Kharkov and Sinai

A Study in Operational Transition

by
Major James E. Sikes

In fan try

School of Advanced Military Studles

US Army Command & General Staff College

Fort Leavonworth, t<ansas

28 April 1988

Approved for public release

dis l r i bu t ion is un limi led.

88-2866

D i r e c t o r , School of
Advanced M l l i t a r y !itihLc,.

U i r e c t o r , tiradtiatt.
Program

lIcr!r+v

ABTllACT
KHARKIJv AND SINAI--A STUDY
hy ~l<1Jlt(

,lrtllt{JS

E.

SlVflS.

IN

liSA!

O~ERATIONAL

TRAN~!TION

86 pages.

the hypot:hf.'Sl~ that, a.t the operatIona.1 Ipvel. thf:irl.' I1fP

uperational transItion that the commander may II li r a~' n
lJulde
ttl dp.te"mlll~ the actIons that must be tal:en to purslie t.he pusit.l 'If' d.Im,
thp LUllllte>roftensive.
The actions a force takes from the successful dE?feIl5r~
1111<)

stull,

(lL>~Jf~rd Jul

te~jt~

Edf'merltc:.

u{

to

the JnItlation of a [ounteroffenSlve IS operatIonal transItIon. To defille

~earch tor e5sential elements of operatIonal transition, the paper bpQlrlS
witll d review of theory and current US Army doctrine concerning the mix of
offenSive and deferlslve actions in the operational defense.
It then closely
e~amln~s
two
successful
operational tranSitions by forces that were
surprlS~~.
o~tnllmbered
and mal-posltioned.
The campalgns chosen for study
are Mallst.eln '5 count.eFoffenslve against the Soviets on the Eastern Front from
Februdry to March 1943 and the Israel! counteroffensive against the Eqyptldns
ttlE

In tho 1973 Arab-Israel. War.

l11e IBonograpn first studies the linkage of ends, ways, means and rIS~S
reQuired for' successful operational defense and the transition to the
offens!?
Second.
the paper e)lamines the elements of operational de~lgn tllat
mIA~;t
tJe
COI1Sldereri
to produce a campaign plan that facilltates opera! ItJn~i
trdnt:.ltlon.
Lastly, the study e~alllines the elements of comhat power tlldt dr~
trltl[dl
for suc[~~sflll defense dnd pursuit of the counteroffensivP dl tIle
Clpt:!rat ltlrlrd ievpl.
T11~
monograph concilldes that there are essential elements of operat.onal
trans,t.on that may be used to gUIde campaign plannIng.
First, ends-ways
"leilll~-r

15k

be

must

harmollized so that strategy, operational art and tactics

to pursue the POSitive aim of the counteroffensive.

Second,
tile operatlonal commander should understand and apply the analytical to()ls of
operational design in order to be successful 1n the defense and transition to
tll~
[OLlnteruffenslve. These cOllcepts are ttlose of the center of gravity, the
syncnronl~ed

are

culmillatlng OOlnt, the determInation of deCisive pOints and the designation

uf llrl~~s of operation and support.
This understanding and appl1catlon
produc~~
a
wor"l:able, lnitlal campaign plan that focuses on setting the
condJtlrl"s

ior'

dp~lJll'atlon

of
sll'3talnlltent,

and
~l)Wer'

~Hsources

the

trans.tlon to the counteroffensive.

fO(1

e (dp,:dlle of t.'),ecutlnq hIS campalgn pIau.

Lt

Ihp mOIlOt]r'rlph (lJllL.ludes

lln/ulves rlO tlp.'r.:ltJlJllrll

It

lhlh

monograph

CJfleratlorlal

the
the

Lastly, through the

intelligence, deception, generation of operational reserves

the operatIonal commander must meld the operational comhat
of leadership. maneuver, firepower, and protection InLo a

planners

also
In

the dp.tense 15 the ~itr()nLJp.r form of

transltiClrl tu the offerlslve.

tha~

contains

three

appendices

developing campaign plans.

that

wdr

Dilly

may be useful to

While the discllsslon in

appendIces is not completely supported by the two case studIes presenteli,

append e. may prOVIde start points for those interested ,n conductIng
f~rther
research into the subjects of operational defense and transition to

til!

uffp.ltl,e.

I.

...........................................

....

lntrnd~ction.

...I

. . . . . .
. . . . . . .1
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . ...

. . . . . .4
.........................................

... . .. 4

. . . ....

I h e o r e t i c a l Rase f o r O p e r a t i o n a l T r a n s i t i o n . . . . . .
Current Doctrine o f Uperatiunal Transition
Thesis.. .............................................
Definitions
IIethodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I!.

1:

Kharkov.

A n a l y s i s rif
KIiar k o v . .
I:asp i i t u d y 2 :
S i n a i . . .
A i i a l v s i s o f
S i n a i . .

111.

c 1111I:

I V .

Apbi en d i r: e s .

1(15 1 0115.

,h

. . . . . . . .

............

.........

..............

...................

...
..

Elements of
E1emen't.s o f
Elements o f
Elemen'ts o f
Elements of

.* 0

. I r,
. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . .,I n.
..........
. . .
. . L . I

..........

..................

Essential
Esseiitial
Essential
Essential
Esst?nt.ial

..

I I i ~ . t o r i r : a l [;a!;@! S t u d i e s .
Lase fiiutly

..

Uperational 'Transition..
Ends, Ways, i l e a n s a n d R i s k

Operational Design
Combat Power
U o e r a t i o n a l Reserves

........

..............

......

. . . .
. ,.
_

%.

....

. PIJ

....
...
....

. .40

....

.Ji
.44
,

. 46

... . .

,I L

V.

. . . . .
. .,>
L

. ,511
. . :.
. . . . . . . . . .5 7

Llrdrr 0 1 b a t . t l e f 01' December 1 9 4 2 . . .......................

Order o f N a t t l e - M a n s t e i n ' s Counter offensive: S o v i e t F u r c e s . . . . .

[ l r d e c o f R a t t l e - M a n s t e i n ' s C o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e # f i x i s Forces
l'lanst.kit1'5 h e i n f o r c e m e n t s i n F e b r u a r y 1943..
Manstein's Counteroffensive-TasI flryanization
A r a h and I ! ; r a e l i Combat S t r e n g t h , 1973 W a r . .

.f>G

Maps I t n 8 : Khari.iiv C a n p a i f l n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
l l a p s 9 ti, 1 2 1 197.i A r a b - I s r a e l i War ..............................

.hl

.70

c11i I s

c-

i.,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..56
.....................
....................

VI.

hrlnotes..

:ibliogr

..................................................

aphy

..................................................

5Y

.78

84

I NTR0DU.r.T I O N

I.
tlizory

of

war

capability

to

transit,ion

CiJusewitr's
tlle

11055e'55

offense.
the

While

poc.ltlve

delay

or

hardelled

thf?

friaits

to

the

Clausewitz argued,

--

t h e a b i l i t y t o g a r n e r r e s o u r c e s and

or m o b i l e d e f e n s e f o r c e s .

Both, however,

' t h e t a b l e s on t h e a t t a c k e r . . . '

strategic

a l s o reLuqni:ed

thereby "...followiiig

,/'

Thus,

t o enjoy

armed f o r c e s must b e a b l e t o e x e c u t e t n e

success,

t r a n s i t i o n from t h e defense t o t h e offense.

SinLe

theory

and

doctrine

suggest

that

operational

tran5ition

d e f e n d i n g o p e r a t i o n a l commander must p r e p a r e f o r i t .

understand

nilst

lip

defense

as t h e a t t a c k e r commits h i m s e l f a g a i n s t e i t h e r

enemy

"...turn

of

operati;inaI

reqtiired,

the

o p e r a t i o n a l i ~ e f e n s ew i t h an o f f e n s i v e c a m p a i g n . .

siicces.ifui
the

the

positioiis
to

from

d e c i s i v e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n a t some p o i n t t o a r h i e v e

take

s t r e n g t h s of t h e defense

attrite

need

quickly

l a r g e m i l i t a r y f o r c e must

8 0 t h W e l l i n g t o n i n P o r t u g a l and S l i m i n Burma aCknl1Wiedged

result,^.

inherent

tilt'

that

may b e t h e s t r o n g e r f o r m o f w a r ,

defense

must

conmarider

implies

Establishing

the

thrrse

essential

element5

elements

of

of

operational

operational
transition

To

at,

i 5

S:I,

transition.

w i l l

aid

tile

friim

the

o p e r a t i o n a l commander. i n t h e p a s s a g e f r o m t h e d e f e n s e t o t h e o f f e n s e .
Th1.i

imiinoqraph

w i l l

study

the

operational

To d e f i n e t h e p r o b l e m ,

i ~ i e o i r . ~ l r . a I , d n r t r i n d l diid h i s t o r i r a l p e r s p e c t i v e .

b ~ g i n with

w i l l

C:lausewitzian
doctrijie,

all

alldlysi!;

coristriict

two

case

traiisiiion

pertinent

.transition

w i l l

be

of

the

mill

will

each.

drawn

be

offense

and d e f e n s e i n t h e

a n a l y z e d t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e1ement.s

Finally,

from

of

it

From t h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e u r y arid

operations.

studies
to

of

.transition

(if

conclusions concerning operational

comparison

of

case study a n a l y s i s w i t h

t h e o r e t i La1 p r o p o s i t i o n s .
CI T h . e o r e t i L a 1 B d s i s f o r O p e r . a t . j o n a l . , T r a n s i t ~ . o n
In

ills

reqtiiremerli

that.
t.;-Ne

liir

monumental
of

an

drtvnsive

c 1 1 d r ' a i : t e ri

stic

tlicfk~fi.src, consist
riieinr

r.IiruSts.

iie

On

work,

operational
form

Wart-,

Claureuitz

transition.

sets

goes

stage f o r the

I n B o o k 6 o f On War.,

he s t a t e s

of w a r h a s t h e concept o f " p a r r y i n g t h e b l o w : w i t h

f e a t u r e being " a w a i t i n g t h e blow".'

ot

the

Defensive operariuns,

w a i t i n g f o r t h e enemy a t t a c k a n d t h e n f e n d i n g o f t t h r .
un

t o say t h a t a d a f e n s i v e campaign i s fouyiir w i t h

[11

both

iiffensive

"a

not

simple

construct

shield,

Clausewitz
attack
the

wlidt

provides

d e f e n s i v e i i p e r a t i o n ~ , ,it

b u t a s h i e l d made u p o f w e l l - d i r e c t e d
purpose

blows"."

F!

it115

f o r limit.ed offensive actions i n the ilefensr.

t h e o f f e n s e may h a v e a b r o a d e r f u n c t i o i 7 ,

howsvel.',

tllc-

I n h i s words.

and d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s .

states

enemy

w i l l

attacker

c o n q u e s t . ''4 T h i i s ,

a p o s i t . i v e one:

defender

.ttritirlg

t h a t " d e f e n s e h a s a p a s s i v e ~ ~ u r p o s cpreservat11111;
:

presently

resources.
gain

owns

while

But,

some

this

g r o u n d and,

t h e defense aims t u h o l d on t u

aheorbinq
is

and

tile

negative

enemy

ai.tacI.

and

fur oftrri the

aim,

at the operational level,

t h e attar.i:rr

measure o f g r o u n d t h a t i s u n a c c e p t a b l e t o s t r a t e g i c a u t h o r i t i e s .

may

take

The

defender

i s obliged,

therefore,

t o undertake o f f s n s i v r actions

ti1

regain

t h i s l o s t ground i f t h e defender i s t o preserve h i s t e r r i t o r y .

Clausewitz

on

goes

to

s t a t e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p bt?tweeii t h e riffsn!;iv?

and

defensive a c t i o n s of t h e defense.
"If
defense i s the s t r o n e r
form o f
war,
y e t has t h e n e g a t i v p
object,
i t f o l l o w s t h a t i@
s h o u l d b e u s e d o n l v so l o n i j a 5 weakness
compels,
a n d b e a b a n d o n e d a5 soon a 5 we a r e s t f o n q e n o u g h t o p u r 5 u e
thl?
positive
object.
When o n e h a s u s e d d e f e n s i v e m e a s u r e s
' . L I i I r s s f 111 1
a more f a v o r a b l e
balance of
strength is usualiv
crtAa+ed;
%[As, t h e n a t u r a l c o u r s e i n , w a r is t.o b e g i n d e f e n s i v s l y a n d
riiil
by
attackin
a war
in
which v i c t o r i e s were used n n l y
d t: f PI>s i v e 1 y w ithou!
t h e in t en t io n o f
c u u n t e r at. t ac k 1 iii
w o u 1d b 9
itlt';iirii
a5 a b a t t l e i n w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a b s o l u ? r d e t e n h r
p d i ! . i v i t y , t h a t i s - were t o d i c t a t e e v e r y a c t i o n . " f ,

...

! ' 1 . 8 i ~ i c w ~ t zd ~ v e l o p s a

reac!i,iii:;
pnini

of

the

defender

conc!iirst..
it,

He

some
a

holdinq

have

the

positive

aim.

ilrtrrisr

dud

defense

shifting

iIc:fert:ii'
tld5

implies
at.

one

succeeded.

strtemeait

The

defender's

seeks t o reduce t h i s d i s u a r i t y
actions

o f b o t h a t t a c k i n g and

t o t h e defender.
f o r m of war,

Once t h e d e f e n d e r

the attack,

t h e balaitce

in

is relatively

nlust b e u s e d t o p u r s u e t h e

l h e defender can no l o n g e r a c c r u r advantaqps by w a i t i n q

ll~llst

end

that

thr

a l o w e r l e v e l ; h e n t i t e s t h a t at. ',i:me

c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t u p o n t h e enemy t h a t r e s u l t s

offensive

iiiqt

t h a t t h e defender. s t a r t s f r o m a p o s i t i o l i o f weakness

u p b y a t t a c k i n g or r i s k d e f e a t .

pt,,f? iI~!tt)nsP w i t h n o p l a n f o r
1111,:

at

i n r l i i d t i b uinre t h a t

t a k e up t h e o f f e n s e and p u r s u e t h e p o s i t i v e a i m n f

milst

defense.

power

strunqer,

o f defense that

r e l a t i v e t o t h e enemy a n d t h u s ,

rugged

combat

and

suggests

form

through

of

offense

plan

dll

u l 1 i m a t . e a t t a c k lids

:111i5,

l i n t 1 t1.d

t l t 1 4

1111

t,he

) p i i r s i i ~ t lot

vdlue.

a d r s t i o c t i o n h e t w e e n t h e r v * c t . i v e t ~ f f e n ~ i v i a. ~ l i ~ i i ~
t i 1! . t l i t i

l e v e l and t h e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s
Clausewitz
"defense is

makes

--

this

iliirlrt

implication

t a k e n .ift,er- t h e rlr!fi:,.~,t.
clearer

thruuql,

s i m p l y the more e f f e c t i v e f o r m o f war:

(21

3.

141s

means

to

il

W I I i

q a I I I i'il

.''h

I l l e r r ~ f o r e , o n e may s a y t h a t ,

rle~neiil.5 a t e

o f feitbive
tlic

v i c l o r y t h a t e l i a b l e s one t o t a k e t h e o f f e n s i v e a f t e r s u p e r 1 1 1 r . i t . y i s

tat:tical

n f f e r ~ s l ~ ed c t i o i ~ s of

ti a n s i t l o n

the

defetider

the

becomes

and,

iri

i i i i c e s u p e r i o r Combat power

detense
the

t h e i n i t i a l d e f ~ n s e , tlir r t ' , i i I i v e

are

uperational.

attacker

at

the

qaiiierl,

Through

this

operational level.

o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n i n t h e defense i s 1 t h e r e f o r e ,

Operational

i 5

markedly d i f f e r e n t

f r o m t.Ii<it o f p u r e d e f e n s e .
Ciausewiiz

actioiis

the

in

makes

distinction

defense

and

those

between

reactive

operational

tactical

offensive

offertsive

actions

of the

s t r d t e g i c defender:
" E v e n when t h e p o i n t o f war i s t o m a i n t a i n t h e s t a t u s q u o , t h e f a c t
a b l o w goes a g a i n s t t h e e s a e n t i a l
remains that
merely p a r r y i n
iiattire of
war, which c e r t a i n q y does n o t c o n s i s t m e r e l y o f enduring.
Once
t h e d e f e n d e r h a s g a i n e d an i m p o r t a n t a d v a n t a g e , d e f e n s e a s si i r h
h a s done i t s work.
W h i l e h e i s e r i l o y i n t h i s a d v a n t a g e , he must
strike
back...while
ttie i r o n i s h o t
?his transition
to
tlie
counterattack
n u r t be a c c e p t e d a s a t e n d e n c y i n h e r e n t i n t h e d e f e r r j r
-indeed.
as one o f
i t s essential
features.
Wherever a v i c t o r y
a c h i e v e d b y t h e d e f e n s i v e f o r m . . . i s a l l o w e d t o w i t h e r away u n u s e d ci
serious mistake
i s made.
A sudden p r t ~ e r f u l t r a n s i t i o n t o ! h r
oflrnsiwe
- t h e ' f l a s h i r r g sword o f ve1,peance'- I S t h e g r e a t e s t m 1 ) i e i ~ l
for
the defender.
If
i t i s n o t i n t h e commander's mind f o r m t h ( >
start,
or
ra.ther i f
i t i s n o t an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f h i s i d e a o i
defense,
he w i l l
n e v e r be p e r s u a d e d o f
t h e s u p e r i o r i t y o f tlle
d e f r!rlsive f o r m . . . 7 ( 1 t a l i c s added)

...

Clausemiti,

tliu5,

from

wccessful

must

attack.

the

Ill?

operational uffensive resulting

d e t e n s e i s t h e more p o w e r f u l .

This

change,

Once s t r o n g e r ,

t h e defender

from t h e s u c c e s s f u l defense t o t h e i n i t i a t i v e of
O p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n must be planned

i ~ e g i i i i t i n go f t h e d e f e l t s e i n o r d e r t o a l l o w f o c u s o n a p o s i t i v c a i m .

the

positive

entire

clear that the

i s operatiqnal transition.

attdcl:

irum

makes

aim

cftort

.iui.t:t?Li'iful

15

of

e s s e n t i a l t o w a r f i g h t i n g or', a s C l a u s e w i t z h a s s a i d , t h e

kilr

~:ommanili~r

tllr? o f f r r i s e t o gaiii

ic,

absurd.

The p r i n c i p a l d u t y o f e v e r y c o m p e t e n t and

the operational defense is a powerful t r d n s i t i o n t o

1111

( i 1 ) 5 i t i v ~ 1e n d .

1 : u r r e r t t l l q c t r l n e o f Oeer.a_t_!on_al..T,:a?5l.t!pri.
i:urrei:t
states
LI

that

Ii eii !, i v t?

"a

o a s r a t . i ~ ~ n a ld o c t r i n e

defensive

1: ump on eii t !i

[.laLisL'wit;!idIt
a

Army

llfi

tu

theory,

strategy
p r ec 1i i d e

suggests t h a t

a 5 s t a t e d i n FH. loo:?

designed

to

d e f e a t '''

!>tdtt?!,
iiii(irov?a

defense

must

deny

deny 5uccess w i l l r p q i r i r e

AirLand B a t t l e doctrine,

success

In order t o t r a n s i t i o n t o the
to

t h e enemy.

t h a t w h i l e " r e a c t i v e m e a s u r e s may h a l t t h e enemy,

the

chalices f o r

like

t h e r e m u s t b e an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n i n

d e f e n s i v e camoaign tu pursue a p o s i t i v e aim.

i i f f e n ~ i v e , !Ile

Operat!qs.

5 ~ 1 c c e s s[ i n t,he d e f e n s e ] .

[;I

US Army d o c t r i n e

e a r l y counterat.tacks

[ B u t ] d e f e n s e rarl g r e a t l y

damage
of

the

the

enemy o n l y when e a r l y c o u n t e r s t r o k e s accompany t t i e r e a c t i v e (iliar,e

battle.

"'

Once

again,

t h e r e i s a d i s t i n c t i o n between t a c t i c a i Ievrl

n f f e n s i v e c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l o f f e n s i v e c o u n t e r s t r o k r l s .
Finally,

doctrine

clearly

states

t h a t s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s e miist r o n c l i i d e

with a succe5sful offensive.

".ro
win
[ c o m m a n d e r s 1 m u s t p r e s e r v e t h e i r own f0rr.e
through
s u r c e s s f u i defense,
weaken t h e enemy, a n d t h e n t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e .
I n some c a s e s , , c o m m a n d e r s c a n s e c u r e t h e a t e r o b j e c t i v e r I h r - o u g h t h e
tar:tical
o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s o f a d e f e n s i v e c a m p a i 11, i l o r e i i j m m o n l v ,
succe5s w i l l r e q u i r e f o l l o w i n g a s u c c e s s f u l operaYtona1 defense w i t t i
ail o f f e n s i v e c a m p a i g n . " l O

Doctrine
transitioii

hetween

and

to

theory

reactive

ttle defense,

clebrly
tyiies

seems

offensive

coticsrninq

the

p05itiv~

aim.

i n agreement t h a t t h e deferider

actioris

of

R u t h draw a ( l i s t i i i i : t i n n

detense,

successful

t h a t i s ttie CDUliter5troke o r counteroffensive.

be a d i f f e r e n c e a t t h e operational

to

must

tnat

I S

t h e p r o a c t i v e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s [ i f t h e a t t a c k t.hat q r i j w s

offensive

of

therefore,

t h e o f f e n s e t o put'fiue a p o s i t i v e a i m .

c o u n t ~ r a t t a c k s , and
fron,

are,

action,

!Since t h e r e

l e v e l b e t w e e n the!;*

one r e a c t i v e and one p r o a c t i v e ,

two

t h e i ~ s i i ea r i = . e s

p r e c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o e n a b l e t h e commander t o p u r s u e t h e
Currently,

AirLand

Battle

doctrine

addrrrses

these

p r e r e q u i a i t e 5 i n o n l y a s u p e r f i c i a l way.

THESIS.

study w i l l t e s t t h e hypothesis t h a t ,

1Iiis
are
as

essential

elements

the

there

o f o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n t h a t t h e commander may

a quide t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a c t i o n s t h a t must

O C I S I ~ ~ Y Pa i m ,

at the operational level:

counteroffensive.

To

,i5e

be t a k e n u l t i m a t e l v ti] p u r s u e a
determine

these

elements

two

h i s t . u r i c a 1 case s t u d i e s w i i l be analyzed.

Definitions
lliree

definitions

are

critii:al

to

o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n w h i c h w i l l he examined.

understanding

the

eiemeiits

They a r e :

1.ran 5 it ion.:
1h e
ac t 1 on s t a k e n b y an o e r a t i o n a l
;Jp u r xt I on a 1.
commander t o s e t f h i c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i h a n q r 111 o p e r a i o n s i r o l i l
t h r s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s e t o t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f t h e c o u 11t e I' i) f f en s 1 v e
TttEa5r
a c t i o n s c e n t . e r on t h e movemen:t o f l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s o v e r v a s t
d i Ljlaiires,
defensive operat ions,
f o r c e q e i i e r a t i o ~ i o f iipera't 1 [iiidi
, s u s t a i n m e n t . o p r r a t i n n s a n d , f i na 1 i y , 1 O I I IIt er n f f P I , 1 . I f !
rPLc,rves

L,

Desi.qr1:
Four
theoret.ica1
concepts c e n t r a l
t o till
p a n n i n r j a n . T ' e i e e u t i o n o f campaigns and mairw o p e r a t i o n s art? r:rnti.,:
of
ravltv,
culminating point,
d e c i s i v e pnirots,
art11 l i r ~ e ? . ,,i
'jp w a 1 u n s 1 s u p p o r t
Camp a ig n d e s i y ii 1 in I: s 5 1 r a t etj y
11p p r a t 1 iiii a I .> t' t
[ l p e r "j!n.n.a!...

of

alitl
t;~i'lii:!; I i y p r o v i d i n g a n a l y t i c a l t o r i l s f u r t h e p l a n n e r t o use 111
< i e t e r m i n i n g t l i t ' b e s t u s e o f combat p o w e r i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f a c t o r s
<if METI-T
aiid I.he i i i f o r m a t i o n p r o v i d e d b y o p e r a t i o n a l i n t e l l i q w t [ i ~
~ i r - i ~ i i a r a t i a (if
ii the b a t t l e f i e l d .

I J ( i e r a t i o i l d 1 Combat P q w e r : I i ~ c l u d e st h e d o c t r i n a l e l e m e n t s o f combat
power:
leadership,
maneuver,
f i r e p o w e r and p r o t e c t i o n a s g r o u p one
and adds i n t e l l i g e n c e , d e c e p t i o n , f o r c e e n e r a t i o n , and s u s t a i n m e n t
as
elements of
a
second g r o u p t h a t a ? f e c t s r o u p one. These t w o
t h e e s s e n t i a l elements o f
comba! p o w e r a n d c r i t i c a l
u n c ' i o n sf o, r m p l a n s a n d c a p a b i l i t i e s t h a t i m p a c t t h e d o c t r i n a l e l e m e n t s
u f c o m b a t power a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l .
Methodo1.og y
This

monosraph

elements

01

criteria

for

the

use5

operational

transition

enters

study

case s t u d y approach t o determine t h e e 5 5 e l l t i d l

necessary

to

conduct

campaigns.

The

on t h r e e q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l s o f

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t . t a k e n f r o m FM 1 0 0 - 5 Opgrat!pn5 1 1 :

1 . WHAT MILITARY CONDITION MUST BE PRODUCED I N THE THEATER OF WAR [IR

OPERATIONS r[i ACHIEVE THE STRATEGIC G O A L ?
( t h e l i n k a g e of s t r a t e q i c e n d s and m i l i t a r y means)

2 . WHAT SEOUENCE OF ACTIONS I S MOST L I K E L Y I0 PRODUCE THAT CONDlllilN'.'

( t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n t h a t r e s u l t s f r o m b a l a n c i n g e n d s , ways,
and r i s k )

medl15

i. HOW SHOULD THE RESOURCES OF THE FORCE BE APPLIED T O ACCOMPLISH Tllk:

SEOLIENCE [IF ACTIONS7
i t l i e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l c o n h a t puwer e l e m e n t s t h a t e n a b l e operat.ion.-.:
drslylli
campaigiis

Itit.

against
JQII

the

the

Israeli

~tioseri f o r

Soviet5

Israeli
iJar,

counterofferisive

chnser~ because

they

outiiumhereil

,ndI

as

under

fepresrnts

stabilized
true

are

Manstein's

couiiteroffeil!.ive

the

against
rubric

the
of

"Kharkov"

E g y p t i a n s i n t h e 197; Arab-

"Sinai".

These campaigns were

d e p i c t s u c c e s ~ f 1 1 1o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n s b y s u r p r i s e d ,
positioned forces.

ii~djor operatitiit

thereiiy

study

F e b r u a r y 1943, s t u d i e d u n d e r t h e r u b r i c o f

in

studied

and

the

that
the

ilrferisive

position,

rifierisive

that resulted

fighting
111

temporarily

German

owerational

T h e K h a r l i o v c a m p a i g n may b e d e s c r i b e d
achieved

strategic

operational

defense.

The

511cce55

Sinai

ar:d

campaign

t r a n s i t i o n i n t h a t I s r a e l s h i f t e d from a p u r e 1 . r
for

her

perceived

SUrViVal,

the defeat of her attacker.

t o a Strategic

O p e r a t i o n a l commaliders

may f a c e s u c h a s i t u a t i o n i n NATO o r a s h o r t n o t i c e c o n t i n g e n c y o p e r a t i o n .

One

of

by

conducted
during
with

the
few

successful

Field-Marshal
period

Manstein

and

in

history

was

Army Group South l A G l

On a f r o n t of

vast s c a l e ,

and f a c i n g a n u m e r i c a l l y s u p e r i o r S o v i e t f o r c e ,

tremendous

o f territory.

von

transitions

1942 t o M a r c h 1943.

resources

inflicted

operational

Erich

November

outside

Manstein
miles

most

the

~OSSRB

o n h i s enemy and r e g a i n e d h u n d r e d s o f

H e c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h e o p e r a t i o n a l art and i t s proper

M a n s t e i n ' s i n c r e d i b l e feat o v e r c a m e a f l a w e d G e r m a n s t r a t e g y that

execution.

had its r o o t s in t h e s u m m e r of 1942.

1942

Hitler'e
Caucasus

of

region
of

aut.umn

summer

1942.

offensive

the

southern

German

ground

agsinrt

Stalingrad

and

the

oil r i c h

S o v i e t U n i o n had g r o u n d t o a halt by t h e
forces

were

weary f r o m m o n t h s of war and

T h o u g h in p o o r c o n d i t i o n

dangerously

overextended

across

s o u t h e r n Russia.

themselves,

the

seized

this opportunity to strike a strategic blow

Offensive

of ' 4 2 - 4 3 d e s t r o y e d t h e G e r m a n 6 t h Army and

lams

of S t a l i n g r a d and t h e G e r m a n 6 t h Army was a

and

in

their

captured
grave

Winter

Strlingrad.

to

blow

decisive.
victory

The

Hitler's

Nonetheless,
and

analysis,
wing

Soviets

believed

they

in

offensive
the

the

launched

plans,

Soviets

were

was

uplifted

w e r e crumbling.

Germans
further

it

but

offensivee

by

not

strategically

their

first major

Based o n t h i s e r r o n e o u s

to destroy the German southern

attempt t o regain t h e strategic initiative permanently. (See Map

an

112, p a g e s 61, b2, and b 3 )

On

20

freeing
the

November 1942, Manstein t o o k c o m m a n d of P O Don w i t h t h e m i s s i o n of

the

German

6th Army f r o m e n c i r c l e m e n t at S t a l i n g r a d and s o l i d i f y i n g

front

around

Rostov.

vulnerable

supply

lines

Manstein
disposal,

position. l 3

Soviet
Manstein
and

to

he

was

offenrives,
felt

to

PIG

mission

which

included
was

the

protection

attacking

in

of t h e

t h e Caucasus.

t w o i m m e d i a t e problemsi S o v i e t s u p e r i o r i t y o f B t o 1 and poor

faced

geographic

This

unable
could

Consequently,

with

the

battered

to s a v e t h e G e r m a n 6 t h Army n o r ,
he

forces

at

hi5

with t h e r e n e w e d

keep t h e l i n e r of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t o A G A open.

his only r e c o u r s e w a s t o shorten t h e d e f e n s i v e l i n e s o f A6 Don

generate

sufficient

combat

power

to

halt t h e S o v i e t thrusts.

To

assemble

the

mobile

proposed

that

the

operational
However,
placed

in

an

u forces

thus

would

required

for

of

AG

generated

be

used

eastern

reserves

Hitler

following

wing

not

allow

any

and

t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e , he
AG Don b e d r a w n in and t h e

t o anash t h e Soviet thrusts.

withdrawal. Consequently, AG Don w a s

u n t e n a b l e position.

T h e front warn in ruch a s t a t e of disarra y

Soviet

of

the

destructi on
the

Germans

the

Italian,

Hungarian and Rumanian

armies

( f i g h t i n g with

unable
6 4I

t o accomplish h i s m i s s i o n s without additional forces. (See Map 3, p a g e

on t h e mouthern wing) that Manstein wa s

On 15 January 1943, t h e S o v i e t s t o o k a d v a n t a g e of t h e d e r p e r a t e G e r m a n
p o s i t i o n t o launch t h e Voronezh F-cr (supported by t h e S o u t h w e s t e r n Fr0n.t)
14
t h r o u g h t h e 270 m i l e gap left by t h e retreating German allied armies.
By
the

end

were

of January t h e S o v i e t s had t a k e n Kursk, croased t h e D o n e t s River and

ready

action

and

authorize

and

the

ability
on

the

Don

obvious

Nanstein's

strength

the

position

it

River

could

of

the

strident

d e n a n d s for f r e e d o m of

Soviet d r i v e c o m p e l l e d Hitler t o

withdrawal o f t h e Gernan 1 s t k * f . A r m y

from the

t h e rear o f AG Don so that t h e Soviet t h r u s t s

to
be

stopped,

Everythlng depended on Manstein's

to shift f o r c e r , constan tly back and f o r t h against t h e Soviet t h r u s t s

Rostov.

Nanstein

shrewd risk
strongpolnte
the

Kharkov.

reluctantly

Caucasus
along

take

to

Soviet

coolly

handled t h e situation t h r o u g h sound judgement,

assessment and op erational adroltnenr. U r i n g interior lines ,

at d e c i s i v e point s, and m o b i l e c o u n t e r a t t a c k f o r c e s h e slowed
advance and employed h i s 4 t h

Army t o s a v e t h e s i t u a t i o n at

Rostov. But h i s s u c c e s s was te mporary as t h e Soviet t h r u s t s w e r e too stron g

f o r him t o hold indefinitely.
t h e German 1st P m g ~ r A- rmy w a s successfully w i t h d r a w n , a "super-

Although
Stalingrad"
River

loomed

b e t w een

the

before

Nans tein's f o r c e s projecting out f r o m t h e Dneiper

Donets River and t h e S e a of Azov.

T h e critical j u n c t i o n s

o f t h e road and rail network along w i t h t h e major river c r o s s i n g p o i n t s in

the
area
of
operation6
we re S l a v y a n s k , Rostov, D n e p r o p e t r o v s k , and
Z a p o r o z h y e . T h e S o v i e t s w e r e o n e half t h e d i s t a n c e t o t h e s e d e c i s i v e p o i n t s
a s w e r e t h e main German f ~ r m a t i o n s ,and
~ ~ t h e y decided t o u s e t h c i r numerica l
superiority

and f a v o r a b l e geographic p o s i t i o n t o s t r i k e t o t h e S e a o f Azov in

o r d e r t o s hatter AG B and cut o f f AG Don and A G A . (See Nap 4. p a g e 651

Renewed
German

S o v i e t a t t a c k s c o u p l e d w i t h H i t l e r ' 5 o b s t i n a c y , a l m o s t caused t h e

O p e r a t i o n a l and t a c t i c a l command and c o n t r o l s y s t e m t o f a i l .

Don

and

AG

did

not

complement

each h a d d i v e r g e n t m i s s i o n s and t h u s ,
each

other.

For h i s p a r t , M a n s t e i n asked p e r m i s s i o n t o

o r d e r t o g r i n d down t h e S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e .

terrain

t h e i r operational plans

o p e r a t i o n a l l y m o b i l e d e f e n s e so h e c o u l d maneuver and g i v e g r n u n d

an

conduct
in

AG 8 , AG

H i t l e r r e f u s e d any g i v i n g up o f

and

f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d t h e i s s u e b y p e r s o n a l l y d i r e c t i n g t h e combat
16
n f s e v e r a l c r i t i c a l P$,nm.c d i v i s i o n s .
Hitler's
fluid

intervention

situation

in

the

southern

debacle,

ordered

and

placed

Manstein

moved

h i s 1 s t -P

River

there

offensive

the

German

K h a r k o v . l 7 The
Hitler

into

operational

southern

front

was

in

c u l m i n a t e d w i t h t h e 1135s o f

a shambles. Faced w i t h a p o t e n t i a l

c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f A G Don and A G B i n t o A G S o u t h

the

command. "

in

wing

command and c o n t r o l o f t h e

Now w i t h o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l , M a n s t e i n

Army and 4 t h F'a'apy- Army t o t h e n o r t h bank of t h e D o n e t s

to

be

designed

strike

force

inflict

to

t h a t c o u l d d e f e a t any c o n t i n u e d S o v i e t

f u r t h e r c r i t i c a l l o s s e s s u c h as had b e f a l l e n

t h e Germans a t K h a r k o v .

at

Mansteln

now

decisive

points

steam

p r e p a r e d an o p e r a t i o n a l d e f e n s e t h a t m i x e d t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e
with

t a c t i c a l offensive counterattacks t o bleed o f f the

of t h e Soviet a t t a c k .

operational

transition

therefore,

renewed

concentration
South.

his

the

call

operational

of

Hitler

to

After s t a b i l i z i n g the front, the opportunity for

counterstroke
for

defensive

reserves

could

be c r e a t e d .

line

Manstein,

a l o n g t h e Mius R i v e r ,

and p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f s u p p l i e r t o AG

r e s i s t e d v e h e m e n t l y , b u t a f t e r t w o t e n s e c o n f e r e n c e s , on 6 Feb

and Ih Feb, h e r e l u c t a n t l y gave i n t o M a n B t e i n ' s p l a n . I 9 (See Map 5, page 661

Manstein
encouraged
the

Don

this
and

Kharknv.

by

the

Donetr

and

blow.

Manstein

Corps
6th

front,

their

perceived

success,

the

pushed

on

Soon t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s were e x h a u s t e d z 0 and M a n s t e i n l a u n c h e d

(See Map 6, page b71

began

his

forward

while

Soviets

t h u s p r e s e n t i n g Manstein w i t h t h e chance f o r a

counteroffensive

by s e q u e n c i n g b a t t l e s t o s t a b i l i z e

t h e n h e t a c k l e d each S o v i e t t h r u s t i n t u r n .

drove
Army

at

r e l i n q u i s h i n g R o s t o v and t h e g r o u n d between

R i v e r o n a l i n e f r o m t h e M i u s R i v e r t o t h e west o f

recklessly,

the counteretroke.

the

judiciously

Jubilant

relentlessly
smashing

knew t h e S o v i e t s u c c e 6 s w o u l d r e s u l t i n t h e i r o v e r e x t e n s i o n and

48th

On 20 Feb, SS P_anzer-

f r o m K r r s n o g r a d and smashed i n t o t h e r i a r o f t h e S o v i e t

Pgner.

Corpi

drove n o r t h i n t o t h e t h e l r flank.

This

concentric

attack

stunned

lines,

conducting

strike

the

German

intelligence

Soviet

size,

location,

German

armor

infantry
strong

and

formation,

Popov

Pm!.:

t o m u s t e r 40th

Mobile

Group,

Corps t o

and d r i v e n o r t h .

armor f o r m a t i o n s w i t h e n a c t i n f o r m a t i o n on t h e

direction
driving,

decisive

every

economy o f f o r c e ,

provided

kept

held
at

risky
tank

1 s t Pjggri Army t h l n n e d I t # e x t e n d s d

the Sovlets.

of

movement o f each S o v i e t t h r u n t . 2 1

avoiding

points.

engagement,

decisive

I n t h i s manner,

engagement,

while

rhus,

German

t h e Germans were a b l e t o b e

s t r i n g i n g together succeimful t a c t i c a l b a t t l e s

i n t o operational victory.
In

quick

Vatutin

would

slowing

nu

succession,

ith he red.'^

it

failed
linked

up

a t t a c k . 22

the

(STAVKA)
24
effort.

Command

Soviet

tactical

Soviet's

to

commit

Feb H a u s s e r ' s

23

offensive

additional

(commander

realized

SS P3na~. C o r p s and 4 8 t h fl.$azpr C o r p s

he

of
was

the

6th

defeated

STAVKA

would

Army

south

with

little

out

and c a l l e d a h a l t .

of

and

German

of

no

Germans

across
Army
AG

blow

the

the front.

on
South
on

everything

the
had
the
to

Army

and 3 r d Tank

They s l o w l y moved s o u t h ,

the infantry

o f s u p p l i e s and w i t h u n t r a i n e d c o n s c r i p t

The

o f f e n s i v e had d i s m i p a t e d t h e S o v i e t Schwerpunkt.
harkened

t o t h e Bllt?_k~zkjq d a y s a s t h e S t u k a d i v e

t h e S o v i e t 3 r d Tank firmy assembly a r e a s and smashed them.

turned

March

(See Hap 7, page 6 8 )

addition t o these miseries, Soviet formations,

t h e t a b l e s on t h e i r enemy e n c i r c l i n g small S o v i e t f o r c e s

t i m e a f t e r t i m e and o v e r w h e l m i n g t h e n .
By

B u t , h e was p a s t h i s

m u t u a l s u p p o r t , became h o p e l e s s l y i s o l a t e d .

the

counterstroke

discovered

short

In

with

expansion

bombers
The

support,

s o l d i e r s . 25

fuel

commander, V a t u t i n ,

g i v e up and d i r e c t e d t h s S o v i e t 6 9 t h

help Vatutin's attack.

armor

as

euphoric
The

to

not

Front

By 2S Feb, a f t e r

Army s t r i k e f o r c e , Popov M o b i l e G r o u p ) ,

c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t and h e c o u l d n o t d e f e n d h i e g a i n s .

peasants

f o r m a t i o n s t o an a l r e a d y

a t P a v l o g r a d and t h e S o v i e t 6 t h Army was r u l n r d .

Popov,

Vatutin

c o a b a t power was so

S o v i e t o p e r a t l o n a l commanders and t h e S o v i e t H i g h

continued
By

The

s e r i e s o f d e s p e r a t e s i g n a l s between t h e S o u t h w e s t

and

1PlderS C r i e d f o r help.

n o t l i s t e n t o s u b o r d i n a t e s i t u a t l o n r e p o r t s and w o u l d t o l e r a t e

of

dissipated

stunned

Soviets

could

(See Map B, p a ~ e6 9 )
not

By 2 M a r c h , 4 t h hn;gc.Army

c o n t i n u e and went on t h e d e f e n s i v e

on t h e l e f t w i n g and 1 s t P ~ E ~ T .

r i g h t d e s t r o y e d t h e i r enemy b e t w e e n t h e D n e i p e r and t h e D o n e t s .
r e g a i n e d t h e i n i t i a t i v e and now t u r n e d t o d e l i v e r t h e d e c i s i v e
Soviet
hold

Voronezh
Ilharkov.

p g n t . H a n s t e i n knew t h e S o v i e t s w o u l d commit
The

d e s t r u c t i o n o f S o v i e t 6 t h Army and Popov

dobile

Group

Soviet

attempt

with

120 m i l e gap i n t h e S o v i e t f r o n t l i n e . 2 6

t o p l u g t h e gap warn p i e c e m e a l , u n c o o r d i n a t e d ,

But, e v e r y

and o u t o f s t e p

tempo o f t h e b a t t l e . By 1 4 d a r c h , K h a r k o v f e l l t o t h e Germans a f t e r

the

bitter

created

fighting.

for

the

had

practically

By

the

1 9 t h , B e l g o r o d was a g a i n i n German hands.

i s o l a t e d 1 7 t h Army on t h e Taman p e n i n s u l a i n t h e Caucasus,

beginning

regained

1942

of

and

the

in

positions

same

the

process
27
i n c l u d i n g 25 p r e c i o u s a r m o r e d b r i g a d e s .

Except
danstein

t h e Germans h a d h e l d a t t h e
d e s t r o y e d 52 S o v i e t d i v i s i o n s

had

6 . n a l y s j s of.&h,ar kov
r e v i e w t h e c r i t e r i a used I n

To

the

Kharkov

100-5

counteroffenmive,

Operations.

strategic
ways

ends,

to

use

portion

of

stated

the
the

given

operational
gravity,
Third,

goals

of

must

understand

the

relationship

between

a v a i l a b l e t o a c h i e v e t h o s e ends, and o p e r a t i o n a l

resources

and

manage t h e c o n c o m i t a n t r i s k s 1

This

as

design

must

took

succe~s.

power.

These

to

by

produce

analysis

as

Hitler

and

the

military

means

s a t i m f a c t o r y m i l i t a r y end s t a t e .

b e s t accomplished by s t u d y i n g d a n s t e i n ' s

is

related

it

to

the

theoretical

ideas of center of

p o i n t , d e c i s i v e p o i n t s and l i n e s o f o p e r a t i o n s / s u p p o r t .

analyze

achieve

presented

Second, we must d e t e r m i n e t h e sequence o f a c t i o n s t h e

the

culminating
we

r e t u r n t o t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s posed by F d

a n a l y s i s i s b e s t s t u d i e d by d e t e r m i n i n g t h e l i n k between t h e

commander

portion

we

we

means

t o danstein.

operational
This

the

strategic

available

First,

the analysis of Manstein's actions during

This

three

the
is

re6ources
best

questions

a v a i l a b l e and how t h e y were u s e d t o

done by e x a m i n i n g o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l combat
form

the

framework

for

investigating the

o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n from t h e defense t o t h e offense.

EndxL.Wwz1.hn.s.
danstein
German

had

._an_!! .._Rjdk.

t o overcome p o o r s t r a t e g i c g u i d a n c e t o a v e r t d i s a s t e r .

G e n e r a l S t a f f t r a d i t i o n a l l y t r a n s l a t e d s t r a t e g i c ends i n t o o p e r a t i o n a l

objectives.

The

O p e r a t i o n a l commander t h e n c r e a t e d t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g r l o r

ways

t o a c c o m p l i s h t h e s e ends b y b a l a n c i n g means and r i s k s .

this

process

through

fast"

policy.

"stand
his

The

enemy,

the

their

industrial

could

not

decisive

unrealistic

strategic

goal5

and

the resultant

H i t l e r f a i l e d t o understand t h e changing r e a l i t y o f

S o v i e t s , who were m a t u r i n g i n t h e i r w a r f i g h t i n g s k i l l s w h i l e
mlqht

match.
battle

his

H i t l e r abrogated

p r o d u c e d q u a l i t y e q u i p m e n t i n q u a n t i t i e s t h e Germans

Hitler's
was

beyond

focus
the

on a s t r a t e g y o f a n n i h i l a t i o n b a s e d on a
means o f Germany.

As an o u t g r o w t h o f t h i s

p u r s u i t o f t h e o f f e n s i v e , H i t l e r would not g i v e up any g a i n s in t h e

obstinate
unrealistic

hope

IHitler

viewed

measure

much

Hitler's

units

fight
point

in

to

The strategy demanded

o p e r a t i o n a l advantages.

routinely

t h e moves o f operationally critical

directed

tactical

counterattscki.

r i s k s a l m o s t inpoisiblo.
all

The

lack

of ~ t r a t e g i c

but

T h e s t r a t s g i c e n d s H i t l e r d e f i n e d for

unattainable.

Whlle

Mrnsteln

did

not

b e l i e v e an

transition to again take the strateglc offensive was pO66ible, he

must

he

retaining

he

pointless

were

that

terrain

and

provided

authorities

to

c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e to a c h l e v e H l t l e r ' s a i m s nf

conduct

steadfastly

preserving

advice

concede

to

and

the

force.

alternatives

Consequently,

Manstein

eventually swaying strategic

h i s plan. R e c o g n i z i n g that a b r o a d t r a n s i t i o n t o

w a s not p o s s i b l e i f t h e end w a s to d e f e a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , h e

offensive

tailored

gain

and f o r e s i g h t m a d e t h e e f f o r t t o b a l a n c e t h e m e a n s a v a i l a b l e with

operational

the

in t h e winter of 1941-1942. C o n s e q u e n t l y ,

t h e d e a t h a g a i n s t n u m e r i c a l l y s u p e r i o r f o r c e s in a b a t t l e of

that

inherent

Manstein

situation

f a s t " d i r e c t i v e s would not a l l o w any c o m m a n d e r t o r e l i n q u i s h

to

flexibility

felt

the

A d d i t i o n a l l y , H i t l e r c o n s t a n t l y m e d d l e d in o p e r a t i o n a l a f f a i r s t o

formdtions
the

like

voluntarily

attrition.
the

t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s t u r e of t h e E a s t e r n f r o n t a s o n l y a t e m p o r a r y

"stand

terrain

h e could r e b u i l d his f o r c e s f o r t h e c l i m a c t i c attack.

that

his

limited

m e a n s t o meet t h e i m m e d i a t e s t r a t e g i c s n d r by s u p e r i o r

o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n in a way that a s s u m e d g r e a t risk and r e q u i r e d boldness.

Peer at_lon_L1!
.EE!!.W
of
the

in which a c o m m a n d e r u s e s h i s f o r c e Is t h e o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n

The

manner

the

campaign.

ultimate

be attained.

of

the

ha5

transition

decisive
an

In o r d e r f o r t h i s p o w e r f u l t r a n s i t i o n t o o c c u r , t h e a n a l y s i s

key e l e m e n t s of o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n must p r o d u c e a c a m p a i g n p l a n which

Operational
is

h a s been noted, t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s i v e must be

intent of a d e f e n s i v e c a m p a i g n i f d e c i s i v e p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s a r e

to

the

A5

from

defensive to lhe offensive as its focus.

the

Thus,

d e s i g n is t h e l i n k a g e b e t w e e n t h a e n d s and t h e m e a n s that p r o d u c e
transition.

Central t o t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e c a m p a i g n plan

a n a l y s i s of t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t s o f c e n t e r of g r a v i t y , c u l m i n a t i n g

p o i n t , d e c i s i v e p o i n t i and l i n e 6 o f o p e r a t i o n / s u p p o r t .
The

most

the

center

the

concept

operational

critical
o f gravity.
of

center

transitlon.

focus

o f o p e r a t i o n a l d e s l g n is t h e c o n c e p t u a l u s e o f

Manstein's operational design, which revolved around

of

gravity,

was

instrumental

to

his

successful

F o r e m a m p l e , h i s a t t a c k on t h e S o v l e t 3rd Tank P r a y

Ill1

in

t h e n o r t h and Popov M o b i l e Group i n t h e s o u t h f o c u s e d o n t h e S o v i e t c e n t e r

of

gravity

its

line

and

had

Popov

of

Group was t h e most d a n g e r o u s S o v i o t f o r c e s i n c e

o p e r a t i o n s t o o k a d v a n t a g e o f a gap i n t h e German d e f e n s i v e l i n e

t h e s h o r t e s t d i s t a n c e t o t r a v e l t o i t s o b j e c t i v e o n t h e Sea o f A Z O V .

Consequently,

destruction

its

was 1 s t or'!

gravity

victory.

Manstein's

protected

through

location

attacked

his

concentration

and

enemy's

giving
center

own c e n t e r o f

and w i t h i n t h e s e t h e p o w e r f u l

SS !aj.z.p~ C o r p s , 4 8 t h !,.nm_er. C o r p s and 4 0 t h

of

Manstein

provided

Army and 4 t h P_ajle.r-Army

formations

This

Mobila

them

Psn.ee-

logistics

C o r p . These

priority.

Thus,

o f g r a v i t y w h i l e p r o t e c t i n g h i s own.

on t h e o p p o s i n g c e n t o r s o f g r a v i t y p r o v i d e d f o c u s f o r h i 5

e n t i r e operational design.

second

c r i t i c a l f a c t o r i n M a n s t e i n ' s succe66 was h i s a b i l i t y t o e n t e n d h i 5

defensive

culminating

mas

action

until

behind

shorteninq

defensive

point.

he

able

the

elements

He

did

this

through

t o g e n e r a t e and s u e t a i n f o r c e s , t h e b a s i c r e a s o n

lines

combined

of

defensive

operations. Manstein's stubborn

w i t h h i s prudent counterattacks a t the t a c t i c a l

level

wure down t h e v u l n o r a b l o S o v i e t a t t a c k s .

lines

of

tide

comnunication6,

of

battle

suctainment
able

to

to

prioritized
when

thereby

he

did

point.

culmination

Watching t h o

he

and

h i s own

t h e optimum moment t o t a k e t h e i n i t i a t i v e .

He was

calculated

reserves

delaying

his

resources

transition
As a r e s u l t ,

while

at

M a n s t e i n f e l l back on his own

n h o r t e n i n g them and g a i n i n g s t r e n g t h .

Operational

sustainment

culminating
own

determine

create

counterstroke

that

closely,

the delay of offensive

the

to

enemy

through

deterioration

force

generation

for

own c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t . A d d i t i o n a l l y ,
to

the
he

h i s counteroffensive forces t o insure

t h e o f f e n s e he d i d n o t pass h i s o f f e n s i v e

M a n s t e i n p r o t e c t e d h i s f o r c e s and s l o w e d h i s
same

time

hastening the culmination of the

Soviet forces.
The
was

next

the

facet

of

c o r r e c t selection of decisive points.

operations

made

Manstein's

operational

of

o p e r a t i o n a l design which aided M a n s t e i n ' s t r a n s i t i o n

Rostov,

protecting

the

Stallno,
his

forces

determination
deiign
tho
in

Hius
tho

of

The v a s t n e s s o f t h e t h e a t e r o f

decisive

points

crucial

issue.

of t h e defense recognized t h e d e c i s i v e p o i n t s

R i v e r , S l r v y a n k s and G r i e h i n o as c r i t i c a l t o
south.

s o u t h e r n e l e m e n t s w o u l d be c u t o f f .

If M a n s t e i n lost t h e s e p o i n t s , h i s

K r a n s n o g r a d , D n e p r o p o t r o y s k and

ZapOrozhye
along

formed

the

d e c i s i v e p o i n t s needed t o p r o t e c t h i s l i n e s o f s u p p l y

the

Dneiper

counteroffensive

River

forces.

and

to

protect

the

asssrbly

areas

of

his

Rugged GDrRIdn d e f e n s e o f t h e s e d e c i s i v e p o i n t s w i t h

f o r m a t i o n s p r o v i d e d t h e P + n r ~f o r c e s t h e n e c e r r a r y p i v o t p o i n t s f o r

infantry
maneuver.

s u c c e s s f u l l y d e f e n d i n g t h o s e d e c i s l v e p o l n t s , H r n s t e i n was a b l e

By

t o chose t h e a p p r o p r i a t e t i n e t o t r a n s i t i o n t o t h s c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .
Ihe
of

final

element

operation

Soviet

lines

flanks,
take

and s u p p o r t .

German l i n e r o f o p e r a t i o n r a n p e r p e n d i c u l a r t o t h e

of

Since t h e Soviets d i d not adequately p r o t e c t t h e i r

attack.

due t o an i n c o r r e c t i n t e l l i g e n c e a ~ s e s s m e n t , t h e Germans were a b l e t o

advantage

o f e n t e r i o r l i n e s o f o p e r a t i o n t o conduct c o n c e n t r i c a t t a c k s .

Critical

to

decisive

points

these

lines

German

operations.

Manstein

communications

decisive

points.

Man5teiri

moved

armor
the

operations

above.
of

lines

had

was

For

iupport

retention

example,

in

Roitov

to

the identified

of

the

early

defensive

p r r r l l e l m d t h e i r l i n e of

g r e a t d i f f i c u l t y i n i t i a l l y h o l d i n g open t h e l i n e s

A G A i n t h e Caucasus due t o t h e S o v i e t a t t a c k s a g a i n s t

to

However,
supplies

using
and

interior

ammunition

lines

and

contra1 position,

over t h e r a i l network t o stage h i s

The a r m o r e d d i v i s i o n s o f 1 s t r ~ m p rArmy s t r u c k t h e f l a n l i s o f

forces.
Soviet

of

discussed

operations,

of

o f M a n s t e i n ' s o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n was h i s u s e o f l i n e s

attack

Hollidt

a6

divisions

from

on

Rostov

maneuver

AD

by

pivot

using

points.

Hollidt,

he

the

strongpoints

Stripping

the

6th

provided

by A D

and 1 1 t h Plagr

r a p i d l y concentrated firepower t o stop four

Soviet

c o r p s a t t a c k i n g h i 5 l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t h a t p a r a l l e l e d t h e Sea o f

Azov.

Through

strongpoints
decisive

proper

and

a n a l y s i s and d e f e n s e o f d e c i s i v e p o i n t s w i t h i n f a n t r y

the

points,

agility

Manstein

was

to

mas5

able

m o b i l e f i r e p o w e r a t t h e s e and o t h e r

to

protect

his

lines

o f s u p p o r t by

o p e r a t i n g on i n t e r i o r l i n e s o f o p e r a t i o n .
emample o f M a n S t e i n ' E u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l i n e s of o p e r a t i o n was t h e

Another
direction

and

strength

counteroffensive
and

57th

nose

of

firepower
attack

to

divergent

forces,

his

counteroffensive.

initial

SS h f l g . ~ ( [ - C o r p i

Soviet

and

He

staged h i s

a t K r a s n o g r a d and 4 8 t h P _ ~ m e ~ . C o r p s

P.anaer.Corp5 n o r t h o f Zaporozhye,
the

b:rdKliograd

of

line

of

operation.

Zaporozhye

as

strongpoints

t o g r i n r c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n on t h e
Using
he

the

deciiive

points

of

maneuvered t h e c o n c e n t r a t e d

o f t h e s e f o r m a t i o n s on e x t e r i o r l i n e s o f o p e r a t l o n e i n a c o n c e n t r i c
destroy
attack

the
on

Soviet

interior

6 t h Army and 1 s t Guards Tank A r m y .

lines

Though a

w o u l d h a v e been t h e sasier t o s u p p o r t ,

[I31

this

cautious

approach would n o t have produced d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s .

Manstein's

b o l d e r u5e o f e x t e r i o r l i n e s o f o p e r a t i o n r e s u l t e d i n o p e r a t i o n a l v i c t o r y .

os.XBtional.ceve!.. Gonk?_t..P??war_
level

will

paper

This

combat

combat

examine

in

power

power

transition.

Tacticdl

leadership,

maneuver,

just

use of t h e elements o f o p e r a t i o n a l

h i s K h a r k o v campaign.

the

Is

Manstein's

next

critical

considerations
firepower

of

M a t u r e , c a p a b l e , and c r e d i b l e

factor

in

successful

operational

combat

power c e n t e r on f o u r a r e a s 1
These same f o u r p o i n t s a r e

and p r o t e c t i o n .

i m p o r t a n t a t t h e O p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l b e c a u s e t h e y a r e t h e means t o t h e

as

attainment

of operational objectives.

intelligence

functions,

Additionally,

a t the operational level

deception e f f o r t s , generation of operational reserves

and s u s t a i n r e n t c a p a b i l i t y m a t e r i a l l y i m p a c t combat power.

Leadership
power.
keys

In

is

the

Kharkov

t o success.

ahead

and

set

HanStRin

also

strengths

and

design

of

the

most i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t o f o p e r a t i o n a l combat

campaign,

M a n s t e i n ' s l e a d e r s h i p and v i s i o n were t h e

H I S a b i l i t y t o s e e t h e l o n g t e r m v i e w p e r m i t t e d him t o p l a n
29
the c o n d i t i o n i f o r the t r a n s i t i o n to the counteroffensive.

understood
accurate

the

conditions

perhaps

the

estimate

appropriate

o f t h e enemy.

mind
of

Soviet

strategy

and

H i s assensrents o f Soviet

i n t e n t i o n s were c r u c i a l t o t h e

operational plan that created the

He u n d e r s t o o d t h a t t h o u g h t h e S o v i e t s were

f o r the counterstroke.

tenacious

on

t h e d e f e n s i v e , t h e y were l i a b l e t o p a n i c d u r i n g t h e u n c e r t a i n t y

attendant

to

deep

mistakes

and

T h i s enabled him t o t a k e advantage of S o v i e t

operations.

weaknesses

such

a s P o p o v ' s p o o r l y s u p p o r t e d and d i f f u s e d deep

s t r i k e and 6 t h A r m y ' s p o o r l y c o n d u c t e d m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n .
On
German

the

other

leaders

and

s.uftia.gstaktik

and

in

of

the

moves

tasks.
their
played

German
enemy,
on

Manstein's

capabilities

hand,

and
ensmy

vision

Manstein

formatlons.
did

also
He

understood

relied

on

the

German

philosophy of

n o t r e s t r i c t h i s o p e r a t i o n a l and t a c t i c a l commanders

t h e i r armored f o r m a t i o n s .
soldier.

and

Manstein's
neaknemi
never

German

I n s t e a d , h e gave them l o n g r a n g e

leadership

were s u p e r i o r t o t h a t o f

l e a d e r s h i p c r e a t e d an o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n t h a t
and

accentuated

exceeded

his

German

knowledge

as h e t u r n e d a r o u t i n t o a v i c t o r y ,

operational transition,

the c a p a b i l i t i e s of h i s

Strengths..
of

his

Army

Finally,
Group's

a c l a s s i c care of successful

second

armored

German

element

of

combat

power

that

gave M a n s t e i n a d i s t i n c t

wa5 t h e German s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e i r enemy i n t h e maneuver p r o w e s s

advantage
of

key

formations.

t h e b a t t l e s o f November 42 t o March 4 3 ,

Throughout

a b i l i t y t o s y n c h r o n i z e maneuver t o s u p p o r t s t a t i c s t r o n g p o i n t s s p e l l e d

success.

Of

particular

Corps.

Using

mobility,

notably

17th

note

were

the

Chir

R i v e r b a t t l e s o f 4 8 t h Panzer

a g i l i t y and f l e x i b i l i t y ,

Pqnzec. D i v ,

the 48th

C o r p s , and

open t h e l l n e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o f A G

held

defeating

t h e a t t a c k s o f t h e S o v i e t S t h G u a r d s Tank Army.

maneuver

wa5

the

Pinm~r.

SS

A n o t h e r example o f

and

in

d e f e a t o f t h e 6 t h Army,

1 s t Guards Tank Army

3 r d Tank Army a f t e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n .

F l e x i b i l i t y of mind

and

the

and

agility

permitted

their

of

by

sb:iftness

~ y o 6 s . d ~ u t . q ~ h l a nDd i v

impact

P_aj;R!

Corps

and

the

German f o r m a t i o n r r t o g a i n maneuver s u c c e s s f a r o u t o f

p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e i r s i z e and power.
Closely
power,

tied

with

firepower.

because

it

maneuver

German

made

the

is

the

firepower

defense

n e x t e l e m e n t o f o p e r a t i o n a l combat

was e s s e n t i a l t o o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n

work

and

provided

the

strength

for

the

counteroffensive.

Qerman o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n c o n t i n u a l l y p l a c e d s u p e r i o r means

at

points.

the

decisive

Guards

Armored

firepower
left

poorly

flanks

P a ~ z e r . Div

aircraft,

the

use

of

mobile

firepower

and
the

the

protected.

The

Germans

a l l o w e d t h e i r enemy t o
Slmultaneoumly,

the l l t h

Using tanks,

i n f a n t r y i n t h e d e f e n c e , t h e Germans massed t h o i r f i r e p o w e r t o
Soviet

massed

the

powerful

force

under

Army

and

As t h e S o v i e t Armored C o r p i a t t a c k e d , t h e y

s t r u c k t h e entended S o v i e t f o r m a t i o n from t h e r e a r .

Manstein

the

illustrates

Corps

D i v i s i o n ' s attack against the Soviet

t o h i t t h e s t r o n g p o i n t o f 6 t h P.abze~D i v .

penetrate

P.aniRi.

P!,R~T

o f t h s t a c t i c a l defenme.

their

destroy

llth

Guards

firepower
the

concentrated

powerful

armor

Armored

of

of

all

control
all

i t 5

During the counteroffensive,

Corps. 3'

of

t h e armor o f AD H o l l i d t t o c r e a t e a
4th

n Army.

armor i n t o 4 0 t h F ' a m r

Additionally,
Corps.

1st

Coupled w i t h

SS PanZ.e[,.Corps t h e Germans h a d s u p e r i o r i t y i n m o b i l e

firepower.
Central
his

use

provided
could

of

to

M a n s t e i n ' s s u c c e s s i n t h e v a s t apace6 o f t h e S o v i e t f r o n t was

airpower.

The r e s p o n s i v e n e s s and l e t h a l i t y o f German a i r f l e e t s

m o b i l e f i r e p o w e r t o s u p p o r t t h e P_@~.mpr f o r m a t i o n s when t h e a r t i l l e r y

n o t keep up w i t h t h e speed and d e p t h o f t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .

concentrated

air

power

ranging

far

ahead

and

With h i s

i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h massed

overwhelmed t h e d i s p e r s e d S o v i e t f o r m a t i o n s .
a r t i l l e r y , German P_mz.~s.

The

final

element

of

combat

power,

protection, a l s o played a r o l e in

IliteinS
success.
T h e critical i s s u e w a s that Manstein stabilized h i 5
f r o n t t o protect h i s c o u n t e r s t r o k e forces.
He fortified t h e a p p r o p r i a t e
d e c i s i v e p o i n t s with infant ry and artillery. Then h e used s t r o n g p o i n t s a 5
p i v o t 5 for m o b l l e armor counterattacks. Armored f o r m a t i o n s did not h a v e t o
worry
1st

about their f l a n k i or s h o u l d e r s s i n c e infantry, s u c h a s C o r p s Raus and

SS Pjn.m.pr Div in t h e north and 1 1 1 P a _ n z ~ r . C o r p sand 30th Army C o r p s in

t h e s o uth, protected t h e d e c i s i v e points. Because o f their better maneuver

a g i l i t y and their a b i l i t y t o protect their f o r c e s at t h e d e c i s i v e point s ,
German

tactical

their

armor

strength
out

his

the

Fu rthermore,

exhausted

relatlve

without

had freedom t o act and t o d e v e l o p S.ch.+!erpunkts

formations.

of

in

liaderr

Manstein

was

infantry formations.

able

with

to conserve the

German infantry could hold

comfort when compared to their Soviet c o u n t e r p a r t s who w e r e

benefit

of

t h e warmth of t h e villages that formed t h e decis i v e

points.
I n t e lligence w a s a key f u n c t i o n that contributed t o G e r m a n success.
G e r m a n intelligence concerning t h e m o v e s of t h e Soviet armor f o r m a t i o n s was
n e a r perfect.
Monitoring Soviet r a d i o traffic allowed t h e G e r m a n s t o h a l t
the

S o viet

economy

drives

of

force

information
brigades.

by

meaiures

provided
Once

mamsing
in

at t h e critica1 t i m e and p l a c e w h i l e tak i n g

other

areas.

Later,

this

s a m e s o u r c e of

critical i n f o r n a t i o n ali t o t h e location of Soviet arm o r

they

fixed t h e Soviet brigades, the G e r m a n s massed strong e r

c o m b a t power againit t h e m and de6troyed them piecemeal.

A

German

major

strength

w a s t h e u s e o f deception a s a key combat power

m u l t i p l i er

that allowed t h e operational plan t o work. Their deception e f f o r t s

sought

portray

to

operations
forces.

weskneis

while
Nanitein

m a n i p u l a ting

their

not

the

b e lieve

to

t h e S o v i e t s along t h e c h o s e n Soviet line o f

sinultaneously
knew

protecting

the

German

that t h e S o v i e t s could b e deluded b y reinforcing and

p e r c e p t i o n s and e v p e c t a t i o n s of 5uccess.
Germrni

counteroffensive

could

ever

set

up

T h e S o v i e t s did

a d e f e n s i v e l i n e on the Mius

River 32
Likewise, every p i e c e of information concerning German armor
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s w a s interprete d by t h e S o v i e t s a s merely armor covering f o r c e s
for
a
general withdrawal
a b a n d o n m ent of Kharkov by
hold

at

retreat. 3 4

dl1

costm,
Finally,

to

Dneiper River. 33
Additionally, t h e
66 P&nw~p.r Corps, which w a s ordered b y Hitler to

convinced
Mrnmteinm

the

the

Soviets

that

prioritization

t h e G e r m a n s w e r e in full

of nuatainncnt r e s o u r c e s to

his

counteroffensivs

iorces

weaker.

Sovietp,

These

giving

cumulative
URilkne6E

forces

of

weaker

ground

1st

and

forces

4th

P z . e m Armies nsdu h i s o t h e r

fought

reluctantly,

but

desperate a c t i o n s against t h e

falling

back

nonetheleis.

Ths

e f f e c t o f t h e s e a c t i o n s r e i n f o r c e d t h e S o v i e t assessment o f tierman
and

their

confidence

in

the

offensive

p l a n upon whlch t h e y had

embarked.
Ths
of

final

their

combat

sustainment
the

of

that

appropriately
operational
their

diligently

may

had

mobile

t o g e n e r a t e and s u s t a i n combat power I r

effort

plan's

operational

use

for

deciiivu

The

key

to

the

to

Bernan

results

when

i u c c e i r i n t h e d e f e n i e and t h e

to

and

hm

would need a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e b t o w i n t h e

to

transition

to

He worked

the offenre.

sustainment

to

forward

these

these
to

use

Likswiie,

gunerated

Once

Though H l t l u r r u l e a r e d t h e p o w u r f u l SS

failud,
in

mhoring

up t h e d e f e n s e and r e t a k i n g

t h e f o r c e o u t o f t h e f i g h t so t h a t he m i g h t use t h e n

liept

his

to

hi

Manstein

assets

sent

but

mannsr.

from

transition.

Wanstein's a b i l i t y t o

t o g e n e r a t e f o r c e s was c r i t l c a l t o h i s o p e r a t i o n a l

defense

HdnStRin

firepower

t h e enemy becomes

o f f e n s e was t h e g u n u r r t i o n o f armor r e s e r v e s

determined

design,

Corps

A l a c k of

transition.

t h e r e l e a s e o f f o r c e s f r o m AG A and A Q C e n t r a l t o f u l f i l l h i s

for

artillery

were

o f f o r c e g e n e r a t i o n o f r e s e r v s s and

i n t h i s area w i l l l e a v e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l commander w i t h

improvise

decisive

Impact

campaign

weakened.

Hu

operational

and

he

and

operational

In

the

the

Tho

transition

transition.

Kharhov,

is

s u s t a i n r e n t d u r i n g the o p e r a t i o n a l defenro.

anticipate

P_rn_mgr

power

capabilities

force

and

o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g German s t r e n g t h r i n t h e us8

operations.

linchpin

credible
no

paint

his

defending
the

forces

ruthlmsi

of

armor

and

f o r c e s and t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t h i s

critical
were

mtripping

reserves

staged,

for

the

operational

t h e b u l k o f German s u p p l l s s

formations. Manstsin, t h e r e f o r e , p r i o r i t i z e d firepower

his

counterstroke

f o r c e s a t t h e enpensu o f h i s f o r w a r d

defending elemsnts.

review o f the preceding analysis gives focus t o t h e emsuntidl questions

of

t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n . F i r s t , M a n s t e i n u n d e r s t o o d what m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n s had

to

be

produced

i n t h e s o u t h e r n wing t o s c h i s v u H i t l e r ' r i r m e d i a t e s t r a t e g i c

goals.

Though H i t l e r and t h e German General s t a f f wure o u t o f t o u c h w i t h t h e

reality

of

strategic

the

E a s t e r n F r o n t , N a n s t e i n p e r s e v e r e d and f i n a l l y persuaded h i 6

authorities

to

harmonize t h e ends, ways, means and r i s k .

t171

Second,

operational

theoretical

e l e m e n t s of c e n t e r of g r a v i t y , c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t , d e c i s i v e p o i n t s

and

lines

large

of

mcale

Finally,

German

rempect

power

were

means

combat
but

the

four

an

that c r u s h e d 3 Soviet armies.

envelopment

r e s o u r c e s w e r e far s u p e r l o r t o t h e S o v i e t s in

power

Central t o M a n s t e i n ' s o p e r a t i o n a l level c o m b a t

numbers.

maneuver c o u p l e d with h i s a b i l i t y

f o r c e s a 6 o p e r a t i o n a l reserves. Through t h e s e e l e m e n t s o f c o m b a t

these actions, he properly applied his resources to accomplish the

and

required

into

assessed

Manstein's o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n c o n v e r t e d a

t h e e l e m e n t s of l e a d e r s h i p and

generate

power

correctly

operationlsupport.
withdrawal

every
to

design

essential

Manstein's

sequence

accomplish

Manstein's operational design balanced ends,

actions.

in 6 u c h a way that h e used o p e r a t i o n a l level c o m b a t power t o

strategic ends through a rucceisful operational transition to

risk

and

of

the

a counteroffensive.

second

excellent

in

counteroffensive
to

of

rxample

dn

O p e r a t i o n a l t r d n s i t i o n is t h e Israeli

Sinai d u r i n g t h e 1973 Arab-Israeli War. In c o n t r a s t

the

t h e K h a r k o v c o u n t e r s t r o k e , t h e S i n a i c a m p a i g n w a s more e w p a n s i v e s i n c e t h e

Israelis
ends.

were
But,

their

able
to

to

arsume

understand

operational

plans,

the

the
we

strategic offensive to accomplish their

p r o b l e m s t h e I s r a e l i s f a c e d in i m p l e m e n t i n g

must

a c l o s e r look at t h e s t r a t e g i c and

take

o p e r a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n f a c i n g t h e antagonists.
As

urre

r e a u l t of t h e 1967 Arab-Israeli War both t h e A r a b s and t h e I s r a e l i s

in

dlfficult

positions.

D e f e n s e F o r c e s (IDF).

Israeli

The

Arabs

faced the seemingly invulnerable

T h e A r a b s k n e w that t h e i r a r m e d f o r c e s w e r e no

match

f o r t h e IDF In g r o u n d maneuver b a t t l e m o r traditional air c o m b a t ;

knew

too

that

overwhelming
massive
edge

lay

succes6

forces.

in

well-coordinated

surprise

attacks

attrition.

warfighting

with

I n t h i s manner, t h e IDF would b e forced t o c o n t e n d uith

a t t a c k B o n m u l t i p l e f r o n t s with o n l y a small s t a n d i n g army.

in

they

was

their

Consequently,
and

then

the

ability
Arab!,

to
had

transition

to
the

defensive

achieve
defense

their

battle o f
operational

to wear d o w n t h e

oblectives

rapidly

Israelis.

T h e Arab i n t e n t , t h e r e f o r e , War t o upset Israeli s e c u r i t y d o c t r i n e

t 181

to

fight

The Arab

and

i n f l u e n c e lsraeli n a t i o n a l m o r a l e t h r o u g h a war c a u s i n g h e a v y

negatively

Israeli casualties.

Arab m i l i t a r y g o a l s t o a c h i e v e t h i s e n d w e r e )

Egypt:

For

1 . C r o s s t h e Suez Canal with a m a s s i v e s a t u r a t i o n o f i n f a n t r y

antitank
systems
under
an
extensive antiaircraft missile

umbrella.

2 . Wear down Israeli c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a ainst t h e brid e h e a d s c a u s e

h e a v y c a s u a l t l e s t o t h e I D F , and
up with !he d e p i o y m e n t of
operational r e s e r v e s o f armor and a d d i t i o n a l m o b i l e a n t i a i r c r a f t
s y s t e m s t o t h e e a s t bank o f the S u e z Crnal.

3. Mount a 5 s t e r a t i c o f f e n s i v e t o c a p t u r e t h e Mitla and Gidi p a s s e s

t h i r t y , m i r e s e a s t of t h e canal

4. Await i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r e s s u r e t k a t w o u l d s t o p t h e war but l e a v e

Egypt i n p o s s e s s i n n 0 4 her gains.

?allow

F o r Syria!
1 . Conduct a m a s s i v e a r m o r e d a t t a c k t o r a p i d l y c a p t u r e t h e G o l a n

H e i g h t 5.

2. A s s u m e t h e d e f e n s e t o hold t h e River J o r d a n and t h e Sea o f

Gal i 1 ee.
3. Wear d o w n Israeli f o r c e s and, i f g i v e n t h e o p p o r t u n i t y , a t t r c k t o

c a p t u r e e a s t e r n Galllee.

their

For

attacl:

using

by

barricading
war

plans

terrain

part, lirasl had been a b l e t o r e d u c e her v u l n s r a b i l i t y t o Arab

the

captured

Sinri

desert

that

to

prevent

useful

for

intended

would

IDF

be
was

the

the

land

u s e i n c e a s e f i f e negotiations.

of

preponderance
warning

deployment
war

of

fortified

buffer

unfavorable

foremost

political

I f lsrrel w e r e

W i t h a small i t a n d i n g army and t h e

A r a b attack, e a r l y m o b i l i z a t i o n o f r e m e r v e r and r a p i d

any

of

bargaining.

power i n t h e r e s e r v e s , Israel d e p e n d e d o n

combat

to the front under

was

Israeli

d i r e c t e d t o d e u t r o y t h e Arab f o r c e s and c a p t u r e Arab

nrtional

of

and

initial Arab r t t a c k f r o m y a i n i n g

political

attacked,

early

t h e Q o l r n H e i g h t s a g a i n s t S y r l a n o b i e r v r t i o n and attack.
were

for

rs

p r o t e c t i v e air umbrellr.

importance

rnd

economic

to

Israeli

However, deterrence

security

due

to

their

situation. As a r e s u l t of t h e 1967 wrr,

many

nations

s a w Israel a s t h e aggressor.

used

in

p a s t , s u c h a s p r e e m p t i v e s t r i k e s , would n o longer b e a c c e p t a b l e

to

the

Though t h e r e s u l t s of t h e 1967 war had r e d u c e d t h e

t h e rest of t h e world.

length

of

Israel's

M i l i t a r y m e a s u r e s t h a t Irrrel had

b o r d e r s , t h e d e f e n s e of t h e s e b o r d e r s w a s more d i f f i c u l t

s i n c e Israel had t o a v o i d any r p p e r r a n c e of b e i n g t h e aggressor.

Realizing
massive
as

that

Israeli

standing

concentratlon

armies

and initial a d v a n c e s would p r o v o k e a

the Arabs sought to make their attack as powerful

response,

As

possible.

Arrb

a r e s u l t , t h e A r a b s i n c r e a s e d t h e potential of their l a r g e
t h r o u g h a eucceisful long r a n g e d e c e p t i o n plan.

full

dress

rehearsals

1972

until

JunP

1973.

and

A series of

e x t e n s i v e m a n e u v e r s ware c o n d u c t e d f r o m December

Israel

enpended

preciour

economic

and

military

re5ource5

in

decision

was

reaction

to

made

reduce

to

these

and e v e n t u a l l y a political

demonstrationr

t h e level of v i g i l a n c e and r e s p o n s e .

In this

way, t h e A r a b s set t h e s t a g e for s t r a t e g i c and operational surprise.

That
and

c a m e o n b O c t o b e r 1973, when t h e A r a b s l a u n c h e d a p o w e r f u l

surprise

coordinated

confusion

Arab

caused

In

attack.

by

the

Sinai,

t h e IDF a d d e d t o t h e initial

t h e E g y p t i a n a t t a c k by t a k i n g poor t a c t i c a l m e a s u r e s to

help t h e isolated d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s o n t h e S u e z Canal. C o u p l e d with t h e i l l advised

efforts , t o save

launched

series

bridgeheads.

of

(See

the

doomed

uncoordinated

Hap

counterattacks

641

page

9,

strongpoints

the

c a n a l , t h e IDF

against

the

Egyptian

As a r e s u l t , E g y p t e n j o y e d t r e m e n d o u s

Within 24 h o u r s o f t h e initial

a s u p e r i o r i t y o f force.

and

on

initial

success

attack,

s o m e 100,000 E g y p t i a n s o l d i e r s , 1,000 t a n k s and 13,500 o t h e r v e h i c l e s

crossed

the

Suez

T h e E g y p t i a n air d e f e n s e u m b r e l l a c o n t r o l l e d t h e

a i r s p a c e over t h e b a t t l e a r e a and d e s t r o y e d 27 IDF a i r c r a f t .

The

left

s u r p r i s e a t t a c k and t h e power of t h e E g y p t i a n f o r c e s a c r o s s t h e canal

front

Egyptian

f a c e d t h e S y r i a n s , mas e v e n m o r e desperate.
preclpitated

political

created
the

IDF

the

Syrian

in c h a o s in t h e Sinai, but t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e G o l a n H e i g h t s ,

IDF

the

where

3h

the

and

of

series

military

Egyptian

failures,

linked

T h e e v e n t s on t h e

mistakes

in

t h e Sinai.

to Syrian incompetence,

o p p o r t u n i t y for t h e s u c c e s s f u l Israeli o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n i n

Sinai.

T h e r e f o r e , t o e x p l a i n t h e Israeli c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e in t h e S i n a i ,

w e must first e x a m i n e t h e e v e n t s on t h e G o l a n Heights.

The
broad

Syrians
front

brigades,
gained

opened

attack

portion

consisting

of

tactical

breakthroughs

through

the

gaps

onslaught

to

divisions

and

many

( S e e Hap 1 1 , p a g e 7 6 )
the

independent
They q u i c k l y

IDF l i n e s and l a u n c h e d t h e i r a r m o r e d

operational

o n l y 180 tanks.

depth.

The surprised Israelis

Though spread o u t , I D F f o r c e s

opposed

this

reacted

well by using i n t e r i o r l l n e s o f o p e r a t i o n s . H o w e v e r , t h e y w e r e s o r e l y

pressed

and

Syrians

r e n e w e d t h e a t t a c k north of K u n e i t r a and breached t h e d e f e n s e with an

armored

division

their

Golan

with

of

the coordinated offinmivr with a

of

three

f o r c e with some 800

divisions

their

h e a d q u a r t e r s w a s q u i c k l y surrounded.

B y E Oct t h e

o p e n i n g t h e road t o t h e Mediterranean. T h e s e r e n e w e d S y r i a n

t h r u s t 5 p r e s e n t e d t h e most s e r i o u s t h r e a t ever t o t h e h e a r t l a n d of Israel.

The
and

Israeli

strategic

defeat
position

the
of

g o v e r n m e n t d e c i d e d t o t a k e a d v a n t a g e of its central p o s i t i o n
interior

Syrians
Israel

lines

attacks

to
that

shift

its s t r a t e g i c c e n t e r of g r a v i t y to

t h r e a t e n e d central Israel.

The strateqic

f a v o r e d t h i s a c t i o n s i n c e i t w a s 100 m i l e s f r o m t h e S u e z
c201

Canal

to

the

Heights.

Israeli

more

than

Sinai

t h e r e w a s no s u c h d e p t h on t h e G o l a n

but

as a r e s u l t o f t h e p o o r l y e n e c u t e d c o u n t e r a t t a c k s of

Additionally,

t h e IDF S o u t h e r n C o m m a n d w a s in s h o c k over t h e t r a g i c l o s s e s of

October,

8-9

frontiers,

until

in two days.30

tanks

260

they

were

Egyptian

operational

measures

against

prepared

design.

the

C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e IDF a c c e p t e d risk in

mentally
Accordingly,

Egyptians

and

m a t e r i a l l y to deal with t h e

and

threw

the
the

IDF t o o k e c o n o m y of f o r c e
f u l l weight of t h e i r a r m e d

f o r c e s a g a i n s t t h e Syrians.
The

IDF

measure

to

Unlike

the

faced a s t r o n g S y r i a n f o r c e t h a t had g a i n e d s u c c e s s d u e in l a r g e
the

this

initial

S y r i a n i had n o S u e z canal t o o v e r c o m e a n d , thus,

T h e IDF, t h e r e f o r e , c o u n t e r a t t a c k e d

a d e c i s i v e d e f e n s i v e victory by f i r s t a b s o r b i n g t h e S y r i a n a t t a c k

their

regular

counteroffensive
counterstroke,

forces

with

their

IDF

the

Syrian

Map

Hence,

s u c c e s s w a s m o r e a r e s u l t of b e t t e r s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n t h a n any

gained

(See

the

t a c t i c a l or o p e r a t i o n a l skills.

improved

1,100

a t t a c k i n g t h e e n t e n d e d Israeli f r o n t in t h e Golan.

c o n c e n t r a t e and a c h i e v e initial s u c c e s s much more easily.

could

with

of

Egyptians,

they

and

ease

and

Egyptian

pressure

However,

it

in

second

mobilized

rapidly

Arab

11/12, p a g e

and

tanks

the

r e s e r v e forces.

launched

utage

for. t h e

Marshalling for the

counteroffensive, destroying
39
and d r i v i n g t o w i t h i n 22 mllss of Damascus.

76-77)
Sinai

setting

to

the

stunned

Gyria

c r i e d for a r e s u m p t i o n o f

p r e s e n t I s r a e l with a two f r o n t war,

again

t o o l a t e , with S y r i a v i r t u a l l y d e f e a t e d , I s r a e l w a s a l r e a d y

war

p r e p a r i n g for its o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e in S i n a i .
Though
launch
they

Egyptian

operational

counteroffensive,

could

pressure

still

off

commanderr

Egyptian

were

a w a r e o f Irrreli p l a n s t o

political leaders disagreed, believing

m a n a g e t o disrupt t h e Israeli f o r c e s in S i n a i and t a k e t h e

Syria. B e n d i n g under S y r i a n p r e s s u r e , Anwar el S a d a t , P r e s i d e n t

of

E g y p t , and Gen. Ahmed Ali Ismail, M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n s e , p r e s s u r e d

el

Shazly,

the

Gen Grad

Chief of S t a f f , E g y p t i a n A r m e d F o r c e s , for a n i m m e d i a t e a t t a c k on

Sinai

passes.

Shazly

operational

plan. 40

He knew that an a t t a c k would f a c e t h e Israeli Air F o r c e ,

leadership

commanders
not

adamant

that

this

was

contrary

to

the

t h e SAM u m b r e l l a w a s not yet r e a d y t o m o v e f o r N a r d , and E g y p t i a n f o r c e s

since
and

was

tie

were

fought

swayed

and

to

not

yet

stick
ordered

ready

for

s u c h a bold move.

S h a z l y and his

t o t h e o r i g i n a l p l a n , but t h e p o l i t i c i a n s w o u l d
the

attack

pleas. (See Map 9 8 , p a g e 721

c211

f o r 14 October in a n s w e r t o S y r i a n

The
thrust

worst
into

case

scenario

Sinai

from

envisioned

two

by t h e IDF was an E g y p t i a n a r m o r e d
41
w i t h 750 t a n k s on each a x i s .

directions

Fortunately,

h o w e v e r , t h e E g y p t i a n o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n was f a u l t y .

prepared

the

by

political
Syria.

gesture

with

Egyptian

design

of

maintain

the

the

over

attack,

of

with presidential input for a purely

a s e c o n d a r y m i l i t a r y e f f e c t o f r e l i e v i n g p r e s s u r e on

politicians

d i s r u p t e d t h e e n t i r e s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l

Army

Egyptian
bridgehead

the

Egyptians

The

front,

did

while

b a t t l e f i e l d . 43

tanks.44

Defense

t h e campaign p l a n a g a i n s t t h e b e t t e r judgment o f E g y p t i a n m i l i t a r y
The

of

Minister

The p l a n was

not

the

resources

t o a t t a c k and

simultaneously c o n t r o l l i n g t h e a i r dimension

Therefore,
reduced

have

to

the

generate

west

bani!

t h e armor needed f o r t h e

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s t o 100

E g y p t i a n s a t t a c k e d on a t o t a l o f s i x a x e s s p r e a d o v e r 100 m i l e s
thereby

s t r e n g t h . 45

reducing

their

concentration

and

dissipating

combat

l a c k of f i r e p o w e r a l l o w e d t h e IDF t o u s e t a c t i c a l i n t e r i o r

This

l i n e s and a c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n t o d e s t r o y each a t t a c k i n t u r n .
Based
the

on

strategic

abortive

armored

Egyptian

attacks

operational

position,

Israelis

placed

six

crossing

c i t e s47

gravity,

which

Israelis

O c t o b e r had c l e a n e d t h e west bank o f

advantage

04 t h e weakened E g y p t i a n

either

strength

against

Israelis

massed

only

brigades

and

the
two

principle
infantry

of

ma65, t h e

brigades

at the

o f t h e t w o E g y p t i a n a r m i e s now on t h e e a s t b a n k .

two

risky

Applying

t h e enemy l a c k o f E g y p t i a n i n i t i a t i v e on t h e e a s t b a n k ,

of

used

canal.

s t r i k e f o r c e t o t r a p and d e s t r o y t h e enemy c e n t e r o f

was

in

the

arrored

as

advantags

bridgehead

I4

t h e IDF knew

IDF p r e p a r e d t o l a u n c h t h e l o n g a w a i t e d and t h o r o u g h l y p l a n n e d

the

across

the

of

Taking

counteroffensive

'Taking

i n t e l l i g e n c e p r o v i d e d by t h e Americans,

but

armored

brigades

to

p i n t h e e n t i r e t w o army

economy

of

force

effective

measure.

Pitting

weakness a t a d e c i s i v e p o i n t w i t h an i n d i r e c t dpprOdCh, t h e
eighty

p e r c e n t o f t h e i r a v a i l a b l e combat power on one a x i s .

(See Map 10, page 7 3 )

I6 O c t o b e r I s r a e l i t a n k s succeeded i n c r o s a i n g t h e c a n a l a t D e v e r s o i r ,

On
between
to

the

counter

the

point

for

this

E g y p t i a n 2nd and 3 r d Army.

such
of

penetration.

branch
Failing

the
east

Egyptians
side

a contingency

of
to

the

The p r e - w a r E g y p t i a n o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n

w a r a c o n c e n t r a t e d armored c o u n t e r a t t a c k a t

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e f o r c e s d e s i g n a t e d and t r a i n e d
operational

p l a n were d e s t r o y e d i n t h e 1 4 O c t o b e r

g r a s p t h e m a g n i t u d e and danger o f t h e I s r a e l i s t r i k e ,

d i r e c t e d t h e 2nd Army t o d e s t r o y t h e I s r a e l i b r i d g e h e a d on t h e

o f t h e c a n a l b y a t t a c k i n g f r o m t h e n o r t h . The 2 5 t h A r m Ede, 04 t h e
t 221

Egyptian

3rd

Army

below D e v e r r o l r , a t t a c k e d t h e I m r a s l i bridgehead from t h e

5 0 ~ 1 t h . ~
The
~

p o o r l y coordinated a t t a c k s r e s u l t e d I n a confused, h a l f - h e a r t e d

effort.

The

2nd

However,

valiant

advance.

The

rapidly

moving

from

which

fire

of

large,

hot.

but

forces.

e f f o r t s b y IDF p a r a t r o o p e r s c h e c k e d t h e E g y p t l a n

t h e E g y p t i a n 2 5 t h Armor B r i g a d e . The c o n c e n t r a t e d

ambushed

brig ad^.^'

The E g y p t i a n

a g a i n s t t h e I s r a e l i b r i d g e h e a d f a i l e d and t h e p r e - w a r E g y p t i a n
c r u m b l e d as I s r a e l 1 t a n k s r u m b l e d t o t h e west bank o f t h e

(See Map I O A / l O B , page 74-75)

October,

Israeli

armor had d e v a s t a t e d enemy r e a r s e r v i c e s on t h e

d e m t r o y l n g c o n v o y s , h e a d q u a r t e r s , g u a r d u n l t r , and t h e d e a d l y S A M

bank,

batteries.

With

reintroduced

Egyptian

air

defense

cover

destroyed

and

maneuver

t o t h e b a t t l e on t h e e a s t bank, t h e I s r a e l i 6 pursued t h e k i n d o f

which

support

with

from i t s as%enbly areas t o concentrate i n defenslve p o s i t i o n s

design

18

at

attacked

tank b a t t a l i o n s a n n i h i l a t e d t h e Egyptlan

Suez C a n a l .

war

defensive

they

operational

west

Army

p o w e r f u l I s r a e l i e n p l o i t a t i o n f o r c e (Magen's D i v i s i o n ) r e a c t e d

counterattacks

By

Egyptian

they

eneelled.

Armor

thrusts

I n conjunction with close a i r

bagged e i g h t t h o u s a n d E g y p t i a n p r i ~ o n e r s . ~By
' n i g h t f a l l the I s r a e l i s

split

i n t o t w o d i v i s i o n s on t h e west bank, one u n d e r M a j . Ben. Sharon h e a d i n g

north

and

one

under

Gen.

Maj.

Adan

moving

south

and west t r a p p i n g t h e

E g y p t i a n 3 r d Army on t h e e a s t bank.

the
On

war,
22

Army

the

consisting

of

and

UN d e c l a r e d a c e a s e f i r e .
two

reinforced

divisions

By 24 O c t o b e r t h e E g y p t i a n 3 r d
e q u a l l i n g 45,000 men and 250

was c o m p l e t e l y c u t o f f , w i t h o u t f o o d o r w a t e r , d o m i n a t e d b y enemy armor

out

of

range o f a i r defense coverage.

communications
only

when t h e S o v i e t U n i o n began t h e C o n c e r t e d e f f o r t t o h a l t

t h e E g y p t i a n army and S y r i a n f o r c e s were s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o l l a p s i n g .

October

tanks
and

October,

19

On

were

protected

from

a t h i n E g y p t i a n tank screen.

The E g y p t i a n 2nd A r m y ' s l i n e s o f

Sharon's

r e v i t a l i z e d armor d i v i s l o n b y

Thus, t h e IDF had overcome t r e m e n d o u s odds

c o m p l e t e s u r p r i s e t o a c h i e v e a s t u n n i n g m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y w h i c h was c u r b e d

o n l y by t h e i n f l u e n c e o f t h e superpowers.

4nalusi.s
The
contrast
the

of

the

the

sides

fought

.!!.the_

1973

t o t h e German-Soviet

Soviets

neither
Both

analysis

! 9 7 3 ._nr.ab:!srae_!LM,r
Arab-Israeli

War

presents

E a t l t e r n F r o n t campaigns.

an

interesting

W h i l e t h e Germans and

an a b s o l u t e w a r w i t h t h e u n l i m i t e d a i m s o f a n n i h i l a t i o n ,

Egyptians

n o r t h e I s r a e l i s c o u l d f i g h t s u c h an e x t e n d e d b a t t l e .

f o u g h t t h e '73 War f o r l i m l t e d ends, w i t h l i m l t e d means u n d e r t h e

1231

eye

uatchful

In

Union.
must

be

superpowers,

in

namely

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e S o v i e t

f o r t h e a n e w e r s t o t h e q u e s t i o n s pored by t h e study i t

searching

kept

rerponies

the

of

mind

that any o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n had t o t a k e t h e p o s s i b l e

In almost every r e a l m , t h e s e o u t s i d e

o f t h e n u p e r p o w e r s i n t o mind.

influences

held

great

sway,

generation

and intelligence.

i n t h e a r e a s of k u s t a i n m e n t , f o r c e

eipecially

The a n t a g o n i s t s w e r e , t h e r e f o r e , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y

a l l i e d with o n e m u p e r p o w e r and under p r e s s u r e from t h e o t h e r .

O n c e a g a i n , t h e a n a l y s i s will c e n t e r o n a n s w e r i n g t h r e e broad questions!

1.

What m i l i t a r y c o n d i t i o n must b e produced in t h e t h e a t e r of war or

o erationr t o achieve t h e strategic goal?

( t h e l i n k a g e of s t r a t e g i c e n d s and m i l i t a r y means1

2. What s e q u e n c e o f a c t i o n s is most like]!

c o n d i t i o n ? (the o p e r a t i o n a l
ends, wayc, m e a n 8 and risk)

design

t o p r o d u c e that
hat r e s u l t s from b a l a n c i n g

3. H o w e h o u l d t h e r ~ s o u r c e sof t h e f o r c e b e applied t o a c c o m lish

that s e q u e n c e of a c t i o n s ?
( t h e , o erational level c o m at power
e l e m e n t s t h a t e n a b l e o p e r a t i o n a l design!

.Ways,. M e a n s and_ Rlak

Israeli political e n d s d e m a n d e d that 110 war t a k e p l a c e but that
EW.1

Foremost,

if

it

did,

strategic

Israeli

endm

maintain

Instead,

they

standing

expandable
deterring

short,

aggrersive,

and d e c i s i v e war t o p r e v e n t

army

based

army
war

their

available
but

equal

t o t h e t h e c o m b i n e d s t r e n g t h of t h e Arabs.

defense

in

72

on

hour6.

well-trained,

highly motivated,

Israeli d e f e n s e p o l i c y c e n t e r e d o n

t h e i r d e f e n s e plan a l s o had t h e element of p r e v e n t i n g t h e

f r o m c a p t u r i n g t e r r i t o r y which t h e y c o u l d u s e a s a political b a r g a i n i n g

chip.52

Operational

d e s i g n , t h e r e f o r e , f o c u s e d o n a b s o r b i n g t.he initial W a b

w h i l e r a p i d l y t r a n s i t i o n i n g to t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .

attack
that

demanded

must g a i n t h e i n i t i a t i v e w i t h o u t risks. Israeli

e c o n o m i c i l l s f r o m becoming t o o great. E c o n o m i c a l l y , Israel c o u l d not

Israeli

Arabs

forces

the

IDF

capture

Arab

territory

to

use

I t was essential

a s a b a r g a i n i n g tool in any

n e g o t i a t i o n s f o l l o w i n g a c e a s e fire.
Historically,
intelligence,
Iarael's
placed
while
Israel
only

key

early

victories,
them

in

the

Araba were seen

could

ingredients
mobilization

in
and

such

campaign

preemptive

plans

Were

a i r strikes.

superior

Ironically,

e s p e c i a l l y t h e ' b 7 War, hampered s u c h actions. T h e s e had

p o s i t i o n of t h e a g g r e s s o r in t h e w o r l d c o m m u n i t y ' s v i e w
a6

both h a p l e s s and h e l p l e s s against t h e IDF.

However,

not USP t h e s e w a y s for f e a r of political r e p e r c u s s i o n s with its

a l l y , t h e US. A S a r e s u l t , t h e d e f e n s e s t r a t e g y of Israel c o n t a i n e d many

contradictions.

I241

lo

overcome

static
!ine

linear

these
the

defensive

nature

SuCCessful
historical
the

small

IDF

of

US,

Israelis

chose to use a

with

an

operational

dichotomy.53

The quiescent,

line

p o r t e n d e d a t t r i t i o n w a r f a r e , t h e o p p o s i t e of

IDF

doctrine.

This

Created dissension over whether t o adhere t o

IDF

warfighting
of

a c t i v a t e t h e alert plan i n t e n d e d to p r o t e c t the

the

influence.
measures

d o c t r i n e and i m m e d i a t e l y s t r i k e d e e p or fight t o

to

Failure

strongporntr

security

the

the

Suer.

diplomatic

restraints,

d e f e n s i v e l i n e along t h e S u e z Canal. T h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l Bar-Lev

presented

hold

political

Bar-Lev

Political

for

fear

line

resulted

pressure

kept

from

undue

political-

t h e IDF from t a k i n g p r c d e n t

t h e i n t e r n a t l o n a l c o m m u n i t y , and e r p e c i a l l y t h e

would r e g a r d t h i s a c t t o n a s t h e h a r b i n g e r of Israeli p r e e m p t i v e strikes.

Israeli

opposing

operational

Arab

actions,

did

not

therefore,

accurately

end6

and

measure

the

risk

m e a n s w e r e not balanced.

of

The

r e c o n c i l e t h e r i s k s w i t h t h e m e a n s and e n d s a l m o s t p r e c i p i t a t e d

inability

to

disaster.

Fortunately,

recover

design

and,

after

Arab

short

mistakes,
but

E g y p t i a n , a l l o w e d t h e IDF t o

mostly

vicioup

attrition

battlem,

return

to

an

o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n b a s e d o n their d o c t r i n e of m a n e u v e r .

oePr,ti.!Y!a! ..OERlls!!
Israeli
provides

second

in

flenibility
mistakes

errors,
enemy

on

the
the

center

capabilities
correctly

s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n . Initial Israeli
flawed

essential
Israelis

ends-ways-means-riik

elements

effectively

of

equation

and poor

o p e r a t i o n a l design. R e a l i z i n g

all

employed

four

elements

of

d e s i g n to d e v e l o p thelr c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e concept. T h e y f o c u s e d on

operational
the

e x a m p l e of t h e i m p o r t a n c e of r o u n d o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n and

based
of

S o u t h e r n F r o n t d u r l n g t h e 1973 Arab-Israeli War

the

achieving

were

consideration
their

on

actions

of

and,

gravity.

thus,

identified

did

the

They
not

matched

emceed

decisive

their

their

o p e r a t i o n s with t h e i r

c u l m i n a t i n g point.

Israel

p o i n t s and namsed a g a i n s t then. F i n a l l y ,

and s u p p o r t w e r e p r o p e r and adequate.

Israel's

lines

detailed

l o o k at t h e s e i s s u e s will i l l u s t r a t e h o w t h e a e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f

operations

of

A more

o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n a s s i s t e d t h e Israeli o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t l o n .
The

focus. on

Israeli

their. s u c c e s s f u l
identity

the

the

armies

two

Egyptian
armies

Army

the

operations.

Egyptian
on
in

constituted

the
the
the

center
east

Egyptian
To

be

center of gravity w a s e6iential t o

successful,

T h e major g r o u n d c o m p o n e n t s w e r e

o f gravity.
bank,

south,
Egyptian

t h e I s r a e l i s f i r s t had t o

2nd E g y p t i a n Army in t h e n o r t h and 3rd

T h e IDF d e t e r m i n e d t h a t o n e or b o t h o f t h e r e
center

of

gravity.

If

either

could b e

or

defeated
these

t r a p p e d , t h i s would lead t o a n Israeli victory.

armies

vulnerable

Israelis

neutralize

antitank

weapons.

w a s n o easy task.

H o w e v e r , making

D e f e a t i n g them d e m a n d e d that t h e

t h e E g y p t i a n air d e f e n s e belt a 5 well a s t h e i r e x t e n s i v e

T o a c c o m p l i s h t h i s , t h e IDF attack f i r s t had t o defeat t h e

d e f e n s e u m b r e l l a , so that IDF a i r p o w e r c o u l d b e brought t o bear. Then t h e

air

ground

attack

Accordingly,
power

could

encircle

and

cut

off

the

enemy

a r m i e s indirectly.

IDF c o n c e n t r a t e d o n c r o s s i n g t h e canal with s u p e r i o r combat

the

t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e E g y p t i a n c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y indirectly.

This demanded

t h e c r e a t i o n of an Israeli f o r c e of s o m e s t r e n g t h .

Israel1
critical

to

gravity,

and

effectively
Israeli
to

of

success.

The

was

operational

generated

masked

armor

Egyptians

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s for t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e w a 5

generation

the
the

became

I s r a e l ' s Center o f

c o n d u c t i n g e c o n o m y of f o r c e o p e r a t i o n 5 that

Egyptian

brigades.

provided

by

reserve

bridgehead

of

two

armies

Nith only t w o

T h e r e l e a s e of f o r c e s from d i r e c t c o n t a c t with t h e
base for the

Israeli c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e force. A d d i n g

t h e b a s e H e r e t h e m o b i l i z e d armor and i n f a n t r y r e s e r v e b r i g a d e s r u s h i n g t o

the

Sinai.

O n c e t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e f o r c e w a s r e a d y , t h e I s r a e l i s held t h e

out

force

of

formidable
allowed

contact

enemy

with

defensive

the

enemy,

positions.

thus

declining combat against the

This pause i n aggressive operations

t h e I s r a e l i s t o r e a d y t h r e e f r e s h d i v i s i o n s for t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e

counteroffensive.
The

second

insure

they

surprise
the

critical

did

not

issue

reach

in

their

the

Israeli

defensive

operational concept was to

c u l m i n a t i n g point.

The total

g a i n s d by t h e A r a b 6 d i r e c t l y a f f e c t e d t h e Israeli a c t i o n s t h r o u g h o u t

war.

H a v i n g lost t h e i n i t i a t i v e in t h e S l n a i , t h e IDF r e s p o n d e d p o o r l y ,

attacking

E g y p t i a n i n f a n t r y with l i t t l e c o m b i n e d a r m s integration. During t h e

first

four

command
the

drys

of

decisions,

the

8-9

on

October

point.

Consequently,

October

to

of

14

attrition

recovery
place

predicted
the

stop

T h i s c o m b i n e d with t h e p a c e of t a n k

a q u i c k l y a p p r o a c h i n g Israeli c u l m i n a t i n g

l i r a e l i s a d o p t e d e c o n o m y of f o r c e m e a s u r e s from 9

O c t o b e r t o c r e a t e a n o p e r s t l o n a l p a u s e that s l o w e d their r a t e
and built up their f o r c e s t h r o u g h mobilization.

effortm

their

conducted

most c r i t i G a 1 being t o s e n d s c a r c e r e s e r v e s t o

i m m e d i a t e t h r e a t i n t h e Golan.

more

losses

war, t h e s h o r t a g e of r e s e r v e f o r c e s s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d

and

potential

rapid

Extensive tank

i n t c g r a t l o n o f r e s e r v e s a l l o w e d t h e I r r a e l i s to

culminating

point

out

of

reach. 4s a r e s u l t , t h e y

an o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s i v e l e s s t h a n o n e week after

t h e i r initial d i s a s t e r s .

Correct
successful
for

the

the

Suez

paints

operational
battle
Canal.

of

decisive

design.

The

the

Israeli
Sinai

attacks

decisive

point

passes.

which

provided

These

attempted

roads,

helped

the

the

launch

between

long

standing

protected the decisive

Israeli armor f o r m a t i o n s d e f e a t e d t h e

to

t h e p a s s e s o n 14 October.

seize

The

the

IDF

Gun.

two
plan

and

for

to

the

Sharon's
to

s t a g i n g areas.

manmuver

Egyptian

IDF

T o s u p p o r t t h i s c o n t i n g e n c y planning, t h e

bridges

points

haj.

Coincidentally,
seam

o f a r m o r force.

f o r t h e canal c r o s s i n g had been t h e s u b j e c t o f much s t u d y f o r

prepared

improvements

IDF had identified t h e d e c i s i v e p o i n t s

placement

IDF S o u t h e r n C o m m a n d in Sinai.

Israelis

points greatly contributed t o their

o f Sinai a s t h e Gidi and H i t l a p a s s e s and a c r o s s i n g s i t e o n

Egyptian
the

of

identification

armies.
October

use.

On

decisive

point

of

Derversoir,

acrosm

a t t a c k s and
the

canal.

T h i s i n f o r n a t i o n , c o u p l e d with t h e

ib

to

Egyptian

reconnaissance battalion discovered the

the

point

the

counteroffensive

crors

croesing

hold

These infrastructure

in

canal,
the

settled

t h e irsue o f which

IDF c r o s s e d t h e canal at t h e

what w a s t h e most c r u c i a l p h a s e of t h e i r

o p e r a t i o n a l transition.
A

advantage of the Israelis w a s their understanding of lines of

critical

operat.ion,

the

strategy

of

last

the

central

strategic

center

lines

operations

of

requires
central

those

element

of

on

position.

of

operational

design.

The

IDF

used t h e

p o s i t i o n and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r i o r l i n e s t o s h i f t its

gravity.

Strategically, t h e Arabs operated on enterior

and

IDF

on

i n t e r i o r lines.

lines

to

m a i n t a i n p r e s r u r s on a n e n e m y w i t h a

the

exturior

Fundamentally, this

H o w e v e r , Arab f a i l u r e t o d o t h i s a l l o w e d t h e IDF t o s h i f t

the

b u l k of its c o m b a t power first t o t h e G o l a n H e i g h t s to d e f e a t t h e S y r i a n s

and

second

the

15rseIis

gravity,
the
line5

on

canal,
of

Israel's
the

t h e Sinai t o d e f e a t t h e Egyptians.
successfully

these

strategic

divisions

and

split

while

interior

generation

transition.

massed

three

A t thm operational level,

d i v i a i o n f o r c e , t h e i r c e n t e r of

s i n g l e l i n e of o p e r a t i o n s for t h e S u e z crossing.

communications

force

Israelis

to

Once across

in d i v e r g e n t a t t a c k s to c u t t h e E g y p t i a n

m a i n t a i n i n g t h e i r o w n intact.

Additionally,

l i n e s of o p e r a t i o n and s u p p o r t w e r e c r i t i c a l t o
s u s t a i n m e n t e f f o r t in s u p p o r t of t h e

operational

lheir p r o p i t i o u s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l i n e s of o p e r a t i o n e n a b l e d t h e

t o s u c c e s s f u l l y use t h e i r c o m b a t power t o c o n p l e t e t h e i r o p m r a t i o n a l

t r a n s i t i o n with d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s .

I271

O p e r a t i o n a l Comb?t Power.

Perhaps

the

Israelis'

leadership

element

transition

from

excellent
ground
critical

in

to

offensive
of

the

2521

all

air.

combat

power

to

allow them to rapidly

l e v e l s e s p e c i a l l y at t h e t a c t i c a l level o n t h e

The

improvisational

skills o f t h e s e l e a d e r s w e r e

s e r i o u s f o r c e s t r u c t u r e p r o b l e m s that had g r o w n f r o m

emphasizing

t h e t a n k and t h e airplane. L e a d e r s h i p at t h e

t o u g h d e c i s i o n s , set t h e e x a m p l e and s u f f e r e d t r e m s n d o u s l y

commander

AOb
in

officers. 5 4

were

the

Sinai

standards...theee

stated1

qualities

Haj. Gen. A v a h r a m A d a n , a

As

"Courage,

...e n a b l e d

us

devotion,
to

take

and

high

calculated

We w e r e c o n f i d e n t that any t i m e a small unit w o u l d f i n d i t s e l f f a c i n g

risks.
an

at

killed,

professional

s t r e n g t h n a 5 their a b i l i t y t o apply t h e

d e f e n s e t o t h e offense. IDF o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n d e m a n d e d

the

concepts

division

operational

overcoming

made

the

the

leadership

and

front

of

greatest

mission,

'oversize'

The

disappoint.

ad. h q c ,

but

that

Israeli

effective

unit

would

surpass

itself and

would

not

o f f i c e r ' s a b i l i t y t o q u i c k l y i m p r o v i s e produced

tactical formations. Though p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f l i c t s at

o p e r a t i o n a l level wracked t h e IDF c o m m a n d s , Israe1'5 t a c t i c a l p r o w e 5 s and

the

improvisational

skills

resulted

tactical

support

and

air

operational

commander

in

victory

combined

based

his

arms

based

on speed, firepower,

operations.

Frequently,

the

p l a n o n h i s k n o w l e d g e of and c o n f i d e n c e in

t h e q u a l i t y of h i s s u b o r d i n a t e commanders.
The

Israelis

serious

problems

resulting
sought

in

in t h e i r initial a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e

many
to

their

casualties,

shortcomings.

but

t h e IDF l e a d e r s h i p quickly

Primarily

t h e IDF w a s not f o r c e

with c l o s e air s u p p o r t on t h e i r terms, C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e y r u s h e d

forward

received

unneccssary

f o r a c o m b i n e d a r m s effort. T h e Israeli c o m m a n d e n v i s i o n e d a f l u i d

battle

inadequate

without

crews.
little

free-wheeling
equipped

with

Deficient

in

dislodge

the

Artillery,

tank

Instead,

discovered

transporter

priority

develop.

IDF

successful

in t h e i r a b i l i t y t o m a n e u v e r in t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of t h e war

solutions

structured

tankm

less

e l e m e n t of c o m b a t power, n a m e l y maneuver. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e I D F s u f f e r e d

next

tank

were

battle

entire

artillery
enemy

guns

critical

moving

in

effective

antitank
the

in

support,

with
part

forward.

little

a m m u n i t i o n , and

of t h e c o m b i n e d a r m s team,
Though t h e IDF pressed for a

t h e Sinai d e s e r t , t h e maneuver b a t t l e did not

Egyptian

infantry,

in

a t a c t i c a l d e f e n s e and

and missiles, opposed Israeli armor. S o o n , t h e

Suez

front

was

on

the

operational

defense.

and mortars, t h e I s r a e l i s ' direct a p p r o a c h c o u l d not

infantry. 5 1

C o m m a n d e r s hastily t h r e w IDF r e s e r v e u n i t s
t281

into

the

fight.

As

rerult, t h e b a t t l e b e c a m e d e c e n t r a l i z e d and c o m m a n d

d i r e c t i o n w a s lost.

'The

following

reporter,

quote

indicates

from

the

Ze'ev

Gchiff,

Israeli m i l i t a r y

renowned

p r o b l e m s t h e lsrrelis i r c e d in c o m b i n e d

tremendous

a r m s m a n e u v e r at t h e o u t s e t of t h e war:

" T o f a c i l i t a t e t a n k mobility, t h e IDF n e lected o t h e r e l e m e n t s that

a r e t r a d i t i o n a l l y c o n s i d e r e d a part of ? h e a r m o r e d team. T h e fact

that t h e 1 D F ' s budget was l i m i t e d o n l y s e r v e d t o I n t e n s i f y t h i s

neglect;
artillery
w a s sli hted. Also
on low d e v e l o p m e n t
were unsuccessful
p r i o r i t y w a s t h e i n f a n t r y . d e n t h e 1sraeIf':anks
i n o posing
t h e Egy t i a n i n f a n t r y t h e lsraeli I n f a n t r w a s c a l l e d
in,
gut i n t h e firs! part of t h e war t h e r e few
i n t a n i r y units in
Sinai. "56

...

...

During

the

uituation
expert

operational

and

their

maneuver

prowess

bear

discussion.

on

armies

Egyptian

division

The

since

rapid
using

wrecked

The
east

enamples

economy
side
They

of

the

Egyptian

t h e i r r e v i t a l i z e d maneuver

of f o r c e o p e r a t i o n # m a s k i n g t h e two
t h e canal c o n t i n u a l l y p e r p l e x e d t h e
they

u e r e f a c i n g Ruch l a r g e r

d e f e n s e s o n t h e west bank o f t h e canal.

mobile,

The

flagen's d i v i s i o n in t h e a m b u s h of t h e E g y p t i d n 2 5 t h Armor

arms

armored

flanks,

of

thought

d e m o n s t r a t e d a g i l i t y and teamwork.

whereby

the IDF reassessed the

October

w e r e e f f e c t i v e l y p a r a l y z e d by i n c e s s a n t Israeli maneuver.

of

combined

while

9-14

t h r u s t by t h e IDF c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e f o r c e at t h e D e r v e r s o i r canal

reaction

Brigade

Some

commanders.

they

dynamic

crossing

the

of

g e n e r a t e d c h a n g e s i n t a c t i c s that r e s u l t e d in

analysis

operations.

Egyptian
forces

pause

to

great

effect.

and

artillery

infantry
hard

hitting

The liraelis eventually recovered

T h e t a c t i c s o f t h e 'armored
slowed

counterattacking

and

anvil",

checked the attackere

armor f o r c e s s t r u c k t h e e n e m y

d e s t r o y e d t h e E g y p t i a n a t t a c k s o f 14 October and t h e E g y p t i a n e f f o r t s

a g a i n s t t h e IDF croscciny s i t e on t h e c a n a l .
Israeli
have

fire

front,

u s e of f i r e p o w e r p r o v i d e s a n e x a m p l e o f t h e a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y t o
superiority

the

Israelis

dominance.
war,

the

only

transition

Israeli

after

firepower

IDF

part

of

capability

maneuver

war.

antitank

mi5siles

This
and

was

initially

A s a result of the

vested much o f its f i r e p o w e r in its air f o r c e a 5 an

had
a

On t h e s o u t h e r n

they achieved firepower

for t h e war t h e A r a b s p r e s e n t e d t o t h e IDF.

integral

Egyptians.

could

Specifically,

inappropriate
1967

in order t o s u c c e s s f u l l y transition.

tank-airplane
team

did

not

antiaircraft

team t h a t had been so e f f e c t i v e i n o p e n ,

work

against

missiler

t h e interlocking maze of

presented

to

t h e IDF by t h e

C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e I D F c o u n t e r a t t a c k s o f 8-9 O c t o b e r f a i l e d b e c a u s e

of

insufficient

stop

artillery

missile

these

insufficient

to

attacks

Unable to

s u p p r e s s t h e e n e m y a n t i t a n k nests.
on

the

t h e IDF a 1 5 0 f o u n d itself w i t h

tanks,

f i r e p o w e r t o g o in and root out t h e e n e m y i n f a n t r y m e n .

infantry

Using

old i t y l e c a v a l r y c h a r g e r , t h e IDF battered itself a g a i n s t t h e a n t i t a n k

nests

precisely

most

telling

the

E g y p t i a n o p e r a t i o n a l design had e n v i s i o n e d . 57

advantage

the

Israelis

enjoyed

The

t h e i r e x p e r t air-ground

was

The aircraft provided t h e operational fires required to support

integration.
the

a5

operational

ground

plan.

Both

the

air

and

ground

effort

were

complementary

and c r i t i c a l to t h e m a n e u v e r s u c c e s s of t h e Israeli main a t t a c k

on

bank

the

west

attacks
the

on

the

into

the

firepower,

E g y p t i a n a r m i e s and massed their a v a i l a b l e f i r e p o w e r at

two

point of D e r v e r i o i r t h a t t h e y w e r e a b l e t o b r i n g t h e i r airpower

decisive

back

of t h e csnal. It w a s not until t h e IDF s t o p p e d t h e direct

fight.

they

When

overcame

they

the

regained

Egyptian

t h e u s e of t h i s key element o f

defenses

and

succeeded

in t h e i r

o p e r a t i o n a l transition.

Israeli

application

criticality.

Initial

respect

their

team.

for

enemies,

mistakes,

losses

e l e m e n t of p r o t e c t i o n a l s o d e m o n s t r a t e d

the

IDF a c t i o n s did l i t t l e t o protect their f o r c e .

Uncoordinated

significant

of

Lacking

they a t t a c k e d without an a d e q u a t e c o m b i n e d a r m s

attacks
in

it5

men

led
and

to

confusion,

equipment.

o p p o r t u n i t i e s and

Once the command realized their

they

stopped

their

critical

Sinai

passes.

Using e c o n o m y o f f o r c e m e a ~ u r e s , t h e IDF e f f e c t i v e l y

screened

t h e Egyptians.

In t h i s manner, t h e IDF p r o t e c t e d their f o r c e s w h i l e

accepting
enough
and

and

for

the

attacked

forces.

integrating

attacks

missed

the

and waited o n t h e d e f e n s i v e near t h e

reserve

formations.

After t h e y w e r e s t r o n g

o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n , t h e IDF c o n c e n t r a t s d t h e i r f i r e p o w e r
on

single

Additionally,

a n i s w h i c h e n a b l e d them t o b e t t e r p r o t e c t t h e i r

destruction

of

the

Egyptian

air defense

belt w a s

vital in a l l o w l n g Israeli a i r p o w e r t o c o v e r t h e movement o f g r o u n d forces.

Lastly,

intelliqence

operational

level

operational

combat

and

combat
power,

d e c e p t i o n played a critical r o l e in t h e uue o f

power

in

this

Israeli

The

last

two

e l e m e n t s of

p l a n s and d e c i s i o n s d e p e n d e d o n

accurate

intelligence.

them

risk. F a i l u r e t o d i s c e r n that t h e A r a b s could p o s t u r e t h e m s e l v e s f o r

at

limited
to

Egyptian

Israeli p e r c e p t i o n s of t h e i r enemy p l a c e d

a i l i t a r y n o l u t i o n m t o political e n d s w a s a s t r a t e g i c failure. F a i l u r e

account

modern

Amazingly,

defense

war.

for

antitank

changes
and

operational

in E g y p t i a n force s t r u c t u r e , n o t a b l y t h e a d d i t i o n a l

antiaircraft
design,

s y m t s m s , and h o w t h e s e c h a n g e s d e t e r m i n e d

nearly

r e s u l t e d in c a l a m i t y . T h e IDF b e l i e v e d

the

A r a b s c o u l d not a t t a c k without m a r k e d l y i m p r o v e d air f o r c e s and i n c r e a s e d

maneuver

in

capabilities

Egyptians

had

militarily

made

armored

great

capable

in

strides

of

To

warfare.

gaining

the

Israelis chagrln, t h e

o v e r c o m i n g t h e s e w e a k n e s s e s and w e r e

limited

strategic

endm.

The

lack

of

i n t e l l i g e n c e a n a l y s i s allowed t h e I D F t o b e surprised.
The
line

Arab

and

plan

of

occupation

deception

which

Intelligence
reactions
faced

envisioned

to

east

for

information

strikes

was

to

anticipated

stated,

Israel

they

would

defencive

be

not
labsled

established

able
the

to

conduct

aggressor.

alert

stages

f o r t h e Sinai.

time,

t h e Israeli c a b i n e t would not a u t h o r i z e t h e i n i t i a t i o n of t h e s e p r u d e n t

and

Command

was

the

measures

Southern

Israeli

risks o f t h e nmu s e c u r i t y i i t u a t i o n that

tha

fear

a key to t h e h r a b plan w a o

Consequently,

alert

IDF

Thuo,

a n initial o p e r a t i o n a l e d g e over t h e I D F .

crucial

reduce
for

bank.

thmm

(Is p r e v i o u s l y

Israel.

preemptive

the

gained

designed

a s ~ c c e s i f u 1 c r o s s i n g , c a p t u r e of t h e Bar-Lev

a s e r i e s of e l a b o r a t e

U n f o r t u n a t e l y for t h e I w a e l i s , at t h e critical

aggressive

actions.

As

reported

by

Israeli

war

correspondent Ze'ev Schiffi

" I n t h e f a c e o f t h i s [decisionl, an o r d e r w a ~issued b t h e Qeneral
S t a f f that a r m o r e d f o r c e s w e r e not t o m o v e toward t i e c a n a l , for
fear that a c h a n g e in t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of armor w o u l d i n c i t e t h e

A r a b s t o act. Israeli t a n k s , au a r e s u l t , w e r e not in p o s i t i o n at

t h e canal when t h e f i hting began, and t h e main a r n o r e d u n i t s w e r e

t o t h e r e a r , in c e n t r a l !inai."JE

Fortunately
deception
quickly
were

the

IDF,

key

r o l e in t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .

played
gathered

using.

and

for

information

commanderB

m i 6 5 1 les.

Successful

information

on

Command
it5

to

devise

from

also

antiaircraft
American

methods

to

provided

neutralize the antitank

the

air

force

with

m i s s i l e s and c o m n a n d l c o n t r o l systenc.

sources,

Israeli

analysts

reported t h e

of

the

operational

transition

that c a r r l e d t h e IDF a c r o s s t h e

H o w e v e r , t h e c r i t i c a l h a n d m a i d e n of i n t e l l i g e n c e w a r deception.

Using
defended

n e w w e a p o n s and t a c t i c s t h e E g y p t i a n s

of c r e d i b l e E g y p t i a n armor r e s e r v e s o n t h e wmit bank, t h e c o r n e r s t o n e

requirement
canal.

the

intelligence

Egyptian

intelligence

absence

on

Intelligence sources

T h i s data, c o u p l e d w i t h c o m b a t e x p e r i e n c e , e n a b l e d t h e t a c t i c a l

operational

Using

t h e l e a d e r s h i p r e c o v e r e d and i n t e l l i g e n c e and

Maj.

Gen.

boundary
quitkly

intention

Sharon's i n t e l l i g e n c e i n f o r n a t i o n c o n c e r n l n g t h e w e a k l y

between

t h e E g y p t i a n 2nd and 3rd (Irnier, t h e IDF S o u t h e r n

s e l e c t e d D e r v e r s o i r a s t h e c r o s s i n g site.
to

cross

the

canal

at

Derversoir,

and

T h e IDF concealed
consequently, the

Egyptians

were

The

spectacular

most

brigades

lulled

against

to

sleep

and f a i l e d t o p r o t e c t t h i s d e c i s i v e p o i n t .

deception

each

effort

Egyptian

was t h e u s e o f t h e economy o f f o r c e

bridgehead.

Edch l e r a e l i b r i g a d e commander

o f h i s t h r e e a v a i l a b l e b a t t a l i o n s c o n s t a n t l y moving b e f o r e t h e e a s t

kept

one

bank

Egyptian

positions.

repaired

tdnks,

notice.

These

commanders

the

other

otherwise

deception

on

attempted

and

The

east

two

prepared

efforts
bank.

b a t t a l i o n s r e s t e d , r e c o v e r e d and
to

go

completely

When

the

into

fooled

Egyptian

a c t i o n a t a moment's
the Egyptian d i v i s i o n

operational

commanders

t o w i t h d r a w b a d l y needed p o r t a b l e a n t i t a n k weapons t o t h e west bank

to

counter

the

east

the

Israeli

bank

transfer
positions.

vehemently

their
59

antitank

generation

Force

capabilities

c a n a l c r o s s i n g , t h e E g y p t i a n t a c t i c a l commanders on

the

protested.

These d i v i s i o n commanders r e f u s e d t o

weapons f o r f e a r o f a m a j o r I s r a e l i a t t a c k on t h e i r

and

surtainment

operational

efforts

commander

has

may

be

the

most

critical

i n determining the appropriate

time

for

t h e operational t r a n s i t i o n from the defensive t o the offensive.

lack

o f f o r c e g e n e r a t i o n and s u s t a i n r e n t means may b e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f a war

that

has

limited

The

IDF's

small

strategic
standing

ends and i s c o n t r o l l e d by s u p e r p o w e r i n f l u e n c e .
forces

and

the

requirement

t o r e l y on l i m i t e d

re~erves initially

delayed l r r a e l i f o r c e generation effort.6.

Israel

industrial

lacked

war.

the

Furthermore,

War

of

Attrition,

base

Additionally,

t o p r o v i d e e n d l e s s r e s o u r c e s f o r modern

r e s u l t o f t h e 1970 c e a s e f i r e a g r e e m e n t s e n d i n g t h e

as

The

I s r a e l had l i m i t e d s t o c k s o f m a t e r i a l and depended l a r g e l y

on US a s s i s t a n c e .
Consequently,
without

help

US

days.

Am

line

with

Israel's

time

working

capability

battlefield

recovery

By

additional
allowed

IDF,

with

defensive

of

in

of
the

US s u p p o r t ,

culminating

the

enhanced

their

materials

was

so l o w t h a t

Israelis.

by

equipment

Fortunately,

IDF

force

t h e i r remarkable a b i l i t y t o conduct
as

well

as

t h e use o f C a p t u r e d

300 b a t t l e damaged t a n k s had been r e p a i r e d and f i v e

brigades

economy

battle

against

ma1

October

armored

the

decisive

warmaking

i u p p l i e r , t h e US f a c e d a 7000 m i l e r e s u p p l y f l i g h t

IDF

generation

material.

of

t h e i r s t r a t e g i c c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t would have a r r i v e d w i t h i n

iole

the

stock

moved

force

into

Sinai.60 I n the Sinai these s k i l l s

mission

t o s u r v i v e w h i l e t h e IDF fought i t s

Goldn H e i g h t s .

Upon c o m p l e t i o n o f t h a t b a t t l e , t h e

h a d g e n e r a t m d s u f f i c i e n t combat power t o f o r e s t a l l i t s
point

dnd

a l l o w t r a n i i t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e on i t s own

terms.

t321

lhe

Israelis

surprised

and

Egyptian

unprspared

threat,

the

l i m i ted

operational

of

October,

8-9

most

tunas

some

had

mamsnts,

opsrationally

but

t h e y recovered.

and t a c t i c a l l y t o dual w i t h t h o n o w

1DF f l o u n d e r e d , u n a b l s t o g r a s p that E g y p t s o u g h t o n l y
and

s t r a t e g i c goals.

After the mistaken counterattacks

t h e IDF went over t o t h e d s f s n s i v e in t h e S i n a l and s h i f t e d

of its r e s o u r c e s t o d e f e a t t h e S y r i a n s o n t h s Golan Heights.

the

Initially

neanwhils,

IDF S o u t h e r n C o m m a n d t o o k t h e m s a s u r e o f t h e E g y p t i a n s and, aftsr c a r e f u l

consideration
fresh

of

campaign

transition
Suez

the

a n a l y t i c a l e l e m e n t s of o p s r a t i o n a l d e s i g n , d e v e l o p e d a

plan.

on

two

Within

WEE^,

IDF

the

conducted

an

operational

f r o n t s , first d e f s a t i n g t h e S y r i a n s and t h R n c r o s s i n g t h e

Canal

to

defeat

criticalness

of

t h e t h r e e r e q u i r s r e n t s o f o p e r a t i o n a l transition. F i r s t , t h e

Israelis
to

were

produce

Second,

the

eventually

the

their

military
operational

Egyptians.

Thls

cdso

study

also

shows

the

successful in b a l a n c i n g s n d s , nryi, m s a n s and risk

conditions
derign

that

lsd

produced

t o t h e i r s t r a t e g i c success.

the

sequence

of

a c t l o n s that

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l end state. F i n a l l y , t h e y g e n s r a t e d o p e r s t i o n a l level

achieved

c o m b a t power r e s o u r c e s and ussd them to set t h s c o n d i t i o n s for

SUCC~SB.

.1. 1.1.... ..C o

.-n -.
c _l us i.o-.n..s..

This
there

study

are

has

tsstsd

elsmsnts

eisential

commander

use

may

ths

as

hypothesis
of

guide

t h a t , at t h s o p e r a t i o n a l level,

opsrational
to

determine

t r a n s i t i o n p l a n n i n g that t h e
the

a c t i o n s h e must t a k e t o

ultimately

p u r s u e a p o s i t i v e aim t h r o u g h a c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .

theory

the

of

doctrine,
clearly
bath

of

taking

that

an

theory

postures
point

doctrine

force

the

the

as

offensive

presented
after

by

C l a u s s w i t r , and US Army

succsssful defense, indicates

o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n must t a k e place.

and

his

for

counteroffensive,

i6

What is m i s s i n g in

a d i s c u s s i o n of h o w t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r

t o conduct t h i s transition.

operational

A review of the

This study provides a start

c o m m a n d e r by i d s n t i f y i n g soms eiiential e l e m e n t s

t h a t malie o p s r r t i o n r l t r a n s i t i o n a success.
This

analycis

imperative

campaign

out

some

essentlal

element6

of

operational

that t h e c o m m a n d e r may uas t o t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e offense. F i r s t , it

transition
is

points

that

ends,

ways, m e a n s and r i s k b e in harmony.

Second, the

plan must b e b a s e d o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g and a p p l y i n g t h s key e l s m e n t s o f

operational

design.

F i n a l l y , t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r must h a v e s u f f i c i e n t ,

t331

mature

and

operations

demanded

some

provide
three

skilled

operational
by

the

conclusions

areas

that

may

level

directed

as

ends.

power

The

for

the

historical

scale

of

case studies

t h e impact o f f a i l u r e and s u c c e s s i n t h e s e

to

benefit

combat

future

campaign

planners

and

operational

c o m m a n d e r 5.
Fir6t,

is

it

i m p e r a t i v e that e n d s , w a y s , m e a n s and r i s k s b e in harmony.

The

conditions

of

the

strategic

and

must

be

executed

t h e t h e a t e r and t h e s t r a t e g i c g o a l s must b e u n d e r s t o o d b y
operational

understood
by

and

leadership.

approved

operational

level

by

A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e c a m p a i g n plan

s t r a t e g i c a u t h o r i t i e s , u n d e r s t o o d and

s t a f f s and properly e x e c u t e d by t h e tactical

leaders.(See Appendix I, p a g e 4 1 )
Second,
four

campaign

theoretical

gravity

is

indirect

an

plans

elements
essential

approach

to

of

must

be based on t h e considerations of t h e

operational design.

also

combat

important

by

power

enemy's

defeating the enemy center of gravity while protecting

since

point.

the

operationlsupport

give

momentum

Decisive

analysis.

synchronization
gravity,

of

form

Lines

the

commander

must

generate

c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e and 5 1 0 w his o w n c u l m i n a t i n g

the
to

point6

culminating

Concurrently,
of

concepts

the

task is to i n c r e a i e h i s r e l a t i v e

d o w n t h e e n e m y c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y and h a s t e n i n g t h e

for

Lastly,

T h e idea o f t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point

commander's

point.

reserves

operations.

ths

wearing

culminating

operational

T h e c o n c e p t of c e n t e r o f

p l a n n i n g tool and t h e c o m m a n d e r s h o u l d f o c u s on an

b u i l d i n g up h i 6 o u n c e n t e r of gravity.

and
is

the

the

are

of

decisive
confiner

points

lines

of

o f t h e c a m p a i g n ' s t h e a t e r of

d e t e r m i n e d based o n t i m e , s p a c e , m a s s and

operationlsupport

information
points,

and

provided

concentration,

by

are

the

outcomes

understanding

economy

of

of t h e

center

force,

and

of
the

d e c i s i o n f o r a d i r e c t or indirect approach. (See Appendin 2, p a g e 4 4 1

The

canpaign

elements
power

of

p l a n d e v e l o p s d is d e p e n d e n t not only o n t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e

operational

avarlable.

The

design

but

also

the relative worth o f the combat

a b i l i t y o f t h e . g i v e n f o r c e s may b e a n a l y z e d using t h e

elements

of combat powerI

required

c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r ' s c o m b a t p o w r in e n s u r i n g

successful
power
and

operational

that

force

transition.

The

tactical

level e l e m e n t s o f c o m b a t

also h a v e o p s r a t i o n a l i m p a c t are: leadership, m a n e u v e r , f i r e p o w e r

Protection.

plans,

The case studies provide some clues concerning the

T h e c a s e s t u d i e s a l s o i n d i c a t e that i n t e l l i g e n c e , d e c e p t i o n

generation

of

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e B and s u s t a i n m e n t o p e r a t i o n s
c341

have

an

forces

impact
and

on

operational

terrain

corbat

power.

F i n a l l y , p r e p a r a t i o n of t h e

f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n was e s s e n t i a l t o b o t h t h e

Germans and t h e l s r a e l i r .
First,

w i l l r e v i e w t h e i m p a c t o f l e a d e r s h i p on s u c c e s s f u l d e f e n s e and

we

operational

transition

instance,

quality

defeat.
of

levels

circumstances.

is

of

actions

be

leadership
neans

effective

conpleu,

their

subordinatem

the

based

on s u b o r d i n a t e i n p u t .

cumulative

national

power.

requiring

thorough

As Q e r r a n and 1 5 r a e l i

emphasizes

superior,

action

command s t y l e s . G e r r a n and I s r a e l i l e a d e r s t o o k r i s k s ,

initiative,

b y g i v i n g t h e r m i s s i o n t y p e o r d e r s and a l t e r e d

patience

Commanders who have i n n e r c o n f i d e n c e ,

and

t i r i n g t e n d t o be a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e

J u s t as success o p e r a t i o n a l l y r e q u i r e s t h e

b a t t l e s of decision.

o f a s e r i e s o f successes i n o r c h e s t r a t e d b a t t l e s , t h e r e i s

effect

cumulative

of

r i s k , c o u p l e d w i t h a knowledge O f

leadership

unleashed

risky

t o achieve, t h e

Central t o leadership i n operational t r a n u i t i o n

and v i s i o n .

independent

impossible

instrument

is
and

oriented,

bold,

leadership l e d t o

poor

when t o a c c e p t and when t o d e c l i n e b a t t l e .

independence,

I n every

o f how t h i s m a y be accomplished under t r y i n g

ways,

illustrate,

plan

and

virtually

coordinated

enample

ends,

theory

knowing

Operational

understanding
military

nay

into

fine

success

are required.

has t h e d u t y t o t r y c o n s i s t e n t l y t o meld t h e d i s p a r a t e

leadership
sets

skills

demands c o h e s i o n and h a r r o n y o f e f f o r t a t e v e r y

this

connander

of

Manstein

While

leaderrhip

enabled

leadership

war.

operational

the

leadership

Quality

level

and

effect

of

o b s t i n a n c e , dissPnSlOn and l e a d e r s h i p m i s t a k e s t h a t

can produce d e f e a t .
The

second

operrtronal
w i l l

be

element

plan

of

operational

suffices

required

in

combat power i s maneuver. No

level

e v e r y d e t a i l f o r an e n t i r e campaign) changes

and t h i s demands f l e w i b i l i t y . E v e r y l e v e l o f war must have

commanders

with

transition.

Therefore,

design

and

are

pursue

branches and s e q u e l s , t h e conmander murt have naneuver f o r c r s t h a t a r e

quick

of

prepared

the

and

for

therr

development,

and
and

bridges,

flewibility
branches
basis

mind

reconnaissance

roads,

the

agile

buildup

of

mind

sequels

to

seize

are

naneuver.

of

Both

transitions,
the

OpportUnitiRE

integral

operational transition.

operational

knouledge

and

and

for

in

of

the
the

for

t o operational

I n order t o r a p i d l y

Gernrn and I s r a e l i s had

Germans

by

thorough

a r e a o f o p e r a t i o n s , r o a d and r a i l n e t

s u p p l y d e p o t s and t h o 1 B r a s l i s COn5trUCtiOn o f

c r o s s i n g s i t e improvements a l o n g t h e Suez Canal c o u p l e d

c351

with

entensive

and

the

by

thorough

knowlodge
and

construction

of

These

positively

inall

of

a s s a u l t c r o s s i n g o p e r a t i o n s . B o t h t h e Germans

l r r a e l i s had p r o p a r e d f o r t h o i r o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n s ,

development,

Canal.

rehearSal6

of

area

of

supply

operations,

depots

and

the

road

and

rail

Israelis

by

net
their

r o a d s , b r i d g e s and c r o s s i n g s i t e improvements a l o n g t h e Suez

are

essontial

in

allowing

the

commander

to

react

u n c e r t a i n t y , chance and f r i c t i o n . These a t t r i b u t e s e w p l a i n how

force6

brigades

the

buildup

skills

to

of

t h e Germans

nuch

were

a0

are

depleted

able

Operational

transition

organization

changos,

to

Gernan

have a c u m u l a t i v o impact f r r beyond t h e i r s i z e .

demands
able

P _ a ~ ' g r - f o r n a t i o n s and Israeli armor

forcor

to

think

that
on

are

the

capable

move,

and

of

rapid

task

competent i n t h e

maneuver o f b o t h combat f o r c e s and l o g i s t i c s elements,

The
the

the

point

operational

Ground
at

newt

level

firepower

the

efforts

from

to

tho

end

formationm
ability
of
also
of

point.

against

battle

Manstein's d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e i s o l a t e d elements of

Deversoir.
of

Critical

to

of

massing

firepower

February

vast

Again, 4 t h Pan-zer. Army's a c t i o n s

1 4 March s e r v e as an enample o f moving l a r g e

to

distances

t o mass f i r s p o w e r .

Ils d i s c u s s e d above, t h e

in

t h o ground dimmnsion a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l . Our a n a l y s i s

r e f l e c t e d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f f i r e p o w o r i n t h e a i r dimension.
air

Furthermore,

the

t h e commander's f o r c o r t o maneuvmr i s c r i t i c a l t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n

firepower

thelr

was

l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s and t h e i r s i m u l t a n e o u s o r s e q u e n t i a l u s e

achiovo s y n e r g i s t i c e f f e c t s .

ovor

of

on two dimensions, a i r and ground f i r e p o w e r .

S o v i e t a r m i e s ~ 6 i O df i r e p o w e r a g a i n s t weakness as d i d t h e IDF

synchronization
in

focuses

Firepower a t

a f u n c t i o n o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f s t r e n g t h a g a i n s t weakness

is

decisive

attacking

i n o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l maneuver i s f i r e p o w e r .

fleets

providod

intelligence

and

German use

operational

fires.

IDF uso o f a i r p o w o r was i n 6 t r u n e n t a l i n t h e i r v i c t o r y s i n c e b o t h

elements

required

operate

in

the

the

air

support

of

dimension

the

aro

other

more

t o be e f f e c t i v e . F o r c e s t h a t

responsive

and

are

therefore

operationally significant.

of

The

f o u r t h o l e b e n t o f combat power a t t h e o p e r a t l o n a l l e v e l i s p r o t e c t i o n

the

force.

control

at

T h l s u i m p l e concept is one o f t h e most d i f f i c u l t d y n d n i c s t o

tho

operational

leadership,

maneuver,

functioning

properly.

operational

level1

level.

firepower,
There

are

Protection

is

only

possible

when

i n t e l l i g e n c e , d e c e p t i o n and s u s t r i n m e n t a r e
two

essontial ideas i n p r o t e c t i o n a t t h e

t h e d e c i s i v e p o i n t 5 must be h e l d t o make t h e d e f e n s e work

1361

and

t h e c o u n t o r o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s must be s a f e g u a r d e d .

i s

knowing

Germans
the

when

and

the

decisive

conduct

point.

IDF

rear

battle

When

and

when

t o declins battle.

c h o o s i n g t o engage t h e ensmy,

operations

of

pursuit

Continuing
the

accept

Both t h s

I s r a e l i s refused b a t t l e t o s s t t h e stage f o r s u p e r i o r i t y a t

continuous

unrelenting

in

to

C r i t i c a l t o t h i s schere

to

allow

the

enemy

t h e conrander r u s t

no r e s p i t e . M a n s t e i n ' s

t h e S o v i e t s t o Bslgorod c r e a t i n g a cascading e f f e c t .

armor p r e s s u r e on t h e E g y p t i a n b r i d g e h e a d s f r o n t h e f r o n t and
caused

Egyptian

commanders

to

resources i n d s s p e r a t e

waits

attacks.

In t h e conduct o f t h e defense, t i m e l y w i t h d r a w a l i s nesdsd t o r e d u c e

exposure

and l i m i t damage.

mobile

defPnSR

prioritized
resources

own

by

forces

Manstein.

and

at

the

Logistical

BUpport must be

appropriate

t i r e t h e s e sans

be focused on t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e f o r c e . M a n s t e i n r u t h l e s s l y

t h i s idea.

At

reserves.

conducted

committed

must
to

adhered

his

to

as

Host o f t e n t h i s r e q u i r e s d e p t h and t h s conduct of

IOF a c c o m p l i s h e d t h i s t h r o u g h t h e r o b i l i z a t i o n o f

The

t h e same t i m e , d e c e p t i o n p l a n s r u s t al10w t h e cornandor t o r e s t

forces.

Noreover,

deception

plans

rust

insure

the operational

r e s e r v e s remain hidden.
that

NOH

that

impact t h e commander's p l a n s

force

deception,
Expert

gravity

the
aware

operational
discerns

lines

support
of

and

analysis
polnt

based

disserinrtlan

useful

of

the

decisive

on

operational

only

of t h e thsater.

preparation
the

on

15

traneition.
Essential t o

and u n d s r s t a n d i n g o f t h e c e n t s r o f

are

conditions

comrander

intentions.

terrain

t h e ConnandRr i s

If

T h i s dunandm t h o r o u g h

(OIPB). The O I P B

battlefield

points,
and

probable enery l i n e s of

intentions.

Also, the best

operation and s u p p o r t a r e d e t e r m i n e d bassd on t s r r a i n and

e l e m e n t s o f a n a l y s i s i n c l u d e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e minds

Key

commanders o f t h e major enemy f o r c e s , a t h o r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e

the

eneny

the

and

friendly

the

intelligence

for

operations

of

sustainnent

analysis

Proper

culminating

w i l l examine t h e i n p a c t o f i n t e l l i g e n c e ,

MU

and

gathering

transition.

and

thoroughly

enemy

generation

intelligencs

operational

of

have l o o k e d a t t h e f o u r e l s r e n t s o f o p e r a t i o n a l combat power

MU

command

probable
Failure

relationship
to

intention
intentions
campaign

structure

detect
early
and

plan.

the

w i l l

and

of

decirilon

ends,
enemy

menace

capabilities
Likewise,

ways,
main

making
means

effort

the force.

process,
and

or

to

risk

and

finally,

the

on t h e enery s i d e .

discern

t h e t r u e enemy

H i t l e r ' s ~ i s u n d e r s t r n d i n ga + S o v i e t

plagued Manstein's e f f o r t i t o c r e a t e a workable

IDF m i s c a l c u l a t i o n o f Arab i n t e n t and c a p a b i l i t i e s

t371

almost

led

to

defeat.

Only

by u n d e r s t a n d i n g enemy and friendly intent i o n s

within

t h e framework of t h e e l e m e n t s of national power and e n e m y d o c t r i n e c a n

t h e o p e r ational commander hops t o s u c c e e d i n oporatlonal transition.

D e c s ption is critical t o t h e c a m p a i g n plan s i n c e economy of f o r c e e f f o r t s
a r e e s sential t o operational transition. Deception p l a n s must reinforce and
m a n i p u l a t e enemy p e r c e p t i o n s and expectations.
To accomplish that, t h e
deception
only
must

must

belisvabl e

to

t h e enemy.

Proper deception involves not

i n e x p e n s i v e m e a n s such a s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and electronic deception, but

a l s o include t h e movemen t and a c t i o n s of forces. T h u s deception e n t a i l s

taking

r i s k s i f t h e enemy is t o b e l i e v e t h e r u s e . Manstein manipulated Sov i e t

perceptions
steam.
his

be

expectations b y a l l o w i n g t h e penetration t o develop and

and

Vatutin

own

was

plan.

deception

l05e

completely f o o l e d s i n c e G e r m a n o p e r a t i o n s coincided with

The

abandonment

K h e r k o v is an e x a m p l e o f an accidental

of

that "proved' t h e Q e r m a n s w e r e withdrawing t o t h e Dneiper.

For

the

G e r m a n s , t h e most plausible d s c e p t i o n wad t h e o n e that c o n f i r m e d t h e So v i e t

b e l i e f i n their plan, which w a s e a s i l y done.
IDF deception w a s tactical i n
nature

but

its

plausibility lulled t h s E g y p t i a n s t o sleep s i n c e they f a i l e d

t o s h o r e up t h e seam between 2nd and 3 r d Army.

T h e final t w o c a p a b i l i t i e s r e q u i r e d for operational transition are f o r c e
generation

and

regard

operational

for
must

to

the

sustainmsnt.

trans ition,

counteroffensive.

somehow

o p e r a t i o nal

be

generated

transition.

T h e s e t w o c a p a b i l i t i e s h a v e but o n e purpose in
that

i5

t o g e n e r a t e operational rese r v e s

E ven with limited resources, operational rese r v e s

if

Mans tein

his
static
formations
and
c o u n t e roffensive. l h e lsraslis

deciiive

stroke

accomplished

is

to

b e m a d s thr o u g h

t h i s by stripping armor f r o m

husbanding
4th
used e c o n o m y of

P~nme~.
force

for
the
m e a s u r e s and ra p i d
Army

n a t i o n al mobilization t o g e n e r a t e r e r e r v s s f o r t h e operational transition.

E v e r y asset must b e used s f f i c l e n t l y t o s t r i k e t h e s n e m y center of gravity.
this

so

that t h e f o r c s had decisive inpact.

on

d o minant

c o m n a n ds'

way,

t h e r e was rufficient mas5 w h e n operation61 transitton occur r e d

In

characteristics

ability

to

F o r c e generatian and sustainment t a k e

at t h e operational levsl. T h e assessment o f t h e

generate

forces

and

keep t h e m supplied will grea t l y

i n f l u e n c e t h e analysis of t h e e l e m e n t s o f operational d e s i g n and dic t a t e

whether
or
not
an opera tional t r a n s i t i o n is achievable. Operational
t r a n s i tion is directly relate d t o a force's logistical power. (See Appendix 3
and 4, p a g e s 47 t o 511

Finally,
of

monograph1 at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level, t h e r e a r e e i s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s of

this

t r a n s i t i o n that t h e c o m m a n d e r n a y u s e a s a g u i d e to d e t e r m i n e t h e

operdtional
actions

h a v e c o m e f u l l c i r c l e and a r r i v e back at t h e o r i g l n a l t h e s i s

we

that

must

counteroffensive.
campaigns.

be

taken

to

ultimately

The

study

has

enamined

Theory

and

transition

in

order

successful

operational

doctrine

direct

us

pursue

p o s i t i v e aim, t h e

the

t h e o r y , d o c t r i n e and h i s t o r i c a l

to

undertake

operational

an

H i s t o r y p r o v i d e s us some e x a m p l e s of

to b e vlctorious.

and from t h e s e w e h a v e g l e a n e d essential

transitions

e l e m e n t s that help t h e c o m m a n d e r m a k e c r i t i c a l c a m p a i g n decisions.

First,

ends-ways-means-risk

operational
Second,

art,

and

tactics

design

as

culminating

point,

decisive

understanding

to

as

harmonized

60

that

strategy,

a r e s y n c h r o n i z e d t o w a r d s t h e utrategic g o a l s .

manifested

by

points

the
and

ideas

of

center

of

gravity,

l i n e n of o p e r a t i o n r l s u p p o r t .

This

and a p p l i c a t i o n p r o d u c e s a w o r k a b l e , initial c a n p a l g n p l a n that

i t s f o c u s t h e s e t t i n g of t h e c o n d i t i o n s for a n o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n

the

counteroffensive.

operitiunal

combat

power

Lastly,

the

resourcen

o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r must meld the

of l e a d e r s h i p , m a n e u v e r , f i r e p o w e r , and

i n t o a c a p a b l e f o r c e t h r o u g h t h e u s e 04 I n t e l l l g e n c e , t h e c r e a t i o n

pratection
and

be

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r must u n d e r s t a n d and a p p l y t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f

operational

has

must

e x e c u t i o n o f d e c e p t i o n plans, t h e g e n e r a t i o n of o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s , and

t h e s u s t a i n n e n t of all forces.

Thus,
only
rests

if

in

the
it
its

notion
involves
ability

that

t h e d e f e n s e is t h e s t r o n g e r form o f war is valid

an operational transition.
to

transition

a c h i e v e t h e d e s i r e d s t r a t e g i c end state.

T h e v i c t o r y of t h e d e f e n s e

t o t h e o f f e n s i v e o n a g r a n d s c a l e and

..

..

.. - . .. .

. ... ......

. .. .. ...

.. .... . .

. ...-.-

.. .. , . . ....

-. . ...
... .

.... _.
. ..... .

..

., ,

.. ..
.

...

Appendix- 1 :E66entia.l E l e m e n t s of E n d s - - W a y s - - M e a n 6 - - R i s k ~
Though beyond t h e scope of t h i s m o n o g r a p h , t h e r e s e a r c h c o n c e r n i n q t h e
t w o c a s e s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e d a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n e n d s , w a y s , m e a n s and
risk.
T h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p may b e i m p o r t a n t t o c a m p a i g n planners.
The
m o n o g r a p h s t a t e s that it is i m p e r a t i v e that e n d s , w a y s , m e a n s and r i s k s b e in
harmony.
S t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l l e a d e r s should u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s
o f t h e t h e a t e r in which t h e c a m p a i g n will b e f o u g h t and t h e e t r a t e g i e e n d s
As indicated t h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r must s e e k
which
are sought.
u n d e r s t a n d i n g and approval from s t r a t e g i c i u t h o r l t i e s and e n s u r e t h e c a m p a i g n
plan is executed. T h e model i n f i g u r e 1 - 1 is a useful tool in u n d e r s t a n d i n g
the
relationshlps
between
ends--ways--means--risks
and t h e i d e a s o f
o p e r a t i o n a l d e s l g n and c o m b a t power.
T h e d i f f e r e n c e b@tween t h e s t r a t e g i c e n d s d e s i r e d and t h e m i l i t a r y m e a n s
a v a i l a b l e is t h e d e g r e e o f risk involved. M a n a g i n g t h e s e r i s k s r e q u i r e s an
o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n t h a t c a r e f u l l y c o n s i d e r s c o m b a t power. Risk is n o r m a l l y
a s s u m e d t o s o m e d e g r e e in t h e p l a c e m e n t of forces. Thue, c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f
the
e l e m e n t s of o p e r a t i o n a l d e s i g n p r o v i d e s t h e f r a m e w o r k for p r o p e r
d e c i s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e critical and d y n a m i c c o n c e p t s of e c o n o m y o f f o r c e
and c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t h e means. T h e r e f o r e , b a l a n c l n g r i s k e a s e s t h e t e n s i o n
b e t w e e n t h e p r i n c i p l e s of c o n c e n t r a t i o n and e c o n o m y of force. T h e s e t w o
p r i n c i p l e s a r e t h e b a s i s upon w h i c h t h e c o m m a n d e r g e n e r a t e s f o r c e s f o r
operational transition.
The l i n k a g e , t h e r e f o r e , b e t w e e n e n d s and m e a n s is
ways.
S i n c e r e c o n c i l i n g risk i s c r i t i c a l t o b a l a n c i n g t h P e q u a t i o n , t h i s
e f f o r t is t h e key t o h a r m o n i z i n g ends, w a y s , and means.
T h e link b e t w e e n e n d s and m e a n s is t h e way i n which t h e f o r c e i s used.
T h e way t h e f o r c e is u s e d is d e s c r i b e d in t h e c a m p a i g n plan. A d d i t i o n a l l y ,
t h e c a m p a i g n p l a n m a n a g e s t h e r i s k that r e s u l t s when e n d p and m e a n s a r e
compared.
T h e c a m p a i g n plan is d e v e l o p e d based on t h e a n a l y s i s of t h e
e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s of o p e r a t i o n a l design. F o r our p u r p o s e s w e h a v e used t h e
c o n c e p t s o f c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y , c u l m i n a t i n g points, d e c i s i v e p o i n t s and l i n e s
of o p e r a t i o n s / s u p p o r t a s a n a l y t i c a l tools.
In our c a s e s t u d i e s , w e see d i f f e r e n t s o l u t i o n s to b a l a n c i n g t h e
equation.
Manstein understood the mean6 were inadequate t o achieve t h e ends
w i t h o u t t a k i n g e x o r b i t a n t risks.
T h e r e f o r e h e worked d i l i g e n t l y t o c h a n g e
Hitler's
s t r a t e g i c p o l i c y so that t h e a v a i l a b l e m e a n s c o u l d be used
s u c c e s s f u l l y . C o n v e r s e l y , t h e Israeli e n d s w e r e r e a l i s t i c , but t h o m e a n s
a v a i l a b l e w e r e i n i t i a l l y e m p l o y e d poorly.
O n c e t h e IDF a d j u s t e d t o t h e
c o n d i t i o n s of t h e war in t h e S i n a i , t h e y d e v e l o p e d a c a m p a i g n p l a n , or way of
using m e a n s , that a c h i e v e d t h e e n d s w i t h t h e a v a i l a b l e forces.
T h e findl
c a m p a i g n plan
u n d e r s t o o d by

s t e p in h a r m o n i z i n g ends, ways, m e a n s and r i s k is I n s u r i n g t h e

i s u n d e r s t o o d at e a c h level. F i r s t , t h e c a m p a i g n plan must b e

s t r a t e g i c a u t h o r i t i e s so that approval i m g a i n e d f o r t h e

t411

actions the commander proposes. A s Manrtein's efforts illustrate, this plan

may
not
be e a s i l y r e c o n c i l e d with political r e s t r a i n t s and r e s o u r c e
constraints.
N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e c o m m a n d e r c o n t i n u e s t h e a d v i s o r y p r o c e s s until
h a r m o n y i s a c h i e v e d in t h 0 aquatian. S e c o n d , h e must e n s u r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
h i s intent and e x e c u t i o n of t h e p l a n b y t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level s t a f f . L a s t l y ,
t h e p l a n must b e u n d e r s t o o d and e x e c u t e d by t h e t a c t i c a l c o m m a n d e r s . I n t h i s
m a n n e r t h e c o m m a n d e r b e g i n s t h e s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n of s t r a t e g y , o p e r a t i o n a l art
and t a c t i c s t o a t t a i n t h e m i l i t a r y e n d state.
It is i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s t a n d t h a t this effort o n l y b e g i n s t h e p r o c e s s o f
l i n k i n g m e a n s and ends.
A t the o p e r a t i o n a l level, t h e r e a r e m o r e w a y s t o
c o m b i n e f o r c e s t o g e n e r a t e c o m b a t power. U n c e r t a i n t y is g r e a t e r but t h e r e is
m o r e t i m e t o react. H o w e v e r , a s i t t a k u s m o r e t i m e t o m o v e f o r c e s ,
anticipation becomes critical
T h e end r e s u l t is m o r e r i s k and t h e p e n a l t i e s
f o r being wrong c a n b e severe. T h e m e a n s n e e d e d t o e n t i r e l y e l i m i n a t e r i s k
and c h a n c e a r e b e y o n d t h e c a p a c i t y of any nation. T h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n
e n d s and m e a n s c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , b e p e r f e c t l y f o r e c a s t e d d u e t o c h a n c e ,
u n c e r t a i n t y , f r i c t i o n , fog, and t h e moral d o m a i n of war. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e
c o m m a n d e r f a c e s c o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g s t r a t e g i c g u i d a n c e based o n t h e o u t c o m e
o f c o m b a t , T h e o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r must keep c o n s t a n t f o c u s o n t h e d y n a m l c
o f ends-wsys-msans-risk.
T h e t r u t h , o r , t h e end s t a t e , c h a n g e s and so must
t h e o p e r a t i o n a l design. G r e a t c a p t a i n s e f f i c i e n t l y u 5 e l i m i t e d m e a n s t h r o u g h
i n n o v a t i v e o p e r a t i a n a l d e i i g n t o a t t a i n s t r a t a g i c e n d s w h i l e o p e r a t i n g under
f r a c t u r e d s t r a t e g i c l e a d e r s h i p and c h a n g i n g end s t a t e s ,
I

...............................................
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Appendix 21 Essential E l e m e n t s o f O p e r a t i o n a l Design in Campa.iqn P l a n n i n g

Ihe c a s e s t u d i e s p r o p o s e additional i d e a s concerning t h e analytical t o o l s

o f operational d e s i g n used t o d e v e l o p c a m p a i g n plans. W h i l e not proved in
t h e c a m p a i g n s s t u d i e d , t h e s e i d e a s d o p r o v i d e a r e a s for additional thought
for operational planners.
T h e concept of c e n t e r of g r a v i t y i s t h e f o c u s o f t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s
actions.
E s s e n t i a l l y , t h e c o m m a n d e r a t t e m p t s t o i d e n t i f y t h e e n e m y center of
g r a v i t y t h r o u g h i n t e l l i g e n c e m e a n s and attack i t w h i l e p r o t e c t i n g hi6 own
The case studies
c e n t e r of g r a v i t y from e f f e c t i v e e n e m y counterblows.
i n d i c a t e t h e c o m m a n d e r h a 6 greater s u c c e ~ s i f he f o c u s e s o n an indirect
a p p r o a c h t o d e f e a t i n g t h e enemy c e n t e r of gravity. T h e effort t o e x p o s e t h e
c e n t e r of g r a v i t y u s u a l l y will r e q u i r e sequenced operations. M a n s t e i n ' s
a c t i o n s i n d i c a t e that when f o r c e s a r e f e w , o p e r a t i o n s must b e sequenced t o
first protect critical a s s e t s and later t o attack t h e enemy center of
grdvity. L i k e w i s e , t h e IDF had t o s e q u e n c e ground and a i r o p e r a t i u n s t o
uncover and d e f e a t t h e E g y p t i a n c e n t e r of gravity. T h e operational d e f e n s i v e
d e s i g n should first p r o v i d e f o r t h e c o n d u c t of a d e f e n s e that a t t r i l e s t h e
c o m b a t power of t h e e n e m y c e n t e r of gravity! second, hold t h e s h o u l d e r s and
d e c i s i v e p o i n t s t o c r e a t e friction and p r o v i d e maneuver pivot points; t h i r d ,
f a c i l i t a t e t h e g e n e r a t i o n of c o u n t e r s t r o k e forces! and f i n a l l y , t h e plan must
call for t h e c o n d u c t of an opmrational t r a n s i t i o n to t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e to
d e 6 t r o y t h e weakened e n e m y forces. S e q u e n c e d o p e r a t i o n s at t h i 5 level will
r e q u i r e t h e movement of l a r g e f o r m a t i o n s over vast d i s t a n c e s , d e f e n s i v e
operations,
force
generation
and s u s t a i n m e n t o p e r a t i o n s and f i n a l l y ,
o f f e n s i v e operations.
T h e idea o f t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point i s a l s o important s i n c e t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s
task i s to i n c r e a s e hiti r e l a t i v e c o m b a t power b y a t t r i t i n g t h e e n e m y c e n t e r
of gravity and h a s t e n i n g t h e e n e m y ' s c u l m i n a t i n g point. At t h e s a m e t i m e ,
the
c o m m a n d e r must g e n e r d t e f o r c e s and s l o w t h e arrival o f h i s own
c u l m i n a t i n g point. The t i m e t a b l e for operational s e q u e n c i n g i r d e t e r m i n e d so
that I U C C ~ S B i s achleved b e f o r e t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point is reached. However,
perfect p r e d i c t i o n of t h e t i m e and p l a c e of t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point i s not
possible.
D e f e n s i v e l y , operational p l a n n e r s ?lust t r a d e s p a c e for t i m e w h i l e
f o r c i n g c u l m i n a t i o n on t h e e n e m y by c o m b a t a t t r i t i o n and friction. T h i s
d e m a n d s s t r e n g t h of will and cggp..d,:..ou.il
t o know when t o a c c e p t b a t t l e and
m o r e importantly when t o d e c l i n e b a t t l e , k e y i d e a s in o p e r a t i o n a l art. L i k e
M a n s t e i n , t h e command mufit b e prepared t o fall back o n t o i t s own logistical
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e , d e c l i n i n g d e c i s i v e b a t t l e and protecting i t s o f f e n s i v e f o r c e s
t o f o r e s t a l l t h e culminating point. As o p e r a t i o n s in t h e K h a r k o v and Sinai
c a m p a i g n s SUgglEt, t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e c o u n t e r s t r o k e , t h e c o m m a n d e r must
i n s t i t u t e a kind o f operational p a u s e by s h o r t e n i n g and thinning h i s l i n e s ,
p r i o r i t i z a t i o n of a s s e t s t o c o u n t e r s t r o k e f o r c e s and s e q u e n c i n g operations.
K e y t o t h e c o n c e p t of t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point i s a c c u r a t e assessment and
s u r t a i n m e n t o f o n e ' s own c o m b a t power w h i l e reducing t h e e n e m y ' s combat
As t h e c a s e s t u d i e s s h o w , for both t h e G e r m a n s and t h e I s r a e l i s , t h i s
power.
d e m a n d s a c c u r a t e intelligence.
1441

E s s e n t i a l t o s l o w i n g t h e arrival of t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point is t h e a b i l i t y
to c h a n g e p l a n s and o p e r a t i o n a l a g i l i t y i n c o m b a t power. T h i s r e q u i r e s enpert
i n t e l l i g e n c e c o l l e c t i o n and analysis.
Intelligence information allows the
c o m m a n d e r t o a n t i c i p a t e and r e c o g n i z e w h e n and w h e r e t h e c u l m i n a t i n g point
will occur so that a p p r o p r i a t e m e a s u r e s c a n b e taken.
Successive operations
and p r o p e r s e q u e n c i n g a r e i m p o r t a n t t o o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n s i n c e t h e s e
a c t i o n s h a s t e n enemy c u l m i n a t i n and may f o r e s t a l l that o f f r i e n d l y f o r c e s .

L a s t l y , t h e c o n c e p t s of d e c i s i v e p o i n t s and l i n e i o f o p e r a t i o n l s u p p o r t
g i v e f o r m to t h e sandbox that is t h e c a m p a i g n ' s t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i o n s .
D e c i s i v e p o i n t s are d e t e r m i n e d b a a e d o n t i n e , s p a c e , m a s s and m o m e n t u m
analysis. Operational skills in t h i s a r e a a r e c l o s e l y linked t o t h e a c c u r a c y
of
t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level i n t e l l i g e n c e p r e p a r a t i o n o f t h e battlefield.
E s s e n t i a l l y , d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e d e c i s i v e p o i n t s I s based o n p r e c i s e
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t i m e and s p a c e r e l a t i o n s h i p s in t h e movement of t h e f o r c e s
that m a k e up t h e e n e m y c e n t e r of g r a v i t y . T h l s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f m o v e m e n t
t i m e s d e m a n d s a c o n c o m i t a n t a n a l y s i s o f t h e r e l a t i v e a g i l i t y of f r i e n d l y and
enemy l o r m a t i o n s and their a t t e n d a n t v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s in movement.
The
m a r k e d l y greater a g i l i t y and m a n e u v e r mki116 of both t h m G e r m a n s and t h e
I s r a e l i s provided t h e m a n a d v a n t a g e in s p e e d over t h e i r e n e m i e s . L i k e w i s e ,
t h e i r airpower provided g r e a t e r a g i l i t y i n O p e r a t i o n a l fires. T h u s , t h e y
c o u l d m o v e to d e c i s i v e p o i n t s m o r e r a p i d l y t h a n c o u l d t h e i r enemies. T h e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f d e c i s i v e p o i n t i is t h e n p o s s i b l e and t h i s p r o v i d e s t h e
o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r t h e i n f o r m a t i o n n e e d e d t o d e r i g n a t e t h e l i n e s of
o p e r a t i o n and support.
Basic
decisions on lines of operation/mupport center on areas o f
concentration
and a r e a s w h e r e e c o n o m y of f o r c e o p e r a t i o n s a r e taken.
U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f t h e c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n and i n t e r i o r or e n t e r i o r
l i n e s o f o p e r a t i o n a r e a l s o i m p o r t a n t w h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s t h e l o c a t i o n and
m o v e m e n t c a p a b i l i t y of t h e enemy c e n t e r of g r a v i t y and h o w t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e
c u l m i n a t i o n point i m p a c t s both sides. T h e a n a l y s i s of t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t i e s o f
t h e e n e m y and f r i e n d l y c e n t e r s o f g r a v i t y a s e l s t s in d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r o r
not a direct o r i n d i r e c t a t t a c k t a k e s p l a c e and a l s o w h e t h e r or not t h e
a t t a c k is d i v e r g e n t o r concentric.
L i n e s of o p e r a t i o n l s u p p o r t are t h e
o u t c o m e s o f d e c i s i o n s based o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s o f
o p e r a t i o n a l design.
(he c o n c e p t s of c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y , c u l m i n a t i n g points,
c o n c e n t r a t i o n , and e c o n o m y o f f o r c e a r e t h e b a s i s f o r t h e d e c i s i o n o n a
direct or indirect approach.

El e m e r i t s

E s s s n t i a1
0.F

Operational
..
................

Design

. . . . . . . . .
. . . . .
...................................................

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Understanding Theoretical Concepts

I CDntr of Bavity
-prot#tim of m c a t s of gravity a d attack ol m a y t n t w of gravity
Culainatirq Point
-the Kale of apwatims u s t not exceed the available IPMS
-rulativr to awh o t k ! r c w r t t trucWt of MV's nd m
-intellipncei mitoring of mmy's c
w
n
d and cmtrol
for opwatimal dKi5ifflMking
-tha tim nd WWS relatimshlpi that MU m forces
-the ilplct of w and s t m i m thu wrl d c u i n ad the willingness to fiqht
+ Liner of (peratimi ad W v t

-facilitatm opwatimal defmu, trade space far tile

- f u i l i t a t a apratimrl difmu if riprired to hold

-frcilltrtn opwatimal trnsltim thrwh ataqinq and alternate LCCs

I k i r i w Points
-facilitate holding shculderr a d trmting u x i w frictim far nmy
-idmtificatim of thou that, If attwkd, lort efficimtly drtroy wlny c n t w of gravity
-idmtificatim of thou that YObnt DbjKtivu point6 for countwoffmiive
L I n k a g e . g L -Sir af P W : . - . ~ P.?.~t?&nr!.. . 4r t :I la 5.t ?. ce,

Re ?'?.o.n,? b!.!

..Ecrl~ofAeeratiflR!i!.atI.ve .to . J r g g s -?.ncLE ncs

Knoy!r!g..I?ben..fg, n c _ c at..
~ B,ttle..rnll

I-lhen

te.. Dec!Lne ...B+tt!.e

c?.!ell gn..e!p?n~~.g_.fhrtGPauen_c.la.Bltt!
esi.
+ bedibli llwns to lhrsltm Eoy

PTimx~of Oltmdble Terrain

Cmtaln lnitlal Enny Thrusts

+ Withdraw in Tim to lkduri Exp~wand Llrlt
I Rbility to Trade Space for Iim

I Rqmd Wratqically ud tpwrtimally far F a c Yithdranalr

I Wility to kit and hatiin Efforts

+ RwlcJld lbfmu
-at k l s l v o Points to I*U dm #tacks
-ability to bald fhculdwr an hmuvw Pivot5
-relatlmlhip L t m n Wrmq, Fixed E l m t i Pratnd nhich M i l e Force h s v w 5
+ Opwatimal lbfrnu ud Resist nd W a i n Emy Muits
+ Develapmt of Cmtingmin to be abh to Recovw frm Enmy Bla
f Cmstant Effort to S&
nd Take Wvntqi of @orttmity to Cmkt Cpmtimal Trsritim
+ Fight Battle in hpth to Dirupt--Orlay--Destroy Follm m Fwcn

f Plan to Weat Enmy kwve

I.

we

T.ak.e Wv_antaq(! _ot.._o

PP.~r_t_unLt~.
..te..ce_ndu~f...P.eer

a t ? wr!..Tra?sit
+ Rema of b d i b l e tpwatimal Lwl h m ad llnluvlr Space

f Opwatimal Plrn that Achlevn Rapid Pmetratim to tpratimal hpth

I Strmq Rmws to Strlkr Hn E m y Rswhn hlrinating Point

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. ...-. . . ..

Appendix 3 1 E s s e n t i a l E l e m e n t s of C o m b a t P o w e r

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....

..

..

O p e r a t i o n a l c o m b a t power c o n s i s t s of l e a d e r s h i p , m a n e u v e r , f i r e p o w e r ,
prntection. A d d i t i o n a l l y , i n t e l l i g e n c e , d e c e p t i o n o p e r a t i o n s , g e n e r a t i o n
of
o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s and s u s t a i n m e n t c a p a b i l i t i e s i m p a c t t h e c o m m a n d e r ' s
u s e o f h i s c o m b a t power.
The c a s e studies provide additlonal information
c o n c e r n i n g s o m e a s p e c t s o f c o m b a t power e l e m e n t s s t u d i e d t h a t a r e of u s e t o
o p e r a t i o n a l planners.
and

C o m p a r e d t o t h e i r e n e m i e s , t h e G e r m a n s and I s r a e l i s w e r e r e s t r i c t e d in
v i r t u a l l y every w a r f i g h t i n g m e a n s , but t h e y w e r e successful. F i r e s u p p o r t ,
f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , s t r e n g t h , a m m u n i t i o n , f u e l r e s u p p l y and I n f a n t r y mobility
w e r e very limited.
L o g i s t i c a l i n f r a m t r u c t u r e in t h e t h e a t e r o f o p e r a t i o n s
Though v u l n e r a b l e in many e l e m e n t s of c o m b a t p o w e r , w e a k , emall
was poor.
f o r m a t i o n s a c h i e v e d great results. T h e c a s e s t u d i e s i n d i c a t e that G e r m a n and
Israeli
forces
with
excellent
m a n e u v e r t r a i n i n g , s o l d i e r skill and
d e d i c a t i o n , and t a c t i c a l - o p e r a t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p w e r e a b l e t o o v e r c o m e g r e a t
odds. A d d i t i o n a l l y , G e r m a n and Israeli f o r m a t i o n s had g r e a t e r r e l a t i v e
agility,
m o r e a d v a n c e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of air-ground i n t e g r a t i o n and a n
a d v a n t a g e in their a b i l i t y t o s y n c h r o n i z e c o m b i n e d arms.
Maneuver at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level must b e for d e c i s i v e r e s u l t s , and its
t a r g e t must be a d e c i s i v e point t h a t will m a k e t h e e n e m y c e n t e r of g r a v i t y
vulnerable. The w e a k n e s s must b e linked t o n e u t r a l i z i n g o r d e s t r o y i n g t h e
e n e m y c e n t e r of gravity. Tactical m a n e u v e r ski115 a r e i n d i s p e n s a b l e t o t h i s
e f f o r t , but
m o d e r n w a r f a r e ' s l e t h a l i t y d e m a n d s p r e c i s e u s e of o p e r a t i o n a l
maneuver and f i r e s f o r d e c i s i v e results.
M a n s t e i n ' s u s e o f 4 t h Pz Army
a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t s p e a r h e a d s and t h e IDF u 5 e of t h r e e drmor d i v i s i o n s i n an
indirect a p p r o a c h t o i s o l a t e t h e E g y p t i a n 3rd Army d e n o n a t r a t e s t h e u s e of
o p e r a t i o n a l m a n e u v e r for d e c i s i v e r e a u l t s .
O p e r a t i o n a l f i r e p o w e r must b e p l a n n e d and c o n t r o l l e d by o p e r a t i o n a l
level c o m m a n d e r s t o s y n c h r o n i z e t h e a c t i o n s of ground m a n e u v e r and f i r e p o w e r
means.
T h i s s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n s h o u l d p r o d u c e a d e c i s i v e result. T h e primary
p u r p o s e o f f i r e p o w e r is t o p r o v i d e t h e m a n e u v e r f o r c e f r e e d o m of a c t i o n and
t o deny t h e s a m e t o t h e e n e m y (or in t h e c a s e of t h e I D F , p r o v i d i n g s e c u r e
s k i e s for air a t t a c k s t o c o m p l e m e n t g r o u n d a c t i o n s ) . D u e to t h e i n c r e a s e d
s p e e d , agility a n d f i r e p o w e r of m o d e r n f o r c e s , t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l
level f i r e s w i t h m a n e u v e r ( a i r o r g r o u n d ) must b e c o n t r o l l e d at t h e level
s e e k i n g a d e c i s i v e o p e r a t i o n a l r e s u l t and t h i s d e m a n d s skill in c o m p l e x joint
air-ground o p e r a t i o n s .
To c o n d u c t f o r c e g e n e r a t i o n and s u s t a i n m e n t f o r o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n ,
t h e c o m m a n d e r must s o m e h o w c r e a t e a s i t u a t i o n a n a l o g o u s t o a n o p e r a t i o n a l
pause. To b e u s e f u l i n p l a n n i n g , t h e " p a u s e " must b e c o n d u c t e d i n a
c o n t r o l l e d m a n n e r that a s s e s s e s r i s k s t o t h e f o r w a r d u n i t s and h a s a v i s i o n
ot t h e c o u n t e r s t r o k e . 'The p a u s e must b e u n d e r t a k e n w i t h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
t h e f r i e n d l y and e n e m y c u l m i n a t i n g point. M a n s t e i n did t h i s b y w i t h d r a w i n g
4th t'z
A r m y , h u s b a n d i n g SS Pz C o r p s and 48 P z Corp. T h e I D F c r e a t e d an

t471

o p e r a t i o n a l pause b y h o l d i n g 3 armor d i v i s i o n s o u t o f t h e b a t t l e f o r b d a y s .
C a r e f u l p l a n n i n g g e n e r a t e s f o r c e s and b u i l d s l o g i s t i c a l r o b u s t n e s s f o r t h e
i n the
use
of
the
declrlve
element,
the
operational
reserves,
counterof feneive.
Careful combinations o f a l l
f u n c t i o n a l forces are r e q u i r e d t o achieve
maXlmum e f t e c t ,
b u t t h e r e i s a t e n d e n c y t o p i e c e m e a l f o r c e s . B o t h S o v i e t and
E g y p t i a n commanders w a s t e d armor r e s e r v e 5 i n t h i e way, w h i l e H a n s t e i n arid t h e
IDF h u s b a n d e d t h e s e r e s o u r c e 6 , o f t e n t o t h e d e t r i m e n t o f t h e f o r w a r d
defense.
Resources,
however, cannot always be f o r e c a s t e d . Both M a n s t e i n ' s
loss o f A G A a s w e l l a s E g y p t i a n p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e o v e r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
reserves
created
tremendous
o p e r a t i o n a l problems.
The commander must
a c c o r d i n g l y h a v e t h e a b i l i t y t o g e n e r a t e and s u s t a i n f o r c e s i n t e r n a l l y .
U n c o n t r o l l a b l e c h a n g e o i n f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e c o n s e q u e n t l y demands e f f i c i e n c y i n
t h e use of a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s i f o p e r a t i o n a l t r a n s i t i o n i s t o occur.

C401

Essential
......

Elements

o+

C o m b a t
........

P o w e r

.............................
-.-.
............ .-. ....
...........
...................................

. . . . . .

............

Leadership
f Ability to lhticipate &ymd the Obvious
t Braad h i m to link lactic5 and Dpwatimal kt to Attain Stratlgic Ends
+ ktim aimted, Independent, Cmfident, Capable of Rapid klrimuking, and having Initiative

* mliilwprs to:

-take Risk6
-unleash and trust wbwdinates
-alter plani flOKibility of rind
t S u p ~ i wObslrvatim/kquisitim--Anilysis/kisim-~tim Cycle
6 Soldiersi
Jlo believe leaders are adhering to the w i a l cmtract
-cmfidmt in ccwundws
-instilled with a fiqhtinq spirit
-aggrssriw
. . . .
.... .- ............. -...........

..._.......

..

...........

.............................................

......

Naneu ver
I hnwver fa a k i s i v e R w l t
f Against a Vulnerable luqot that will YHkm Enny Cmter of Gravity
f Ability to Rapidly bas and Cancentrate Large Units and M a t PDlrr at the k i s i w Polnt
f Certain Minim Lwel of lbbility Cmslstmt with the k p i r t a n t s of tlm h a t e r
f Greats Rolative Mility in Rolatim to E
rmy
f Flexibility of Hind to Alter Plan, kimuvw Fwcss a
d Firss
..

........

. .

-.
..............

.- . . . . . . . . .

.........

..............................

...............

F-lreppwer

Dperatimally Significant to Create A k i s i v e R w l t

Fauced m Dprctimal k m s , cwrmtly in the Air Oinmrim
I hcentratim ot kan5 m me Air at the k i s i v s Point
f Planned and Cmtrolied by Operational Lewl Cuwndws
I Operationally Synchrmized Betrspn Air nd Grmd Eltants tw Colplmtuy EffKt
I Intended to lnwre Friendly Freedm of k t i m nd Oeny SU to Erw
t

.................
. . . . . . . . . . .

...........

- .........

.........

..

Protect!_on
f Knhac
f

hen to kept Battle and hen to k l i w M t l e

Oeny E
n
q any Respite through htinuour m a t i m s

k e p t i m Plans to Cmceal Intent of Dperatimal Defense and h t w d f m r i v e

Hidden Operational Resnves

1,qistical Suppwt to b i t t o d Facer but hiwitired to h t w o f f m r i w

Tirely Yithdrml
+ Eupmre and Dauqe Liiitatim
f M i l e Defmu
t Adequate Enqinew Aswts to Provide Survivability
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. ...
....
................ _. ..
....................
f
f

t491

.......

-. . . . . . .

E s s a a t ~ n t i a l E l e m e n t s
.-

of

.- ............................

................

Power.

C o m b a t
-.

......................................................

.......

Intel 11q p f i c ~ ~
t
t

Supwiat Ob~vitim/llequisitim--lhalyris/lktirim-dctim
Cycle
lntellignrci

ilacro Uien of Elemtr of Ptimal P a w m Both SidK

-(hdrctmdinq of1

*ind of th ujr mny c o u n d R 5

wmy cDvvld and cmtrol prorbn and &xirim uking praerrss

-enmy vim d mdr-~ryr-wann--risk

-Tactical Intelligmo halyric

Expwt lntellignce Cullectic, lhalyrlr and Disminatim
.......

........
t

....

...........................................................

............
......

__

Brlievabls to Eney
-...... __. .....

- .-

.......................

.............

................

-..................

.................................

....

Force !ie?e_r?,t!!!fi. 3.M.. Wrtai.nrea!

Wade Ib Rwavcn
gfficimt UM of a11 Reravca to StrikB at Enny h t e r of Gravity
Hlul--PII-fwl-fir--Tm~t-AotrctiFacn W i t t e d to Fawd Opfnse
md h t w d f m r i v e Farces

*Baluxe Mr of Cavitted FKCRI with wiremtr of FKCES fw

Opwatimal Iranritim
* h a t i c of "Opwatical Pauu' Situatlm to Gnwrto ad Sustain Opwatimally Signillrant Recwves
a i l i t y to RO~KI, Rwmstitute and Refit Focn that we Witted to
FrHard Detmu f rthe Cu!ntwoffrrive, Especially &en Opwatims are
-d

*Careful Winatims of Fwcn to kin Suffitint Nass fa k i o i w l q r t

fLstainmt of @Amd L 5 s thrDughout the Rvctim and apth af tho

wefatis byi
* Mming La)istirr

I EstabliJHpnt of LEEin apth

f Regulating Cmwqtim

Estrblinhing Rltwnate Gavces of Supply

.....................
.

.........................

....... .- .... -- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

......

......

........................

. .

.........

... .
. . .. . . ..... .. .
...
Appendilc 4: E s i e n t i a i E l e m e n t s o f O p e r a t i o n a l R e s e r v e s

.. .

... . . .. .. . ... . .. .

.. .

.. ...
..... ... .. .
. ...

T h o u g h a d e s c r i p t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s w a s not t h e intent of t h i s
monograph, the case studies provide some pertinent information concerning
o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s that may b e o f u s e t o o p e r a t i o n a l planners.
The o p e r a t i o n a l commander's a b i l i t y t o a f f e c t t h e b a t t l e is d i r e c t l y
l i n k e d t o an o p e r a t i o n a l reserve. R e s e r v e s may h a v e t o b e e s t a b l i s h e d by
reducing
f o r w a r d t a c t i c a l f o r t e s , t a k i n g risks, and e c o n o m y of f o r c e
o p e r a t i o n s . A lack o f d e d i c a t e d o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s d e m a n d s e n t e n s i v e and
judicious economy of force operations t o generate t h e counteroffensive force.
S u c h a c a m p a i g n p l a n d e m a n d s s t r e n g t h o f w i l l s i n c e o t h e r f o r c e s must
i n i t i a l l y a b s o r b t h e e n e m y blows. W h i l e f i g h t i n g off t h e e n e m y attacks,
e x t e n s i v e d e c e p t i n n m e a s u r e 6 must b e t a k e n t o b u t t r e s c t h e mindset o f t h e
e n e m y so that h e b e l i e v e s h e is g a i n i n g s u c c e s s and c a r e must b e t a k e n t o
h i d e t h e operational reserves. F u r t h e r m o r e , rrecrecy must b e m a i n t a i n e d a s t o
w h e n , where, and h o w t h e f o r c e will b e used. Timing is c r i t i c a l t o t h e u s e
ot t h e r e s e r v e s , t o o e a r l y and t o o s t r o n g r e a c t i o n s in t h e form o f
c o u n t e r a t t a c k s d i s s i p a t e t h e o p e r a t i o n a l Schwer.eunk.t. f o r t h e c o u n t e r s t r o k e .
Thus,
when t h e d e c i s i v e moment and point of e n e m y c u l m i n a t i o n is r e a c h e d , t h e
o p e r a t i o n a l c o m m a n d e r is l e f t with no d e c i e i v e f o r c e u n l e s s h e h a s t a k e n
s t e p s t o r e c o n s t i t u t e a reserve.
T h e o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s must b e c r e d i b l e and c a p a b l e o f t a k i n g t h e
counteroffensive
t o a c h i e v e s t r a t e g i c ends.
T h e s e f o r c e s must b e o f
s u f f i c i e n t s t r e n g t h t o d e s t r o y enemy c o m m a n d and control or n e u t r a l i z e t h e
R e s e r v e s must b e c o m b i n e d a r m s g r o u n d
e n e m y m a s s by d e f e a t i n detail.
m a n e u v e r f o r c e s s u p p o r t e d by air. M o d e r n c o m b a t d e m a n d s a n element o f
" a i r m i n d e d n e s s " in l e a d e r s a s t h i s is t h e m e d i u m that i n c r e a s e s c o m b a t t e m p o ,
h e l p s g a i n t i m e , and p r o v i d e s s y n e r g i s t i c power t o t h o o p e r a t i o n a l maneuver
and f i r e s o f s m a l l e r r e s e r v e f o r c e s . T h e o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e must h a v e
n u b i l i t y t o maneuver d e e p t o a c h i e v e d e c i s i v e operational objectives.

1511

Es c s ent i a1

E l ement5

a+
Operational
........................................

Reserves

....................

* C o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e F o r c e s Should1
I Be The Bnt ad k t P a r f u l Frxcls
t Use E#tmilw k e p t i m to Rotact Fcrcn
+ Bs B d hud Fwcc Supportd by Air huts
t Bs W i n d k r Fcrutim of &flicimt hrs to be Oltislw
t Be Self Cantrined ad Wf Bqprxting fw Anticlprted Length of Cgaatim
-fuel
-amltim

-rwovwy ad repair capability

mdicrl suppat

i m u n i t r t i a r frx @rating in depth

f Have Air ml B r d Coadination

+ Be M i l e ad not w Luge n to k r i f i t e lqlllty
i Be Eqloyed In Seq~mcedOpwatimr to &In Mass
4 Have the Wility to lark Rgmlrr m the Fly
i Hvs spesd Wvvltqn over th hny in Path the Air ad b
wnd Dimrims
t Bypass hny RnistuKe and allw Follw a d Supprxt Fortes to Reduce these Points
t Bs Paitionad IRY Anticipated h
o
. . . . . . . . . .

. .

............................

-..

.....

. . . . . .

lnfarmrtian

1st Gdr kby

4th USRifls Carps4 Dlvs
bth Gdu Rifle Carpr=3 Divr
l a d Rifle Div
18th Tank Carpulll60 tnkrl
3 Ink Wpl
IIbt Rifle Bds
24th Ink Carpsll59 tnkrl
3 Ink Bdsl
1 Ibt Rifls We
25th Tnk Carpr(l60 tnkrl
3 Ink Wllr
I Ibt Ritle Bde
126th sep Ink Rqtfl? tnkrl
I4l1t Sep Ink R q t l l J tnkrl
407th Ink k r t Rqt
3rd Hixod Avirtlm Carps
I2 ea H-50 IR btrys
Totals: 110,796 I P D
SO1 lnkr
1.523 punrlbortr
1,311 guns

40th Rifle Div

47th Gdr Rifle Div
119th Rifle Div
321rt Rifle Div
333rd R i l l e Riv
346th Ritle Riv
1st Tank Carpsf? 183 tnkrl
3 ea tnk be
I ea mt r i l l e bde
8th Cav Carp523 D i v P 40 tnkrl
54th k c h Carpdl83 t t n k r l
3 ea rech bds
2 ea tnk regt
l a t h I n k Rqt(? 13 tnkrl
l a t h Tank Rqt(? 13 tnkrl
5 ea arty rqt5
b tnk dert r q t s
6 antiair z t y r q t s
2 wt reqts
2 ffiL r q t s

for

O_B.DE.R..-42F B AT-T-LEthe

trblei

concerning

the order of b a t t l e far the

3rd Gds kiy

14th Gds Rifle Carp14 Diva
IWth Rifle Div
276th Rlfle Div
5Mh WI Rifle Div
Wth Ssp Rifls We
94th 6ep Rifls We
I 5 t WI h c h Carpi
3 ea h c h Inf Bdt
2 et lnk Roqt

2 h d Ibr Rills Bde

24Jld Ssp Ink Roqt

111th Ssp Ink Rqt

119th scp Ink R q t

1st Hiiod Aviation Carps

5 ea arty rqtr

8 ea tnk dert arty r q t s

4 et lntitir ary rqt5

2 ea wrt roqts

Tottlrr II0,WO w n
134 tnkr

6th kiy
15th Rifle Carps = 3 Div
127th Rifle D i v
l6Gth Rifle Dlv
17th lank Carps (161 ttnkrl
3 tank b h
1 bt r i f l e bde
115th Ink Ws (56 t n k r l
8Znd Sep Ink Rqt (13 t11il
?IZth ssp Tnk We ( I 3 trYrl
8th kty Div = 9 k t y Rqtr
3rd Hixod Aviatim Carp5
5 er tnk dest arty rqt5
2 ma antiair arty r q t s
3 ea IRL r q t s
5 er rsp M btrys

I533

Reinfwcrusnts
5th I n k nd 6th Pry~50,ooOm

h i s ads? af httle
k & N 1912
6th.ltalin kiy
kq Cets.hmt Mlljdt. M,000 6rruns/S0,000 h i n s / 3 0 tnks
lit kiy Corppl div I-)
2nd kiy Corps I: 3 divlcorpr arty
17th Ry b p s 4 divl-I
35th kly Corps3 2.61cwps arty
2nd ky Corps
ZPth by Corpr 3 Div 150 tanks)
2 n R dlvl-1
Alpine Corps= 4.5 divlcwpr uty
I ea cav Div I-)
4 ea hvy arty b t r y ~
I ea inf div 1-1
6eaurtbnr
Totalrt 100,000 m
48th R Corps
2 3 t h inf Divl-I
50 tank5
litli R Div 130 tankrl
621 puns
7th Luft Field Div
3rd M i m kq
BP spns
kp Stahellluft Divl
Grp 5twpfrl
4th kiy Corpslml
Sth kiy CarpS(rBBl
3 41 SSC Dlv

7th Pz Div
bth R Div
Bp Pfeiffw
Total1 45,wo 111

SBJth inf Div

387th Inf Div

30th kiy CorpslFrittw Picol

kd lltn Div
301th Inf Div
19th R Div
Total: 65,W
Total his RthforceamtsiIl0,W
Corrrlatim 01 Fwcss

8th Italian kiy

initial
100,000 m
Rrinfacmts 70,000 IRI

6th kiy and Irt bards ky

171,000 m
Initial
Riinfwtarents 30,000 m

110 tbllidtlkl Rllunivl kq

Initial
110,000 m
40,oOO m
Reinfwcmts

3rd buds kiyl 5th Tnk ky

initial
200,000 m
Ikinfwcntr 30,000 nn

Iota1 liiitial
Reinfwcmtr
krnd Total

220,000 m
!!&@I

330,M)O m

Total initial 371,000 IRI

Rrinfwcsmts &C4Oo_m_
Band Total
431,000 mn

IRM a MlRE
hstein's h t r o f f n s i v e

W!Ef

acrr

VPTP?~?? Fro?!.!W!!v!.c!V,M
40th h v I90,uOO w. md 100 l?nks)
iOOth Rifle D i v
1Ukd Rifle Oiv
M t h Rifle Div
W t h R i f l e Div
340th Rifle Div
107th Rifle Div
J03td Rifle Div
25th hards Rifle Div
iZPtli Rifle Ede
4th lank Cap5 150 l a n k r l
3 Bd&l ht Rifle Bde
I l b t h Tank Bde
l92nd lank Me
59th Sep lank Reqt
M)th E q lank Regt
blst Sep Tmk Rqt
Heinfacmtri
25th kJ5 R i f l e D i v
25kd Rille Div
219th R i f l e Div
1st CZKh Div
19th R i f l e Div
Uth I n k Bde
17th Rifle Me
1st Gdr Cav Corps
113th R i f l e Div
Total P w m e l i 57,517

len

pth @q.!K$z!kolQ@, ! ! ! .

??? nblJ t&!

m md Lad!)

Ihlst R i f l e Div
159th R i f l e Div
219th R i f l e Div
270th Rifle Div
37th R i f l e Bdr
137th lank Bde
%?nd lnk Reqt

3rd hnt Prr,

12th lvlk Caps
3 tnk B
dn
15th Ink Corps
3 tnk b d d l lot r i f l e
6th Gds c l v Cwps
48th Eds Rifle Div
6znd Gds Rifle Div
111th Rifle Div
l a t h R i f l e Div
179th lank Bde
B l s t TMk Rqt

150th lMk Bde

3d Ink b p s 1150 Tanlsl
2d lank Corps 1175 T a n M

lank Strmpthi 29 Jan :165

I4 Feb = 100
IS Feb = I10
27 Feb 39
Ib Ihr 0 22

t551

' h t h w s t q n F g t IVitutin)

6th ply (Khjrltriwl

40,000 m/40tanka
15th Rifle Capr
hth Rifle Div
17hd Rifle Oiv
EGth RifIo Div
267th Rifle Div
l a t h Rille Div
115th lank ffle
21hd lank Reqt

1st

bards pq IKuznetsov)
70,000 en

m i l e Boup Popov IPOpovl

4th Ms Rifle Corps

SSth Mr Rifle Div
4lrt MI Rifle Diu
193th Rille Div
6th M5 Rifle Carps
44th Gdr Rifle Div
58th 13,Rifle Diu
78th Rills Div
244th Rifle Oiv

4th Ms lank Carp5

3 Medl ht Rifle

3rd Tank Carp5

10th I n k Carps

18th Tank Carp5

57th Gdr Ri4Ie Div

N t h Ms Rille Div

5Znd Rifle Div

9th lank ffle

11th lank Me

J each Ski We5

Pwov's Strenqth = 55,000 len

lank Strength 25 Jan : 212
30 Jan :180
7 Fsb = 140
I6 Fsb I45
21 Fsb = 25
22 Fsb a 90
2h Feb = 50

3rd W! b L !MY!!*@kQ!
100,000 vntll0 tanks
14th Gdr Rifle Carps
14th Ms Rifls Div
90th Wr Rifle Div
hlst WB Rifle Div
lath M5 Rifle Carps
5Rh Ms Rifle Div
24kd Rifle Oiv
279th Rifle Diu
Mth Ws Rifle Div
2&th Rifle OIV
N k d Rille Div
2nd Mr Tank Cups
2kd Tank Carps
2nd Tank Carps

s?trgk wi 1 % mr
~
40,W m
J21tt Rifle Oiv
47th MBRifle Div
Ukd Rifle Div
Zhbth Rifle Div
Nkd Rifle Div

Frpni-3

m,wo en

l i t Wr lank Cups 11501

25th lank Caps
I5t Odr clv Carps
Iota1 Tanks 562

nd TMk CUP5

1st W k
h Carp
8th M5 Cav Capr

C561

mw IF mrnE
knstiin's Countmffniive

Jan*

I943

M.9FEW
RD tan2 (50,oOo renl
24th Pz Cap5
385th Inf Div
387th In1 Div
Zlkd In1 Oiv
32Mh Inf Oiv
298th In1 Div
SS Pz Oiv 'Das Reich" 1-1
Cap5 craw

'Rc66dsutKhland" Div
168th In1 Oiv 1-1
BBth In1 Div (-1
Rewants a t 5 other Div5

l
4th Yz Pray l 7 0 , W e
5th Army Cap5
Ko5

Regirent

111th In1 Div

15th Luftnalfe Fld Div

57th Pi Cap5
23rd Pz Div
5s Pat Div "Viking"
17th Pz Oiv
Zrd Pz Div

16th Ibt Div

11th R Oiv

1st R. pr?r.!%,ooo1sn!
40th R b p i Hp
30th llrq Hp
bp Krrlring 13d M n Oivl
335th Oiv (-1
3rd R b p i
7th Pz Oiv
19th Pz Div
27th PI ON

nP Ho!lldt !lPLW.M!
29th h y bpr
6rp 79 12d h a kmy R w t 4
bp k u r i t y Regt 177
&pup k i t h
W t h Inf Div
336th Inf Div
17th Rrry k p s
6Znd In1 Olv
30bth Inf Oiv
Zplth In1 Div
6th L u f t u l f s Fid Div
1Bth Pz (&pi
5th Pz Div
22nd Pz Div
W t h I n f Div
6rp W l d t
Bp v m Hvldrdwd
bp S t l i n b U R

R ~ i n f p l c y ~t tar I(an5tiin during February 1743

. .

.........

...

ReintacerentsLYL! Fep
e4 hnl

ss Pz Cups

SS R D i v 1 s Reich"
SS R Div 'Liebrtmdarte'
298th Inf Div
23rd R Div

55 lbt Div 'Viking'

17th R Div
3rd Pz D i v

16th lbt Div

11th Pz Diu

__........

.key
4Bth Pz Caps
30th Cups
6th Pz Div 1-1
335th Inf Div
302nd Inf Div
304th Inf Div
2hd Pz Div
3rd Pz Caps

17th Pz Div

3rd PI Div

40th Pz Cwpi

11th R D i v l l Rqt 333rd Inf Divl

7th Pz D i v I-)

333rd Inf Div 1-1

55 Ibt D i v 'Viking'

It!.!!

no $!!It

RD Lanl
ss Pz Cup

W t h Inf Diu

SS Pz Div "Totmkopf' ( I lhgt)

Cap RHlS
B a d w t u h l t n d Div
I U t h Inf Div
BBth Inf Div 1-1
SS Pz Div "Totmkopf' 1-1
40th Pi Cup4
19th Pz D i v 1-1
.................

Re!?!orc&to

rroc 11 Feb

AD Keq! lforully Lmzl

Caps Rtu5
SS R Div 'Totmkopf' II Rqtl
320th Inf Div
167th Inf Div
53 R Div 'Lipbitandarto'

no %.!!I!

. . . . . . . . . .

4Lk.R
l s t h R Cups
17th R Div
l a d Fld Trn9 Div

6s R Cups

15th Inf Div

B p Steinbiw

kw4
5th Any Cups
454th W w i t y Div
444th SKurity Div
KN Rcginmt
27th kry Cups
15th Luftluffe Div
lbth Ibt Div
7Pth In1 Div
Z r d R Div
17th Any Carps
hth PZ DIV 1-1
306th Inf Div
30hd Inf Div

M h Inf Div

198th Inf Div

33Znd Inf Div

hd kry

7th Arny Cups

ZJJth Inf Div

57th lnf Div

4th Pz Div

!rtE&nl

XHth Inf Div

Bp Schuldt

' B o r d w t s c h l n d ' Ibt Div

Cap5 Hau6

SS Pz Div 'Totmkqf'
lb7th lnf Div
168th Inf Div
320th Inf Div
BBth Inf Div (-1

nn ~ o i i i d t
5th kmy Carpr
451th

Sec Div

(-)

AD K q f
Carps Raur
320th In1 Div
lh7th lnf Div
"Bossdwtschlmnd"
Div lbath Inf Div

444th See Div

29th kny Cups
15th Luft Fld
79th In1 Div
Ihth h t Div
Grp P a t h
2Jrd Pz Div
381th Inf Div
3 3 t h In1 Div
17th kmy Caps
291th In1 Div
3 N t h In1 Div
302nd In1 Div
6th Pz Dlv
2nd kry
7th kny Carps
75th In1 Div
52nd kiy Cap6
57th In1 Div
332nd Inf Div
4th Pz Div
255th Inf Div

rth?! prw

15th In; Div

17th Pz Div
4Bth R Carpi
6th R Div
11th R Div
55 R Carps
SS Pz Div 'Das Reich'
SS PI Div 'lotmkopf'l-l
SS R Dlv 'Liebstmdart'
Bp 5tlinpbaUR
4bth Inf Div 1-1
15Srd F l d Trng Div

inf

Wth
Div, Bp k h u l d t
Grp Krsiring 4 I Rcqt 46th Inf Div
S3Jth Inf Dlv
3rd R Carps

6Znd Inf Div

19th R Div
3rd PI Div
40th Pz Carps
SS tbt Div 'Vikinp'
7th Pz Div 1-1

1st Pz May
YJth Pray Carps
304th Inf Div, Bp k h u l d t
Bp Krsirirq, I r8gt 3rd kn Div
335th Inf Div
3rd Pz Carps
bhd Inf Div
3rd Pz Div
W d Inf Div
40th k p 6
SS tbt Div 'Viking'
7th R Div
19th Pz Div
3rd kn Div

57th Pz Carps
15th In1 Div

17th Pz Div

46th P i Carp5

I N t h Inf Div

6th Pz D l V

11th Pz Div

SS PZ h O S
SS Pz biv "DasReich"
'3 Pz Div 'Totenkqf'
SS Pz Div "Liebrtmdarti
39th Inf Div
15Jrd Fld Trnq Div I-)

2nd &w

7th kny Carps 1-1

75th In1 Div
J3rd kny Carps
57th Inf Div
Wnd In1 Div
255th Inf Div

no24th
M!!N
Pz Cups
Kwwk

?M)

414th SK Div
115th SK Div
111th Inf Dlv
29th kny Carps
lSth Luft F l d Div
lbth Ibt Div
bphith
23rd R Div
m t h Inf Div
Bp de 5alngre
17th kny Cups
291th In1 Div
W t h In1 Div
M2nd Inf Div
Bp R r q s t a l l s

Nation

_-

- .....

........

......

.........

Soldiers

...
Jadan

. . .

Syria

Egypt
.
.
. -.....

.. -_....

......

-.

..

255,ooO

105,ooO

59,000

Tanks

1,940

1400

280

40

sp llrtillwy

1,m

40

1115519 Sites

Po

XI

M a t Aircraft
.....

320

Mx)

.......

-.

........

-. .

.......

40

.-

...............................

..

.........

............

..
Israel

_
..

...

-.

Tanks

....

.....

...........

.-........

..............1,225

kwxd Fighting vshlclsr.

..........I ,515

kwxed Pwmnel Carriers...

P ~ s ~ mio dStvlding

.......500

Face,....,,...75,W

...........275,ooO

Pwmnel at Full nobilizatim

-......
............

.....

.................................

..............................

Frm, A History ol the_!uyll h y by Ze'w Schiff.

........

_-

....

........

.-.

EAP

2--JGViEi PLAN TO DEFEAT GERRAN S O U T H E R N YING

..

EAP t: 23 HOLLIDT HOLDS NUIS RiVERLINElist PZ STABILiiES DONEi.3 Si'4E2

JZL'IEiS EXPLOIi GAP LEFi BY FALL OF A6 B W I i H biH A R N Y
Si PI CORPS EVACUATES KHARKOV AFTER BIiTER S C T T ; E / S O V I E T S X O ' K I:i

SUEZ C A N A L

,m.\

C A M P A I G N IN S I N A I

MAP 9 8

Ortiis, pol?.

MAP 10

Beiss, p, 13.

M 11P I (I I1

Geirr, p.13.

Endnotes

US Department of the Ariy, @e[m!!ggy-EL!pQ:~,

I.

IFt. Leavenworth, Kansas: CGSC, IWb), p.15 and

p. 139.

2.

C a r l von Claurewitz, O?-y!!,

Ilniversity Press, 197b1, p.357.

3.

Ibid.

1.

Ibid., p.358

5.

Ibid.

b.

Ibid., p.370.

7.

hid.

8.

FM 100-5, IlleCg!!!?!.~ pa129

9.

Ibid., p.129 and 130.

10.

Ibid., p.139.

11.

Ibid., p.10.

edited and translated by M. Honard and P. Paret IPrinceton: Princeton

12.

Erich von Manstein, &!t-Wgoerl edited and translated by A.6. Powell INovato, Californla:
Presidio Press, 1982), p.368. The Volga River flank of A6 A was screened by only one division, the l b t h
Motorized Infantry Division covering 250 r i l e s . The defensive frontage of AG 8 along the Don River and
the Chir River was held by Hungarian, I t a l i a n and Ruianian Armies. The bulk of the German fornations were
f i g h t i n g t o capture Stalingrad and the o i l f i e l d s of the Caucasus.

13.

Ibid., p.370. The 6erman southern wing consisted of 32 divisions covering 435 i i l e s facing a Soviet

force of 341 divisions.

11.

IS.

F.Y. von Nellenthin,

P??g[-#gt!!eyl

Inen Vorki Ballantine Books, 1971), p.250.

Manstein, p. 383. 48th Pz Rrny prevented the enemy from l o v i n g i n against the rear of 1st Pz Army
u n t i l such time an the l a t t e r had wheeled back f r o i the Caucasus on t o the defensive front facing east.
48th Pz Corps had t o insure the enery d i d not thrust dDwn tho l w r reacher of the Dan River t o Rostov
and cut o f f both 4th Pz Arry and A6 A. The collapse of the Rumanians ieant 57th Pz Corps, conslsting of
only two divisions
17th Pz and 23rd Pz Div, was t o hold against the Soviets. A6 Don could not get
enough forces t o help 4th Pz Army. Even when A6 A offered the help a f 3rd Pz Corps, DKH denied the nove.
A6 Don persisted and ianagad t o get 7th Pz Div freed t o send t o 4th PI Arry, but H i t l e r personally
intervened and halted the move and stationed the d i v l s i o n i n Rostov. Not u n t i l mid January d i d help
a r r i v e i n the form of SS Viking Div and l b t h Not I n f Oiv. During t h i s t i n e , the 4th Pz Ariy faced tno
Soviet armies, the 2nd 6ds Arry and the J l s t dray consisting of 1 tank corps, 3 iech corps, 3 r i f l e corps
and I Cavalry Corps.
The 4th PI Army kept i t s forces concentrated i n v i t a l strongpoints resisting a t
decisive points. The i n f a n t r y ranned there strongpoints while the armor was d r i v i n q i n the eneny flanks
with strong i o b i l e forces,
while other less threatened p a r t s of the front were covered only by f l i i s y
e a r l y warning screens.

t781

Ib.

Ibid., p.383. 'Hitler shored l i t t l e understanding for thr old-established 6ernan p r i n c i p l e of

leadership and repeatedly sought t o reddle i n the operations of subordinate headquarters by issuing
specific orders of h i s own...Nothing could be done about such orders when they related t o the novenents
of adjacent arny groups or the action t o be taken with fornations which were s t i l l DKH reserves.
However, when they directed that a particular l i n e be held t o the l a s t ran...the force of circunstances
usually proved stronger i n the end.'

17.

Paul Carell, h~gwgd-E![!h, (New Vorki Ballantine Books, 1971), p.194-195. Although operational
control was solidified, strategic influences on t a c t i c s threatened the operational design. Before
Nanstein gained authority over AD Lanz (12 Febl, H i t l e r had ordered i t s SS Pz Corps t o hold Kharkov at
a l l costs. Nanstein f e l t i t operationally indecisive t o hold Kharkovi i f ground were given up if
resources could be husbanded, Kharkov could be retaken easily i n the operational counterstroke. AD Lanr
understood how hopeless Hauorer's situation was i n Kharkov. But, under dlrect orders fron H l t l e r , AS Lanz
ordered SS PI Corps t o hold. Rlnost surrounded, Hausser ordered the evacuation on I6 Feb and fought h i s
Hausser's forces fought doggedly and upset the Soviet tinetable, forcing the
way out of the c i t y .
dissipation 01 precious amor t o take Kharkov. I n an unknown side advantage, Hauner'r heroic stand also
confirned the Soviet idea that the 6ernans were indeed withdrawing. H i t l e r placed the blare for the
debacle on Lanr and replaced h i n with Kerph.

IS.

Nanstein, p.421. Though A6 B was weak, i t provided a v i t a l coordination l i n k with A6 Central. This
quick change i n cornand structure rade for some anxious norents as u n i t s l e f t i n contact t r i e d t o t i e i n
n i t h the newly forned A6 South. A6 South nas faced with t r y i n g t o rake sense of the dirpositions and
capabilities of the inherited fornations 50 that a coherent plan could be developed for a front that
Signals were hard t o establish and RD Lanz was locked i n
stretched fron Belgorod t o the Black Sea.
conbat a t Kharkov and could not be extracted for repositioning. '...although the reMval of HE Army
Group B corplicated the handling of operations at the nost delicate spot on the Eastern Front, i t s t i l l
served one useful purpose. By bringing Arry Detachment Lanz under Southern Army Group, i t enabled our
headquarters t o exercise exclurive corrand at the decisive place and tine.' This i n i t i a l confusion was a
significant advantage t o the Soviets.'
OKH 5aw the need for unity of corrand and created llG South
consolidating A6 Don and A6 8, but H i t l e r refused t o consider the placing of K l e i r t ' s 400,000 trapped I o n
of A6 A under Hanstein.
Renoval of A6 B war i n i t i a l l y detrinental since l i t t l e e f f o r t was given t o
proper handover, but German a g i l i t y stabilized the situation.

19.

Ibid., pp.426-427. 'Ny purpose i n putting forward these ideas was t o persuade H i t l e r t o consider
operations on a long-tern basis for once...Yhen I objected that our own divisions were also at the end of
their tether, he r e p l i e d that they would be brought f u l l y up t o strength and issued with new weapons
during the ruddy season...He would not recognize, however, that during that sane period the enemy (could1
bring 1.5 n i l l i o n men t o the front. Neither would he adnit that with the nurber of tanks the enery
could produce i n two nonths...he could r e f i t about 60 arnoured brigades.'

...

20.

Carell, p.207 and 200. Popov was struck by the SS Viking Div which led with a devastating a r t i l l e r y
attack.
l i t h Pz D i v and 333 Inf Div joined the attack cutting Popov's overextended l i n e s of
cowunications.
Lacking follon and support infantry forces and too far forward t o turn around, Popov
loat h i s supply lines. Further indications of supply probleas are found i n the fanous quote of Popov,
' A l l wheels a r e standing s t i l l . '

21.

Ibid., p.209. Since the 6th of February the 6erranr had broken the Russian signal codes and were
p r i v y t o a11 the conversations betneen Popov Nobile Group and Vatutin. The 6errans knew, even before the
Soviet reginental conranders, where the Soviet battalions wnre going t o be sent. The 6errans had perfect
t a c t i c a l intelligence that enabled then t o s h i f t forces and take c a k u h t e d r i s k s with the r e s u l t that
they were always ready a t the r i g h t spot at the r i g h t t i r e .

17'11

22.

Ibid., p.213. On 23 Feb, Popov signalled a11 that remained t o him was a handful of tanks, and
they were out of fuel.
He had no a r t i l l e r y l e f t , next t o no ammunition, and no food supplies. A5
Vatutin explained t h i s t o S t a l i n he was rebuffed and Vatutin signalled Popov, 'I wish t o remind you
emphatically that you dre t o u5e a11 available means t o you i n order to...annihildte the enerv...I am
holding you personally responsible.'

23.

John Erickson, !h-Rg$ddlg-Be!rin, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 19831, p.53. 'In p a r t i c u l a r ,
the tank forces urgently needed increased repair f a c i l i t i e s ; a l l Front repair u n i t s were up with the tank
corps, so that the armour i n the rear went completely untended, p a r t l y because the two mobile tank
repair workshops p r o r i r e d t o the Front had not arrived.'

24,

Ibid., p.54. 'The German d r i v e on Belgorod made the reinforcenent of the Voronezh Er.g?! a very urgent
matter.
Rokossovskii on the Central Em?! wa5 ordered t o move the 2 I s t Army south of Kursk; 64th Arrv
was ordered t o move from Stalingrad area and Katukov's 1st Tank Arry received orders t o block the G e r m
thrurt...Kazakov's
69th had t o hold o f f the SS troops. ..not that Kazakov could do r u t h with divisions
ground down t o less than 1000 men each...Iwithl no tanks and less than 100 guns. ..ITlo Katuzov's disgust
the corrand of 2nd 6ds [sent t o reinforce h i s sector1 d i d not seize t h e i r chance t o attack the 55 tank
u n i t s i n the flank; HP 2nd 6dr remained on the east bank o f the Donets d i r e c t i n g t h e i r brigades by radio
but f a i l i n g t o follow up t h e i r chance.
With 69th over the Donets, 215t Army moved t o the north of
Belgorod, 15t Tank concentrated at Oboyan, and b4th Army roved t o the north of Belgorod, 1st Army roved
to the l i n e of the Donets; thus Kursk was secured from the south [ t o f o r r the southern face of the
'Kursk' salientl'.

25.

Erickson, p.52.

26.

Carell, p.216.

27.

Ibid., p.221.

28.

AD H o l l i d t consisted of the k i t h Group, the Fretter-Pic0 Group, four regular i n f a n t r y divisions, tno
Luftwaffee F i e l d Divisions, and various pasted together a l l i e d and G e r m d a r e units. German alarm u n i t s
were h a s t i l y formed security u n i t s made up of rernants of destroyed formations. The main strength of the
formation lay i n the 6 t h and 11th Pz Divisions.

29.

Manstein, p.422.

30.

von Mellenthin, p.251.

31.

Ibid., p.241-245.

32.

Carell, p.194-195. 'The enemy i s withdrawing i n r e t r e a t and massed colunns are withdrawing behind the
Dneiper...reqardless
of supplies or enery rearguards, ( a l l attacking fronts) t o thrust through the
r e t r e a t i n g enemy, reach the Dneiper before the onset of spring mud, and thus cut o f f Manstein's r e t r e a t
t o the river.'

33.

Erickson, pp.19-50.
6olikov had r e t h i s
1000 men, a handful
Southwestern Fronts had

'Vatutin had decided on t h i s 'broadening' of the h i s offensive on 12 February.

siqhts on the Dneiper, even though h i s senior commanders, t h e i r d i v i s i o n s down t o
of guns and perhaps 50 mortars, pleaded for a pause. Both the Voronezh and
done some prodiqious f i q h t i n q and covered great stretches of ground, following

nothing less than a t r a i n of destruction as r e t r e a t i n g German u n i t s blew up bridges, buildings and

a i r f i e l d s , tangled railway l i n e s and damaged the few roads as much as possible. Both Vatutin and
Golikov, however, embarked on an expansion of t h e i r offensives as a r e i u l t of three factors:
overestimation of t h e i r own c a p a b l l i t i e r , wholly erroneous interpretations of the i n t e l l i g e n c e of German
movement and SlAVKA approval.
Vatutin had already dipped deeply i n t o h i s reserves...All three Soviet
f r o n t s had substantial i n t e l l i g e n c e of German movement. On the afternoon of 19 February and at dawn on
20 February Soviet reconnaissance planes reported large concentrations of German armor i n the Krasnograd
area ( t h i s was 4th Pz Army), troop movements a t Dneprovpetrouski and what looked l i k e armor regrouping on
the south-east of krasnoarmeisk. lhese concentrations-lying slap across the path of Vatutin's r i g h t wingwere immediately interpreted a t E m ! HPs as German tank cover for withdrawal of the main body of German
forces from the Donbas.'

34.

Carell, p. 199.

35.

Saad E l Shazly, !Le_Er~rr!?g-o!fBe-se?l

(Sin Francisco8 American Research, 19801, pp.222-223.
200
a i r c r a f t struck I s r a e l i medium a r t i l l e r y positions, three a i r f i e l d s , air defense 'Hawk' batteries,
2000 a r t i l l e r y tubes f i r e d a 53 minute
administration centers, command posts, and radar stations.
preparation using 10,500 shells and a brigade of 'FR06' surface t o surface missiles was launched. Chain
Herzog, !he-_Rrib_1!rae!i--??IT1 (New Vork: Vintage Books, 1904I, p.242. Arab losses i n the assault
crossing aaounted t o only 208 KIA, the Egyptians had thought they would lose as many as 10,000 soldiers.

36.

Shazly., p.223-235. By 2230 hrs, 6 October, eight heavy bridges and four l i g h t bridges were working
with t h i r t y one f e r r i e s .
Sixty of the planned seventy breaches i n the east bank rampart were opened
except that three i n the southern crossing areas were inoperable due t o mud slides. The Egyptians had
105t f i v e a i r c r a f t , twenty tanks and almost three hundred men. Ze'ev Schiff, A-YL!ory_o!_tl?-!r!r!!i
h y , (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, I9851, p.217. lhough the I s r a e l i Air Force succeeded i n
protecting I s r a e l proper, i t ma5 unable t o provide support t o ground forces during the early days of the
c o n f l i c t ; the Arab missile systems were too extensive. Y l t h the assistance of the Soviet Union the
Eqyptians and Syrians had b u i l t networks of a n t i a i r c r a f t missiles even denser than those used by North
Vietnam. I n I 8 days of combat, the IDF l o s t more than 251 of i t s airframes 11041. Egyptian and Syrian
air furces l o s t 456 planes.

37.

Schiff, p.213 and p.214.

38.

Shazly, p.238.

39.

Schiff, p.208.

40.

Avraham Adan, oe.!Be-Br?~i.~!-t?e-s?eE, INovato, California: Presidio Press, 19801, p.234. The
'operational hold', or defensive operations designed t o a t t r i t e the IDF as i t smashed i t s e l f on the
Egyptians, was having l i t t l e e f f e c t a f t e r 9 O c t when the IDF went over t o a defensive posture and s h i f t e d
the strategic main e f f o r t t o Syria's attacks.
On the 11th and 12th i t became clear t h a t the Syrian
e f f o r t was i n grave circumstances. In l i g h t of these events, the Syrians demanded that Egypt go ahead
with the plan t o take the Sinai passes and force the IDF i n t o t r a n s f e r r i n g forces t o the Sinai. I t was
obvious that the two Arab nations had a disconnect i n t h e i r operational plans. Ihe Syrians claimed that
the Egyptians were t o take t h e i r i n i t i a l canal crossing a l l the way t o the passes and indeed soae Sixty
kilometers i n t o the Sinai and then go over t o the operational defense. The Egyptians denied t h i s s t a t i n g
that t h e i r posture o f 11-12 October 1115 only about f i v e miles short of t h e i r intended positions (they had
not achieved a l i n e roughly analogous t o the A r t i l l e r y Road). Nonetheless, the Egyptians agreed t o
attack on 15 October, however, the Egyptian operational commanders were so reluctant t o take t h i s action,
that the attack d i d not take p l a c e u n t i l I4 October.

41.

Ibid.,

p.237.

42,

Shazly, p. 246-211. Both Arny conianders, f u l l y aware of the i n t e n t of the operational design and
t h e i r neans/strengths stated they could not attack, one threatened resignation 12nd hrnyl. After a
conference, there was only one concernion, on the date of the attack, now t o be on 14 October. Yhile t h i s
gave the Egyptians one nore day, i t a150 gave the I s r a e l i s one nore day t o f i n i s h business on the 601an
and get t o Sinai. An additional r e s t r i c t i o n t o operations was the requirenent that the bridgehead not be
weakened at a l l and that the operational reserves be used for the attack. The operational reserves
consistsd of 330 tank, the t o t a l i n two d i v i s i o n s the 4th hrn Div and the 21st Am Div. The 4th was
behind the 3rd Arny and the Z l s t posted behind the 2nd Arny. Each d i v had two brigades with one hundred
tanks per brigade and one nechanized brigade. The 215t Div had h a l f of i t s tanks forward t o provide
f i r e support t o the i n f a n t r y holding the bridgeheads. The 4th D i v Has also t o leave one brigade on the
west bank as a reserve, thus the operational design t h a t depended on at least 330 tanks as a mobile
reserve was now reduced t o 100 tanks i n reserve.

43.

Ibid., p.241-245. Egypt had 1700 tanks with 1020 on the east bank i n the defensive positions and
330 i n operational reserve on the west bank t o destroy any eneny penetration. Losses up t o date were 240,
the Egyptians h i d only 780 tanks across the canal. Though the I s r a e l i s had l o s t 610 tanks t o date, they
had the neans t o replace then. Thus the I s r a e l i s had 900 tanks and the Egyptians 780 and t h i s was not
enough t o attack the passes a5 was nor proposed i n the euphoria of the moment.

44.

Ibid., p. 217.

45.

Shazly, p. 248.

46.

Shazly, p. 252.

17.

Shazly, p. 258.

40.

Ibid., p. 253.

47.

Ibid., p. 254 and 255.

50.

Adan, p, 237.

Schiff., p.271. 96 Egyptian tanks and a large nunber of arnored personnel c a r r i e r s roved i n t o the
giant antitank anbush set by the I s r a e l i d i v i s i o n waiting t o cross the canal. Only four vehicles escaped
the naelrtron, one was the brigade connander. The I s r a e l i s l o s t four tanks.

51.

Ildan, p. 442.

52.

Herzog, p, 315.

53.

Ibid., p. 246.

54.

S r h i f f , p. 320 and 321.

55.

Adan, p. 471.

56.

Schiff, p. 216.

57.

Schazly, p.240. Ihe IDF attacked the Egyptian 18th Div on the norning of B October and wa5 repulsed.
The Egyptian 2nd Div was h i t i n the afternoon of B October with two armored brigades i n the d i r e c t i o n of
El-Ferdan and was annihilated.
One I s r a e l i a r m e d brigade struck the Egyptian l b t h I n f Div a t
Derverroir and was destroyed.

58.

Schiff, p. 213.

59.

Sharly, p. 261.

h0.

I h i d . , p. 2.Tb

hl.

Operational intelligence preparation of the battlefield must take a macro view of the elements of
natioiial power on both sides! political, economic, psycholoqical, geographic and military. Still, the
basic aspects of nurbers, norm5 and doctrinal procedures continues to be important. l o this complete
analysis the comrander brings his understanding of theoretical concepts and his knowledge of HEIT-1 to
determine the operational design.

I831

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I861