The doctrine of the mean is a central concept in Aristotles virtue ethics. According to the
doctrine of the mean, virtue is a mean state between extremes of excess and deficiency. Aristotle
describes this mean state as an intermediate relative to us. To find the mean relative to us is to
find the state of character that correct reason requires.
Within the scholarly literature, the doctrine of the mean has been subject to wide-ranging
interpretations. James Urmson[1] (1973) called it, at the very leasta substantial doctrine
worthy of Aristotles genius, while Rosalind Hursthouse[2] (2006) stated that it was not only a
false doctrine, but a silly one, and hence should not be ascribed to Aristotle.
The diversity of interpretations is largely due to the ambiguity that Aristotle himself
acknowledges in Book VI of the //Nicomachean Ethics[3] where he states that his account is true,
but not at all clear (EN VI 1138b26).
Phronesis
In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle describes virtue as a prohairetic state (EE 1227). In Book V of
the Eudemian Ethics and Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the mean at
which one should aim is as the right logos says" (Moss, 2011)[6] . Phronesis (practical wisdom),
as described in the Nicomachean Ethics (1106b21-22), provides the logos which helps the
virtuous person determine the mean.
One of Aristotle's controversial claims is his belief that it is impossible to hold all of the virtues
bravery, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, the virtue concerned with honor on
a small scale, mildness, truthfulness, wit, friendliness, and justice fully without phronesis, and
that it is impossible to have phronesis without holding all of the ethical virtues fully (NE
VI.13.1144b30-1145a1).