Memories of Dai Do (Apr 2004) Marine Corps Gazette

Volume 88, Issue 4

Author:
William Weise

Then:
Imagine yourself as an infantry battalion commander with less than 700 Marines going toe to toe against
a battle-hardened enemy division of over 7,000. Fair odds-right? But what if you got no reinforcements?
What then? Fasten your seat belts as the battalion commander takes us on a wild ride near the Cua Viet
River in early 1968. The narrative picks up on the second night of action, as excerpted from the original
article (MCG, Sep87).
The Night of 1-2 May; Predawn Attack by Echo Company on Dai Do Followed by Hotel Company Attack on
Dinh To, 2 May
My concern about Golf Company, increased greatly as it started to receive enemy probes. To take the
pressure off Golf, I decided to launch Echo Company in a predawn attack on Dai Do. I ordered Hotel
Company to be prepared to follow Echo Company. Echo's attack would be northwest from An Lac. We had
to move quickly because Golf Company's situation grew worse by the hour. Two large enemy night attacks
and several small probes were beaten back.
The thunder of Golf's defensive fires muffled the movement of Echo Company as it crossed the line of
departure and moved into the rice paddies toward assault positions just south of Dai Do village. Before
Echo Company reached its assault positions, the enemy opened up with heavy volumes of small arms and
mortar fire. The two forward (assault) platoons received heavy casualties and lost forward momentum.
But Capt Livingston immediately committed his reserve platoon, personally leading it forward to
penetrate the forward enemy defenses and moved well into Dai Do. The fighting was furious. Although
twice wounded by grenade fragments, Livingston continued to move wherever required to encourage his
men and to maintain the momentum of the assault. Each enemy position had to be located, pinned down
by accurate fire, blinded with white phosphorous, and destroyed by grenades, flamethrowers, satchel
charges, and LAAWs (light assault antitank weapons).
Casualties were heavy as the assault continued for several hours. Golf Company broke out of its perimeter
to assist Echo Company clear Dai Do. Finally, after several hours of heavy fighting and heavy casualties,
Dai Do was secured.
Col Hull told me it was very important to keep the pressure on the enemy. I told him that we had just
about run out of steam. I recommended that several battalions be landed about 10 kilometers north of
Dai Do, attack south, and drive the enemy into our positions. I also recommended that the other two
battalions of the 3d Marines be moved north of the river and placed on the left and right of [Battalion
Landing Team 2/4] (BLT 2/4). BLT 2/4, 1st Battalion, 3d Marines, and 1st Amtrac Battalion would form an

anvil against which the helilifted northern battalions would hammer the enemy. I believed that we could
annihilate or capture most of the 320th [North Vietnamese Army] (NVA) Division.
Col Hull didn't have the assets or authority to carry out such a plan. He could not even move his other two
battalions from their positions without permission. Only the commanding general, 3d Marine Division
could react in the manner I suggested.
Lost opportunities notwithstanding I still had to carry out my orders: keep pressure on the enemy. I called
upon Hotel Company, ordering Lt Prescott to pass through Dai Do and Echo Company, attack north, guide
on the stream to the left, and seize Dinh To.* Hotel crossed the line of departure on the northwest of Dai
Do and entered Dinh To, receiving light enemy small arms fire in the process. As the advance continued,
enemy fire increased, reinforced with mortars, rockets, and artillery. About one-third through Dinh To,
the enemy fire became so great that it halted Hotel's assault.
Realizing that Echo and Hotel could not hold their position in Dinh To, I told both company commanders
to pull back to Dai Do. At this point, Capt Livingston was hit in both legs by machinegun fire. Unable to
move, he would not permit himself to be dragged to the rear until he was certain that all other wounded
were evacuated.
Echo and Hotel Companies brought all their wounded and withdrew to Dai Do where they formed a
perimeter under the leadership of Maj Warren. Warren had earlier brought the main [command post] CP
Group forward to the southern edge of Dai Do. Wounded were evacuated. Echo and Hotel Companies
were resupplied and reorganized.
By afternoon on 2 May, BLT 2/4 was weakened by heavy casualties, loss of key leaders, and fatigue from
more than two days of heavy fighting. Equipment casualties were also high.
I did not have much choice in selecting the companies for the afternoon attack of 2 May. Echo, Hotel, and
Bravo Companies were decimated and unsuitable for offensive action. Golf Company, although down to
about 40 effectives, including 4 officers, was still a viable, spirited fighting outfit, despite its 2-day ordeal.
The only other company was Foxtrot, the strongest with about 80 effectives, including 3 officers.
As I briefed Capt Vargas and Foxtrot's company commander on the northern edge of Dai Do, we saw
another rare sight-large numbers of enemy troops in the open fields northwest of Dai Do. We called in air,
artillery, and mortar fire. Pilots in the attacking aircraft were ecstatic at being able to strafe and bomb
enemy troops in the open.
I ordered Golf Company to lead the attack, followed closely in trace by Foxtrot. The principal direction of
attack was northwest from Dai Do, through Dinh To and Thuong Do, guiding on the stream to our left and,
hopefully, maintaining contact with the [Army of the Republic of Vietnam] (ARVN) battalion mounted in
armored personnel carriers. Contact between the two battalions was from left to right. This meant that
the ARVN battalion was responsible for maintaining contact with BLT 2/4. Foxtrot Company, following
closely behind Golf Company, was responsible for maintaining contact with Golf and providing rear
security for both companies.

The attack jumped off from Dai Do at 1500, as planned. Golf Company moved into Dinh To. Except for
occasional small arms fire, there was little enemy opposition. Enemy fighting holes and bunkers were
checked out as the assault elements moved cautiously forward. Crossing the open area northwest of Dinh
To, Golf Company came under heavy enemy fire from the front and right flank as it entered Thuong Do.
Enemy mortars, rockets, and artillery added to the tempo. I told Capt Vargas to hold up and ordered
Foxtrot Company forward. But Foxtrot could not move. After some delay, I learned that Foxtrot Company
was pinned down in the rice paddies east of Dinh To and Thuong Do. Golf Company's rear was hanging in
the air, unprotected!
About the same time, approximately 1700, we began receiving heavy automatic weapons fire from the
west (our left flank) where the ARVN battalion was supposed to be. Then we saw troops moving toward
us from across the stream to our left. They were clearly North Vietnamese soldiers. We tried,
unsuccessfully, to contact the ARVN battalion. Later we learned that the ARVN battalion had simply
withdrawn without telling us! We began to receive light small arms fire from our rear and realized that
some enemy had slipped in behind us. Things were not looking good at all. Then a large group of enemy
assaulted from our front. Simultaneously, heavy automatic weapons fire hit us from our right (east) flank.
Things were getting worse.
Desperate circumstances require desperate measures. Vargas called his two assault units back and
attempted to draw his company into a tight perimeter. We called in artillery so close that the shrapnel
landed among us. We called for naval gunfire to plaster our front and asked for emergency air support.
Several helicopter gunships responded. The fighting was close and violent. Everyone in the Golf Company
and battalion command groups fired his weapon. There were plenty of targets, and we dropped enemy
assault troops within a few yards of our positions. SgtMaj Malnar blasted away with his 12-gauge shotgun.
Even the radio operators fought between transmissions. The enemy frontal attack was finally stopped,
but our losses were great. Big John Malnar was killed by a rocket round. Both my radio operators and I
were wounded. All of the Golf Company radio operators were either killed or wounded. Capt Vargas was
painfully wounded (his third wound in three days and fifth in three months) but managed to stay on his
feet and control things-in fact, he helped move me part of the way to the rear. I ordered Vargas to
withdraw. He did, bringing all the wounded. It was a fighting withdrawal by fire and maneuver, using
artillery and helicopter gunships to box in our front and flanks.
I passed command to Maj Warren, who strengthened the perimeter at Dai Do and remained in command
of BLT 2/4 until relieved by the battalion executive officer (Maj Charles W. Knapp) that evening. After
evacuating the wounded and reorganizing the able-bodied survivors and replacements, BLT 2/4 had four
rifle companies with 1 officer and 40 Marines each at the perimeter at Dai Do. (Bravo Company remnants
were located at An Lac.)
The reorganized BLT 2/4 spent an active night on 2-3 May. The perimeter received some light probes and
a few dozen enemy mortar and artillery rounds. But the heavy fighting was over.
Dai Do in Retrospect
Some officers, not aware of the ferocity of the fighting, have asked why BLT 2/4 suffered so many
casualties. Here is my answer:

* First, we were attacking a well-trained, well-equipped, well-supported enemy in excellent fortified

positions.
* Second, BLT 2/4 was piecemealed into the battle. When the battle began, the rifle companies were
spread out over a wide area (one, Echo Company, was not even under my operational control). It took too
long to gain the required authority to move even those units under my direct control (Golf Company and
3d Platoon, Foxtrot Company). With all four rifle companies readily available, we could have seized Dai Do
immediately after Hotel Company seized Dong Huan. To retake Dai Do, the enemy would have had to
attack two or three well-dug-in rifle companies. Subsequent attacks on Dinh To and Thuong Do could have
been made a day earlier by strong rifle companies rather than by the pitifully understrength companies
we had to use on 2 May.
* Third, BLT 2/4 was not reinforced during the battle, but the enemy continued to reinforce his units and
to replace his casualties.
* Fourth, about half of our casualties occurred during the afternoon attack of 2 May. During that attack,
the ARVN battalion on our left flank withdrew without notice allowing the enemy to move in on that
flank.
* Fifth, if we had more fixed-wing air support, especially during the first 36 hours, assaulting enemy
fortified positions would have been less costly.
* Sixth, we should have been reinforced with at least 10 tanks (we had only 2) and an equal number of
ONTOS (we had none). The heavy firepower, greater mobility, and shock action of these weapons systems
would have made our assaults more rapid and much more potent.
* Finally, the possibility exists that the 2d ARVN Regiment, which had responsibility for the Dai Do
complex, might have been collaborating with the enemy.
But despite numerous problems and possible treason, BLT 2/4 accomplished its mission. A superior
enemy force was driven from the riverbanks, and the vital Cua Viet and Bo Dieu Rivers were opened to
traffic.
How badly was the 320th NVA Division hurt at Dai Do? I'm not sure, but much of its fighting effectiveness
was destroyed. MajGen Raymond Davis, who became commanding general, 3d Marine Division after the
battle of Dai Do, stated that the defeat of the 320th Division during August through September 1968 was
hastened by the punishment it took during April and May.
I have refought the Batle of Dai Do many times in my mind and always return to the same conclusion: We
accomplished our mission against great odds. Whatever the enemy intended to do, he didn't. Whatever
success we had is a tribute to the individual Marine. Once again, I quote Lt Vie Taylor, who says it well for
all of us:
I waited and watched those Marines about to go into battle. Some were standing watch, some readied
equipment, some slept or rested, but all were quiet. No nervous jabbering, no false bravado, no whining,
no melodramatics . . .they were professionals. Most were teenagers; many far less than a year away from
home; but they were seasoned by months of fighting with a determined enemy. Despite their youth and

their relatively short time in the Corps, they were as willing and professional as anyone who ever wore a
uniform. I was proud to be among them.
Now:
In recent correspondence concerning the battle, BGen Weise stated, "The outstanding artillery and naval
gunfire (NGF) support really made a big difference. Fire from our 105mm and 155mm howitzers was
continuous throughout the battle. I was told that the 105s at Dong Ha fired more than 6,000 rounds. Also,
in an interview in 1999, LtGen Tran Van Quan, the commander of all enemy forces in the northern two
provinces of South Vietnam from 1965-74, told me that Marine Corps artillery caused more NVA
casualties than NGF or air. In 1987, then-MajGen Dennis Murphy, who had been S-3 for Col Hull's 3d
Marines, told me that the engineers buried 1,568 enemy bodies 3 days after the battle."
In today's Marine Corps espousing expeditionary maneuver warfare, one would assume the command
and control restrictions experienced by 2/4 simply would not occur.
Semper Fidelis
* For a close look at the Dinh To battle, see LtCol Vic Taylor's "Sting of Battle" account, p. 71.

William Weise July 2004 Marine Corps Gazette

- See more at: https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/04/memories-dai-do#sthash.IxDe6kBE.dpuf

Dai Do Remembered
* This letter refers to LtCoI Vie Taylor's "Hotel Company-Day Three," (MCG,
Apr04). Not many people know this about then-2dLt Vie Taylor, and he
certainly would never tell, but he wasn't supposed to be present at the battle
of Dai Do. When the battle started on 30 April 1968, he was aboard the USS
Iwojima (LPH 2) recovering from wounds suffered during a previous battle
(Task Force Kilo). Vie heard the medevac choppers landing on the flight deck
and hurried to learn what was going on. all of the initial Marine casualties
were from Hotel Company, suffered during the afternoon assault on Dong
Huan. Vie never hesitated. He scrounged a rifle, flak jacket, helmet, and ammo
and jumped aboard one of the "Ugly Angels" H-34 helicopters returning to
pick up more casualties. Vie, of course, never asked permission as he knew it
would be denied. He arrived at Dong Huan in time to help mopping up and
reconsolidation.
Capt Jim Williams, an outstanding company commander and combat leader,
had been seriously wounded and medevaced during the Dong Huan assault.

IstLt Scotty Prescott assumed command of the battered but still feisty Hotel
Company. Two days later Scotty would also be wounded and medevaced,
passing command to 2dLt Vie Taylor in the midst of a horrendous firelight.
Young Vic Taylor was more than equal to task, and a number of Marines are
alive today because of his bravery and superb leadership.
Vie did all of this while he was AWOL from sickbay!
God, where does the Corps get men like him?
BGen William Weise,
USMC(Ret)
- See more at: https://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/2004/07/letters#sthash.LRx6IsBq.dpuf