13.

AN EXAMPLE OF A STATATIC FISHERIES MANAGEMENT MODEL

Crutchfield and Pontecorvo (1969) presen amodel of the pacific salmon fishery which, while
somewhat specialized to the conditions of that anadromus fishery, is very similar to other widely
used fisheries models. Whiles the model is d=static (as contrasted with our basic resources model
in chapter 5 and 10), it permits us to illustrate many of the important insights gained through
many decades of fisheries study. The first relation is the stock-growth relation :
(13.2.1)

H(t) = K1(SS S)

If we plot this relation as in figure 13.4, we find that S = 0 and S = SS/2. Furthermore, H(t )= K 1
SS2/4 {found by substituting SS for S in (13.2.1)}.
The second relatiom is the production function for fishing operations, often called the catcheffort relation :
(13.2.2)

Ro(t) = K2L(t) . S(t)

If we interpret L(t) as an index of total inputs, this relation implies thatcost increase linearly with
catch and inversely with stock size, an obvious simplification of the more general relation
illustrated in figure 13.3.
This static model permitsan analysis of management schemes in which the stock, S, is
maintened at constant level. Such management schemes are often called steady state schemes
because of the constant stock. In such cases the natural rate of growth, H(t), must h=just offset
the catch,R(t). if we set (13.2.1), wecan quickly determine that there are two stock levels at
which this condition holds :
(13.2.3) Se = {0/S K2/K1 L(t)2
Obviously,Se = 0 is not a desirable steady state, so the second value is the releant one. The
steady-state producr=tion function, that is, the constant stock catrch-effort relation, is gotten by
substituting Se, into (13.2.2), which yields
(13.2.4) Ro(t) = K2 L(t) SS - K22/k1 L(t)2
This quadratic function is plotred in figure 13.5.
Figure 13.5 Constant Stock Catch-effort relation.
What is the optimum level of fishing aticvity under steady-state conditions interms of figure
13.4, what is the optimum stock level? In terms of figure 13.5, what is the optimum level capitallabor input? Note that if we fix the value of Se(t), the corresponding level of L(t, the
corresponding steady-state stocks is determined. Looking at figure 13.4, we see that two stocks

levels are consistent with catch level R0,1. However, as we can see by looking at figure 13.5, it
takes different quantities of capital-labor, L(t), to produce R0,1 with different stocks. It is clearly
cheaper to produce R0,1 with L2 (which is the input requirement corresponding to S2) than with
L1 (which corresponds to the smaller stocks,S1) Thus, we see that:
Steady-state result 1:
From the point view of minimizing current fishing cost for a given level of output, stocks greater
than S are preferred to Stocks less than S.
Conside rfigure 13.5 once again, the marginal productivity of the capital-labor input,L(t),clearly
falls as L(t) increases. Since L(t) is not free, the marginal cost of the catch riseswithout limit as
the marginak product drops to zero at L(t) . sinceL(t) is the input level required to obtain the
maximum sustainable yield, we can thus draw the dfollowing important conclusion for steadystate fisheries management :
Steady-state result 2:
As long as the inputs used in fishing are scarce(cost>zero), it does not pay to extendthe catch rate
to the maximum sustainable yield.
Figure 13.5 can be illustrate additional important result, at least for a special case. Assume the
price of fish to be fixed an equal to 1. Let w be the cost of a unitof L(t), measured in the same
value units as the price of fish. Then the curve in the figure represents the total value of the fish
or the total revenue derived by fisherman form the sale of the catch. The straight line, TC = w.
L(t), represents total cost. The distance between the two represents (in this example case) the
value of this fishery? It must be remembered that the unit cost inputs, w , includes the
competitive rate of return on capital. The profit ab is, therefore, pure profit in the economic
sense-a return beyond what is required to keep capital-labor in the industry.the only way an
outsider can share in these profits is to buy a boat and start fishing. If entry is not controlled, say
by limited licensing, more labor-capital will be attracted to the fishery since, presumably, only
the competitive rate of return is avaible in other industries. Thus, inputs will continue to expand
toward the value Le where the net benefits (and net profits) of the industry disappear. Thus we
have :
Steady-state Result 3:
if the fishery is a commo n property resource, that is, if there is free access, then there will be a
tendency towards excessive inflow of labor-capital (toward the point L e) and excessive reduction
of the stock, S.
We now turn to considerations of managing the fishery over time without assuming steady-state
management, for we dont know under what conditions management of the fishery in steadystate would be economically efficient.