GROUP 3

Adan, Queenie Kate

Bono, Leo Joselito E.
Calang, Princess V.
Famor, Jewel Jade
Magaso, Jovita Andelecia
B. QUALITIES
3-4. IMPARTIALITY AND PROPRIETY
PERTINENT LAWS
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 204. - Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. - Any judge who shall
knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for
decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute
disqualification.
ART. 205. - Judgment rendered through negligence. - Any judge who, by
reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance shall render a
manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision
shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special
disqualification.
ART. 206. - Unjust interlocutory order. - Any judge who shall knowingly
render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall
acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the
interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be
suspension.
ART. 207. - Malicious delay in the administration of justice. - The
penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed
upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of
justice.
Art 215. Prohibited Transaction. The penalty of prision correccional in
its minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1000 or both, shall
be imposed upon any appointive public officer who, during his
incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in any
transaction of exchange or speculation within the territory subject to
his jurisdiction.
Art 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. The
penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in
its minimum period, or a fine ranging from P200 to P1000, or both,
shall be imposed upon a public officer who directly and indirectly, shall
become interested in any contract or business which it is his official
duty to intervene.
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. 3019)
Sec 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

XXX
(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, or contract or transaction in connection with which here
intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is
prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
CANONS
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.02 A judge should administer justice impartially and
without delay.
CANON 2 A judge should avoid impropriety
appearance of impropriety in all activities.

and

the

Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote

public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary.

Rule 2.02 A judge should not seek publicity for personal

vainglory.

Rule 2.03 A judge shall not allow family, social, or other

relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The
prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance
the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to
convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

Rule 2.04 A judge shall refrain from influencing in any

manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before
another court of administrative agency.

CANON 3 A judge should perform official duties honestly, and

with impartiality and diligence.
DISQUALIFICATIONS
Rule 3.12 A judge should take no part in proceeding where
the judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
These cases include, among others, proceedings where;
1. a.
the judge has personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
2. b.
the judge served as executor, administrator,
guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as
counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer
was a material witness therein;

3.

c.
the judges ruling in a lower court is subject of
review
4. d.
the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a
party litigant within the 6th degree or to counsel within the
4th degree;
5. e.
the judge knows that the judges spouse or child
has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary,
or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a
party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could
be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceeding.
In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for
inhibition.

REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATION
Rule 3.13 A judge disqualified by the terms of Rule 3.12 may,
instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the
record the basis of disqualification. If, based on such
disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of the
judges participation, all agree in writing that the reason for
the inhibition is immaterial or insubstantial, the judge may
then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by
all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of
the proceeding.

Rule 4.01 A judge may, to the extent that the following

activities do not impair the performance of judicial duties or
case doubt on the judges impartiality:
1. a.
speak, write, lecture, teach or participate in
activities concerning the law, the legal system and the
administration of justice;
2. b.
appear at a public hearing before a legislative or
executive body on matters concerning the law, the legal
system or the administration of justice and otherwise
consult
with
them
on
matters
concerning
the
administration of justice;
3. c.
serve on any organization devoted to the
improvement of the law, the legal system or the
administration of justice.
CANON 5 A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to
minimize the risk of conflict with judicial activities.
VOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES
Rule 5.01 A judge may engage in the following activities
provided that they do not interfere with the performance of
judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the courts:
1. a.
write, lecture, teach and speak on non-legal
subjects;
2. b.
engage in the arts, sports, and other special
recreational activities;
3. c.
participate in civic and charitable activities;

4.

d.
serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal
advisor of a non-profit or non-political, educational,
religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.

FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES
Rule 5.02 A judge shall refrain from financial and business
dealings that tends to reflect adversely on the courts
impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvements with lawyers or persons
likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage
investments and other financial interests as to minimize the
number of cases giving grounds for disqualification.

Rule 5.03 Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a

judge may hold and manage investments but should not serve
as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any
business except as director of a family business of the judge.

Rule 5.04 A judge or any, immediate member of the family,

shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone
except as may be allowed by law.

Rule 5.05 No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall

be used or disclosed by a judge in any financial dealing or for
any other purpose not related to judicial activities.

FIDUCIARY ACTIVITIES
Rule 5.06 A judge should not serve as the execution
administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for
the estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate
family and then only if such service will not interfere with the
proper performance of judicial duties. member of immediate
family shall be limited to the spouse and relatives within the
second degree of consanguinity. As a family fiduciary, a judge
shall not:
1. a.
serve in proceedings that might come before the
court of said judge; or
2. b.
act as such contrary to Rule 5.02 to 5.05
PRACTICE OF LAW AND OTHER PROFESSION
Rule 5.07 A judge shall not engage in the private practice of
law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may
engage in the practice of any other profession provided that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial
functions.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE
Rule 5.08 A judge shall make full financial disclosure as
required by law.
EXTRA-JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS
Rule 5.09 A judge shall not accept appointment
designation to any agency performing quasi-judicial
administrative functions.

or
or

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
Rule 5.10 A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on
political questions.
But to avoid suspicion of political
partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches,
contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for
political office or participate in other partisan political
activities.
NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial
office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision is made.
SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor,
bias or prejudice.
SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and
out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the
public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of
the judge and of the judiciary.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct
themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be
necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding
cases.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is
before or could come before them, make any comment that
might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such
proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor
shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.
SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in
any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter
impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer
that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such
proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party

or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts
concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material
witness in the matter in controversy;
(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an
economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian,
trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a
former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness
therein;
(e) The judges ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party
litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the
fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a
financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or
otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to
the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;
SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of
withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the
basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the
parties
and
lawyers,
independently
of
the
judges
participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the
inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then
participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all
parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the
proceedings.
CANON 4
PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the
performance of all the activities of a judge.
SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities.
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must
accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely
and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in
a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual
members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their
court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a
case in which any member of their family represents a litigant
or is associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a

member of the legal profession to receive clients of the latter
or of other members of the legal profession.
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom
of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in
exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in
such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office
and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal
fiduciary and financial interests and shall make reasonable
efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members
of their family.
SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial
office to advance their private interests, or those of a member
of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or
permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a
special position improperly to influence them in the
performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their
judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other
purpose related to their judicial duties.
SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties,
judges may
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities
concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of
justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body
concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system,
the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract
from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere
with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of
judicial office.
SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or
participate in other organizations representing the interests of
judges.
SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask
for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to
anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or
her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.
SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others
subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or
accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with
their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public

disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as
appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that
such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived
as intended to influence the judge in the performance of
judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of
partiality.
SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-92 August 31, 1992
TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL
SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE
FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL PURPOSES
All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice
maybe used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of
the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, list of all as
residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein
any trade or profession.
Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nelly Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat
Guerra), a case involving an authorized and improper use of the court's premises
for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the Court, by
Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of
irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of
justice and best interest of the service and imposed on him the penalty of
SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court's premises
inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing
judicial records to danger of loss or damage.
FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.
August 31, 1992.
JURISPRUDENCE
A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015
Dantes, et.al v. Judge Jose S. Jacinto
Facts: A petition for prohibition with urgent application for the
issuance of a TRO and WPI for the demolition of the public market of
the Municipality of Mindoro was raffled to respondents sala. During the
hearing, only 12 out of more than 500 members accompanying
complainants on that day were allowed to enter. Worse, upon motion of
the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the courtroom
except for Julieta who had to testify that day. According to the
petitioners, during the hearings respondent argued, berated, accused,
scolded , confused and admonished petitioners without basis or
justification, and further claimed that respondent asked complainants
confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit
answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the
cause of their adversary.
Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent was impartial.
2.Whether or not respondent violated Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct?

Held: 1. No. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. The
contention of petitioner that respondents bias and partiality can be
gleaned from the fact that he did not allow the more than 500
members who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to the
courtroom is devoid of merit. The standard sizes of courtrooms could
not accommodate such the huge group inside.
2. Yes. Section 1 of Canon 4 clearly enjoins judges not only from
committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the
appearance of impropriety. In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor
Villarosa for not asking for the courts permission to leave while the
trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the formers
advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of
the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important
appointment to attend. It was the Mayors lawyer, and not respondent
judge who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom
without asking for the courts permission.
A.M. No. SB-14-21-J
September 23, 2014
[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE
RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG,
SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
This involves the PORK BARREL SCAM of Janet Napoles. In the course of
the investigation conducted by the Senate (Blue Ribbon Committee),
the names of certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the
alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an exmilitary officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers
allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events,
among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory
S. Ong, herein respondent.
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria
Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the
controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a
magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by
the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, a
previous case which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs.
Napoles.
Administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after
investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice Ong of the
Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON Ong is guilty of Impartiality, Bribery and Misconduct?
HELD: Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality
and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and
impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after
her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to
disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that
he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently
denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful

in character, improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been

defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful;
such conduct as is not to be excused."12 We agree with Justice
Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during
the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct
notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery
in the rendition of the said judgment.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by
the respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with
Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The
totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates
respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's
perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of
going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent
exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which
was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of
partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the
publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and
Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants
and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere
perception of possible bias or partiality. In pending or prospective
litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful
to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their
personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for
not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must
act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort,
litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and
independence.
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA
FACTS: The petitioner Barias filed the complaint before the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) on Nov. 11, 2010 charging respondent Judge
Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of
the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct. In her
complaint, Barias revealed that she had a dinner meeting with the
respondents in a restaurant in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City in Taguig
on March 3, 2010 where they have discussed her pending cases.
During the meeting, Rubia allegedly asked her questions not related to
her pending cases, including her supposed involvement with another
man, her being connected with a leading airline in the country and the
hospital where she brought her husband when he suffered cardiac
arrest.
The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice
Samuel Gaerlan.
In his investigation report dated March 13, 2012, Gaerlan
recommended that the respondents Rubia and Pecana should not be
held administratively liable as he was convinced that the meeting of
complainant and respondents at Burgos Circle in Global City was just
a chance encounter and that Barias had failed to present substantial
evidence to prove her allegations.

HELD: The SC rejected the report of Gaerlan as they decided to hold

Judge Rubia administratively liable. The evidence on record supports
the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several
cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubias
mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for
administrative liability.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated
Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Propriety.
Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be
models of propriety at all times. Propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must
behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or
otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system.
His actions failed to assure complainant and other litigants before his
court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 150 Because
of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality.
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be
impartial but should also appear impartial." The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As
we have recently explained, a judges official life can not simply be
detached or separated from his personal existence. Being the subject
of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen.
GACAD V. CLAPIS, JR.
(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012)
FACTS:
Criselda C. Gacad filed a Verified Complaint against Judge
Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of
Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule
1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.
Petitioner alleged that through Arafol, she was able to meet
Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the
case of her brother. Arafol informed the petitioner that the Judge will do
everything for her favor but on the pretext that in return she has to
give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the meeting, the Judge, after
being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount, told
her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it all
to me, we shall crush them.) She was able to give such amount.
On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed to Gacad a
copyof Judge Clapis Order dated 4 January 2010 denying the Motion
for Reinvestigation filed by the accused. Subsequently, Arafol told
Gacad that Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000 from her for his
mothers hospitalization. Arafol handed to Gacad a postdated BPI

check allegedly issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment.

However, Gacad failed to produce the P50,000. Gacad alleged that,
from then on, Arafol and Judge Clapis began to play different hideous
schemes to prejudice their case.
When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings
were mailed to the petitioner only after the date of hearing. Thereafter,
Judge Clapis set a hearing which Gacad came to know only
inadvertently since she received no notice for the hearing. During the
29 March 2010 hearing, PublicProsecutor Alona Labtic moved that the
petition for bail be put in writing. However, the counsel for the accused
manifested that he was not prepared for a written petition because it
was only right before the hearing that the accused informed him of
Arafols agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis calendared the case for
speedy trial. He set a continuous hearing for the petition for bail on 12
April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010. Moreover, Judge Clapis
issued a Notice of Preliminary Conference set on 2 December 2010. To
bolster her case of corruption against Judge Clapis, Gacad recounted
her previous encounter with Judge Clapis and Arafol in a Criminal
against her brother. According to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they
give Judge Clapis the P80,000 cash bond posted in the case so that her
brothers case could be dismissed. After conceding to Arafols proposal,
Judge Clapis indeed dismissed the case despite the strong evidence
against her brother.
In his comment, the judge claimed that notices were made
verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that
both sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all
proceedings, petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open
court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently scheduled the
preliminary conference of the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.
HELD: YES. Judge Clapis committed grave misconduct for acting
contrary to the prescribed standard of conduct for judges.
The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a
case pending before his sala and telling her, Sige, kay ako na bahala
gamuson nato ni sila (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.),
both favoring Gacad, constitute gross misconduct.
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation
of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with ones
performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross
misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or
inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of
well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and
not a mere error of judgment.
Judge Clapis wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are
made overt by the circumstances on record. First, the Notices of
Hearings were mailed to Gacad only after the hearing. Second, Judge
Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an application for
bail and granted bail without affording the prosecution the opportunity
to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set
a preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set,
patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. Judge
Clapis cannot escape liability by shifting the blame to his court
personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for

order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the
guardians of the judges responsibility.
The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give
doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to
gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon 3, Section 2 and
4; and Canon 4, Section 1.
We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for
conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the
accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove
that the guilt of the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is
not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a
patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and
patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge
liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly
misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be
confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard
of the basic requirements of due process.
Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. is DISMISSED from the service.
A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014

March 4, 2009

NILDA VERGINESA-SUAREZ, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG AND COURT STENOGRAPHER III
CONCEPCION A. PASCUA, Respondents.
FACTS:
These consolidated cases involve (a) the administrative charges of
graft and corruption against respondents Judge Renato J. Dilag (Judge
Dilag) and Court Stenographer III Concepcion A. Pascua (Pascua) of
Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales
filed by Nilda Verginesa-Suarez (Suarez), Court Stenographer III of the
same court; and (b) the administrative charges for gross misconduct
and gross ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag filed by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). These cases also include the countercharges of Judge Dilag and Pascua against Suarez for falsification,
negligence in the transcription of stenographic notes, and absence
without official leave.
The OCA observed that the controversies between the parties were
replete with substantial factual issues, and so it recommended a formal
administrative inquiry to be conducted by a designated Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution[8] dated August 2, 2006,
this Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the OCA, to: (1) treat
the comment of Judge Dilag as a complaint against Suarez; (2)
redocket the instant matter as an administrative matter and refer the
same to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation
within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record; and (3) require the
Investigating Justice to submit a report within thirty (30) days from
termination of the investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct
and/or gross negligence
RULING:
The exhaustive evaluation of evidence and findings of fact by the
Investigating Justice are quoted hereunder:

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014

A. Respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag
This Investigating Justice finds that there is no
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold
respondent Judge administratively liable for graft
and corruption.Jurisprudence dictates that the ground for
the removal of a judicial officer must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. The general rules regarding the
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply to charges
of misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or
incompetence.
The exhaustive evaluation of evidence and findings of fact by the
Investigating Justice are quoted hereunder:
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014
A. Respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag
This Investigating Justice finds that there is no
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence to hold
respondent Judge administratively liable for graft
and corruption.Jurisprudence dictates that the ground for
the removal of a judicial officer must be established
beyond reasonable doubt. The general rules regarding the
admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply to charges
of misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or
incompetence.
In the instant case, there is no clear and convincing
evidence that indeed respondent Judge received money
from
litigants
to
obtain
favorable
decisions. The
testimonies of Belen Trapane and Aurea Rowena Cayabyab,
stating to the effect that they each paid P30,000.00 to
respondents, through respondent Pascua, cannot be given
due weight against respondent Judge for being hearsay
evidence. By the same token, the rumors relative to the
alleged acceptance of money in exchange for a favorable
decision remain as such and cannot be admitted as
evidence, let alone given due evidentiary weight. Corollary,
private complainant Suarez fell short of the required
degree of proof needed in an administrative charge of graft
and corruption.
Respondent Judge, however, should be made
accountable for gross misconduct constituting violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Sections 1 and
2 of Canon 2; Section 2 of Canon 3; and, Section 1 of
Canon 4, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary which provide:
Canon 2. Integrity is essential not only to the
proper discharge of the judicial office but also
to the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that
not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to

be so in the view of a reasonable

observer.
Section
2. The
behavior
and
conduct of judges must reaffirm the
peoples faith in the integrity of the
judiciary. Justice must not merely
be done but must also be seen to
be done.
Canon 3. Impartiality is essential to the proper
discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but also to the
process by which the decision to made.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that
his or her conduct, both in and out
of court, maintains and enhances
the confidence of the public, the
legal profession and litigants in the
impartiality of the judge and the
judiciary.
Canon 4. Propriety and the appearance of
propriety are essential to the performance of
all the activities of a judge.
Section
1. Judges
shall
avoid
impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety of a judge.
This finds support in the case of Kaw vs. Judge Osorio
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1801, March 23, 2004], where the
Supreme Court, though dismissing the charges of extortion
and graft and corruption against respondent judge therein,
nevertheless, held him administratively liable for violations
of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
In the case at bench, the existence of the two (2)
sets of conflicting decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc and Del
Rosario cases, respectively, though speculative, absent
clear evidence that respondent Judge received monetary
considerations, the same, however, from a reasonable
point of view, would seriously arouse the suspicion of a
reasonable mind that something is wrong. In other words,
while not conclusively and clearly proving the charge of
graft and corruption, the same casts a cloud of suspicion
upon the integrity, impartiality and propriety of which
respondent
Judge
is
expected
to
possess
and
manifest. These requirements are concepts of the mind
which can only be manifested through actuations of a
magistrate. Thus, as explicitly worded in the New Code of
Judicial Conduct, a judge must not merely possess these
requirements but he must be also be seen and perceived
to be such. The judiciary is the bastion of justice, fairness
and equity. Certainly, it cannot afford to have erring
magistrates who will only tarnish its image rather than
maintain and preserve the same.

A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity

and independence to uphold and maintain public
confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected
to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence,
he is presumed to have more than a cursory knowledge of
the rules of procedure. Not every error is indicative of
ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative
sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only
within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not
apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable
legal procedures evident and basic as to be beyond
possible margins of error. In the case at bench, respondent
Judge failed to follow basic legal procedures which are not
excusable but renders him liable to administrative sanction
for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.
BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS IN RELATION TO
IMPARTIALITY AND PROPRIETY
ESSAY
2013
IX.
Atty. Hermano requested his fraternity brother, Judge Patron, to
introduce him to Judge Apestado, before whom he has a case that had
been pending for sometime. Judge Patron, a close friend of Judge
Apestado, acceded to the request, telling the latter that Atty. Hermano
is his fraternity brod and that Atty. Hermano simply wanted to ask for
advice on how to expedite the resolution of his case. They met, as
arranged, in the fine dining restaurant of a five-star hotel. Atty.
Hermano hosted the dinner. Did Atty. Hermano, Judge Patron and Judge
Apestado commit any ethical/administrative violation for which they
can be held liable? (8%)
Yes. This is literally in violation of the provisions against fraternization.
Atty. Hermano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, in
particular, the duty not to influence judges and the prohibition against
fraternization with judges before whom they have pending cases.
Judges Patron and Apestado violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, in
particular the Canons on Impartiality and Propriety. Judges are
precluded from socializing with lawyers who have pending cases before
them. The Supreme Court has decided in several cases that Judges
must not only be impartial, they must also appear to be impartial.
2007
-V(10%)
During the hearing of an election protest filed by his brother, Judge E
sat in the area reserved for the public, not beside his brothers lawyer.
Judge Es brother won the election protest. Y, the defeated candidate
for mayor, filed an administrative case against Judge E for employing
influence and pressure on the judge who heard and decided the
election protest.
Judge E explained that the main reasons why he was there in the
courtroom were because he wanted to observe how election protests

are conducted as he has never conducted one because he wanted to

give moral support to his brother.
Did Judge E commit and act of impropriety as a member of the
judiciary? Explain?
Yes, Judge E committed an act of impropriety as a member of the
judiciary. The personal behavior of a judge must be beyond reproach
for he is the visible representation of the law and of justice. The Code
of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety, but
even the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct, whether in
their public or private life. The proscription includes a judge's meddling
with judicial processes in courts other than his own and acting in a
manner that would arouse suspicion that he is meddling with such
court processes as what Judge E demonstrated in the case at bar.
2008
VI
Atty. Abigail filed administrative cases before the Supreme Court
against Judge Luis. Thereafter, Atty. Abigail filed a Motion for Inhibition
praying that Judge Luis inhibit himself from trying, hearing or in any
manner acting on all cases, civil and criminal, in which Atty. Abigail is
involved and handling. Should Judge Luis inhibit himself as prayed for
by Atty. Abigail? Explain fully. (6%)
No. Being the subject of an administrative case is not one of the
grounds for disqualification of a judge from handling case provided by
the Code of Judicial Responsibility in Canon 3 Rule 12.

IX
State, with a brief explanation, whether the judge concerned may be
sanctioned for the conduct stated below.
a. Refusing to inhibit himself although one of the lawyers in
the case is his second cousin. (3%)
No. Under Canon 3, Rule 3.12 a judge should take no part in a
proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be
questioned. One of the cases would be where the judge is related
by consanguinity or affinity to counsel within the fourth degree. A
second cousin is a relative within the 6th degree, hence it is not
covered by the prohibition.
b.Deciding a case in accordance with a Supreme Court
ruling but adding that he does not agree with the ruling.
(3%)
No. There is no law or rule prohibiting such conduct. Regardless
of his opinion, the judge still followed the Supreme Court's ruling
thus there is really nothing wrong with such act. Further, his
opinion will not have any bearing as it is not part of the decision.
MCQ
2011 (SET A)

6. In a verified complaint, Kathy said that Judge Florante decided a

petition for correction of entry involving the birth record of her
grandson, Joshua, who happened to be child of Judge Florante's
daughter, Pilita. Judge Florante insisted that he committed no wrong
since the proceeding was non-adversarial and since it merely sought to
correct an erroneous entry in the childs birth certificate. Is Judge
Florante liable?
A. Yes, because Florante breached the rule on mandatory
disqualification.
B. No, because Judge Florante has no pecuniary interest in the
proceeding.
C. No, because it is true the proceeding was non-adversarial so it
prejudiced
no
one.
D. Yes, since the correction in the childs record affects the details of
birth of the child.
13. On appeal, RTC Judge Rudy affirmed the MTCs conviction of Lorna
for violation of the bouncing checks law and awarded Agnes, the
complainant, Php1.6 million in damages. Two years later, upon Lornas
motion and after ascertaining that her counsel never received the
court's decision, Judge Rudy recalled the entry of judgment in the case,
reversed himself, and absolved Lorna of guilt. Claiming an unjust
judgment, Agnes filed an administrative complained against Judge
Rudy, saying that it is plain from the circumstances that he connived
with Lorna, her counsel, and the handling prosecutor. But she offered
no further evidence. Rudy denied the charges and asserted that any
error in his judgment is correctible only by an appeal, not by an
administrative suit. Should Judge Rudy be disciplined?
(A) No, because Agnes' complaint is merely based on suspicions and
speculations.
(B) No, because Agnes has yet to establish that Rudy's decision is
plainly erroneous.
(C) Yes, because he gravely abused his discretion in recalling the entry
of judgment.
(D) Yes, because reconsidering the judgment of conviction that the MTC
and he earlier issued shows anomaly in Judge Rudy's action
18. Judge Cristina has many law-related activities. She teaches law
and delivers lectures on law. Some in the government consult her on
their legal problems. She also serves as director of a stock corporation
devoted to penal reform, where she participates in both fund raising
and fund management. Which of the following statements applies to
her case?
A. She should not engage in fund raising activities.
B. Her activities are acceptable except the part where she is involved
in fund management.
C. She can teach law and deliver lectures on law but not do the other
things.
D. All of her activities are legal.