Theological Series
12
THEOLOGY
AS ANTHROPOLOG Y
Philosophical Reflections on Religion
by
William A.1.Pi.lpen
200'.1
72-90638
ISBN 0-391-00311-9
First Printing
Manufactured in the United States of America
CONTENTS
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
.1
PREFACE
:.0:.
J. Koren
INTRODUCTION
13
14
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
15
16
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
17
petrified through lack of critique and continues to prolong its existence while history goes forward, it can
become a deed of violence against the authenticity of
life. If history puts up with this, life loses its authentic
character.
Lack of critique, I said, could lead to this, but perhaps it is better now to use the expression "explicit
critique." For implicit rationality itself also is critical
because it implies "nihilation" and "distance" (Sartre).
But the attitude of explicit critique deliberately puts
itself at a distance, so that there is a better chance of
making the "distinctions" at which the critique aims.
Because the authenticity of religious life is not guaranteed and because the explicitly critical attitude is
eminently suitable to "distinguish" the authentic from
the inauthentic, second-ranking explicit rationality also
enjoys a measure of importance. That's why it can be
meaningful to offer the reflections contained in this
work to the reader, but only if they help to improve the
authenticity of life.
18
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY
AND THE
"AFFIRMATION" OF GOD
21
22
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
23
24
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
Rudolf Carnap
The implication of all this is a condemnation of
metaphysics. Metaphysical statements are not meaningful statements but a misuse of language. According to
Carnap, metaphysics refuses to view its judgments as
analytic-a view that would make them meaningful.
Metaphysics ascribes to itself the task of discovering and
stating knowledge which lies beyond the domain of the
empirical sciences. 1o But, as we saw, the meaning of a
statement lies in the method of its verification; a statement asserts only as much as can be verified. Since,
then, metaphysics doesn't wish to make analytic judgments and holds that its statements cannot be verified
by the empirical sciences, it follows that its judgments
are nothing but pseudo-judgments. 11
The word "God" also is a pseudo-word. Used in a
metaphysical sense, it refers to something beyond the
empirical; therefore it is meaningless. 12 Even the first
9. Nuchelmans, op. cit., p. 134.
10. "Because metaphysics neither wishes to state analytical sentences
nor get involved in the realm of empirical science .... " Carnap, op. cit., p.
236.
11. Carnap, op. cit., p. 236.
12. Carnap, op. cit., p. 226.
25
26
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
27
Ayer
Similar considerations can be found in the work of A.
28
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
29
For Ayer this means that agnosticism also is untenable. The agnostic claims that he doesn't have any way to
decide which of the two propositions, "There is a transcendent God" and "There is no transcendent God," is
true. He holds that one of these two assertions is true,
but doesn't know which one. He should realize, however, that both are meaningless, that the question, True or
false?, cannot possibly be asked. Only if deities are
identified with objects of nature can meaningful statements be made about them. If, e.g., someone asserts
that the occurrence of thunderstorms is necessary and
sufficient to verify the truth of the statement that
Yahweh is angry, his statement is meaningful because he
doesn't affirm anything else than that there is a thunderstorm. 29 "Sophisticated religions," however, assume
that a "Person" controls the empirical world without
being localized in it. That "Person" is deemed to be
"higher" than the empirical world and is placed outside
26. Ayer, op. cit., p. 115.
27. " But in that case the term 'god' is a m etnphysicnl term. And jf
'god' is a metaphysical term, then it ennno r be even probabl e that god
exists. For to say that 'God exists' is to make a mcmphysical un:cr!l''''e
which cannot be either true or false." Aye .. , op. cit., p. ~i5.
28. Ayer, op. cit., pp. 115-116.
29. Ayer, op. cit., p. 116.
30
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
116.
31. Ayer, op. cit., p. 118.
31
Ayer, op.
Ayer, op.
Ayer, op.
Ayer,op.
cit.,
cit.,
cit.,
cit.,
pp. 118-119.
p. 119.
p. 119.
p. 120.
32
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
33
Let us begin with 'a parable, says Flew and he paraphrazes a story borrowed from John Wisdom. Once
upon a time there were two explorers, who deep in the
jungle suddenly came face to face with a beautiful
garden. The first explorer then says: "A gardener must
have been at work here," but his companion denies this.
To settle the issue, they put electrically charged barbed
wire around the garden and patrol it with blood hounds.
But no gardener shows himself, no cry betrays a gardener who got entangled in the barbed wire, the
electric current is useless, and the blood hounds do not
react. The "believing" explorer, however, fails to be
convinced. He simply claims that the gardener is invisible because he has no body; that's why the charged wire
and the barbs are to no avail. And being odorless, there
is nothing by which the blood hounds can smell him.
Driven to despair, his sceptical companion exclaims:
"But what remains in all this of your original claim?
What's the difference between your invisible, incorporeal and odorless gardener and my 'no gardener'?"41
According to Flew, theological speaking is always like
the speaking of the above-mentioned "believing" explorer. Statements such as "God intends," "God created
the world" and "God loves us as a father loves his
children" seem to be conceived by theologians as assertions.42 Now, one who asserts that this or that is so
41. Anthony Flew, "Theology and Falsification," New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. by A. Flew and A. MacIntyre, London, 1958, p. 96.
42. Flew, op. cit., p. 97.
34
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
must also deny that this or that is not so. Thus one who
doubts whether this or that is so will look for instances
which could contradict his assertion. But in the preceding parable, as in theological discourse, it turns out to be
impossible to conceive anything at all that could falsify
the above-mentioned assertions. When no gardener
shows himself, he is called "invisible." When God's love
doesn't take action when a beloved and innocent child is
dying, his love is said to be "beyond human measurement" or "unfathomable." Statements, however, which
simply cannot be falsified do not affirm anything and
are not really assertions at al1. 43 They die from the
"thousand qualifications" added to them because with
all these qualifications they ultimately no longer assert
anything. 44 If any state of affairs can be harmonized
with a certain affirmation, then this affirmation no
longer says anything and is no longer a real affirmation.
Flew later recognized that he had not done justice to
the theologian's discourse. He had presented matters as
if the theologian did not conceive suffering as a fact
arguing against the truth of the statement, "God loves
man." But B. Mitchell pointed out to Flew that he was
wrong on this score. The irreconcilability of suffering
with God's love "generates the most intractable of theological problems. "45
Flew now grants that he had disregarded the theologian's attempt to find an explanation of suffering which
does not contradict the affirmation of God's love. But,
he adds, the attributes which the theologian ascribes to
43. "And if there is nothing which a putative assertion denies then
there is nothing which it asserts either: and so it is not really an assertion."
Flew, op. cit., p. 98.
44. Flew, op. cit., p. 97.
45. B. Mitchell in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, p. 103.
35
God are of such a nature that every explanation becomes impossible. One cannot say that God would like
to help the sufferer but is unable to do this, for "God is
allmighty"; or that he would help if only he knew, for
"God knows everything"; or that God is not responsible
for the evil of the others, for "God has created the
others." The divine attributes make every explanation
impossible; that's why the theologian is forced to take
refuge in the "thousand qualifications" which totally
wreck his original assertion. 46
Hare
Richard M. Hare has replied to Flew by telling a
parable of his own. A certain lunatic student, he relates,
is convinced that all of the dons intend to murder him.
His friends introduce him to the most amiable and
respectable dons in an effort to cure him from his
illusion. They point out to him that so much friendliness surely indicates that he must be mistaken about
their intentions in thinking that they want to murder
him. But to no avail; he cannot be convinced. All that
friendliness, he says, simply is a part of their diabolical
cunning. 47
We say, argues Hare, that such a student is mentally
deluded. But deluded with respect to what? The truth
or falsity of an affirmation? According to Flew's view,
applied to the student's assertion, his affirmation
46. "So though I entirely. concede that Mitchell was absolutely right to
insist against me that the theologian's first move is to look for an explana
tion, I still think that in the end, if relentlessly pursued, he will have to
resort to the avoiding action of qualification. And there lies the danger of
that death by a thousand qualifications." Flew, op. cit., p. 107.
47. Richard Hare in New Essays . .. , pp. 99-100.
36
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
37
another one. For one who claims that everything happens by pure chance can never explain or predict anything. This is the kind of difference that exists, says
Hare, between people who believe in God and those
who don't. 51
Flew could only reply weakly to Hare's criticism. He
claims that Hare should not call himself a genuine Christian if he does not admit that theological statements
really intend to be assertions and views them merely as
expressions of a "blik."52 According to Flew, theological statements do intend to affirm that this or that is
really the case. But since such affirmations can never be
falsified, they have no meaning.
In the preceding pages we have seen examples in
which all speaking "about" God is rejected on the
ground that such speaking cannot be verified or falsified. Among the older representatives of analytic philosophy, however, there are also some who think that this
philosophy can decisively and definitively prove that
God does not exist. J.N. Findlay offers us an example. 53
Findlay
.'
38
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
39
Findlay,op.
Findlay,op.
Findlay, op.
Findlay, op.
cit.,
cit.,
cit.,
cit.,
p.
p.
p.
p.
52.
53.
54.
55.
40
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
41
to distinguish the cognitively meaningless use of language from its cognitively meaningful use. The question
arising here was where to find the criterion by which
one could establish the criterion separating meaningful
and meaningless uses of language. For it turned out that
in the attempts to answer this question one always made
a choice. Let us give an example.
Ayer makes a distinction between the "strong" and
the "weak" sense of verifiability. A statement is verifiable in the strong sense if-and only if-the truth of this
statement can be decisively and conclusively established
in experience. 64 The opposite of this conclusive verifiability is verifiability in the weak sense, for which it
suffices that it is possible for experience to render it
probable. 65 Ayer rejects the demand of conclusive verifiability because of the consequences flowing from such
a demand. For it would imply that general scientific
statements such as "arsenic is poisonous" and statements about the remote past must be called meaningless. Since the series of observations by which these
statements must be verified is unavoidably finite, their
truth can never be decisively and conclusively established. 66
It is rather obvious that an option is involved here.
General scientific statements and statements about the
remote past apparently must not be allowed to be
meaningless. But why not? And why is a criterion for
the meaningfulness of statements not rejected if it eliminates metaphysical statements? Metaphysical propositions apparently must not be allowed to be meaning64. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. 37.
65. Ayer, op. cit., p. 37.
66. Ayer, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
42
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
43
And speaking about the "first step of all philosophizing," Schlick says:
The first step of all philosophizing and the foundation of
all reflection is to realize that it is utterly impossible to
indicate the meaning of any assertion whatsoever in any
other way than by describing the state of affairs that must
exist if the assertion should be true. If this state does not
exist, then the assertion is false. For the meaning of an
assertion obviously lies only in this that it expresses a
certain state of affairs. One must precisely indicate this
state of affairs to indicate the meaning of the assertion.
True, one can say that the proposition itself already indicates this state of affairs, but this is so only for one who
70. Edmund Husserl, Ideas, Collier ed., 1962, p. 83.
71. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, New York, p. 51.
72. Husserl, Ideas, p. 83.
44
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
understands the proposition. When, however, do I understand a proposition? When I know the meaning of the
words occurring in it? This meaning can be clarified by
definitions. But in these definitions new words occur and I
must again know their meaning. One cannot go on to
infinity in defining; sooner or later we arrive at words the
meaning of which cannot be again described by a proposition. This meaning has to be immediately indicated, the
sense of the word must ultimately be shown, it must be
given. This is done by an act of pointing, of showing, and
what is shown must be given, for otherwise it cannot be
pointed out to me. 73
The similarity between phenomenology and analytical philosophy with respect to "the first step of all
philosophizing" is indeed striking. But let us add one
other text of Husserl. In his Logical Investigations he
says:
Evidence is ... nothing but the "experience" (Erlebnis)
of the truth .... The evident judgment ... is a consciousness of originary givenness .... Evidence is called a seeing,
perceiving, grasping of the self-given ("true") state of affairs. 74
45
.I
46
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
47
48
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
49
50
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
51
52
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
out to have been merely pseudo-statements. The philosophers were willing to admit that they had produced
quite a bit of nonsense. Yet this willingness had its
limits; one could also go too far in reducing statements
to pseudo-statements. 97 Thus they began to ask themselves whether those statements so lightheartedly reduced to pseudo-statements were really intended to be
statements in the sense of "straightforward information
about facts."98 Is this really the case, for instance, in
ethical propositions?
These reflections led Austin to make a distinction
between "constative" and "performative" sentences. 99
Performative utterances look like constative sentences
or descriptions of states of affairs, but this is not at all
what they are. Austin gives several examples of performative utterances: "I do take this woman to be my
lawful wedded wife," "I name this ship the Queen
Elizabeth," "I give and bequeath my watch to my
brother," "I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow." 100 In such sentences I do not describe what I am
doing, but I do what I am saying in it. 101 If I say, "I
promise it to you," I do not give an external description
of an internal act, but my act of speaking itself is the
promise. 102
A certain manner of speaking, then, is itself doing
something, and the term "performative language" aptly
expresses this. That's why performative language is not,
like constative language, either true or false. This cannot
97. Austin, op. cit., p. 2.
98. Austin, op. cit., p. 2.
~9. Austin, op. cit., pp. 2-7.
100. Austin, op. cit., p. 5.
1Ol. Austin, op. cit., p. 6.
102. Austin,op. cit., pp. 9-11, 13.
53
be proved-just as it cannot be proved that the expression "Damn!" is true or false. 103
Nevertheless, all kinds of things can be wrong with
performative language. 104 A performative utterance
such as "I appoint you Secretary of Defense," is invalid
if I make it. It is an abuse to say, "I promise you that
I'll do it," if I have no intention of doing it. It is
"inconsistent" to tell someone, "I transfer my power to
you," if next I treat him as a usurper of my power. Such
language utterances are not untrue but "unhappy," they
suffer from "infelicities." lOS
At first it may seem that the distinction between
constative and performative acts of speech is watertight
and convincing. But Austin himself later criticized it.
Initially he had thought it possible to call certain acts of
speech exclusively constative and others exclusively performative. This would have meant that the former
would then have been exclusively either true or false
and the latter exclusively either happy and felicitous or
unhappy and infelicitous. Austin, however, discovered
that the infelicities, which at first he had viewed as
characteristic of performative speech, can also be found
in the constative use of language. 106 Constative utterances also can be infected with invalidity, 107 abuse 108
and inconsistency. 109 To limit ourselves to an example
103. Austin, op. cit., p. 6.
104. Nuchelmans, op. cit., pp. 218-226.
105. Austin, op. cit., p. 14.
106. Austin, op. cit., p. 135.
107. Austin,op. cit., pp. 136-137.
108. Austin, op. cit., pp.135-136.
109. "If I have stated something, then that commits me to other
statements: other statements made by me will be in order or out of order.
Also some statements or remarks made by you will be henceforward
contradicting me or not contradicting me, rebutting me or not rebutting
me, and so forth." Austin, op. cit., p. 138.
54
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
5S
56
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
57
58'
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
ments. This situation changed when Wittgenstein introduced his theory of the language games. The mere fact
that a language game is actually played thereby sufficed
to make this game an object of possible investigation,
for the meanings of words and sentences are determined
by their use in a specific context and in all kinds of
particular circumstances. When this principle is accepted, the religious use of language can no longer be
rejected.
Here, however, a crucial question arises, a question
which could shake the importance of the entire analytical philosophy as philosophy down to its very foundation. It is obvious that on the basis of the use principle
of analytical philosophy religious language can no longer
be rejected. But the question is whether such a rejection
is now altogether impossible by the simple fact that it
cannot be based on the use principle of analytical philosophy. If a certain language game is de facto played,
the logic of such a language use can be analyzed. But if I
play the religious language game, does this de facto use
per se imply that it is impossible for anyone to tell me:
"Don't indulge in such nonsense!" to indicate that my
speaking "is about nothing"? The objector knows that
I've read Austin and Evans, that I don't intend to give
"flat descriptions" of God; he knows that I interpret my
speaking as performative, self-involving and expressive,
that I conceive it as adoration, blessing and thanking,
and that I wish to give expression to an attitude and
way of acting by which I intend to commit myself to
God. He knows all this. Nevertheless, does this make it
logically impossible to say: "Don't indulge in this nonsense, for your language speaks about nothing"?
There are analysts who say that this is indeed impossible. No one, they hold, can meaningfully say that there
59
is no God because "God," in the Judeo-Christian language use, means "necessarily existing being." 126 Evans
relates that he has "occasionally encountered" this view
and explicitly ascribes it to Norman Malcolm. 127 Any
attempt to justify or reject a language game in its
totality from a standpoint outside that game would thus
be a logical error. 128 For if people de facto speak in a
particular way, their words have a "use and hence a
meaning"; thus there is no further question as to whether anything real or existing is referred to in the language
game as a whole. 129
Evans rejects this view, which he puts on a par with
Karl Barth's conception of God's word. According to
Barth, God's word is decisive for man's knowledge of
God, because the latter is based on God's word. That's
why this knowledge of God cannot possibly put itself
into question or allow that it be put into question from
any standpoint outside God's word. 130 There simply is
no standpoint from which someone or something can
compete with God's word as the foundation of man's
knowledge of God. 131 There is indeed a striking similarity between Malcolm and Barth in this matter. 132
In our opinion analytical philosophy has reached a
point in its development where its limitations as a philosophy can no longer remain hidden. Logical atomism and
126. EVans, op. cit., p. 23 note 4.
127 . "The only effect (Anselm's ontological argument) could have on
the fool of the Psalm would be that he stopped saying in his heart 'There is
no God', because he would now realize that this is something he cannot
meaningfully say or think." Norman Malcolm, "Anselm's Ontological Ar
guments," The Philosophical Review, vol. 69(1960), p. 61.
128. Evans, op. cit., p. 22.
129. Evans,op. cit., p. 22.
130. Karl .'3arth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, Zurich, 1948, vol. 111, p. 2.
131. Barth, op. cit., p. 2.
132. Evans, op. cit., pp. 2223.
60
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
logical positivism still were ways of metaphysical thinking because, at least implicitly, they contained a certain
conception about "reality" and "truth" as such. But
through the works of the later Wittgenstein the analysis
of "ordinary language" became the focus of attention,
every de facto used language game was accepted as an
object of logical analysis, but the question whether a
particular language game was worth playing fell into the
background. The crucial issue, however, is whether this
question can really stay in the background. Is it really
impossible to say to someone who plays the religious
language game : "Stop that nonsense!"? Certainly not.
But in defense against such an order one cannot be
satisfied by saying that one's speaking is performative,
self-involving and expressive and therefore has a logic of
its own. He will have to justify the use of his language
by showing that it is "about something," and this brings
back the question about "reality" and "truth." 133
Now, the attempt to answer this question is entirely
different from analyzing the logic of the religious language game; it is metaphysics.
The question of "reality" and "truth," we may add,
doesn't adse only in connection with the justification of
the religious language game. If in a particular situation
or in encountering someone I get angry and shout
"Damn!" no one can say that my utterance is untrue.
But it is possible for someone to show that my choice of
language game is not justified-for example, by indicating that I was totally mistaken in my appreciation of the
situation, that the meaning of certain words in that
133. "But the fact that a word has a meaning does not guarantee that
it refers to anything; and the fact that a word has a use does not justify the
use." Evans, op. cit., p. 24.
61
62
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
63
64
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
z.3.
65
66
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
67
160. F. Ferre, Language, Logic and God, New York, 1961, pp.
139-143.
"DINNER IS READY"
- A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY
OF THE
ACT OF FAITH
71
72
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
endeavors to show that the reality underlying his description has collapsed-a point in which some people
will disagree with him. But if I personally were to think
that van de Pol is wrong when he claims that the
conventional Christian reality has collapsed, would I
then not feel unhappy with his description? This I doubt
very much. For the question whether the kind of descriptions given by van de Pol is possible appears to me
to be much more important than the question whether
or not this author is right.
Assuming that the descriptions offered by van de Pol
are not right, would it be possible to find other descriptions which would not make me unhappy? I have already indicated that even the more casual descriptions
offered by Time are not the reason for my unhappiness,
for I am unable simply to reject them; Perhaps, then, my
unhappiness arises from the attempt to offer any description at all, from describing as such. Let us list a few
"points" which occur in the above-mentioned type of
statements about the faith. The Catholic, it is said,
believes that:
God has made heaven and earth;
God is one Nature in three Persons;
Man fell into sin and this sin is still with us;
In Christ there are two natures and one Person;
Christ has redeemed mankind;
The Christian marriage is a sacrament;
Christ will return at the end of time;
Prayer is necessary for salvation;
Saint Joseph never had any sexual relationship with
Mary;
God will punish the sinners, even though they don't
believe it.
"DINNER IS READY"
73
Belief in Statements
Do I really believe all this? I asked myself. The
question was concerned with the judgments, the statements listed above. It is rather obvious, I think, that the
faith must also be talked about if it is to stay alive in the
believing community. The same is true for anything
human. We talk about the fabulous achievements of
football stars and baseball stars and by this very fact
keep their future open for them. If people were to plot
against a particular famous player and abstain from
mentioning him, he would very soon be relegated to the
ranks of mediocre players. By talking about him, on the
other hand, we keep him provisionally on the level of
outstanding players and it is partly because of this that
he is an excellent player.
The fact that being talked about keeps things human
alive manifests itself also on levels of existence which are
"more serious" than that of sports. One who acquires
skills in technology inserts himself in a "course of af-
74
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
"DINNER IS READY"
75
76
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
the question was even asked whether it would be possible to pursue theology without faith. The fact that this
question could be raised eloquently illustrates how impoverished the idea of faith had become. If faith is
nothing but a "yes" to statements, there is no reason to
claim that one cannot act as if he affirms these statements and then draw "theological conclusions" from
them. Theology thus degenerates into a kind of logic,
and faith is no longer a matter of believing in God. 6
"DINNER IS READY"
77
without-man, reality-in-itself, and the intellect was assumed to be in possession of a faithful copy of this
reality.
We will not dwell here on the theories devised to
explain how such "copies of reality" were supposed to
come about but only investigate what the consequences
of the above-mentioned theory of truth are for faith. To
see what these consequences are one need only take
note of what "reality in itself" means: it signifies "reality with which man has, as a matter of principle, nothing
to do." In reference to faith, then, this means that
statements of faith express a reality with which man, as
a matter of principle, has nothing to do. And even if it
were granted that God through his revelation guarantees
the truth of statements of faith, this would not imply
that their truth is important for man, for this truth was
conceived as a mirroring of "reality with which man has
nothing to do." How could God reveal that I have
something to do with things with which I have nothing
to do?
These considerations also show that the Greek idea of
being or reality favored the conception that faith is
primarily a "yes" to statements. For the Greek idea
represented being as being-"divorced"-from-man, as non"affirmed"-being. Thus God also was represented as
God-"divorced"-from-the-affirmation-of-faith, in other
words, as God-in-himself. But how would faith be able
to affirm this God? Such a God could only supply us
with "information" about his essence. And the believer
could then do no more than affirm this "information."
In this way faith must then be conceived as holding
certain judgments or statements to be true because God
guarantees that they are in agreement with the reality-initself of God.
78
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
The way Thomas Aquinas himself evaluated his thinking about the existence of God unintentionally fostered
the view that faith is a "yes" to statements. Thomas was
always profoundly conscious of the unknowability of
God because the God of Christianity is a Transcendent
God. "We are unable to say what God is," he wrote. 9
Any attempt to say something about God is, in his eyes,
an attempt to say what God is not rather than what he
is.IO The question which inevitably arises then is whether it is possible to say that God is. Thomas replies to this
question by pointing out that the term "is" can be used
in two ways: as affirmation of being or reality and as a
verbal copula. As a verbal copula, "is" connects the
subject and the predicate of a judgment or statement.
Now, according to Thomas, "is" cannot be used with
respect to God in the first-named sense, for such a use
would disregard God's transcendence; "is" can be used
only in the second sense. For one who says that God is
intends to affirm that the statement expressing that God
is, is true. 11
Thomas's intentions are clear: he is concerned with
God's transcendence. But the way he safeguards it in his
thinking is so dangerous that only a small step is needed
to arrive at the view that faith is a "yes" to statements
supposedly mirroring God-in-himself. According to Leslie Dewart, Thomas himself took this fatal step.12 Dewart's exegesis of Thomas does not impress me as very
9. "Ergo dicendum quod, licet de Deo non possimus scire quid
est .... " Summa Theologica, p.I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1.
10. Summa contra Gentiles, bk.I, art. 14.
11. "Scimus enim, quod haec propositio quam formamus de Deo cum
dicimus Deus est, vera est." Summa Theol., p. I, q. 3, a.4, ad 2.
12. Leslie Dewart, The Future of Belief, London, 1967, p. 167.
"DINNER IS READY"
79
80
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
Truth as "Event"
"Do I really believe this?"-that was the question I
asked myself when above we spoke of the fact that
other people put before me a series of statements expressing what I believe. And I indicated that I cannot
dismiss the matter with a simple denial. On the other
hand, I feel very unhappy when the others then assume
that I will answer the question with a simple affirmation.
The reason should be evident from the foregoing:
neither the "yes" nor the "no" have any meaning. It
makes no difference whether I reply in the affirmative
or the negative because both the "yes" and the "no" do
18. A de Waelhens, La philosophie et les experiences naturelles, The
Hague, 1961, pp. 48-58.
"DINNER IS READY"
81
19. "Aber indem das 'ist' der Copula iiber alles formale Verbinden
hinaus eben 'ist wirklich so', 'ist wahrhaft so' sagt, enthalt es die Grundauffassung des Menschen iiber Sein als Wirklichkeit und Wahrheit." Max
Miiller, Sein und Geist, Tiibingen, 1940, p. 41.
20. Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, pp. 5-13.
21. Heidegger, Being and Time, New York, 1962, pp. 257-262.
22. Cf. Luijpen, Phenomenology and Metaphysics, p. 100.
82
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
"DINNER IS READY"
83
84
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
"DINNER IS READY"
85
86
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
For otherwise my believing would always remain a "doing as if." My need to pray is a need to pray for
conversion.
"I Don't Care"
"DINNER IS READY"
87
88
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
"DINNER IS READY"
89
.I
90
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
"DINNER IS READY"
!
I
91
92
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
"DINNER IS READY"
93
94
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
Endless "Verification"
To conclude this study, let us finish the "dinner
story" mentioned in the preceding pages. It could be
useful to some people, the "modern people" who like to
"verify" everything. For some of them "verification"
has become a passionate pursuit, they cannot stop doing
it even if it becomes ridiculous.
What can the waiter of the little restaurant which I
entered to verify whether dinner was indeed ready expect when I return to my friends with an "affirmative
description"? That we will come in, of course, to dine.
If we are satisfied with verifying the call and invitation
and do not come in to eat, we cut a sorry figure before
the waiter.
Yet, it seems that today there are many people who
cut such a sorry figure. They keep whipping in and out
of restaurants to verify whether dinner is ready, without
ever sitting down to enjoy a meal. They offer a kind of
apology: they are "modern people." They make use of
"electricity and radio,"44 things which the sciences have
made possible. Therefore, they must devise scientific
models and techniques to verify whether dinner is ready.
While they are busily engaged in animated discussions
about the nature of these models and techniques, they
totally fail to notice that other people are already sitting
down and enjoying the meal.
44. Peter L. Berger, "Een sociologische kijk op de secularisatie van de
thcologie," Wending, vol. 22(1967), p. 441.
THE
HIDDEN GOD
"Lord, I am not trying to invade and pry into Your Majesty, for I do not liken my knowledge to It in the least. But I
long for a glimpse of the truth that is believed and loved by
my heart. " St. Anselm
97
98
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
99
436-437 .
"\ c..
LJUl'UY.
100
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
101
102
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
Heidegger
The above-mentioned ideas derive their inspiration
from Heidegger's thought. For Heidegger developed
Kant's transcendental doctrine of method to greater
depth and made it into what he himself calls the "fundamental analysis of Dasein. "18 Heidegger did not aim,
however, at the question about God but at that about
the meaning of Being (Sein).
Anyone thinks that he knows what Being is, but he
17. Max Miiller, Sein und Geist, Tiibingen, 1940, p. 41.
18. Heidegger, Being and Time, New York, 1962, p. 67 .
103
Heidegger,
Heidegger.
Heidegger.
Heidegger.
Heidegger.
Heidegger.
Heidegger.
op.cit.
op.cit.
op.cit.
op.cit..
op.cit.
op.cit.
op.cit..
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
p.
21.
24.
26.
27.
27.
32.
36.
104
THEOLOGY AN ANTHROPOLOGY
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
105
106
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
equiprimordially also the "letting be" of the other-thanitself. 45 The "event" which truth itself is, is the appearing, the disclosing itself, the unveiling itself of the unconcealed. 46
All this was "forgotten" by traditional metaphysics.
The latter "pro-posed" be-ing, it took be-ing for granted
and acted as if be-ing was true "divorced" from Dasein,
"in itself"; in other words, traditional metaphysics acted
as if nothing had to "happen" for the truth of be-ing
either on the part of the subject or on the part of be-ing.
Thus, according to Heidegger, traditional metaphysics
lived in "forgetfulness of Being" because it stood in the
"natural attitude." This is also the reason why Heidegger demands that, in order to overcome the "forgetfulness of Being," thinking must make the transition from
"pro-posing" thinking to "re-collective" thinking.47 He
also calls "re-collective" thinking "foundational" thinking; unlike "pro-posing" thinking, this is not characterized by the "natural attitude" which claims that the "in
itself" is mirrored in thought. In other words, Heidegger's demand that the "pro-posing of be-ing" be replaced by the "re-collection of being" means that he
wants us to give up the "natural attitude" and to perform the phenomenological reduction.
Heidegger's attention is fully occupied with laying
anew the authentic foundation of thinking. "F oundational thinking" must again think the subject and worldly meaning as the unity of reciprocal implication, with
all the wealth contained therein. One who realizes the
45.
46.
47.
48.
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
Heidegger,
107
necessity of the "step back" and performs the phenomenological reduction in his thinking prefers not to speak
at once about God. 48 What has to be clarified first is
Dasein, existence. But calling the being of man a "beingin-the-world" implies no decision, whether negative or
positive, with respect to man's possible "being toward
God." What the explicitation of being-in-the-world does
is open up the possibility of positing the question about
God in a meaningful way.49 For reflection on the
meaning of Dasein opens the road to reflection on the
"truth of Being." "The truth of Being allows us to think
the "coming to pass" of the holy; the "coming to pass"
of the holy allows us to think the "coming to pass" of
Godhead; and in the light of the "coming to pass" of
Godhead, the meaning of the word "God" can be
thought of and expressed. 50
Reflection on the meaning of Being and the holy, as
preparation for speaking about God, is not for Heidegger at once a form of theistic thinking; it is neither
theistic nor atheistic. This should not be taken to mean
that Heidegger is indifferent toward the theistic or atheistic character of his thinking;51 all it means is that God
cannot be at once spoken about in Heidegger's attempts
to restore "foundational thinking." "We must often
remain silent, for lack of holy names" (Holderin). It is
the poets who are called to voice again the holy and to
prepare for the coming of God. In his poetical naming,
the poet lets the High One himself appear.52 The appearing of God comes about in a dis-closure which
49. Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, Frankfurt a.M., p. 39, n.56.
50. Heidegger, Ueber den Humanismus, pp. 36-37.
51. Heidegger, ibid., p. 37.
52. Heidegger, Erlauterungen zu Holderlins Dichtung, Frankfurt a.M.,
3rd imp., 1963, p. 26.
108
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
109
mation" which existence itself is. In the sentence, however, we find the expression "anything which is notGod." Perhaps we have now reached the stage where we
can return to the original, implicit "affirmation" of that
which is meant by the expression "anything which is
not-God." Let us examine the example given in the
preceding essay, abbreviated somewhat to prevent too
much repetition.
After a hike in the mountains, I can give a series of
statements in which the passable or impassable character
of the trail is objectively described. I explicitly say "is"
by ascribing certain predicates to the subject of a sentence in order to indicate that what I am saying "truly"
and "really" is SO.55 For one who has no notion whatsoever of what mountains are, however, my statements
do not refer to anything. For me, they have meaning
because in my hiking, my tired feet and my bruised
body themselves are the "affirmation" of the trail. But
this "affirmation" presupposes the original "event" of
the "emergence" of the "saying"-of-is which subjectivity itself is. My statements make this implicit "saying"of-is explicit, but they are preceded by the coming to be
of meaning for the subject. The "coming about"56 of
the truth-as-unconcealedness of the trail is tied to my
hiking over the mountain trail. 57 Divorced from the
"affirmation" which my existence is, my statements
have no meaning at all. 58 A statement, divorced from
55. "In einem jeden Satz gebrauchen wir das Wortchen 'ist' als Verbindung zwischen Subjekt und Pradikat, zwischen Aussagegegenstand und
Ausgesagtem, und wollen dam it jeweils sagen: Es ist wahrhaft und in
Wirklichkeit so und nicht anders." Max Muller, Sein und Geist, p. 40.
56. Heidegger, Identitiit und Differenz, p. 24.
57. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 262.
58. Heidegger, ibid., p. 263.
110
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
111
112
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
113
114
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
115
116
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
reproduction of children, health, illness and death, fertility and intense pleasure. He knows that astrophysics
speaks about the sun, the moon and the stars, and that
the meteorologist forecasts the roaring of the sea, bad
weather and sunshine. He is not ignorant of the fact that
strategists explain military victories and defeats, and
that economists can predict poverty and prosperity. The
religious man does not deny what the men of science
tell him, but it does not seem to make any impression
on his religiousness. What does this mean?
It means that he goes beyond the constative, descriptive and explanatory statements in which the sciences
speak about man's embodied-being-in-the-world-together-with-fellowmen because, implicitly or explicitly, he
knows that his own "statements about God" do not
have a constative, descriptive or explanatory sense-no
more than the statement of a young man that his girl
is a peach can be conceived as a botanical statement.
Statements about God, which externally look as if they
are constative, explanatory and descriptive, intend to
express the "depth" of human existence; they intend to
give voice to man's being as orientated to ... ; they
intend to touch the mystery contained in the subjectivity immersed in the body and involved in the world.
Implicitly or explicitly, the religious man "knows" that
this mystery cannot be seen by the sciences because
they do not speak about man as existence but as an
"ingredient" of the sciences. "Ingredients" of the sciences are not religious.
117
118
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
119
religious man really intended to offer constative, descriptive and explanatory statements just as the sciences
do this. But Hare points out to Flew that this is not the
casej74 what the religious man says is not a series of
assertions or explanations. Flew argues that Hare has no
longer the right to call himself a Christian if he takes
such a position. 7s According to Flew, then, a statement
such as "God intervenes in history," must be understood in the same way as "The police intervened in the
riot." Moreover, says Flew, in the context of religious
practice, the two statements are understood in the same
way.
It would be wrong to deny that people sometimes
understand the two statements in the same way, but this
is a misunderstanding of what a religious statement
means. But Flew makes this misunderstanding the condition of Hare's orthodoxy. This is similar to defining
man's appendix as an infection, the heart as an infarct,
marriage as a fight, and the psyche as a disturbance.
One may also doubt whether Flew's appeal to religious practice is as justified as Flew insinuates. When he
sees the religious man practising the prayer of supplication, Flew interprets this as an attempt to make God a
factor in a series of worldly causal influences, with the
hope that in this way this series of worldly causal
factors will operate differently. Thus the statement,
"God hears me," has for Flew the sense of an assertion
and God functions as an explanation.
But this way of representing things is not sufficiently
differentiated. For when the authentically religious man
74. R.M. Hare, "Theology and Falsification," op.cit. in footnote 63, p.
101.
75. A. Flew, "Theology and Falsification," op.cit. in footnote 63, p.
108.
122
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
123
124
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
125
Carl lung
With respect to lung, matters are fundamentally the
same, although the accent is somewhat different. lung
also holds that speaking "about" "God" is speaking
about man. 90 It is a speaking about the human psyche,
the collective unconscious, archetypes, that which is
psychically most powerfu1. 91 lung emphasizes the
"relativity of God," by which he means that God never
exists "absolutely" and "divorced" from human subjectivity and human conditions. In a certain sense God is
dependent on the human subject. There exists a mutual
relationship between man and God, so that, on the one
hand, man can be conceived as a function of God and,
on the other, God as a psychical function of man. 92
The idea of God is the symbolic expression of a psychical condition or function which is characterized by the
fact that in this condition conscious willing is totally
overpowered, and this leads to deeds and accomplishments beyond the power of conscious efforts. 93 This
overpowering impulse or inspiration originates in an
accumulation of energy in the unconscious. It gives rise
to symbols which the collective unconscious contains as
hidden possibilities.
In the orthodox view God is "absolute," i.e., "exist90. "Die Entdeckung und ausfiihrliche Formulierung der Relativitat
Gottes zum Menschen und seiner Seele scheint mir einer der wichtigsten
Schritte auf dem Wege zu einer psychologischen Erfassung des religiosen
Phanomens zu sein." Carl G. lung, Psychologsiche Typen, Ziirich, 1921, p.
340.
91. Jung, ibid., pp. 337-362; "Psych logic und Religion," Zur Psychologie westlicher und ostlicher Religion, GesammelLe We,ke, vol. 11, Ziirich,
1963, p. 64; Psychologie und A lclufmit;, Zurich, 2nd imp., 1952, pp. 13-62;
Symbolik des Geistes, Ziirich, 1953, p. 394; Das Geheimnis der goldener
BlUte, Ziirich, 1948, p. 58.
92. lung, Psychologische Typen, p. 340.
93. lung, "Psychologie und Religion," op.cit. in footnote 91, p. 88.
126
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
ing for himself. "94 This view expresses a total separation between God and the unconscious. Psychologically
speaking, this means that one is unconscious of the fact
that the divine power originates in one's own self. 95
Those who lack this consciousness project God outside
themselves.
According to Jung, primitive religions 96 and Catholic
Christianity as a matter of fact do make such a projection. 97 They exteriorize that which is really an interior
process. Such an exteriorization, however, must not be
rejected without any further ado. The experience of the
numinous, which arises overpoweringly from the unconscious, is the experience of the "awe-inspiring" (tremendum) and "fascinating" (jascinosum) , and this can be
too much for the individual psyche. 98 The individual
psyche will then endeavor to defend and shield itself
against individual religious experience. It can effectively
do this by adhering to a religion in general and Catholic
Christianity in particular. Religious experience is dogmatically and ritually channeled there, and this gives a
feeling of certainty, security and tranquillity. The dogma is like a dream which mirrors the spontaneous and
autonomous activities of the objective psyche, the unconscious. As objectified expressions of the unconscious, dogma and ritual offer a certain protection
against the "awe-inspiring" and "fascinating" of the
individual religious experience. The dogmatic expression
is, moreover, much more effective than a scientific theory.99 The scientific theory neglects the affective aspect
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
lung.
lung.
lung.
lung.
lung.
lung.
127
of experience, while this aspect precisely finds expression in the dogma. Thus scientific theories become
much more quickly antiquated than dogmas. The idea
of the suffering God-man may well be five thousand
years old, and that of the Trinity is probably even
older. 100
Although Jung shows appreciation for "confessions"- primitive religions and Catholic Christianity-he
thinks that religious experience occurs in them only in a
very impoverished form. For the "confessions" give
religious experience the form of a proj ection. They
transfer the content of the religious experi.ence from
"within" to "without." God, the Trinity, Christ, Mary,
angels, devils, sin, redemption and salvation are put
down as "metaphysical entities," divorced and isolated
from man. In this way the authentic religious experience
is reduced to "faith," i.e., to a certain holding to be
true. This faith blocks the road to self-consciousness,
self-understanding and autonomy demanded by the
modern mind. Modern consciousness abhors faith, 101 it
wants to know, i.e., to experience. 102
According to Jung, it is especialJy in Christianity- and
particularly in Catholicism- that the original religious
experience of the archetypes has shrivelled tip through
the overpowering influence of dogma and ritual. This
impoverishment is a kind of stagnation and reglession
of the archetypical unconscious. 103 Because the Christian located his God wholly "outside" himself, his interiority remained untouched and undeveloped. It could
even happen that he would in the unconscious revert to
100.
101.
102.
103.
lung,
lung,
Jung,
lung,
128
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
104.
105.
106.
107.
lung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
ibid.,
ibid.,
ibid.,
ibid.,
p. 24.
p . 25 .
p . 26.
p . 32.
129
Is Jung Agnostic?
From the preceding it should be clear that J ung
conceives religious experience exclusively as the experience of the "interior God." He doesn't wish anyone to
make the mistake of interpreting his psychological "considerations as a kind of proof for God's existence. All
they prove is that there exists an archetypical image of
the divinity." 108 The experience of this image has a
numinous character; that's why it is a religious experience.
Critics have reproached J ung that for him too God,
then, is "really nothing," i.e., nothing "objective,"
but at most something "subjective." Jung's answer was
that no one should be surprised by this since he wished
to speak about "God" solely as a psychologist. Such a
standpoint implies methodological limitations; any pursuer of any empirical science whatsoever has to accept
such limitations and he need not apologize for them. 109
The psychologist of religion speaks exclusively about
psychical facts and regularities, which he describes just
as the mineralogist and the botanist describe their own
objects. 110 In other words, the psychologist of religion
does not intend to enter the realm of the theologian.
Even if the language used by the psychologist and the
theologian seems the same, what they speak about is
different. When the theologian speaks about God, he
refers to "the metaphysical Absolute Being," III but
108. lung, "Psychologie und Religion," op. cit. in footnote 91, p. 64.
109. lung, "Vorwort zu V. White: Gott und das Unbewusste," Gesammelte Werke, vol. 11, p. 332.
110. lung, ibid., p. 331.
111. lung, ibid., p. 331.
130
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
when the psychologist uses the same term, he is concerned with the archetypical unconscious.
J ung complains bitterly that his critics appear unable
to make the necessary methodological distinctions.
When he speaks about God as archetypical image-Cland
this is all we can say about God from a psychological
standpoint" 112 -when he calls gods personifications of
unconscious psychical contents, 113 his critics imagine
that he is trying to replace theology by psychology or
reduce it to this. 114 J ung objects to philosophers and
theologians who view his empirical-psychological concepts, hypotheses and models as attempts to make metaphysical statements. He reminds philosophers and theologians that he is not at all ignorant of the fact that,
philosophically speaking, his empirical concepts are logical monstrosities. "As a philosopher I would be a sorry
picture." 115 But he doesn't wish to be a philosopher.
Neither does he wish to be called a heretic, for heretics
make theological statements. If anyone is to be called a
heretic, says J ung, it will have to be my patients.
Accordingly, Jung intends to speak only about the
psyche and objects if his opponents conclude from this
that God is for him "merely something psychical." This
merely is too much. Although the psychologist cannot
make metaphysical statements without going beyond
the boundaries of his competence, 116 this doesn't give
anyone the right, he holds, to add a qualifying "merely"
to what the psychologist can talk about. 117 One who
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
Jung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
Jung,
131
lung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
132
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
133
132
This is why he is
134
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
135
lung,
lung,
lung,
lung,
ibid., p. 661.
ibid. p. 658.
"Bruder Klaus," Gesammelte Werke, vol. 11, p. 350.
Psychologie und Alchemie, pp. 28-29.
136
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
137
138
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
139
140
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
141
Conclusion
In spite of their external form, statements "about"
God, we said, do not have a constative, descriptive and
explanatory meaning. This gives rise to the question
whether perhaps the best language to be used by the
religious man is mythical language. Even if one answers
this question in the negative, Bultmann's program of
demythologization may not be absolutized as if it demanded that all myths be eliminated from our speaking
"about" God. Bultmann himself had no such intentions. 154 He merely objects to false interpretations of
151. "Thl;! first principle ... is that the demand for demythologization
that arises with necessity from the situation of modern man must
accepted without condition." S.M. Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 148.
152. Van Buren, op.cit., p. 102.
153. Gabriel Vahanian, No Other God, New York, 1966.
154. "This does not mean that mythological language as such can no
longer be used in theology and preaching. The absurd notion that demythologization entails the expurgation of all mythological concepts completely misrepresents Bultmann's intention." Ogden, op.cit., p. 149.
be
142
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
155.
286.
156.
157.
158.
Gusdorf,
INDEXES
INDEX OF NAMES
Altizer, T., 112
Anaximander, 104
Anselm, St., 39, 59
Aquinas, Thomas, 78' f.
Ayer, A. J., 27 ff., 41 f., 66
Barth, K., 59
Berger, P., 94
Bolin, W., 123
Braithwaithe, R., 49
Buber, M., 132 ff.
Buitrnann, R., 66, 90, 121,137 ff.
Burke, T., 117
Carnap, R., 22, 24 ff., 66
Cox, H., 14, 15, 17
Daly, C., 46, 49
De Pater, W., 45, 49, 62, 63, 89,
112
De Waelhens, A., 79,80
Dewart, L., 78,87
Evans, D., 51 ff., 58 ff.
Ferre, F., 67
Feuerbach, L., 122 ff.
Findlay, J., 31, 37 ff.
Flew, A., 31, 32, 33 ff., 115, 118
ff., 138
Fortmann, H., 18, 133
Fransen, P., 74
Gasparri, P., 79
145
146
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY
Waisrnan, F., 22
Wisdom, J., 33,46
Wittgenstein, L., 45 ff., 50, 60, 66
147
148
THEOLOGY AS ANTHROPOLOGY