Altruism in the Financial Sector

Name: Hiwot Alemayehu

Candidate Number: T06558
Supervisor: Prof. Alex Preda
Word count: 11,671

Contents
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 4
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 5
2. Literature Review ................................................................................................................................ 8
2.1 Evolutionary biology ..................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 Social psychology ........................................................................................................................ 10
2.3 Cultural differences ..................................................................................................................... 13
2.4 Gender differences ..................................................................................................................... 14
2.5 Corporate Altruism ..................................................................................................................... 15
2.6 Motivations ................................................................................................................................. 17
2.7 Summary & Research problem ................................................................................................... 21
3. Hypotheses........................................................................................................................................ 22
4. Research methodology, method & data ........................................................................................... 24
4.1 Sample......................................................................................................................................... 25
4.2 Experimental procedure ............................................................................................................. 26
4.3 Experimental limitations ............................................................................................................. 30
5. Results & Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 31
5.1 Altruism (Dictator game task) ..................................................................................................... 31
5.2 Demographical analysis .............................................................................................................. 32
5.2.1 Gender differences .............................................................................................................. 32
5.2.2 Age differences .................................................................................................................... 33
5.2.3 Income differences .............................................................................................................. 33
5.2.4 Years worked within the financial sector ............................................................................. 35
5.3 Perceived altruism (Scenario) ..................................................................................................... 36
5.4 Perceived vs. Actual altruism ...................................................................................................... 36
5.5 Motivations & Influences ............................................................................................................ 37
5.5.1 Scenario................................................................................................................................ 37
5.5.2 Dictator game task ............................................................................................................... 38
6. Limitations & Future Research.......................................................................................................... 40
7. Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 44
8. References ........................................................................................................................................ 46
9. Appendices ........................................................................................................................................ 52
Appendix A Information Sheet....................................................................................................... 52
Appendix B Consent form .............................................................................................................. 54
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Appendix C Scenario Sheet ............................................................................................................ 56

Appendix D Dictator Game Task .................................................................................................... 57
Appendix E Full Interviewer Script ................................................................................................. 58
Appendix F Debrief......................................................................................................................... 64
Appendix G Ethical Approval form ................................................................................................. 65
Appendix H Data: Altruism (Dictator game task) ........................................................................... 67
Appendix I Date: Gender Differences ............................................................................................ 68
Appendix J Data: Age differences .................................................................................................. 69
Appendix K Data: Income Differences ........................................................................................... 71
Appendix L Data: Years worked within the financial sector .......................................................... 77
Appendix M Data: Perceived Altruism (Scenario) .......................................................................... 79
Appendix N Data: Actual vs. Perceived Altruism ........................................................................... 80

Abstract
Does professional employment within the financial sector impact altruism? Despite economic theory
modelling humans as rational, selfish, and always striving for utility maximisation, research often
supports the existence of altruism. Whilst initiating comparative investigations of altruism by
sectoral employment, this article focuses more specifically upon professionals working within
financial service companies. Accordingly, this study explores whether a difference exists in the
altruism levels exhibited between finance and non-finance professionals. 80 participants were
recruited (40 finance professionals, 40 non-finance professionals) to take part in this experiment. By
combining an interview with a hypothetical scenario, a dictator game task, and demographic
questions, this experiment examined both participants perceived and actual altruism levels. Dictator
game findings revealed finance professionals donated significantly less to their anonymous partners
than non-finance professionals, with the number of years spent working within the financial sector
being the largest influential factor on their behaviour. The participants income and gender were
also found to be influential, while their age was not. Commonly amongst both experimental groups,
participants perceived altruism levels were lower than their actual altruism levels. This article
concludes by confirming that finance professionals are significantly less altruistic than non-finance
professionals, acknowledging the studys contributions to altruism literature, and urging researchers
to further explore the different lines of investigation suggested.

1. Introduction
Why do humans engage in altruistic acts? With everyday behaviour filled with clear contradictions,
this appears to be one of the most complex unanswered questions about human nature. Humans
value honesty, yet still cheat (Ariely, 2012). We have the ability to behave selfishly, yet still engage in
altruistic activities...but does societal context vary which dominates human nature at what time?
(Kluver, et al., 2014, p.150). More importantly, what is altruism? Altruism is often described as a
form of unconditional kindness, where one behaves intentionally to benefit others, without the
expectation of reward, and possibly at cost to ones self (Neusner and Avery-Peck, 2005; Fehr and
Gtcher, 2000). Whilst Wilson (1975) defines altruism as self-destructive behaviour preformed for
the benefit of others (Michalski, 2003, p.342), Batson (1994) disagrees and provides further
granularity to altruism by distinguishing between helping and self-sacrificial behaviour. An act
cannot be defined as altruistic simply because the actor has suffered a cost, instead the behaviour
should have been intended to improve the welfare of the recipient (Batson, 1994). In order for the
act to be considered altruistic, the altruist should not expect to be the recipient of benefits or
recognition, nor should they expect an act of altruism in return. Although social and biological
perspectives may vary in their explanations or rooting of altruism, they both agree upon its existence
within humans.

Contrastingly, economic theory on human behaviour of resource transfer, takes an opposing stance,
constructing a behavioural model built upon preserving self-interest. This suggests that individuals,
referred to as Homo economicus, are rational, individually-orientated, and simply interested in
maximising their own well-being (Nyborg, 1999). Gintis (2000) further describes the outcome
orientated nature of Homo economicus as only being concerned about social interactions when it
affects their final consumption and wealth. This economics model often forms the bases for
neoclassical theory of a firm, suggesting individuals act rationally within a group of other rational
individuals, all independently acting upon available information to maximise their own utility (Kluver,
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2014, p.151). With finance professionals often thought to have individualist mentalities, and the
finance industry often being viewed as the pinnacle of self-interest, this research has chosen to focus
on the altruistic nature of those within the financial sector. Despite this homo economicus model
being commonly used in the world of business and finance, it has been subject to much criticism for
its rigid, uncompromising stance, and its lack of acknowledgment for all behaviours that do not
conform to the theory e.g. altruism. Anderson (2000, p.173) proposes that this is one of the only
theories that still functions across disciplines as a working assumption, even though it is
continuously discredited on empirical grounds. Research analysing both primary and secondary data
have advocated altruistic acts, and behaviours that deviate from the homo economicus individual.
Through conducting a dictator game experiment, Camerer (2003) found participants on average
gave away 20% of their endowment to their anonymous recipient. DeScioli and Krishna (2012) also
strengthened the argument against economic theory, finding dictators donated 36% of their
endowment, whilst the recipient only expected to receive 30%. Without exploring ones motivations,
charitable giving is also considered as a form of altruism. Upon analysing charity donation records
(i.e. secondary data), typical months in 2012 saw 55% of the UK population (approx 28.4million
adults) donate an average of 10 (NCVO & CAF, 2012). Nonetheless, economic theory disregards
these acts as abnormal deviants from human nature. When ones motivations are explored however,
researchers often challenge the intentions behind their altruistic behaviour before being considered
truly altruistic. Andreoni (1989) introduced the concept of impure altruism, proposing that even
through the act of giving, people obtain some utility. An example of this utility, termed warm-glow,
suggests that an individuals motivation for giving is due to this act evoking a sense of joy and
positive emotions within them.

The dictator game is a commonly used experimental technique when quantitatively measuring
altruism (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Eckel & Grossman, 1996; 1998; Jakiela, 2013). This one staged
experiment is essentially a money distribution task, where the participant (who plays the role of the
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dictator) decides on the money split with their, often anonymous, partner. There are many different
variations to this experiment e.g. naming a charity as the recipient of the donation as opposed to an
anonymous partner (Eckel and Grossman, 1996); however the level of altruism exhibited is generally
determined by the amount donated by the dictator. Of course the dictator can also choose to keep
all the money for themselves, thereby supporting economic theory. The dictator game will form the
basis of this studys experimental technique.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews previous literature, and
analyses its applicability to the current study. Section 3 proceeds to specify the hypotheses for this
current study, followed by a thorough explanation of the methodology, method, and data collection
techniques in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results of this experiment, with section 6 analysing
the studys limitations, and looking ahead for potential future research. The paper concludes in
section 7.

2. Literature Review
Is economic theory of human behaviour correct in stating that individuals are selfish rational beings?
Are humans only interested in maximising their own well-being? Clearly this view contradicts the
mere existence of altruism, let alone pure altruism. The opposing views held towards altruistic
behaviour have arrived at an apparent impasse, and appear unable to overcome it due to altruism
being an aporia. Altruism is often referred to as an aporia since questioning ones true motivation is
indeterminate (Benson, 2011).
There are many well documented, and possibly some undocumented, cases of egotistical or deviant
behaviour of finance professionals. Former presidential candidate John McCain even attributed the
2008 Global Financial Crisis to greed, corruption, and excess, as Wall Street treated the American
economy like a casino (Salsman, 2009). With several countries around the world still feeling the
strain from this crisis, it is of public opinion that the financial demise was as a result of corporate
greed and the working professionals within this sector. Due to causes of the financial crisis being
partly attributed to capitalism and inherent greed (Salsman, 2009), it is essential to investigate
altruism, and to what degree it is expressed by professionals within the financial sector, in
comparison with those who are not. Moreover, the gravity of exploring altruism within finance is
further apparent when evaluating where modern finance roots its theories of value from. According
to De Bondt (2008), there are 2 benchmark assumptions, beautiful people, and beautiful markets.
The concept of beautiful people depicts individualistic actors who use all available information to
make rational decisions, in striving for utility maximisation. Beautiful markets assume competitive,
yet perfect markets. This leaves no room for rational arbitrage, as value equals price i.e. Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH). With the roots of finance based around homo economicus beings, this
study into altruism within finance could provide further evidence for the need to update and extend
the homo economicus view on human nature.

Although a limited amount of research studying altruism in helping professions (e.g. medical
treatment or clergy professions) have been conducted (Blaikie, 1974; Saks, 1995; Burks, et al., 2012),
altruism is yet to be studied between professions, in non-helping sectors. This current study has
revealed a gap within altruism research thus far, as comparative analysis through professional
sectors as a whole is not widely reported on. This report will focus on the finance industry as a broad
sector, and aim to uncover whether the levels of altruism demonstrated by finance professionals
differ to those outside of the financial services sector. Due to the insufficient amount of literature
researching altruism in the financial sector, this literature review is conducted in an indirect manner.
It proposes to explore opposing perspectives of altruism, and gain insight on differences in altruistic
behaviour displayed, including their possible motivational drivers.

2.1 Evolutionary biology

Evolutionary biologists explain altruism in relation to genetic survival and reproductive fitness,
particularly relative to animals/creatures, which unlike humans are presumably incapable of
conscious thought, (Okasha, 2013). The evolutionary perspective suggests altruism has a genetic
basis with a role of increasing reproductive success (Wilson, 1978). For example, organisms are
identified as behaving altruistically when increasing the offspring production quantity of another
organism, even if it means reducing their own (Okasha, 2013). This concept seemed to contradict
Darwins basic evolutionary concept of natural selection, and led to altruism levels being
differentiated. Darwin introduced the concept of group selection, proposing that although altruism
may be disadvantageous at an individual level, it could potentially be beneficial at group level.
Darwin explained this notion of self-sacrificial human behaviour to have evolved through a process
of between-group selection, in turn being a form of natural selection. For example, a tribe with
many altruistic members, helping one another and sacrificing themselves for the common good,

would prosper against tribes mainly compiled of selfish individuals, who would eventually go extinct
(Okasha, 2013).
Hamilton (1964) later developed group selection into the inclusive fitness theory (kin selection),
identifying 3 components within the evolution of altruism as being: the cost to the altruist, the
benefit of the recipient, and the genetic relatedness of the two. Hamilton stated that the ability for
the altruism gene to spread through natural selection was contingent on the benefits (in terms of
reproductive fitness) outweighing the cost of the altruistic act (Okasha, 2013). This suggests the
altruist discriminates towards relatives who share the same gene pool in order to increase the
number who carry this gene into the next generation. This is further supported by Wilson (2005),
who studied worker insects with zero reproduction (sterile), concluding that true altruism is
positively correlated to relatedness (Foster, Wenseleers and Ratnieks, 2006).
When addressing altruistic behaviour through an evolutionary perspective Trivers (1971, p.35)
asserts that the models take the altruism out of altruism. It is argued that altruism through the
evolutionary perspective cannot be described as pure altruism, as they appear to be of genic selfinterest. Nevertheless, evolutionary biologists stress that biological altruism is not to be likened to
the everyday, vernacular sense of the concept (motivating intentions), but instead, in relation to the
fitness consequences of the behaviour (Okasha, 2013).

2.2 Social psychology

Social scientists claim that when interacting with other people, individuals have unconscious, preprogrammed rules of social exchange behaviour (Hoffman, et al., 1996), and decisions are often
believed to be highly influenced by their conscious and moral sentiments (Frank, 1987, p.603).
Contextual, social-cognitive, relational and affective roots of altruism are also often emphasised as
being embedded within the values and norms of the society (Mattis, et al., 2009, p.3). Additionally,
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the social perspective argues that society nurtures an individuals predisposition to assist others
through processes of positive reinforcement, internalisation, and role modelling (Michalski, 2003,
p.343).

The relational models theory suggests humans cognitively create different types of relationships,
which serve for different functions. Distinctions made include: authority relationships based on
unbalanced power, trade relationships founded on reciprocity, and communal relationships based
on meeting each others needs (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). In line with this theory, DeScioli and
Krishna (2012) systematically tested the relational distinctions. Associations with communal
relationships was found to markedly influenced altruistic behaviour, finding 55% of participants
donated their endowment in the high-need condition, in comparison to only 28% in the low-need
condition. This can be argued to have an association to the evolutionary concept of kinship, as
altruistic behaviour was found to be more prevalent in high need communal relationships. These
findings however were believed to be predominantly dominated by context effects (i.e. the
participants degree of hunger) rather than the communal relation. Upon testing asymmetrical
authoritative relationships, results showed authority ranking to be influential in altruistic decisions
with 62% of dictators donating in high authority ranking conditions, compared to only 26% in the low
ranking conditions (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). Fiske (1992) also specified that the expectations of
how one distributes their resources differ depending upon their relationship; with Braas-Garza, et
al. (2010) finding people in dictator games give more money to friends than strangers.

In contrast, the social preferences model suggests no differentiation is made between types of
personal relationships, power relationships or trade. This model is often been used to understand
the constructs of altruistic behaviour, by which an individual values the others payoffs, i.e.
incorporating self-interest with altruism (DeSioli and Krishna, 2012). Individual social preferences are
believed to offer insight into many economic situations such as political support for redistributive
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social programmes, charitable giving, team production etc. (Jakiela, 2013, p.208). This model extends
to suggest that altruism may vary dependent both on the individuals payoff and the potential
payoffs that the recipient is exposed to, dependent on the altruists decision (DeSioli and Krishna,
2012). When considering the social preference model, if an individual is valuing payoffs before
acting, can their behaviour be categorised as an act of pure altruism? This model is also believed to
be limited due to its failure to include the impact of situational factors and contextual/framing
effects on altruistic behaviour. The first experiment, on communal relations, conducted by DeScioli
and Krishna (2012) contradict this models prediction. High generosity was witnessed in the
anonymous condition, even though the participants knew that the cues were hypothetical, and
would therefore not be receiving a payoff.

Secondary data clearly supports the flexibility of an individuals altruistic nature when faced with
different situations. In the analysis of 2012 charity donation figures in the USA, although giving
totalled $316.23 billion, this was 8.2% below the total giving of 2007 (Charity Navigator, 2013). This
shows the reduction of general altruism on a mass scale, doubtlessly due to the constraints of the
widespread financial crisis. This situational change also saw individuals alter the direction of their
altruistic behaviour towards charitable sectors they felt were currently more in need (e.g. food
banks and human services, as opposed to arts, and environment charities) (Charity Navigator, 2013).

Taking a cognitive approach, DeScioli and Krishna (2012) continue to explain that due to framing
effects; altruistic decisions are not only driven by explicit payoffs, but also by implicit payoffs (e.g.
cues given in the task description). This explanation is supported by Braas-Garza (2007), who found
participants donate a larger proportion of their endowment when the recipient is said to be relying
on the dictator. Eckel and Grossman (1996) echo this by stating that altruistic behaviour is context
dependent, with dictator game experimental findings supporting this. When controlling recipient
identity, results found subjects on average donated 10.6% to their anonymous partner, compared to
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a donation of 31% when the recipient was described to be a charity (American Red Cross). Clear
contextual effects may go some way to explain variations found in public giving between different
charitable causes/sectors. Hoffman, et al., (1994) controlled how the dictator obtained their
endowment, and found that participants gave less money to their partners, when their endowment
had to be earned. Social distance was additionally identified as influential in ones altruistic
behaviour. Bohnet and Frey (1999) created 3 main comparative degrees of identification
(anonymous, 1-way identification, and 2-way identification), finding participants altruistic behaviour
diminished as social distance increased.

Although these social models have their differences, social psychologists commonly argue that all
economic transactions are social due to the fact that they take place in various types of relationships
(DeScioli and Krishna, 2012).

2.3 Cultural differences

In accordance to Fiskes (1992) relational models theory, an individuals social-cognitive mechanism
is thought to distinguish the different functions from relationships, and adjust their altruistic
behaviour accordingly. This model claims to hold true for human social interaction across cultures
based on four basic relational models: communal sharing, authority ranking, equity matching and
market pricing (Fiske, 1992). When kinship (as a form of moderating altruistic behaviour) was
experimentally tested across European and South African Zulu cultures by Madsen, et al. (2010),
they found that within both cultures, altruism was strongest the closer the recipients relationship to
the individual. In 2006, the Charities Aid Foundation also reported for international comparisons in
charitable giving. Results found that although USA had the highest giving levels at 1.67% of their GDP
in comparison to the UKs 0.73% of GDP, they found the fundamental nature of altruistic giving
between the countries to differ. UK donations to international causes represented 13% of their total
13

giving, in comparison to only 3% donated to international affairs in the USA (CAF, 2006). Draguns
(2013, p.2) suggests that there must be a threshold for altruism that varies culturally, especially
between individualistic and collectivist societies, as what may seem completely selfless and heroic in
one, may appear as a mundane, involuntary action in another.

2.4 Gender differences

Studies continuously attempt to investigate the causes behind different altruistic decisions, with
some attributing variances to gender effects. The belief that human nature differs according to
gender is not a modern perception. Charles Darwin (1874) also concluded that men and women
differ in mental disposition, with woman showing greater tenderness, and men taking pleasure in
competition, which effectively leads to ambition and selfishness (Eckel and Grossman, 1998). A
double-anonymous dictator game experiment conducted by Eckel and Grossman (1998) revealed
statistically significant gender differences, with women, on average, donating twice as much as men
to their anonymous partners. These differences were mainly attributed to men being more
individually-oriented and selfish, in comparison to womens socially-orientated, selfless nature (Eckel
and Grossman, 1998). Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) found gender differences when varying the
price of giving, showing woman appear more generous when the price of giving is high, but less
generous than men at lower prices of giving.

Due to methodological variations in experimental design, results from analysing gender differences
in altruism have been largely inconsistent. Bolton and Katok (1995) conducted dictator game
experiments and concluded there to be no gender differences. A number of empirical studies over
the years have found no gender differences in empathic or altruistic responding (Boice and
Goldman, 1981; Oswald, 1996; Rodgers and Klotz, 1994). After reviewing over 30 studies, Maccoby
and Jacklin (1974) also determined that women were not more empathic than men. It is possible
however, that unclear experimental instructions may have contributed to variations in gender
14

differences analysis, with participants possibly interpreting the same initial question differently. For
example, some experiments required participants to recall how often they have helped others in the
past. This ambiguous design exposes answers to a degree of subjectivity. This is due to initial gender
differences when determining what to categorise as helping behaviour, even before being able to
analyse differences in the quantitative amount stated (Oswald, 2000, pp.545-546).

Nonetheless, Western society generally deems women to be more altruistic and empathic than men
(Oswald, 2000, p.545), and the existence of gender differences is further supported through the
analysis of charitable donations in non-experimental environments. When controlling for variables
such as background, income levels and age, regardless of marital status, women are significantly
more likely to donate than men, support more charities, as well as give larger amounts (Piper and
Schnepf, 2007).
As a form of supplementary analysis, this study will also interpret the experimental findings to
explore if any gender difference, in donation amounts, were observed.

2.5 Corporate Altruism

In 2012, charitable donations by corporations in the USA totalled $18.97billion, accounting for 6% of
total giving (Charity Navigator, 2012). Well known philanthropists, such as Bill Gates, argue the
necessity of corporate philanthropy, to aid those that markets are unable to (Henderson and Malani,
2008). In 2012 alone, the Gates Foundations total charitable distribution amounted $3.897 billion
(Gates foundation, 2012). However the true motivations behind general acts of corporate altruism
are often debated. Corporate philanthropy, in for-profit organisations, is considered as any
corporate social action, which allows the organisations altruistic output to take many different
forms (e.g. helping provide medication to the uninsured, producing green goods, and voluntarily
reducing environmental emissions) (Henderson and Malani, 2008).
15

On an individual employee level, researchers have investigated ways in which the company can
affect an employees altruistic behaviour. Studies have found that employees altruistic levels
increase when employer-employee ethical values are more congruent (Goodman and Svyantek,
1999), contract expectations are better fulfilled (Coyle-Shapiro, 2002), and when firms create a
positive work environment by implementing good ethical values (Valentine, et al., 2011, p.513). It is
suggested that these factors, as well as career satisfaction, play a role in employee motivation to
behave more altruistically, due to the development of a stronger psychological contract (Valentine,
et al., 2011, p.513). The altruistic, or homo economicus, nature of individuals as a whole can
additionally have large effects on a variety of corporate and economic issues e.g. the optimal design
of institutions and contracts, the analysis of incomplete contracts, allocation of property rights etc.
(Henrich, et al., 2001, p.73).

In relation to firm level monetary funding donations, government legislation allows income tax
deductions, for the value of the charitable donation. These tax breaks also allows companies to
avoid capital gains taxation on donated properties/assets that have appreciated in value (Cordes,
2011). Intentions behind these financial donations are thereby often doubted. Apart from tax
breaks, other potential sources of motivation include, essential profit maximisation opportunities,
symbolic capital through public relations, and the agency-cost problem leading managers to try and
maximise their own utility (i.e. bonuses) by taking major risk with money that isnt theirs (Henderson
and Malani, 2008). The financial advantages, as well as the perceived benefits to brand reputation,
has led many to maintain that, due to the rewards received, and lack of net loss/cost of welfare to
the company, these acts of philanthropy however beneficial to the recipient are not truly
altruistic. On the other hand, some researchers believe that social and economic goals maybe
integrally connected, thereby allowing the philanthropy to be a source of competitive advantage, as
well as public good (Henderson and Malani, 2008).

16

Although this report will not be delving into corporations acts of philanthropy as an output of
altruistic behaviour, it shall aim to measure altruistic behaviour within the corporate world on a
more individual level. By capturing the levels of altruism displayed by professionals within the sector
(as opposed to corporate entities), this study attempts to provide some indication about the nature
of those who are behind the corporate decisions. Comparing their results to non-finance
professionals should be able to give the findings an extra dimension, when trying to attribute
behavioural traits of those within the financial sector, or contribute to explaining factors behind
questionable decision they may make.

2.6 Motivations
What drives people to behave altruistically? More specifically, do individuals help for selfless or
selfish reasons? Many different factors such as identification, reciprocity and social distance have
been suggested as potential motivators for helping behaviour (Trivers, 1971). Research also confirms
the influence of gratitude, as well as acknowledging its sensitivity to the cost and benefits linked to
altruistic behaviour (McCullough, et al., 2008).
Analysis of both experimental primary data, and charitable-giving secondary data, clearly supports
altruisms flexible nature when faced with situational differences, however fails to pinpoint ones
motivations for such behaviour. Batson (2011) stresses the importance of motivation when defining
altruism as a motivational state with the ultimate goal of increasing anothers welfare, however
does not specify the significance of behaviour. Nevertheless, ones motivation and behaviour should
go hand in hand. After all, altruistic intentions cannot be recognised as such until put into action,
whilst actions cannot be considered altruistic if they were unmotivated and unintended (Draguns,
2013, p.2). The key to differentiating an act of pure altruism, from one of self-interest, is through
determining the behaviours goal-directed drive. However, due to questions of ones true motivation
being often deemed as indeterminate, Benson (2011) proceeds to describe altruism as an aporia.
17

Is the giver in giving, or the partner in cooperating not acting in a way that, while
seeming to sacrifice, maximises that individuals fitness, status, prestige, or
security? Is what appears on the surface to benefit others or the common good
indeed selfish? (Benson, 2011, p.195).
Batson, et als (1981) empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that individuals are more likely to
engage in pure altruistic behaviour out of concern, by taking the perspective of the individual in
need. It is suggested that this empathetic concern in turn creates an altruistic motivation. Sanderson
(2010) supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis with evidence from a study where participants
were provided with 2 research tasks, which they had to allocate to themselves and another student
(1 task was more desirable than the other). Participants were split into 2 groups, a control group,
and a group that had to complete a perspective-taking exercise before allocating tasks. Findings
revealed 75% of the control group assigned themselves the more desirable task, compared to only
42% of the perspective-taking condition. Results support the notion of altruism motivated by
empathy.

Impure altruism pertains to explanations of motivation that are associated with psychological
egoism. Psychological egoism is a concept, in support of the homo economicus model of human
nature, suggesting that even in an act that appears altruistic, no matter how noble or beneficial it
may appear to others, humans are always motivated by their ultimate goal of self-interest (Batson,
1991). The aporia of altruism and concept of psychological egoism are well described by Graebers
(2001) fictional dialogue:

Q: If people only act to maximise their gains in some way or another, then how
do you explain people who give things away for nothing?
A: They are trying to maximise their social standing, or honour, or prestige that
accrues to them by doing so.
18

Q: Then what about people who give anonymous gifts?

A: Well, theyre trying to maximise their sense of self-worth, or the good feeling
they get from doing it. (Benson, 2011, p.196).

Generally, such self-benefits are grouped into 3 main classes; reduction of aversive arousal, fear of
punishment for not helping, and desire for reward (Sanderson, 2010, p.488). Despite the fact that
the individual is still engaging in an act of helping, it cannot be defined as pure altruism as these 3
classes suggest the individual is motivated by personal, internal benefits. Similarly the negative-state
hypothesis suggests that individuals engage in altruistic behaviour in an attempt to improve their
own state. Cialdini, et al. (1973) proceeds to argue that altruism increases when an individual is in a
state of temporary negativity, as the altruistic behaviour is self-gratifying and helps to improve their
low mood state (e.g. guilt or depression) (Baumann, et al., 1981, p.1039). This is due to altruism
being affected by cognition, emotions and mood (Cialdini, et al., 1982). The negative-state
hypothesis has however been hotly contested. Batson (1989) challenged this hypothesis when his
experiment found that between high and low empathy participants, high-empathy participants were
more likely to behave altruistically. Since high-empathy subjects were not in a negative state, results
indicated that other factors were involved in their motivation, instead of reducing ones negative
state.

Questions about an individuals intentions have also lead to the idea of reciprocal altruism, with
Trivers (1971) suggesting gratitude to be a motivating factor in facilitating reciprocal altruism.
Altruism and reciprocity are often concepts used in the same likening, however should not be
confused. Whilst an act can only be deemed purely altruistic if it is selfless and not done with the
expectation of any form of repayment, reciprocal actions do expect something in return. The notion
of reciprocity is based around unofficial social norms where individuals respond to friendly actions in
a nicer more cooperative manner. Similarly when responding to hostile actions, individuals are
19

frequently more nasty and sometimes brutal (Fehr and Gtcher, 2000). This current study is only
concerned with investigating altruism.
It is evident that the distinction between pure and impure altruism is not whether the individuals
own welfare was increased by their behaviour or not, but rather whether their intention behind
their behaviour was to maximise the welfare of the recipient, or their own. Finding a way to identify
these driving intentions is the current predicament. Batson, et al. (1981, p.291) alternatively
proposed that motivations for helping need not be completely or even majoritively altruistic in order
for it to have an altruistic component, since ones motivations may often be a combination of
altruism and egoism. Krebs and Van Hesteren (1994, p.104) also echo this proposal by stating a
behaviour can still be defined as altruistic even if it is not purely altruistic, and recommending
altruism to be viewed on a continuum with some acts being more altruistic than others.

Though definitions of altruism may show slight variations over the years, they all insist that an act of
helping, in an attempt to pursue self-gain, cannot qualify as altruistic (Krebs and Van Hesteren, 1994,
p.104). Defensively Batson, et al. (1981) propose that an increase in own welfare, e.g. through
feelings of satisfaction or relief, may actually be an unintended by-product of the altruistic
behaviour, as oppose to its goal, thereby still making the behaviour altruistically motivated. The
question of motivation behind ones altruistic behaviour appears to be a cyclical scientific debate.
Acknowledging altruism and egoism to be motivational concepts, Batson, et al. (1981) attributed the
difficulty and current inability, in providing evidence to conclude the debate, to being unable to
observe motivation directly. Only the output of behaviour is observable, with motivational
explanations being subjective.

20

2.7 Summary & Research problem

Taking all of the definitions and views into consideration, the definition of altruism that is chosen for
the purpose of this study is one influenced by Batson (1994) and Post (2002), and used by Mattis, et
al. (2009, p.2). In order for the behaviour to be defined as altruistic it must be:
1. Voluntary
2. Undertaken without any prior interest in receiving internal or external rewards
3. Intended to enhance the welfare of others
After carefully evaluating various types of literature within this field, it reaffirmed the clear lack of
altruism research analysed by sectoral employment. This study views this gap in literature as
problematic, emphasising the importance of exploring the altruistic nature of individuals working
within different employment sectors. If differences between sectors are found, research can
subsequently be developed to investigate causality, potentially identifying whether the individuals
level of altruism is as a result of their long-term employment within that sector, or the reason they
are working within that sector to begin with. This studys primary line of enquiry is to initiate
investigations of altruism by sectoral employment, through specifically analysing the financial sector.
Does professional employment within the financial sector impact altruism? Such findings will allow
for a deeper understanding of both the financial sector and human nature, offering an extra
dimension to current models and theories.

21

3. Hypotheses
Taking the studys main focus and research question into consideration, the following hypotheses
have been derived.

H0: No comparative difference will be found in the altruism levels displayed between finance
professionals and non-finance professions.
Holding the expectation that non-finance professionals will show higher signs of altruistic behaviour,
this study aims to disprove the null hypothesis.

H1: Finance and non-finance professionals will display differing levels of altruism.
As there is no previous literature within this field, expected findings are deduced through various
other sources, as opposed to being founded upon previous results. Therefore, this non-directional
hypothesis states a difference will be found between the 2 experimental groups, but does not
specify how they will differ.

H2: Finance professionals will display lower levels of altruism than non-finance professionals.
Although both groups of participants are expected to show signs of altruistic behaviour, this study
expects finance professionals to exhibit lower levels of altruism, displayed by donating less money to
their anonymous recipient. As discussed in previous sections, this expectation is built upon
perceptions of finance professionals having individualist mentalities, and the financial sector being
depicted as greedy, self-interested and corrupt. Much of the characteristics attributed to the
financial industry and their employees are in line with the homo economicus model. This report is

22

interested in exploring this further. Unfortunately, uncontrollable external economic factors, such as
the 2008 global financial crisis, may still be influential on participant behaviour. As this is not a
longitudinal study, and an experiment of this kind was not conducted before the crisis, this report
will be unable to decipher to what degree (if any) this will affect donation amounts allocated by
participants.

23

4. Research methodology, method & data

Theoretical economic assumptions have largely been developed from analysing self-interested
trades under enforceable contracts; however these self-interest models have proven to be
inadequate (DeScioli and Krishna, 2012). Deceptive laboratory experiments construct an optimal way
of providing evidence about altruism, potentially revealing more coherent and definitive evidence
than other methods such as natural observation, or theoretical deduction (Batson, 2011). As a result,
this research will adopt a quantitative approach when collecting primary data through implementing
a single-blind, anonymous dictator game experiment. This particular economics games theory is
appropriately matched to my research question and hypotheses, as well as being in line with
previous research conducted within the field of altruism (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Eckel and Grossman,
1996; 1998; DeSioli and Krishna, 2012; Jakiela, 2013).
As previously discussed, the dictator game is made of only one stage; therefore the amount donated
by the dictator remains final. This differs from the ultimatum game experiments, often used when
examining fairness and reciprocity, which consists of two players and two stages. One player initially
proposes the amount of money split, and the second player chooses to accept/reject the offer.
Rejecting the offer will result in both players receiving nothing. Participants in the ultimatum game
must consider fairness of distribution, as well as strategic considerations to avoid counterpart
rejection (Hoffman, et al., 1994). In comparison, due to the dictator game only consisting of one
stage, the dictator bares no consequences for their actions. It is this lack of consequence that will
make their behaviour either support the concept of altruism, or maintain the homo-economicus
stance on human behaviour.

24

4.1 Sample
The population of this study consists of those who do and do not work within the financial sector,
forming 2 experimental groups identified as Finance Professionals and Non-Finance Professionals.
The criteria used to classify participants as Finance Professionals was identifying if they were
currently working within a financial services company, with a company office located in the financial
district of London/the Square Mile. This study chose not to recruit participants who work within the
finance department of non-finance related companies (e.g. market research, retail, healthcare etc.).
This was in an attempt to maintain consistency, due to the belief that overall, office culture and
personalities may differ between financial and non-financial service companies. No additional
criterion was placed on these participants in terms of specifying which sub-sector they work in (e.g.
trader, analyst, corporate banker etc). As this is the first experiment to comparatively analyse
altruism by professional sectorspecifically the financial sectorthe population selected for
sampling was intentionally left broad. This study sought a general investigation of finance
professionals working within the financial district as a whole, allowing scope for further research to
expand on these findings (e.g. only using finance professionals and comparing them by sub-sector).
A criterion specifying participants neither to work, nor have a higher educational background within
the area of finance was used to categorise participants into the Non-Finance Professionals group. In
an attempt to strengthen the population validity of this experiment, and to allow for further
demographical analysis, no age or income restrictions were imposed onto the selection criteria. To
achieve equal gender representativeness, this study recruited 20 males and 20 females for each
experimental group.
Using a combination of convenience and random sampling, 80 participants were sampled in total,
with both experimental groups consisting of 40 participants each. A sample of 80 was chosen to
allow for stronger significance testing. In line with the search criteria, convenience sampling was
used when selecting which offices and companies to conduct the experiments in, as they were the

25

companies the researcher was able to gain access to. However, to minimise sampling bias, and to
ensure for the generalisability of the results, random sampling was used when recruiting the
participants within these companies. Participants in the Finance Professionals group, were
recruited from 4 financial services companies, and took part in their respective offices; Deutsche
Bank, Bloomberg LP, Deloitte, Lloyds Banking Group. Participants from the Non-Finance
Professionals group were specifically chosen according to their selection criteria, with the study
taking place in a mixture of open and closed spaces.

4.2 Experimental procedure

As mentioned previously, a single-blind, anonymous dictator game was conducted, where the
dependent variable is the altruism levels exhibited by participants (i.e. donation amount), and the
independent variable is the participants profession. The experiment was standardised for all
participants, and was conducted in an identical manner in 8 sessions, with a total of 80 participants.
Each experiment was conducted on a one-to-one basis with only the researcher and 1 participant in
the room at one time.
There is a critical link between the properties of a situation, and the behaviour of the individual
within that setting. This significantly applies to traditional dictator games, as the experiment invokes
a set of expectations upon the participant, unknowingly creating a demand for a positive donation
(List, 2007). To avoid any unintentional set expectations from being a confounding variable upon this
studys results, certain experimental adjustments were made from the traditional dictator game. The
single-blind nature of this study meant that participants were initially unaware of the true nature of
the study, as they were informed they were partaking in a study examining the effect of culture and
personality in the alternative ways stress is handled in the work place. All participants read the
information sheet (appendix A) and signed the consent form (appendix B) before proceeding to take

26

part in the study. The experiment was split into 3 parts; a short interview containing a mixture of
open and closed-ended questions, a practical independent scenario and task, and finally a few
demographic questions for analytical purposes. The experimental room was arranged so there were
envelopes laid out in numerical order on a table by the entrance. Envelopes were numbered 1-40 for
the Finance Professionals group and 41-80 for the Non-Finance Professionals group. Each
envelope contained a scenario sheet (appendix C), and a smaller brown envelope inside (identically
numbered to its corresponding white envelope) containing the dictator game task (appendix D) and
10 1 coins. An empty box was placed on the other side of the room for participants to place their
envelope in upon completion. This experiment chose to use real money (GBP) in order to increase its
external validity, and observe less artificial behaviour.
Upon entry into the experimental room, each participant was instructed to randomly pick up 1 of
the large white envelopes on the table before taking a seat. The 1st part of the study asked 11
questions in relation to culture, personality, and stress, but responses collected were not analysed
(appendix E). For the purpose of this study, part 1 consisted of bluffer questions, created in line with
the apparent topic, to make sure participants were unaware this experiment was investigating
altruism. It was imperative that the participants had no knowledge of the true nature of the study as
it could have led to either a conscious or sub-conscious modification of their behaviour through the
influence of demand characteristics, or social-desirability effect.
After completing part 1 of the study, participants were then given brief insight and explanations
about the 2nd part of the study (appendix E) before the experimenter left the room. The participant
was first instructed to read and complete the scenario sheet inside the random envelope they had
selected at the beginning of the study. The scenario created was a hypothetical situation where the
participant had to decide if they were willing to donate a percentage of their hypothetical sign-on
bonus. The percentage that they may/may not have allocated in this scenario was analysed as their
perceived altruism level. Next participants opened the small brown envelope and read the dictator

27

game task inside. The dictator game task was presented and worded in such a way so participants
would not be aware that their altruistic natures were being studied. Nonetheless it was the
monetary amount donated from this task that represents the level of altruism demonstrated by the
participant. As altruism requires context for individuals to feel the cause is worthy of a donation
(Eckel & Grossman, 1996), the paper inside the brown envelope informed participants that the
unknown participant in group b, who was also doing the same task, was not allocated any cash for
task participation. Inside each envelope were 10 1 coins, and the paper continued to read if
participants were willing to anonymously donate any of this 10 cash, to donate it into the brown
envelope and place it in the box at the back of the room. Taking inspiration from Jakiela (2013), the
wording of this experiment intentionally created enough ambiguity for participants to assume that
the 10 in the envelope was their money to keep, however this was not explicitly stated. In order to
test true altruism, it was important for participants to believe the 10 would be theirs to keep,
because this means any donation they make will be negatively affecting their net income for the
task. Although the sole aim of altruism isnt for the act to be costly to the giver, using real money
(that participants think will be theirs to keep) avoids participants yielding higher altruism levels, due
to not feeling a real connection with the money, or a sense of gain/loss. This also increases the
experiments ecological validity as it allows the settings within the study to be more relatable to the
real outside world. The anonymity of each dictators paired-partner (the participant conducting the
same task in the alternate group) is essential, not only to remove potential preferential helping
behaviour by the dictator, but also as the paired-partner in this experiment is fictional and does not
exist. The complete anonymity of this study (including the anonymous donation recipient) ensures
that participant cannot be receiving, or expecting to receive, any type of direct reward, in return for
their donation. Their potential benefit through indirect reward however, cannot be controlled by
anyone bar the individual. On the other hand questions remain as to whether these indirect rewards
can substantially be described as a benefit. The experimenter was not present in the room for the

28

part 2 of the study to avoid the possibility of observer effects and experimenter effects altering the
participants behaviour and thereby biasing the results collected.
The experimenter returned to the room for part 3 of the study to gather the participants
demographic information (appendix E). For supplementary analysis, this study additionally reports
for demographic distinctions/similarities found in relation to the participants behaviour, but will not
be analysing reasons why they may exist. The study concluded by asking the participant what they
thought this study was a better measure of (full interviewer script found in appendix E). This was
asked as a precautionary measure; since knowledge of the studys true nature may alter the
participants behaviour, making them more or less generous than they normally would be.
Consequently, the results of any participant that associated the study with greed, altruism, or
anything of the like, would be withdrawn from the analysis. For the purpose of this report, the
participants motivation behind their behaviour is simply secondary information. Nevertheless for
additional insight, participants are asked to anonymously share their motivations/influences behind
their behaviour after the experiment had been completed.
This study took approximately 15 minutes with each participant, and all participants were debriefed
(appendix F) either by email or given a printed sheet to read. This study used human participants to
collect primary data, as well as initially incorporating minor elements of experimental deception,
therefore conducting a full debrief was essential. This debrief detailed the true nature of the study,
explaining why this study is important and why the deception was necessary, and provided the
experimenters contact details for the purposes such as reading this report, seeking counselling, or
withdrawing their data. Despite the ethical concern of deception, taking part in the experiment did
not result in any psychological distress, harm or embarrassment for the participants, which was
further controlled for by the anonymity and confidentiality of the data collected. In addition, all
experimentation took place after being granted ethical approval from the E&M Research Ethics
Panel (appendix G).

29

Subject-subject interaction was also controlled for by making sure those who have, and those who
are yet to, part-take in the study are not housed in this same room. This further precaution
minimised the risk of participants exchanging ideas/details about the experiment, to avoid demand
characteristics or social desirability effects influencing their behaviour (i.e. donation).
Both descriptive and inferential statistics will be used to analyse data collected from this study. The
main statistical analysis used for both altruism and perceived altruism, is an independent-groups
one-tailed t-test. This parametric test compares differences of mean donation amounts between
experimental groups, revealing whether the difference found is significant or not. Additionally,
measures of central tendency is be reported for, as well as conducting 1-way between groups
ANOVA tests when conducting demographic analysis for age, income, and number of years within
finance. All statistical testing will be conducted on SPSS using a 95% significance level (p<0.05).

4.3 Experimental limitations

It must be noted that this study is being conducted for an MSc dissertation project and is
consequently subject to heavy time and budgetary restrictions. 80 participants were sampled for the
dictator game experiment, and although this is adequate for statistical significance testing, the
experiment would have ideally been conducted on a much larger scale. This would have allowed for
a better representation of the population, generalisability of the results, and sharper statistical
significance testing. Unfortunately, larger samples require a greater amount of time and resources.
Additionally, experiments with finance professionals only took place in 4 offices. Had there been
more time and resources available (as well as a larger sample size used), it would have permitted
experiments to be conducted in a wider variety and amount of financial services companies.
Researchers aiming to replicate or develop this study further should use a sample size in excess of
100 participants, using a rough guideline of 10% of the finance participants for the amount of
companies they should be sourced from (e.g. 50 finance professionals, 5 finance companies). This
will ensure the significance of their results is not as limited.
30

5. Results & Discussion

In an attempt to disprove the null hypothesis (H0), this study initiated analysis by drawing a
comparison between finance and non-finance professionals, by using their mean donations from the
dictator game task. Using the same results, this study then took a deeper analytical approach by
investigating any demographical differences/trends that may exist, in order to identify any
attributing factors/explanations to the overall results. Finally, statistical testing was concluded by
firstly comparing results from the scenario between experimental groups, and then comparing them
to dictator game results, to see if there is a difference between participants perceived, and actual
altruism levels. None of the participants guessed the true nature of the experiment, so results from
all 80 participants were used for analysis.

5.1 Altruism (Dictator game task)

Results rejected H0 by revealing a significant difference (p=0.0001) in the altruistic levels displayed
by finance professionals (M=1.73, SD=1.601), and non-finance professionals (M=3.05, SD=1.260;
t(78)=-4.113 (appendix H). The proportion of variance in donation amounts that is explainable by the
experimental groups was 17.8%, which in accordance to Cohen (1988, pp.284-287) is considered to
be a large effect.
Out of the possible 400, finance professionals donated 69 to their anonymous recipient (17.25%),
with the most frequent decision being to keep the 10 for themselves (27.5%). This is in stark
contrast from the non-finance professionals who donated almost double that amount (122). With
only 2 participants donating 0, the modal donation by non-finance professionals was 3 (37.5%).
Findings clearly support the existence of altruism, as 83.75% of the 80 participants made voluntary
donations, yet simultaneously expose finance professionals as being less altruistic than non-finance
professionals. This is apparent by both the amount of participants who made a donation (mean

31

difference=22.5%), and by the monetary value of the mean donations made (mean
difference=1.33). In spite of these differences, both groups commonly did not make donations
above 5. This threshold of 50% suggests that although those who donated behaved altruistically,
their altruistic nature did not extend to the extent of increasing their recipients welfare above their
own. Whichever way these results are analysed, they are in clear support of both H1 & H2.

5.2 Demographical analysis

Demographic information was collected about each participant, and used to further analyse altruism
levels by conducting an independent-groups 1-tailed t-test for gender, and 1-way between-groups
ANOVA tests for age, income bracket, and years within finance.

5.2.1 Gender differences

On average, both experimental groups showed females to be more altruistic than males, however
statistical significance was only obtained within finance professionals (p=0.003) (appendix I). 21% of
the variance in mean donations within finance professionals is attributed to gender differences,
compared to only a moderate 7.9% within non-finance professionals. Mean donations also revealed
male finance professionals (M=1, SD=1.257) to be the least altruistic, with female non-finance
professionals being the most (M=3.4, SD=1.314) (Fig 1). Results from this study support that of
previous research (Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Andreoni & Vesterlund, 2001), in suggesting that
females are more altruistic than males. Interestingly, male non-finance professionals (M=2.7,
SD=1.129), showed higher levels of altruism in comparison to female finance professionals (M=2.45,
SD=1.605). This somewhat contrasts with the general finding of females being more altruistic than
men, whilst simultaneously supporting the notion of finance professionals having a lower propensity
of exhibiting altruistic behaviour.
32

4.00
3.50

Donations ()

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
Finance Professionals
Male

Non-Finance Professionals
Female

Fig 1

5.2.2 Age differences

No progressive patterns were found in mean donations in both experimental groups, with results
suggesting age may not be a confounding variable upon participants altruistic behaviour (appendix
J). In addition, differences in mean donations were found between the age groups, with their effect
sizes calculated using eta squared (finance professionals=0.14; non-finance professionals=0.21).
Despite these large effect sizes, differences between groups were not significant for both finance
professionals (p=0.373), and non-finance professionals (p=0.147).
Even though the selection criteria didnt specify age, the amount of participants within each of the 6
age brackets ended up being relatively even, which resultantly strengthens the representativeness of
the sample.

5.2.3 Income differences

A negative correlation was found between income and altruistic behaviour, as both groups showed
as income increased, altruistic behaviour decreased (appendix K) (Fig 2). Although causation cannot
be determined, effect sizes for finance professionals was 35%, and 25% for non-finance

33

professionals, suggesting the degree to which income brackets is accountable for variances in mean
donations is fairly large. This is seen to be more so than age or gender have been. Mean donations
were significantly different within both finance professionals (p=0.003), and non-finance
professionals (p=0.034), with post-hoc comparisonsusing Tukey HSD testfinding the greatest
statistically significant difference to be within finance professionals between the brackets <20,000
and >50,000 (p=0.002).

4.00
3.50

Donations ()

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
<20,000

20,000-30,000 30,001-40,000 40,001-50,000

Finance Professionals

Non-Finance Professionals

>50,000

Fig 2

As previously mentioned, no selection criteria was imposed upon income. As a result a wide
variation was found when comparing income earned by participants in the 2 groups, with double the
amount of participants earning <20,000 in the non-finance group (n=12), and more than double the
amount of finance professionals earning >50,000 (n=7). This could be attributable to salaries
generally being larger within the financial sector, or the lack of sector specification for non-finance
professionals within this study. Nonetheless the small number of non-finance participants within the
upper income brackets may have impacted the lack of significance found between brackets in posthoc comparison. To draw on further comparisons, the ANOVA test was run again after condensing
the 5 income brackets into 3 (conjoining the lower 2 and the upper 2 brackets) (appendix K). Post-

34

hoc Tukey HSD test found a strong significant difference between the upper and lower income
brackets (p=0.013).

5.2.4 Years worked within the financial sector

This supplementary analysis was only conducted upon finance professionals as they are the main
focus of this investigation.
The length of time the participant had spent working within the financial sector had the largest
effect on mean donation variation than all other demographic splits (eta squared=.04779).
Unfortunately, this effect was negative. As seen in Fig 3 the longer the participant had been working
in finance, the less money they donated in the dictator game task.

4.00
3.50

Donations ()

3.00
2.50
2.00
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
<1

1-3
3-5
5-8
Number of years worked in finance

8-11

>11

Fig 3

Findings showed an overall significant difference between groups (p=0.0003), and more specifically a
significant difference in donations when comparing those working within finance for <1yr, with the
remaining 4 brackets >3yrs (appendix L). Donations of participants working within finance 1-3yrs
were the only bracket that did not significantly differ from other brackets. An equally large
significant difference was found when comparing those working <1yr to those working 8-11yrs and
>11yrs (p=0.001; mean difference=3). Interestingly, the mean donation of those working in finance
35

for less than 1yr (M=3.71, SD=1.89, n=7) was greater than the overall mean donation of non-finance
professionals (M=3.05, n=40), however the considerably smaller sample size must be noted.

5.3 Perceived altruism (Scenario)

On average, finance professionals allocated a slightly higher percentage (M=15.5, SD=16.283) than
non-finance professionals (M=13.88, SD14.119; t(78)=0.477) (appendix M). However, this difference
lacked statistical significance (p=0.635), and the effect size (eta square=0.0029) further showed the
small magnitude of difference between the groups average percentage distribution. A commonality
shared between both groups was a mode percentage allocation of 0% from their sign-on bonus
(n=23).
This scenario attempted to capture perceived altruism by creating a hypothetical situation; however
the construct validity of the scenario may arguably be limited. Does the scenario truly capture
perceived altruism? Although the dream role within this scenario was left intentionally vague in
order to aid with participant identification, it was consequently subjected to the currently negative
perceptions of corporations and societal inadequacies. This could have partly biased responses, and
contributed to the amount of 0% donations. Perhaps specifying a specific sector of this role (apart
from finance), may have yielded different results.

5.4 Perceived vs. Actual altruism

Findings revealed non-finance professionals to be significantly more altruistic than what they initially
perceived (p<0.0001), with a mean difference of 16.625 between the scenario and the dictator game
task. Although finance professionals also donated more during the dictator game task (M=17.25,
SD=16.011) rather than the scenario (M=15.5, SD=16.283), this difference was not found to be
significant (p=0.629) (appendix N).

36

The 2 experimental groups were then combined (n=80), and analysis comparing perceived and
actual altruism was conducted at an overall level. Comparisons showed that participants perceived
themselves to be 35.8% less altruistic than their actual altruistic behaviour showed them to be.
Findings showed there to be a significant difference (p=0.0002) between perceived altruism
(M=14.69, SD=15.165), and actual altruism (M=23.88, SD=15.791).

5.5 Motivations & Influences

After completing part 3 of the study, all participants were asked if they could share any motivational
influences behind their decisions in part 2 of the study, without revealing what answers they gave. In
line with the empathy-altruism hypothesis, many participants across both experimental groups cited
empathy as a behavioural influence. They stated that before making their decisions, they attempted
to identify with the individual, and think about how they would feel if they were in that situation.
Commonly, participants expressed that they were not able to identify with the hypothetical scenario
as much as they could with the task, raising queries as to how percentage allocation decisions were
made. A few participants within both groups also referred to the concept of karma as part of their
motivation behind their actions, which is somewhat similar to the concept of reciprocal altruism.
Although the recipient was anonymous, participants were still influenced by the belief that their
good actions will one day positively impact their life (i.e. indirect reward). Overall, differences in
participant responses were found both between the experimental groups, and between the scenario
and the dictator task.

5.5.1 Scenario
Although this study initially anticipated that external economic factors, such as the Global Financial
Crisis, could possibly affect participants donation amount, it did not anticipate that decisions made
37

in the initial scenario would be effected by the general negative perceptions of corporate firms
today. Participants stated that the greed and selfish nature associated with their perception of
corporations affected their behaviour negatively; citing that they felt it was the firms responsibility
to have enough funds to provide for the new recruits. Although this view was held by participants in
both experimental groups, this response was more prevalent within non-finance professionals, and
clearly displayed to be influential in their decisions. Nonetheless, non-finance professionals more
commonly cited that they were able to identify with the scenario, as some of them were asked to
voluntarily take a slight annual pay cut in order to avoid the redundancy of work colleagues. This was
never mentioned as an influential factor amongst finance professionals, presumably since financial
service companies did not implement such schemes.

5.5.2 Dictator game task

Again, differences in explanations were found between the 2 groups. As expected, a number of
finance professionals stated that their decisions were influenced by the competitive environment of
the financial world, as well as growing accustomed to its culture and common conduct within the
office. Interestingly, a few specifically stated that if they had done their task before working in
finance, they would have conducted part 2 of the study differently, and this response was common
in those working within finance from as little as 1 year, to as much as 37 years. Some finance
professionals even continued by saying that after conducting their task, they were surprised to see
how unknowingly selfish they had become over the years. As this is not a longitudinal study that
measures long-term changes in altruistic behaviour, it is impossible to evaluate these apparent
changes expressed by participants within a specific individual. Nonetheless, results from
demographic analysis clearly depict a significantly negative association between altruism levels, and
the length of time participants have been working within finance. Moreover the extent of this
difference can also be seen when analysing the mode responses between the finance and non38

finance professionals groups, showing that the most common donation was 0 and 3 respectively.
One finance professional suggested had they conducted their task outside of their working
environment (e.g. their home), the result from their task may have differed. Insightfully, this
participant proposed this may hold true for other participants also, as they are aware of many
professionals that have different personas when in and out of work. Non-finance professionals on
the other hand, mostly suggested influences relating to empathy. Responses commonly showed
feelings of identification, stating their task felt realer than their scenario, with their actions aiming to
reflect their desire to aid the unjust situation. A handful of participants between both groups also
stated that their answer to the task was partly influenced by their earlier answer to the scenario (i.e.
allocating 20% in the scenario influenced them to give 2 in the dictator game).

39

6. Limitations & Future Research

Despite controls being put in place, one of the basic unavoidable criticisms, common to most
experimental studies, is their automatic subjection to lower degrees of external validity due to their
artificial setting. In relation to dictator game experiments specifically, Bardsley (2007) argues that
the ex-ante external validity should be relatively high, as it requires minimal cognitive demand, and
reproduces familiar sets of opportunities faced by individuals on a daily basis. Additionally, this study
attempted to increase external validity by using real currency (GBP) in the dictator game, as well as
conducting the experiments in environments the participants were familiar with (e.g. their work
offices), as opposed to off-location laboratories. Conversely, motivations/influences feedback from
finance professionals suggested that donations may have differed if the experiment was conducted
outside their place of work. Future research could attempt to explore this further by sampling
finance professionals and comparing donations of experiments conducted in, and away from the
office.
Some well-recognised literatures investigating altruism generalise their results whilst only sampling
undergraduate students (e.g. Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Batson et al., 1981), arguably limiting their
population validity. Although this study did not implement a specific selection criteria based on age,
income etc., acknowledging the limitations imposed onto the previously mentioned studies, it
attempted to increase population validity by recruiting a sample from a large demographical range.
This was successfully implemented as participants backgrounds encompassed a large range of
income, age, education, professional seniority, and ethnic background, allowing findings to be better
generalised to the wider population. Though the participants within the sample had diverse
backgrounds, the restrictions imposed upon this study (refer to section 4.3), resulted in a relatively
small sample size. Using an appropriate confidence interval of 95%, this study was still able to
achieve statistical significance, when testing differences between experimental groups; however
future research replicating this study should strive to use a larger sample.

40

As identified earlier, this study purposefully took a broad approach in recruiting participants, but
after conducting the demographic analysis it is clear that this study offers many different directions
for future research to explore. When studying finance professionals, the most prominent factor
found to affect their donation amount was the number of years they had spent working within the
financial sector. Future research should aim to explore this further by only sampling finance
professionals, and using the number of years worked within finance as an independent variable, to
distinguish the experimental groups. This could pinpoint the critical turning period of altruistic
behaviour (if one is found at all). Similarly, feedback also revealed that finance participants felt they
had become more selfish over the years, suggesting they would have previously conducted the task
differently. This alternatively provides inspiration to conduct a longitudinal study. For example, a
longitudinal study could test candidates on their 1st day within the financial sector, and then conduct
a similar dictator game task on these individuals approximately 3years later. 3years is the suggested
time frame since the largest mean difference was found between the <1 and the 1-3 year brackets
(mean difference=1.339). Alternatively, the study can chose to test participants on multiple
occasions within a time frame longer than 3years.
When isolating demographic factors, participants annual income appeared to correlate with their
altruistic nature. Future research could choose to use the income brackets of finance professionals
as the independent variable and scrutinise this further. Additionally, finance professionals generally
earn higher salaries (in relation to other sectors), and tend to deal with large sums of money on a
day-to-day basis. Thus, the 10 used in the dictator game may have appeared insignificant. It would
be interesting for future research to recognise this, and test it further, as many different approaches
can be taken. Such approaches include replicating this study, but using larger sums of money e.g.
10,000 instead of 10, and comparing mean percentage donations. Alternatively, applying the
different amounts used in the dictator game as the independent variable, and comparing the mean
percentage donations of the different experimental groups. Taking a different approach when
narrowing down the participant sample, future studies may choose to focus on comparing specific
41

professional sectors to one another. Some may assume the social sector to be the most altruistic,
whilst others may assume those in the media and broadcasting sector will show less altruistic
behaviour. A large comparative study, sampling participants from a variety of different sectors, may
help develop an altruism continuum scale for sectoral employment.
When scrutinising experimental methodology, this study appeared to limit participants endowment
decision to 1 increments, in the dictator game task. Through analysing percentage allocations from
the scenario, participants were found to exercise their unrestricted opportunity to use 5%
increments (e.g. allocating 25%). Similarly future research can implement this into the dictator game
task by supplying 50p coins, rather than 1 coins, thereby allowing participants a greater range of
donation choice. When examining the scenario, both experimental groups displayed lower levels of
perceived altruism, than the actual altruistic behaviour they later exhibited. Apart from the
previously mentioned influential possibilities, questions are raised as to whether participants lacked
empathetic concern due to their recipient being described as Candidate Z. Would participants have
empathised more with the scenario if Candidate Z was given a randomly identifiable name? If so,
would this have resulted in a higher percentage allocation? Future research could test this by
replacing Candidate Z with a well recognisable name, and comparing the results of perceived
altruism. Extending this concept of perceived altruism, future research could also look to compare
perceived and actual altruism levels on a deeper level. As this comparison was not the main focus of
this study, only a basic comparison was drawn upon.
Finally, this article proposes that only using dictator game experiments to test altruism is a limitation
in itself. The majority of altruism literature implements the dictator game as its method of collecting
results, but this study raises concerns about the dictator games content validity. Although monetary
donations are identified as a form of altruistic behaviour with the dictator game demonstrating
this form very well it does not define, nor encompass all aspects of altruism. As a result, this form
of testing should not be used to such a disproportional amount. Future research could gain better

42

insight by investigating other acts of altruism (incorporating relevant observations or testing), and
possibly combining/comparing this with dictator game results. While researchers such as Oliner
(2002) and Smolenska and Reykowski (1992) investigated altruism without implementing the
dictator game experiment, their results are limited by the extremity of the setting, since results were
based on individuals that rescued others during the holocaust. Distinctions however, should be
made between altruism and other helpful or self-sacrificial behaviour, as not all grand acts of
heroism may be purely altruistic (Mattis, et al,. 2009).

43

7. Conclusion
Against the homo economicus concept, this study aimed to capture levels of pure altruism by using
the experiments complete anonymity to limit any identification, affection or gratitude from the
recipient, due to the potential benefits this may give the dictator. Moreover, it experimentally
compared levels of pure altruism (as well as perceived altruism) between finance and non-finance
professionals. As expected, findings revealed finance professionals to be less altruistic than nonfinance professionals, with factors such as income, gender, and years worked within finance
impacting donation decisions.
This study opposes the homo economicus concept, derived from economic theory, and instead
proposes that human nature is better illustrated by mile Durkheims more developed homo duplex
model. This model is able to encompass both the selfish and altruistic nature of humans, by
suggesting individuals move back and forth between 2 levels/phases. The individual state, and the
collective state. Originally developed in 1915, this model may initially appear outdated; however
Ehrenreich (2006) and Kluver et al. (2014) explain how homo duplex applies to modern society and
the corporate world. While the individual lower state refers to ordinary experiences, with one
pursuing their own goals, it recognises humans have social emotions that connect them with others,
whilst acknowledging these cultivated relations will essentially be beneficial to the individual in the
long-run. The collectivist state manifests through relationships, binding the individual to the social
entity as a whole. These 2 states are interlinked by uppers and downers, which symbolises contexts,
activities, or behaviours that initiate the change in state (Kluver, et al., 2014). Kluver et al. (2014,
pp.152-153) then continue to explain how corporate organisations facilitate level changes through
team building retreats, parties, and encouraging cohesion both in and out of work, which in turn
enhances altruism and compassion. This model takes a social approach to altruism, suggesting that
behaviour is influenced by its social environment.

44

This current study contributes to the field of altruism by beginning comparative investigations of
altruistic behaviour through professional sectors, creating a path for other researchers to further
analyse, examine and compare sectoral employment, along with their demographic variations. This is
beneficial to the world of altruism literature in a variety of different directions. For example
identifying which sectors have the highest/lowest amount of altruistic employees, or discovering a
cause and effect relationship between altruistic nature and an individuals long-term line of work etc.
Specifically to the financial industry, this research can provide valuable insight into the nature of
finance professionals, as well as aid in attributing contributing factors and explanations for deviant
behaviours they may display (e.g. taking unnecessary risks in order to gain larger bonuses, at the
possible expense of their clients fund). Furthermore, this study concludes to disagree with De
Bondts (2008), financial theory of beautiful people. The altruistic behaviour displayed across both
experimental groups suggests that individuals do not always strive for utility maximisation, or act in a
perfectly rational manner.

45

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Cordes, J. J. (2011). Re-thinking the deductions for charitable contributions: Evaluating the
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DeScioli, P., and Krishna, S. (2012). Giving to whom? Altruism in different types of relationships.
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Draguns, J. G., 2013. Altruism in Its Personal, Social, and Cultural Contexts: An Introduction. In:
D. A. Vakoch, ed. 2013. Altruism in cross-cultural perspective. New York: Springer. pp.1-16

Eckel, C., and Grossman, P. J. (1996). Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games. Games and
Economic Behaviour. 16(2), pp.181-191.

Eckel, C., and Grossman, P. J. (1998). Are women less selfish than men? Evidence from dictator
experiments. The Economic Journal. 108, pp.726-735.

Fiske, A. P. (1992). The four elementary forms of sociality: Framework for a unified theory of
social relations. Psychological Review. 99, pp.689723.

Frank, R. H. (1987). If Homo Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility Function, Would He Want
One with a Conscience? The American Economic Review. 77(4). pp. 593-604

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Henrich, J., Boyd, E., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gentis, H., and McElreath, R. (2001). In
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Hoffman, EMcCabe, K., and Smith, V. (1996). Social distance and other regarding behaviour in
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Jakiela, P. (2013). Equity vs. efficiency vs. self-interest: on the use of dictator games to measure
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heuristicus, and homo duplex. Organisational Behaviour and Human Decision Process. 123.
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Mattis, J. S., Hammound, W. P., Grayman, N., Bonacci, M., Brennan, W., Cowie, S.,
Ladyzhenskaya, L., and So. S. (2009). The social production of altruism: Motivation for caring
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Wilson, E. O., 1978. On Human Nature. New York: Bantam

51

9. Appendices
Appendix A Information Sheet

INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS

REC Reference Number: KCL/13/14- 1058
Title of study
The effect of culture and personality in the alternative ways stress is handled in the work place.
Invitation
I would like to invite you to take part in this study, which will form the basis of my postgraduate MSc
research project. Your participation is completely voluntary, so please be advised that refusal to take
part will not disadvantage you in any form (be it social or professional). To gain further information
on this study, please take the time to read below, and feel free to ask me any questions if you are in
need of further clarity.
What is the purpose of the study?
This study aims to uncover whether personality and culture have an effect on the way stress is
handled in the work place. Findings of this research can add greatly to this field of research, as it can
lead to better understanding of how stress is handled, and therefore lead to better solutions. This
research will also be comparing averaged results from a variety of different working sectors to
examine whether employees ways of handling stress differ between sectors.
Why have I been invited to take part?
This research aims to sample from a large population, as variety of working sectors, personality
types and cultural backgrounds are necessary. As to not cause any sampling biases, participants are
randomly selected from each of the different sectors being studied.
Do I have to take part?
No. Participation is completely voluntary, and you should only take part if it is your desire to do so.
Participation is completely anonymous; none of your personal details (e.g. name or phone number)
are required. You also have the right to withdraw your data during or after participating, if you no
longer wish to be part of the study until 15/08/2014.
What will happen to me if I take part?
If you still wish to take part after reading this information sheet, you will be asked to sign a consent
form and we will proceed with the study. The study is split into 3 sections. The 1st section is a short
interview asking a mixture of closed and open ended questions. For the 2nd section, after reading a
short explanation, the interviewer will step out of the room as this section involves a stress inducing
practical task that must be conducted individually. The interviewer will then rejoin the participant
52

for the 3rd section for another short interview simply asking some demographic questions. Overall,
this study should take approximately 15mins.
What are the possible risks of taking part?
Depending on the length of time each participant takes to complete the 2nd section of the study,
there might be slight delay in the length in time the study takes.
Will my taking part be kept confidential?
Upon analysis all data is completely anonymous, so the participant can NOT be linked to their data at
any given time. All information provided will be kept completely private and confidential.
How is the project being funded?
This research project is being Self-funded
What will happen to the results of the study?
All data will be averaged to see a general trend and then compared accordingly. These results will
then used in my final report. Should you wish to read a copy of the final report, it can be sent out to
you upon request.
Who should I contact for further information?
If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact me using the
following contact details:
Name: Hiwot Alemayehu
Email: Hiwot.alemayehu@kcl.ac.uk

What if I have further questions, or if something goes wrong?

If this study has harmed you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the conduct of the
study you can contact King's College London using the details below for further advice and
information:
Alex Preda
Dept. of Management
King's College London
Franklin-Wilkins Building
150 Stamford Road
London SE1 9NH
Tel. 0207-848-4553
Email: alexandru.preda@kcl.ac.uk
Thank you for reading this information sheet and for considering taking part in this research.
53

Appendix B Consent form

CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS IN RESEARCH STUDIES

Please complete this form after you have read the Information
Sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.
Title of Study: Altruism in the Financial Sector

Kings College Research Ethics Committee Ref: KCL/13/14- 1058

Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research
must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions
arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the
researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent
Form to keep and refer to at any time.

I confirm that I understand that by ticking/initialling each box I am consenting to this

element of the study. I understand that it will be assumed that unticked/initialled
boxes mean that I DO NOT consent to that part of the study. I understand that by not
giving consent for any one element I may be deemed ineligible for the study.

Please tick
or initial

Please tick
or initial

1. *I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated [INSERT
DATE AND VERSION NUMBER] for the above study. I have had the opportunity
to consider the information and asked questions which have been answered
satisfactorily.
2. *I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw
at any time without giving any reason. Furthermore, I understand that I will be
able to withdraw my data up to 15th August 2014.
3. *I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes
explained to me. I understand that such information will be handled in
accordance with the terms of the UK Data Protection Act 1998.

54

4. *I understand that my information may be subject to review by responsible

individuals from the College for monitoring and audit purposes.
5. I understand that confidentiality and anonymity will be maintained and it will
not be possible to identify me in any publications

6. I agree that the research team may use my data for future research and understand
that any such use of identifiable data would be reviewed and approved by a research
ethics committee. (In such cases, as with this project, data would/would not be
identifiable in any report).
7. I understand that the information I have submitted will be published as a report and I
wish to receive a copy of it.

8. I agree NOT to discuss the details of the interview, and the individual task.

__________________

__________________

Name of Participant

Date

__________________

__________________

Name of Researcher

Date

_________________
Signature

_________________
Signature

55

Appendix C Scenario Sheet

Allocated group: A

Scenario 17:
You, and candidate Z have just been newly employed into your dream roles by company X.
Unfortunately , over the phone, the employer informs you that due to large unexpected budget cuts
in candidate Zs department, the company will be unable to pay candidate Zs sign-on bonus, whilst
you will still be receiving the advertised amount. Candidate Z is yet to be informed.
The employer suggests that if you were willing, they would be open to the suggestion of donating a
percentage of your sign-on bonus to candidate Z, as it is currently unknown for what period of time
candidate Zs department will be in this stage of difficulty. However the employer then stipulates
that if you were to agree to this, the donation would be made anonymous, and should candidate Z
decide to stay on this role, you can never tell them that their sign-on bonus was a donation from
you. It will simply appear to be a sign-on bonus paid by company X.
The employer then assures you that this is by no means obligatory, and guarantees that your
decision will not affect your position at the company, as this was an informal conversation, off the
record.

Question:
Would you be willing to donate a percentage of your sign-on bonus?

Yes

No

If yes, please state the percentage...................................................................

56

Appendix D Dictator Game Task

Similarly, the participant conducting scenario 17, in group B, has not been given cash for their
participation.
If you are willing to anonymously donate some of the cash in your large white envelope for this
random participant, please place it into the small brown envelope. Please note that this is not
compulsory.
Whether you have given away all of your participation cash, part of it, or none of it, please place this
brown envelope inside the box at the back of the room.
You must also make sure to keep your decision anonymous from the interviewer in the 3rd part of
the study, and be sure to keep your remaining participation cash in the original white envelope, so
the interviewer is unaware of your decision.

57

Appendix E Full Interviewer Script

Introduction & Disso Details

Ask for the number on the envelope they have chosen and note it down
Hello my name is Hiwot Alemayehu and I am currently undergoing an MSc at KCL. Thank you
for agreeing to participate in this study.
My dissertation aims to capture the effect of culture and personality in the alternative
ways stress is handled in the work place.
I will be conducting this study in an identical manner within different working sectors, on 8
different occasions, with 80 different participants.

Study details
This study will be conducted in 3 parts:
o Part 1: Brief interview, conducted by interviewer (me)
o Part 2: Practical section, conducted individually. Enclosed within this envelope is
cash for task participation, and a scenario you must read in order to progress to the
3rd part of the study
o Part 3: Demographic questions for analytical purposes, conducted by interviewer
(me).

58

PART 1 - Interview
1. Which professional sector do you work in?
..............................................................................................................................
2. How many years have you been working within this sector?

<1

1-3

3-5

5-8

8-11

<11

3. Are you British born?

Yes

No

If No, how many years have you resided here? .....................................

4. Which culture would you say you were influenced by most?

British

Native

How so?
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
5. What is the highest level of your parents educational background?
Mother: ....................................................................................................
Father: ......................................................................................................

59

6. Out of a selection of low/medium/high, what levels of stress would you associate working
within your sector to?

Low

Medium

High

Please explain your choice:

..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
7. Which industry of work would you associate the LOWEST levels of stress with? And why?
Selection:..................................................................................................................................................
Explanation:..............................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
8. Which industry of work would you associate the HIGHEST levels of stress with? And why?
Selection:..................................................................................................................................................
Explanation:..............................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
..................................................................................................................................................................
9. When feeling stressed at work, do you conceal your stress and let it build up inside you, or
release it straight away? (e.g. crying, speaking to someone about it, making more plans/todo lists, shouting at someone releasing it in a form of anger etc).
..................................................................................................................................................................

60

10. When feeling stressed whilst still in the office, what is a common thing you do to destress?
..................................................................................................................................................................
11. Different types of exercise are commonly suggested as forms of reducing stress. Do you do
any kinds of exercise? If so which ones? And how often weekly?
Exercises:..................................................................................................................................................
Weekly?....................................................................................................................................................

PART 2 Scenario & Task

This is the individual practical section. As mentioned at the beginning, you will find a
scenario in the envelope that you must read in order to finalise the 2nd part of the study.
Please do not open the smaller brown envelope inside until you have completed the
scenario in the white envelope 1st.
In total there are 40 different challenging tasks, and each envelope randomly contains 1 of
those tasks inside. Although the 40 tasks differ in nature, they all induce the same level of
stress.
It should be noted that as there are only 40 tasks, and 80 participants, each task will be
performed twice by two different people. Therefore each paired task, (and hence each
participant) is allocated to be in either group A or group B (this allocation is found at the top
of the scenario sheet)
In order to ensure complete anonymity, the random scenario allocation was conducted by
an independent adjudicator, and was not made note of. Therefore I, nor anyone else, is
aware of which task is contained within which envelope.
I will now leave the room to allow you to conduct the task individually.
When you have completed the task pop your head out the door so we can continue with the
3rd and final part of the task.

61

PART 3 Demographic Questionnaire

Age

20-25

26-31

32-37

38-43

44-49

50+

Gender

Male

Female

Ethnicity
White

British

Irish

Other

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Black or Black British

African

Caribbean

Other

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Asian or Asian British

Indian

Pakistani

Bangladeshi

Chinese

Other

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Arab

62

Mixed/Multiple Ethnic Backgrounds

White & Black

African

White & Black

Caribbean

White &
Asian

Other mixed
background

If other, please specify ..............................................................

Other

Please specify...................................................................................................................................

Highest Educational level

GCSE

A-Level

Bachelors

Masters

PHD

Area of study? ...................................................................................................

Income bracket ()

<20,000

20,000-30,000

30,001-40,000

40,001-50,000

>50,000

**FINAL QUESTIONS**
12. On a scale of 1-10, how well do you think this study measured stress, culture and
personality?
.................................
13. What did this study measure best?
..................................................................................................................................................................

63

Appendix F Debrief

Altruism in the financial sector

Thank you for your participation in todays study. Please read the following in order to gain a clearer
perspective on the purpose of this study.
This study aims to examine true altruism, and more specifically, explore whether a difference exists
between the altruistic behaviour of those who do, and do not, work within the financial sector.
Although there is currently a vast amount of research on altruism, it has never been investigated in
direct relation to an individuals profession. The financial sector was specifically investigated due to
the perception of finance professionals having individualist mentalities. This comparative
investigation of altruistic behaviour is an important addition to current research, as results may
either support or contradict the benchmark economic theory of human behaviour. This is significant
for finance as much of its roots also implements this theory (e.g. Efficient Market Hypothesis),
modelling individuals as rational decision makers who preserve self-interest. This clearly contradicts
the mere existence of altruism.
For the purposes of this study, the 80 participants were split into 2 groups of 40. 1 group consisted
of professionals working within the financial sector, and the 2nd group, of individuals without an
educational or professional background within finance. Due to the imperative need to collect
unbiased results, the true nature of the study was not revealed. It was essential to this study that
the data collected reflected levels of true altruism, as opposed to collecting data of modified
behaviour with participants striving for social desirability.
All participants were also given the same scenario and practical task to read and complete for the
individual part of the study. This study will analyse altruistic behaviour using results from the
amount you may/may not have donated to the anonymous participant, in the individual practical
task. Please be assured that the purpose of this study is not to embarrass you, or cause you any
psychological harm, but simply to increase the validity of the collected data.
I want to reassure you that all of the information and data collected today is completely anonymous
and confidential, and there will be no way of identifying your individual responses. This study is NOT
interested in individual responses, as data from each group must be averaged in order to conduct
the comparison. However if you feel uncomfortable about the use of your anonymous data, you
have the right to withdraw your results until 15/08/2014.
As to not confound results, please refrain from discussing any details of this study, or your
experience as a participant, with anybody until after 15/08/2014.
Once again, your participation today is greatly appreciated, and will be of great aid within this
investigation of altruism. If you have further questions about the study, wish to know more about
the current research on altruism, or seek counselling due to psychological distress after
participation; please do not hesitate to contact me at hiwot.alemayehu@kcl.ac.uk

Many thanks,
Hiwot Alemayehu
64

Appendix G Ethical Approval form

Research Ethics Office

King's College London
Rm 5.2 FWB (Waterloo Bridge Wing)
Stamford Street
London
SE1 9NH
4 August 2014
TO: Hiwot Alemayehu
SUBJECT: Approval of ethics application

Dear Hiwot,

KCL/13/14-1058 - Altruism in the Financial Sector

I am pleased to inform you that full approval for your project has been granted by the E&M Research
Ethics Panel. Any specific conditions of approval are laid out at the end of this letter which should be
followed in addition to the standard terms and conditions of approval, to be overseen by your
Supervisor:
o Ethical approval is granted for a period of one year from 4 August 2014. You will not receive a
reminder that your approval is about to lapse so it is your responsibility to apply for an
extension prior to the project lapsing if you need one (see below for instructions).
o You should report any untoward events or unforeseen ethical problems arising from the project
to the panel Chairman within a week of the occurrence. Information about the panel may be
accessed at:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/committees/sshl/reps/index.aspx
o If you wish to change your project or request an extension of approval, please complete the
Modification Proforma. A signed hard copy of this should be submitted to the Research Ethics
Office, along with an electronic version to crec-lowrisk@kcl.ac.uk . Please be sure to quote
your low risk reference number on all correspondence. Details of how to fill a modification
request can be found at:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/innovation/research/support/ethics/applications/modifications.aspx
o All research should be conducted in accordance with the Kings College London Guidelines on
Good Practice in Academic Research available at:
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/iop/research/office/help/Assets/good20practice20Sept200920FINAL.pdf

65

If you require signed confirmation of your approval please email crec-lowrisk@kcl.ac.uk indicating why
it is required and the address you would like it to be sent to.
Please would you also note that we may, for the purposes of audit, contact you from time to time to
ascertain the status of your research.
We wish you every success with this work.
With best wishes
Annah Whyton Research Support Assistant
On behalf of
E&M REP Reviewer

66

Appendix H Data: Altruism (Dictator game task)

67

Appendix I Date: Gender Differences

68

Appendix J Data: Age differences

69

70

Appendix K Data: Income Differences

71

Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:
Donation
Tukey HSD

(I) Income
1

Mean
Difference (IJ)

Std. Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

1.300

.701

.360

-.72

3.32

2.056

.716

.050

.00

4.11

2.250

.733

.032

.14

4.36

3.071

.755

.002

.90

5.24

-1.300

.701

.360

-3.32

.72

.756

.624

.745

-1.04

2.55

.950

.644

.585

-.90

2.80

1.771

.669

.083

-.15

3.70

-2.056

.716

.050

-4.11

.00

-.756

.624

.745

-2.55

1.04

.194

.660

.998

-1.70

2.09

1.016

.684

.579

-.95

2.98

-2.250 *

.733

.032

-4.36

-.14

-.950

.644

.585

-2.80

.90

-.194

.660

.998

-2.09

1.70

.821

.703

.769

-1.20

2.84

-3.071

.755

.002

-5.24

-.90

-1.771

.669

.083

-3.70

.15

-1.016

.684

.579

-2.98

.95

-.821
.703
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

.769

-2.84

1.20

72

73

Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:
Donation
Tukey HSD
Mean
Difference (IJ)

(I) Income
1

Std. Error

Sig.

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

.450

.493

.890

-.97

1.87

1.050

.493

.230

-.37

2.47

1.350

.612

.202

-.41

3.11

2.083

.743

.059

-.05

4.22

-.450

.493

.890

-1.87

.97

.600

.514

.770

-.88

2.08

.900

.630

.614

-.91

2.71

1.633

.757

.220

-.54

3.81

-1.050

.493

.230

-2.47

.37

-.600

.514

.770

-2.08

.88

.300

.630

.989

-1.51

2.11

1.033

.757

.654

-1.14

3.21

-1.350

.612

.202

-3.11

.41

-.900

.630

.614

-2.71

.91

-.300

.630

.989

-2.11

1.51

.733

.840

.905

-1.68

3.15

-2.083

.743

.059

-4.22

.05

-1.633

.757

.220

-3.81

.54

-1.033

.757

.654

-3.21

1.14

-.733

.840

.905

-3.15

1.68

74

75

76

Appendix L Data: Years worked within the financial sector

77

Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:
Donation
Tukey HSD

(I) Years in Finance

1
2

.641

.317

-.60

3.27

2.314

.725

.033

.12

4.50

2.548

.689

.009

.47

4.63

3.000

.662

.001

1.00

5.00

3.000

.662

.001

1.00

5.00

4
5

Sig.

1.339

Mean
Difference
(I-J)
Std. Error

95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound

-1.339

.641

.317

-3.27

.60

.975

.706

.738

-1.16

3.11

1.208

.669

.476

-.81

3.23

-.27

3.60

1.661

.641

.128

1.661

.641

.128

-.27

3.60

-2.314

.725

.033

-4.50

-.12

-.975

.706

.738

-3.11

1.16

.233

.750

1.000

-2.03

2.50

.686

.725

.932

-1.50

2.88

.686

.725

.932

-1.50

2.88

-2.548

.689

.009

-4.63

-.47

-1.208

.669

.476

-3.23

.81

-.233

.750

1.000

-2.50

2.03

.452

.689

.985

-1.63

2.53

.452

.689

.985

-1.63

2.53

-3.000

.662

.001

-5.00

-1.00

-1.661

.641

.128

-3.60

.27

-.686

.725

.932

-2.88

1.50

-.452

.689

.985

-2.53

1.63

0.000

.662

1.000

-2.00

2.00

-3.000

.662

.001

-5.00

-1.00

-1.661

.641

.128

-3.60

.27

-.686

.725

.932

-2.88

1.50

-.452

.689

.985

-2.53

1.63

0.000

.662

1.000

-2.00

2.00

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

78

Appendix M Data: Perceived Altruism (Scenario)

79

Appendix N Data: Actual vs. Perceived Altruism

80