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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
FOR THE COUNTY OF KING
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Plaintiffs,
v.
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Defendants,
SEATAC COMMITTEE FOR GOOD JOBS,
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Intervenor.
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This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs motion to set case schedule, including trial
and related dates. The Court considered the following pleadings when reaching its decision:
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Plaintiffs Motion To Set Case Schedule, Including Trial And Related Dates;
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SeaTac Committee For Good Jobs Opposition To Motion To Set Case Schedule,
Including Trial And Related Dates;
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3.
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4.
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET CASE
SCHEDULE, INCLUDING TRIAL AND RELATED DATES
AND DISMISSING PART TWO OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT -- 1
LAW OFFICES OF
SCHWERIN CAMPBELL
BARNARD IGLITZIN & LAVITT LLP
18 WEST MERCER STREET SUITE 400
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98119-3971
(206) 285-2828
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5.
City of Seatacs and Kristina Greggs Opposition to Plaintiffs motion to set case
schedule; and
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The Court further reviewed the Supreme Courts opinion in this matter at 183 Wn.2d 770,
357 P.2d 1040 (2015), the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification, the Supreme
Courts November 30, 2015 Order denying the motion for reconsideration and clarification, and its
December 1, 2015 Mandate to this court.
DISCUSSION
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Plaintiffs argue that, because the trial courts decision in this matter was predicated on a
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motion for summary judgment brought on a declaratory judgment action, the Supreme Courts unam-
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biguous holding that the SeaTac Good Jobs Ordinance (the Ordinance) was enforceable at SeaTac
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Airport, (notwithstanding RCW 14.08.330 and the Airline Deregulation Act) should be revisited, and
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plaintiffs should be allowed to conduct discovery and to proceed to trial in an attempt to prove that
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the Ordinance nevertheless does violate RCW 14.08.330. This is precisely what the Supreme Court
rejected when it denied plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification1.
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Nothing in the Supreme Courts Mandate suggests an intention that the issue of the
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enforceability of the Ordinance at SeaTac airport should proceed to trial. On the contrary, the
Supreme Courts holding that the Ordinance was enforceable at SeaTac Airport was unequivocal:
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Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification at p. 2 requested that the Court make clear that on remand
the parties have the opportunity to develop a factual record regarding whether implementation of Proposition 1
would interfere with airport operations and affect airline prices, routes or services.
At p. 22, plaintiffs again asked the Court: To avoid uncertainty and to promote judicial economy, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court clarify that the procedural posture of the case after remand will allow development
of a factual record regarding whether Proposition 1 will interfere with airport operations and whether it will affect
airline prices, routes or services. The Court declined to so order.
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET CASE
SCHEDULE, INCLUDING TRIAL AND RELATED DATES
AND DISMISSING PART TWO OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT -- 2
LAW OFFICES OF
SCHWERIN CAMPBELL
BARNARD IGLITZIN & LAVITT LLP
18 WEST MERCER STREET SUITE 400
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98119-3971
(206) 285-2828
[W]e conclude that the legislature intended to give the Port of Seattle exclusive
jurisdiction over the operation of the SeattleTacoma International Airport:
specifically the construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance,
equipment, operation, and regulation of the airport. RCW 14.08.120(1). Here,
Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport operations or the subject of
aeronautics. In addition, the Port of Seattle does not show that Proposition 1
would interfere with airport operations. As a result, we conclude that Proposition
1 can be enforced at the SeattleTacoma International Airport without violating
RCW 14.08.330.
Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac, 183 Wn.2d 770, 357 P.3d 1040, 1050 (2015) (emphasis in orig-
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inal).
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The Supreme Court had before it briefs and declarations2 from the plaintiffs, from Amicus
Airlines for America, and from the Port of Seattle, which argued that the Ordinance would affect air
carrier services and prices.3 Plaintiffs Reply Brief on Cross Appeal specifically noted that plaintiffs
had submitted evidence that the Ordinance would result in an increase in costs for labor-heavy
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services such as baggage handling, aircraft cleaning, and aircraft fueling that are directly related to
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airport operations.
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dissenting opinion specifically noted that there was evidence before the Court that the Ordinance
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specifically regulates the performance of quintessential airport activities that the Port of Seattle
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contracts for, regulates, and licenses ...4 Despite this evidence, the majority opinion held that the
Indeed, the
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The record before the Supreme Court included declarations from several persons explaining that the Ordinance
would affect airport operations, including food service and handling; airplane fueling, cleaning and, maintenance;
baggage and cargo handling; curbside check-in; concessions; etc.
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Interestingly, the Port of Seattle, which is the governing body for the airport, takes no position on plaintiffs
motion.
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Proposition 1's text specifically regulates the performance of quintessential airport activities that the Port of
Seattle contracts for, regulates, and licenses, including aircraft interior cleaning; aircraft carpet cleaning; aircraft
washing and cleaning; aviation ground support equipment washing and cleaning; aircraft water or lavatory services;
[and] aircraft fueling. SeaTac Municipal Code 7.45.010(M)(1)(a); see also Br. of Resp't Port of Seattle at 2732
(describing the Port of Seattle's regulation of these and other activities that Proposition 1 attempts to regulate). The
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET CASE
SCHEDULE, INCLUDING TRIAL AND RELATED DATES
AND DISMISSING PART TWO OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT -- 3
LAW OFFICES OF
SCHWERIN CAMPBELL
BARNARD IGLITZIN & LAVITT LLP
18 WEST MERCER STREET SUITE 400
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98119-3971
(206) 285-2828
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Ordinance was enforceable at the airport because there has been no showing that this law would
interfere with airport operations. 183 Wn.2d at 770, 357 P.3d at 1060. This was the holding of the
majority of the Supreme Court when it issued its Mandate, and this court is bound by that Mandate.
ORDER
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1.
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Plaintiffs Motion to Set Case Schedule, Including Trial and Related Dates is
DENIED.
2.
All Plaintiffs claims in this matter, other than those under the pending petition for
review in Supreme Court Cause No. 90113-9, are dismissed with prejudice and with costs to the City
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of SeaTac.
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The issue of whether the SeaTac Committee for Good Jobs is entitled to an award of
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Committee for Good Jobs presents a costs bill and authority for an award of costs.
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s/
e-filed
The Honorable Andrea Darvas
King County Superior Court Judge
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majority's summary conclusion that Proposition 1 has nothing to do with airport operations or the *1063 subject of
aeronautics, majority at 1050, makes the majority's new test all the more troubling.
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Filo Foods, LLC v. City of SeaTac, 183 Wn.2d 770, 357 P.3d 1040, 1062-63 (2015).
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ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET CASE
SCHEDULE, INCLUDING TRIAL AND RELATED DATES
AND DISMISSING PART TWO OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT -- 4
LAW OFFICES OF
SCHWERIN CAMPBELL
BARNARD IGLITZIN & LAVITT LLP
18 WEST MERCER STREET SUITE 400
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98119-3971
(206) 285-2828
Document Title:
Signed by:
Date:
Andrea Darvas
12/30/2015 2:33:31 PM
Judge
13-2-25352-6
Andrea Darvas
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