1

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA UNIVERSITY, BANGALORE

A RESEARCH PROJECT ON CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

Prof. M.P. Padmanabhan Pillai

And
Miss Priya Misra
Faculty, NLSIU

ROHIT KUMAR
691
I TRIMESTER
LLM (BUSINESS LAWS)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I express my sincere gratitude to Prof. M.P. Padmanabhan Pillai and Miss Priya Misra and owe
my foremost regards to them for giving me an opportunity to carry out this project assignment
under his guidance. This work would not have been possible without his invaluable support and
thought provoking comments. It is due to his patient guidance that I have been able to complete
the task.
I am very glad to present my project assignment titled Shareholders and Modern Corporation and
their changing role- A critical study based on theory and practice. I also extend my gratitude to
the Librarian and the Library staff who made available the required materials within time. I am
indebted to all those who obliged me while doing the research work. Their valuable contributions
have played a vital role in the completion of this project.
.
With profound gratitude,
Rohit Kumar
Id No. 691

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS UNDER INDIAN COMPANY LAW

Minority protection
DEFACTO ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS
Position in US and UK

8
9
11

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

14

BIBLIOGRAPHY

16

Books

16

Reports

16

Bare Acts

16

Websites

16

SUMMARY

17

Annexure I

18

Annexure II

19

Annexure III

20

INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance is a set of relationship between a companys management, its board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders1. As the general meeting is the primary organ and invested
with plenary powers, the role of shareholders in a corporation is very significant. Before looking
into their role it will be beneficial to refer the theories of company. This will help us in determining
the relationship of shareholder and company. The intervention of state, its extent in the affairs of
the company and different corporate governance model can be better understood on the basis of
these theories. One view is that the corporation is the result of legal contractualism. It means there
is a contract between founders inter se and founders and management.2 Since its an outcome of
private contract the principle of laissez-faire should be observed. On the other hand some consider
it as communitarian, means it is created by an instrument of the state, which ultimately implies the
more intervention of the state. These both are extreme so, the concession theory is a midway.
According to which its a concession granted by state for the benefit of the society and state
intervention is confined to external regulation of the company. The shareholders have two rights:
one is personal right and other is derivative right, i.e. to protect the interest of corporation. Now
the reason for such substantial role is not only that they gave their money to the corporation to
carry on its business activity but also that the interest of company is a divergence of both
shareholder and societal interest. Apart from that corporations now transforming from organization
to social institution because of having public money 3 . So the society delegated its duty to
shareholders. To know exactly that how much weight should be attached to shareholders it is better
to mention one of the judicial verdicts in Bamford v. Bamford4 where court observed that an act
of directors, which is breach of fiduciary duty, can be ratified by general meeting, if general
meeting acts in full knowledge and without the oppression of minority. While putting their money
to the risk they expect some nominal, if not lucrative, incentive in the form of dividend.
Accordingly they have given different rights by companies act. Till now the situation was ideal
but when it comes to the effective exercise of these rights the whole scenario becomes ironical. So

OECD Principles of Corporate Governance

Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups. P. 47, (Cambridge University Press, 2000)
3
Class lectures
4
Chd. 135 (CA 1970)
2

in this paper I am analyzing that how far our legal system is from the reality. In simple words what
are the differences in the shareholders role between practice and as permitted by law.

ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS UNDER INDIAN COMPANY LAW

There are two primary organs of the company general meeting and board of directors. General
meeting consists of members of the company5 and board consists of directors, who can collectively
exercise their rights but can be held liable individually. The apex court in Life Insurance
Corporation v. Escort Ltd.6 used the analogy that a company is like a state carrying on its business
under the authority of companies Act and its constitution, Memorandum of association. General
meeting and board, the two organs of the company comparable with legislative and executive
organ of a parliamentary democracy. Just as the legislative sovereignty lies with parliament and
administration left to, subject to control of parliaments power to change the government,
executive government. Likewise the general meeting vested with power to appoint, remove
directors and amend the constitution of the company while board conferred the powers of general
administration and management necessary to carry on business of the company. Similarly board
also subject to control of general meeting. Since the position of shareholders in the governance of
the corporation is very important Indian law also recognized the same and contains various rights
to be exercised by the shareholders. These rights are meant to strengthen the shareholders. As
stated above general business of the company lies with board shareholders given powers to
exercise in matters which are special and extraordinary. So a concrete analysis of provisions of
companies Act 2013 shows that what are those powers and functions entrusted with shareholders.
First of such right is right to vote. Every member of company has a right to vote on every resolution
placed before company7. Even a member may assign his voting right in the form of proxy8.The
Act of 2013 also provides voting through electronic means which makes participation even easier.
However this voting right is subject to certain restriction and limitation as company can issue

Sec.2(55) Companies Act, 2013

1985 SCR Supl. (3) 909
7
Sec. 47 companies Act,2013
8
Sec.105Companies Act,2013
6

shares with varied rights, if company wants to vary the rights attached to its shares it can be done
by the resolution9, so preference shareholders can vote in specific circumstances such as winding
up, repayment and reduction of share capital and on any resolution directly affect the rights
attached to their shares. Members may demand a poll before the declaration of result of resolution
by show of hands10. Members can alter the memorandum by special resolution11. Alteration of
memorandum is something which could result in change of nature of company, extent of liabilities
of the members. So this right has dual threshold one affects Company and other affects members.
In order to carry out the conversion by alteration of memorandum, Act gives right to make
necessary changes in the articles of the company12. When a company offers its shares, it offers
with certain object and terms. If company willing to vary these terms and object, it can do so by
the mandate of the members13. The members should be informed members to exercise their rights
effectively. So, in furtherance of this purpose law provides availability of registers and annual
returns at every place where ten percent of members resides14.the member can get the copies of
audited financial statement15 and can inspect the register of director, key managerial personnel and
their shareholding in the companies16. Whether company is running well or not members entitle to
review performance at general meetings and other meetings17.the members of company has to be
given, along with notice, a statement containing material facts concerned with special business to
be transacted at meeting. So that they will be able to appreciate matter well18. Register of contracts
or arrangements in which directors are interested shall also be produced in the annual general
meeting. In case of default of holding annual general meeting, the members can apply for holing
annual general meeting and extraordinary general meeting. The power of determination that who
will be directors, auditors, managing director, whole-time director or manager lies with the
members. Members also invested with the powers of removal of the same. Although the removal
of auditors subject to previous approval of central government. Since the general meeting has a

Sec.48Companies Act,2013
Sec.109 Companies Act,2013
11
Sec.13 Companies Act,2013
12
Sec.14 Companies Act,2013
13
Sec. 27 CompaniesAct,2013
14
Sec.94 CompaniesAct,2013
15
Sec.136 CompaniesAct,2013
16
Sec.170 Companies Act,2013
17
Sec. 97-98 Companies Act,2013
18
Sec.102 Companies Act,2013
10

vital role in a corporation, the directors required to exercise substantial power by virtue of
resolution. Those powers includes: call unpaid money on shares, issue & buy-back of securities,
borrow and grant loans or guarantee, merger-amalgamation & acquisition-takeover, investment of
company fund and diversification of business. If the directors wish to contribute more the five
percent of average net profit to bona fide and charitable funds, etc. then it also requires permission
in general meeting. In certain related party transactions company requires approval by way of
special resolution19. Whenever a company enters in non-cash arrangement with directors it needs
approval in general meeting by resolution. In addition to all these right members, by special
resolution, demand investigation into the affairs of the company and in some cases five or ten
percent shareholders, as the case may be20.
If any member feels that either the affairs of the company managed in such a way, as its prejudicial
or oppressive to the interest of himself or any other member or public interest or interest of the
company or any material change in the management and control of the company made which is
prejudicial to its or its members or class of members, he can apply for relief to the tribunal21.
Similar remedy can be availed by a group of stakeholders in the form of class action. Although the
code of civil procedure permits class action suit, which were not in Act of 1956, the new Act
recognized it specifically. The corporation is vehicle which used for perpetual businesses but the
members have the right to apply to winding up by tribunal or may decide to wound up voluntarily.
There are certain other functions which is conferred upon members like appointment of Company
Liquidator 22 , power to remove and fill vacancy of Company Liquidator 23 , appointment of
committees24, issue of sweat equity shares and Company Liquidator can exercise certain powers
subject to sanction of special resolution of the company.

19

Sec.188 Companies Act,2013

Sec.110 & 112 Companies Act,2013
21
Sec.241 Companies Act,2013
22
Sec.310 Companies Act,2013
23
Sec.311 Companies Act,2013
24
Sec.315 Companies Act,2013
20

Minority protection
The oppression of minority is a great concern globally. In the same line Organization For
Economic Cooperation and Development expressly provides certain rights for the protection of
minority such as disclosure of information, financial statements, related party transaction,
meetings and voting rights25.The new act of 2013 provides appointment of a director for small
shareholders amongst small shareholders upon the notice of five hundred or one tenth of small
shareholders. Small shareholders are the shareholders who owe share not more than twenty
thousand rupees. The small shareholders are different from minority shareholders which are
ascertained collectively unlike the small shareholders which ascertained on the basis of individual
shareholding value. However they can be considered as minority as they represent the noncontrolling stake. Similarly minority shareholders entitled for exit option when an acquirer
acquires ninety percent of equity share capital by virtue of share exchange, amalgamation,
conversion of securities or any other reason26. In the event of a contract or scheme of transfer of
shares approved by nine-tenth of shareholders then Transferee Company shall offer to buy shares
of dissenting shareholders27. With the advent of concept of independent director the law tends to
ensure protection of minority shareholders and balance the interest of minority and majority28.

25

Protection of Minority Shareholders in Listed Issuers. 2009. Web. 19 Aug. 2015.

Sec.236 Companies Act,2013
27
Sec.235Companies Act,2013
28
SCHEDULE IV,II(5),Companies Act,2013
26

DEFACTO ROLE OF SHAREHOLDERS

After considering the provisions mentioned earlier it is apparent that members given due weightage
and participation in almost every essential activity of the corporation. But how effectively our
shareholders exercises these powers in practice is a question of great importance, while
ascertaining the actual role of shareholders in modern corporation in India. As the mother cannot
discriminate among her issues that to whom she loves most but its a truth that she loves the most
to weaker one. Similarly all rights of shareholders are of equal importance but there are some
which requires special mention. Such as right to vote because it may influence the decisions of the
board. Nowadays it is general practice to compare and find a solution in different legal systems
when problem occurs in ours. Similarly this paper analyses position, with regards to the exercise
of right, of shareholders in United States of America and United Kingdom.
Whether it is appropriate or not, to deal with foreign legal systems, may be matter of issue because
someone may argue that since we have different society and problems than of theirs then it is not
reasonable to try to apply same solutions as formed by them. In order to check the veracity of this
argument it becomes more relevant to study scenario in US and UK. Berle and means in their
classical work described three periods in which earlier it was concentrated shareholding in which
most of the shares held by promoters and their family members. During second phase bulk of
individuals acquired some shares but finally it again transformed to re-concentration with the
emergence of institutional investors. Due to dispersed and scattered shareholdings29 the investors
become passive investors. Passive investors means the persons investing and having rights to
participate in the decision making process of the corporation.
In India the institutional investors are the passive investors as they generally not willing to
intervene with the decisions of management. It can be considered as breach of fiduciary duty
because they entrusted with the hard earned money of the employees. The all three patterns are
now prevalent in different kinds of corporation at the same time. For instance in privately held
companies shares mostly by the promoters and their family members. All most every private
company typical shareholding pattern where promoter along with other family members and

29

Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell Publications, London, 2012.

10

relatives held majority of shares and remaining by institutional investors and only a negligible
number of shares held by general public, whose fate decided by promoters.
Institutional investor usually goes with majority, family in this case, leaving minority shareholders
with no option than to accept silently the mandate of majority inspired with self-interest only.
Similarly in public companies state is the substantial shareholder. So, generally it is the concerned
departments of the particular ministries which exercise all the powers such as hire and fire the
CEO, its compensation package and even as far as audit is concerned Comptroller and Auditor
General plays prominent role rather than audit committee. A close look can show that board only
powerful on paper and doing task of managing instead of directing. In this paper an analysis of
shareholding pattern of seven major public sector undertakings discloses that state has 54 percent
to 79 of shares of the company. Although Institutional shareholding ranging from 3 to 18 percent,
which is still larger than of general public, but they have a tendency to nod with the willingness of
majority. General public hardly occupies 2 to 2.5 percent shares30. Normally board has power to
control managerial employees of company for the effective and appropriate management of the
company. But here the situation doesnt permit board to do so. Therefore all the decisions taken
for the sole benefit of largest stakeholder. In private companies the shareholding pattern is as
follows: in major corporations promoters along with their family members held 43 to 73 percent
shares. After them foreign institutions held 10 to 40 percent shares. While general public
shareholding ranging from 0.83 to 10 percent. Apart from that institutional shareholding
aggregately amounts to 10 to 50 percent31. If we talk about giant multinational corporations foreign
promoters held 51 to 68 percent shares. Foreign institutions held 2.5 to 56 percent shares and
institutional shareholding along with foreign institutions amounts to 6 to a huge amount of 75
percent. Again general public held only 10 to 20 percent shares 32 . Multinational Corporation
foreign parent has plenty of shares to influence the decision making. The problem not fully
understood by seeing these figures because on an aggregate general public held at least 1 to 20
percent but all these shares held by number of individuals. So it ultimately results in dispersed
shareholding among them. Neither of individual have substantial shareholding which permits to

30

Annexure I
Annexure II
32
Annexure III
31

11

controlling by an entity on the coast of non-controlling shareholders33. The severe consequence of

it to taking excessive risk which ought not to be taken. In India the matter of concern is conflict
between majority and minority shareholders. However new act tries to bring some safeguard for
the prevention of oppression minority. Such as small shareholders director, independent director
and stakeholder relationship committee34 for the grievances of security holders of the company.
Apart from that voting through electronic means may help in greater participation of shareholders
in decision making of the corporation.

Position in US and UK
It is well known that when there is a need for any new policy framework or reform in old one, we
mimicked either US or UK laws. In US shareholders majority allowed to remove directors with
cause and even without cause unless certificate of incorporation otherwise provided35.the members
can amend certificate of incorporation from time to time and as many respects till it will be lawful
and proper to amend 36 . The corporation requires approval of shareholders for fundamental
transaction such as dissolution of company, merger and sale of substantially all assets 37 the
members also entitled to inspect books and records of the corporation on written demand either
personally or by agent or attorney38. Generally board conferred great control over shareholders
meeting but if board fails to call annual meeting within fifteen months of last preceding annual
meeting then the members can force the company to organize the meeting39. The de facto position
of shareholders in US can be judged by situation that board flooded with 136 proposals out of
which one received majority. Again the percentage of proposals getting majority in 2014 reduced
to four percent as compared to seven percent in 201340. However the success rate of proposal may
be least but it shows active participation of shareholders. But the great matter of concern as one
third of proposals came from few dominant individual shareholders41. Nevertheless the increase in

33

ID.
Sec.178,CompaniesAct,2013
35
141(k),DGCL
36
242,DGCL
37
271(a),DGCL
38
220(b),DGCL
39
211,DGCL
40
Sidley Austin LLP,corporate governance and executive compensation update, 13 Jan.2015,at p. 2
41
Id.
34

12

shareholder activism results in heavy influence on the decisions of the company. These shareholder
proposals intended to be complied in the course by the company. Hence long term goals of the
company are innovation; growth, job creation, and sustainability are facing a great protest by the
instant profit making goals. Several courts in different states upheld the validity of bylaws
restricting intra corporation litigation. As the litigation cost is to be borne by corporation which is
ultimately burden on shareholders. Similarly courts also upheld some bylaws determining
exclusive venue for litigation. All these instances shows that shareholder participation is raised to
such an extent that is referred as financial activism and posing a threat to the long term objectives
of the corporation. Hence state regulatory focusing on the guiding principle which can effectively
mould the interest of shareholders towards the ultimate goal of corporation. It seems similar to
what Janet Dine described interest of corporation is divergence of interest of shareholders and
interest of society42. The shareholders also obliged by fiduciary duty towards corporation as a
social institution 43 and other shareholders. If the shareholder activism hindering the growth of
corporation then restricting members rights can be justified on the ground that the fiduciary duty
of members towards corporation includes ensuring required autonomy of management and
administration in the best interest of corporation. It can be achieved through intervening to only
such extent so that it will not prejudicial to the interest of the corporation, which is ultimately
affects the interest of the society. It may be a possible answer for the query that why constitution
does not confers concurrent powers on both organs. It is obviously for the avoidance of conflict
among both the organs.
Corporate governance in UK is considered as one among the best globally. United Kingdom placed
second by Governance Metrics International in 200944. The reason is that 60 percent of shares in
listed companies held by institutional investors like insurance companies, pension funds, trusts etc.
The rest 40 percent divided among individuals, overseas owners and individuals45. So in US and
UK due to scattered shareholding and nobody having substantial part which affects their ability
and willingness to exercise rights conferred upon them. Although the institutional investors are
in majority but individually they hold maximum 5 percent46. Due to dispersed shareholding there
42

Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups, 29 (Cambridge University Press 2000)
Supra, note 3, at p.2
44
Financial Reporting Council,The UK Approach to Corporate Governance,2010,at p.3
45
The Hampel Report, corporate governance, 1998, at p.1.
46
Id.
43

13

is separation of ownership from control 47 . The organization of institutional investment best

explains this principle. Employees are the beneficiaries whose contribution consolidated in
pension fund. Trustee of fund not himself invest it but through investment manager, which further
transfers by latter to some custodian company. Finally the custodian company may be part of some
group company. Now the ownership is so distinct that it is too difficult to locate it beneath the
control. Therefore it may be a good reason in the best interest of company to non-intervention by
employee. But the trustee is under a fiduciary duty to monitor and influence if activity enhance
investment48. They are rationally apathetic towards general meeting rights. The reason behind this
that they are not homogeneous group and differs with each other in objective, agenda and duration
of investment. These institutional investors generally not participate actively but only deal with
management as pressure group. Even in situations of conflict they choose cheaper remedy by
selling their shares. The regulatory framework of UK depends upon the comply or explain
approach49. The primary reason is similar to US where autonomy provided for in the best interest
of the corporation. In UK the board has given some autonomy regarding compliance of statutory
norms.
If board wish to dissent it may do so but should be justified by explanations. The FRC report
2015 50 stated that still some companies not complying with this rule and instead of proper
explanations doing it as check box formality. Hence it is recommended that board should adhere
strictly by forming clear and accurate explanation to the principle on one hand while on the part
of advisor it is desired to properly take into consideration the circumstances and explanations of
the corporation. The advisor should render right advice rather advising to vote against the directors
in the event of compensation package and reappointment of directors51.

47

Supra, note 29, at p.7

Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, Publications, London, 2012.
49
Id, 427.
50
Financial Reporting Council, Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship 2014,Jan. 2015, at p.3
51
Financial Reporting Council, Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship 2014,Jan. 2015, at p.4
48

14

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

In the view of above discussion some suggestions may be forwarded as regards to Indian
shareholders. Although the new Act of 2013 brought many changes to endeavor greater
shareholder participation in decision making process. It is too early to comment on the working
status of new Act since only 2 years going to pass. Nevertheless it can be said mere inserting
provisions not suffice but the proper implementation required achieving desired goals. There are
certain concerns regarding effectiveness of post of independent directors, to address this query
properly all the constituencies and external regulatory required making every possible effort to
ensure independence of the directors. Apart from that director themselves requires to maintain
their independence for better accountability, transparency of governance of the corporation and
prove such independence whenever required. Similarly small shareholder directors, stakeholder
relationship committee, corporations measures towards shareholder awareness and electronic
voting schemes shall be implemented in letter and spirit to develop a good model of corporate
governance.

In US and UK efforts for striving a balance between shareholders rights and autonomy of
management has been made. But India the main issue is conflict between minority and majority
conflict. To cure this companies Act 2013 introduced with special provisions of small shareholder,
independent directors, exit option for minority, stakeholder relationship committee and voting
through electronic mode. As compared to both the countries India is far behind from the situation
where state regulatory thinks about restricting shareholders intervention for smooth running of
corporation. However there are signals in the market which shows that our shareholders have
potential to become activist but the need of proper information and implementation of policy
framework. For instance a resolution for rise in royalty of parent company more than 50% nonpromoter shareholders participated and 83 % disapproved the resolution52.

52

NSE-QB-1,Emergence of shareholding activism in India, April 2013, at p.3

15

Another instance where in a resolution for restructuring for which half of the non-promoter
shareholders, out of 45 %, voted against resolution 53 . The role become much important in a
scenario where corporation transforming from organization to social institution. Life Insurance
Corporation is a better example.
LICs annual income from individual assurance and pension scheme for the year 2013-14 is
27007.15 lacks. Out of policy holders money it invested 1163.24 & 5219.00 in debentures and
shares respectively54. On the analysis of figure of random private companies chosen as sample it
discovered that its shareholding in Infosys is (127144076) 5.54% while (46881417) 1.90% in
Wipro55. It indirectly implies that if the shareholders of private companies such as Infosys or Wipro
will not exercise their power effectively then the money of a poor LIC policy holder will be at risk.
So underpinning the shareholders role in corporation should be our priority now.

53

Id.
57thLIC, Annual Report, 2013-14,schedule 8A, at p.143
55
Annexure II
54

16

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
1. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
10th Ed., Transaction Publishers, London, 2009.
2. Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell
Publications, London, 2012.
3. Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Reports
57th LIC, Annual Report, 2013-14

Financial Reporting Council, Developments in Corporate Governance and Stewardship

2014

Financial Reporting Council, The UK Approach to Corporate Governance, 2010

https://www.frc.org.uk/Our-Work/Publications/Corporate-Governance/Developments-inCorporate-Governance-and-Stewardsh.pdf retrieved on 10th August, 2015 at 02:36.

NSE-QB-1,Emergence of shareholding activism in India, April 2013

Sidley Austin LLP, corporate governance and executive compensation update 2015

Bare Acts
The Companies Act, 2013

Delaware General Corporation Law

Websites
http://www.nseindia.com/corporates/corporateHome.html?id=spatterns retrieved on 10th
August, 2015 at 19:37.

http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/gail-%28india%29-ltd/shareholding/companyid4845.cms retrieved on 7th August 2015 at 01:48.

17

SUMMARY

1. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
10th Ed., Transaction Publishers, London, 2009.
2. Gower and Davies, Principles of Modern Company Law, 9th Ed., Sweet and Maxwell
Publications, London, 2012.
3. Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
The author relied and taken insight of concentration and dispersion of ownership from
shareholding. Where writer emphasized on shareholding in public utilities and
shareholding of these companies in other corporations.
The author relied on the role of the shareholders in decision making of the corporation,
Emergence of institutional shareholders and controlling shareholders right. The concept of
dispersed shareholding and separation of ownership from control also focused.
The three theories of the origin of the corporation and objectives of the corporation and
responsibilities of shareholders. How the shareholders have greater responsibility due to
society of interest merged with their interest.

Apart from that reports has been used in the project which contains relevant data
and cited at appropriate place.

18

Annexure I56

COMPANY

COAL
INDIA

IOCL

ONGC

NTPC

BEL

BHEL

BPCL

5030970582
79.65%
578310691
9.16%
481215938
7.62%
85352369
1.35%
70153656
1.11%
62818635
0.99%
5241176
0.08%
2301353
0.04%

1664945295
68.57%
59188360
2.44%
86995342
3.58%
58849198
2.42%
466353413
19.21%
27823826
1.15%
62910022
2.59%
887026
0.04%

5897676260
68.93%
618168225
7.23%
813643290
9.51%
142881442
1.67%
993190974
11.61%
78342766
0.92%
7435236
0.09%
4151927
0.05%

6180614980
74.96%
823307792
9.98%
964562855
11.7%
156995704
1.9%
22680372
0.28%
84309979
1.02%
8091278
0.1%
4901440
0.06%

60014210
75.02%
3112588
3.89%
5432868
6.79%
1985009
2.48%
2340605
2.93%
6934196
8.67%
80355
0.1%
100169
0.13%

1543452000
63.06%
394269174
16.11%
382565498
15.63%
53758971
2.2%
23226795
0.95%
41888066
1.71%
4577534
0.19%
3861962
0.16%

397200120
54.93%
131093727
18.13%
34608381
4.79%
16304223
2.25%
22377691
3.09%
46536380
6.44%
68230054
9.44%
511450
0.07%

HOLDER
PROMOTER
FOREIGN
INS.
FINANCIAL
INS.
GENERAL
PUBLIC
OTHER
COMP.
NBANKS/M
UTUAL F
OTHERS
FOREIGN
NRI

56

www.nseindia.com

19

Annexure II Private Companies57

COMPANY

Infosys

HOLDER
PROMOTER

13.08%
941415237

FOREIGN
INS.
FINANCIAL
INS.
GENERAL
PUBLIC
OTHER
COMP.
NBANKS/M
UTUAL F
OTHERS

FOREIGN
NRI

57

Id.

300431272

Jindal steel

68808566
7.52% *
492405286
53.82%

Wipro

1812022464

TCS

Reliance
ind.ltd.

Bharti
Airtel

518797
0.03% #
1446755110
73.86%

3915939
0.12%#

865673286
21.66% *

1463961977
45.23%

1750613515
43.79%

175559361
19.19%

73.38%
253471307
10.26%

327472033
16.72%

617803494
19.09%

650629970
16.28%

40.99%
242513216
10.56%
228425799

15859400
1.73%

58292945
2.36%

77192004
3.94%

324667099
10.03%

285781618
7.15%

86069966
9.41%

125412425
5.08%

78544268
4.01%

331575690
10.25%

33311352
0.83%

9.94%
19608329
0.85%
127561539

33537594
3.67%

64740472
2.62%

7053903
0.36%

104661954
3.23%

105449852
2.64%

9033395
0.99%

61714250
2.5%

19320579
0.99%

79783300
2.47%

92538127
2.31%

25616178
2.8%

18199781
0.74%

1871257
0.1%

205078809
6.34%

211379457
5.29%

8014054
0.88%

27094627
1.1%

5.55%
52488000
2.29%
----

* foreign promoter
# central government

2022925
0.05%

20

Annexure III58
COMPANY

Colgate
Palmolive

Ranbaxy

nestle

Procter&
gamble

HOLDER

149331
0.11%*

69237
0.02% #

32897
0.03%*

619683
1.91% ^

FOREIGN
PROMOTER

69356336

268711323

60515079

22310090

51%

63.22%

62.76%

68.73%

FOREIGN
INS.

23508054
17.29%

51926151

12201842

836701

12.22%

12.66%

2.58%

662,345
56.6%

FINANCIAL
INS.

9269163

3634107

6.82%

30079894
7.08%

3.77%

928624
2.86%

230,875
19.7%

GENERAL
PUBLIC

49,177,521
20.29%

43849321
10.32%

13735484

3991282

1585147

14.25%

12.3%

51.13%

OTHER
COMP.

3021370
2.22%

15547929

923237

27,203

615537

3.66%

2160424
2.24%

2.84%

19.86%

NBANKS/MU
TUAL F

2103680

7942681

593872

2552243
7.86%

2.3%
15,893
1.4%

OTHERS

1.55%
405564
0.3%

946540

581712
0.43%

2115688

FOREIGN
NRI

58

Id.

1.87%

0.22%
0.5%

0.62%
3021747
3.13%
519764
0.54%

148574
0.46%

150302
0.46%

Sony
corporation

Citi port fin.

899304
29.01%

233,457
20.0%