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Doctrine of the Mean

The doctrine of the mean is a central concept in Aristotles virtue ethics. According to the
doctrine of the mean, virtue is a mean state between extremes of excess and deficiency. Aristotle
describes this mean state as an intermediate relative to us. To find the mean relative to us is to
find the state of character that correct reason requires.
Within the scholarly literature, the doctrine of the mean has been subject to wide-ranging
interpretations. James Urmson[1] (1973) called it, at the very leasta substantial doctrine
worthy of Aristotles genius, while Rosalind Hursthouse[2] (2006) stated that it was not only a
false doctrine, but a silly one, and hence should not be ascribed to Aristotle.
The diversity of interpretations is largely due to the ambiguity that Aristotle himself
acknowledges in Book VI of the //Nicomachean Ethics[3] where he states that his account is true,
but not at all clear (EN VI 1138b26).

The Doctrine is Born


Aristotles doctrine of the mean is introduced in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics
(II.2.1104a12-26) by way of a medical analogy. Here, Aristotle says that we destroy our strength
by training too much or too little. Similarly, when we eat too much or too little, we destroy our
health. Excellence of character, like strength and health, is destroyed by excess and deficiency,
but preserved by what is intermediate (mesotetos).

Core Aspects of the Doctrine


Gottlieb[4] (2009) identifies the three core aspects of the doctrine of the mean. First, virtue, like
health, is produced and preserved by avoiding extremes. Second, virtue is a mean relative to us.
Third, each virtue is a mean between two vices, one of excess and one of deficiency.
Of the three elements, it is the second the mean relative to us -- that, according to Gottlieb, is
most commonly misunderstood. Here, Aristotle does not offer a precise quantitative test to help
determine the mean either generally or for specific cases. Indeed, he does not believe that virtue
can be captured by rules or universal principles. Rather, the virtuous person uses reason to
determine the correct action at the time. This correct action is the mean relative to us and is not
to be confused with moderation. For example, correct reason may require extreme anger at
extreme injuries and slight anger at a trivial offence. According to the doctrine of the mean,
moderate anger would be wrong in both instances. Furthermore, there is no "correct" degree of
anger to be displayed under all conditions or under all conditions of a particular type.

The Virtuous Person


According to the doctrine of the mean, virtuous individuals act in a way that lies in a mean
between extremes, as when a person of courage, when faced with danger, chooses to take the
course of action that is neither cowardly nor foolhardy. For the virtuous person, this mean (e.g.
courage) is the state in which feelings are neither indulged without restraint nor entirely
suppressed. However, such a state does not come naturally. Instead, it requires habitual training
and rational control of one's feelings. Through practice, a balanced disposition -- characteristic of
the virtuous person -- can eventually be achieved.
The doctrine of the mean also assumes a unity of virtues such that it is impossible for two virtues
to conflict with each other. For example, courage never calls for one to act in a way that is unjust.
Annas[5] (2011) is among the virtue ethicists who distinguish between full or perfect virtue and
the enkratic or self-controlled. The fully virtuous take the correct action without any struggle
against contrary desires. The enkratic, on the other hand, must control a desire or temptation in
order to do so. While the enkratic may act rightly in doing what is tactful, courageous or just,
he fails to act virtuously since he does not experience the correct emotions.

Phronesis
In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle describes virtue as a prohairetic state (EE 1227). In Book V of
the Eudemian Ethics and Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the mean at
which one should aim is as the right logos says" (Moss, 2011)[6] . Phronesis (practical wisdom),
as described in the Nicomachean Ethics (1106b21-22), provides the logos which helps the
virtuous person determine the mean.
One of Aristotle's controversial claims is his belief that it is impossible to hold all of the virtues
bravery, temperance, generosity, magnificence, magnanimity, the virtue concerned with honor on
a small scale, mildness, truthfulness, wit, friendliness, and justice fully without phronesis, and
that it is impossible to have phronesis without holding all of the ethical virtues fully (NE
VI.13.1144b30-1145a1).

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