KursK:

A Study i n O p e r a t i o n a l Art

by
Major Kerry K. Pierce

Engineer

School o f Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s

U.S. Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e

'
Fort L e a v r n w o r t h , Kansas

20 May 1987

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i m i t e d .

67-3054

School of Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s

Monograph Approval

Name o f S t u d e n t : U n c - K a r c r u i a r r e

T i t 1 e o f Monograph : K
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Approved by:
Monograph D i r e c t o r

D i r e c t o r , School of
Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s

__________l__

Colonel R i c h a r d H a r t S i n n r e i c h , M.A.

&iy J&

--- --- --------

P h i l i p J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted t h i s

_________

D i r e c t o r , Graduate Degree
Programs

a
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day o f

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ABSTRACT

KURSK:

A STUDY IN OPERATIONAL ART.

by MAJ Kerry K. Pierce, USA, 47 pages.

This monograph examines the practice of operational art from the

perspective of the Kursk Campaign of July-October, 1943. The study begins by
presenting the German and Russian campaign plans as examples of two different
m.thods of achieving a desired end state. Each plan's vision of the future was
heavily influenc.d by the nature of the strategic situation and the
personal ities of the two principal artists: Adolph Hitler and Marshal Georgi i
Zhukov. These two lead.rs had vastly diff.rent understandings of strat.gic
possibil ities, time-space dimensions of the battlefield, and the means required
to achi.v. th.ir d.sired end stat.s. Th. succ.ss of Zhukov's campaign plan was
directly r.lated to his I inkag. of appropriate means and methods toward a
d.sired end state, while Hitler's failure repres.nted a failure to do likewise.
Th. monograph also us.s Kursk to examine s.v.ral theor.tical concepts of war.
Thes. include the r.lativ. strength of off.ns. and defens., culminating points,
the art of combinations, use of r.serves, and the cent.r of gravity.
The Russian d.cision to d.fend first against an expect.d German offensive
is an excellent example of the us. of operational art. Acting on the
information of the LUCY espionage n.twork, Zhukov constructed his campaign
around an unpr.c.d.nt.d tactical d.f.nsiv. system in an effort to destroy the
G.rman armor.d formations as th.y attacked toward Kursk. He intended to
initiate his counteroffensive at the point where the German panzer coPps had
been so attrited that th.y would not be able to prevent a Russian onslaught
which would exp.l all G.rman forces from the Donetz Basin. German operational
fleXibility, which had b n the hallmark of their pr.vious campaigns, was
el iminat.d by Hitler's centrally devised and executed plan, reducing commanders
such as Manst.in and Mod.l to m.r. tactical actors. In the .nd the Russian
victory was a complete one: tactical, operational and strategic. It also
secur.d the strategic initiative for the remaind.r of the war.

T a b l e o f Contents
Page

S e c t i o n 111.

.....................
Strategic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Campaign P l a n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Section IU.

Preparation

S e c t i o n U.

The Qerman O f f e n s i v e

S e c t i o n U1.

The F l a s h i n g Sword o f Vengeance

27

Section U I I .

Conclusions

32

S e c t i o n I.
S e c t i o n 11.

Introduction

..........
.................

- The Means A v a i l a b l e

...........
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13

18

F i gures:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

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. . . . .. .. .. ... ... ,.. ,.. ,.. ...
. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..

E a s t e r n Theater o f War - M a r c h 1943

Army Group South s i t u a t i o n
March 1943
Russian defenses a t Kursk
Qerman o f f e n s i v e p l a n (ZITADELLE)
N i n t h firmys a t t a c k
F o u r t h Panzer Armys a t t a c k
O p e r a t i o n KUTUZW
O p e r a t i o n RUMYFlNTSN

..............................
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Endnotes

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

43

44

46

'How many people do YOU t h i n k even know where Kursk i s ?

I t ' s a m atter o f profound i n d i f f e r e n c e t o the w o r l d
whether we h o l d Kursk o r n o t . I repeat my question8
Why do we want t o attacW i n the East a t a l l t h i s year?'
H i t l e r ' s r e p l y was: 'You're q u i t e r i g h t . Whenever I
t h i n k o f t h i s a t t a c k my stomach t u r n s over.' 1

SECTION I : INTRODUCTION
From the perspective of western accounts o f the Second World War KursR

i s synonymous w i t h the war's

l a r g e s t tank b a t t l e .

Far more than a s i n g l e

clash of armor, however, the Kursk campaign endured over a p e r i o d o f two

months,

i n v o l v i n g over two m i l l i o n ccinbatants, s i x thousand tanks, and f i v e

thousand t a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t .

When i t had r u n i t s course the s t r a t e g i c

scales w e r e t i p p e d i r r e v e r s i b l y i n f a v o r o f the Soviet Union. Never again

would Oermany maruhal the necessary reserves t o e x e r c i s e the s t r a t e g i c
i n i t i a t i v e i n the East. Just as important f o r the Red Army, b l i t z k r i e g was
defeated t a c t i c a l l y f o r the f i r s t t i m e on the f i e l d s o f Kursk, thereby
paving the wry f o r Russia's f i r s t successful s u m e r o f f e n s i v e .

For these

reasons i t i s Kursk not S t a l i n g r a d which h o l d s the a t t e n t i o n o f Soviet

h i s t o r i a n s a8 the d e c i s i v e t u r n i n g p o i n t i n the Eastern Theater o f War.
I n the study o f operational a r t , Kursk has much t o o f f e r i n t e r m s o f
both planning and execution.

I n the f o l l o w i n g n a r r a t i v e we w i l l p o r t r a y a

c l e a r dichotomy i n the campaign p l a n s o f the two b e l l i g e r e n t s t o the e x te n t

t h a t t a c t i c a l means and events w e r e l i n k e d u l t i m a t e l y t o a s t r a t e g i c end
state.

I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s the campaign's outcome i t s e l f p r o v i d e s the

d e f i n i t i v e judgment on the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f each p l a n .

- 1 -

We w i l l a l s o be

a b l e t o e v a l u a t e t h e two p r i n c i p a l a r t i s t s o f t h e a c t i o n f r o m t h e
p e r s p e c t i v e of p l a n n i n g and conduct o f o p e r r t l o n s amid t h e f o g and f r i c t i o n
o f war.

F i n a l l y , Kursk p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t l a b o r a t o r y i n w h i c h t o t e s t

s e v e r a l t h e o r e t i c a l concepts o f war i n c l u d i n g t h e r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f
o f f e n s e and defense, c u l m i n a t i n g p o i n t s , t h e a r t o f c a n b i n a t i o n s , use o f
r e s e r v e s , and t h e c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y .

SECTICN 11:

SllWTEGlC SITMTICN

By l a t e March 1943 t h e E a s t e r n Theater o f War had s e t t l e d i n t o r e l a t i v e

inactivity.

The s p r i n g thaw accompanied by oceans o f mud c e r t a i n l y

c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e r e s p i t e , b u t so t o o d i d t h e e x h a u s t i n g e v e n t s o f t h e
previous winter.

The Red Armys w i n t e r o f f e n s i v e w h i c h s e a l e d t h e f a t e o f

Pauluss 6 t h Army a t S t a l i n g r a d achieved tremendous t e r r i t o r i a l gains, b u t

ended d i s a p p o i n t I n g l y ,
S t i l l l e a r n i n g t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l c r a f t , t h e S o v i e t s had a g a i n
overextended themselves l o g i s t i c a l l y and f e l l p r e y t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
a g i l i t y o f German armored f o r m a t i o n s .

F a i l u r e i n t h e end stemmed from

o v e r c o n f i d e n c e and an i n a b i l i t y t o match t a c t i c a l r e s o u r c e s t o o p e r a t i o n a l
ends.

The German c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e o f February n o t o n l y i n f l i c t e d heavy

l o s s e s on S o v i e t tank u n i t s , b u t a l s o succeeded i n r e c a p t u r i n g much o f t h e

lost territory,

i n c l u d i n g the c i t i e s o f Kharkov and Belgorod. I t was

e v i d e n t t h a t t h e German Army, and Manstein i n p a r t i c u l a r , s t i l l o c c u p i e d

t h e o p e r a t i o n a l h i g h ground and c o u l d s t i l l i n f l i c t d e v a s t a t i n g d e s t r u c t i o n
d e s p i t e t h e S t a l i n g r a d setback.
The s t a b i l i z e d E a s t e r n F r o n t i n March 1943 s t r e t c h e d f r a n L e n i n g r a d i n

- 2 -

the n o r t h t o the Sea o f Azov i n the south, a d i s t a n c e o f 2,000 m i l e s .

One

o f the most d i s t i n g u i s h i n g f e a t u r e s throughout i t s l e n g t h was the massive

Kursk s a l i e n t t h r u s t i n g some 140 m i l e s i n t o the German zone and extending
n o r t h t o south 170 m i l e s .

(see f i g u r e 1, page 36) H i s t o r i c a l l y s a l i e n t s o f

t h i s k i n d comnanded a great deal o f a t t e n t i o n ; Kurek would prove t o be no

exception.

For the Germans i t presented the o p p o r t u n i t y t o destroy

overextended armored forces! on the o t h e r hand the Russians saw i t as a

possible launching p o i n t f o r a renewed o f f e n s i v e .

The a t t r a c t i o n was

evident, but i t would r e q u i r e o u t s i d e events and s i t u a t i o n s t o push the

adversaries t o actual operation s there,
For many reasons 1943 loaned as a year o f d e c i s i o n f o r H i t l e r and
Qermany. The expected l o s s o f T u n i s i a would draw the campaign i n No r t h
A f r i c a t o a d i s a p p o i n t i n g close.

A t the same t i m e , events i n Ruseia w e r e

sever ely s t r a i n i n g the A x i s a l l i a n c e .

Heavy losses t o Rumanian and

Hungarian a r m i e s presented H i t l e r ' s a l l i e s w i t h a s t r o n g argument t o

approach the S oviets f o r some way o u t o f the carnage.

Mu s s o l i n i wanted h i s

b a t t e r e d f o r c e s r e t u r n e d t o I t a l y i n response t o t h r e a t s C l 0 6 ~t o home.
2
OKW expected a new A l l i e d o f f e n s i v e i n the West, e i t h e r i n the
Mediterranean (Qreece or I t a l y ) o r perhaps a c r o s s channel invasion.

To

make m a t t e r s worse the A l l i e d a i r campaign had reached a p o i n t where i t s

impact on domestic l i f e could no longer be ignored.

Despite these ominous

f a c t o r s , Qermany was s t i l l able t o concentrate her m i l i t a r y e f f o r t i n the

East. I n f a c t , over 75 percent o f a l l Qerman f o r c e s
s t a t i o n e d i n Russia. There was s t i l l t i m e ,

- 161 D i v i s i o n s - was

i n H i t l e r ' s l o g i c , t o defeat the

Russians before t u r n i n g west t o deal w i t h the B r i t i s h and Americans. The

question f o r consideration was how best t o accomplish t h i s end.

- 3 -

Because o f the l o s s e s o f t h e p r e v i o u s y e a r , Germany f o u n d i t s e l f i n t h e

p o s i t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c defense.

W i t h i n t h i s c o n t e x t two o p t i o n s f o r

I n t h e words o f M a n s t e i n one course

o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s were a v a i l a b l e .

of a c t i o n was a p r e e m p t i v e a t t a c k , "on t h e f o r e h a n d " , aimed a t d i s r u p t i n g

Russian p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a summer o f f e n s i u e by d e s t r o y i n g t h e i r o p e r a t i o n a l

3
reserves.

T h i s o p t i o n w o u l d have t o be c a r e f u l l y p l a n n e d t o take i n t o

account t h e reduced means a v a i l a b l e t o t h e Wehrmacht. The a l t e r n a t i v e which

M a n s t e i n p r e f e r r e d was t o a l l o w t h e Russians t o l a u n c h f i r s t and s t r i k e
4
them, "on t h e backhand", w i t h c o n c e n t r a t e d m o b i l e f o r c e s . M a n s t e i n had
a l r e a d y demonstrated t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h i s new k i n d o f m o b i l e r e a c t i v e
defense i n t h e d e f e a t o f S o v i e t f o r c e s around Kharkov i n February. Qerman
i n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e Russians were indeed p l a n n i n g an o f f e n s i v e
whose o b j e c t i v e was t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f Army Group South. To be s u c c e s s f u l
i n t h e d e f e n s i v e o p t i o n , however, M a n s t e i n r e q u i r e d t h e freedom t o g i v e up
ground w h i l e c o n d u c t i n g a f l u i d m o b i l e campaign f r a u g h t w i t h some r i s k .
Regardless o f t h e c h o i c e , he f e l t t h a t t h e d e s i r e d end s t a t e w o u l d be
o p e r a t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c s t a l e m a t e , p r o v i d i n g t h e b a s i s f o r a n e g o t i a t e d
end t o t h e war i n t h e East.
J u s t as he had i n 1942, H i t l e r r e j e c t e d even t h e n o t i o n o f c e d i n g
t e r r i t o r y a l r e a d y purchased w i t h Qerrnan b l o o d .

T h i s , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e hope

t h a t a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n c o u l d be o b t a i n e d i n Russia, l e d t o H i t l e r ' s
choice o f the operational o f f e n s i v e o r forehand option.

H i s reasoning

c e r t a i n l y i l l u s t r a t e d t h e b l e n d i n g o f h i s p e r s p e c t i v e b o t h as p o l i t i c a l
l e a d e r and m i l i t a r y commander i n c h i e f .
F i e l d Marshal K e i t e l , C h i e f o f S t a f f o f OKW, perhaps best e n c a p s u l a t e d

t h e reasons f o r O p e r a t i o n

ZITADELLE

, the

- 4 -

r e d u c t i o n o f t h e Kursk s a l i e n t .

I n response t o Guderians q u e s t i o n as t o why H i t l e r wanted t o a t t a c k a t a l l

i n 1943, he remarked, We must a t t a c k f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons.

With the

i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e 30 January a u s t e r i t y programs i n Germany under t h e l a b e l

of total mobilization,

t h e home f r o n t was b e g i n n i n g t o f e e l t h e b i t e o f

war f o r the f i r s t t i m e .

H i t l e r no doubt f e l t t h a t t h e c l o c k was r u n n i n g on

the p e r i s h a b l e commodity known as morale.

I t was c e r t a i n l y e a s i e r t o

demand s a c r i f i c e when the p e r c e p t i o n was one o f v i c t o r y r a t h e r t h a n

defeat.

Even f u r t h e r , t h e image o f t h e Wehrmacht had been d e a l t a s e r i o u s

blow a t S t a l i n g r a d . An i n v i n c i b l e m i l i t a r y was e s s e n t i a l n o t o n l y f o r
b a t t l e f i e l d r e s u l t s , b u t t o h o l d t h e w a v e r i n g A x i s t o g e t h e r and t o c o n t r o l
conquered t e r r i t o r i e s .

The s u r e s t way t o r e s t o r e t h a t p r e s t i g e was a

c r u s h i n g m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y r e m i n i s c e n t o f the g l o r y days o f b l i t z k r i e g .

Yet

f o r a l l these r a t i o n a l reasons, H i t l e r a l s o added a somewhat i r r a t i o n a l

i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h t h e economic s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the Donetz Basin. Convinced
t h a t German o c c u p a t i o n o f t h i s r e g i o n s e v e r e l y hampered Russias i n d u s t r i a l
p r o d u c t i o n , he r e f u s e d t o c o n s i d e r any p l a n which w o u l d g i v e back the a r e a
w i t h o u t a f i g h t , e v e n i f some o p e r a t i o n a l %uccess c o u l d be achieved.

In

t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h i s i n t r a n s i g e n c e which had hampered Mansteins

p r e v i o u s w i n t e r campaign was t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e causal c h a i n o f e v e n t s
l e a d i n g t o ZITADELLE.
The k e y concern, then, was where t o a t t a c k . Kursk d r e w the a t t e n t i o n o f
7
OKH l i k e a magnet. I n a d d i t i o n t o the o p p o r t u n i t i e s a f f o r d e d by a s a l i e n t

o f t h i s k i n d , i n t e l l i g e n c e p r e s e n t e d an assessment o f numerous enemy

armored u n i t s which had been h a l t e d i n t h e i r t r a c k s by t h e s p r i n g thaw.
These f o r c e s were v u l n e r a b l e a p p a r e n t l y t o the k i n d o f o f f e n s i v e e n v i s i o n e d
by H i t l e r .

- 5 -

I n March 1943 t h e German army was no l o n g e r t h e same army t h a t conducted

t h e campaigns o f 1941 and 42. To be s u r e t h e t o t a l m o b i l i z a t i o n

effort

d i d p r o v i d e raw numbers almost equal t o t h e peak German s t r e n g t h achieved

e a r l i e r on t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t , b u t numbers alone were d e c e i v i n g .

U n i t s were

s h e l l s o f t h e i r former s e l v e s ! c a s u a l t i e s had sapped n o t o n l y s t r e n g t h b u t

experience; b u t w o r s t o f a l l t h e armor s i t u a t i o n was g r a v e .

I n an e f f o r t

t o m a i n t a i n t h e same number o f panzer d i v i s i o n s , u n i t tank s t r e n g t h had

been a l l w e d t o f a l l r e p e a t e d l y .

From t h e 1940 d i v i s i o n a l s t r e n g t h o f 350

tanks, t h e 1943 German panzer d i v i s i o n c o n t a i n e d o n l y 2 7 , w i t h enough s e l f

p r o p e l l e d guns, o r SPs, t o f i e l d 80 t o t a l armored u e h i c l e s .

I n f a c t , by

January, 1943 o n l y 493 s e r v i c e a b l e t a n k s were a v a i l a b l e on t h e e n t i r e

8
Eastern Front.
The Wehrmacht c o u l d s t i l l r e l y on s u p e r i o r t a c t i c a l combined arms
o r g a n i z a t i o n s , more o p e r a t i o n a l command and s t a f f f l e x i b i l i t y , and l e a d e r s
o f t h e c a l . i b e r o f Manstein. I n t h e t h i n k i n g o f t h e Army Group South
Commander, however, t h i s c a l c u l u s p o i n t e d toward m o b i l e defense, n o t the
massed o f f e n s i v e o r d e r e d by H i t l e r .
1943 a l s o p r e s e n t e d t h e S o v i e t s w i t h some d i f f i c u l t dilemmas and

choices.

The r e c e n t l y completed o f f e n s i u e , a l t h o u g h i n i t i a l l y s u c c e s s f u l ,

l e f t many l i n g e r i n g d o u b t s as t o t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s k i l l o f the Red Army.

Y e t , offensive opportunities c e r t a i n l y existed.

v u l n e r a b l e f o r t h e n e x t o f f e n s i v e round.

A r m y Group South l a y

I f i t c o u l d be c u t o f f frm Army

Group Center and crushed a g a i n s t t h e Black Sea, i t s d e s t r u c t i o n would

f a c i l i t a t e t h e s t r a t e g i c c o l l a p s e o f the e n t i r e German defense, opening a
r o u t e a l l the way t o Oermany i t s e l f .

(see f i g u r e 2 , page 37) On t h e o t h e r

hand, S t a l i n f u l l y expected t h e Germans t o open an o f f e n s i v e o f t h e i r own.

- 6 -

A f t e r a l l , had they n o t done so i n each p r e c e e d i n g summer?

I t was i n h e r e n t

i n t h e s p i r i t o f t h e Wehrmacht, i t s d o c t r i n e , and i t s commander, A d o l f

Hitler.
The means a v a i l a b l e t o STAUK4 f o r the n e x t campaign season l e f t much t o
be d e s i r e d .

Yet t o p r o v e i t s e f i n t h e summer, the Red Army had shown some

improvement i n t a c t i c a l capabi i t y , b u t s t i l l c o u l d n o t be reckoned as

s k i l l f u l a s t h e German f o r c e s .

F u r t h e r , i t had l e a r n e d f i r s t hand t h e

p o t e n t i a l d e s t r u c t i v e c a p a c i t y o f a b r u i s e d b u t n o t beaten Wehrmacht,
p a r t i c u l a r l y under t h e a g i l e d i r e c t i o n o f a Manstein. On the p o s i t i v e s i d e
c o u l d be counted an i n c r e a s i n g tank p r o d u c t i o n which would s h o r t l y r e a c h
one thousand p e r month and a f l o o d o f Lend Lease t r u c k s which would
e v e n t u a l l y a l l o w the Red Army t o m o t o r i z e most o f i t s i n f a n t r y u n i t s .
A l l these concerns no doubt i n f l u e n c e d p l a n n e r s a t STAUKA, b u t u n l i k e

the s i t u a t i o n i n t h e German s t r a t e g i c command, t h e Russians e n j o y e d a

d i s t i n c t advantage.

By 1943 S t a l i n had deueloped such a degree o f

c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s Deputy Supreme Commander, Marshal Zhukov, t h a t he was

w i l l i n g t o l e n d a f a r g r e a t e r scope o f o p e r a t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c l a t i t u d e
than H i t l e r a f f o r d e d t o any o f h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s .

MOSCOW,

The h e r o o f L e n i n g r a d ,

and S t a l i n g r a d , Zhukov commanded n o t o n l y S t a l i n ' s r e s p e c t b u t more

importantly, h i s approval.
F o l l o w i n g the s e t b a c k s around Kharkov i n February, S t a l i n s e n t Zhukov t o
t h e C e n t r a l F r o n t t o s t a b i l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n and p r o v i d e him w i t h a
d e t a i l e d r e p o r t o f the area.

Zhukov s u h i t t e d a t h o r o u g h l y reasoned and

i n t e l l i g e n c e s u p p o r t e d assessment i n a memo d a t e d 8 A p r i l . I n i t he
a c c u r a t e l y e v a l u a t e d t h e weakened German s i t u a t i o n w h i c h i n d i c a t e d t h a t
f u t u r e o f f e n s i v e s i n t h e Lower Don, U o l g a and N o r t h Caucasus a r e a s w e r e

- 7 -

unl i k e l y .
The b u l k o f German o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y panzer d i v i s i o n s ,
were c o n c e n t r a t e d near Kharkou, O r e l , and Belgorod. T h i s l e d Zhukov t o
conclude t h a t t h e Germans would conduct an o f f e n s i v e i n t h i s area w i t h t h e
o b j e c t i v e o f r e d u c i n g t h e Kursk s a l i e n t and d e s t r o y i n g t h e C e n t r a l ,
Voronezh, and Southwestern F r o n t s . Zhukov ended h i s memo w i t h a
c o n t r o v e r s i a l y e t p e r c e p t i v e recommendation.

1 c o n s i d e r i t unwise t o launch a p r e v e n t i v e a t t a c k i n
the n e x t few days.
I t would be b e t t e r i f we f i r s t wore
t h e enemy down w i t h our defenses and d e s t r o y e d h i s tanks,
and o n l y then, a f t e r h a v i n g moved up f r e s h r e s e r v e s ,
went over t o a general O f f e n s i v e and f i n a l l y d e s t r o y e d
h i s main f o r c e . 9

A l t h o u g h much o f Zhukous

p l a n o b v i o u s l y r e l i e d on t h e i n f o r m a t i o n

a v a i l a b l e f r o m t a c t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e and t h e marshals own i n t u i t i v e

powers, h i s t o r y muddies t h e w a t e r s s l i g h t l y as t o the u l t i m a t e causal
r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t h e Russian campaign p l a n .

By t h i s time i n t h e war STAUKA

had almost i n s t a n t a n e o u s access t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e Qerman h i g h

10
Later i n the
command through an espionage network known as LUCY.
p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r KursK we know the Russians had almost c m p l e t e d e t a i l s o f
t h e a t t a c k p l a n , b u t a t t h i s e a r l y d a t e i t i s n o t known how much LUCY had
p r o v i d e d o r t h e e x t e n t t o which i t i n f l u e n c e d ZhuKous 8 A p r i l e s t i m a t e .

SECTION 1 1 1 8

THE cA).(mio)JPLANS

Zhukov was r e c a l l e d t o Moscow on the 1 1 t h o f A p r i l t o p r e p a r e a p l a n f o r

- 8 -

t h e upcaning o p e r a t i o n .

He c a n p l e t e d i t i n a u i n g l e n i g h t w i t h the

a s s i s t a n c e o f h i s C h i e f o f S t a f f General U a s i l e u s k y . S t a l i n ' s approval o f

t h e i r e f f o r t s on the 1 3 t h , however, d i d n o t end t h e debate as t o the best
course o f a c t i o n .

T h i s would c o n t i n u e among t h e s e n i o r r a n k s w e l l i n t o

June, by which t i m e the S o v i e t s knew t h e f u l l d e t a i l s o f ZITADELLE.

Zhukou's p l a n e n v i u i o n e d the defense o f t h e Kursk s a l i e n t conducted by
two f r o n t s .

(see f i g u r e 3 , page 38) OInRral Rokossovsky's C e n t r a l F r o n t i n

the n o r t h e r n s e c t o r and General U a t u t i n ' s Uoronezh F r o n t i n t h e s o u t h were

t o prepare s t r o n g a n t i t a n k defenses i n g r e a t depth t o erode t h e armored
strength o f the attacker.

These were e s s e n t i a l l r i n f a n t r y o r g a n i z a t i o n s

w i t h a s i n g l e tank army each t o a c t as m o b i l e r e s e r v e .

To t h e r e a r o f

these f r o n t s Zhukov c o n c e n t r a t e d the s t r a t e g i c tank r e s e r v e s o f t h e S o v i e t

Union under the banner o f General KOnRU'S Steppe F r o n t . A l t h o u g h Steppe
F r o n t was earmarked f o r t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e phase, i t would a l s o be
p r e p a r e d t o a s s i u t i n t h e defense o f Kursk and r e a l o f f any German
penetrations.

I t i s a f u r t h e r mark o f S t a l i n ' s c o n f i d e n c e i n h i s Deputy

Supreme CUranandeP t h a t he a l l o w e d the p o s i t i o n i n g o f these c r i t i c a l a s s e s t s

away from Moscow.
Once the d e f e n s i v e phase had achieved s u f f i c i e n t a t t r i t i o n o f German
armor, a massive S o v i e t c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e would commence.

To t h e n o r t h

C e n t r a l F r o n t i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h Brransk and Western F r o n t s would launch

i n t o t h e Ore1 p o c k e t .

South o f t h e s a l i e n t Uoronezh, Southwestern and

Steppe F r o n t s would a t t a c k i n t o t h e Belgorod-Kharkov s e c t o r .

The campaign

was designed t o achieve t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l German t r o o p s e a s t o f t h e

Dnieper R i v e r and e s t a b l i s h the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a general o f f e n s i v e a l l

a l o n g the E a s t e r n F r o n t . E x t e n s i v e

USR

o f p a r t i s a n s was planned i n o r d e r t o

- 9 -

g a t h e r i n t e l l i g e n c e and sabotage t h e b u i l d u p o f Qerman r e s o u r c e s i n t o O r e l

and Kharkov.
Zhukou h i m s e l f went t o t h e C e n t r a l F r o n t t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e ac i u i t i e s o f
the n o r t h e r n t h r e e f r o n t s , w h i l e General U a s i l e v s k y was s e n t t o
three f r o n t s t o the south.
group-of-fronts

m t r o l the

T h i s p r a c t i c e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a temporary

command known as a ' s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n ' was used by t h e

S o v i e t s a t b o t h Moscow and S t a l i n g r a d and i l l u s t r a t e d t h e i r d e s i r e f o r

u n i f i e d strategic control.

A s we s h a l l see s h o r t l y t h e German p l a n

s u f f e r e d from a l a c k o f such u n i t y .

Zhukov's l o c a t i o n w i t h C e n t r a l F r o n t

i n d i c a t e d h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h e main Qerman e f f o r t would come f r o m the

north.

I n t h i s he was m i s t a k e n .

T h i s one e r r o r i n p l a n n i n g was t o have

f a r r e a c h i n g impact on t h e Russian campaign, e s p e c i a l l y t h e s y n c h r o n i z a t i o n

o f t h e c o u n t e r o f f e n s i u e phase.
Under t h e d i r e c t i o n o f Q o n e r a l Z e i t z l e r t h e e s s e n t i a l elements f o r a
German s p r i n g o f f e n s i u e w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d by March and c o n t a i n e d i n
O p e r a t i o n s Order Number F i u e . Army Qroups A and N o r t h were o r d e r e d t o
defend i n s e c t o r w h i l e Army Qroups South and Center were d i r e c t e d t o f o r m
s t r o n g tank armies on e i t h e r s i d e o f the Kursk s a l i e n t .
were t o follow.

Further d e t a i l s

The p l a n n i n g e f f o r t s o f OKH c u l m i n a t e d i n H i t l e r ' s

O p e r a t i o n s Order Number S i x on 15 A p r i l . The aim o f t h i s Operation, code

named ZITADELLE, was, " t o e n c i r c l e the enemy f o r c e s deployed i n t h e Kursk
area by one a t t a c k i n g army each from t h e a r e a s o f B e l g o r o d and s o u t h o f
and a n n i h i l a t i n g them through a c o n c e n t r i c a t t a c k . . . . I t
11
t h e i n i t i a t i v e f o r s p r i n g and summer."

Orel,

must g i v e u s

To implement ZITADELLE Colonel-Qeneral Model's N i n t h Army o f Army Qroup

Center would a t t a c k towards Kursk from t h e n o r t h w h i l e General Hoth's

10

F o u r t h Panzer A r m y and General Kempfs Army Detachment w o u l d s t r i k e from

t h e south.

(see f i g u r e 4, page 3 9 ) I t was t o be b l i t z k r i e g a l l ouer a g a i n

w i t h n a r r w c o n c e n t r a t e d p e n e t r a t i o n s f o l l o w e d by deep e x p l o i t a t i o n ,
e n c i r c l e m e n t , and a n n i h i l a t i o n .
The problems w i t h ZITADELLE w e r e numerous e s p e c i a l l y when c o n t r a s t e d
w i t h t h e scope o f the Russian p l a n .

L e a v i n g a s i d e the q u e s t i o n o f adequate

means f o r t h e moment, O p e r a t i o n s Order S i x r e a d s more l i k e a t a c t i c a l p l a n

than a campaign.

Very l i t t l e freedom o f a c t i o n was g i v e n t o t h e army

commanders as t o auenue o f a t t a c k o r scheme o f maneuver.

Hitler clearly

s t a t e d t h a t h i s o b j e c t was the s e i z u r e o f t h e i n i t i a t i v e , b u t t o what

ends?

The post-envelopment phase o f t h e o p e r a t i o n was vague a t b e s t ,

g i v i n g Manstein and Kluge u e r y l i t t l e guidance f o r t h e i r own p l a n n i n g .

Beyond d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e C e n t r a l and Voronerh F r o n t s , ZITADELLE m e r e l y
h e l d out the p o s s i b i l i t y o f continuing w i t h Operation

PANTHER, an o l d p l a n

f o r advancing i n t o t h e r e a r o f Southwestern F r o n t , o r perhaps a renewed

t h r u s t t w a r d s Moscow. Even i f the envelopment w e r e s u c c e s s f u l , however,
OKH had a l l o c a t e d i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s t o make any f o l l o w - o n phase
plausible.

The p l a n f a i l e d n o t o n l y t o l i n k c o n c e p t u a l l y these separate

t a c t i c a l e v e n t s i n t o a coherent whole, b u t a l s o t o p r o v i d e some reasonable

e v a l u a t i o n o f the s u i t a b i l i t y o f t h e means a v a i l a b l e .
From t h e t a c t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e t h e p l a n n e r s assumed many o f t h e same o l d
s t e r e o t y p e s o f the Russian s o l d i e r .

Breakthrough would be e a s i l y o b t a i n e d

and t h e Russians would f l e e i n d i s a r r a y as always.

A t Kursk, howeuer, t h e

Germans would meet a f a r more competent and d e t e r m i n e d f o e .

The success o f ZITADELLE depended on s u r p r i s e and speed o f e x e c u t i o n ,
b u t i n f o r m a t i o n fran t h e LUCY network was even then making a shambles of

11

any f o r m o f d e c e p t i o n e f f o r t .

F u r t h e r , the a t t a c k was e n v i s i o n e d f o r A p r i l

b u t no assessment was made as t o the impact o f any d e l a y .

The most g l a r i n g

m i s s i o n o f a l l , however, was t h e absence o f a u n i f i e d commander.

The

method o f ZITADELLE was t o be a c o o r d i n a t e d a t t a c k by two army groups, Yet

no one o t h e r t h a n H i t l e r h i m s e l f was charged w i t h o v e r a l l c m r n d .

This

l a c k o f u n i f i e d o p e r a t i o n a l f o c u s was t o c r e a t e problems r i g h t f r o m t h e
beginning.

O p e r a t i o n a l combinations, u n l i k e those executed w i t h i n t h e

Russian s t r u c t u r e , w e r e t o be conducted by the s t r a t e g i c commander i n East

P r u s s i a , n o t on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .
A t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e s t o r y i t i s w o r t h c o n t r a s t i n g t h e v i s i o n and
a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the b a t t l e f i e l d by t h e two key o p e r a t i o n a l commanders.
Based on good i n t e l l i g e n c e , t h e o p e r a t i o n a l p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by German t r o o p
d i s p o s i t i o n s , h i s knowledge o f t h e opponent, and h i s own i n t u i t i o n , Zhukov
c o r r e c t l y assessed n o t o n l y t h e c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n b u t t h e f u t u r e course o f
e v e n t s as w e l l .

He proposed a concept o f o p e r a t i o n s t h a t remained

e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged t h r o u g h o u t t h e p e r i o d o f p r e p a r a t i o n t h a t c u l m i n a t e d
i n a f i n i s h e d campaign p l a n .

A t t h e same time he c o n t i n u e d t o a d J u s t t h e

d e t a i l s t o account f o r h i s opponent's a c t i v i t i e s .

His determination t o

pursue the chosen course o f a c t i o n d e s p i t e the o p p o s i t i o n o f h i s own

m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e i l l u s t r a t e s an e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l
art.

A g a i n s t t h i s s t a n d s H i t l e r who adopted a p l a n o f a c t i o n which l a c k e d

an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h i s own means and a r e a l i s t i c v i e w o f the b a t t l e f i e l d .

I t was a p l a n which assumed an almost s t a t i c environment and a p a s s i v e

a d v e r s a r y who w o u l d n o t a l t e r t h e l o c a t i o n o f h i s m o b i l e f o r c e s .

As d e l a y s

s e t i n and t h e m o u n t i n g s t r e n g t h o f t h e Russian defenses became o b v i o u s t o

a l l , OKH even c o n s i d e r e d two a l t e r n a t e p l a n s .

12

B o t h e n v i s i o n e d a more

i n d i r e c t a t t a c k i n t o t h e s a l i e n t and as such, o f f e r e d b e t t e r chances f o r

success.

H i t l e r , however, endorsed ZITADELLE. T h i s k i n d o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n

i s n o t a v i r t u e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l commander! i t i s o b s t i n a c y and o f t e n
proves disastrous.

I n a sense H i t l e r b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f

March, f o r which adequate means d i d n o t e x i s t , would s t i l l be a u a i l a b l e

when Germany c o u l d marshal t h e r e s o u r c e s ,
n o t t h i n k i n such l i m i t e d dimensions.

Thu t r u e o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i s t does

U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r t h e Germans, t h i s

f l a w e d b e g i n n i n g was the source o f p r o f o u n d d i s j o i n t e d n e s s and u l t i m a t e

f a i l u r e a t Kursk.

IU: PREPARCITIW

- THE HEMS M I L A B L E

The months t h a t passed between the f o r m u l a t i o n o f campaign p l a n s and t h e

a c t u a l b a t t l e were seen b y b o t h o p e r a t i o n a l c m a n d e r s as t i m e spent t o
t h e i r own advantage.

ZITMELLE r e q u i r e d massive human and m a t e r i a l support

o f which i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e i n A p r i l . Zhukov a l s o
needed t i m e t o c o n s t r u c t t h e k i n d o f defenses which would b l e e d t h e Germans
white.
Thanks t o t h e e f f o r t s o f A l b e r t Speer, t h e German economy was s t i l l
growing i n 1943. I n f a c t , p r o d u c t i o n l e v e l s s t o o d a t 126 p e r c e n t o f the
p r e v i o u s years t o t a l s . Medium tank p r o d u c t i o n , f o r example, was more than
12
double t h a t o f 1942.
These f i g u r e s c e r t a i n l y seemed t o p r a n i s e an a b i l i t y
n o t o n l y t o r e p l a c e the l o s s e s o f 1942, b u t a l s o t o i n c r e a s e t h e armor
s t r e n g t h o f t h e panzer d i v i s i o n s .

A d d i t i o n a l l y , new weapons systems w e r e

j u s t b e g i n n i n g t o r o l l o f f the assembly l i n e s i n g r e a t q u a n t i t i e s .

I n the

end i t was the l u r e o f q u a l i t a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y which caused the successive

13

d e l a y s i n D-Day.

H i t l e r b e l i e v e d e a r n e s t l y t h a t t h e new Pzkw

13

V (PANTHER),

Pzkw V I (TIGER) and FERDINAND SP would t i p t h e armor s c a l e s d e c i s i v e l y i n

h i s f a u o r , w h i l e new ground a t t a c k a i r c r a f t such as t h e Focke Wulf 190 A
and Henschel 129 would dominate the s k i e s .
OKH a l l o c a t e d 50 d i v i s i o n s t o t h e Kursk o f f e n s i v e , o f which 16 w e r e
armored.

A c c o u n t i n g f o r one t h i r d o f the e n t i r e German s t r e n g t h on the

E a s t e r n F r o n t , t h i s f o r c e i n c l u d e d 900,000 s o l d i e r s , 2,700 tanks, 10,000

guns and some 2,000 a i r c r a f t .

U n i t s were f i l l e d t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l

r e q u i r e m e n t s and e x t e n s i v e l y t r a i n e d i n such t a s k s as b r e a c h i n g S o v i e t
m i n e f i e l d s and f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

I n t h e v i e w o f General uon M e l l e n t h i n ,

"There had been s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o make thorough p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e

14
attack "

From an o p e r a t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i u e , H i t l e r ' s p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r t h e b a t t l e o f
Kursk r e v e a l e d s e v e r a l f l a w s .

He had r e p e a t e d l y demonstrated h i s

b r i l l i a n c e as a s t r a t e g i c t h i n k e r b e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e P o l i s h campaign o f
1939. The e a r l y v i c t o r i e s o f Germany can be a t t r i b u t e d , i n f a c t , t o
H i t l e r ' s s t r a t e g i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s a d v e r s a r i e s r a t h e r than t o any
overwhelming a b i l i t y o f t h e Wehrmacht. Y e t ,

i n translating strategic

guidance i n t o an o p e r a t i o n a l r e a l m and c o n d u c t i n g a c t u a l m i l i t a r y
campaigns, H i t l e r ' s a b i l i t i e s d i d him l i t t l e good.

He c o u l d n o t grasp the

b a t t l e f i e l d impact o f d e l a y and became f i x e d upon o n l y one i n p u t t o

o p e r a t i o n a l design.

T h i s was i n t h e form o f new technology.

Almost a l l

t h e d e l a y between the o r i g i n a l d a t e f o r ZITADELLE and t h e e v e n t u a l one can

be a t t r i b u t e d t o tank p r o d u c t i o n , mechanical problems w i t h new models and

d e l a y s i n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o the f r o n t .

To be s u r e many o f these new

systems were e x c e l l e n t , b u t as w i t h any i n i t i a l p r o d u c t i o n l i n e , numerous

14

f l a w s needed t o be s o r t e d o u t .

Operational experts l i k e Manstein

r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h e t r a d e o f f between more TIQERS and more t i m e f o r the

defender t o p r e p a r e d i d n o t j u s t i f y w a i t i n g .
r e l a t i v e strength.
not Hitlers,

I n the end Mansteins

I t was a l l a m a t t e r o f

v i e w o f the f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d ,

was t h e more c o r r e c t i n terms o f a l l t h e f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n

operational a r t .
F i n a l l y , H i t l e r demonstrated no a b i l i t y t o adapt t o changing o p e r a t i o n a l
realities.

H i s method remained v i s c e r a l l y r o o t e d i n t h e b e l i e f i n

technology and the r a c i a l s u p e r i o r i t y o f h i s SS u n i t s .

To t h i s p o i n t i n

t h e c o n f l i c t the Qerman method o f w a r f a r e had been c l e a r l y s u p e r i o r a t b o t h

t h e t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s .

B l i t z k r i e g was a proven w i n n e r .

Yet,

as w i t h e v e r y age, a d v e r s a r i e s t e n d t o copy success o r f i n d ways o f

degrading i t .

The t r u e o p e r a t i o n a l g e n i u s c o n t i n u a l l y e v a l u a t e s e v e n t s and

a n a l y z e s h i s t o o l s t o see i f t h e y must be adapted.

than anyone e l s e , embodied t h i s a b i l i t y .

M a n s t e i n , perhaps mor

He adapted t o a m o b i l e defense

t h e w i n t e r o f 1942-43 t o c o u n t e r the S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e , proposed t h e

i n n o v a t i v e backhand o p t i o n f o r the 1943 campaign which most c l o s e l y
matched means w i t h ends, and as we s h a l l see adopted an i n n o v a t i v e armor
t a c t i c i n t h e Kursk o f f e n s i v e .
ability.

H i t l e r d i d n o t possess t h e same v i s i o n o r

The l e s s o n i n o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i s c l e a r : t h e b a t t l e f i e l d

environment i s e x t r e m e l y dynamic and the s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n a l comnander

must c o n t i n u o u s l y analyze h i s methods, means a v a i l a b l e , and ends, always
s t r i v i n g f o r t h e most e f f e c t i v e combinations.
As the Germans marshaled t h e i r armor, the Russians were f e v e r i s h l y

p r e p a r i n g t h e i r defenses.

A l l the w h i l e LUCY k e p t d e f i n i n g the s p e c i f i c s

o f t h e Qerman p l a n and s i m p l y i n g t h e i r t a s k .

15

D u r i n g the time between A p r i l

and J u l y Zhukov was a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t a defense whose t a c t i c a l depth was

unprecedented.

W i t h i n t h e C e n t r a l and Voronezh F r o n t s t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n s

extended t o a depth o f 110 m i l e s .

I f t h e Steppe F r o n t and Don R i v e r t o i t s

r e a r were included, the Kursk s a l i e n t was 180 m i l e s deep

consist in^ o f 8

To e s t a b l i s h t h i s STAUKA had amassed 20 p e r c e n t o f i t s

defensive b e l t s .

t o t a l manpower, 36 p e r c e n t o f i t s t a n k s and SP5, and 27 p e r c e n t o f i t s

combat a i r c r a f t i n an a r e a which o c c u p i e d o n l y 13 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l

1s
strategic front.

When t h e Qermans d i d a t t a c k they would be i n f e r i o r t o

t h e i r opponents i n e v e r y c a t e g o r y o f combat power.

Frwn t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c a l concept o f ' c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y ' ,
t h e Russian defensos aimed d i r e c t l y a t d e g r a d i n g the German's source o f
o p e r a t i o n a l power.

Zhukov's o r i g i n a l c h o i c e of a l l o w i n g t h e Germans t o

a t t a c k f i r s t was made w i t h keen u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e power o f German panzer

formations.

I n p r e v i o u s encounters where German armor and Russian armor

met head on, t h e aduantage went t o the Qermans. W i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f

ZITADELLE f u l l y known t o him, however, Zhukov was a b l e t o d e v i s e a campaign
which would n o t o n l y a t t a c k t h e Qerman c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y d i r e c t l y , b u t a l s o
s h i e l d h i s own u n t i l he was r e a d y t o unleash i t .

I n t h i s c o n t e x t the Kursk

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s can be seen as an example o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l use o f

obstacles.
The Russians c e r t a i n l y used o b s t a c l e s t o enhance t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f
t h e i r weapons, d e l a y t h e advance o f German u n i t s , and screen t h e i r own
movements, a l l o f which w e r e t a c t i c a l uses.
them i n a f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t f a s h i o n .

Zhukov, however, a l s o employed

Much o f the p l a n n i n g f o r t h e

d e f e n s i v e b e l t s was done by Zhukov and U a s i l e v s k y i n a top-down approach.

The i d e a was t o use o b s t a c l e s t o r e s t r i c t German o p e r a t i o n a l c o m b i n a t i o n s ,

16

c r e a t e o p e r a t i o n a l maneuver o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Russian tank r e s e r v e s , and

g a i n t i m e which c o u l d be measured i n days i n s t e a d o f h o u r s .

Even as e a r l y

as t h e 8 A p r i l Memo, Zhukov a r t i c u l a t e d c l e a r l y t h e aim o f d e s t r o y i n g

German armor w h i l e a l s o p r o t e c t i n g h i s aun.

Because t h e Germans chose t o

a t t a c k i n t o t h e Kursk s a l i e n t a l o n g avenues which were defended by t h e mass

of Russian f o r c e s ,

directly.

they a l l o w e d t h e i r c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y t o be a t t a c k e d

The e n t i r e f o c u s o f t h e Russian e f f o r t s c e n t e r e d on t h e Qerman

armored f o r m a t i o n s , t o t h e near t o t a l n e g l e c t o f the i n f a n t r y .

The h e a r t o f t h e S o v i e t defense, then,
zones.

l a y i n i t s a n t i t a n k p o s i t i o n s and

These combined arms r e g i o n s c o n s i s t e d o f a n t i t a n k guns, a r t i l l e r y ,

m o r t a r s , i n f a n t r y , and m o b i l e engineer o b s t a c l e detachments.

Supported by

thousands o f m i l e s o f a n t i t a n k d i t c h e s and trenches, and m i n o i e l d

which

were s i x t i m e s t h e d e n s i t y o f those which p r o t e c t e d Moscow i n

941

the

emphasis o f t h e defense was on armor a t t r i t i o n .

eve

Units at a l l

pursued an i n t e n s i v e t r a i n i n g program which focused on immedia e

c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and the b e s t t a c t i c s t o d e s t r o y armor.
A l l t h i s a c t i v i t y was c a r r i e d o u t under a v e i l o f secrecy which the
Germans c o u l d n o t p e n e t r a t e .

As the launch d a t e approached, OKH had

i n c r e a s i n g euidence o f the S o v i e t b u i l d u p , b u t t h e f u l l e x t e n t o f Zhukovs

p r e p a r a t i o n s remained hidden.

There w e r e no l o y a l p a r t i s a n s b e h i n d Russian

l i n e s t o p r o v i d e such v i t a l i n f o r m a t i o n t o t h e Germans. The presence o f

Steppe F r o n t was a v i r t u a l unknown a s evidenced by t h e o p e r a t i o n a l sketches
16
o f Manstein i n h i s book Lnrf-llirfncias

17

SECTIW V:

THE Q E H OFFENSIVE

F r a n t h e s t r a t e g i c aspect Z i t a d e l l e was t o be a
v e r i t a b l e 'death r i d e ' f o r v i r t u a l l y t h e whole o f
t h e o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e was t o be f l u n g i n t o the
supreme o f f e n s i v e . 17

The f i n a l d a t e f o r D-Day,

5 J u l y , was e s t a b l i s h e d a t a s u r p r i s e m e e t i n g

o f the p r i n c i p a l commanders a t Rastenburg, East P r u s s i a on 1 J u l y . M a n s t e i n

had b e l i e v e d a l l a l o n g t h a t e x c e s s i v e d e l a y would f a v o r t h e defender, b u t
on t h i s day o n l y Colonel-General Model o b j e c t e d s t r e n u o u s l y t o t h e
i n i t i a t i o n order.

The N i n t h Army Commander had b r o u g h t d e t a i l e d a e r i a l

photography which r e v e a l e d t h e e x t e n t o f Russian defenses, b u t t h e Fuhrer

w o u l d n o t be d e t e r r e d .

H i s v i s i o n o f the e n d - s t a t e f o r t h e campaign had

become t o t a l l y detached f r o m t h e r e a l i t y o f the r e l a t i v e means a v a i l a b l e

and t h e n a t u r e o f h i s opponent.

D e s p i t e t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s ahead, H i t l e r

m a i n t a i n e d almost m y s t i c a l f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y o f h i s panzer d i v i s i o n s ,

p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e SS f o r m a t i o n s , t o conduct the k i n d o f s w i f t and v i o l e n t
p e n e t r a t i o n which had been t h e norm on e v e r y o t h e r summer o f f e n s i v e .
On the f o l l o w i n g day STAUW Knew o f t h e imminent a t t a c k t h a n k s t o LUCY.
A l l f o r w a r d u n i t s were a l e r t e d t o expect the Germans t o i n i t i a t e t h e i r

o f f e n s i v e s o m e t i m e between 3 and S J u l y .
The ZITADELLE p l a n e n v i s i o n e d a s i m u l t a n e o u s a t t a c k by two t i t a n i c
armored f o r c e s which w o u l d q u i c k l y p i n c h o f f t h e Kursk s a l i e n t .

Y e t , on

t h e eve o f combat the c o n d i t i o n s t o achieve t h i s c o o r d i n a t e d e f f o r t had n o t

been e s t a b l i s h e d .

The German c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e which ended i n February

stopped j u s t s h o r t o f an a r e a o f h i g h ground on the s o u t h e r n p a r t o f t h e

18

salient.

General Hoth, cwrmander o f the F o u r t h Panzer Army, had t o secure

t h i s K e y t e r r a i n b e f o r e D-Day i n o r d e r t o s i t u a t e s p o t t e r s f o r h i s
a r t i l l e r y units.

Consequently, he o r d e r e d an a s s a u l t on t h e h e i g h t s t o

b e g i n on t h e a f t e r n o o n o f 4 J u l y . D e s p i t e the w a r n i n g g i v e n by STAUVKA, the

Russians d e f e n d e r s w e r e s u r p r i s e d by Hoths a t t a c k .
ground was secured.

By m i d n i g h t t h e h i g h

There remained p r e c i o u s l i t t l e t i m e , however, t o s o r t

o u t the u n i t s , c o o r d i n a t e a r t i l l e r y a c t i o n , and p r e p a r e f o r the main a t t a c k

which was scheduled t o b e g i n i n a few hours.

A d d i t i o n a l l y , any hope o f

o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e was gone.
Why d i d t h e Qermans n o t s e i z e t h i s o b j e c t i v e weeks b e f o r e J u l y ? T h i s i s
c e r t a i n l y one o f t h e many examples o f t h e loose ends which t e n d t o occur i n
t h e e x e c u t i o n o f such a d e t a i l e d campaign p l a n i n t h e absence o f an o v e r a l l
o p e r a t i o n a l commander.

I t was a theme which was t o plague the Qerman

e f f o r t s throughout the days t o f o l l o w .

Colonel-Qeneral Models n o r t h e r n a t t a c k was p l a n n e d t o t r a u e r s e the
o b v i o u s Orel-Kursk avenue.(see f i g u r e 5, page 40) O f h i s f o u r c o r p s
p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the o p e r a t i o n
main e f f o r t .

I t s m i s s i o n was

r a c e f o r Kursk and t h e eventua

t h e 47th Panzer Corps was d e s i g n a t e d as t h e

o p e n e t r a t e t h e l e f t f l a n k o f 1 3 t h A r m y and

l i n k - u p w i t h Hoths f o r c e s from t h e s o u t h .

S u p p o r t i n g r o l e s w e r e assigned t o 41st Panzer Corps, 4 6 t h Panzer Corps and

2 3 r d Army Corps. The 4 1 s t w o u l d a t t a c k t h e main p o r t i o n o f 1 3 t h Army and
b l o c k any Russian f o r c e s moving f r a the e a s t .

L i k e w i s e the 46th was t o

p e n e t r a t e t h e r i g h t f l a n k o f 7 0 t h Army, swing w e s t and b l o c k m o b i l e tank

reserves,

The 2 3 r d A r m y Corps was a s s i g n e d t h e l i m i t e d b u t c r u c i a l t a s k o f

s p l i t t i n g the 1 3 t h and 48th b r m i e s and s e c u r i n g Maloarkhangelsk. T h i s w o u l d

e f f e c t i v e l y b l o c k the r o u t e s which Russian o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s w o u l d take

19

i n t r y i n g t o s t o p 4 7 t h Panzer Corps.
To oppose t h e Germans General R o k o s s o v s k ~echeloned h i s f o r c e s i n g r e a t
depth a l o n g t h i s avenue.

1 3 t h Army which was a r r a y e d i n two d e f e n s i v e

b e l t s would bear the b r u n t o f t h e main e f f o r t w h i l e 2nd Tank Army was

l o c a t e d t o the r e a r i n a r e s e r v e echelon.

(see f i g u r e 3 , page 38)

Known more as an e x p e r t i n d e f e n s i v e t a c t i c s , Model o r g a n i z e d h i s a t t a c k

forces along t r a d i t i o n a l b l i t z k r i e g l i n e s .

I n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s would open

up r o u t e s i n t h e m i n e f i e l d s and breach f o r t i f i c a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o a l l o w
panzers d i v i s i o n s t o e x p l o i t i n the enemys r e a r .

He a l l o c a t e d n i n e

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s and one panzer d i v i s i o n i n the f i r s t days a t t a c k .

B e g i n n i n g a t 0730 w i t h a massive a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n , t h e N i n t h Army
a t t a c k covered a f r o n t a g e of 28 m i l e s .

Supported by FERDIMDS and TIGERS

i t managed t o f o r c e a p e n e t r a t i o n o f 5 m i l e s by t h e end o f t h e day.

This

was f a r s h o r t o f e x p e c t a t i o n s as o n l y the 4 6 t h Panzer Corps a c h i e v e d i t s

f i r s t days

objectiues.

with a high price.

To make m a t t e r s worse, even

i m i t e d success came

Massive Russian a i r s u p p o r t , a r t i l e r y , and deadly

a n t i t a n k f i r e took a heavy t o l l on German armor.

Model l o s t over 100 tanks

and SPs on J u l y 5 a l o n e .
On t h e 6 t h Model d e c i d e d t o c m i t two o f h i s r e s e r v e Panzer D i v i s i o n s
i n t h e 4 7 t h Corps s e c t o r i n the hopes o f advancing l i m i t e d success i n t o a
Qeneral penetration.

These u n i t s c o l l i d e d w i t h a Russian c o u n t e r a t t a c k

o r d e r e d by R o k o s s o v s k ~ , d i s r u p t i n g t h e German p l a n f o r t h e remainder o f the

day.
By t h e end o f 6 J u l y two c r i t i c a l e v e n t s were t a k i n g shape which would
determine t h e outcome on t h e n o r t h e r n s e c t o r .

F i r s t , 2nd Panzer D i v i s i o n

had reached t h e h i g h ground n o r t h o f the v i l l a g e o f Olkhovatka and was

20

h a l t e d by 2nd Tank Army w i t h i t s t a n k s i n hull-down p o s i t i o n s .

The e n s u i n g

b a t t l e f o r these d e c i s i v e h e i g h t s and Olkhovatka i t s e l f was t o dominate t h e

e n t i r e e f f o r t s o f both sides.

Secondly, i t became o b v i o u s euen a t t h i s

e a r l y d a t e t h a t 2 3 r d Corps c o u l d n o t c a p t u r e Maloarkhangelsk. I t s d i v i s i o n s
had exhausted themselves and w e r e now o r d e r e d by Model t o d e f e n d t h e i r
current positions.

T h i s meant t h a t Russian r e s e r v e s were unhampered i n

t h e i r a b i l i t y t o move f r o m e a s t t o w e s t .

Zhukou took f u l l advantage o f

t h i s freedom o f movement and q u i c k l y t r a n s f e r r e d s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s t o the

Olkhovatka b a t t l e f i e l d .
The f o c u s o f Model's a s s a u l t s f r o m 7 J u l y u n t i l the 1 0 t h was the twenty
m i l e f r o n t between P o n y r i and Teploye. By now he had commited f i v e o f h i s

seven p a n r e r d i u i s i o n s .

Each t i m e t h a t a gap opened i n the 1 3 t h and 7 0 t h

Armies' defenses t h e r e was always a Russian c o u n t e r a t t a c k t o s e a l i t o f f .

Rokossousky wa5 s k i l l f u l l y moving h i s scarce o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s t o t h i s
d e c i s i v e p o i n t i n the n o r t h e r n b a t t l e w h i l e Zhukov o r c h e s t r a t e d t h e
s t r a t e g i c reserves.

BY 9 J u l y 41st Panzer Corps a c t u a l l y secured n o r t h e r n

p o r t i o n s o f P o n y r i , b u t the urban f i g h t i n g t h a t ensued resembled the

carnage o f S t a l i n g r a d . Model had r e q u e s t e d a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s from Kluge and
d i d r e c e i v e t h e 1 0 t h Panzer Grenadier and 8 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n s , b o t h o f
which were c m i t t e d t o the r i d g e l i n e b a t t l e .
Massive Russian c o u n t e r a t t a c k s on 10 J u l y marked the end o f N i n t h Army's
o f f e n s i v e and t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a s l o w a g o n i z i n g r e t r o g r a d e .

Model's l a s t

o f f e n s i v e a t t e m p t o c c u r r e d on the e v e n i n g o f 10 J u l y when a two d i v i s i o n

attack f a i l e d .

Rokossovsky now o r d e r e d a g e n e r a l a t t a c k b y h i s e n t i r e

F r o n t t o push Model's t i r e d f o r c e s back t o t h e i r s t a r t p o i n t s .

T h i s was

a150 t h e day when t h e Western and Bryansk F r o n t s were p o i s e d t o i n i t i a t e

- 21 -

t h e i r own o f f e n s i v e .

As t h e s i g n s o f a Russian o f f e n s i v e p r e s e n t e d themselves, Kluge o r d e r e d

Model t o s w i t c h t o t h e d e f e n s i v e .

Model was f o r c e d t o use h i s l a s t

r e m a i n i n g r e s e r v e s t o b l o c k S o v i e t p e n e t r a t i o n s , s e v e r a l o f which w e r e
stopped by massed a r t i l l e r y f i r e alone.
I n the s o u t h e r n s e c t o r Hoth and Kempf had s e v e r a l d i s t i n c t advantages
over Model. I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e t h e S o v i e t s w e r e i n some doubt as t o t h e
e x a c t r o u t e o f . a t t a c k t h e Germans w o u l d take.

There was the o b v i o u s r o u t e

a c r o s s t h e P s e l R i v e r t o Oboyan, o r t h e r o u t e n o r t h e a s t t o Korocha, o r
f u r t h e r s o u t h from Volchansk t o Novy-Oskol.

(see f i g u r e 3, page 38)

A d d i t i o n a l l y , M a n s t e i n had two s e p a r a t e armies t o commit, 4 t h Panzer and

A r m y Detachment Kempf. A l l t h i s tended t o f o r c e U a t u t i n t o d i s p e r s e h i s

m o b i l e f o r c e s t o cover a l l t h e o p t i o n s .

He employed 6 t h Guards Army on t h e

Oboyan approach and 7 t h Guards Army a l o n g the Korocha avenue.

1 s t Tank

Army was p l a c e d b e h i n d 6 t h Guards t o p r o t e c t Oboyan which V a t u t i n b e l i e v e d

w o u l d be t h e most p r o b a b l e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e German main e f f o r t .

The 6 9 t h

Army o c c u p i e d a second echelon d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n b e h i n d 7 t h Guards.

M a n s t e i n u t i l i z e d h i s armor i n a d i f f e r e n t f a s h i o n than Model and
employed a novel t a c t i c .

R e a l i z i n g t h a t h i s f o r c e was i n f a n t r y poor he

o p t e d t o mass h i s armor i n s m a l l wedge-like f o r m a t i o n s o f g r e a t d e n s i t y .

He hoped t o achieve ouerwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y a t t h e p o i n t o f a t t a c k and

q u i c k l y b u l l through the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .

A l t h o u g h l o s s e s were bound t o be

heavy, M a n s t e i n was persuaded t h a t he would save armor i n t h e l o n g r u n .

For a l l Mansteins p l a n n i n g and i n n o v a t i o n t h e s o u t h e r n a t t a c k almost

m e t d i s a s t e r b e f o r e i t even began.

A c t i n g on t h e LUCY i n f o r m a t i o n , the

S o v i e t A i r Force marshaled a massive preemptive a i r s t r i k e on t h e German

- 22 -

a i r f i e l d s around Kharkov. Such an a t t a c k w o u l d have c r i p p l e d the L u f t w a f f e

on the ground and t h e r e b y s e r i o u s l y degraded the a i r s u p p o r t so c r i t i c a l t o
t h e ground f o r c e s .

Manstein's a i r was saved, however, by technology and

the i n i t i a t i v e o f subordinates.

The Germans had deployed an e a r l y

g e n e r a t i o n r a d a r known as F r e r a around t h e i r a i r f i e l d s and i t p r o v i d e d

e a r l y w a r n i n g o f t h e Russian a i r s t r i k e .

L u f t w a f f e commanders q u i c k l y

assembled f i g h t e r w i n g s and r o s e t o meet t h e Russian bombers.

Thanks t o

F r e y a t h e Germans n o t o n l y saved t h e i r own a i r f o r c e f r o m d e s t r u c t i o n , b u t

so d e p l e t e d the S o v i e t a i r f o r c e s t h a t t h e s k i e s over t h e s o u t h e r n s e c t o r
belonged t o t h e L u f t w a f f e f o r the f i r s t few days.
By 0500 on the 9 t h o f J u l y Manstein's armored j u g g e r n a u t s t r u c k t h e 6 t h
Guard's A r m y and 7 t h Guard's Army. The main e f f o r t was made by t h e 4 8 t h
Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps which w o u l d s t r i k e on p a r a l l e l axes
toward Kursk. Army Detachment Ksmpf c o n s i s t i n g o f two c o r p s w o u l d p r o v i d e
f l a n k s e c u r i t y f o r Hoth's f o r c e s .

(see f i g u r e 6, page 4 1 ) Coupled w i t h

overwhelming a i r s u p e r i o r i t y , t h i s i m p r e s s i v e armor a t t a c k a c h i e v e d a l l
o b j e c t i v e s s e t f o r the f i r s t day's b a t t l e .
On t h e Russian s i d e V a t u t i n q u i c k l y assessed t h e t h r u s t toward Oboyan as
the main o b j e c t i v e and began t o move h i s f o r c e s a c c o r d i n g l y .

He o r d e r e d

1 s t Tank Army t o cover the c i t y w h i l e o t h e r m o b i l e f o r c e s c o n c e n t r a t e d f o r

a counterattack.

Even as e a r l y as the f i r s t day S t a l i n began t o c o n s i d e r

the t r a n s f e r o f o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s t o V a t u t i n . As the e x t e n t o f
Manstein's o f f e n s i v e became c l e a r e r , t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r t r a n s f e r r e d f i r s t
the 2 7 t h A r m y and then the 9 t h Guards Tank Army t o t h e Voronerh F r o n t .
Steppe F r o n t Commander Konev was f u r i o u s a t t h i s piecemeal c m i t m e n t o f
h i 5 command, b u t i t was t o prove d e c i s i v e i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s .

23

A t t h i s p o i n t i n t h e a c t i o n an i n t a n g i b l e f a c t o r f r o m t h e moral domain
o f b a t t l e began t o i n f l u e n c e e v e n t s and cause more t h a n a l i t t l e
u n c e r t a i n t y f o r t h e S o v i e t s . U s i n g h i s own i n i t i a t i v e General Hoth d e v i a t e d
fran t h e campaipn p l a n .

He knew from h i s reconnaissance i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t

t h e S o v i e t defenses were echeloned i n s t r e n g t h on t h e r o u t e he was

scheduled t o t a k e .

I n s t e a d o f d o i n g t h e obvious, Hoth d e c i d e d t o deal w i t h

t h e Russian s t r a t e g i c r e s e r v e s f i r s t b e f o r e moving n o r t h t o l i n k up w i t h
Model's N i n t h Army. The t e r r a i n t o t h e r e a r o f Uoronerh F r o n t d i c t a t e d t h a t
any tank r e s e r u e s moving f r o m t h e e a s t w o u l d have t o t r a n s i t t h e narrow gap
a t Prokhorovka. I t was h e r e t h a t he e l e c t e d t o o r d e r SS Panzer Corps once
t h e p e n e t r a t i o n o f 6 t h Guards Army was achieved.
O v e r t h e n e x t f e w days t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e s o u t h e r n s e c t o r was b o t h

f l u i d and u n c e r t a i n f o r t h e Russians. BY the e v e n i n g o f 7 J u l y SS Panzer

Corps c a p t u r e d t h e v i l l a g e o f T e t e r v i n o , t h e l a s t m a j o r town b e f o r e
Prokhorouka. A t t h i s p o i n t two key o p e r a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n s w e r e made, one by
U a t u t i n and one by H i t l e r , which were t o have l a s t i n g r a m i f i c a t i o n s .

As

4 t h Panzer A r m y moved t o t h e n o r t h e a s t , a gap began t o develop between i t

and A r m y Detachment Kempf. From the b e g i n n i n g General Kempf had e x p e r i e n c e d
d i f f i c u l t y i n p e n e t r a t i n g the 7 t h Guards Army defenses.

I n t o t h i s gap,

U a t u t i n now o r d e r e d 6 9 t h A r m y , h i s second o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e .

T h i s was t o

prove e x t r e m e l y i m p o r t a n t as i t guaranteed t h a t Kempf w o u l d be slowed even

further.

The second k e y d e c i s i o n was taken by H i t l e r on t h e 7 t h and 8 t h o f

J u l y . I n response t o Model's u r g e n t r e q u e s t s f o r more f o r c e s , H i t l e r

d e c i d e d t o s h i f t much o f M a n s t e i n ' s a i r t o the n o r t h e r n s e c t o r .

Hoth's

l o s s o f a i r s u p e r i o r i t y o c c u r r e d a t the c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e o f the s o u t h e r n
battle.

Unhampered by overwhelming German a i r power, t h e S o v i e t a i r f o r c e

- 24

appeared i n g r e a t e r s t r e n g t h which f o r c e d Hoth t o slow h i s advance toward

Prokhorovka. Given t h e e u e n t a l outcome, any d e l a y would have been l e t h a l t o
t h e German e f f o r t s .
T h i s perhaps more than any o t h e r i n c i d e n t demonstrates t h e disaduantage
o f n o t h a v i n g a u n i f i e d o p e r a t i o n a l commander.

By t h e 7 t h o f August i t was

o b v i o u s t h a t Model would n o t achieve a q u i c k p e n e t r a t i o n towards Kursk; h i s

b a t t l e c o u l d o n l y be one o f a t t r i t i o n .

On the o t h e r hand, Hoth had n o t

o n l y succeeded i n p e n e t r a t i n g the f i r s t d e f e n s i v e b e l t , b u t was a l s o

p r o c e e d i n g on a course o f a c t i o n which promised t o g a i n a f a v o r a b l e e a r l y
d e c i s i o n w i t h Russian tank f o r c e s .
t h e p l a n : a double enuelopment.

H i t l e r remained r o o t e d t o the l e t t e r o f

One c o u l d argue t h a t a u n i f i e d commander

on t h e ground w o u l d have seen t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n t h e s o u t h and d e c i d e d t o

r e i n f o r c e success r a t h e r than draw f r o m i t .

C e r t a i n l y t h e removal o f

Hoth's a i r cover was one o f the k e y d e c i s i o n s i n t h e s o u t h e r n b a t t l e .

BY t h e m o r n i n g o f 9 J u l y 4 8 t h Panzer Corps was h a l t e d 10 m i l e s f r o m
Oboyan i n f r o n t o f the Pena r i v e r .

I t had succeeded i n o c c u p y i n g the

a t t e n t i o n o f 1 s t Tank Army and a l l o w e d SS Panzer Corps t o push f o r

Prokhorouka a g a i n s t euer i n c r e a s i n g p r e s s u r e .

S t a l i n , howeuer, was q u i c k

t o s u b o r d i n a t e 5 t h Guards Tank Army t o U a t u t i n . Over the n e x t t h r e e days

t h i s armored u n i t w o u l d moue 250 m i l e s from i t s assembly a r e a t o
ProKhorouka.
The 1 0 t h o f J u l y wau an a n x i o u s day f o r the Russians. BY t h i s t i m e ,
however, U a t u t i n had a c c u r a t e l y assessed Hoth's

i n t e n t i o n s and a d v i s e d

S t a l i n t h a t the Germans w e r e heading f o r Prokhorouka. He planned a

desperate c o u n t e r a t t a c k on a l l f l a n k s o f the p e n e t r a t i o n u s i n g 9 t h Guards
Army and Sth Guards Tank Army.

25

SS Panzer Corps reached t h e Prokhorovka area on t h e e v e n i n g o f 11 J u l y

b u t by t h i s t i m e t h e Russians had been a b l e t o s t a b i l i z e t h e s i t u a t i o n .

5 t h Guards Army had moved i n t o d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s e a r l i e r i n t h e m o r n i n g
w h i l e two o t h e r armies were moved i n t o the KursW area t o i n s u r e t h a t no
l i n k - u p would o c c u r .

S t h Guards Tank Army c o n c e n t r a t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e day

between t h e P s e l and Donetz R i v e r s . The o n l y unknown was whether o r n o t

Kempf c o u l d a r r i v e i n t i m e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e n e x t day's a t t a c k .

Late

i n the evening Marshal ZhuKov a r r i v e d a t Uoronezh f r o n t t o assume o v e r a l l

command o f t h e o p e r a t i o n .
Hoth i n t e n d e d 12 J u l y t o be t h e day o f d e c i s i o n .

I f Kempf's 3 r d Panzer

Corps c o u l d a r r i v e on t h e Prokhorovka b a t t l e f i e l d he w o u l d be s t r o n g enough

t o d e f e a t t h e S o v i e t tank f o r c e s and s t i l l have t i m e t o swing n o r t h f o r

Kursk. SS Panzer Corps a t t a c k e d i n t o the gap w i t h a p p r o x i m a t e l y 600 t a n k s

i n i t i a t i n g t h e l a r g e s t tank b a t t l e o f t h e war.

General R o t m i s t r o v ' s 5 t h

Quards Tank Army p i c k e d almost t h e same i n s t a n t t o e n t e r t h e gap f r o m t h e

e a s t w i t h 850 tanks.
down c o m p l e t e l y .

I n t h e melee t h a t ensued l a r g e u n i t c o n t r o l b r o k e

The speed and w e i g h t o f t h e Russian a t t a c k overwhelmed

the Qermans, g e t t i n g a t c l o s e range where t h e advantage o f t h e TlQER tank

was 1o s t

A l t h o u g h Kempf's 3 r d Panzer Corps secured a s u r p r i s e bridgehead over t h e

N o r t h Donetz p r i o r t o dawn on t h e 1 2 t h , i t was unable t o reach t h e
b a t t l e f i e l d i n time.

BY 2100 h o u r s R o t m i s t r o v o r d e r e d h i s f o r c e s back i n t o

d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , l e a v i n g t h e b a t t l e f i e l d t o the Germans. Both s i d e s

s u f f e r e d l o s s e s i n t h e neighborhood of 300 t a n k s each, b u t the r e l a t i v e

loss t o Hoth was f a r g r e a t e r .

H i s SS Corps was exhausted and R o t m i s t r o v

s t i l l m a i n t a i n e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e tank f o r c e .

- 26 -

3 r d Panzer Corps d i d j o i n Hoth

on t h e n e x t day, b u t any chance o f q u i c k l y d e f e a t i n g t h e Russian

o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s was gone,
On t h e 1 3 t h o f J u l y H i t l e r c a l l e d a conference o f h i s Army Group
Commanders a t East Rastenburg t o announce t h e end o f ZITADELLE. Three days
e a r l i e r t h e A l l i e s had launched an i n v a s i o n o f S i c i l y and i n d i c a t i o n s were
t h a t t h e I t a l i a n s had l i t t l e stomach f o r r e s i s t a n c e .

The F u h r e r wanted t o

b e g i n s h i f t i n g f o r c e s , n o t a b l y the SS Panzer Corps, t o I t a l y . There w e r e

a l s o e a r l y s i g n s t h a t t h e S o v i e t s were b e g i n n i n g t h e i r own o f f e n s i v e .

In

f a c t , on t h e 1 2 t h Zhukou launched h i s Western and Bryansk F r o n t s I n t o t h e

Ore1 pocket.

M a n s t e i n u r g e d H i t l e r t o a l l o w h i m t o c o n t i n u e w i t h Hoth's

a t t a c k i n the south.

The Army Group South commander was c o n v i n c e d t h a t he

was d e s t r o y i n g v i t a l S o v i e t o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s .

As with h i s original

assessment o f Russian f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e , M a n s t e i n ' s i n t e l l i g e n c e was

erroneous.

Steppe F r o n t s t i l l had t h r e e uncommitted armies.

On J u l y 17 H i t l e r o r d e r e d t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f SS Panzer Corps i n
p r e p a r a t i o n f o r i t s d i s p a t c h t o I t a l y . For a l l i n t e n t s and purposes
ZITADELLE was o v e r .

Hoth d i d c o n t i n u e h i s o p e r a t i o n s i n t h e s o u t h and was

n o t h a l t e d u n t i l t h e 23rd, b u t a l l t e r r i t o r i a l g a i n s w e r e q u i c k l y
s u r r e n d e r e d as t h e f u l l e x t e n t o f the S o v i e t c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e became
evident.

SECTlaJ V I :

THE FLASHINB SWORD OF VENQWCE

Zhukov had e n v i s i o n e d t h a t t h e p l a n n i n g f o r h i s g r e a t c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e
w o u l d proceed c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h the d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e .

He planned f o r a

s i m u l t a n e o u s a t t a c k i n b o t h the n o r t h and s o u t h , b u t i n t h i s he was

- 27 -

f r u s t r a t e d by the d i s j o i n t e d e x e c u t i o n o f ZITADELLE and h i s own e r r o r i n

i d e n t i f y i n g t h e German o p e r a t i o n a l c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y .

Hoths s t u b b o r n

e f f o r t s i n t h e s o u t h t o t a l l y o c c u p i e d t h e Steppe F r o n t and made i t

i m p o s s i b l e f o r General Konev t o p l a n and execute h i s r o l e i n t h e
c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e u n t i l t h e German t h r e a t was e x t i n g u i s h e d .
Code named O p e r a t i o n K U f U Z W , t h e n o r t h e r n o f f e n s i v e commenced on 12
J u l y . I t i n v o l v e d u n i t s f r o m Western, Bryansk and C e n t r a l F r o n t s and was
designed t o c u t o f f the O r e l s a l i e n t and d e s t r o y the German N i n t h A r m y and
2nd Panzer A r m y . I n t h i s e n t i r e a r e a t h e Germans o n l y had f i v e r e s e r v e
divisions.

Aimed a t a c h i e v i n g depth, S o v i e t f o r c e s were a r r a n g e d i n

columns o f two o r t h r e e e c h e l o n s and s u p p o r t e d by mass a r t i l l e r y .

(See

f i g u r e 7, page 42)
H i t l e r p l a c e d t h e 2nd Panzer Army under Models command on the 1 3 t h o f
J u l y . A l t h o u g h t h e Russians were a b l e t o s u r p r i s e t h e Germans i n t h e O r e l
s a l i e n t , Models d e f e n s i v e e x p e r t i s e and t h e s t r o n g German f o r t i f i c a t i o n s
which had been c o n s t r u c t e d over a p e r i o d o f two y e a r s p r e v e n t e d a complete
breakthrough.
The Russians w e r e a l s o r e d i s c o v e r i n g t h e f r i c t i o n i n v o l v e d w i t h
employing massive f o r m a t i o n s .

A s t h e tempo o f t h e f i g h t i n c r e a s e d t h e y

were n o t a b l e t o Keep enough u n i t s engaged.

The c o m b i n a t i o n o f poor

weather, a g i l e German w i t h d r a w a l s and t r a f f i c jams on t h e i r own s i d e k e p t

most o f t h e i r t r o o p s from t h e b a t t l e f i e l d s .

BY the 1 8 t h o f August the

Germans had completed t h e i r w i t h d r a w a l t o the Hagen L i n e which extended

a c r o s s t h e neck o f t h e Orel s a l i e n t .
c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e i n the n o r t h .

T h i s marked t h e end o f t h e S o v i e t

The two German armies w e r e indeed b l o o d i e d ,

h a v i n g l o s t t h e e q u i v a l e n t o f 14 d i u i s i o n s , b u t Model had succeeded i n

- 28

f o r m i n g a v i a b l e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n and f r u s t r a t i n g t h e grand aim o f the

KUTUZW p l an.
South o f t h e Kursk s a l i e n t M a n s t e i n was d e a l i n g w i t h a d i f f e r e n t
problem.

On t h e 1 9 t h o f J u l y t h e S o v i e t s a c h i e v e d a b r i d g e h e a d over the

M i u s R i v e r which,

i f expanded, c o u l d t h r e a t e n t h e e n t i r e s o u t h e r n f r o n t .

H i t l e r r e j e c t e d any r e q u e s t t o f a l l back t o a s h o r t e r l i n e a l o n g t h e
Dnieper which w o u l d have f r e e d up v i t a l m o b i l e r e s e r v e s .

Instead, H i t l e r

a l l o w e d M a n s t e i n t h e use o f SS Panzer Corps t o e l i m i n a t e the bridgehead.

The Germans a t t a c k e d on 30 J u l y and were a b l e t o push the S o v i e t s o f f t h e
west bank, b u t t h e Panzer Corps was withdrawn a s s o o n as t h e s i t u a t i o n was
stabilized.

H i t l e r s obsession w i t h the t h r e a t t o I t a l y p r e v e n t e d him f r o m

s e e i n g the o p e r a t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c danger on t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t . T h i s

e r r o r caused t h e c o n t i n u e d o p e r a t i o n a l misuse o f SS Panzer Corps and k e p t

i t o u t o f a c t i o n d u r i n g some o f t h e most c r u c i a l f i g h t i n g o f Mansteins

defense o f the Kharkov area.

As n o t e d e a r l i e r , General Hoths a t t a c k was h a l t e d on t h e 2 3 r d o f J u l y .

The S o v i e t s then began t h e i r b u i l d u p f o r the s o u t h e r n o f f e n s i v e known as
O p e r a t i o n RWWWTSEV. The p l a n c a l l e d f o r c o n s i d e r a b l e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n due
t o t h e i n t e r m i n g l i n g o f Uoronezh and Steppe F r o n t s d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s i v e
phase.

Uoronezh F r o n t was a s s i g n e d t h e m i s s i o n o f punching a h o l e through

the German defenses and e x p l o i t i n g t o the southwert w i t h two tank armies.

They would o u t f l a n k KharWov f r c m the n o r t h w e s t .

Steppe F r o n t was t o take

B e l g o r o d and c o n t i n u e toward Kharkov from the s o u t h , t h e r e b y t y i n g down

Army Detachment Kempf and e v e n t u a l l y c o m p l e t i n g the e n c i r c l e m e n t o f

Kharkov. (See f i g u r e 8, page 43)

The S o v i e t s were indeed c o n f i d e n t and t h e i r p l a n n i n g r e f l e c t e d i t .

29

They

e n j o y e d an advantage o f almost f o u r t o one i n e v e r y combat c a t e g o r y .

While

General Hoth had o n l y f o r t y p e r c e n t o f t h e armor w i t h which he began

ZITADELLE, t h e S o v i e t s had been a b l e t o double t h e i r 5 J u l y tank s t r e n g t h
t h r o u g h replacements.

Y e t s e r i o u s d e f i c i e n c i e s e x i s t e d i n the f o r c e s

a s s i g n e d t o RUMYANTSN. They were exhausted f r o m weeks o f d i f f i c u l t

f i g h t i n g and personnel l o s s e s had n o t been made up.

The Germans, a l t h o u g h

b a t t e r e d , had q u i c k l y gone over t o the defense and had formed a l i n e o f

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s two b e l t s deep.
The Russians a t t a c k e d on 3 August w i t h 5 t h and 6 t h Guards Armies. They
a c h i e v e d a deep p e n e t r a t i o n by noon and U a t u t i n committed h i s two tank
armies.

Steppe F r o n t was somewhat s l o w e r , b u t by l a t e a f t e r n o o n i t t o o had

s e n t i n i t s m o b i l e c o r p s t o e x p l o i t a breach.
Belgorod f e l l .

BY t h e 5 t h o f August

By 7 August the o f f e n s i v e had a c h i e v e d ouer 60 m i l e s ,

opening a gap o f 35 m i l e s between 4 t h Panzer Army and Army Detachment

Kempf

M a n s t e i n r e a l i z e d t h e t h r e a t t o h i s e n t i r e FIrmy Group and wanted t o

w i t h d r a w t o t h e Dnieper R i v e r , b u t H i t l e r w o u l d hear none o f i t .
o r d e r e d Kharkov defended a t a l l c o s t .

He

1 1 t h Army Corps, c o n s i s t i n g o f s i x

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , was o r d e r e d i n t o the c i t y .

M a n s t e i n knew t h a t i f

U a t u t i n and Konev c o u l d r e a c h t h e Dnieper R i v e r they c o u l d c u t o f f K l e i s t ' s

A r m y Group A i n Crimea and d e s t r o y 1 7 t h Army. F u r t h e r ,

i f Kharkou were

e n c i r c l e d , which seemed l i k e l y , 1 1 t h Corps would a l s o be l o s t .

A t t h i s p o i n t t h e r e w e r e two p a r a l l e l b a t t l e s b e i n g waged, one around
Kharkov and one between M a n s t e i n and h i s F u h r e r . M a n s t e i n c o n t i n u e d t o u r g e
OKH t o a l l o w h i m t o evacuate t h e Donetz B a s i n i n o r d e r t o s h o r t e n h i s
f r o n t , or t o p r o v i d e him w i t h a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s .

- 30 -

H i t l e r promised more

f o r c e s , b u t t h e y never came.

A l l the w h i l e M a n s t e i n conducted a desperate

o p e r a t i o n t o save h i s 1 1 t h Corps and p r e v e n t the S o v i e t s from r e a c h i n g t h e

D n i e p e r . For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes Mansteins o n l y r e s e r v e was the 3 r d
Panzer Corps which had been employed t o h e l p e l i m i n a t e the M i u s
bridgehead.
o f Konevs

The t i m e l y r e t u r n o f t h i s c r i t i c a l u n i t p r e v e n t e d the l i n k u p
and U a t u t i n s f o r c e s .

A l t h o u g h some s t a b i l i t y was a c h i e v e d around Kharkov, the second h a l f o f

August saw t h e e n t i r e E a s t e r n F r o n t explode i n a s e r i e s o f Russian
offensives.

I t was Foches 1918 o f f e n s i v e a l l over a g a i n as t h e Germans

w e r e p a r a l y z e d by s u c c e s s i v e c r i s e s a c r o s s the f r o n t .

a c t i o n was d e s t r o y e d and t h e i r r e s e r v e s exhausted.

T h e i r freedom o f

H i t l e r was so

p r e o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e general s i t u a t i o n t h a t he c o u l d do l i t t l e more than

express h i s d i s p l e a s u r e when Manstein evacuated Kharkov a g a i n s t o r d e r s on
t h e 22nd. The German l e a d e r f l e w o u t t o meet w i t h M a n s t e i n a t U i n n i t s a ,
U k r a i n e on 27 August. He a g a i n promised more f o r c e s which w o u l d be
t r a n s f e r r e d from Kluge, b u t renewed Ruseian a t t a c k s i n Army Group Centers
a r e a the n e x t day c a n c e l e d the move.

As l a t e as 3 September w i t h the

e n t i r e Donetr B a s i n i n the balance, H i t l e r s t i l l r e f u s e d t o a l l o w r e t r e a t .

Kluge and M a n s t e i n even a t t e m p t e d t o persuade h i m t h a t he c o u l d no l o n g e r
a c t as b o t h s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l c m a n d e r i n t h e e a s t .

They a d v i s e d

h i m t o a p p o i n t a commander i n c h i e f f o r the e a s t e r n t h e a t e r and c r e a t e a

Great General S t a f f t o c o o r d i n a t e a l l wartime a c t i u i t i e s .

A l l their

e f f o r t s were t o no a v a i l .
The a l l i e s invaded I t a l y on 3 September and H i t l e r f i n a l l y agreed t o a
w i t h d r a w a l b e h i n d the Dnieper R i v e r on the 1 5 t h . Any hope o f a Great
Eastern W a l l a l o n g t h i s r i v e r , however, were dashed by numerous Russian

- 31 -

bridgeheads on a b r o a d f r o n t i n e a r l y October. The Germans had i g n o r e d t h e

need t o c o n s t r u c t such a d e f e n s i v e l i n e i n the p r e v i o u s year and they now
s i m p l y had t o o f e w m o b i l e r e s e r v e s t o e x t i n g u i s h a l l t h e f i r e s .

The c l i m a x

came on 6 November w i t h t h e f a l l o f K i e v . The g r e a t summer campaign o f 1943

was o v e r .

D u r i n g the month-long pause which f o l l w s d , t h e Russians

c o n s o l i d a t e d t h e i r g a i n s and b r o u g h t up b r i d g i n g i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a
massive c r o s s i n g o f t h e Dnieper.

SECTION U I l r

CONCLUSIONS

A t f i r s t g l a n c e the Kursk campaign d i d n o t appear t o be a s g r e a t a

debacle f o r t h e Germans as S t a l i n g r a d . There was no army which was

surrounded and e v e n t u a l l y l o s t .

Y e t t h e r e a l i t y was t h a t Kursk had f a r

r e a c h i n g o p e r a t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e .

From t h e s t r a t e g i c p o i n t

o f v i e w the i n i t i a t i v e had s h i f t e d permanently.

The S o v i e t Union r e c o v e r e d

much o f i t s p o p u l a t i o n base which had l i v e d under German d o m i n a t i o n i n

1942, and her i n d u s t r i a l base was now beyond t h e range o f L u f t w a f f e
bombers.

T h i s meant t h a t the w e i g h t o f p r o d u c t i o n would f a v o r the S o v i e t s

more and more i n t h e months ahead.

For i t s p a r t Germany c o u l d no l o n g e r

r e p l a c e the l o o s e s i n personnel and equipment on t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t . W i t h

t h e a l l i e d l a n d i n g s i n I t a l y H i t l e r would have t o s h u f f l e h i s d w i n d l i n g
r e s o u r c e s between two f r o n t s .

Germany would n o t a t t e m p t another o f f e n s i v e

i n t h e e a s t u n t i l the i l l - a d v i s e d o p e r a t i o n t o r e l i e v e Budapest i n June,

1945.

O p e r a t i o n a l l y and t a c t i c a l l y t h e Red Army g a i n e d immense c o n f i d e n c e as a

r e s u l t o f i t s v i c t o r y a t Kursk. I t had taken on the b e s t t h a t Germany had

32

t o o f f e r on ground o f t h e Wehrmachts c h o o s i n g and d e c i s i v e l y d e f e a t e d t h e

b l i t z k r i e g s t y l e o f war.

I t was as much a moral and s p i r i t u a l v i c t o r y as a

mater i a1 one.
What does Kursk have t o t e l l the s t u d e n t o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t about t h e
r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f o f f e n s e and defense?

Zhukov made a d e l i b e r a t e c h o i c e

t o defend which begs t h e q u e s t i o n as t o why any c m a n d e r who has s u p e r i o r

r e s o u r c e s w o u l d e l e c t t o do so.

H i s t o r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t he made a w i s e

s e l e c t i o n , b u t s e v e r a l o f t h e f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n t h e Russian campaign p l a n
were unique.

R a r e l y does a c m a n d e r have complete and a c c u r a t e

i n f o r m a t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n s o f h i s a d v e r s a r y .

LUCY p r o v i d e d t h e Russians

w i t h unprecedented i n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h i s r e g a r d s .

Zhukov a l s o r e a l i z e d t h a t

once he knew o f t h e enemy p l a n he c o u l d take advantage o f s e v e r a l

t h e o r e t i c a l advantages o f the defender.

These i n c l u d e d knowledge o f t h e

t e r r a i n t o be defended, t h e a b i l i t y t o r e i n f o r c e t h e t e r r a i n w i t h
o b s t a c l e s , and t h e a b i l i t y t o reduce f r i c t i o n by d e p l o y i n g the u n i t s b e f o r e
the b a t t l e .

When we add h i s l a c k o f t o t a l c o n f i d e n c e i n the Red Armys

t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s ,

the d e c i s i o n t o d e f e n d makes g r e a t

sense.

A l l t h i n g s b e i n g equal the defense i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y s t r o n g e r than the

o f f e n s e a c c o r d i n g the C l a u s e w i t z . When the enemy e n j o y s c e r t a i n advantages
such as a b e t t e r t a c t i c a l system o r more accomplished o p e r a t i o n a l
commanders, the defense t a k e s on even g r e a t e r appeal.

Kursk c e r t a i n l y

v a l i d a t e d the s t r e n g t h o f t h e defense, e s p e c i a l l y t h e aspect o f t h e

f l a s h i n g sword o f vengeance.

There can be no q u e s t i o n t h a t the impact o f

KUTUZW and R U M Y N S E V was g r e a t e r because o f the a t t r i t i o n o f Berman armor

d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s i v e phase.

On t h e o t h e r hand the Germans, had they

33

adopted Manstein's 'backhand o p t i o n ' ,

s h o u l d have been a b l e t o cause t h e

Russian o f f e n s i v e c o n s i d e r a b l e d i f f i c u l t y .

I n t h e i r panzer c o r p s t h e y had

t h e i d e a l o p e r a t i o n a l t o o l t o s t r i k e a t S o v i e t a t t a c k i n g c o n c e n t r a t i o n s as
t h e y had done e a r l i e r i n February.
I t would be easy t o argue t h a t t h e Germans had exceeded t h e i r o f f e n s i v e

c u l m i n a t i o n p o i n t b e f o r e ZITADELLE even began.

The Russians had c e r t a i n l y

amassed s u f f i c i e n t r e s o u r c e s w i t h which t o i n i t i a t e a t h r e a t e n i n g o f f e n s i v e
by t h e summer, r e g a r d l e s s o f German a c t i v i t y .

A l t h o u g h t h e Germans c o u l d

have b l u n t e d such en o p e r a t i o n , the g r o w i n g m a t e r i a l imbalance made f u t u r e

Russian o f f e n s i v e s more l i k e l y w i t h i n c r e a s i n g chances f o r success.

There

s i m p l y were n o t enough Qerman r e s e r v e s on the e n t i r e E a s t e r n F r o n t t o s t o p

t h e k i n d o f t h e a t e r - w i d e a t t a c k s t h e Russians mounted i n CIugust o f 1943. On
t h e o t h e r hand t h e S o v i e t s p r o b a b l y had n o t y e t reached t h e i r d e f e n s i v e
c u l m i n a t i o n p o i n t when they i n i t i a t e d t h e i r c o u n t e r o f f e n s i v e .

The l o n g e r

M a n s t e i n and Model were a l l w e d t o impale t h e i r armor on t h e Russian

defenses t h e more advantages went t o t h e defenders.

H i t l e r w o u l d have

c a l l e d o f f the o f f e n s i u e i n any case due t o t h e S i c i l y i n v a s i o n and h i s

desire t o siphon o f f forces f o r the w e s t .

A11 t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d ZhuKov

p r o b a b l y i n i t i a t e d O p e r a t i o n KUTUZOU a t t h e r i g h t time w i t h O p e r a t i o n
RWYANTSN more dependent on t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f h i s two d e f e n d i n g
fronts.

Given h i s e r r o r i n p r e d i c t i n g t h e German's main e f f o r t and t h e

r e s u l t i n g force allocations,

i t s i m p l y was n o t p o s s i b l e f o r Zhukov t o

synchronize both offensives.

I n comparing t h e p r a c t i c e o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t , Zhukov demonstrated a f a r
g r e a t e r grasp o f the e s s e n t i a l s than h i s c o u n t e r p a r t , A d o l f H i t l e r . I n
e v e r y aspect o f o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n n i n g and e x e c u t i o n , ZITADELLE r e f l e c t e d

34

above a l l e l s e , r i g i d i t y .

I t was r i g i d i n i t s v i s i o n o f t h e b a t t l e f i e l d ,

t h e opponent, and the c o m b i n a t i o n s o f f o r c e s t o be employed.

The Germans

p a i d d e a r l y f o r t h i s l a c k o f f l e x i b i l i t y i n t h e f o r m o f wasted r e s o u r c e s .
Zhukov d i s p l a y e d f a r g r e a t e r v i s i o n and f l e x i b i l i t y i n h i s c r e a t i o n o f the
Russian campaign.

He took f u l l advantage o f the LUCY i n t e l l i g e n c e , b u t

e s t a b l i s h e d a d e f e n s i v e combination which remained capable o f d e a l i n g w i t h

unexpected enemy success, w h i l e a t t h e same t i m e a l l o w i n g f o r a r a p i d
t r a n s i t i o n t o the o f f e n s i v e .

He c l e a r l y understood t h e v a l u e o f h i s own

c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y , Steppe F r o n t , and developed a d e f e n s i v e s t r u c t u r e which

n o t o n l y p r o t e c t e d i t , b u t d i r e c t l y i n f l u e n c e d t h e Qerman o p e r a t i o n a l
c e n t e r o f g r a v i t y , the c o n c e n t r a t e d panzer c o r p s .
I f H i t l e r had p a i d a t t e n t i o n t o h i s stomach i n s t e a d o f h i s w i l l ,

ZITADELLE m i g h t have been a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e k i n d u r g e d by

Manstein. The f i n a l r i g i d i t y which c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e Qerman d o w n f a l l ,
however, may have been i n h e r e n t i n the v e r y system o f Nazism. I t s s e l f
p r o c l a i m e d s u p e r i o r i t y g r e a t l y i n h i b i t e d the a b i l i t y t o conceive o f
a n y t h i n g l e s s than a g g r e s s i v e o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n .

Religious-like fanaticism

o f t h i s k i n d tends t o purge any n o t i o n o f a f l e x i b l e approach t o

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and almost guarantees f a i l u r e i n the l o n g r u n .

The

o p e r a t i o n a l a r t i s t must remain f r e e o f a b s o l u t e d o p n a t i c p r i n c i p l e s ,
whether they be t a c t i c a l o r s t r a t e g i c , and u t i l i z e h i s s k i l l s w i t h i n the
c o n f i n e s o f a b a t t l e f i e l d dynamic which demands i n t e l l e c t u a l f l e x i b i l i t y .

- 35 -

FIGURE
36

31

Legend

A.

Army

TFI- Tnnh A r m y
FIGURE

38

39

q-q

I
3
Y

II

/.

i
/

/*

FIGURE
7

FIGURE 8

ENONmES

1 Heinz Guderian, Pmzerleldar, (New York, 19521, p . 309.

o r Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was t h e Supreme Command o f the

2 O.K.W.
Armed Forces o f Germany.

3 E r i c h von Manstein, L p h f - Y i r t & n s ,

[ o r i g i n a l c o p y r i g h t 195811, p. 446.
4 Ibid.,

(Navato, C a l i f o r n i a , 1982

p. 445.

5 Zitadelle i n English i s Citadel.

6 Guderain, op. c i t . ,

pp. 308,309,

7 O.K.H.
o r Oberkommando der Heeres was t h e Army High Command. H i t l e r had
a l o n g r u n n i n g d i s p u t e w i t h OKH stemming f r o m t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e Poland
and France campaigns. Throughout t h e course o f t h e war H i t l e r g r a d u a l l y
t r a n s f e r r e d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r v a r i o u s t h e a t e r s o f war from OKH t o OKW. He
l e f t o n l y t h e E a s t e r n F r o n t under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f OKH, b u t w i t h h i m s e l f
as t h e commander o f o p e r a t i o n s t h e r e . There was no supreme s t a f f which c o u l d
d i r e c t t h e o v e r a l l war e f f o r t and p r o v i d e i n p u t t o t h e f o r m a t i o n o f Grand
S t r a t e g y . I t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t OW and OKH s h o u l d c l a s h on t h e i r i d e a s o f
war p r i o r i t i e s and t h e a l l o c a t i o n o f r e s o u r c e s t o the v a r i o u s t h e a t e r s . I t was
an i n e f f i c i e n t system, b u t i t s u i t e d H i t l e r s temperment and h i s c o n f i d e n c e i n
h i s own a b i l i t i e s as b o t h s t r a t e g i c and o p e r a t i o n a l cmmander, e s p e c i a l l y i n
the East.
8 Robert I c k s , E m o ~ ~ ~ l ~ Y - B a t f l t l (Garden
ns,
C i t y , 1972), p . 162.
9 Georgi Zhukov, M a . s b a l l b u Y & ~ ~ n k s . i ~ U l s s , (New Y o r k , 1969
[ o r i g i n a l c o p y r i g h t 19651), pp. 209,210.
10 G e o f f r e y Jukes, ~llc~~s-1ha-~lahh,nf-8cmnrl
(New York, 19681,
pp. 45-47.

11 Ibid.,

pp. 38,39.

12 I b i d . ,

p. 41.

13 Pzkw o r Panzerkampfwagen i s German f o r tank.

14 F.W.

von M e l l e n t h i n , Eanrac-Bafflas, (Norman, 195.51, p. 219.

44

15 0 . A . Koltunou, 'Kurski The Clash o f Armour,'

Sncnnd-Wocld-Wac ( 1 9 7 3 , p . 1381.
16 Manstein, op. cit., p . 444.

17 Mellenthin, op. clt., p . 215.

- 45 -

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