photographs and the
correction moreover were enclosed by four lines, the type used was bolder than ordinary, and
the item was placed in a conspicuous place in order to call the attention of the readers to such

amends being made. The businessman Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez and Gatbonton in the Court
of First Instance of Manila for the recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the
above publication of his picture. After trial duly had, he was awarded P5,000 as actual damages,
another P5,000 as moral damages, and P1,000 for attorney's fees. That judgment was affirmed
on appeal to the appellate Court. Lopez and Gatbonton filed the petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether the claim of freedom of the press negates Lopez and Gatbontons liability
arising from libel.
Held:
A libel was defined as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in writing, printing, or by signs
or
pictures, or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural defects of one who is alive, and
thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule." There was an express provision in
such legislation for a tort or a quasi-delict action arising from libel. There is reinforcement to
such a view in the new Civil Code providing for the recovery of moral damages for libel, slander
or any other form of defamation.
According to the standard treatise of Newell on Slander and Libel: "Publication of a person's
photograph in connection with an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose
picture is published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
Why libel law has both a criminal and a civil aspect is explained by Hale in his Law of the Press
thus: "On the one hand, libeling a person results in depriving him of his good reputation. Since
reputation is a thing; of value, truly rather to be chosen than great riches, an impairment of it is a
personal wrong. To redress this personal wrong money damages are awarded to the injured
person. On the other hand, the publication of defamatory statements tends strongly to induce
breach of the peace by the person defamed, and hence is of peculiar moment to the state as
the guardian of the public peace.
Viewed from this angle, libel is a crime, and as such subjects the offender to a fine or
imprisonment." No inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the guise of punitive action
visited in what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of printed words or
a defamatory imputation resulting from the publication of Cruz's picture with the offensive
caption as in complained of.
This is not to deny that the party responsible invites the institution either of a criminal
prosecution or a civil suit. It must be admitted that what was done did invite such a dire
consequence, considering the value the law justly places on a man's reputation. This is merely
to underscore the primacy that freedom of the press enjoys. It ranks rather high in the hierarchy
of legal values. If the cases mean anything at all then, to emphasize what has so clearly
emerged, they call for the utmost care on the part of the judiciary to assure that in safeguarding

the interest of the party allegedly offended, a realistic account of the obligation of a news media
to disseminate information of a public character and to comment thereon as well as the
conditions attendant on the business of publishing cannot be ignored.
However, the correction promptly made by Lopez and Gatbonton would thus call for a reduction
in the damages awarded. It should be noted that there was no proof of any actual pecuniary
loss arising from the above publication. It is worthwhile to recall what Justice Malcolm referred
to as the tolerant attitude on the part of appellate courts on this score, the usual practice being
"more likely to reduce damages for libel than to increase them."

Japan Airlines v. Simangan

Facts:
In 1991, respondent Jesus Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto
Simangan, in UCLA School of Medicine in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. Upon request of
UCLA, respondent undertook a series of laboratory tests at the National Kidney Institute in
Quezon City to verify whether his blood and tissue type are compatible with Loreto's.
Fortunately, said tests proved that respondent's blood and tissue type were well-matched with
Loreto's.
Respondent needed to go to the United States to complete his preliminary work-up and
donation surgery. Hence, to facilitate respondent's travel to the United States, UCLA wrote a
letter to the American Consulate in Manila to arrange for his visa. In due time, respondent was
issued an emergency U.S. visa by the American Embassy in Manila.
Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from
petitioner JAL for US$1,485.00 and was issued the corresponding boarding pass. He was
scheduled to a particular flight bound for Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. via Narita, Japan.
On July 29, 1992, the date of his flight, respondent went to Ninoy Aquino International Airport in
the company of several relatives and friends. He was allowed to check-in at JAL's counter. His
plane ticket, boarding pass, travel authority and personal articles were subjected to rigid
immigration and security routines. After passing through said immigration and security
procedures, respondent was allowed by JAL to enter its airplane.
While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected respondent of carrying a falsified travel
document and imputed that he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay
and work in Japan. The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel documents. Shortly
after, the stewardess along with a Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to stand up
and leave the plane. Respondent protested, explaining that he was issued a U.S. visa. Just to
allow him to board the plane, he pleaded with JAL to closely monitor his movements when the
aircraft stops over in Narita. His pleas were ignored. He was then constrained to go out of the
plane.18 In a nutshell, respondent was bumped off the flight.
Respondent went to JAL's ground office and waited there for three hours. Meanwhile, the plane
took off and he was left behind. Afterwards, he was informed that his travel documents were,
indeed, in order. Respondent was refunded the cost of his plane ticket less the sum of
US$500.00 which was deducted by JAL. Subsequently, respondent's U.S. visa was cancelled.
Displeased by the turn of events, respondent filed an action for damages against JAL with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Valenzuela City, docketed as Civil Case No. 4195-V-93. He
claimed he was not able to donate his kidney to Loreto; and that he suffered terrible

embarrassment and mental anguish. He prayed that he be awarded P3 million as moral

damages, P1.5 million as exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as attorney's fees.
JAL denied the material allegations of the complaint. It argued, among others, that its failure to
allow respondent to fly on his scheduled departure was due to "a need for his travel documents
to be authenticated by the United States Embassy" because no one from JAL's airport staff had
encountered a parole visa before. It posited that the authentication required additional time; that
respondent was advised to take the flight the following day, July 30, 1992. JAL alleged that
respondent agreed to be rebooked on July 30, 1992.
JAL also lodged a counterclaim anchored on respondent's alleged wrongful institution of the
complaint. It prayed for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.28
On September 21, 2000, the RTC presided by Judge Floro P. Alejo rendered its decision in favor
of respondent (plaintiff), disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, the amount of P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages and the amount of P250,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the cost of suit.29
The RTC explained:
In summarily and insolently ordering the plaintiff to disembark while the latter was already
settled in his assigned seat, the defendant violated the contract of carriage; that when the
plaintiff was ordered out of the plane under the pretext that the genuineness of his travel
documents would be verified it had caused him embarrassment and besmirched reputation; and
that when the plaintiff was finally not allowed to take the flight, he suffered more wounded
feelings and social humiliation for which the plaintiff was asking to be awarded moral and
exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
The reason given by the defendant that what prompted them to investigate the genuineness of
the travel documents of the plaintiff was that the plaintiff was not then carrying a regular visa but
just a letter does not appear satisfactory. The defendant is engaged in transporting passengers
by plane from country to country and is therefore conversant with the travel documents. The
defendant should not be allowed to pretend, to the prejudice of the plaintiff not to know that the
travel documents of the plaintiff are valid documents to allow him entry in the United States.
The foregoing act of the defendant in ordering the plaintiff to deplane while already settled in his
assigned seat clearly demonstrated that the defendant breached its contract of carriage with the
plaintiff as passenger in bad faith and as such the plaintiff is entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as well as to an award of attorney's fees.

Disagreeing with the RTC judgment, JAL appealed to the CA contending that it is not guilty of
breach of contract of carriage, hence, not liable for damages. It posited that it is the one entitled
to recover on its counterclaim.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT
WAS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. JAL WAS NOT GUILTY OF BREACH OF CONTRACT.
B. MORAL DAMAGES MAY BE AWARDED IN BREACH OF CONTRACT CASES ONLY WHEN
THE BREACH IS ATTENDED BY FRAUD OR BAD FAITH. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT JAL
WAS GUILTY OF BREACH, JAL DID NOT ACT FRAUDULENTLY OR IN BAD FAITH AS TO
ENTITLE RESPONDENT TO MORAL DAMAGES.
C. THE LAW DISTINGUISHES A CONTRACTUAL BREACH EFFECTED IN GOOD FAITH
FROM ONE ATTENDED BY BAD FAITH.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT
WAS ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES CONSIDERING THAT:
A. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE IN BREACH OF CONTRACT OF
CARRIAGE UNLESS THE CARRIER IS GUILTY OF WANTON, FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS,
OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT CONDUCT.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT JAL WAS GUILTY OF BREACH, JAL DID NOT ACT IN A
WANTON FRAUDULENT, RECKLESS, OPPRESSIVE OR MALEVOLENT MANNER AS TO
ENTITLE RESPONDENT TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
DAMAGES, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS AWARD OF P750,000 IN
DAMAGES WAS EXCESSIVE AND UNPRECEDENTED.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING FOR JAL ON ITS
COUNTERCLAIM.
Held

JAL is a common carrier. JAL's business is mainly with the traveling public. It invites people to
avail themselves of the comforts and advantages it offers.84 Since JAL deals with the public, its
bumping off of respondent without a valid reason naturally drew public attention and generated
a public issue.
The publications involved matters about which the public has the right to be informed because
they relate to a public issue. This public issue or concern is a legitimate topic of a public
comment that may be validly published.
Assuming that respondent, indeed, caused the publication of his complaint, he may not be held
liable for damages for it. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the speech and of the press
includes fair commentaries on matters of public interest. This is explained by the Court in Borjal
v. Court of Appeals,85 to wit:
To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid
defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to
a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.86 (Citations omitted and underscoring ours)
Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public
interest applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public officials but extends to a great
variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for
office.87
Hence, pursuant to the Borjal case, there must be an actual malice in order that a discreditable
imputation to a public person in his public capacity or to a public official may be actionable. To
be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or
published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are
false or not.88
Considering that the published articles involve matters of public interest and that its expressed
opinion is not malicious but based on established facts, the imputations against JAL are not
actionable. Therefore, JAL may not claim damages for them.

People's Journal v. Thoenen

Facts:
On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples Journal claiming that a certain
Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds
in his domain. It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren
Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in
the future. Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in
the community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a social and moral duty
to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the
moral public (sic) of the people, and that the story was published in good faith and without
malice.
Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore
protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech.
Held:
The right of free speech is not absolute.
Libel is not protected speech.
In Vasquez v. Court of Appeals:
An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the
possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt, or which tends to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
There is publication if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that the
person defamed has read or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third
person has read or heard the libelous statement, for a man's reputation is the estimate in which
others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself.
On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third
person or a stranger was able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.
Finally, malice or ill will must be present. Art. 354 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention

and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or security duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers
in the exercise of their functions.
The article is not a privileged communication. We first discussed the freedom of speech and
press and assembly vis-a-vis the laws on libel and slander in the groundbreaking case of US v.
Bustos,[23] where we applied the prevailing English and American jurisprudence to the effect
that:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case
of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with
the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be
exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is
less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good? Rising superior
to any official, or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to the Judiciary - to
any or all the agencies of Government - public opinion should be the constant source of liberty
and democracy.
The demand to protect public opinion for the welfare of society and the orderly administration of
government inevitably lead to the adoption of the doctrine of privileged communication. A
privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely
privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in
bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a
member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing
defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong private communications and fair and true
report without any comments or remarks.[24]
The appellate court correctly ruled that the petitioners story is not privileged in character, for it is
neither private communication nor a fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
US v. Bustos defined the concept of private communication thus: A communication made bona
fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference

to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or

duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous
and actionable. A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint
made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official
when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter.
In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged
communication, it lost its character when the matter was published in the newspaper and
circulated among the general population, especially since the individual alleged to be defamed
is neither a public official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did
not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Angara was a
mere request for verification of Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue
because the events she reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty.
Efren Angara, apparently either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
In Borjal v. Court of Appeals, we stated that the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive
list of qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are likewise privileged. We stated that the doctrine of fair commentaries means that while in
general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is
presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to
a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the
careless error materially advances societys interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality
The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the
truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection

MVRS v. Islamic Dawah

FACTS: Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines, Inc., a local federation of more than 70
Muslim religious organizations, filed a complaint for damages against MVRS Publications, Inc.,
arising from an article, which reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na
sila pa ay magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at
sinasamba pa nila ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na
tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
ISSUE:
W/N this is an action for defamation (libel) or an emotional distress tort action
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that there is no cause of action for defamation.
DEFAMATION DEFINED:
Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's
character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. It is that which tends to
injure reputation or to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill or confidence in the plaintiff or to
excite derogatory feelings or opinions about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is
injurious to the good name or reputation of another or tends to bring him into disrepute.
Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the
community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.
GROUP LIBEL/DEFAMATION:
where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that
the statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group
or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the
defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if
need be.
The statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically identify nor refer
to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous publication.

Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly
resulting in damages.
The action likewise is not for emotional distress.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS v. DEFAMATION:
Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by
an individual to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his
character. It has no application in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in
the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage caused by the article, assuming there
was any, falls under the principle of relational harm which includes harm to social relationships
in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the principle of reactive harm
which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an infliction of emotional
distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the standing of
Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro Manila
and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present
case falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation,
rather than the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly
belongs.
WHEN PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER:
To recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The
conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct
was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme
and severe.
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so
extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The defendant's actions must have been so
terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.
"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief,
shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering
and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin. "Severe emotional distress," in some
jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may
be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including
posttraumatic stress disorder, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia. The plaintiff is
required to show, among other things, that he or she has suffered emotional distress so severe
that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it; severity of the distress is an element
of the cause of action, not simply a matter of damages.

Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety,
vexation, embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of
outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is necessarily expected and required to be hardened to
a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to occasional acts and words that are
definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard
the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.
(3) Interferences with Contractual Relations
Art. 1314: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to the other contracting party.

People v. Castelo
Facts: In the issue of 19 March 1955 of the Manila Daily Bulletin an English daily published in
the City of Manila while the Monroy murder case was pending decision, a news story entitled
"Foil Extortion Try on Castelo" was published. In summary, the story states that Philippine
constabulary agents investigated two society matrons in their attempt to extort P100,000.00
from Oscar Castelo allegedly to secure his acquittal. The investigators questioned the matrons
and took tape recordings and pictures while they were negotiating the money. Castelo
confirmed the extortion attempt. The plan was broached to Miss Adelaida Reyes, a friend of
Castelo, who upon being informed thereof reported the matter to the military intelligence service
of the constabulary (G-2). The negotiations took place in San Juan de Dios coffee shop on
Dewey Boulevard. There Miss Reyes was told by one of the matrons that she saw the decision
sentencing Castelo but that they could secure its change to acquittal if Miss Reyes could raise
P100,000.00. The negotiations did not go through because Miss Reyes could not raise the
amount. When Miss Reyes informed Castelo of the plan he reportedly got mad. The news story
came to the knowledge of Judge Emilio Rilloraza who was trying the Monroy murder case on 19
December 1955 and so he issued on that date an order citing Hernando Abaya, who admittedly
was the news editor who wrote the story, to show cause why he should not be punished for
indirect contempt in connection with the publication. A motion to dismiss the contempt citation
having been denied, Abaya filed his reply to the citation. Thereafter, the contempt proceeding
was set for hearing, after which the court rendered decision finding Abaya guilty of indirect
contempt and ordering him to pay a fine of P50.00 payable within 15 days from notice of the
decision or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Dissatisfied with this
decision, Abaya took the present appeal.
Issue: Whether Abaya's act, in publishing the news story, be considered indirect contempt.
Held: There is nothing in the story which may even in a slight degree indicate that Abaya's
ultimate purpose in publishing it was to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice
in connection with the Castelo case. The publication can be searched in vain for any word that
would in any way degrade it. The alleged extortion try merely concerns a news story which is
entirely different, distinct and separate from the Monroy murder case. Though mention was
made indirectly of the decision then pending in that case, the same was made in connection
with the extortion try as a mere attempt to secure the acquittal of Castelo. But the narration was
merely a factual appraisal of the negotiation and no comment whatsoever was made thereon
one way or the other coming from Abaya. Indeed, according to the trial judge himself, said
publication did not in any way impede or obstruct his decision promulgated on 31 March 1955.
For a publication to be considered as contempt of court there must be a showing not only that
the article was written while a case is pending but that it must really appear that such publication
does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of justice. Here, there is no such
clear showing. The very decision of the court shows the contrary. Still, even if it may have that
effect, the publication comes well within the framework of the constitutional guaranty of the
freedom of the press. At least it may be said that it is a fair and true report of an official

investigation that comes well within the principle of a privileged communication, so that even if
the same is defamatory or contemptuous, the publisher need not be prosecuted upon the theory
that he has done it to serve public interest or promote public good.
Thus, under our law, it is postulated that "a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in such proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions", is deemed
privileged and not punishable (Article 354, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code). While the
present case involves an incident of contempt the same is akin to a case of libel for both
constitute limitations upon freedom of the press or freedom of expression guaranteed by our
Constitution. So what is considered a privilege in one may likewise be considered in the other.
The same safeguard should be extended to one whether anchored in freedom of the press or
freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle regarding privileged communications can also
be invoked in favor of Abaya.

People v. Alarcon
Facts: As an aftermath of the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in
criminal case 5733 (People s vs. Salvador Alarcon, et al.), convicting the accused therein except
one of the crime of robbery committed in band, a denunciatory letter, signed by one Luis M.
Taruc, was addressed to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines. A copy of said letter
found its way to Federico Mangahas who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that
paper of 23 September 1937. The article provides, in part, that "Fifty-two (52) tenants in
Floridablanca, Pampanga, have been charged and convicted on a trumped up charge of
robbery in band because they took each a few cavans of palay for which they issued the
corresponding receipts, from the bodega in the hacienda where they are working. These tenants
contend that they have the right to take the palay for their food as the hacienda owner has the
obligation to give them rations of palay for their maintenance and their families to be paid later
with their share of their crop. But this is not all. When the convicted tenants appealed the case
and were released on bail pending their appeal, court and public officials exerted pressure upon
one of their bondsmen, as this bondsman informed the tenants, to withdraw his bail for them,
and the fifty two tenants were arrested again and put in jail." On 29 September 1937, the
provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed with the Court of First Instance of that province to cite
Federico Mangahas for contempt. On the same date, the lower court ordered Mangahas to
appear and show cause. Mangahas appeared and filed an answer,alleging, among others, that
the publication of the letter in question is in line with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
the press. On 29 November 1937, the lower court entered an order, imposing upon Mangahas
the nominal fine of P25, or in case of insolvency, 5 days in prison; this without prejudice to the
action for libel that the public prosecutor believes to be advisable to file against Luis M. Taruc.
Magahas appealed from this order to the Court of Appeals which later certified the case to
the Supreme Court as involving only a question of law.
Issue: Whether the trial court properly cited Mangahas for contempt inasmuch as the robbery-inband case is still pending appeal.
Held: Newspaper publications tending to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is
summarily punishable by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended. It must,
however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere with, and embarrass the
administration of justice before the author of the publications should be held for contempt. What
is thus sought to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important
duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. There is no pending
case to speak of when and once the court has come upon a decision and has lost control either
to reconsider or amend it. That is the present case, for here the letter complained of was
published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the criminal case for
robbery in band, and after that decision had been appealed to the Court of Appeals. The fact
that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the accused therein was

subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important consideration is that it was then without
power to reopen or modify the decision which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and
could not have been influenced by the questioned publication.
If it be contended, however, that the publication of the questioned letter constitutes contempt of
the Court of Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case was then pending, the interrelation of
the different courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in vindication of the
authority and decorum which are not its own. The appeal transfers the proceedings to the
appellate court, and this last court becomes thereby charged with the authority to deal with
contempts committed after the perfection of the appeal.

Webb v. De Leon - di ko din maintindihan yung text ng kaso.

On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita NicolasVizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF
Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They assail the credibility of
Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her
April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure followed by the
DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right
to an impartial investigation. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their
preliminary investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to
charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against the
accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica
Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that
more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence

establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the RTC may issue a
warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges should have conducted
searching examination of witnesses before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were given all the opportunities
to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for
the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and
legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department whose principal
power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component
of this right is to prosecute their violators.
"Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain
circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et
al. vs. Alejandro, et al., 54 we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that
the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal
effects of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown
and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a
factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of
publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by
the parties. The length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and
the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of

their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of
the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity."

People v. Sanchez
Facts: (The Sarmenta-Gomez rape-slay) On 28 June 1993, Luis and Rogelio "Boy" Corcolon
approached Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, forcibly took the two and loaded them at the
back of the latter's van, which was parked in front of Caf Amalia, Agrix Complex, Los Banos,
Laguna. George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit also boarded the van
while Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan, who were also with the group, stayed in the
ambulance. Both vehicles then headed for Erais Farm situated in Barangay Curba, which was
owned by Mayor Antonio Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna. The two youngsters were then brought
inside the resthouse where Eileen was taken to the Mayors room. Allan was badly beaten up by
Luis, Boy, Ama and Medialdea and thereafter thrown out of the resthouse. At around 1:00 a.m.
of the next day, a crying Eileen was dragged out of the rest house by Luis and Medialdea her
hair disheveled, mouth covered by a handkerchief, hands still tied and stripped of her shorts.
Eileen and Allan were then loaded in the Tamaraw van by Medialdea, et. al. and headed for
Calauan, followed closely by the ambulance. En route to Calauan, gunfire was heard from the
van. The van pulled over whereupon Kawit dragged Allan, whose head was already drenched in
blood, out of the vehicle onto the road and finished him off with a single gunshot from his
armalite. The ambulance and van then sped away. Upon reaching a sugarcane field in Sitio
Paputok, Kilometro 74 of Barangay Mabacan, Eileen was gang-raped by Luis Corcolon,
Medialdea, Rogelio Corcolon, Ama, Brion and Kawit. After Kawits turn, Luis Corcolon shot
Eileen with his baby armalite. Moments later, all 8 men boarded the ambulance and proceeded
to Calauan, leaving the Tamaraw van with Eileens remains behind. Initially, the crime was
attributed to one Kit Alqueza, a son of a feared general (Dictador Alqueza). Luis and Rogelio
Corcolon were also implicated therein. However, further investigation, and forensic findings,
pointed to the group of Mayor Sanchez. Centeno and Malabanan bolstered the prosecution's
theory. On 11 March 1995, Judge Harriet O. Demetriou of the Regional Trial Court (Pasig City,
Branch 70) found Mayor Sanchez, Medialdea, Ama, Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and
Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, ordering them to pay
Eileen Sarmenta the amount of P50,000 and additionally, the amount of P700,000.00 to the
heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez as additional indemnity. On 25 January 1999, the
Supreme Court, through Justice Martinez, affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction rendered
by the trial court. Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed
their respective motions for reconsideration. The Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment on 6 December 1999. Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by
publicity, besides claims that principal witness Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility, that the
testimony of his 13-year old daughter should have been given full faith and credit, and that the
gargantuan damages awarded have no factual and legal bases. Ama, Brion and Kawit maintain
that Centeno and Malabanan were sufficiently impeached by their inconsistent statements
pertain to material and crucial points of the events at issue, besides that independent and
disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecutions version of events. On 2 February
1999, Justice Martinez retired in accordance with AM 99-8-09. The motions for reconsideration
was assigned to Justice Melo for study and preparation of the appropriate action on 18
September 2001.

Issue: Whether the publicity of the case impaired the impartiality of the judge handling the case.
Held:
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of Mayor Sanchez, et. al., was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does
not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. The right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible
reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial.
The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of
justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny
and criticism. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and
on camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. To warrant a finding of prejudicial
publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced by the
barrage of publicity.
Records herein do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against Mayor Sanchez,
et. al., as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pretrial and trial of his case.
The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Mayor Sanchez, et. al., has the burden to prove this actual bias and
he has not discharged the burden.
This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez,
having failed, in his motion for reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the
part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellants case has been exhaustively and
painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by an iota
of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in
affirming the sentence of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of conviction by
publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no ground to stand on.

In re Parazo - pak. wala nito, shet.

Reporters refusal to reveal source of news report regarding claimed bar examination leak
favoring one school.
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines authorizes this Court to promulgate
rules concerning the admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that authority, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court was promulgated, under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar
Examinations yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be presided by one of the
Justices, to serve for one year, acts on the report of the committee and, finally, admits to the Bar
and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees who have passed the examinations.
Any charge or insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of the Bar Examinations, of necessity is
imbued with wide and general interest and national importance. We have the inherent
power of courts in general specially of the Supreme court as representative of the Judicial
Department, to adopt proper and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and render
possible and facilitate the exercise of their functions. .. The revelation demanded of the
respondent of the identity of his informants is essential and necessary to the investigation of the
charge contained in the publication already mentioned.